Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God

A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos
The Work’s Sources, Aims and Relation to its Contemporary Theology

NIELS ARNE PEDERSEN

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Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God

A Study of Titus of Bostra’s *Contra Manichaeos*—The Work’s Sources, Aims and Relation to its Contemporary Theology

by

Nils Arne Pedersen

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PREFACE

Few scholars have been willing to take up the challenge of Titus of Bostra’s lengthy refutation of Manichaeism. On being informed that I was working on Titus of Bostra a colleague declared, “He doesn’t exist. He’s just someone you made up!”—But Titus was actually the author of important works that require repeated engagement from scholars, as I hope to prove within these covers.

The book contextualises Titus and simultaneously includes many modern studies on his context, though it should be noted that for practical reasons I have been unable to include any contributions published after 2001.¹

The study would not have come into being without major inspiration and support from many sides. I wish to thank all those persons, institutions and foundations who have helped and supported me in various ways:

Peter Nagel, then in Halle, now in Bonn, suggested during his stay in Copenhagen in 1992 that I should work on the Church fathers’ criticism of Manichaeism. His view was that by and large scholars of Manichaeism knew relatively little about patristics, and scholars of patristics knew relatively little about Manichaeism. The idea of providing new knowledge and perspectives by linking areas of scholarship usually examined in isolation has been a guiding principle in the composition of this book.

Paul-Hubert Poirier (Université Laval) granted me access to his and Catherine Sensal’s (unpublished) French translation of the first two books of the Syriac version of Contra Manichaeos, as well as to the 100-year-old German translation (also unpublished) of parts of

¹ A practical note is necessary for readers. I refer throughout to the Greek text of Titus and to the Syriac translation through the abbreviations Gr. and Sy; afterwards I give the number of the pages and lines in Paul A. de Lagarde’s editions of these texts from 1859. The form of the Greek and Syriac texts is also the one found in De Lagarde except where I have revised this text on the basis of my examinations in Ch. XI. Thus although I refer to pages and lines in De Lagarde, my text may here and there be different; in which case an explanation is given in Ch. XI.
Book III and the whole of Book IV, done by Ludwig Nix. These translations have been at the very least an introductory aid to reading Titus, who is among the more difficult writers to understand.

The Danish Research Council for the Humanities awarded me a 3-year grant for a project titled, “An examination of early Church theology as marked by the clash with dualistic ‘heresies’.” The project concentrated on Titus of Bostra, and together with a number of articles the present book is the project’s result. Since 1994 I have also been attached to the Department of Church History and Practical Theology in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Aarhus. In recent years the faculty has also established a research seminar under the title, *Antiquity and Christianity*, to which I am also affiliated. Within this framework I have received inspiration from conversations with colleagues, and support from the Faculty of Theology for financing copies of manuscripts and rare books as well as from the librarians at the State and University Library in Aarhus who have laboured to locate books for me through interlibrary loans.

Of great importance for the Titus project were my studies in Oxford in 1996–1997, generously supported by Julie von Müllens Fond, Arthur Christensen og hustrus legat for orientalister and Frimodt-Heineke Fonden.

Sebastian P. Brock at the Faculty of Oriental Studies in Oxford read large sections of the Syriac version of Titus and placed his expert knowledge at my disposal. In Oxford I also had the opportunity to discuss specific problems with Kallistos Ware and Richard Sorabji.

The Greek parts of Ch. XI as well as certain individual passages have been discussed in detail with George Hinge of the Danish National Research Foundation Centre for Black Sea Studies, University of Aarhus.

Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, section grecque (C.N.R.S.), allowed me to purchase copies of the Titus text in the manuscripts “Congregazione della Missione urbana di S. Carlo, Genoa, cod. 27” and “Athos Vatopaedi No. 236”. Through kind assistance of V. Heidi Hass (Pierpont Morgan Library), Susan Halpert (Houghton Library, Harvard), and James Hodgson (Widener Library) I also obtained a copy of an additional folio in the Athos manuscript which was missing among the photographs in the French institute. From the British Library I purchased copies of the Syriac manuscript “British Museum add. 12,150”; from Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen, copies of Paul A. de
Lagarde’s notes on Titus of Bostra; and from the Faculty of Oriental Studies Library, University of Cambridge, photocopies of C.R.C. Allberry’s notes on Titus of Bostra.

Bas ter Haar Romeny (Leiden) provided copies of parts of a preliminary translation into French of the Armenian version of Eusebius of Emes’a Genesis commentary, made by L. van Rompay and J. Weitenberg. Romeny is reworking this translation for publication.

At various points I have received practical support or inspiration through discussions from a number of other persons: Anna Marie Aagaard (Aarhus), A.M. Allchin (Bangor), Byard J. Bennett (Toronto), Per Bilde (Aarhus), Søren Giversen (formerly Aarhus), Johannes Glenthøj (Nordby), Ittai Gradel and Hanne Lavér Hansen (Copenhagen), Finn Ove Hvidberg-Hansen (Aarhus), Anders-Christian Lund Jacobsen (Aarhus), Henning Lehmann (Aarhus), Samuel N.C. Lieu (Macquarie University), Peter Paludan (Aarhus), my brother Kim Arne Pedersen (Aarhus), Gert Skov (Lystrup), Holger Villadsen (Kappel).

I am deeply indebted to all the above for their generous support. I also owe a great debt of thanks to the foundations who have financed the English translation: Lillian og Dan Finks Fond, G.E.C. Gads Fond, Landsdommer V. Gieses Legat, Carlsen-Langes Legatstiftelse, The Aarhus University Research Foundation, Frimodt-Heineke Fonden, Lademanns Fond; and to the foundation, Statsaut. el-installatør Svend Viggo Berendt og hustru Aase Berendt, født Christoffersens Mindelegat for help in purchasing an IBook.

Edward Broadbridge (Randers) has demonstrated great enterprise in translating the book into fluent and precise English. He has also translated my own Danish translations from Greek, Syriac and Latin, after which I have revised them with the original text.

Finally, I wish to thank Johannes van Oort (Utrecht) for recommending this book to be published in the NHMS-Series.

A special vote of thanks goes to my wife, Kirsten, to whom I dedicate this book. They have been difficult years with changing and uncertain tenures, but she has supported me throughout and been a source of my courage. Thanks also to our children, Jonatan and Jakob, who perhaps one day will think that it was a good book their father spent all that time on.

Nils Arne Pedersen
Aarhus Universitet, August 2003
ABBREVIATIONS

Acta Arch.  
Ad Autol.  
Ad Hyp. IV  
Adv. haer.  
Adv. Marc.  
Adv. omn. haer.  
Adv. Sab.  
Anaceph.  
Anal. post.  
Anal. pr.  
Apoc. Mosis  
Apocr. Joh.  
Apol.  
Bibl.  
Capt.  
Carm. adv. Marc.  
Cat.  
Catech.  
Catena in Gen.  
Catena in Luc.  
Chron.  
Chron. Seert.  
1 Clem.  
CMC  
Cod. Theod.  
Coll. Pal.  
Coll. par  
Concil. Univ. Const.  
Conf.  
Constitutum de tribus capitulis, epistula  
Contra Adim.  
Contra adv. leg. et proph.  
Contra Ar.  
Contra Cels.  
Contra Chald.  
Contra ep. fund.  
Contra Faust.  
Contra Fel.  
Acta Archelai  
Ad Autolycaum  
Ad Hypatium tractatus quartus  
Adversus haereses  
Adversus Hermogenem  
Adversus Manichaes  
Adversus Manichaes homiliae  
Adversus Marcionem  
Adversus Mathematicos  
Adversus omnes haereses  
Adversus Praxeum  
Adversus Sabellium  
Anacephalatosis  
Analytica posteriora  
Analytica priora  
Apocalypsis Mosis  
Apocryphon Iohannis  
Apologia  
Bibliotheca  
Capt. VII contra Manichaeos  
Carmen adversus Marcionitas  
Categoriae  
Catalogus librorum omnium ecclesiasticorum  
Catecheses  
Catena in Genesim  
Catena in Lucam  
Chronicon  
Chronicon Seertensis  
First Letter of Clement to the Corinthians  
Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis  
Codex Theodosianum  
Collectio Palatina  
Collectio paraemiarum  
Concilium Universale  
Constantinopolitanum sub Iustiniano habitum  
Confessiones  
Constitutum, ep.  
Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum  
Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum  
Contra Arianos  
Contra Celsum  
Contra Chaldaeos  
Contra epistulam fundamenti  
Contra Faustum  
Contra Felicem Manichaeanum
Contra Gal. Contra Galilaeos
Contra gent. Contra gentes
Contra Jul. Contra Julianum
Contra Manich. Contra Manichaeos
Contra Manich. opin. disp. Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio
Contra Marc. Contra Marcionem
Csl. Collectio Coisliniana
Cyropaed. Cyropaedia
De Abr. De Abrahamo
De an. De anima
De apost. et fide De apostolis et fide liber secondus
De arb. fici De arbore fici
De arbitr. De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione
De autex. De autexusio
De cal. De calice
De carne Chr. De carne Christi
De civ. Dei De civitate Dei
De comm. math. De communi mathematica scientia
De cons. phil. De consolatione philosophiae
De decr. De decretais
De duah. anim. De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos
De Fil. De Filio
De Gen. contra Manich. De Genesi contra Manichaeos
De gen. et corr. De generatione et corruptione
De haer. De haeresibus
De hom. assumpt. II De hominis assumptione II
De ieran. De ierantio
De inc. De incarnatione
De incorp. De incorporali
De incorp. et invisib. Deo De incorporali et invisibili Deo
De int. De interpretatione
De lib. arb. De libero arbitrio
Dem. Demonstrationio apostolicae praedicationis
De Manich. rec. rep. Narratio de Manichaeis recens repellulantibus
De mart. De martyribus
Dem. ec. Demonstratio evangelica
De mor. eccl. De moribus ecclesiæ
De nat. boni De natura boni
De nat. deor. De natura deorum
De nat. hom. De natura hominis
De op. mund. De opificio mundi
De orat. De oratione
De or. mund. De origine mundi
De paradiso De paradis
De plant. De plantatione
De praescr. haer. De praescriptione haereticorum
De princ. De principiis
De quinque pan. De quinqu觚 panibus
De res. De resurrectione
De spec. leg. De specialibus legibus
De syn. De synodis
De vir. inlustr. De viribus illustribus
De virt. mor. De virtute moralis
Dial. Dialogus cum Tryphone
Dial. Adamant.
Dial. contra Pelag.
Dial. contra Manich.
Dial. cum Heracl.
Did.
Diogn.
Disp.
Doctrina Silv.
Eclog.
Emm.
Ep.
Ep. ad Arg. et Lib.
Ep. ad Afr.
Ep. ad Const.
Ep. fund.
Eth. Nic.
Ev. ver.
Exp. Ec. conc.
Führist
Gorg.
Gr.

Adamanus, Dialogus de recta in Deum fide
Dialogus contra Pelagianos
Dialogus contra Manichaeos
Dialogus cum Heraclide
Didascalicus
Epistula ad Diogenetum
Disputatio cum Manichaeo
Doctrina Sivani
Eclogae
Enneades
Epistula
Epistula ad episcopos Aegypti et Libyae
Epistula ad Arios episcopos
Epistula ad Constantiam
Epistula fundamenti
Ethica Nicomachea
Evangelium veritatis
Expositio Evangelii concordantis
Fihrist al-’ulum
Gorgias
Greek text of Titus of Bostra, Contra Manichaeos, as found in Lagarde 1859 and Ch. XI of the present book
Panarion/Adversus haereses
Haereticarum fabularum compendium
Historia eclesiastica
Homiliae
Homiliae cathedrales
Homiliae in Genesim
Homilia in Jeremia
Homiliae in Lucam
Homiliae in Numeri
Hymni contra haereses
Hymni de paradiso
Pyrrhoniea hypotyposes
Pyrrhonisme
Hypostasis Archonton
Commentarius in Canticum canticorum
Commentarius in Categorias
Commentarius in Epistulam ad Corinthios I
Commentarius in De anima
Commentarius in De caelo
Commentarius in Esaiam
Commentarius in Epistulam ad Galatas
Commentarius/Commentarius in Genesim
Commentarius in Hiobem
Commentarius in Hiexechiel
Commentarius in Isaiam Sketensem
Commentarius in Iohannem
Commentarius in Lucam
Commentarius in Matthaeum
In Matth. Hom. Commentarius in Matthaeum. Homilia
In Oct. Commentarius in Octateuchum
In Rom. Commentarius in Epistulam ad Romanos
In Rom. Hom. Commentarius in Epistulam ad Romanos. Homilia
In Tim. I Commentarius in Epistulam ad Timotheum I
Isag. Isagoge
Leg. De legibus
Leg. all. Legum allegoriae
Lib. schol. Liber scholiorum
Man. Hom. Manichaean Homilies
Met. Metaphysica
Od. Sal. Odae Salomonis
Oratio in ram. palm. Oratio in ramos palmarum
Paed. Paedagogus
Par. Paroemiae
Phaed. Phaedo
Phaedr. Phaedrus
Philoc. Philologia
Plac. Placita philosophorum
Praep. ev. Praeparatio evangelica
Prot. Protagoras
Protr. Protrepticus
PsB Manichaean Psalm Book
Quaest. in Gen. Quaestiones in Genesim
Quaest. in Oct. Quaestiones in Octateuchum
Rec. Recognitiones
Ref. Refutatio omnium haeresium
Rep. De republica
Retract. Retractationes
Rhod. Rhodonia
Sacra Parallela
Sermo contra omnes haer. scholium
Sermo contra omnes haereses
Strom. Stromata
Sy Syriac text of Titus of Bostra, Contra Manichaeos (British Museum add. 12,150)
Symp. Symposium
Test. ver. Testimonium veritatis
Theaet. Theaetetus
Theoph. Theophania
Timaeus
Top. Topica
Tract. Magni Seth II Tractatus secundus Magni Seth
Tract. trip. Tractatus tripartitus
Vita Adae et Evae
Vita Porphyrrii
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. The main interpretation

The subject of this study is the Catholic Bishop Titus of Bostra’s work, Ἐνάντιον τοῖς Μανιχαίοις (Contra Manichaeos or Against the Manichaeans), which consists of four λόγοι (‘treatises’) or books written between the years 363 and 377 C.E.1 Contra Manichaeos represents perhaps the most comprehensive attempt in the first four centuries of the Church to formulate a theodicy—or in Titus’s own terminology, “demonstrative proof in defence of God” (πρὸς ἀρχήν ἁμαρτίαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς θεοῦ → Ch. XI.2). And yet,—it has been widely overlooked in modern scholarship. I hope to change this state of affairs by showing its importance for the history both of the Church and of theology. As an introductory guide I shall first present the complex problem facing the scholar and the theories that underpin the book.

The present study of Contra Manichaeos is historical, meaning that it seeks to understand a past discussion within the context of its own time and on its own historical terms. I do not claim that I myself or anyone else could arrive at such a final understanding, for the interpretation of texts is always partly determined by the interpreters’ own assumptions; I am merely pointing out what the attempt sets out to achieve and what is its interest. A historical study of this nature can be a foundation on which others may build, and as such these enquiries find their justification in reflections and questions that transcend their own context. I can claim an interest in Contra Manichaeos that goes beyond the boundaries of the historical questions,2 but to my mind nothing is gained by confusing the two questions.

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1 Contra Manich. was written in Greek, but the original is only partially preserved. The Greek text editions exist in, among others, Migne PG 18, 1069–1258; De Lagarde 1859 and Nagel 1973. In its entirety Contra Manich. is only preserved in a Syriac translation which is edited in De Lagarde 1859a. See further below pp. 109–19.

2 My theological interest has in particular been concerned with the price that Titus of Bostra paid for propounding his theodicy. In my view, Titus had to blur the seriousness and power of evil, thereby undermining the soteriology.
My approach to *Contra Manichaeos* is more specifically concerned with the history of the Church and the history of theology. I understand the latter to be “the history of Christian ideas”, that is, the study in the time-perspective of the Christian patterns of thought as they are found in texts from among Christian elites. Their theology does not necessarily correspond to what broader Christian communities understood by their Christianity. The field covers both Catholic writers who have received particular attention in patristics, as well as those writers regarded by Catholics as heretical, such as the Manichaeans, and it cannot be adequately covered without paying particularly close attention to the relation of the theology to the cultural history of the time and in particular the history of philosophy in Late Antiquity. Furthermore when I classify my approach as being to “the history of the Church”, it is due to a wish to grasp these ideas in their institutional context. *Contra Manichaeos* cannot of course be explained solely on the background of its historical institutional context, that is, on the basis of the concrete conflicts between various religious communities, but the guiding principle is nevertheless to search for as much of that context as possible.

That context can seem hard to find. *Contra Manichaeos* is both a theological-philosophical theodicy and an exposition of the correct non-Manichaean interpretation of the Bible, and it keeps very close to its subject: God, the Creation, the Bible. It thus provides no information about its author and hardly any about the relationship between the Catholic and the Manichaean Church in the province of Arabia. Titus is barely concerned with historical data and names, and the modern reader looking for the concrete and the historical will doubtless soon abandon the search.

Nevertheless, Titus did live in a particular time and place; and we know that he represented a particular institution that was in opposition to other, specified, groups. If we read *Contra Manichaeos* closely, we notice that Titus has scattered information throughout the books regarding its purpose, and that in this context he also hints at a concrete situation that gave rise to his authorship of the work. *Contra Manichaeos* is constructed in such a way that in the first two books Titus seeks to refute Manichaeism without using the Bible, basing his argument solely on the universal, innate concepts that are contained in the common reason of all mankind; whereas in the last two books he is concerned with the Manichaean’s interpretation of the Bible. At the start of Books I and III he explains the purpose
of this structure more closely. In the first two books of *Contra Manichaeos* Titus wishes to strengthen the pagans’ mind against Manichaeism, and he therefore employs only universal rational arguments. The last two books, however, are ostensibly aimed solely at those Catholic circles that have assumed an open attitude towards the Manichaeans. The background for the work is thus a two-pronged, aggressive Manichaean mission which presents Manichaeism to pagans and Catholics alike as the very essence of their own tradition.

Despite the subject and target-group being different in the last two books of *Contra Manichaeos* the presentation is nonetheless governed by the same theological-philosophical views as in the first two books. The narrower theological-historical studies thus show that, primarily on the basis of the first two books but also with the inclusion of the last two, Titus’s idea of God, his idea of universal natural concepts and his understanding of the soul were deeply informed by philosophy. However, this powerful influence of Greek philosophy is not peculiar to Titus in comparison with older patristics. More particular to Titus is his interpretation of the Paradise narrative in Book III of *Contra Manichaeos*, which within the Catholic tradition is noteworthy in being—precisely on the basis of its philosophically influenced concept of God—a denial of the traditional teaching on Adam’s original immortality and the catastrophic “Fall of Man”. In my opinion it is not only the constructional division of *Contra Manichaeos* into a “rational” and a “biblical” part that can be explained by the nature of the Manichaean mission, but also the theology itself, with its strong philosophical leaning in both halves of the work.

In the first instance, however, the question must be why Titus is so intent on repelling the Manichaean mission to the pagans that he is willing to suspend the Bible for the entire argumentation of the first two books. My theory here is that this ideological strategy is to be understood on the background of the complicated relations existing between the pagans, the Catholics and the Manichaeans. This complexity cannot be uncovered simply through an analysis of *Contra Manichaeos* itself but requires the inclusion of external material. For instance, from the letters of the famous rhetorician Libanius we know that under Emperor Constantius II (337–361) and Julian the Apostate (361–363) Bostra had been the scene of bitter conflict between Catholics and pagans. In Emperor Julian’s 52nd Letter, addressed to the citizens of Bostra and issued in Antioch on 1st August 362, the citizens are urged to drive Bishop Titus out of the
city. Relations between the Catholics and pagans of Bostra thus seem to be extremely poisonous, with Titus being drawn into the very centre of the confrontation. After the Emperor’s death Titus also found occasion to attack him in *Contra Manichaeos* II.28.

These contexts may perhaps be linked to a significant feature of the work, namely that in the first two books of *Contra Manichaeos* Titus wishes to immunise the pagans against Manichaeism by using only rational arguments. He seeks to show that Manichaeism is irrational, insane and barbaric. In this connection I set out to prove that some of the Manichaean texts that Titus uses in his work, known through his quotations and references, must have been especially intended for the mission to educated pagans and Catholics, since these texts invoke philosophically-slanted, cultural values that were shared by practically all educated citizens in the Roman Empire. One of them superficially attempted to obscure the mythological stamp of Manichaeism. Another attacked the Catholics’ God as he appears in the Paradise narrative for lacking foreknowledge and for begrudging Adam and Eve the knowledge of good and evil—the text thereby reflecting the general philosophical stamp of the contemporary image of God. This philosophical slant is also rendered probable not only through a comparison of the fragments of Emperor Julian’s anti-Catholic treatise, where the attack on the God of the Paradise narrative contains the same points, but in general through an examination of the roots of these motifs in the history of ideas.

I conjecture that the Manichaean mission threatened to create an alliance between Manichaeism and paganism, turned against Catholicism. Titus wished instead to persuade the educated pagans that the Manichaeans were enemies of their own and also of the Catholics’ common cultural values of rationality and morality, and thus he could also hope that the antagonism between pagans and Catholics would slip into the background as being less relevant.

If it is indeed the case that the Manichaean mission has regarded educated pagans and Catholics in particular as its target-group, then this observation helps to explain why the same theological-philosophical views also play so important a role in the last two books that even the traditional interpretation of man’s primal history must be rewritten. The Manichaean mission strategy in relation to the Catholics was not only concerned to demonstrate the Christian character of Manichaeism, but also to show that Manichaeism was rational Christianity. When Titus regarded it as necessary to revise the
common interpretation of the Paradise narrative, it was because he accepted that this interpretation was particularly vulnerable to the Manichaeans’ arguments. As regards the Paradise narrative Titus’s attack is therefore directed not only against the Manichaeans, but against all those who believe that Adam was originally immortal and that the Fall had catastrophic consequences. Their teaching on original immortality and the disastrous Fall confirms for Titus the Manichaeans’ polemical picture of an ignorant and malignant Creator God and this teaching should therefore be abandoned.

Thus a central feature of the rational Christianity which Titus instead represents is the rejection of any idea that either allows evil and sin to be a principle and a substance, or allows them to be linked to a catastrophic transformation. Sin is not a power but man’s passing misuse of his reason.\(^3\) Titus is even ready to regard a slight initial sin such as Adam and Eve’s violation of God’s prohibition as a necessary and useful step in man’s ethical development. Although Titus nowhere claims a relation between the Manichaean teaching of an evil primal principle and the traditional Catholic teaching of a catastrophic Fall—only that the irrational character of the latter exposes it to Manichaean attack—it is thus clear that both doctrines are in opposition to his more optimistic portrayal of the nature of evil and of man’s possibilities.

In my view Titus’s theology has been developed precisely in his meeting with this aggressive Manichaean mission, and it is furthermore my opinion that here we have an interesting example of the more general fact that the philosophical forming of the Catholic theology of Antiquity very often took place in the confrontation with the so-called heresies.

One could also imagine, however, that it was not the meeting with the Manichaeans that gave rise to Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative, but that on the contrary it had come into being on other grounds and had only secondarily been employed in this anti-Manichaean context. For even though the interpretation in question is new in relation to the older patristic texts, it anticipates corresponding interpretations of the Paradise narrative by the important

\(^3\) However, alongside and in partial conflict with this view Titus also believes that individual sinful actions can come to form a pattern that has such power over people that they cannot free themselves from it, though Titus does not attribute such habits to the Fall.
Antiochene theologian, Theodore of Mopsuestia. I suggest, however, that the similarity with Theodore’s interpretation could be due to both Titus and Theodore building on one of the lost anti-Manichaean works from the Syrian region—which would imply that anti-Manichaean problems and strategies of the same kind that we find in Titus may have been more widespread and thus determinative for aspects of theological development in the 4th century.

This then is a summary of the main interpretation of the present study. Before I move on to the actual development and documentation of the thesis, I shall give a brief account of some of the resolutions and demarcations of the study as regards content and terminology.

The subject of the present study, ancient Christianity, involves both Catholic Christianity and the so-called “heresies” (in casu Manichaeism). I do not therefore regard it appropriate to describe the relationship between them in terms of “Christianity” meeting “a foreign religion”. Manichaeism was not—as has been claimed, for example, by G. Widengren in continuation of the History of Religions School—an Iranian religion which in the Mediterranean area pretended to be Christianity for tactical reasons. In the present study therefore the terms Christianity/Christian/Christians etc. are used broadly, and include Manichaeism, whereas I use the terms Catholic/Catholics etc. about Titus of Bostra’s affiliation. Since with regard to Manichaeism I go beyond the terminology of most presentations on this point, I must briefly explain what I mean and do not mean by including Manichaeism under Christianity.

Excursion: Manichaeism as Christian Gnosis

The perception of Manichaeism as being in origin essentially a non-Christian movement which only superficially posed as Christianity, as exemplified above by Widengren, can already be traced in embryo in the work of J.L. von Mosheim, but it received its best-known expression within the History of Religions School, particularly in R. Reitzenstein, where Manichaeism is regarded as an Iranian religion. This theory was always disputed and has received little credit in the last few decades, when scholarship has to a greater degree emphasised Manichaeism’s Christian background, in partic-

4 Widengren 1961, 123.
5 See below pp. 74, 81. In a larger perspective this theory is of course only a partial aspect of the broader theories regarding the non-Christian origin of “Gnosis” in Antiquity.
ular as a result of the publication of the Graeco-Manichaean text *On the Origin of His Body* in the Cologne Mani Codex (*CMC*). The text portrays Mani as growing up in a baptising sect that invoked Jesus, but then tells how Mani’s break with the sect was over the question of the right interpretation of Jesus’ words and commandments. It must be emphasised that even though on this basis alone Manichaeism can no longer be considered an “Iranian religion”, it is still possible that significant Manichaean theologoumena, in particular “radical dualism”, are of Iranian origin.

By way of contrast, another theory that still has considerable support acknowledges that to a very great extent Manichaeism had “Christian roots”, but must nevertheless be understood as a new non-Christian religion. This theory received classic expression in a contribution by A. Böhlig, originally dating from 1957. By “Christian roots” Böhlig was thinking of the Bardesanites and Marcionites, whom he assumed to have strongly influenced the Manichaeans. In this connection and with reference to W. Bauer’s seminal work, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* from 1934, Böhlig stressed the necessity of operating with a broader concept of Christianity that not only embraced “die Großkirche”, but, for example, also Marcion and Bardesanes, both of whom considered themselves to be Christians. In Böhlig’s view Bauer was right to claim that in many areas of the Roman Empire “Gnosis” constituted the most original type of Christianity. On the other hand, in contrast to the Marcionites and Bardesanes the Manichaeans cannot be regarded as a Christian group, since they consciously understood themselves as a new, non-Christian religion, named after its founder, Mani. Böhlig sought to prove that this was the case on the basis of a Coptic-Manichaean text, *Kephalaia* Ch. 105. Today Böhlig’s position is held by many scholars, such as C. Markschies, who in a stimulating contribution

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7 The theory that Mani’s dualism was of Iranian origin (already anticipated by Titus of Bostra in *Contra Manich.* IV.19 → Ch. X1.46) finds favour in Sundermann 1997a, who claims, however, that the purpose of adopting this dualism was really in order to explain a problem in the Christian religion, i.e. how it was possible for Jesus to have been killed by God’s human enemies at the instigation of “the prince of this world” (Jn. 14.30). An attempt instead to explain Mani’s dualism as being fully and completely of Christian origin—as inspired by Bardesanes and Marcion—is to be found, for example, in De Blois 2000.

8 The lecture from 1957 was first printed in 1960 and then reprinted in Böhlig 1968. Nor of course was this conceptualisation accepted by Widengren (1978, 300): “... christliche *Wurzeln* gibt es im Manichäismus nicht. Die christlichen Elemente sind eben nur ‘Stilelemente’...”

9 Böhlig 1968; cf. also Böhlig 1968b, 262–65.
seeks to understand the ancient “Gnosis” as being at first mainly a movement within the Christian religion, but who also maintains that there is a widespread consensus that the ancient “Gnosis” ended in the foundation of an independent religion, namely Manichaeism.\textsuperscript{10}

Treatment of these problems must also in my view be linked to the discussions elicited by Bauer’s book, the chief interest of which lies not in its concrete and partly doubtful historical theses, but rather in the view that the currents which were retrospectively regarded as “orthodoxy” and “heresy” had in fact a parallel genesis. If this is the case, it makes no sense to claim that “orthodoxy” was earlier and more original in relation to the “heresies”. This view must be taken on board if we are to avoid the historical account ending in mere reproduction of the classic concepts of Church and heresy, where the one true Church is the continuous bearer of a historically unalterable truth, while the heresies, as bearers of false teaching, could not rightly be called Christian.\textsuperscript{11} If we follow this line of Bauer’s, the problem with the old theory of “Gnosis” being a non-Christian religion that lived parasitically in the Christian body becomes clear. Even though the intention was a quite different one among scholars who maintained these theories, they are nonetheless \textit{de facto} difficult to distinguish from the reproduction mentioned,\textsuperscript{12} at least when they imply that all forms of “Gnosis” should be developed from a single, non-Christian model. This view obscures the wide range of potential options for the development of Christianity in the 1st century, while simultaneously the historical contingency in the development of both “orthodoxy” and “heresies” is blurred.

The question now is whether Manichaeism really—as Böhlig believed—falls outside the broader concept of Christianity? Would it not be more natural to regard Manichaeism as the last form of “Christian Gnosis”? This problem can be discussed from several different angles.

Firstly, it must be underlined that in a strict sense it is anachronistic to claim that the Manichaeans consciously understood themselves as constituting a new religion, for the good reason that the concept of religion is a modern one.\textsuperscript{13} But the significance of this observation must not be exag-
gerated, for if the Manichaeans distanced themselves from the Christians in their awareness of being an independent group with a different identity, it is obvious in a modern context to interpret this self-understanding as constituting a new “religion”. However, Böhlig’s claim that this distance from Christianity actually existed is less secure; he himself mentions the testimonies that the Manichaeans described themselves as “Christians”, but regards them as an expression of a later, secondary development—in contrast to Kephalaia Ch. 105, which expresses the original Manichaeism. Böhlig’s claim that this distance from Christianity actually existed is less secure; he himself mentions the testimonies that the Manichaeans described themselves as “Christians”, but regards them as an expression of a later, secondary development—in contrast to Kephalaia Ch. 105, which expresses the original Manichaeism. It must be admitted that Kephalaia Ch. 105 contains a testimony in which the Manichaeans understand themselves as being different from “Christians”, but that this should constitute evidence of an inherently different phenomenon from the one that Böhlig himself mentions—where, for example, the Marcionites in areas with other dominant churches described themselves as “Marcionites”—remains unclear to me.

Secondly the discussion must focus in particular on the ambiguous Manichaean Jesus-figure. If the Manichaean Jesus is used to justify the claim that Manichaeism is regarded as a Christian phenomenon, it will not be sufficient to refer to the proven misunderstanding that the Jesus-figure was seen as a secondary element in Manichaeism for tactical missionary purposes. The crucial point is not that Jesus was included from the start, but rather that Jesus was not merely one among many Manichaean saviours. Jesus was at the centre of Manichaeism, the saviour par excellence. This view, which in my opinion must already undermine the understanding of Manichaeism as a “new religion”, has in fact long been widespread and has also found expression among many important scholars of Manichaeism; these include J.P. Asmussen, who has inspired the present wording, and J. van Oort, who stresses “the special place of Jesus in Mani’s system” and “the essential ‘Christocentric’ character” of the Manichaean psalms. On this basis certain scholars including myself have been willing to regard Manichaeism as a part of ancient Christianity. This is the view of E. Rose,  

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14 Böhlig 1968, 204, 218.
16 Under all circumstances it is problematic that Böhlig believes that Kephalaia Ch. 105 reflects the original Manichaean self-understanding. One of the translations from Mani’s own (as yet unpublished) Epistles in Gardner 2001, 100 could also undermine Böhlig’s theory inasmuch as the following quotation possibly means that Mani himself described his Church as “the Christians”: “our good saviour, our god (?) Christ Jesus, by whose name I chose you (pl.).”
17 E.g. Asmussen 1965, 208ff. (208: “Already to Mani himself... Jesus was a central figure of almost incalculable importance”), but particularly Asmussen 1975, 107: “But as Jesus the Splendor he is one of the most popular figures in Manichaean theology. He is the redeemer par excellence.”—Compare also Henrich’s and Koenen’s views quoted above p. 7, n. 6.
18 Van Oort 2001, 35. On the background of the Jesus-figure’s fundamental importance for the Manichaeans, Van Oort (2001, 39–53, esp. 44) further emphasises that in the Latin West the Manichaeans must be considered a Christian movement, a view which here I also extend to the movement as a whole.
for example, who in his *Die manichäische Christologie* finds Jesus’ central position in Manichaeanism confirmed by the practical and soteriological concern of Manichaeanism; he concludes, “daß der Manichaäismus zwar ein durch und durch häretisches Christentum ist, aber doch noch ein Christentum”. The other contribution is in A. Khosroyev’s *Die Bibliothek von Nag Hammadi*, where the author understands the “Christianity” of Antiquity as a designation for all the movements for which belief in Jesus Christ was fundamental and which confessed themselves to be Christians; he therefore regards “ecclesiastical Christianity”, Gnosticism and Manichaeanism as the three major currents.

In the third place and with reference to Bauer, if Manichaeanism is to be regarded as a Christian movement, the discussion must be seen in the context of an understanding that the so-called “orthodoxy” or “Catholic Church” was a phenomenon that only gradually came into being. In my opinion it is clear that the largest group of “ante-Nicene” Christians had already achieved, institutionally and theologically, a certain degree of self-definition and self-demarcation which formed a point of departure for the later far more clearly defined and self-demarcated “post-Nicene” Church. But since in Antiquity this Church was never the only one in existence, the concept of Christianity cannot be restricted to this Church alone—as it indisputably can when it is a matter of its continuation into the early Middle Ages in Europe. However, because Manichaeanism has its origin in the “ante-Nicene” period and moreover in a region (Mesopotamia) where it is possible that at the time (the beginning of the 3rd century) “Catholic Christianity” did

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19 Rose 1979, *passim*, quote 182. Cf. also Rose 1979, 4: “Zwar ist es keine Frage, daß die Religion des Mani in die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte hineingehört . . ., aber darüber hinaus besitzt er doch seine feste Stellung in der christlichen Kirchengeschichte.” When Rose took his methodological starting-point in Mani’s personal, religious relation to Jesus and from that explained the role of the Jesus-figure in Manichaecism (e.g. Rose 1979, 29, 30ff., 54), the value of this starting-point seems to be confirmed in some degree when one compares it with Gardner’s (2001, 100) observations on the basis of Mani’s *Epistles*: “The emphasis upon the authority of Jesus is a striking feature throughout the *Epistles*. . . . I believe that Mani’s own sense of the personal authority of Jesus still needs further emphasis and discussion.”

not even exist, the oldest Manichaeism actually belongs to a place where Catholic self-definitions were perhaps not yet established. It will not be possible in a historical work to present the process in such a way that the formation of an orthodox or Catholic Christianity meant that Christianity as such became Catholic. This would imply, for example, the impossible line of thought that Manichaeism was Christian in origin, but that the growth of the Catholic Church in the ante-Nicene and particularly post-Nicene period turned Manichaeism into a non-Christian movement. Historically it is necessary to extend the broad understanding of Christianity to cover the entire period of Antiquity, however large the Catholic Church grew in the 4th-5th centuries and however small other Christian groups gradually became.

Fourthly and crucially, I must make it quite clear what I mean and do not mean by regarding Manichaeism as a form of Christianity. The paramount concern is to avoid a terminology that tears apart groups and ideas which in a historical perspective had not only a common source, but also a continuous, interconnected history in which they remained related: each defined itself in relation to the other and each professed to represent the true version of what its opponent also claimed to be. On this basis Titus’s polemic could, for example, be understood in a credible historical perspective that makes it clear that the struggle between himself and the Manichaeans is concerned with the ownership rights to a common spiritual legacy. It is not my intention to discard theological benchmarks and norms for what is correct Christian theology but to make clear that theological valuation lies on a different level from the historical. Theological evaluation must involve a reflection on one’s own historicity, that is, a dependence and commitment in relation to the Church that was determined by the biblical canon and regula fidei. The Manichaeans fall outside these limits, their history is another. I do not see why this position should

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21 At this point it is also apposite to deal with two other views of Markschies (2001) which are used to justify the perception of Manichaeism as a “new religion”. Thus Markschies (2001, 107) believes that Manichaeism was intended as a universal religion which integrated, superseded and replaced previous religions such as Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity, but he overlooks the point that this “universal religion” was meant to be the final revelation of Jesus the Splendour. Similarly, Markschies apparently sees Manichaeism as a return to true polytheism when he presumes (2001, 104) that the aeons surrounding the Father of Greatness (the fundamental divine hypostasis in Manichaeism) “im Unterschied zum System der ‘Valentinianer’ wohl nicht als Teilaspekte des einen Gottes, sondern als weitere Götter gedacht sind.” This statement does not take into account the Manichaean theologians who emphasised that they only reckoned on one God, or that all aeons and ‘gods’ are one substance, see Contra Faust. XX.2; XXI.1; Contra Fel. I.XVIII.

exclude a recognition of the religious or intellectual greatness that may exist in the diverging histories, and preoccupation with them can continue to have theological relevance. Thus, for instance, the historical possibility that Manichaeism might among other things have been set in motion by dualistic tendencies in Paul and John raises the question of whether a theology like Titus of Bostra’s, which will reject the understanding of evil as a real “power”, can be a plausible interpretation of Christianity.

At this point I must also justify the use of the word “Catholic” regarding the main current of Christianity to which Titus of Bostra belonged. There are other terms that could be used such as “orthodoxy”, “great Church” (“Großkirche”), “majority Church” (“Mehrheitskirche”; Markschies) or “ecclesiastical Christianity” (Khosroyev). There are a number of advantages, however, in using the term “Catholic”. In the first place the term was used in Antiquity to indicate “orthodoxy” in contradistinction to “heresy”, and it appears to be precisely in this sense that Titus uses it in Contra Manichaeos I.1 (Gr. 1.24), where he makes it clear that he is speaking on behalf of “the Catholic Church” (→ Ch. XI.1). Secondly, the Manichaeans do not appear in any way to have defined themselves as “Catholics”; indeed, material exists which suggests that they have accepted the term as the correct designation for their opponents (though now of course emptied of the meaning “of the true faith”). Moreover, the term is used in Antiquity about the Church’s geographical universality, and at the time with which we are concerned (4th century) it is practically meaningful to identify this ideal theological and religious self-understanding with a legal and geographical reality, since by then “the Catholic Church”—despite a continuing and considerable inner theological plurality—existed throughout the Roman Empire as a clearly defined collective institution recognised by the Empire. True there were “heretics” and “schismatics” around, who in contrast to the Manichaeans had been segregated from the broad “majority Church” which had developed gradually throughout the

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23 There is no instance of the Manichaeans calling their Church “Catholic”, and documentary texts from Ismant el-Kharab can even be interpreted to mean that the Manichaeans in ancient Kellis referred to their own congregation as the “Holy Church” (Τεκταγη Ετουαρε) in contrast to the “Catholic Church” (καθολικη Εκκλησια) (see Gardner, Alcock and Funk 1999, 72–74).

24 See Schindler 1986–94 on the meanings of the term “Catholic” in the early Church and in Augustine (on orthodoxy and on universality etc.).
Roman Empire, and who therefore called themselves Catholics, such as the North African Donatists or the Arians and the Pelagians, but in a historical work it makes little sense to use this term about them, for they could in no way match the legal and geographical range of the Church with which they were not in communion. The advantages listed above justify my use of the term “Catholic”, which does not therefore reflect a “decadence model” that interprets the early Church as a declining “Catholic” phenomenon in relation to the “pure” primitive Christianity, and is therefore not used to generate associations with e.g., the modern Roman Catholic Church.

In the present study the term “heresy” will also be employed as a designation for false teaching in reference to the Catholics’ views or as a looser conventional designation for non-Catholic Christianity seen from the Catholic Church’s point of view. Again there is no question of reproducing the classic concepts of Church and heresy.

2. Overview of the study’s structure

It remains for me to present an overview of the structure of this study that will serve to guide the reader through the extensive material. Since Titus’s Contra Manichaeos does not exist in a modern translation, the best point of departure must be a relatively detailed overview of the content (Chapter II), which nonetheless can only present the reader with the main features of the work; it is not possible to reproduce all the nuances and details of the argumentation. The summary of contents at the beginning can give a general impression which the book cannot otherwise offer. Readers may of course also choose to skip this comprehensive summary, and should they later require an amplifying context the summary is easily available.


26 Markschies (1998, 45–46) rejects the use of the term “Catholic” for the early Church, which has been standard practice in Church historiography since the 19th cent.: “Somit wird über diese Terminologie die ganze antike Christenheit in die konfessionelle Polemik der mitteleuropäischen Neuzeit hineingezogen”. Cf. Markschies 1995 on the problematic usage of “decadence-models” in Protestant historiography. I can quite understand Markschies here, but in my view the term can remain in use provided one is clearly aware of what one means and does not mean by it. Even Markschies is forced to use some term to characterise the institution that is here called Catholic, namely “Mehrheitskirche” (e.g. Markschies 1997, 46).
Chapter III deals with the history of the book’s reception, editions and scholarship, without claiming total inclusiveness. An interpretation can never be detached from the previous history of reception and scholarship, and this study will not seek to conceal this fact but on the contrary bring it into the light. The interesting questions that will be raised concerning *Contra Manichaeos* have in a number of cases been treated before, but at the same time it is important not to be a prisoner of the problems of previous discussions; therefore it is useful here to be aware of the contemporary historical context that determined questions from earlier times. Moreover I have divided off the history of the editions of *Contra Manichaeos* as a specific aspect of scholarship history and treated it at the end of the chapter in the context of an account of the text transmission; in this connection I explain my own procedure in relation to the difficulties of textual criticism when working with *Contra Manichaeos*.

Chapter IV collects various material that illuminates Titus’s historical context as well as the theological and literary context of his work. The first section deals mainly with the contemporary conflicts in the province of Arabia between Catholics and pagans, along with the dating of *Contra Manichaeos*. A brief *Excursion* is added on other works by Titus of Bostra. The second section comprises in particular an overview of the most important anti-Manichaean texts of the 3rd and 4th centuries from the eastern part of the Empire, which conclude in an attempt to place Titus in a group of early “Antiochene writers” who were particularly interested in anti-Manichaeism. In order to define Titus’s theological context I also include the question of his position in the “Trinitarian controversies”. A further *Excursion* examines three passages and a few other places in *Contra Manichaeos* that point to various patristic sources on which Titus may have drawn.

Chapter V initially analyses those passages in *Contra Manichaeos* that suggest most clearly to whom the text was addressed. The background to *Contra Manichaeos* was the Manichaean mission among pagans and Catholics respectively, and Titus wished to protect both groups against this mission. That is why the first part of the work (Books I–II) is addressed not only to the Catholics but also to the pagans. And even though Titus states that the second part (Books III–IV) is only aimed at Catholics, I will attempt to demonstrate that his likely purpose in reality was that pagan readers should ”read on” in Books III–IV, in other words the second part was intended
for Catholics and pagans. I propose that Titus's particular interest in the pagans is linked to the serious conflicts in the province of Arabia at the time, while simultaneously calling attention to the probable similarity between the pagans and Catholics whom Titus is trying to protect from Manichaeism. Titus seeks to depict Manichaeism as irrational barbarism, but he also acknowledges that Manichaean theology has raised significant problems relating to theodicy. In addition he draws a picture of Manichaeism as deterministic and immoral. It is reasonable to assume that Titus is here appealing to attitudes already present among his readers, who indeed have been troubled by theodicean questions, but regard themselves as operating in a cultural context characterised by “rationality”, lack of barbarism, and morality.

Chapter VI shows that Titus takes up a position on Manichaean texts that were intended for use in the Manichaean mission, which partly explains his strategy of refutation. The texts sought to present Manichaeism as rational, philosophical and especially moral. One text, for example, simplified the Manichaean mythological system and omitted mention of the names of the mythological gods, while another text criticised the OT, especially the Paradise narrative, by borrowing arguments from older Marcionite and Gnostic literature which in fact were ultimately of philosophical origin.

Titus's refutation strategy therefore consists of demonstrating that it is Catholicism that is the rational Christianity, whereas Manichaeism is philosophically untenable. Because of this strategy, Titus's own philosophical position becomes the subject of Chapter VII, which examines Titus's concept of God, his idea of common, universal human concepts, and his psychology in the context of the philosophical background for all these ideas. Chapter VIII shows how this philosophical position and complex of problems from the equally philosophically-influenced Manichaean criticism of the Paradise narrative determines Titus's own interpretation of that narrative, in which he breaks with previous tradition. Instead of understanding Adam and Eve’s disobedience as a fall into mortality and sin, he interprets it as a useful experience for man’s moral progress. Chapter IX, however, raises the question of whether this particular understanding of the Paradise narrative should truly be regarded as a reaction to Manichaean criticism, since a similar reading is to be found in Theodore of Mopsuestia. A comprehensive comparison of Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative with that of various writers
within the Antiochene School, and with Theodore in particular, leads on to a suggestion that both Titus and Theodore’s interpretations must be understood as being dependent on an older Antiochene, anti-Manichaean tradition.

Chapter X comprises a brief summary of the most important results of the study, while Chapter XI contains additional, text-critical studies of the passages in *Contra Manichaeos* that are of special significance for my argument. Translations of these passages are also included. Parts of these translations also appear at various points in this study, always with reference to the examination of the original text in Chapter XI. However, a few passages that do not contain text-critical problems are not included in Chapter XI, and in these cases both the original text and the translation are cited in the earlier chapters of the book.
CHAPTER TWO

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

As already stated, *Contra Manichaeos* is not an easily accessible text. The following summary of contents may therefore to some degree help readers over this difficulty by giving an impression of the whole work chapter by chapter.

In the Syriac edition of Titus a division into chapters is sustained through all four books, an order that De Lagarde and later Nagel also transferred to the Greek text and which I employ in the present study; this chapter division must not be confused with that of Migne, PG 18.

a. *Summary of Book I*

The first four chapters lay out the fundamental purpose and content of the entire work—a defence of God and His Creation and a demonstration that evil is an ethical category, not a natural one. Titus begins his work by mentioning certain persons (undoubtedly heretics) who out of a genuine desire to acquit God of the responsibility for human sin have ended up denying that Divine Providence reveals itself in everything; the worst of these is Mani, who placed evil on an almost equal footing with God. Mani claimed that evil was also eternal and uncreated, and although he did not deny God’s care for the world, he did reject His omnipotence.

The Catholic Church similarly confesses that God is innocent of human sin, and Titus therefore also presents a “demonstrative proof in defence of God” (τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν ύπερ θεοῦ, Gr. 1.30) on the basis of the Bible and the “common concepts” (τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, Gr. 1.28). The proof is to the effect that man is himself responsible for sin. This solution implies not only that evil is not an independent principle—so there is no eternal being that opposes God—but that man can be improved ethically (I.1). In contrast, the Manichaean teaching on eternal evil is that evil (matter) is a necessity of nature in that sins are due to a preponderance of evil in a given person, and correspondingly that good is a necessity of nature among those
who act for the good. Thus the Manichaeans are undermining the possibility of any ethical appeal (I.2).

A further problem is that since the Manichaeans did not understand the rationality of God’s Creation either, they assumed that it was a mixture of complete opposites, and on this basis they blamed most of Creation for being evil. In reality, however, it is only human sin that is evil (I.3). The Manichaeans thus divided all created things on these two principles, linking sin to created things and censuring the whole of Providence; and to put it bluntly they have ended up in total ignorance (I.4).

On the basis of this presentation Titus then outlines in Ch. I.5 what he sets out to prove in the first two books.\(^1\) Firstly, he wishes to deal “with the two opposing principles which they take as their basis” (περὶ τῶν δύο ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν ἀγὶ ὑποτίθενται, Gr. 3.38–39), i.e. the contents of Book I, after which he endeavours to show that all that exists is good and necessary, and that man’s sin does not contradict the principle that God is good, which is the content of Book II. Titus then declares that he will begin by demonstrating that both a doctrine of two principles in general and a doctrine of two principles in conflict is unacceptable for “the natural concepts” (αἱ κατὰ φύσιν ἐννοομαι, Gr. 4.12–13) (I.5).

Titus deals first with Mani’s doctrine that there were originally two opposite, uncreated, living principles (I.6), a claim which he proceeds to refute in Ch. I.7–16.\(^2\) Whereas the two principles limit each other, Titus seeks to show that God is uncircumscribed and is everywhere (I.7). According to the Manichaeans, the two principles occupy each their own ground; the problem is whether they are greater and older than the ground or the reverse is true. Perhaps it is their ground that is uncreated and not the principles, or perhaps there

\(^1\) Cf. Poirier and Sensal 1990, 16 n. 129: “Il faudrait voir dans quelle mesure ce chapitre n’annonce pas le plan de tout l’ouvrage.” I believe, however, that it is a question of the plan for Books I–II (which perhaps is Poirier and Sensal’s intention?). Cf. also Frankenberg 1938, *28*.

\(^2\) After the introduction (I.1–5) Book I appears to be structured in such a way that Titus presents more or less continuous excerpts from, or summaries of, a Manichaean book (I.6; I.17; I.38; I.40; I.42) with long refutations interrupting these. In passing he also includes brief quotations and summaries from the book in question which occasionally contain information that goes beyond what has already been set out in the fuller excerpts and summaries. The passage in I.38 is not so essential for the subsequent rebutal in I.39–40, for so many of the details refuted there come from the reproduction of the myth in I.17.
are four uncreated principles (I.8)? The Manichaeans also claim that there was a boundary, e.g. an adamantine wall, which delimited the two from each other, a position which in I.9 and I.10 Titus demonstrates is untenable.

Nor does the Manichaean attempt to situate the principle of evil in the south fare any better; thereafter Titus moves on to the fundamental point that it makes no sense whatsoever to speak of two principles, since a ‘principle’ means what is older than, and what controls, all else. This criticism is expounded through several arguments in I.11–13, leading on to a proof that there cannot be two eternally opposite principles, but only one. Titus further attempts to prove that in their usage of two principles the Manichaeans are employing concepts in a meaningless way (I.14–15). Confronted with such objections the Manichaeans always resort to asking from where then do evils and disorder in concrete realities originate? Titus states, however, that he will later show that nothing that is evil in substance exists, and that the so-called disorder is in reality order (I.16).

Titus then deals with the next step in the Manichaean myth: through its unordered growth, matter was led to seeing the earth and the light of goodness and then wishing to attack it; in return goodness sent out a special power, which matter then devoured not knowing that the power was a kind of bait that constrained it like an animal. Power and matter were hereby mixed and goodness and evil in the world stem from this mixture of opposites; the soul is good, but the body and the flesh belong to matter. Matter holds the soul fast in a prison, but matter is also itself imprisoned, and it was the good one who created the universe out of the mixture, even though He did not really intend its existence. The purpose of the good one, however, was to free the soul and to scoop it out of matter; this happens through the aid of the moon, which is like a pail, as is clear from its waxing and waning. Titus adds that there is much more nonsense in Mani’s writings, which incidentally are composed in Syriac (for example, that the earth is borne by Atlas or that showers are the beads of perspiration from the archons of matter), which it is superfluous to treat, the whole idea being laughable if it were not for the fact that the main argument, to defend Providence, continued to be worth pursuing (I.17). The Manichaean material that has been presented is then refuted by Titus in Ch. I.18–37.

Titus’s refutation initially builds on the distinction between necessity of nature and free, rational action. He is mostly concerned with
the following question: if the growth of matter happened as a necessity of nature, it must have taken place for all eternity and not just before the attack on the Kingdom of Light. If on the other hand the growth of matter is due to a rational decision, it comes into conflict with the Manichaeans claim (according to Titus) that matter was without reason (I.18). When the Manichaeans say that the emanations of matter were in disorder and devoured each other until they saw the light, Titus objects that it was not disorder but good order, because as a result evil destroyed itself (I.19). The Manichaeans believe that this disorder ceased when matter saw goodness, but it must surely on the contrary be called disorder that evil’s self-destruction ceased (I.20). When the Manichaeans maintain that the emanations of matter desired the beauty of light, one can only protest that it is good to desire what is good (I.21). Titus is also able to find a number of details in the Manichaeans myth that do not accord with the belief that matter is without reason, and he further maintains that there is a contradiction between matter both fighting and desiring goodness simultaneously. Talk of the earth of goodness is meaningless, for it is all ostensibly supposed to have happened before the earth was created; yet if this earth has not come into being, it is an eternal principle beside God (I.22).

A corresponding question arises as to which light it was that the demons of matter saw; can it really have been a sensible light, when the creation had not yet taken place? Titus assumes further that cognition presupposes equivalence between the knower and the object of knowledge, which in turn means that if the darkness saw a sensible light, then the darkness was not dark, and if the light was intelligible, then darkness cannot be its opposite. Darkness must be of the same nature as light. Moreover, it is unclear to Titus why matter would rise up to the light; did it wish, for example, to change its nature and itself become light? Whatever the case, the desire of matter reveals here that it was not without reason, nor was it the opposite of light (I.23). These arguments can be equally applied to matter, which desired and devoured the power from God. For instance, it is absurd that matter should be without reason and yet see and desire intelligible power, especially when one takes into account that both we and the angels know that goodness or God exists and yet no one is capable of seeing Him in substance. Furthermore it is clear that when Mani asserts that matter desired goodness, he has in reality, yet without knowing it, testified that its substance was good (I.24).
If matter truly devoured the power, they must have been associated natures (I.25). Mani’s teaching can also be attacked from another angle. If in reality the power emitted was incorporeal, it would not have been possible for it to be divided among many or to be devoured, whereas if it was corporeal, it would have been annihilated through division (I.26).

Even worse, however, is the point that in order to save His earth God surrendered to matter the power that is of His own substance, so that this power is united with matter and therefore sins together with it; this implies that God’s substance can actually sin (I.27). Mani is thus railing against God by attributing weakness and suffering to Him (I.28).

Titus then attacks Mani’s teaching that the body is from evil and that the soul is from good (in passing Titus mentions the possibility here that the Manichaeans consider the soul to be either homogeneous or compounded of opposites). When a body has no soul within it, it does not commit sin. The cause of sin must therefore be sought in the mixture of the evil body with the good soul, but in that case the power from God ought not to have mingled itself with evil. Sin can altogether only be committed with reason, and if matter was without reason before it was mingled with the good power, it was incapable of committing any evil (I.29). Matter was thus not bound by the mixture with goodness, but on the contrary brought to life by it (I.30). When Mani goes on to claim that God did not want the world to come into existence yet nevertheless created it, this can only mean that God must have been forced to do so. In the final count, and contrary to Mani’s purpose, God is therefore the cause of human sin (I.31). Titus then returns to the possibility that he briefly mentioned in I.29, namely that the soul is made up of a good and a bad part. Sin must nevertheless originate from the good part, for that is the rational part and sin requires precisely deliberation. Titus himself, however, rejects outright the argument that the soul consists of various parts. The soul is a unity, and good and evil are differing qualities that it can take on by choice of reason (I.32). If evil were not a possibility for those who are training themselves in virtue, we would not be able to reproach the dissolute for any sin. It is altogether reason alone that is responsible for virtue and vice (I.33). Various examples can demonstrate that it is the underlying intention of an action that decides whether it is just or wicked, which again demonstrates that reason alone is responsible (I.34). The most
governing element, which is to be found in reason, is thus responsible for sins, but if Mani operates with a good and bad part of the soul, the most governing element must belong to the good part. Mani ought therefore to think that the good part is responsible for sin, while the material part, which Mani condemns quite unreasonably, is innocent (I.35).

Titus next turns his attention to Mani’s teaching that God wished to release the devoured power, the soul of the universe, from matter and that the soul suffers within matter. According to Titus there would be some point in this teaching if the power in question had been of another substance than God, but that is precisely not so, and there is thus a case for blasphemy here (I.36). Titus regards the Manichaean idea that until the end of time God is endeavouring to ensure that His own power is returned as meaning that He sits idle merely feeding on hope (I.37).

A further stage of Mani’s myth is the fresh object of Titus’s criticism. When those who originate in matter felt that they would perish through the light slowly being taken away from them, they took counter-steps by constructing flesh as a chain for the souls (I.38). Titus believes, however, that Mani contradicts himself by claiming both that it is God who has created the world, that it is those who originate from matter who have produced flesh, and he also finds other contradictions in Mani’s teaching, including some in connection with Manichaean eschatology (I.39).

Titus now concentrates on eschatology. If, as the Manichaeans maintain, the goal is that the light is brought back to God, it is hard to see why it should be tormented for so long beforehand. But if the soul binds matter, one should think that matter would return to its natural disorder, once the power from God was gradually taken back. Yet Mani denies this, claiming that God will form matter as a self-devouring ‘globe’ (βῶλος). But why has God not done this a long time ago? Either He would not, or He could not. If He would not, why will He then do so later—has He had second thoughts? If He could not, then He is powerless—and how could He then do so later? If He later becomes capable of doing so through receiving a new power, it must be pointed out that nothing can be added or subtracted from an uncreated substance. Titus then returns to the teaching that the light that is bound is slowly being released via the moon. This must presumably imply that there are now fewer people and animals and that the world order has been changed—but
none of this has actually happened (I.40). And what about those souls that sinned through their long connection with evil, are they also punished? Mani believes so, saying that they are attached to the ‘globe’ together with wickedness, with the result that God is punishing His own nature. Nothing could be more absurd. Yet if Mani would prefer instead to claim that sin went unpunished, then sin would seem to have the advantage of justice, since the sinners would then enjoy life both in this world and in the world to come (I.41). Titus then takes the opportunity to reject yet another point in Mani’s book. While here on earth matter is occupied with the captive light, God is sitting filling up the abyss from which it emanates with earth. Was this earth from the earth of goodness or the earth of evil, Titus asks, since he believes that both are impossible, after which he concludes the book by exclaiming that it would be ridiculous to answer this unreasonable madness any further (I.42).³

b. Summary of Book II

At the start of Book II Titus picks up the thread from I.42: although the Manichaean fables are no longer worthy of refutation, it is still incumbent upon him to show that evil does not exist in substance and that there is no principle of matter without beginning that is opposed to God; there is only one single principle, namely the one God who has created all things good. The Manichaeans’ objection is always the same: where then do evils originate? (II.1). Against this Titus claims that God is one, and that He has created all things good. Absolutely nothing in Creation is evil in relation to its substance; everything has its rational purpose and is joined together by God’s wisdom like limbs on a perfect body. Only human sins are evil, but they do not stem from an evil principle without beginning; that simply does not exist (II.2).

This paves the way for the Titus’s real theme: mankind, which is his subject throughout II.3–14. The world is created by God; even the Manichaeans accept this, though they believe that it is in disorder.

³ In De Lagarde 1859, I.42 is part of I.41, but Sy separates the two chapters at the point which corresponds to Gr. 25.24. Here De Lagarde has apparently forgotten to transfer the division of chapters from the Syriac to the Greek text. The rest of PG 18, I.XXXI together with I.XXXII–XXXVI actually belongs to Serapion of Thmuis’s anti-Manichaean book (see below pp. 110–11).
However, God has set mankind over this world as a rational citizen. God has kept under His own control everything except virtue and vice, which He has handed over to us. Mankind’s reason is responsible for both of these; sin is the unwise use of the natural world, while virtue builds on the hard training of reason (II.3). God has enabled us to choose vice because virtue consists precisely in refraining from desires. So the virtues could not exist unless their opposites did so too. If we nevertheless demand that man should not be able to experience the opposite of virtue, we are actually demanding that man should not be man (II.4). The virtues cannot exist unless they can be compared with their opposites, so if God had not created man with access to vice, we would have been able to reproach Him for not giving us the opportunity to be virtuous (II.5). If we demand that man should be chaste by nature and not by labour, we have failed to understand that there can be no question of chastity if it is enforced by nature (II.6). As we can see with small children, man is by nature neither good nor bad, but beautiful, like gold and precious stones. However, God has created man so that he is able to become good, i.e. to acquire virtue himself (II.7). In other words, good and bad are qualities that come into being through upbringing and by choice. Evil therefore does not exist until it is committed. If God had not given man the power to do evil and therefore also to do good, we would be able to accuse Him of begrudging us good repute and freedom. God is good alone through being a benefactor, whereas man’s goodness depends on the negative virtue of refraining from vice. Man can be a benefactor insofar as he has the power to sin because he can only win good repute by self-restraint (II.8).

Titus expands on this idea in a brief excursion on the difference between God’s and man’s goodness. It is good to say that God is incapable of committing injustice, but the fact that He is unable to do so is due neither to ignorance nor weakness. God is good through a power that is perfect in not willing evil (II.9). Of course God could do so, but because His nature is immutable, His unwillingness to do evil is also of an immutable nature. With man, on the other hand, resistance to evil is not constant (II.10). Being created in the image of God means that with the freedom of his will man must emulate God’s goodness, which is free by nature.

Man’s vice and virtue rest on his intention, which can be altered; the two qualities mentioned are thus of the will (II.11). Titus refutes
the possible objection against his argument that there are indeed people who wish to refrain from wicked deeds but are nonetheless unable to do so; such people may admittedly find it difficult to remove the vice that has become a habit, but this is precisely a question of a condition for which they themselves are responsible. The very fact that we punish offenders also shows that there is a consensus that these have not been forced into the offence by their natures (II.12). Nor are the Manichaeans right in claiming that the fact that we involuntarily think of both good and evil together means that two opposite natures dwell within us. It is due to our knowing both by nature, and the fact that our thoughts therefore move in both directions merely allows us the basis on which to choose and act (II.13).

Finally, Titus summarises the results of his study. Because God is good and incapable of jealousy, He has given man the possibility of sinning so that he can acquire virtue. No matter without beginning exists, and evil does not exist in substance, but has its existence in action (II.14).

In II.15 Titus makes it clear that he is introducing a new section that will deal with God’s all-wise governance and with created objects which Mani assigns to evil; this section concludes the book. According to Mani, disorder is due to the principle of evil, and by disorder he means social and health inequalities, the fact that the innocent are punished instead of the guilty, and that the wicked rule the rest. Titus treats these accusations against the Creation in Ch. II.15–21, first by replying that God has created man exclusively in order that he can fight for virtue; He supplies man with food and clothing, air to breathe, water and so on, so that he can live to toil or fight for virtue, and both rich and poor have need of these essentials. Gold, silver and precious stones are also from God, but they contribute little to the toil in question; both rich and poor have the possibility of living a virtuous life, and for either state both wealth and poverty can become the hindrance to virtue that is necessary for there to be a struggle (II.15). The wealth of the rich can train the poor in endurance, and poverty puts the rich to the test of how to use that wealth to do good. Not every rich man is happy, and not every poor man unhappy, for only that soul is happy who possesses the virtuous solid kindness. Man receives existence from God, but from himself he gets goodness added with God’s assistance. In truth the poor man has more than the rich; for the rich man who acts evilly
is not happy but is consumed by anxieties for the future and grows ill with the life of luxury, while the poor man’s way of life gives him a healthier body. For the rich man the good things become trivial, while the poor man can enjoy them as new and strange (II.16). Sickness and health are necessary: for example, good health can render possible a good deed, and sickness frustrate a sin. Drawing on several other examples Titus demonstrates how the purpose of Providence is found everywhere in allowing some to be healthy and others sick. The only pernicious sickness is that which inflicts the soul with an evil disposition to remove itself from virtue. It is also an expression of God’s wisdom when offenders are not struck down by illness or the law’s punishment: if punishment was always certain, then everyone would keep the law insincerely for fear of that punishment; but because it is not certain that we will be punished, we can keep the law because we hate evil deeds (II.17). Of course one could object that, on the contrary, it is an incentive to evil deeds if no one is ever punished. Titus acknowledges the objection: it is both necessary that some are punished as an example to others, and that others escape punishment, so that man’s reason is tested as to whether it nevertheless will keep the law. In both ways reason is aided from without by sickness, poverty, wealth etc. (II.18). The innocent man who is punished is not damaged if he is an admirable person, even if he is punished to the point of death. With a view to his later death he has already taken care of his worldly affairs, and he is indifferent to the vicissitudes of fortune that are generally estimated as beneficial or detrimental; he even receives his enemies’ injuries positively, since his hope is concerned with a reward after death (II.19). It is God’s dispensation that permits evil people to rule in the world. With their injustice they punish precisely those who commit evil deeds (II.20). Mani speaks ill in order to maintain both his dogma that wickedness is without beginning and his blasphemy, but Titus emphasises that if all that is required to be happy is virtue, then nothing in God’s dispensation can be suspected of inequality or disorder. Happiness (virtue) is equally accessible to all, and the basic human conditions such as birth, food and death are also universal; whatever else exists is a beneficial multiplicity and not inequality, despite the Manichaean claim, on the same basis, for fate, the meaningless inequality (II.21).

Titus then concerns himself with the fact that the Manichaecans believe that wars are derived from the principle of evil (this was not
mentioned directly among Mani’s accusations in II.15). Titus’s most
important answer is that wars do not derive from God but from
man’s evil avarice, which however is realised in war, because God
permits it. However, not even death is evil, nor should it be under-
stood as a punishment, but as ordained by God to create room for
new people. The dead are not annihilated but receive their punish-
ment or reward after death. Although death is not evil, it is still
associated with fear, which is really only aimed at frightening the
wicked; the wise know that death is not evil. Those who wage war
are themselves guilty if they die. Death is moreover a benefit both
to sinners in that it puts an end to their sin, and to survivors by
being an example of something to fear; for righteous people death
means that finally they are rewarded for their arduous struggle for
virtue (II.22). In regarding death as the release of the soul from mat-
ter, the Manichaeans are contradicting themselves, since they also
say that death in war is wicked. Death is not good because it frees
the soul from matter, says Titus, but because it is a reward for the
virtuous and a conclusion to their sin for the wicked. Wars on the
other hand are evil—but they are man’s responsibility (II.23).

A further accusation has to do with earthquakes, plagues, famine,
grasshoppers, etc., which supposedly have their origin in the princi-
ple of evil. Titus on the other hand believes that all these calami-
ties help to shake us out of a soft self-indulgence that can lead us
away from the struggle for virtue. When God chastises us by these
means, He is not seized by some form of passion of anger, but has
the conversion of the wicked in view. It would not be an expression
of love for man if God merely allowed human passions to grow; and
here Titus compares God with the father who chastises and the sur-
geon who cuts out and cauterizes. The sin that God chastises, how-
ever, is one that man is responsible for; fortunately, partly God is
long-suffering, so He does not deprive man of his freedom to sin,
and partly He is not soft when chastisement is required (II.24).
Earthquakes and the like arouse awe; they are unpleasant for the
senses but good for the soul (II.25). Mani moreover contradicts him-
self, for if the growth of matter is harmful, it is hindered precisely
by the disasters mentioned; the truth, however, is that both abun-
dance and misfortune are benefits from God (II.26). What is more,
it is only if man loses these benefits from time to time that he
acknowledges that they are a grace from God; and God wishes this
to be recognised, so that man can become more worthy to receive
the things that issue from Him (II.27). One example is the recent earthquake under the ungodly Emperor. Natural death and divine austerity may be compared to good medicine. When Mani says that the procreation of children is an instance of the growth of matter, yet that mass death is evil, he is again contradicting himself. Summarising his views from II.22 Titus asserts that on the contrary procreation renews the race and death is not an evil (II.28). The conceivable objection that misfortunes have no effect on people is rejected by Titus; it arises from the habit of noting only the sinners and not all those who have been helped to piety and virtue. The rapid coming and going of misfortunes does not happen in order to enforce a conversion but only to persuade; and to test those already converted. Even if misfortunes were to have no effect, it is better that they come than that we should accuse God of being negligent. But basically Titus nevertheless maintains that misfortunes really do have a powerful effect in the direction of conversion (II.29).

Titus now comes to a new series of charges against created things, beginning with Mani’s accusation against darkness and night (II.30). According to Titus, the darkness of night is without existence in substance; it is accidental and merely the shadow of the physical world that comes when the sun sets. Titus states that shadow is merely the absence of light; light has substance, but not darkness (II.31). The reason that God has ordered it thus is to create rest for man, and to offer equal access to it (II.32). Moreover, the calculation of time would be impossible without night’s interruption of day, and we would be unable to sense and enjoy the light, if we could not compare it to darkness (II.33). In a final summary Titus says that night is accidental but useful and an expression of God’s wisdom (II.34). The Manichaeans say that the thief steals in the night; but this can also happen by day, says Titus. In both cases it is the thief’s responsibility and not the fault of the night, for the purpose of night was for the thief to sleep (II.35). What darkness and light are to the body, lies and truth are to the soul; darkness and lies have no existence in substance, but they are essential for cognition of the light and the choice of the truth (II.36). It can never be proved that lies and darkness have substance; but truth and light clearly do. Titus then turns aside to a brief excursion on God, who in Himself is truth (αὐτοαληθεία) and intelligible light. The reason that He does not lie is not that He is powerless but because He never wishes to lie; it is in this sense that God cannot lie. For it is absurd to imag-
ine that the Creator should be subject to the constraint of His nature or to necessity; He who has made the natures is beyond nature and free of the necessity of nature. He is in truth good and without lies. Titus then returns to his main subject: the lie is without substance like the night, but we should shun the lie, for it is thought up by ourselves, whereas the physical darkness is set by God (II.37).

Titus’s next subject is Mani’s mockery of wild animals. His antipathy to these creatures, who are God’s own means of chastisement, shows that he himself is in need of them. God, however, always employs two means by which to educate man: the enjoyment of His benefits makes him appreciate God’s grace, while frightening occurrences make him turn to God (II.38). Wild animals are a frightening means of education, but they are not evil, for they are without reason, and wickedness is reason’s passion. When Mani claims that the principle of evil is without reason, then this too is a contradiction; there can only ever be a question of evil on the premise that the opposites “good and evil” are known. Consequently the principle of evil does not exist and cannot be accused of anything (II.39). Only a creature of reason like man can therefore be evil; on the other hand animals (and also infant children) are without reason and cannot be reproached (II.40). Furthermore, how can poisonous animals originate from the principle of evil when snake venom and meat from snakes and reptiles can be used in curative medicine? In this respect poisonous animals are useful, as they are again when they function as a frightening means of education (II.41).

This point leads Titus on to a series of considerations on God’s admirable means of education, which with many examples he proves are adapted to the various people and situations (II.42). He continues the series by marveling at how different causes have the same effects, but he points out at the same time that God only reveals to us the purpose of a few of His actions; these must serve as examples to show us that everything is governed by Providence; those who are upright in their intention will always remember these examples, whereas those who have weighed down reason with the habits of sin—or like Mani believes in beings that are hostile to God—are very far from acknowledging and benefiting from these examples (II.43).

Titus now returns to the question of wild animals; he summarises some of his views and adds that in addition to the animals’ usefulness for man, they represent the diversity of the world, which is a
well-ordered beauty. God has generously granted them much, such as fur and hides against the cold and heat, the ability for large or small propagation, and so on. God’s wisdom reveals itself in the capacity of the same plant to nourishing one species yet poison another; the fact that the animals can distinguish between the plants that are respectively edible or poisonous for their own species even shows that God has nevertheless given creatures without reason a trace of it (II.44). On this basis Titus remarks that Mani’s charge against poisonous plants is rejected. But Mani also accuses iron and fire of annihilating bodies, even though this annihilation ought really in his view to constitute a useful destruction of matter. Fire and iron, however, are created by God, and with God’s authority discovered by man’s reason; fire and iron are of great benefit. It is clear that man’s reason is not a gift from evil matter but from the good one. Yet it is equally clear that it is the same reason that is responsible for the misdeeds that iron and the other instruments are used for. According to Titus, man has acquired access to these instruments in order that he may be tested and free to choose them in the service of virtue. Nor, he adds, is it an argument against the instruments that death can occur through them, for death is not wicked but natural (II.45).

There follows a summary in which Titus adds that nothing in Creation is evil; only sin, for which man’s reason is responsible, is evil. The law or nature of created things cannot be altered, but reason can use them unreasonably (II.46). Since death is not evil but killing is, one might still ask why Providence has allowed man to kill. According to Titus, there are many reasons why God allows this, such as chastisement of severe vices. Death, as it reveals itself in the many ways of dying, is on the other hand natural and determined by the Creator in a beautiful and appropriate way for the whole race (II.47). Thus all that is created is good, and created by God’s wisdom and governed by God’s Providence. It is not surprising, however, that God’s reason and the signs of His wisdom are not accessible to everyone; the thoughts of kings are also hidden. We must trust in the wisdom of Providence, just as we must have faith in the experience of a craftsman. The proper thing for us is to be awestruck and to honour God’s wisdom which is beyond all reason, both when we understand it and when we do not (II.48). Unless we understand the reason behind most of the things that come from God and instead use our own reason’s blindness as a
guide, we will end up like Mani, who in his fantasy has formed evil as a second principle without beginning, who mocks God by dividing Creation and attributing it to those two principles, and who refers God’s good works to consist in reality partly of something that is evil (II.49).

On this basis Titus then looks at the principles of the corporeal substances, which he explains as being four elements, the dry, the wet, the hot and the cold; the merging of these contrasting elements produces the body. Is Mani really referring some of these elements to good and bad respectively, either two to each or three to the first and one to the second? Each element, however, is in itself able to do damage. When Mani then goes on to imagine that the elements are themselves mixed, Titus protests: each element is homogeneous and indivisible (II.50). Mani says, for example, that some of fire comes from the good, and some of it from evil, but then he even has to separate the qualities in the elements, which on the contrary are simple and homogeneous (II.51). Mani’s reasoning is that fire is both curative and consuming, but he overlooks the fact that this separation touches only on the use of fire, not on its nature. For the nature of fire is precisely to consume; it is dangerous to get too close to it, and not dangerous to be further away from it, and it is as a consumer that it can be useful (II.52). Titus further points out the contradictory and impossible consequences of referring the merger of the elements to the principle of evil (II.53).

The sun constitutes a subject all of its own. Mani praises the sun for not being mixed with evil, and Titus accepts that the sun originates from only one of the four elements, the substance of heat; it also shares the nature of fire in both warming when it is at a distance and burning when it is too close. The nature of fire is more glorious than the other elements’ nature, for whereas their natural direction is downwards, the nature of fire is upwards; through its fineness it is lighter than air, which it overpowers by climbing above it, since it is finer in its affinity with the sun. When Mani deifies the sun by saying that it is from the nature of good, this would in effect mean that he reckons fire to belong to goodness, for the sun differs from fire only in its position, but otherwise performs the same task by its activity; only because God has set the sun so far away for our benefit, are we prevented from being consumed by it. Allotting the sun to the element of heat also refutes those who regard it as a fifth element. Mani’s deification of the sun is a mockery of God;
visible bodies are by nature contrasted with invisible and incorporeal (II.54).

Mani refers the fruits of the earth to matter, but in so doing he contradicts himself, for they would not be able to grow without the sun’s help in concert with rain and wind (II.55). On the one hand Mani believes that rain-showers are a superfluous extravagance, for instance when it rains in the desert, on uncultivated soil or in the sea, yet on the other hand he maintains that they are the perspiration from the archons of matter who are enflamed with love for the forces of goodness.  

Titus’s response is that God generously allows the rain to fall everywhere, but that rain is also useful; rain over the sea becomes clouds, and rain in the desert and on uncultivated soil forms springs which, like rivers elsewhere, nourish the earth. Whether it rains or not, the Manichaeans accuse God, even though they themselves sow the earth and eat bread. The Manichaeans ridicule sexual intercourse and procreation, i.e. the continued existence of the human race; the force of the sexual instinct, however, is an expression of God’s wise means of sustaining the human race and, what is more, it enables women to suffer the labour pains of childbirth, and for both sexes to take the trouble to raise children; these are beneficial trials. The sexual drive is free from accusation if one follows reason and the Creator’s law. The Manichaeans encourage women to dispose of their foetuses, and they are enemies of nature and the Creator (II.56). The Manichaeans also ask why desire for sexual intercourse exists in bodies, why some people could not be chaste without being excited by nature. Titus’s answer is naturally that chastity consists precisely of a triumph over desire (II.57). And just as with sexuality, so the moderate enjoyment of food and drink is natural and good (while training through fasting is not against, but over, nature). It is not the use of the natural that provokes sin but the immoderate use (II.58). Desire is not evil, but actually makes virtue possible through abstinence from desire (II.59).

Mani dishonours goodness and virtue, and vilifies man’s power and freedom, nor has he been ashamed to say that stones and everything else are animated, because the nature of goodness was bound in them when evil defeated its opponent. A sign that there is a soul in trees and stones is the sound in the air that branches and stones

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4 Previously treated by Titus in I.17.
evoke. According to Titus, however, these sounds are signs of corporeal objects and not of animation (II.60).

Mani lays a charge against those who kill animals for nourishment, since the animals are animated with souls; the power of goodness is confined within them. Titus then asks who it was that from the beginning allowed the animals to be handed over to man as food. It cannot be the work of the evil one in order to deride the good one, for in that case the evil one would be gifted with reason (which the Manichaeans deny, according to Titus), and furthermore the Manichaeans admit that God is the Creator. Some animals are obviously created to be food for man, as can be seen by the way they propagate so rapidly, or the animals are otherwise created to be beasts of burden or to provide clothes etc. Man has not tamed the animals against God’s will but in accordance with the order of Creation (II.61). Mani on the other hand claims that it is unjust for oxen to be subjected to the labourer in order to till the soil; this too is an example of the slavery of the good soul in the world. To this Titus asks how should we till the soil if we did not use oxen, and how should the race of man survive without food? It is plainly natural for domestic animals to slave for man. As for wild animals, there are, as he has mentioned, a number of reasons why God has permitted some of them to be able to kill man, among others as a trial (II.62).

Any further polemic is now superfluous, since it is clear that everything has been ordered by the one and single reason of the Creator and that there is no conflict, sign of war or disharmony among His created things, but that they all exist in mutual peace. Titus depicts in wonder the harmonic, regular order of the whole universe (II.63–64), and in connection with the four elements he emphasises that it is precisely the contrast between them that is the cause of their harmony and a testimony to their Creator (II.65). May we not be astonished at the power of the Creator and the harmony of the Creation, which is only broken by man’s injustice? Considering this, what man in his right mind would be able to invent another principle that was contrary to God? The Creation is manifold and contains both the mild and the strict, and man needs both God’s mildness and His strictness in his education, for unqualified mildness is harmful, while seriousness and strictness without mildness become coarseness and misanthropy (II.66). At this point Titus concludes Book II.
The first three chapters of Book III constitute a kind of introduction that establishes the aim of both Book III and Book IV. Titus begins by stating that the previous refutations in Books I–II have not been based on the Bible, because they were also intended to strengthen the pagans’ mind against Manichaeism. Now, however, his refutations will be on a Scriptural basis in order to fortify the believers who are being misled by the Manichaeans’ distortions of the words of the Bible and their misuse of the name of Christ. Mani is proselytising among both pagans and Christians, and he is leading imprudent Christians astray both by calling himself the intercessor (παράκλητος, Paraclete), and also in his epistles, just as Paul does, the apostle of Jesus Christ (III.1). Mani attributes the Law and the prophets to the principle of evil, whereas the gospels and the other parts of the NT are given by the principle of goodness, even though they are defiled by matter. As the intercessor Mani is now removing those parts of the NT that supposedly stem from matter, thereby leaving behind incoherent fragments. Yet even these fragments will be sufficient to disprove Mani (III.2). First, however, Titus will demonstrate that Mani’s mockery of the OT is not according to reason. Mani is in agreement with the older heretics, and indeed he is even more ungodly than them. Titus would not be attacking Mani, if, like the pagans, he had just settled for not believing in the stories of the Bible; it is precisely because he believes that they have taken place—and because he attributes them to the principle of evil—that these miracles must be proved to be expressions of God’s wonderful dispensations (III.3).

Titus then turns to a rebuttal of the Manichaeans’ attack on Gen. and Ex. (III.4–47) in the form of three sequences: III.4–9, III.10–29 and III.30–47. In the first Titus quotes and refers to one or more Manichaean texts that have construed and criticised Gen. and Ex., and in this context he employs various polemical strictures against the Manichaeans. In III.10–29 Titus defends Gen. 1–3 against the Manichaean criticism or profanity. In the third sequence, III.30–47,
he rejects the other profanities against Gen. and Ex. that were mentioned in III.7 (this refutation is furthermore continued in III.62–65).

In III.4 Titus explains that he will now deal with the chapter to which either Mani himself or one of Mani’s disciples has given the title “On the first human moulding” (περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης πρωτοπλαστίας, Gr. 68.12). Following on in III.5 are long quotations from the chapter, which claim that when the archons discovered that they were being deprived of the light, they created Adam in order to keep the soul in its prison. This is therefore the same step in the Manichaean myth that Titus was concerned with in I.38. III.6 revolves around the built-in contradictions and the ludicrousness of this story, and around the fact that it turns man, the peak of Creation, into a creature of matter. Titus begins III.7 with a summary that partly Mani is in doubt as to why the world came into being, and partly he wishes to show that man is not God’s creature. Titus then repeats and quotes Mani’s criticism of the Paradise narrative, beginning with the question of whether God knew beforehand that Adam would disobey His commandment. Mani does not believe that God knew this beforehand, and therefore this God he considers to be the evil one. The serpent was the angel of goodness who persuaded Adam to break the command so that he received his eyesight, acquired clothing and knew good and evil. God banished Adam from the Tree of Life and immortality, because he begrudged him immortality. Mani ridicules the murder of Abel and thinks that the Flood and the destruction of Sodom can only stem from the principle of evil. Mani also censures the polygamy of the patriarchs and claims that with the ten plagues of Egypt God showed much hostility and anger against the Egyptians and unfair bias towards the Hebrews. Nor can it have been the good one that commanded the Hebrews to steal the Egyptians’ jewels. Mani vilifies both the fire on the mountain and Moses, who said that God is a consuming fire (cf. Deut. 4.24). In III.8 Titus also states that these blasphemies are aimed at documenting the differences between the OT and the NT, and in III.9 he writes that the Manichaeans hide their books, because untruth loves to hide itself. He himself, however, will refute major and minor lies in the Manichaean texts.

In III.10 Titus sets out on the refutation itself, returning first to Mani’s doubts about why the world was made (cf. beginning of III.7). Titus maintains that the reason for the creation of the world is God’s creative goodness; God did not need the Creation, but as a boon.
He nevertheless gave non-existent things a share both in being and in being good (III.10). God then brought order to what He had created. However, the only usefulness of created things, including the heavenly bodies, lies in their existing for man’s sake; man is thus the principal part of the world. It therefore makes no sense when the Manichaeans refer the heavenly bodies to the good Creator, while man, for whom they are made, is referred to the archons (III.11–12).

By now Titus has already moved on to the question of the creation of man. He sets out to explain what it means that man is created in God’s eikón and according to his dímosiòsis and he is to rule over the animals (Gen. 1.26). The difference between man and the animals is contained in their various natures; animals are without reason, bound by the necessity of nature, whereas man’s nature is to be reasonable, and reason is natural freedom: reason can pass its own judgements, which ensures that man is in the world like the free citizen in the city. It is in man’s power whether to employ his natural capacities or not, as one can see, for example, with regard to procreation and also with nourishment and sleep, which, however, man can only abstain from within the limits of the exercise of perseverance and the power of reason. When man utilises nature, he does not do so like the animals out of necessity but with premeditation, and in consequence man is lord of both the animals and himself. Man’s createdness kατ’ eikóna is thus concerned with his lordship over nature, his reason and his freedom (III.13).

With this in mind Titus explains the command not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge. The animals were not given a commandment, because they were not worthy of it and being without reason they would not have understood it, but man is honoured by the commandment because he thereby comes to participate in his Creator’s reason. When he receives the order, he apprehends as far as possible the commanding God, and correspondingly, in commanding man God wishes to reveal knowledge of Himself to the degree that is possible for human nature. In this context Titus also adds an interpretation of Gen. 2.7 (III.14). He explains further that already through man’s knowledge (contained in his createdness kατ’ eikóna) he anticipated the command that he should obey the Creator. However, the command was an exercise of his nature and freedom, for just like a man who already has the rules in his soul for some art or other, such as the art of medicine or carpentry, and is driven to practise
them so that they do not remain in the soul unused, so was man-driven through the commandment to apply his natural knowledge. Freedom would be ineffectual without the command that God therefore gave, even though He knew beforehand that Adam would disobey it. On this background one could accuse God of having harmed man by punishing him for a disobedience that he knew of beforehand; but Titus will deal with this problem later (i.e. from III.17–18); for the present he expounds in greater depth on how obedience or virtue are only possible together with the freedom to disobey, and how the initial disobedience later came to benefit virtue, in that man became careful out of regard for later virtue, since he had been disobedient and experienced harm. For obedience always requires man’s genuine experience, whether he has to learn it for himself or he settles for using the example of others (III.15).

Titus maintains that God’s purpose was not defeated by man’s disobedience, but satisfied; this can already be seen by God giving man a commandment he could disobey rather than forcing him (III.16). Out of consideration for later obedience God wanted man to have the power to be disobedient, and although He humbled man after his disobedience, He allowed him to preserve the possibility of leading a virtuous life and encouraged him to do so. As man’s first experience disobedience was necessary, for it showed him the freedom and the power to choose that lay in man’s nature, which was a precondition for later obedience. Nor did disobedience mean that man perished or made himself incurable, but only that he became conscious of his own power. The reason that God did not give him new laws and commands immediately after his disobedience was because man already in his nature had knowledge of what he should or should not do. When God censured him, he did not counsel him to do penance; for man did not need healing for what he had done, since he did not remain in a state of disobedience but could assume his true life-form (III.17).

Titus next returns to the question of whether mortality and expulsion from Paradise damaged man (cf. III.15). Presumably it is Titus’s idea to counter this question by referring to what is God’s fundamental purpose with man, and he therefore again points out that man has been given his existence through the benefaction of the good God (cf. III.10). God not only gave man freedom of choice but also a body and thus mortality because He had foreknowledge of man’s disobedience. It is impossible for a free agent such as man
always to be without sin; nor does God therefore demand it. However, it is for this reason that death is necessary, though also terrifying. Even though there is a fear of punishment linked to death, it is nonetheless of benefit for both sinful and virtuous alike; it puts an end to whoever deliberately wishes to be evil, and gives rest to whoever has made his endeavours for virtue (III.18). It is with God’s permission that man freely takes the cause of death from himself. Yet man’s disobedience does not please God, and therefore he seals it with death. If, however, one could imagine that everyone made such an effort that they lived without sin, death would still be necessary as rest (III.19).

Titus can also support these interpretations with precise references to Scripture. Already before man was disobedient, God had appointed him to rule over the animals (Gen. 1.26.28), but in Paradise he had no need of them; in other words the intention was not that he should remain there; furthermore Paradise was a place of particularly spiritual value which was not in the long run destined for the irrational animals; this point also demonstrated the provisional nature of the primeval state. Further evidence is found when God says in Gen. 1.26, “let them have dominion” (καὶ ἀρχέωσαν, ed.N 324.14–15), even though there was only one man. The plural form must refer to “the sum total of mankind” (τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς ἄνθρωποτητος, ed.N 324.15), but the reason that Adam did not “know” Eve (Gen. 4.1) until after the banishment from Paradise was because there was no purpose for them to concern themselves with procreation in Paradise: only for the man who must die does procreation become necessary for the continuation of the race. It is thus quite clear that God had beforehand made all things ready and controlled them as it suited Him, so that mankind could fill the earth, and that the purpose of the first man and his descendants was not just to inhabit Paradise (III.20). When God says that mankind shall be multiple, fill the earth and have dominion over the animals (Gen. 1.28), He is making a promise that would not be required if they were to inhabit Paradise incessantly. When God gives man corn and fruit for food (Gen. 1.29), it is clear that from the beginning man was formed to the condition in which he now finds himself (Titus believes that ‘seed corn’ alludes to agriculture). God’s foreknowledge and dispensation were of course connected, in that He had prepared the things that would be appropriate to man after the disobedience. Through its consequences it led to man’s beneficial endeavour to virtue as well as his
industrious labour with the arts and crafts, both being tasks that can hinder him from getting involved in incurable wickedness, which nevertheless happens now and again (III.21).

Man’s disobedience did not force God to invest him with death and expel him from Paradise; the point of origin in His action was God Himself. Death and banishment should not harm man; for the experience of a lost, better life animates man to moral efforts to return. It is enough that only Adam had this experience, for we, his descendants, can settle for knowing something that another has experienced (III.22).

Since God in this way was in control of all things and man was not harmed, the prohibition against eating from the Tree of Knowledge must be interpreted in this light. Man should not be prevented from eating something bad, for there was nothing harmful in Paradise, and consequently the purpose of the prohibition was that it should be an ethical exercise in abstinence. The fact that the tree was called “the Tree for knowing good and bad” referred neither to the tree knowing good and evil nor to man acquiring this knowledge by eating of it. The tree is so called because man knew good and bad by not approaching it. It is true that man had this knowledge beforehand, but it was not tested in practice until the commandment was to be kept. Thus the prohibition was an exercise in obedience and contained no danger of sinning: in Paradise Adam had no possibility of sinning, i.e. stealing, committing adultery, killing, bearing false witness and being envious, and therefore God did not forbid him any of these things. Such a prohibition would not have been necessary either, since Adam’s nature already contained the knowledge that these things are wrong; the name of the tree is in itself a testimony that man possessed this knowledge (III.23). So Adam had no opportunity to sin, but since his need in Paradise was for food, it was of course on food that he was tested. Titus again underlines that the tree and its fruit were not harmful, indeed, Gen. 3.6 even shows that the tree was good to eat from (and the same passage shows that the Manichaeans are not right in claiming that Adam and Eve were physically blind before they received their sight again in Gen. 3.7). Titus now explains the character of the eating prohibition as an ascetic exercise in greater depth: one does not evaluate the actions themselves that an abstaining person has promised not to perform, but rather the intentions of the person in question, since the actions gain another quality through the particular aim of the
person’s vow; correspondingly there was nothing wrong in the action of eating of the tree, but God’s prohibition gave the action a different quality, so that it all turned into a contest.

Titus then concentrates on interpreting Gen. 3.7: when Adam and Eve saw that they were naked and were ashamed of themselves, it was because that he who is unfamiliar with wickedness exposes himself, but experience of disobedience drives out innocence and introduces shame. The two people thus lost their ignorance of wickedness (III.24). When their eyes were opened and they knew that they were naked, the reference is to reasoning: it is reasoning that leads the eye to see a particular object; not until one knows what one is seeing does one see it (III.25).

In this context Titus deals with an interpretation that assumes that Adam and Eve still had no flesh in Paradise, since the time for procreation had not yet arrived, and that God had therefore not yet given them the concern about nakedness. According to this reading, their disobedience gave rise to mortality, and in consequence of this came procreation, and therefore God gave them modesty towards one another, so that they knew their different forms, which God had foreseen as being necessary for the continuation of the race (III.26). Titus rejects this interpretation. That man and woman could see in Paradise is clear enough—the central evidence is Gen. 2.23—, they just did not know shame. But from the moment they had eaten, they regarded one another in a more bodily form and were transferred to the earth, from which they had been created in the beginning. But it was not because God was jealous that he cut man off from access to the Tree of Life, but because it would be harmful if he who has great boldness to sin, lives forever (III.27).

When God says that Adam has become “like one of us” in his knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 3.22), He is referring to Adam’s original nature; the meaning is not that Adam only acquired this knowledge through disobedience. It is clear that this is how it is, since Adam had already been created in God’s image, which must mean that knowledge of good and evil was put into his nature. The command that God gave man for exercise was given to a cognitive being, as can be seen from Eve’s knowledge of God’s commandment in her answer to the serpent (Gen. 3.2–3). The reason that Eve could be led astray by the serpent is because she was deceived by a deceptive reason, and Titus now takes the opportunity to reject Mani’s interpretation of the serpent as the messenger of goodness
(cf. III.7): when the serpent says that man will not die (Gen. 3.4), it is clearly a fraud; the serpent was a liar like Mani himself (III.28).

Titus is nonetheless willing to acknowledge that whoever claims that the tree was really created in order that it effected a knowledge of good and evil in those who ate of it is not necessarily saying something absurd, provided he agrees that man was from the first free, had reason and knew the power of the Creator’s commandment, but he just does not think that man from the first had acquired full knowledge of virtue and vice. From this less than perfect life man was led to the full and complete knowledge when he ate of the tree. In all circumstances Titus concurs that disobedience increased man’s knowledge; God allowed the disobedience, which by virtue of His foreknowledge he knew would be committed, because despite the pain of its acquisition man’s accruement of knowledge would improve his capacity for choosing goodness.

Even though to all intents and purposes Titus thus grants the Manichaeans that Adam and Eve’s disobedience was a benefit in that it involved a useful growth of knowledge, this does not mean that he accepts that the serpent was the messenger of goodness: the serpent was evil, not just because it lied, but in particular because it believed that by advising Eve it would do harm; they were ignorant of God’s dispensation. This finds its correspondence later on in God’s greatest dispensation, the crucifixion, where Paul testifies in 1 Cor. 2.8 that the rulers of this world would not have crucified Jesus if they had known God’s secret wisdom. For God often uses the attacks of the evil one to carry out His will (here Titus refers to his later exposition of the Devil [cf. IV.57]). Because the intent of the serpent was to deceive, it has also deserved God’s curse (Gen. 3.14–15); on the other hand the reason that God was angry when he turned to Adam and Eve was to emphasise his stern character.

Titus ends his study of Gen. 1–3 by explaining that this is how the interpretation must be for one who loves God (φιλόθεος); Mani’s reading stems from a φιλαξίτιος, i.e. from one who loves to bring accusations (III.29). However, Mani and his supporters have clad themselves in the darkness of aberration, and even extended it by sticking to the difficult passages in Scripture.⁶ That is why they also

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⁶ The Greek text transmission ends here (i.e. manuscript V; see below); what follows, apart from small sections in Sacr. Parallel. (see below) builds entirely on Sy.
read the Scripture in such a way as to blame God for the murder of Abel (cf. III.7). It was, however, Cain who was responsible for murdering his brother out of envy, whereas God punished Cain for his wicked deed (III.30). Of course God could have prevented Cain from murdering; the reason He allowed the killing was to institute the rule that as a trial the righteous should humbly endure even to death the scorn of the unrighteous. Abel suffered no harm, since he returned to the Paradise that his father had left, and furthermore it is reasonable that a righteous man was the first to share in the great benefaction that death is. For Adam too Abel’s death was an example in favour of conversion; precisely by being an example such a death is even preferable from the viewpoint of the righteous (III.31).

In censuring the Flood as cruel (cf. III.7) the Manichaeans are contradicting themselves, for they overlook the fact that it was aimed at evil people; on the contrary, they could have reproached God if He had merely let things carry on as they were. God was a wise judge who before He let the waters rise even set a limit of a hundred twenty years for conversion, while the ark was being built. God also reveals Himself as an example of both the just and the good judge by actually saving one pious man and his sons (III.32). One would think that the Manichaeans could turn it to their account as an accusation against the flesh when God says that His spirit shall not remain in these people who are flesh (Gen. 6.3), but that is not the case because they will not regard this God as good. It is not the intention of the text to accuse the flesh, however, but rather to accuse the reason of those who satisfied the flesh through pleasures. Even today the Flood is a useful and essential example for man (III.33). The same considerations are also true of the Sodomites (cf. III.7). Wherever human reason deliberately moves from natural thoughts to the passions Providence in its goodness prepares a swift ending to their wicked life, and by this example simultaneously educates the few who are willing to repent, while the rest are left without an excuse if they continue their actions (III.34). In contrast the reason that God did not annihilate those responsible for the Tower of Babel was because they had not corrupted their nature through the passions of desire, even though their audacity was without reason. The division of languages was also of advantage to them, for they became the fathers of all the peoples of the earth, differing from each other through their various languages which were all given by God (III.35). So when Mani refers this wonderful, wise gover-
nance to his own self-concocted principle of evil, it is clear that he in no way scorns the principle; this ought to be clearly stated (III.36).

In connection with Moses’ and Pharaoh’s wonders in Egypt (cf. III.7) Titus asks Mani to which of the two principles he would refer the two persons in question. Moses was clearly superior to Pharaoh! Mani, who like Pharaoh does not know God (cf. Ex. 5.2), must either refer Pharaoh, who was openly unjust, to the principle of goodness, since he refers the OT to the archons of matter, or he must acknowledge that Moses was God’s servant, in which case the plagues on the Egyptians must have been from this God, who did not act in unseemly anger but wished to bring up a race of free men, whom the Egyptians were oppressing, in the fear of God (III.37). Perhaps Mani would refer both the Egyptians and the Hebrews to matter, so that in some way or another goodness abandoned matter to its own self-destruction through the two peoples fighting each other; but it is hard to believe that the archons, who originally formed the body as a strategem against goodness (cf. III.4–5), should again allow themselves to be cheated by goodness. As it happened, the Hebrews were unharmed, and if it was the archons of evil who were protecting them, then the Manichaeans must at least admit that evil also both sustains and destroys. But if the principle of evil was sparing the Hebrews, then it has also possessed compassion; this, according to Titus, presupposes knowledge of goodness, which in turn would come into conflict with the Manichaeans’ teaching that matter was without reason (III.38). Moreover, if matter was indeed without order and reason, then the archons have not deliberately committed any evil against man either (III.39). But above and beyond all this it could not possibly have been a disordered being but rather a wise one who took pains to protect the Hebrews against the great plagues that struck the Egyptians among whom they were living (III.40). Nor can the confusion and disordered fortuitousness of matter be the cause since Moses with his prayer was able to call up and then to stop the plagues not just once but all of ten times (III.41). But to whom did Moses pray? The sorcerers who served the evil spirits were only able to imitate Moses’ first four miracles; after that they had to admit that his actions could not be compared with their own, and that the finger of God was with Moses (cf. Ex. 8.19). Thus Mani, who continues to accuse God, is worse than the sorcerers (III.42). If the Manichaeans say that the evil spirits which were obeying the sorcerers correspond to their evil matter, they must
recognise that Moses was God’s prophet. Titus adds that he will return to the question of evil spirits in his section on Satan (cf. IV.57–85) (III.43). And to which of the two principles would Mani refer Moses and the sorcerers respectively? How would he deal with the sorcerers accepting that the finger of God was with Moses if he, Mani, numbers them with the principle of goodness? (III.44). Finally, Titus again explains how it is impossible to refer all these events, which at every step express the will of Providence, to the area of matter which the Manichaeans believe in; he concludes that further argument on this point is therefore superfluous (III.45).

As for the charges of theft of Egyptian jewellery (cf. III.7), the jewels were no more than a reasonable payment for the Hebrews’ toil, and whoever was representing devotion to God by drowning the Egyptians, who worshipped animals, cannot possibly have been matter. Is it credible that Moses, his company and his sister should really sing the praises of matter as though it were God? cf. Ex. 15 (III.46). And surely the miraculous solicitude for the Hebrews during their desert wanderings cannot be attributed to evil matter, especially since the manna came from above, where Mani says that everything is pure? And can one believe that the principle of evil would teach the Hebrews justice in the course of these forty years? Since we can see that the Ten Commandments are just and good, they can only originate from the good one, and not from the evil one, as Mani otherwise claims (III.47).

Titus now moves on to a completely new subject, namely, the question of sacrifice, which the Manichaeans regard as evil. Sacrifices do not satisfy a need of God, he says, but of those who sacrifice; and God also received only their pious intention, and not their sacrifice; for instance, God rejected the intention behind Cain’s sacrifice. Nor did He command the first righteous people to sacrifice; that was their own idea, which He accepted. His purpose in giving Moses laws regarding sacrifice was His way of adapting and descending to the Hebrews’ level, which required that worship of God be linked to the corporeal (III.48). It was necessary to educate the Hebrews slowly to perfection by beginning on a small scale (III.49). Titus therefore wishes to go over what God through the prophets said to the Jews regarding sacrifice (III.50). He cites a number of their statements that criticise sacrifice, such as Isa. 1.11–13 (III.51), Isa. 66.3 (III.52), Isa. 43.22–24 (III.53), Hos. 6.5–6 (III.54), Am. 5.22 and 5.25 (III.55), Mic. 6.6–8 (III.56), Jer. 7.21–23 (III.57), and
notes that one can find more of the same kind in Jeremiah (III.58). Similar things have also been said in the Psalms of David, such as Ps. 40.7 (LXX 39.7), Ps. 50.7–14 (LXX 49.7–14) and Ps. 51.18–19 (LXX 50.18–19) (III.59). Consequently God scorns sacrifices, but nevertheless uses them to educate man to rise from the corporeal and into the incorporeal. The Manichaeans should admit that also these critical prophetic voices belong in the OT, which they otherwise attack (III.60).

Just as with sacrifice the whole of the OT should be understood as types and images which are intended as milk for babes and sucklings who must be weaned onto solid food (cf. 1 Cor. 3.1–3). Those who on the way realised the inadequacy of the Law did not reject it but supplemented it through their faith, because only the Lawgiver Himself could replace it with anything else, when the time was right. Such people thus demonstrated that through love for the Lawgiver they had already raised themselves above the others; this is true of both the prophets mentioned and further back even of Moses, who himself had no need of the Law; and the same is true of Elijah, who also sacrificed (1 Kings 18.20–40 [=LXX 3 Kings]) (III.61). Titus then returns to some of Mani’s points of criticism from III.7; he states that the purpose of the fire on the mountain in the desert was to imbue the Hebrews with devoutness, and that Moses’ words about God being like a consuming fire (cf. Deut. 4.24) do not mean that God was that fire; the formulation was adapted to the sensuous preconceptions of the audience (III.62). Titus again asserts that much of the OT is types and images with a deeper meaning, but also that other things which are now forbidden were allowed as a result of special circumstances. This is true of polygamy, for example, which was permitted because the earth required a surplus of children so as to be filled with people, and it was appropriate that the devout patriarchs became forefathers of many peoples (though Titus even finds a purpose in sinful people also participating in polygamy). Once the earth was populated, however, polygamy could be abolished (III.63). If one wonders that anything can be forbidden which was once permitted, one can compare with Titus’s own times, in which marriage is not a sin for anyone except for the demented Manichaeans, though it may nevertheless be a sin for those holy men who have taken a particular vow of abstinence. Correspondingly, marriage between siblings, which one must assume was practised by the first generations after Adam, was once both permitted and essential,
yet was later forbidden (III.64). The first people on earth were virtuous, but they had many children because children were needed; since then chastity has been introduced for the pious (III.65).

Mani is a barbarian who believes that virtue and vice come from the body and not from the disposition of the one who acts; nor does he grasp that people require spiritual food in relation to the level which they are at (III.66), which is true, for example, of the Jews who were born and bred in Egypt (III.67).

When Mani contrasts the OT and NT and claims that the two testaments cannot stem from the one and the same, he joins the company of previous heretics such as Marcion, who may not have believed that the OT was a product from evil but of a righteous one who was different from the good one, thereby showing that he was still in awe of the strength of the righteousness that the OT commandments contain. Basilides, however, dared to aver that the OT is a product from evil, and Valentinus also agreed with these persons on several points; they slandered the OT in particular, calling it bad and presenting certain passages in the OT as being both internally contradictory and in conflict with the NT (III.68).

However, before Titus deals with the passages in Scripture where the heretics allege there is a discrepancy between the OT and the NT, he wishes to attack the pagan philosophy which is without validity, since it is split into heresies. He takes up the subject because the pagans defend themselves by referring to the Christians as also being split into the heresies in question. This argument is untenable, he says, for the pagans acknowledge all their disagreeing philosophers as still being philosophers, thereby undermining any credibility for themselves (III.69), whereas heretics are immediately banished from the Catholic Church if they fail to acknowledge Scripture and to relinquish their teaching but instead actually reject part of Scripture. The Catholic Church has never called itself by the name of an individual person, apart from God’s Christ, who speaks in both the OT and the NT and who is God Himself, as can be seen from His speaking to ordinary shepherds and fishermen who with their lack of education must have been genuine and cannot have lied about Him (III.70). Heretics on the other hand are called by the name of their heresiarchs. Just like the pagan Greeks they introduce new and godless doctrines out of their own intellects and their own thought, and that is why the Manichaeans are called after Mani, the Marcionites after Marcion and the Valentinians after Valentinus. The truth is
present in the collected Scriptures, which are without internal contradiction, and the Catholic Church had always refused to call heretics Christians; for they are more alien to the Catholic Church than pagans (III.71). Those who are expelled have no share in the name of Christian, since it is not against a person that they have initiated their new doctrines but against Christ Himself (III.72).

If, however, one wishes to refer to the current debate, which has already been going for a long time, and the division that exists in the Catholic Church (clearly referring to the “Arian controversies”), Titus retorts that in the first place none of the Catholics dare to remove anything from the Holy Scriptures, and secondly, the division is not about the existence of the hypostases or their properties as such, but only about in what manner these properties exist. The conflict is due to overweening pride, and Titus wishes in all humility to refrain from such an inquiry. For all are agreed in their belief in the one principle that has no beginning, and the important thing is that all honour the Son, just as they honour the Father (cf. Jn. 5.23); as the Father’s honour is incomprehensible for every human being, so is the Son’s honour also incomprehensible (III.73). Against this, the heretics who are completely outside the Church, including the Manichaeans, have introduced non-existing principles and new properties; they are not Christians at all and therefore their existence does not render the Catholic truth dubious either. Christianity is solicitude for and protection of the holy books right down to the tittle of a single letter, and the heretics are thus expelling themselves from Christianity. While the pagan philosophers only do battle with people, the heretics do battle with God, who speaks from both the OT and the NT alike. Titus ends by explaining that he has found it necessary to diverge from the theme of his inquiry and attack the pagans because they have dared to employ the existence of heretics in an argument against the Catholic Church (III.74).

Simultaneously Titus has also moved away from the theme of his inquiry, because it is correct to argue in the same way against all the heretics who will not attribute the lawgiving in the OT to God. Against them Titus will prove that it is the same God who stands behind the OT and the NT. The heretics may be in dispute with each other, but they still agree on quoting passages such as Mt. 5.27–28.33–37 as proof of the conflict and contradiction between the two testaments. Titus, however, will only speak of difference and change, not about conflict and contradiction. In the NT there is a
growth and intensification of what has gone before, not its abolition. The OT was only insufficient out of concern for the weakness of its audience, and Christ came to perfect it (cf. Mt. 5.17) (III.75). The heretics on the other hand also wish to refer to Mt. 5.38–39 (to turn the other cheek, in contrast to lex talionis), which in their opinion demonstrates a distinction between humility and madness, but Titus explains that both the words of the OT, which are quoted, and Jesus’ words are spoken by the same God, but to different people in different epochs, as was appropriate for them (III.76). Those to whom God gave the Law were hard of heart, but lex talionis at least prevented the minor offences from being avenged by death, so instead they could be avenged in proportion to the offence itself; at the same time the threat of punishment implied in lex talionis had a preventive effect on the men of violence. God proved Himself good and merciful by paying regard to the weakness and violence of the times. If He had demanded at that time that they turn the other cheek, they would have thought that violent deeds were permitted because there was no punishment for them (III.77). Those who were taught in the NT, however, excelled in virtue to such a degree that they were able to receive the perfected precepts to show strength through endurance. But both the old and the new rules were given by the one and the same, and do not contradict one another, they are merely addressed to different people (III.78). The precepts would only contradict one another if the one group of rules inflicted nothing but damage, while the other was only of benefit. However, the precepts bring various advantages to those who receive them. The laws of the Jews were to take care of worldly matters, while the Christians’ laws were to train them in virtue with a view to what lay beyond. That is why the Jews were threatened with visible punishments of this world, whereas the Christians were threatened with something in the future in order that they should not be prevented from sin because of something visible. Permission for divorce furthermore was only given in the Law of Moses to prevent a worse evil, namely that anger in the family led to killing, but permission could be retracted in relation to Christians, whose customs were more elevate. So the Law of Moses already improved the customs with regard to the introduction of the new precepts. In the Law, the mystery of service was shown in types, but now it is overtly demonstrated with the help of truth itself; so the blood of salvation
was in both places, for there is no salvation without redemption through blood (cf. Heb. 9.22). Titus also adds the typologies from Rom. 2.29 and Gal. 4.25–26 (III.79).

The Manichaeans also put forward other passages from the OT and NT which they claim to conflict with one another. Titus settles for giving one example to refute their madness, also because the Manichaeans hide their books so as to prevent them being proved wrong. The Manichaeans exploit the OT portrayal of the sins of the righteous, even though they ought rather to wonder that the Scriptures also criticize them. But God benefits man both by depicting the righteous as good examples and by censuring their sin. Both when the Scriptures show that God was long-suffering towards these sinners, and that He punished the sinners, the Manichaeans attack Him. God’s forbearance even reveals itself in His indulgence with these attacks from the Manichaeans (III.80). Titus then seeks to demonstrate God’s divine dispensation in relation to the sins of one of the righteous, namely David’s sin in connection with Uriah and Bathsheba (2 Sam. 11–12); this is an example that every man can transfer to the others. Yet the Manichaeans ignore all David’s pious deeds and concern themselves only with his sin. However, when God weighed up David’s good deeds against his bad deeds, it was the former that tipped the scales, and yet God did not fail to heal the wicked deeds, for He had them censured through a prophet, then He revealed the hidden sin, and finally punished David despite his deep repentance; the Manichaeans ought to be ashamed of themselves. God gives everyone the opportunity for repentance, and only those whom He knows beforehand will not repent does He allow to harden themselves (III.81). Like a healthy body David’s devoutness had only one sore; so God did not destroy the entire body but healed the sore instead (III.82), and if there was more time, there would be much more to say about this matter (III.83). Titus urges his readers to admire David’s repentance when he was rebuked by Nathan; also in this way did David become an example for coming generations, just as in his psalms he continually confessed his sin with tears, so that one cannot read them without weeping (III.84). The Manichaeans ought not to call David a whoremonger, for one does not call a man an archer just because he fires a single lucky shot. One should similarly rather admire David for recovering so swiftly than for his degradation (III.85). In the same way the Manichaeans criticise other
righteous men from the OT, because they do not understand what they are reading, but Titus will not tire his readers with further refutation (III.86).

When the Manichaeans censure Moses’ words concerning the sins of the fathers that are punished to the third and fourth generations (Ex. 20.5; 34.7; Num. 14.18; Deut. 5.9), it is because they do not understand that the meaning only is that punishment is inflicted if the descendants also imitate the sins of their fathers; in other words the descendants are only punished for their own sins, but the threat in the formulation has a useful preventive effect. Titus summarises by saying that the Law and the Lawgiver are good, because they progressively raise mankind to a greater perfection, where the Law becomes superfluous (III.87).

Titus ends by stating that all the heretics’ scorn for the OT is foolish, for without the OT’s narratives and prophecies of Messiah the NT has no context; and also in relation to the NT Titus will refute the Manichaeans (III.88).

d. Summary of Book IV

Titus begins Book IV by referring to his refutation in Book III of Mani’s scorn for the OT, adding that he will now undertake a similar refutation with regard to the NT. Whereas Mani let the entire OT text stand unaltered and merely referred it to the archons of matter, he made cuts in the NT and discarded most of it in favour of only a few passages. Yet even on the basis of these fragments it is still possible to demonstrate Mani’s effrontery, quite apart from the fact that the fragments themselves point back to the context from which Mani excised them (IV.1). Mani did not really have any need for the NT, for a liar has no need of true words; his sole purpose in using NT passages was to lure the sheep from the church, and that is why in his writings he called himself Christ’s apostle and the Paraclete. However, towards the pagan Greeks he abandons the Christian material and instead sets out to prove that his message accords with their traditions (IV.2). When Mani calls himself Jesus Christ’s apostle, it must be pointed out firstly that the very name “Christ” comes from the OT (IV.3). Thus, one must either discard one’s confidence in Mani, or he himself must acknowledge the OT and its God. If Mani dared to say that the archon of matter proph-
esied the coming of Christ, he would undermine his own position, for it would mean that the archon was in possession of divine fore-
knowledge (IV.4). And if Mani says that the OT too has something of the good in it, he cannot then continue to reject the entire text. If one accepts the OT prophecy of Christ, however, one must also accept the rest that belongs with it, including the OT’s offices of king and high priest, both of which involved anointing and were united in Christ (IV.5). The term ‘Jews’ in the OT was not a shameful one, but contained a provisionally typological meaning that pointed forward to the new designation ‘Christians’, which was to replace it (IV.6). The Christians’ only disagreement with the Jews was indeed concerned with Christ, whom they believe has not yet come; on the basis of their own Scriptures they must themselves be refuted (IV.7). And when Mani calls himself Jesus Christ’s apostle, he is refuted by both the OT’s prophecies of Christ and the fact that the very name ‘Jesus’ is Hebraic (IV.8). At this point Titus takes the opportunity to explain in further detail the reason for the name ‘Christ’, partly through the oil of the priesthood, which typologically pointed towards the anointing by the Holy Spirit, and partly through the fact that those who are to fight are to be anointed with oil; the Christians are thus people who fight, in their case on the side of virtue, for which they are persecuted (IV.9). But the Manichaeans require no anointing for battles, since they regard virtue and vice as necessities of nature (IV.10). Nor does Mani wish to see his followers persecuted to death, but believes on the basis of 1 Cor. 9.19.22 that it is permissible to make sacrifices. So the Manichaeans are not anointed for battle and therefore do not have the right to the name of Christ. But Christ’s incarnation took place among the Jews because they had the prophecies about Him (IV.11).

Like his heretical predecessors Mani removed all the passages in the NT that referred to the God of the OT, but he also claimed to have been sent out by Christ as apostle and Paraclete with the purpose of removing the passages mentioned in the NT. However, Christ was born under Augustus, and suffered and ascended into heaven under Tiberius, after which 213 years passed before Decius. Under him lived Origen, who has named all the heretics, though not Mani, who consequently must have lived later than him. Why did it take such a long time before anyone was sent out who could cleanse Christ’s words from the intermingling of evil, and how was such intermingling at all possible? (IV.12). On the other hand, when Mani
claims that the words of Christ have been polluted with wicked additions, one must ask why Christ waited so long to intervene, right up until Mani arrived, and why he chose his disciples in vain and why he promised them the Holy Spirit after his ascension in vain. If Mani really was the Paraclete, Christ must also have been lying when he said that it was the Holy Spirit who would be the Paraclete (cf. Jn. 14.26; 15.26; 16.7). But how, without the Holy Spirit, have Christ’s disciples been able to convert so large a part of the world, which was otherwise in thrall to idolatry and immorality? It is clear, however, that it must have been none other than the Holy Spirit which enabled such simple people to perform miracles, to do battle with evil spirits and to step forward and speak out with boldness to hostile assemblies (IV.13). Furthermore, in contrast to Christ the Holy Spirit did not come in either bodily or visible form (IV.14). But how should a corporeal man like Mani be this Holy Spirit? The idea that Christ had a body was infamous, say the Manichaeans; yet on the other hand they believe that the Paraclete was a man, as though salvation by Christ was not enough (IV.15). And again, if they regard Mani as an ordinary man who has been instructed through his receptivity to the true Paraclete, then Mani cannot himself be the Paraclete, and we must also ask what was it for a spirit that Mani actually received? Why does Mani’s teaching differ on nearly every point from what Jesus’ apostles taught, if they received the same Holy Spirit? Mani has obviously received an unclean spirit, as can clearly be seen from his teaching about the principle of evil, blasphemies against the Creation and Providence and his denial of Christ’s corporeality. Mani, however, pretends to be sent out by the Christ who performed miracles and founded churches (IV.16).

Mani thus has his teaching from Satan and the evil spirits, but God allows his activity in order to test the believers in accordance with passages like Mt. 13.25.30; 1 Cor. 11.19; Tit. 3.10–11. Mani is a liar who has collected together all kinds of bad teaching from others (IV.17), but who himself claims that as the Paraclete he brings a revelation that is not from human beings, and that he is the coming completeness that is spoken of in 1 Cor. 13.9. However, none of Mani’s fables originates with himself; he merely gathered the evil things that were scattered among others (IV.18). The teaching of the two opposite principles, for instance, comes from the Persians, and the concept of ‘matter’ is from Aristotle, where, though, it means something quite different. Mani is thus both a thief and a forger. The
The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is from Plato, and it is common for both barbarians and pagan Greeks to call the sun ‘God’ and to believe in fate and horoscopes (IV.19). Mani ought to admit his thefts, but he is just an ungrateful disciple of the Greeks and barbarians and full of lies (IV.20). Titus does not exclude the possibility that errant teaching can contain certain elements of truth without however being a help to piety, but Mani’s teaching contains only lies. Mani has gathered up the lies of others, but also seems to have invented new things. Like the pagans Mani worships many gods, the only difference being that he gives them barbarian names (IV.21).

Titus goes on to state that Mani rejected the gospel’s references to Christ’s physical birth (a problem dealt with in IV.22–39). This accords with the fact that Mani did not regard the body as God’s work, a subject that Titus has already treated and to which he will return (cf. IV.27ff.). In addition Mani asked the question, how could it be a true prophecy that Christ would be of David’s seed? For Joseph was not Jesus’s father, since Mary was a virgin. It was Joseph nevertheless who was descended from David, not Mary. This was a question also raised by the Jews (IV.22). Titus’s provisional answer makes a point among others of showing that it is the same prophet who has predicted the virgin birth (Isa. 7.14) and Christ’s descent from David (Isa. 11.1), and he also discusses Mary’s ancestry (IV.23). Titus then emphasises that the bodily descent from David took place symbolically through Joseph’s engagement to Mary, which confirmed the truth of the prophecy, while the conception in truth and in reality was through the Holy Spirit. Moreover it was not for the sake of noble blood that the symbolic descent from David was important, but in order to express the fact that just as the family line came to an end, so did the corporeal kingdom (IV.24). The purpose of Joseph being of the tribe of Judah and Mary of the tribe of Levi was also to demonstrate that kingship and priesthood were united as spiritualised in Christ. This too was the prophesy of David, who furthermore spoke of Christ’s incorporeal generation from the Father, as well as his suffering, resurrection and coming again as judge (IV.25). Titus states that his presentation is somewhat broad, and he names Jews, Manichaecans and heretics among his opponents (IV.26).

The Manichaecans put the blame for sin on the body, even though it is only an instrument for the responsible part, namely the soul. However, as an instrument the body also participates in the virtuous deeds of the soul (IV.27). Because the Manichaecans find fault
with the body and say that Christ did not assume a body, Titus wishes to devote some attention to the subject. Through the incarnation Christ has assumed His own Creation. The body is not evil, but can be the soul’s assistant in virtuous action (IV.28). If Mani’s principle of evil had existed, it would not have been able to create an instrument like the body, since according to Mani this evil principle is without reason (IV.29).

Christ assumed a body, because salvation required that he resembled us, while the virgin birth was to show that it was God who became man (IV.30). Thus, the Creator did not come to something unclean, and Mary was particularly suitable for Him since she was sanctified to a special degree (IV.31). The virgin birth was supernatural, but nothing is impossible for the Creator (IV.32).

According to Titus, Mani claimed like previous heretics that the Saviour’s revelation was merely illusionary and apparent, and that is why he removed all the references to Jesus’s true body in the gospels. In consequence the Scriptures contained large lacunae and gaps between the individual passages, but Mani then connected these passages to each other, even though they were far apart. Titus adduces that Jesus really was circumcised on the eighth day (apparently this story was struck out by Mani), in order that the shepherd himself could belong with the sheep and fulfil the prophecy (IV.33). The reality of the incarnation is testified to in both Jn. 1.14 and at other points in the same gospel, in particular at the wedding in Cana (IV.34). But if a Manichaean were to say that the evangelist has written Jn. 1.14 and similar passages excised by Mani while he participated in matter, or were to claim that the fact that Jesus was seen by and associated with people perhaps does not mean that the body was real—like the angels who dined with Abraham (cf. Gen. 18)—Titus would answer that if that were the case, then Jesus was an impostor, but that at least the turning of water into wine must have been a reality, and that must then be true of the other things (IV.35). If on the other hand the Manichaean was to say that in these passages John has lied on purpose, one would be unable to give credence to anything else that he wrote; another possibility, however, is that they attribute the evangelist’s lie to the influence of matter, thereby acquitting the evangelist himself. Titus now cites passages from Jn. that assume Jesus’s real body, also after the resurrection, and he considers it totally improbable that the evangelist’s statement on the crucifixion should be illusory or mendacious (IV.36).
Also Lk. 24.37–39 testifies to the reality of Jesus’s body; Titus again refutes the possibility of a lie or of the influence of matter (IV.37). Since the influence of matter can be excluded, there are only two options left: the evangelists are either lying or telling the truth that Jesus did indeed have a body (IV.38).

The Saviour not only instructed souls but also healed bodies, which he would not have done if they originated from the evil one. In other words, the bodies were Christ’s creatures; he even gave the body back to Lazarus. It would not have been a special miracle if Christ had only promised life to those souls that are immortal by nature and not to the mortal bodies, and the body, which like the soul has also toiled for virtue, deserves just such a reward (IV.39).

In repeating many of the themes from Books I and II in a series of chapters (IV.40–43) Titus asks how Jesus’s promise of peace (Jn. 14.27) can be consistent with Mani’s fable of God, who can never find any peace from being attacked by matter (IV.40). In addition to adopting the pagans’ worship of evil spirits as gods, Mani goes much further than them by asserting his principle of eternal evil which even forced God to create a world for which there is no need; Mani’s God is weak. The body is not even created by God, but by the archons of matter (IV.41). Mani mocks the entire Creation and considers man’s fear of God’s rule futile (IV.42). Titus is astonished at the madness and blasphemy of Mani, who vilifies the Creation while enjoying its benefits. Mani does not acknowledge the difference between things and an ethical being like man; he introduces coercion and banishes the hope of conversion, and that is why he becomes the friend of young people who want permission to sin. In appearance the Manichaeans resemble ascetics or philosophers, but that is simply hypocrisy, a cover for magic and secret felonies (IV.43).

Indeed one ought to hate Mani even more than has been so far intimated for his destruction of the gospel. Mani rejects the reality of Christ’s body, and denies that the Word can influence matter. He restricts the Saviour’s words to just a few, but spins on endlessly with his own chatter in long hymns and epistles; there is no reason to say any more about his empty words and seductive arts (IV.44). However, Titus wishes to give a few examples of how Mani misuses different passages in the NT (the first examples he presents are concerned with dualism [IV.45–49]). Thus, Mani quoted the opening of Mt. 6.24 (“No man can serve two masters”) and interpreted this to mean the two principles, but he kept quiet about the sequel, “You
cannot serve both God and mammon”. If the opening words really do refer to two principles, it would not be true, for then one would have to serve them of necessity. The meaning, however, is precisely that it is possible to rid oneself of avarice, which is a passion of the mind. Titus cites other examples of how one can figuratively phrase it so that it is the passions that govern (IV.45). Mani struck out verses such as Jn. 1.3 and 1 Cor. 8.6, which show that there is only one principle, whereas he used a verse such as Mt. 6.24 in complete contravention of its meaning, which has to do with ethics, not God (IV.46). Mani similarly quoted Lk. 6.43–45 on the two trees and interpreted the verses as references to the two principles. However, the sequel (Lk. 6.45) shows that Jesus was not speaking of the two principles but about ethics (IV.47). For instructive purposes Jesus used unfree things from nature such as the two trees in order to speak about the freedom of the will (IV.48). The difference between necessity of nature and freedom is expressed by Jesus saying on the one hand good trees cannot bring forth bad fruit, nor bad trees good fruit, but on the other hand, despite His assertion that the evil person produces evil deeds, He does not say that such a person cannot also do good. Conversion is possible, as the Baptist’s words also demonstrate (cf. Mt. 3.10; Lk. 3.9); the Baptist’s threat of punishment contains an appeal and assumes that man sins freely and not out of the necessity of nature (IV.49).

Mani vilified the Creation and called it evil, invoking the passages on hatred of the world in Jn. 15.18–19; 17.14 (IV.50). But Christ does not call created things “the world”. Created things did not hate Christ; in the gospels they actually serve and obey him. “The world” that hated Christ means rather its inhabitants, mankind (IV.51). This is also clear from Jn. 15.20 (IV.52), as well as from Jn. 7.7, where Jesus does not say that the world is evil but only that its deeds are evil, which is because conversion is possible. It is also clear that Christ loved those who hated Him, and that He came to save and convert them. The correctness of Titus’s interpretation is to be seen from the way Jn. 17.14 is followed by 17.15 (IV.53). Christ wanted His disciples to remain in the world in order to convert their persecutors. The persecutors were to be changed voluntarily, but their nature was not to change, since it was not evil (IV.54). Not only in the gospel but already from the first Christ spoke in this way about humanity (Gen. 6.3.5) (IV.55). Titus has previously explained that man is of necessity created with the possibility for sinning, and that
the choice of sin is easy, whereas the virtuous deed is difficult (cf. III.10–29), but Titus now wishes to add that mankind is not worthy of the benefits that he hopes and expects. There is nevertheless a reason as to who receives them, in that God gives much for a small effort in order that man does not censure God for giving without distinction; moreover God’s gifts would not be of value to man if they were received by accident, without reason. It is not our own but God’s merit that we who did not exist came into being, but since we do exist, it is up to us to acquire virtue through reason. Man could not have been created differently (IV.56).

The Manichaeans, however, demand from the Catholics an explanation of Satan, which Titus is therefore also willing to provide (IV.57–85). The Manichaeans claim Jn. 12.31, among others, as proof that the prince of this world is another than God; Titus will now present the true understanding of this verse (IV.57). The reference to the prince of this world may either be to a prince of the other created things or to one who is only a prince of humanity. But since all created things have their immutable position within God’s order and can only move by virtue of the Creator’s decree (IV.58), the reference can only be to a prince of mankind, and Titus has already in fact explained the meaning of the term “the world” (cf. IV.51–55). On the other hand, certain passages such as Jn. 17.15 and 12.31 state that “the prince of this world” has no power from the necessity of nature; he is indeed to be “cast out”, and this is to happen through the sin of the world being taken away (cf. Jn. 1.29). Evil, then, is sin, not nature, and the prince will be cast out by the cessation of his power when the idolatry of evil spirits is destroyed and judgement is held over sin (IV.59). The conversion of all Romans and barbarians demonstrates that the Devil has lost his power. The fact that this conversion had its origin among a few uneducated fishermen proves that the power of the Devil cannot be a necessity of nature; otherwise he would not be driven out by such a little force.

Evil is the sickness of reason and not of nature, and the Devil also therefore uses precisely reason when he dupes man into sinning. It is thus clear that the Devil acts out of knowledge of both good and evil and appears to be motivated by envy (IV.60). That is, the Devil seduced man because he envied him his ability to be virtuous, since he knew that virtue is better than vice. In consequence, the Devil was evil by virtue of his intention, not because of his nature (IV.61). The Devil, who is thus evil on purpose, can only
lure man into sin, he cannot force him, for God has not allowed him to (IV.62). The Devil’s nature is thus good, and he is a created being, as can be seen from Jesus’s comparison of him with a flash of lightning (cf. Lk. 10.18), or—even more clearly—from the entire portrayal in Job 1 (IV.63). The demons’ words to Jesus (cf. Mt. 8.29; Mk. 1.24; Lk. 4.34) also prove that they were gifted with reason and knew the good one; moreover, the fact that it was possible to drive them away shows that they were subject to the dominion of God and not to an independent principle (IV.64). As for Satan himself, the temptation narrative (Mt. 4.1–11) proves the same thing (IV.65). Satan’s name, διάβολος, does not refer to his nature but to his deed, namely that he dares to slander man before God.

The Devil’s purpose is evil, but he can do nothing without the permission of God, who without the Devil’s will allows him to serve His will by testing rational man. For man has need of an opponent for there to be a battle and a victory for virtue (IV.66). Thus, it was inappropriate for God Himself to make tyrants persecute Christians, but God allows the Devil of his own free will to incite them to persecution, so that the believers can be crowned as confessors and martyrs. How could the whole world have gained salvation if the Devil had not aroused the envy of the Jews against our Lord, who gave Himself up to them? The Devil deserves no credit for his deeds, however, since his purpose is evil, and yet in a wonderful way God uses it in the service of great matters (IV.67). From the very first God could have stopped the Devil, but He leaves him alone and he comes to serve God’s plans (IV.68). If one is to object that on the contrary the Devil is victorious over a large number of people, Titus will answer that sin is man’s own responsibility, as can also be seen from the many inexperienced souls choosing evil without the Devil’s assistance (IV.69). The reason why God also allows the pious either to be tempted by the Devil or by their own nature is because with His foreknowledge He knows that they will win the struggle admirably, but as for the large number who fall, we must entrust the matter to God and His judgement (IV.70). The righteous, however, must have the opportunity to demonstrate their righteousness in practice and to exercise themselves (IV.71).

While the righteous are winning renown through their victory over the Devil, he on the other hand is already being punished through this disgrace (IV.72). The Devil is mocked by God’s forbearance, which does not remove him from the scene but allows him to be
where he is, so that he can constantly suffer defeat until the final judgement (IV.73).

The Devil’s rebellion and fall was not due to corporeal desire, since he is incorporeal, but rather to pride. This pride continues to reveal itself in the Devil’s endeavour to be worshipped as God, for instance before the Saviour’s face (Mt. 4.9) or before confessors and martyrs, and Mani shows himself as the Devil’s disciple by being seized with a similar pride against Christ to that which seized the Devil against God (IV.74). So the Devil fell, and was deprived of the intelligible nourishment which otherwise falls to the share of all spiritual beings, and that is why he envies man his goodness and cognition of God and tries to cause him to fall—voluntarily and through his bodily passions. The expression “prince of this world” is used because it makes sense from the viewpoint of the fallen beings, but in reality the Devil has no other power than that which God permits. In order to test the pious, God allows the Devil to attempt to be equal to Him, for example through Mani and the other heretics who abuse the name of Christ (IV.75).

Since the Devil has seen how Christ has defeated him by His coming in the flesh, he will also, as the Bible predicts, in the final count attempt to achieve a similar worship from man; this attempt will fail, and then Christ will come and punish him. For the present, however the Devil is seducing whoever he can in order to become their accuser later (IV.76). However, God does not allow him to force or test those who are truly weak either too hard or too soon. So those who fall do not do so because they were tempted beyond their powers, and those who prevail should not boast, for God determined the magnitude of the temptation (IV.77). Christ Himself provided the pattern for how to resist the Devil’s temptation, and when He finally commanded him to depart (cf. Mt. 4.10), He demonstrated who held sway, and that the Devil is not an independent principle (IV.78).

In their uncertainty, however, the Manichaeans ask who can have placed evil in the mind of Satan (IV.79). Titus answers by pointing out that all rational beings in their nature have a love of honour, the purpose of which is to drive them to toil for virtue, even though in their inexperience some rush headlong towards honour, losing their humility and becoming wicked in the process (IV.80), so that instead of honour they achieve the opposite in accordance with Jesus’s words in Mt. 23.12 (IV.81). In similar fashion the Devil abused his
natural self-esteem and exalted himself, and that is something he did not learn from others (IV.82). By nature all rational beings know virtue and vice, and indeed all ethical opposites, and they are in addition gifted with free choice, for only in that way is virtue a victory (IV.83). So the Devil fell through his own pride, but his nature was not changed. For his nature is beautiful, yet neither good nor bad, and this is true in general of the whole substance of Creation. Goodness comes subsequently through the choice of reason. Only God is substantially and immutably good, as the Saviour also testifies to (cf. Mt. 19.17 parr.), but the Saviour, who is from the Father, is also good, as well as the Holy Spirit. All others, however, are good by virtue of their rational will and not by nature (IV.84).

In conclusion Titus states that he has now as requested sought to give an account of the Devil and to show that he is not evil by nature or an eternal principle and to explain why God is leaving him alone until the last times. The account may also be of benefit to Catholics who are unsure on this point (IV.85).

Titus now wishes to mention all the quotations from Paul that Mani invoked and to refute his interpretation of them, which he does in IV.86–109. He therefore quotes Mani’s claim to be “the perfection”, in 1 Cor. 13.9–10, so that “the partial” can at last be repaired and cleansed, but Titus rejects this interpretation: complete knowledge is an eschatological gift that is not available in this life (IV.86). Claiming 1 Cor. 9.22 as a justification for the right to sacrifice during persecution contravenes the entire concern of Christ (IV.87). What Paul is referring to in 1 Cor. 9.22 was rather the fact that he was seeking to convince the Jews with the help of proof from the Law, but to convince the pagans with the aid of quotations from pagan poets (cf. Acts 17.28; Tit. 1.12). But if Paul had sacrificed while he was being persecuted, all sides would have lost confidence in him, and he would never have been beheaded by Nero or become the jewel and seal of the city of Rome (IV.88). The Manichaeans also invoke Mt. 20.16 and claim to be “the chosen” (the Elect), but already before the election in truth at Christ’s second coming the Manichaeans are outside the faith (IV.89).

Titus goes on to interpret some central passages in Rom. (IV.90–95). The Manichaeans cite Rom. 7.23—the law of the bodily members and of sin contra the law of the mind—as evidence that there is a conflict and opposition in man that stems from the “mixture” of good and evil. In his refutation Titus takes as his starting-point the
fact that just prior to the passage (Rom. 7.22)—and in conflict with the Manichaean view—Paul has acknowledged the law as being God’s. But if the laws of God and of matter are placed on an equal footing, then the good one ought not to have begun a battle against the evil one, since that battle could never be ended. If matter, as the Manichaeans claim, is without reason, then it could not have laid down a law either. The insane Manichaeans will never manage to understand the Scriptures (IV.90). Paul, however, was writing to the Jews who were contending for the Law in order to nullify the faith, and his purpose was to shame them and raise them up to the faith, which is better than the Law. The Law was given to the Jews, because they had no faith; of its own accord faith manages that which pleases God, and it has not learned this from outside. Faith in God is the knowledge that is acquired through the visible Creation and the natural concepts, and which is linked to affection and love of God (IV.91). But the Jews had no room for the inner faith, because they were buried in voluntary sin and therefore had to learn those things from the outside which the believers know from, and within, themselves. Since the commandments on cognition of God and virtue did not mediate love of God, they became idle and the Jews again became sinners (IV.92).

If one asks how the Law is of profit when it does not convert a man from evil, Titus answers that the Law has a preparatory value in revealing hidden sins; only when sins are acknowledged as sins, can steps be taken against them. Sinful habits had hidden knowledge and mind from view completely, but these were awakened by the Law, so that now we can distinguish between virtue and vice. That is why Paul says that the Law came in order to increase sin (cf. Rom. 5.20), which must be understood to mean that hidden sin was revealed. God’s grace, however, abounded all the more (cf. Rom. 5.20), but if the Law had not come first, grace would not have made sense, and herein lies the advantage of the Law.

So when Paul speaks to the Jews in Rom. 7, he is playing the role of a man who knows right from wrong through the external law, but who is imprisoned in sinful habits, and he speaks in the first person, but not of himself. Titus now lays out an interpretation of Rom. 7.14–17, in which he emphasises that “the sin that dwells within me” (cf. Rom. 7.17) refers to the sinful habit that is fixed in the person and which cannot be defeated by external commandments of the law but only from within through a good passion that
will increase by faith and banish the sinful habit from its habitation (IV.93). The “inner man” who delights in God’s Law (cf. Rom. 7.22) refers to mind, which accepts what the Law has taught it concerning virtue and vice, but which continues to be in thrall to the habit of sin because it is without faith, as Paul phrases it by speaking of another law in the bodily members which is at war with the law of the mind (cf. Rom. 7.23). The sinful action takes place through the limbs, and although it does not act by necessity, it is, like a long-standing habit, not different from necessity. The apostle wishes to shame the Jews, however, so that they can move forward to the faith of the gospel, but he asks who will set man free from “the body of death” (cf. Rom. 7.24), which refers to death of condemnation, not ordinary death. Nor is it a question of the apostle being against the natural, created body and wishing to live on this earth without a body, which is impossible, but he wishes to be released from the sinful habit which takes hold through the aid of the body. Release is possible, because the sinful habit is not natural but finds its power through the evil choice, and release takes place through God’s grace removing the evil and allowing man to become his own lawgiver. There is no longer a need to hear the external law (IV.94). This law of the spirit of life that has released man from the law of sin and death (cf. Rom. 8.2) does not refer to the law that was sent inside man by being heard, but to a law that with the aid of faith has taken up residence in the heart, as was also predicted in Jer. 31.33. However, the “law of sin and death” (cf. Rom. 8.2) is different from the Law of God (cf. Rom. 7.22), but the same as the law of sin in the members (cf. Rom. 7.23), namely, the sinful habit that resembles a law. On the other hand, the verse on the impotency of the Law (cf. Rom. 8.3) refers to the whole passage and deals with the fact that the Law could not change the incitements of the body or add anything extra to man. When the apostle says that God sent His Son “in the likeness of sinful flesh”, it is in order to specify that this flesh is without sin. Through his association with us, however, Christ killed our bodily passions by means of faith. We are gradually to move away from the Law and towards faith, for when we love God, we have no need of laws (IV.95).

Mani’s allegorical interpretations produce patent aberrations, and if Titus were to expound on all the passages that the Manichaeans adduce as evidence for their doctrines, yet another book would be required. Instead he will settle for refuting a couple of examples
(IV.96). For instance, the Manichaeans use 1 Cor. 15.50 to deny the resurrection of the dead and on this basis reject the entire context in which the apostle presents this doctrine (IV.97). To underline what was the apostle's concern, Titus now emphasises various passages from 1 Cor. 15 (IV.98). The meaning of 1 Cor. 15.50, however, is that the resurrected body will no longer contain bodily passions and diseases, nor will it require bodily nourishment, but will harmonise completely with the soul in the worship of God. We know, for example, from the heavenly bodies that bodies do not have to be made of flesh, and the fact that a change takes place we learn from 1 Cor. 15.51 (IV.99). The soul receives back its instrument (i.e. the body), which laboured with it but which is now in its altered state, no longer earthlike and full of fleshly desires which were originally required to render the battle for virtue possible (IV.100). The Manichaeans deny the resurrection with the help of words that are to do with the resurrection. By denying the resurrection of the body the Manichaeans either attribute weakness to God, which fits in completely with their fable that everywhere makes evil greater than God, or to injustice, because the body that took part in the struggle for virtue will not be rewarded for its victory (IV.101).

Paul cannot be credited with a doctrine concerning an eternal, hostile principle that acts with necessity; otherwise he would not, as in Eph. 2.1–2, censure his readers by speaking of them as previously being dead through trespasses and sins. In this passage Paul again assumes that they have converted voluntarily. But if this is to be believed, then Paul's teaching must already have been perfect, even though he wrote long before even the birth of Mani's grandparents (cf. IV.86). “The ruler of the power of the air” (cf. Eph. 2.2) refers to the Devil and seeks to express that he has mastery neither above nor below. The Devil sins of his own free will, and he is only our master if we ourselves allow him to be so (IV.102). If instead Paul had meant that the Devil was the ruler of all worlds, he would have said so; however, he makes it crystal clear that the Devil was evil of his own free will (IV.103). Titus demonstrates that Eph. 2.2–3 must refer to voluntary sins and does not contain an accusation against the body or against an eternal matter, as may also be seen from the expression “children of wrath”, which can also illustrated by Eph. 5.6–8. If evil here should be ‘darkness’ (Eph. 5.8), how can it also be ‘air’ (Eph. 2.2)? But with such expressions the Scriptures describe only the rational beings’ qualities (IV.104). When Paul says
that they were previously darkness (cf. Eph. 5.8), he is not referring to their substantial nature but to something linked to their free will (IV.105). The Manichaeans also invoke Eph. 6.12; here, though, it is clear that the Devil does not work with flesh and blood, but with cunning. The Devil seeks to outwit us because he is envious of us, which cannot, however, be reconciled with the Manichaean doctrine of the evil one who is outside reason (IV.106). In Eph. 6.11 Paul makes it clear that the Devil’s wiles can only be defeated with the aid of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are faith and devoutness, and he then lists who the Christians are to fight against (Eph. 6.12) (IV.107). Titus elaborates on the details of Eph. 6.12; thus “this darkness” refers to ignorance about God—for their doctrine of an eternal principle the Manichaeans cannot, according to Titus, invoke the designation “the god of this world” (2 Cor. 4.4) or such-like expressions; they are to be understood just as figuratively as when Paul says “the belly is their God” (Phil. 3.19) (IV.108).

Titus concludes by saying that just as he has now construed certain passages of the apostle in accordance with his intention, so can others do the same with the rest (IV.109). In the gospels and the epistles of the apostles one cannot actually find anything that is in concordance with Manichaean teaching, but only clear statements about the one and single God, the righteous and good dispensation and the judgement. The expressions “matter” or “the evil, opposite principle” do not even appear (IV.110).

The Manichaeans cannot cite Gen. 1.2 as proof that the earth is without beginning for immediately before, the Scripture states that God had created the earth. Mani avoids the entire OT because there we clearly find the doctrine of God’s monarchy and only a little about the Devil’s opposition, and from the NT he can only retain a modicum in support of his teaching. But with foreknowledge the Scripture has already warned against Mani (Titus refers to Mt. 13.25; Tit. 3.10–11) (IV.111). Titus has no hope of being able to convert those who are completely captured by Manichaeism, but he does hope to be able to immunise those who are stronger and more vigilant against it. Above all one should avoid those who worship idols, as Paul has already cautioned in 1 Tim. 4.1–5 (IV.112). Titus underlines how exactly this passage by Paul fits the Manichaens (IV.113).

Christ, who has promised that the Church will be spread throughout the world, gave the promise that the gates of Hades should not prevail against it (cf. Mt. 16.18); this expression refers to all the
means whereby the Christians are to enter the gates to martyrdom, such as by the sword, fire, water etc. Where the gates to martyrdom and confession are, there the Church of Christ is also manifest, but those who believe that martyrdom is superfluous are foreign to Christ and His Church (IV.114). A further characteristic of the true Church’s position is that it is the Son of Man to whom one confesses as Christ, which implies the incarnation; Mani on the other hand teaches that Christ is the fifth element, and that from time to time the good one has constantly sent out others than Christ (IV.115). So the Church of Christ is not with those who do not confess that the only Christ is He whom the OT predicted would come in the flesh (IV.116).
CHAPTER THREE

RECEPTIONS, EDITIONS AND SCHOLARSHIP HISTORY
OF CONTRA MANICHAEOS

1. Knowledge of Titus in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages

There is a considerable difference between on the one hand identifying one’s own position and those of the past when using Contra Manichaeos to attack “the Manichaeans” and on the other hand making the work an object for analysis and interpretation. Since the Catholic and Orthodox Churches continued to be confronted with what they regarded as “Manichaeism”, Contra Manichaeos was used for the first purpose far into early modern times. In the Roman Catholic world, however, there was no access to Contra Manichaeos in the Middle Ages; its author was only known through Jerome’s mention of him, whereas the work was in use in both the Greek Orthodox and the Syrian Churches.

It is still not possible at present to draw a clear picture of Titus’s importance for posterity.1 The fact that he was not completely unknown is apparent from the material that follows in this chapter. Several writers from his immediate posterity name Titus; Jerome mentions him twice very commendably,2 and Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica III.14,42 (written between 439 and 450) ranks him alongside Eusebius of Emesa, Serapion of Thmuis and a number of others as the most outstanding writer of the 4th century.³ We must assume, however, that Titus’s particular significance was for the later anti-Manichaeism.

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¹ A separate case which will not be dealt with here is the further importance that Titus’s other authorship has had (see below pp. 128–29 on this; see Sickenberger 1901, 118–30 on the use of Titus’s Hom. in Luc. in later gospel commentaries. Syriac excerpts from Titus’s Hom. in Luc. (cf. British Museum, Add. 17,191, Wright 1871, 1010b, No. 23 [Wright 1871, 1008b–1015b (DCCLXIV)]) suggest that this work too was translated into Syriac (Baumstark 1922, 60).
² See below p. 126 and p. 256.
³ Bidez 1960a, 125; cf. Sickenberger 1901, 5–6. See also below p. 123 with regard to Sozomen’s mention of the Julian-episode.
G.G. Stroumsa and S. Stroumsa regard Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos* as by far the most important Christian anti-Manichaean work in Greek, and they assert—without direct documentation, though it is *a priori* probable—that its arguments were taken up time and again by later Christian heresiographers, a claim supported by other writers.4 A closer examination of whether this assertion has anything of substance in it would be of interest; so far there have been only a few studies and in this context I can furthermore point to the possibility of other influences from Titus on later writers which could be examined. It has been proved, for instance, that Epiphanius, who wrote shortly after Titus, already uses him as a source in his refutation of Manichaeism.5 Theodoret of Cyrus mentions Titus explicitly several times in his *Haereticarum fabularum compendium*,6 and it is therefore possible that he has drawn on him in his presentation of Manichaeism. Around 500 Bishop Heraclianus of Chalcedon mentions him in his own, lost work against Manichaeism, as can be seen from Photius’s *Bibliotheca*, cod. 85; the same work by Photius also testifies, in cod. 232, that Stephanus Gobarus (after 560) quoted Titus and also claimed that Titus was positive towards Origen.7 Later John of Damascus (c. 750 or 780) employs Titus quotations in his *Sacra Parallela*; since John was also acquainted with Titus, it would conceivably be a fruitful project to search for the influence of Titus on the great theologian.8

I. Hadot demonstrated several similarities between the anti-Manichaean polemic in Titus and the Neo-Platonic philosopher Sim-

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4 Stroumsa and Stroumsa 1988, 43; Casey 1937, 1589; Klein 1991, 42.
5 Epiphanius himself states in *Haer.* 66.21.3 that great men have already rebuffed Manichaeism with admirable counter-attacks, after which he mentions a number of writers, the last being Titus (Holl 1933, 49.3). Cumont has proved that in his chapter on the Manichaens Epiphanius actually used Titus as a source (Cumont and Kugener 1912, 157–59; cf. Alfaric 1919, 17, 25. Cf. also the notes in Holl 1933, 13–132 and Williams 1994, 219–308).
6 See also below pp. 137–38.
Simplicius (c. 530), respectively, but would nevertheless not assume that Simplicius was dependent on Titus. On the basis of Hadot’s work, however, S.N.C. Lieu appears to believe that this was the case, which, if it is so, is of great interest for the history of ideas to show that it was not only Christian writers of Late Antiquity who were influenced by the Platonists, but that the opposite was also now and again the case.

Photius himself also mentions Titus together with Cyril of Jerusalem, Epiphanius, Serapion, Alexander of Lycopolis and Heraclianus in his anti-Manichaean work (871–72), which was directed at the Paulicians (Narratio de Manichaïs recens repullulantibus). We have thus reached the point that the reason why so many anti-Manichaean works, including Titus’s Contra Manichaeos, are preserved is presumably to be found in the fact that for later churchmen they served as an arsenal of arguments against heresies such as the Paulicians and the Bogomils. In this context it must be noted that the two Greek Titus codices from the Middle Ages contain other anti-Manichaean works besides that by Titus.

Posterity thus regarded Titus as an orthodox authority; indeed, Sickenberger actually states that the manuscript titles and the lemmata in the catenae often describe him as holy, but that other traces of a Titus of Bostra cult are lacking.

Outside the Greek-language Church Titus’s Contra Manichaeos has been of importance to the Syrian Churches. Contra Manichaeos was translated into Syriac almost in Titus’s own lifetime and there are also a number of Titus quotations in Syriac manuscripts. Finally, Contra Manichaeos is mentioned in the Syriac writer Abdišo’s Catalogus librorum omnium ecclesiasticorum.

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10 Lieu 1994, 159, 192.
12 Cf. Lieu 1994, 159.
13 I.e. the codices G and V; see below pp. 109–12. Among G’s 14 texts are 3 anti-Manichaeans (Ehrhard 1893, 205;—Ehrhard 1893, 204 also writes of G: “Die Quaternionen sind eigenhümlicherweise armenisch numerirt. Die orientalische Heimath des Codex, die sich auch im übrigen erkennen lässt, wird dadurch bestätigt”, cf. Brinkmann 1894, 490–91). V contains among its many texts no fewer than 8 that are anti-Manichaeans (Eustratiades and Arcadios 1924, 52–53).
14 Sickenberger 1901, 9.
15 Cf. below pp. 112–13, 116.
16 Abdišo’s Catal. XXIX (Assemani 1725, 41.2; translated by Badger 1852, 366).
2. Reception of and scholarship on Contra Manichaeos from the end of the 16th century to De Lagarde’s editions of the text in 1859

In the turmoil of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation it was almost inevitable that the Catholic tradition for branding heresies as “Manichaean” would be revived. Now it was Luther and Calvin who were Manichaean, and the ancient heresiology was dug out to prove the claim, while the Protestants defended themselves by among other things attacking the Manichaeism of the past through historical studies.17 It was precisely in the context of this Counter-Reformation strategy that Contra Manichaeos became available to Western European scholars. The Spanish Jesuit Francisco Torres (Latinised “Franciscus Turrianus”, c. 1504–84) produced translations of Greek heresiology in Latin, among them those parts of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos that were available to him (i.e. Book I–II, as well as the beginning of Book III). After his death they were published in Ingolstadt, also with a Counter-Reformation purpose, as was the case too with the Contra Manichaeos translation first printed in 1604 by Heinrich Canisius and reprinted many times since.18

However, it turned out that it was unsure whether Greek heresiology always contained a confirmation of Roman Catholic dogmatics. Barely 100 years after the first two books of Contra Manichaeos had become generally available through Torres’s translation, the question was raised by Louis Ellies du Pin in the second volume of his major work, Nouvelle bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques, as to whether Titus had been an adherent to the doctrine of original sin. Du Pin possessed a genuinely historical understanding that the Church writers were to be seen in the context of their time, and he realised that Church dogmas could be unknown to the older Church writers, because they had not been taught until a later epoch. Regarding Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos he noted:

17 See further in Ries 1988, 17ff.
18 See Petitmengin 1988, 128–36 on Torres’s person and work with further references to the Titus translation; and Petitmengin 1988, 135, 153, on the Titus translation; and Petitmengin 1988, 130, 133 on the context with Counter-Reformation interests. Editio princeps Canisius 1604, 31–142. Reprinted 1610 (Petitmengin 1988, 153; Petidier [1692, in his unpaginated “Table des editions”, which follows the “Préface” and “Table des chapitres”] also speaks of an edition “dans la Bibliothèque des Peres, édition de Cologne de 1618”). See further below p. 110 on Torres’s translation, which also included a long interpolation that has later been proven not to be part of Titus’s work.
Il y a dans ces Livres beaucoup de Metaphysique & de Dialectique. Les raisonnemens en sont solides & subtiles. Le stile est assez net & assez pur pour un ouvrage de cette nature. Il est surprenant qu’il n’ait point eu recours au peché originel, pour expliquer toutes les difficultez des Manichéens. Il lui cût servi de solution generale à presque toutes leurs objections. Car on n’a plus de peine à comprendre, pourquoi l’homme est porté au mal, pourquoi il souffre, pourquoi il est sujet à la faim, à la douleur, aux maladies, aux miserades, à la mort, quand on a une fois admis le peché originel. Il ne s’en est toutefois point servi pour expliquer ces questions, il les a examinées en Philosophe. Il n’a point parlé de la grace de Jesus-Christ, & il semble avoir supposé que l’homme peut de lui-même faire le bien comme le mal.  

It was Du Pin’s historical understanding, including in particular his observations on the weak position of the doctrine of original sin among many of the early Church fathers, which especially aroused the ire of the orthodox Benedictine, Mathieu Petitdidier, and forced him to go on the attack in Remarques sur la bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques de M. Du Pin. Here Petitdidier also dealt with Titus of Bostra, maintaining that Du Pin in Contra Manichaeos ought to have been able to read why Titus did not avail himself of the mystery of original sin in his refutations. Petitdidier pointed out that Titus’s remarks in Contra Manichaeos III.1 on the aim of the whole must mean that des quatre Livres de Tite de Bostre les deux premiers étoient destinez pour détourner les Payens des rêveries de Manichée, & les deux derniers pour en détourner les Chrétiens: Que dans les deux premiers n’ayant en vû que des gens qui n’étoient pas instruits de nos Mysteres, & qui ne reconnoissoient pas l’autorité de l’Ecriture, il avoit cru devoir se renfermer dans les bornes de la raison, sans rien emprunter de ce que la foy & l’Ecriture nous enseignent: & que dans les deux derniers il s’en étoit tenu uniquement à l’autorité des Ecritures.

When measured by how much of Contra Manichaeos was available at the time, Petitdidier’s interpretation was doubtless just as feasible as Du Pin’s. But also in relation to Du Pin’s claim about the lack of teaching on grace in Contra Manichaeos Petitdidier expressed his disagreement: Titus himself pointed out in Contra Manichaeos (II.16) that

\[\text{19} \text{ Du Pin 1687, 380–81 (on Titus in general Du Pin 1687, 378–82, 967, 996).}\\ \text{20} \text{ Petitdidier 1692, 362–77. See further in Carreyre 1935 on Du Pin and Petitdidier’s controversy; their disagreement on Titus is also referred to in Sickenberger 1901, 14 n. 3 (–15); cf. also Haase 1959, 381–82. Cf. also Basnage 1725, 57 on the question of a doctrine of original sin in Titus.}\\ \text{21} \text{ Petitdidier 1692, 362–64 (quotation: 363–64).}\]
man achieved virtue “with God’s assistance” (→ Ch. XI.20), and he speaks of God’s correction and education of man. Petitdidier commented:

Il est clair... que Tite de Bostre parle de la grace, & que quoiqu’il
donne beaucoup à la liberté de l’homme, il ne laisse pas de reconnaitre
que pour faire le bien il a besoin du secours de Dieu. ... Il est vrai qu’il semble...
que cet Auteur ne mette la grace que dans ces choses purement exterieures.
Mais outre que je ne pretens pas justifier
sa doctrine sur la grace, & qu’il ne suffit d’avoir montré que M. du
Pin s’est trompé lorsqu’il a dit, qu’il n’a point parlé de la grace: On
peut répondre qu’il a cru que ces adversissements & ces châtimens
extérieurs étoient accompagné d’un mouvement intérieur...

Du Pin’s Jansenism presumably excludes the possibility that he had any hidden theological or ideological agenda, when he maintained that many early Church fathers only had imprecise or no ideas at all of original sin, but Petitdidier was undoubtedly right to fear that Du Pin’s observations could be used by others.23 In the following century the rejection of the doctrine of original sin was to become a basic element in many forms of Enlightenment ideology.

At the same time tendencies towards the concept of heresy being undermined appeared in the Protestant world. Best-known is Gottfried
Arnold’s Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments biss auf das Jahr Christi 1688, which was first published in 1699–1700. A radical pietist Arnold condemned the persecutions in the confessional conflicts, denunciations and the use of ancient heretical designations by himself taking the side of mystics and enthusiasts—the inner man’s true piety that was played off against institutions, dogma and the heresy-makers. Heretics were nearly always defended—and indeed Arnold also rehabilitated the Manichaeans—at the same time as he noted with disgust how among others the Lutherans had been accused of being Manichaeans, while themselves bringing charges of Manichaeism against one another in their internal disputes. Arnold’s

22 Petitdidier 1692, 365–66.—In the third edition (Du Pin 1701, 499 [the second edition has not been available to me]) Du Pin seems to make an admission to
Petitdidier, though not a real one, in that the last sentence in the above quotation now reads: “& il semble avoir supposé que l’homme peut de lui-même faire le bien comme le mal avec les secours extérieurs de Dieu.”

23 In his “Preface” Petitdidier (1692, LXXXI) argues that Du Pin commits a very great injustice against the Church and he believes that Du Pin has partly given the Calvinists the opportunity to despise the Church fathers, and partly allowed the Socinians to exploit Du Pin’s admission to maintain their claim that the doctrine of original sin did not exist at all in the oldest times.
treatment of Manichaeism was rather summary, however, and Titus of Bostra was not mentioned.\footnote{Only the edition of Arnold 1729; 1729a has been available to me. The section on the ancient Manichaeans is in Arnold 1729, 129–35 including (130) his remarks on the later use of charges of being Manichaeans.}

Arnold’s demand for a truth-seeking “impartial” re-evaluation of the heresies and his sympathy for the Manichaeans is found again in the Reformed theologian Isaac de Beausobre’s \textit{Histoire critique de Manichée et du Manicheisme} from 1734–39, which with reservations is regarded as the first work of modern scholarship on Manichaeism.\footnote{Cf. also De Beausobre’s (1734, 239–40) remarks on Arnold; cf. Ries 1988, 36, 56 n. 88. Cf. Haase 1959, 390; Van Oort 2000a; Stroumsa 2000 on De Beausobre.} As a result of the Huguenot persecutions De Beausobre had fled from France via Holland to Berlin, and his motives for writing the book were undoubtedly linked to the application of Manichaeism as a cliché in the confessional conflicts of previous centuries. He himself asserts that when he set out to examine the origins of the Reformation, he found an attempt at reformation already among the Waldenses and the Albigenses. The charges against the latter of being Manichaeans now led De Beausobre to investigate the ancient Manichaeans.\footnote{De Beausobre 1734, III–V.} He endeavoured to acquit the Manichaeans of false accusations and considered that, whatever their errors, they had been driven by honourable motives, and therefore it was the Church fathers who were to be criticised.

De Beausobre’s book represented scholarly progress, particularly through his collection and evaluation of source material which among other things shook the historicity of the information about Mani in an important anti-Manichaean text, \textit{Acta Archelai}. In contrast to this text and in particular to the heresiologist Epiphanius’s work, De Beausobre considered with some justification that Titus’s refutation of Manichaeism bore the mark of \textit{fairness}. De Beausobre stated that Titus never accused the Manichaeans of employing magic, of calling up demons or of performing disgusting ceremonies, but although this is admittedly true, he ought really to have mentioned that on other points Titus was willing to impugn the Manichaeans morally. Nevertheless De Beausobre also hit the mark when he wrote that Titus presented his opponent \textit{comme un Philosophe, qui, persuadé que le Monde ne répond pas à l'idée, que nous avons des Perfections}
Divines, s’est mis dans l’esprit, qu’il y a un autre Principe que Dieu.”

This is true even if the formulation may well be influenced by the contemporary discussion of theodicy in Bayle and Leibniz.

Finally, it must be noted that De Beausobre led subsequent scholarship astray by claiming definitively that Titus used as a source one of Mani’s own works, *The Book of Mysteries*; this mistake was retained by many later scholars until it was corrected in 1912 by F. Cumont.

De Beausobre used only Torres’s translation of *Contra Manichaeos*, even though the Greek original of the same parts of the work had been edited a few years previously in 1725 by another Huguenot, Jacques Basnage, who had gone into exile in the Netherlands and had also incidentally been a close friend of Pierre Bayle. Basnage’s project was to present a revised edition of Canisius’s work, supplementing the Latin translations with the Greek originals also in the case of Titus. By virtue of his experience as a persecuted Protestant Basnage, like De Beausobre, was eager to clear persecuted religious communities of false allegations, and he was also in dispute with Roman Catholic theologians interested in establishing a continuity between the Reformation and the mediaeval heretics, which raised the problem of the Albigenses’ “Manichaeism”.

De Beausobre and Basnage remained orthodox Calvinists, but went a long way down the road in support of religious freedom, and their desire for truth in their historiography paved the way for some of the most sympathetic aspects of the Age of Enlightenment that followed. One of the greatest Church historians of that era, Johann

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27 De Beausobre 1734, 222–23 on Titus (quotation: 222).
28 De Beausobre (1734, 221–23, 427–28) misunderstood Epiphanius, *Haer.* 66.13–14, who having first mentioned *The Book of Mysteries* and then a number of other titles of Mani’s works carried a Mani-quotation (Ἡθες και ζηλη, etc., *Haer.* 66.14,1, Holl 1933, 363ff.) that De Beausobre referred without grounds to *The Book of Mysteries*. Since this same quotation is found in Titus, *Contra Manich.* 1.6, Gr. 4.16ff., De Beausobre concluded that Titus throughout refuted *The Book of Mysteries*. The error is found again in Walch 1762, 720, 752; Baur 1831, 10, 461 n. 35; Flügel 1862, 355; Kessler 1889, 197–98.—Cumont (Cumont and Kugener 1912, 157ff.) pointed out firstly that Epiphanius did not refer the quotation to *The Book of Mysteries*, and proved secondly that Epiphanius was merely quoting Titus. Cf. also Holl 1933, 36 in the note.
29 Basnage 1725, 56–162. This edition, which also contains only *Contra Manich.* I–II and the beginning of Book III (plus the interpolation [see below pp. 109–11], which does not come from Titus), includes Torres’s translation.—See Haase 1959; Cerny 1987 on Basnage; Haase (1959, 390) and Cerny (1987, 169–72) on his edition of the Church fathers; cf. Petitmengin 1988, 134.
Lorenz von Mosheim (1694–1755), also devoted much attention to the heretics, but by now the question of who had constituted the “true Church” was outmoded. Heretics were not to be condemned, though they were not to be regarded as witnesses to the truth either. It therefore comes as no surprise that Von Mosheim’s comprehensive investigation of Manichaeism\textsuperscript{31} was finally able to detach this area of scholarship from the clashes between Catholics and Protestants. Instead he changed the direction of the debate by deriving Manichaeism to a large extent from non-Christian oriental philosophy. Von Mosheim also emphasised Titus of Bostra’s importance as a source, and he included a good deal of Titus’s information in his own interpretation.\textsuperscript{32} Another major Church historian of the Enlightenment, Christian Wilhelm Franz Walch (1726–84), also treated Manichaeism, mentioning Titus and drawing on his work.\textsuperscript{33}

The tendency towards accentuating the non-Christian elements in Manichaeism that Von Mosheim in particular initiated grows even stronger with the key work, \textit{Das Manichäische Religionssystem nach den Quellen neu untersucht und entwiikelt}, by the Tübingen theologian, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), published in 1831 and generally regarded as the second and real basis of modern scholarship on Manichaeism. Baur proposed that Buddhism and Iranian religion had been the two main sources of Mani’s inspiration.

Baur also made wide use of Titus in his presentation. With his background in German idealism Baur was better placed than later scholars to appreciate Titus and Augustine’s philosophical arguments against dualism.\textsuperscript{34} Baur thus accepted that Manichaean dualism was philosophically untenable,\textsuperscript{35} but he therefore had to ask how Mani could possibly have constructed such a system. Baur then drew on the distinction in German idealism between “image” and “concept”,\textsuperscript{36} and his answer was broadly that although Mani’s “matter” could in

\textsuperscript{31} Von Mosheim 1753, 728–903. See also Baur (1831, 2–3; 1852, 118–32) on Von Mosheim and his studies of Manichaeism.
\textsuperscript{32} Von Mosheim 1753, 730–31 on Titus; scattered references in Von Mosheim 1753, 728–903.
\textsuperscript{33} Walch 1762, 812 on Titus; scattered references in Walch 1762, 685–814. See also Baur (1831, 3; 1852, 145–151) on Walch’s work.
\textsuperscript{34} A brief summary of Titus’s argument in \textit{Contra Manich.} I.5–13 is found in Baur 1831, 29–33; Baur 1831, 29 (cf. 340) describes Titus and Augustine’s arguments as “scharfsinnige Einwendungen”.
\textsuperscript{35} Baur 1831, 37.
\textsuperscript{36} See e.g. Baur 1831, 9.
fact only have an apparent reality, Mani was indulging a propensity for “mythisch-bildlichen Versinnlichung”. It is therefore necessary, says Baur, that one not only judges Mani’s system “als ein philosophisches System nach der logischen Strenge des Begriffs”, but that one also regards it “als ein mythisches Poem”.

Baur is possibly right in claiming that the philosophical criticism of Manichaeism by the Church fathers is not without interest in the field of philosophy. He is at any rate clearly right in stating that the Church fathers asked philosophical questions of the Manichaeans that to some extent lay outside their horizon. Whatever the case, there can be no doubt that it was Baur’s ability to think in “image” and “concept” that enabled him to draw such a significant distinction within the anti-Manichaean texts that were his sources. According to Baur these texts can be divided into two classes:


Baur’s distinction can serve as an example that speculative models may also help towards a better understanding of historical material. Widengren’s judgement is that here Baur has “eine evident richtige Scheidung der Quellen unternommen”.

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38 Baur 1831, 39–40. Baur also believed, however, that the mythical was a poetical clothing of philosophical and religious ideas that could not be separated from the mythical (see e.g. Baur 1831, 81, 149), though this circumstance was not always clear to Mani and therefore could not really be pursued in Baur’s interpretation (see e.g. Baur 1831, 348–50, 489–90).
39 Baur 1831, 8–9. Baur (1831, 9–10) thought that both ways of presentation belonged to the original Manichaean system, and also explained the difference between them based on the views of the authors in question and not on the character of their sources.
40 Widengren 1978, 279.
Baur’s view of the passage on the Paradise narrative in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 (→ Ch. XI.34) is also of interest. He believed that the allegorical reading found in *Acta Archelei* XI.1, represents the Manichaeans’ original understanding of the narrative; “Die Erklärungen der Manichäer über die Mosaische Geschichte des Falls machen es ... sehr wahrscheinlich, daß sie ihr keine historische Wahrheit zuschrieben.”41 On this basis Baur suggested that *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 could hypothetically either assume “die factische Realität der Mosaischen Erzählung”, or the text could express a later polemical development within Manichaeism.42

In the period up to and including Baur, scholarship on Manichaeism was primarily the domain of Church historians, but after him it also passes into the hands of orientalists and historians of religions, though without the theologians ever quite relinquishing it. This change is due in some degree to the tendencies in Baur’s book, but also to the arrival of new sources that provided a clearer awareness that Manichaeism contained many ideas of non-Christian origin. Like Baur, therefore, the conclusion was that Manichaeism had essentially been a non-Christian movement. To some extent, however, the trend in scholarship was also linked to the intellectual and political changes of the 19th century which were to initiate university studies in the new fields of History of Religions and Comparative Religions.

One scholar who to some extent may be considered as being in the field of tension between theology and the trend towards Comparative Religions is the remarkable German orientalist Paul Anton de Lagarde (1827–91), who in 1859 provided in all essentials the textual basis on which scholarship on *Contra Manichaeos* has rested ever since. Although to the best of my knowledge De Lagarde expressed no particularly deep interest in Manichaeism, it is worth stating in the context that certain impulses from De Lagarde seem to have been instrumental in the development of the so-called “History of Religions School” in Göttingen in the 1890s which proved to be of such importance in the history of scholarship on Gnosticism and Manichaeism.43

The reason that De Lagarde became the hitherto most important editor of Titus was to some extent a coincidence. He arrived in

41 Baur 1831, 157–62; quotation: 159.
43 See the section on De Lagarde in Hjelde 1994, 87–125, and on De Lagarde’s importance for the History of Religions School in Hjelde 1994, 89.
London in 1852, because in previous decades the British Museum had acquired a large treasure of ancient Syriac manuscripts, but his plan was to create a new edition of the NT based on the oriental versions. It was only when it turned out that the assistant keeper of manuscripts, W. Cureton, had reserved for himself the most important manuscripts that would have been relevant for the project in question that De Lagarde plunged into a transcription of other Syriac manuscripts, so that already by Oct.-Nov. 1852 he had transcribed the Syriac translation of Titus, which, in contrast to the material that had so far been available, comprised all four books. In 1859 De Lagarde then published his edition of this Syriac version, along with a new edition of the same parts of the Greek text that Basnage had published earlier. In a number of respects the basis for Titus-studies was changed by De Lagarde’s editions, as I shall hope to point out, but at this point it is reasonable to take stock of the character of the contributions to Titus scholarship that the previous c. 280 years had given rise to, and which first and foremost had reached a turning-point with Baur’s book.

We can note the existence of two differing interests in relation to Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos*. Whereas Du Pin and Petitdidier were concerned with Titus’s own dogmatic position, De Beausobre, Von Mosheim and Baur, for example, were interested in Titus’s information on the Manichaeans. These two possible approaches are also to be found after Baur, and since scholarship on Manichaeism now took place, often but not always, without contact to Church history, it is possible to present them separately, even though contributions were still being made that covered both lines. The interest in Titus as a source of knowledge of Manichaeism is clearly represented as the stronger of the two, and here Titus’s own concern is really without importance, since the important thing is to find authentic information on Manichaeism that is hidden in his work. On the other hand, the interest in placing Titus’s thought within the theological and philosophical currents of his time grants Titus’s own concern a place of importance, while on the other hand largely ignoring the issue of Titus’s work as a source of knowledge on Manichaeism.

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44 De Lagarde 1859 (the Greek text); De Lagarde 1859a (the Syriac text). See the forewords in both editions, as well as Rahlfis 1928, 15 n. 3, 42–48, 54 n. 1–2, 56–58, more distantly Schemann 1920, 125, 139, 319, on De Lagarde’s editions of Titus.
As far as possible the following presentation will follow the division of Titus scholarship into these two lines. In addition the presentation will continue to place the scholars in their historical context, to make their underlying interests explicit and, where it is deemed relevant, to include aspects from the wider field of scholarship in which their examination of Titus places itself.

3. Contra Manichaeos as a source of knowledge on Manichaeism

The second half of the 19th and the whole of the 20th century were marked by a tremendous expansion of the source basis for Manichaean studies, in the first place through the publication of Arabic accounts of Manichaeism, then later through the publication of hitherto unknown Syriac sources, and finally and above all through the discoveries of original Manichaean texts. In consequence, the significance of the information that can be extracted from Titus’s own work has become increasingly less, even if it has never quite been extinguished in that it remains a source of independent information. But perhaps relatively little work was done on the value of Titus as a source because the information did not have the same decisive importance as before.

However, a minor contribution was made on the subject of Titus’s Manichaean sources in 1901 by a study orientated towards Church history, in which through a comparison with Contra Manichaeos J. Sickenberger examined the authenticity of, and edited alleged fragments of, Homiliae in Lucam, a work written by Titus. Around the

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45 With regard to Titus as a source of knowledge on Manichaeism I mention only writers who have either tried to establish which sources Titus might have used or who have made an extensive use of material from Titus. It is not possible to include the many who have merely borrowed some “information” on Manichaeism from Titus’s work. In addition a few minor contributions may be mentioned: a paper from the 1930s on Titus’s Contra Manich. (Frankenberg 1938) exists only as a summary. Observations regarding content and textual criticism on Titus, Contra Manich. II.56, Gr. 60.38–61.5, exist in a minor article by Allberry (1939, 130–31). Information on the Manichaens’ understanding of evil, derived from Titus, is included in Rottenwöhrer’s (1986, 115–45) survey of the origin and nature of evil according to heterodox teaching from Marcion to the Cathars. Incidentally, accounts of the history of scholarship on Manichaeism as such are to be found in Nyberg 1935; Widengren 1978; Ries 1988, and an almost complete bibliography up to and including 1996 in Mikkelsen 1997.

46 Even among these “new” Syriac sources we can also include De Lagarde’s edition of the Syriac version of Titus’s Contra Manich. (De Lagarde 1859a).
year 500 the anti-Manichaean Bishop Heraclianus claimed that Titus had actually written his work against the writings of Adda, another Manichaean, and not against Mani himself.\(^{47}\) Commenting on this claim Sickenberger remarked that Titus himself did not profess to be writing against Mani either, but he often speaks of Manichaeism in such a way that a plural such as οἱ Μανιχαῖοι must be imagined as the subject, and that he often expressly refers to such a subject, e.g. οἱ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνοι I.3 (Gr. 2.39–3.1), οἱ ἔκεινοι II.1 (Gr. 26.5), II.59 (Gr. 62.14), οἱ ἐκ τοῦ μανέντος Ι.13 (Gr. 31.33), οἱ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα διαμαχόμενοι ΙΙ.23 (Gr. 40.5), φησὶ δὲ πρὸς λέξιν αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνος ἡ ἕτερος τις τῶν ἀντι ἐκεῖνοι ΙΙΙ.4 (Gr. 68.10–11) etc.\(^{48}\)

The increase in oriental source material strengthened the religio-historical perspective of Manichaeism; this was already the case in Baur’s book, but even more so in F. Cumont’s studies in Manichaeism, which also incorporated Syriac sources that had so far not been examined, e.g. Theodore bar Kônai’s Liber Scholiorum and Severus of Antioch’s 123rd Homily (in the Homiliae cathedrales, only preserved in a Syriac translation). Titus was included when Cumont, together with M.-A. Kugener (a few years after Sickenberger’s book) proposed that Titus had used several Manichaean works; as one possibility Cumont and Kugener suggested that on the basis of passages such as I.6 (Gr. 4.15), I.21 (Gr. 12.22) and I.22 (Gr. 13.6) a written work by Mani himself was Titus’s source for Book I, while in Book III Titus had used another work, since in III.4 (Gr. 68.10–11) he is in doubt as to who had written the work he was using.\(^{49}\) Here Cumont and Kugener did not apparently consider the fact that also in Book I, as demonstrated by Sickenberger, Titus speaks in indefinite terms of “Manichaeans” as his source, although perhaps this fact nevertheless lay behind Cumont and Kugener’s further suggestion that all Titus’s Manichaean sources originated in an older anti-Manichaean work, possibly from the early years when Manichaeism spread into the Roman Empire and provoked the interest of philosophers and theologians; they attributed Titus’s doubt in III.4 to his use of this work too.\(^{50}\) Moreover, Cumont and Kugener believed that they could document Titus’s source in Book I as the same source that Severus

\(^{47}\) See below pp. 138–39.

\(^{48}\) Sickenberger 1901, 7 n. 3 (–8).

\(^{49}\) Cumont and Kugener 1912, 159.

\(^{50}\) Cumont and Kugener 1912, 159.
of Antioch used in his 123rd Homily and Theodoret of Cyrus in Haereticarum fabularum compendium I.26 (PG 83, 378B). They also suggested (with great reservations) that this source had been Mani’s work, The Book of Giants.  

Around this time the epoch-making discoveries were made in Central Asia of original Manichaean texts, which inspired the great Augustine scholar, P. Alfaric, to examine all the material on the Manichaeans’ literature that was available at the time. Alfaric was also aware of how unsure Titus had been as to the author of his Manichaean sources. Since Heraclianus also mentions a writing by Adda with the title Μόδιως, which he maintains has been refuted by Diodore of Tarsus, who confused it with Mani’s Living Gospel, Alfaric made the assumption that Μόδιως and The Living Gospel had the same content, and he suggested that Book IV of Titus’s Contra Manichaeos, which indeed concerns itself with the NT, was also directed against Μόδιως. At the same time, however, Alfaric knew that according to Heraclianus Titus used several works by Adda. Alfaric further proposed that Book I was aimed at Mani’s Κεφαλαία (κεφάλαια), which is mentioned in the Acta Archelai. Since Alfaric also accepted Cumont’s hypothesis that Titus, Theodoret and Severus had used the same Manichaean source that he believed Alexander of Lycopolis had also used, this source must then have been Κεφαλαία. Alfaric went on to suggest that Κεφαλαία, which he translated as “Principes” (“fundamental doctrines”), had been identical with Mani’s Book of Giants. Alfaric explained Titus’s uncertainty as to who had written his own sources by referring to the Chinese-Manichaean Traité in which Adda (Ato) puts a question to Mani, who then answers it in the rest of the work. “L’écrit s’offre sous une forme telle qu’on pourrait se demander, à l’exemple de Titus de Bostra, s’il est de Mani ou d’Ato”, Alfaric commented. Finally, Alfaric believed quite simply that Contra Manichaeos III.1–7 quoted a text by Adda, and that the content of III.7 corresponded to a writing on the flesh not being created by God that

52 Alfaric 1919, 98–99.  
54 Acta Arch. LXII.6 (LII) (Beeson 1906, 91.5); the Greek text in Epiphanius, Haer. 66.2.9; Holl 1933, 18.13.  
56 Alfaric 1919, 99.
Augustine mentions in *Contra adversarium legis et prophætarum* II.41, and which Alfaric took to be a work by Adda-Adimantus. 57

As is well-known, theories of Iranian influences on Middle Eastern religions, such as Jewish eschatology, apocalyptic and Gnosticism, were prevalent in the contemporary “History of Religions School” in Germany, and here R. Reitzenstein’s studies of Manichaeism played an important role; it seemed that the new Manichaean Turfan texts could support new theories. However, in 1927 Reitzenstein’s presentation in which Manichaeism is based on oriental mythology was attacked by a former collaborator, H.H. Schaeder, whose objections rested on the same distinctions as the one made by Baur between mythological and conceptual presentations of Manichaeism. Schaeder argued that it was not the “myth” but the “conceptual apparatus” as found in the Platonic anti-Manichaean Alexander of Lycopolis that was Mani’s “original system”. 58 Titus played only a minor role in Schaeder’s argument, but the similarity between his and Alexander’s account of Manichaeism was underlined. 59

Reitzenstein’s response to Schaeder was the final study he prepared before his death in 1931, 60 which also contains a minor examination of Titus, since Reitzenstein believed that the Manichaean sources for both Titus and Alexander of Lycopolis belonged to the same transmission nucleus, but that Alexander’s source was an abbreviated and partially misleading summary by a “Neo-Platonic Manichaean”, whereas Titus contained the more original and complete tradition, which was more mythological. 61 According to Reitzenstein, Titus had been in possession of a Syriac work by Mani or one of his personal disciples; he referred to the fact that in I.21 Titus speaks of η παρ’ αὐτοῖς βιβλὸς (Gr. 12.22), and to the formulation ὁ τά τοῦ μονέντος συγγράφων φησίν (Gr. 13.2), and pointed out that in III.4 (Gr. 68.10–12)

58 According to Schaeder (1927) Manichaeism ought primarily to be interpreted in the light of the philosophical systems of Antiquity, though he also thought it wrong to separate ancient “philosophy” too far from “religion”. This thesis ran into criticism not only from Reitzenstein’s side, but also from e.g. Polotsky (1935, 246–47), Jonas (1934, 49–58); cf. also Widengren (1978).
59 Schaeder 1927, 109; see also 131 n. 3.
60 Reitzenstein 1931; cf. Reitzenstein 1931a (there is also [192–93] a summary of his view of Titus).—In his earlier work Reitzenstein had also made use of Titus as a source; see e.g. Reitzenstein 1917, 4 n. 2, 10 n. 1, 31 n. 8, 40.
61 Reitzenstein 1931, especially 46–58. Also Villey (1985, 130) thinks that Alexander and Titus used related texts.
Titus himself is unsure as to whether a section of the book was by Mani himself. Reitzenstein concluded that the work was in Syriac on the basis of I.17 (Gr. 10.13), where Titus nevertheless strictly speaking only states that Mani wrote in that language, but not that his own version was a Syriac one.

With reference to Heraclianus Reitzenstein believed that Book IV of Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos* was directed at Adda’s work, Ἱδιως, which had counted up all the places in the NT (more probably only in “the gospel” and “the apostle”) which Mani, as God’s final envoy, knew to be “material” elements that had intruded into the text. Adda’s writing had presupposed that Mani himself had produced a text without these elements, but for practical, presumably including “political” reasons, Adda had allowed the Christians to retain their old “book” and had merely written a kind of “user’s manual” as to what the correct text should be, aimed at the Christian who had converted to Manichaeism. Furthermore, Book III of *Contra Manichaeos* built on a corresponding writing by Adda that was an attack on the OT and had supplemented Ἱδιως. It was therefore also possible that Adda was the source behind Titus’s Book I and “ultimately” behind Alexander of Lycopolis’s account of Manichaeism.

In the same year as Reitzenstein’s paper was published (1931) there also appeared C. Schmidt and H.J. Polotsky’s account of the discovery of the Coptic-Manichaean papyri from Medinet Madi in Egypt, amongst which was a work (or rather two works, perhaps a work in two volumes) with the title Κεφαλαία. With knowledge of this work Schmidt and Polotsky could definitively reject Alfaric’s translation of κεφάλαια as “principles”; the title means “chapters”, and the work has not been the same as Mani’s *Book of Giants*. On the other hand they considered it likely that in *Contra Manichaeos* III.4–5 Titus quotes from Κεφαλαία, because in III.4, Gr. 68.10–12 Titus speaks of a κεφάλαιον, which seems to come from Mani or one of

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62 Reitzenstein 1931, 47.
63 Reitzenstein 1931, 48–49. Already Cumont (Cumont and Kugener 1912, 159) thought that “l’évêque de Bostra connaissait certainement cette langue [i.e. Syriac, NAP] comme le nabatéen”.—This line of reasoning is rejected by Bennett (2001a, 72 n. 12), who states that in Titus’s time Nabataean in Bostra had been completely supplanted by Arabic.
64 Reitzenstein 1931, 56–57.
65 Reitzenstein 1931, 57.
66 Reitzenstein 1931, 57.
his disciples, and which bears the heading περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προβολαστικῆς. This theory was later followed up by A. Böhlig, who in the edition of *Kephalaia* (1st half) went so far as to suggest that Titus’s chapter could be identical with *Kephalaia* Ch. 55.

Finally, it was also in 1931 that in continuation of Reitzenstein’s paper A. Baumstark used philological means to underpin the theory that Titus had used a Syriac Manichaean work. Baumstark attempted to render it probable that the Syriac translator of *Contra Manichaeos* had been in possession of Titus’s Syriac source. When Titus quoted this source, the translator had inserted the original text instead of retrotranslating Titus’s Greek text. For according to Baumstark the Mani quotations in the Syriac Titus-translation diverge more from the Greek original than the translation otherwise does, just as certain terms are rendered otherwise in the quotations than in Titus’s own text, and the Greek text appears at times to rest on a misunderstanding of the Syriac, etc. Baumstark later supplemented this examination by showing that the Syriac translator had not translated Titus’s biblical quotations from the Greek either, but instead, when dealing with OT quotations, had inserted the *Pešitta*-text and with NT quotations a Vetus Syra-text, which in Baumstark’s opinion had been the *Diatessaron*.

In the post-war period the discussion on Titus’s Manichaean sources was discontinued, and new contributions did not appear until P. Nagel followed up his edition of the Greek text of *Contra Manichaeos*

67 Schmidt and Polotsky 1933, 19.

68 *Kephalaia*, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 133.4–137.11 with the heading (133.5–6) ἐπὶ τῆς ταυτιλικῆς ἕλασθαι, “Über die Bildung (πλάσσειν) Adams.” Böhlig writes in his note on the translation of 133.5 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940): “Ist dieses Kapitel bei Titus von Bostra gemeint?”

69 Baumstark 1931.—Baumstark’s theories have recently been accepted by Clackson, Hunter, and Lieu 1998, vii–x, see in particular ix: “The coverage of the vocabulary of the Syriac version of Titus is limited only to sections which are mainly devoted to Manichaean cosmogony (esp. I,17 and I,21ff.) as these sections in their original Greek version were most likely to have been derived from genuine Manichaean writings which Titus claimed to have read in Syriac.” Also Cumont and Kugener’s theory of the common source behind Severus, Titus and Theodoret’s accounts is accepted in Clackson, Hunter, and Lieu 1998, vii and Lieu 2001, 141.

70 Baumstark 1935. See Nagel (1967, 20–24) on both studies by Baumstark; Nagel (1973, 290, 293 n. 28) has also remarked of them that they demand a new study, but particularly the latter in the light of the Syriac *Diatessaron*, by which he presumably means Ephrem’s Syriac commentary on the *Diatessaron*. Cf. also Nagel 1974, 303 n. 7, 308–9.
In his work from 1980 on the Gnostic interpretation of the Paradise narrative Nagel included the criticism of the Creator that is repeated in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 (→ Ch. XI.34); Nagel reckoned the criticism with what he called the aggressive, polemical type of interpretation, which is also represented in a number of Nag Hammadi tractates. However, Nagel rejected the possibility that this criticism could originate in a Manichaean text: the reason is that in the first place the serpent in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 is regarded as the angel of good and mediator of Gnosis, which incidentally also corresponds to Augustine’s presentation of Manichaeism, whereas the serpent in the original Manichaean sources belongs to the side of Darkness, and secondly that there is no testimony in the original Manichaean literature that the creator of man as in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 and 27 should be ignorant or animated by φθόνος and βασανία. Instead Nagel proposed that Titus was in actual fact attacking Emperor Julian the Apostate’s polemical treatise *Contra Galilaeos*, which contains all these features.

A further contribution to the discussion of Titus’s Manichaean sources has come from a different angle in G. Sfamani Gasparro, who has again attempted to render probable Heraclianus’s remark that Titus was in reality writing against Adda. Sfamani Gasparro refers to *Contra Manichaeos* I.21 (Gr. 13.2) ὡς γε ὁ τοῦ μανιέντος συγγράφων φησίν, which she translates with “as he who wrote down Mani’s teaching asserts”, and comments as follows:

The polemist thus shows himself to be aware of a Manichaean author who is an intermediary between the Prophet’s dualistic doctrine and the written report that he knows and utilizes. This writer speaks in the name of his Master whose teaching he faithfully reports.

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72 Nagel 1980, 55–57; cf. also earlier; Nagel 1973a, 163–65. Other scholars have also cast doubt on the idea that the Manichaeans regarded the serpent as a saviour: Cumont (1908, 49) observed that in the Manichaean excerpts in Theodore bar Kônai it is Jesus and not the Tempter who makes man eat of the Tree of Knowledge; according to Cumont, this explained why the Christian polemicists could accuse the Manichaeans of identifying Jesus with the serpent. In furtherance of Cumont’s view Waldschmidt and Lentz 1926, 25 similarly regarded this charge as a misunderstanding. Skjærvø 1995, 243 also thinks that it is a misunderstanding from Augustine’s side; his arguments are feasible but not binding.
74 Nagel 1980, 57.
75 Sfamani Gasparro 2000, 551.
This Manichaean writer was Adda, a claim that can also be rendered likely in another way. In Sfameni Gasparro’s view the text used in III.4–5 tells the myth of man’s creation that at one critical point differs from Mani’s *Epistula fundamenti*. In Mani’s text man is created by the demon couple begetting humans, but in Titus’s Manichaean text Adam is formed by the demons. From this Sfameni Gasparro concludes that Titus’s source was not composed by Mani, but more probably by Adda, who out of regard for the western mission removed what was for Christians the offensive thought that man had come into being through the demons’ intercourse. We know from Augustine that Adda was identical with the Adimantus against whom Augustine wrote a polemic in *Contra Adimantum*, and Sfameni Gasparro now thinks that since we know from *Contra Adimantum* that Adimantus in particular concentrated on biblical exegesis and attacked the OT, it is probable that his authorship in general has been Titus’s source. Sfameni Gasparro also points out that there are major similarities between the Manichaeism that Titus attacks in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7, and that which Augustine attacks in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, and this may be because both Church fathers used a text from Adda.

Sfameni Gasparro’s article is without doubt an important contribution to the question of Titus of Bostra’s Manichaean sources, and this is especially true of her emphasis that the similarities between Titus and Augustine’s description of Manichaeism may be linked to a usage of Adda texts.

Other relevant contributions to the question of Titus’s Manichaean sources have dealt with Cumont and Kugener’s older theory that Titus, Severus of Antioch and Theodoret of Cyrus all drew on Mani’s *The Book of Giants*. The main element in this theory, which turns on

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76 Sfameni Gasparro 2000, 552. Fragments of Mani’s account in *Ep. fund.*, on the origin of man are found in Augustine, *Contra ep. fund.*, 12, Zycha 1891, 207.25–208.11 = Feldmann 1987, 10–12, frg. 4a and in Augustine, *De nat. boni* 46, Zycha 1892, 884.29–886.17 = Feldmann 1987, 16–20, frg. 9. In Feldmann 1987, 82–87 there is an overview of the other Manichaean source material on the creation of man. The difference between *Ep. fund.*, in which man is begotten by the Prince of Darkness and his spouse, and a number of other accounts of the Manicheans’ teaching on the creation of man (*Acta Arch.*; Titus and Alexander of Lycopolis) was already noted in Baur 1831, 120, 131–32.

77 Sfameni Gasparro 2000, 556.

78 See also below p. 181.

Severus of Antioch’s *123rd Homily*, was the object of discussion in J.C. Reeves’s monograph on ‘The Book of Giants traditions’ in Manichaeism; Reeves did not deal with Titus of Bostra’s inclusion in the theory, however. Reeves convincingly proves that we have no basis for claiming that Severus’s Manichaean source has been *The Book of Giants*.

Finally, B. Bennett has examined one of the parallels between descriptions of Manichaeism in Titus, Severus and Theodoret, which formed the basis of Cumont and Kugener’s theory, namely reports about the Manichaean division of primordial space into four quarters corresponding to the four cardinal directions. Bennett points out that this division is not only found in the three writers (in abbreviated form in Titus [*Contra Manichaeos I.11*]), but also in descriptions by many other writers. Bennett believes that since these reports... are consistent in content but do not display obvious literary dependence upon one another, it is reasonable to assume that they are all summaries of information found in some common source document. All of the early citations are found in Greek writers and there is no evidence that these writers were conversant with Syriac; it is therefore reasonable to assume that the source document was in Greek. Furthermore, this source document must have been produced before 348, the date of the earliest extant citation.

Bennett now calls attention to the fact that like Titus the other writers also oscillate between referring to what the “author”, “the Manichaeans” and “Mani” say, and this fact he explains by claiming that “the source document was a summary which contained some citations attributed to Mani, but was not itself identical with one of Mani’s works.” Titus’s remark that Mani used Syriac is interpreted by Bennett to mean that “Titus of Bostra believed that the Greek source document’s Mani quotations were derived from a Syriac-language work of Mani.” However, presumably Cumont and Kugener were right that “the source document was a Manichaean text rather than a hostile account by a Christian writer”, partly because it does not seem to have contained any “obvious distortions or polemical

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81 Bennett 2001a, 71–72. Cf. above on Bennett’s view on the question of whether Titus could read Syriac. Bennett does not include Baumstark’s (1931) arguments in his study.
82 Bennett 2001a, 72–73 (quotation: 72).
83 Bennett 2001a, 76.
elements”, partly because it corresponds with Augustine’s description of Manichaean cosmogony on the basis of quotations and references based on Mani’s *Epistula fundamenti* and certain other writings by Mani that were only available to a few people. Since the Arab writer Šahrastānī in his *Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects* presents the same teaching and asserts that it was found in the first Chapter (ālaf, ʿr) of Mani’s *Living Gospel* and at the beginning of Mani’s Šabuhragān, Bennett concludes that the Mani quotations in the Greek-Manichaean source came from *The Living Gospel*, since Šabuhragān is known to have existed only in Middle Persian; moreover Bennett supports this argument with religio-historical references that make it probable that the teaching in question has belonged to the original Manichaeism.

As can be seen from the above exposition the question of Titus’s Manichaean sources contains many unsolved problems. In the long term an elaborate examination of all Titus’s specified references to, and quotations from, Manichaean texts is required, if more secure results are to be achieved. Without delivering such an examination I nevertheless hope in the present study to take scholarship in this area further. The reason why Titus’s Manichaean sources are at all of significance for my work is the supposition that Titus’s own refutation of Mani is fundamentally determined by the nature of the Manichaean sources that he employs. In this context we must be aware of how the question of the philosophical character of the Manichaeism that Titus is writing against was raised by scholarship already in the 18th century. De Beausobre held that Titus presented Mani as a philosopher who was shaken by the imperfection of the world, while Baur underlined how Titus gave almost the same picture of Manichaeism as an abstract thought-system of concepts as Alexander of Lycopolis. Reitzenstein’s reflections on the other hand moved in a different direction, for even though like Baur he stressed the similarities with Alexander, it was of equal importance for him to underline the stronger mythological character of Titus’s picture of Manichaeism.

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84 Bennett 2001a, 73–75 (quotation: 73).—Bennett makes much of a remark in Augustine’s *Contra ep. fund.* 25, Zycha 1891, 224.23–27, that the Mani writings are only in the hands of a few people.

85 Bennett 2001a, 75–77.—Bennett refers to Šahrastānī, *Book of religious and philosophical Sects* II, I, II in Gimaret and Monnot 1986, 660 [*628*].
The question of Titus’s Manichaean sources hereby touches on the question of the relation between mythology and philosophy in Manichaeism, which as stated was raised by Schaeder, but which cannot be said to be finally clarified. In spite of the heavy criticism Schaeder received, for example at the hands of Reitzenstein, Polotsky, H. Jonas and Widengren, we must note that in a number of studies A. Böhlig, who was a pupil of Schaeder, defended elements of Schaeder’s thesis. Böhlig sought to prove that significant elements of Manichaeism were completely or partially of philosophical origin.\textsuperscript{86} A number of these results, for instance, have also found acceptance and have been further pursued by Sundermann.\textsuperscript{87}

Fundamentally, however, one can hardly maintain that Böhlig answered the question as to whether those elements in Manichaeism which according to him were philosophical in origin were also employed to the same purpose as in philosophy, or whether they were inserted into a new and quite different context that on crucial points changed their original sense. When some of Schaeder’s critics, for instance, have agreed that also Mani himself used “concepts” such as Ὄλη on the lines of mythical names such as “Prince of Darkness”, but have simultaneously pointed out that precisely this equivalence between concepts and mythological ideas makes it doubtful that Mani’s concept of Ὄλη should be what Schaeder called a “logical concept”,\textsuperscript{88} there is at any rate no question of a criticism that Böhlig attempted to refute.

As far as I can see, therefore, it is still possible to interpret the presentation of Manichaeism that is summarised in Alexander of Lycopolis and perhaps also Titus as a further development in relation to the original Manichaeism, more closely defined as an attempt to make Manichaeism presentable among philosophically educated circles in the Roman Empire by superficially brushing off the mythical character.

\textsuperscript{86} See e.g. Böhlig 1986.—A skilful criticism of Böhlig’s position is to be found in Khosroyev 1995, 110–29.
\textsuperscript{87} Sundermann 1997, 17–24.
\textsuperscript{88} Cf. Widengren 1978. This was also noted by Titus, see pp. 170, 256–57.
4. Titus as a theological and philosophical writer

I turn now to the second line of Titus scholarship, that is, the occupation with Titus’s own dogmatic position. In this field the contributions have been even more limited than for the subject of Titus as a source for knowledge of Manichaeism. What has been written is mostly concerned with three areas: firstly Titus’s relation to the doctrine of original sin, secondly, which philosophies are included in his work, and thirdly Titus’s place in anti-Manichaean literature as such. The third area contributes to an understanding of the anti-Manichaean literature as being borne by common theological concerns, although some studies may still be borne by a wish to draw on the literature as a source of knowledge about Manichaeism, or are written in the perspective of illuminating the reaction to Manichaeism as a contribution to its history. Nor in this context shall I in general include works that mention or treat Titus more or less en passant.89

The most important of these discussions is without doubt the debate among scholars within the history of doctrines on the origin of the dogma of original sin. In brief this may be said to be concerned with the extent to which Augustine is solely and completely the father of this dogma within the Catholic tradition, or whether similar ideas were to be found in Greek patristics. It is in this context that Titus’s position has also proved to be of interest: we are dealing here with a debate in which significant theological interests are invested, as it is intertwined with fundamental questions of how Christianity is to be interpreted.90 In the background of this debate we sense a set of problems from Augustine’s own time, in which his opponents, Pelagius and Julian of Eclanum, claimed that not only was there no tradition behind the doctrine of original sin in either the Eastern or the Western Church, but that it had in fact been invented by Augustine. Both of them believed it to be a legacy of Augustine’s Manichaean past: original sin was an attempt to revive the Manichaean view of evil.91

89 A few works may be mentioned, however: Titus’s interpretation of the Cain and Abel story (Contra Manich. III.7 and 30–31) is included in e.g. Glenthøj 1997 (311, follow the index).—The valuable encyclopedia articles and sections in patrologies and literary histories etc. should also be emphasised (e.g. Bardenhewer 1912, 269–73; Puech 1930, 554–61; Casey 1937; Quasten 1963, 359–62).

90 A brief survey of the history of scholarship is found in Hauke 1993, 30–45.

91 See further in Bruckner 1897, 35–39, 52, 57–59, 65–68, 82–83, 86; Clark
I have already mentioned how the subject of Titus and the doctrine of original sin was raised in the dispute between Du Pin and Petitdidier back in the 17th century, and how its rejection was later fundamental for theologians of the Enlightenment. Since the thinking of that period forms a significant background for the modern world, taking up a position on it is in many ways still relevant. The attraction yet the problem of postulating man’s innate goodness and natural ethical freedom may doubtless explain why patristic scholars even in the 20th century have struggled to discover the origin of the doctrine of original sin.

In another way Sickenberger’s aforementioned study and edition of Titus’s *Homiliae in Lucam* from 1901 also marks an important milestone in Titus scholarship by including, together with a collation of the most accessible information on Titus (prosopographical etc.), a summary of the contents of the entire *Contra Manichaeos* and—with a view to a comparison with the catena fragments of Titus’s *Homiliae in Lucam*—by being the first to seek to place Titus in relation to the philosophy, theology and exegesis of his time. Sickenberger held that in relation to the contemporary Trinitarian controversies Titus represented a cautious, conservative but non-heretical position. On the other hand Sickenberger claimed that Titus’s anthropology and teaching on the primeval state brought him close to a later heresy. In referring to the controversy between Du Pin and Petitdidier, Sickenberger stated initially that


These books were aimed at the pagans and Sickenberger thus thought that Petitdidier was probably right, but he also added:

Sickenberger then adduced that in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7–29 Titus dismissed the claim that God urged the first people on earth to repent; that he maintained that from the beginning they were created to the present life-form; that they themselves through virtue were to gain the path back to Paradise; and that death is a benefit. Sickenberger continued:


Sickenberger’s view that these Pelagian-like sentences are provoked by anti-Manichaeism is of course obvious, but may also be inspired by the fact that prominent theologians of the 19th century had precisely explained the weak position of the doctrine of original sin in Greek theology with the anti-Manichaean bias.96

When Sickenberger came to clarify what lay behind the “natural standpoint” that he found to be prominent in Books I–II, he claimed,

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95 Sickenberger 1901, 14–15 with n. 3.
96 According to Hauke (1993, 33) J.H. Newman already in 1845 explained why original sin is rarely mentioned among Greek theologians with the argument that they were involved in a struggle with Gnostic-Manichaean fatalism; similarly the Lutheran G. Thomasius (Hauke 1993, 34). Later examples of this view that the powerful position of “the free will” in Greek theology of the 4th and 5th century is linked to the anti-Manichaean counter-position: Kelly (1977, 344) claimed that part of the explanation as to why the Greek Church fathers of the 4th and 5th century had a relatively optimistic view of man’s condition after the Fall is that “the rival philosophy was Manichaeism, with its fatalism and its dogma that matter, including the body, was intrinsically evil.”—According to Slomkowski (1928, 110) Gregory of Nyssa insisted on the free will against the Manicheans’ determinism.—Stroumsa and Stroumsa 1988, 47–51, 56 assumed partly that the development of a theodicy in the context of the significance of *autexousion* in older patristics was very much due to the battle against the Valentinians and other Gnostics, and partly that the Manichaean challenge served to sharpen this view in the Byzantine Empire and develop the Christian teaching on evil. Cf. also Williams (1927, 274–76, 278, 302), who stressed the importance of Manichaicism for the development of theodicies in the Eastern and the Western Church.
though without any real argumentation, that Titus was re-examining Manichaeism’s fantastically-furnished oriental system with the aid of concepts derived from Aristotelian logic, physics and psychology. Titus was an “Aristotelian”, and for Sickenberger there was an incompatibility between this ostensible “Aristotelianism” and “Platonism”.97

This evaluation must presumably be seen in the light of Sickenberger’s claim that he could demonstrate that Titus’s exegesis was “Antiochene”, i.e. more down-to-earth and simple than speculative and respecting the literal meaning of the text. According to Sickenberger, the reason that Titus nonetheless allegorises at intervals can be explained by the fact that he lived before the contrast between the Antiochene and Alexandrian schools was fully manifest.98

The developed Antiochene theology to which Sickenberger refers is of course that which we find in Diodore of Tarsus, John Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Although Sickenberger does not state it explicitly, it is likely that he has associated Titus’s non-allegorical exegesis with other features that are normally linked to theologians in the Antiochene School. Thus, the question of a connection between Theodore of Mopsuestia and Pelagianism was a problem both in Late Antiquity and in 19th century research,99 and furthermore A. von Harnack claimed, apparently as the first, that the differences between the Antiochene and Alexandrian School also had something to do with the possibility that philosophically the Antiochenes were Aristotelians, while the Alexandrians were Platonists.100 The distinction that Sickenberger draws between Titus’s “Aristotelianism” and “Platonism” is presumably to be understood on the basis of this model.

However, Von Harnack’s theory on the Antiochenes’ “Aristotelianism” was by and large rejected by later scholarship in the light of

97 Sickenberger 1901, 14–15, 111. Sickenberger referred to the fact that in Contra Manich. IV.19 Titus speaks directly against the Platonic doctrine of the soul (→ Ch. XI.46). But as I demonstrate below (see p. 257), we are dealing here with a specific point in Plato which all the Church fathers criticised to a man, namely, the transmigration of souls. More comprehensive conclusions cannot be drawn from this on Titus’s attitude to the Platonic tradition.

98 Sickenberger 1901, 15–16, 111–114. Jülicher’s (1902, 82) explanation was different: “Der Abstand von Origenes ist allerdings erheblich, aber Titus allegorisirt vor Allem deshalb so viel weniger als Origenes, weil er so viel weniger Phantasie und Gedanken besitzt.”

99 See further in Norris 1963, 239–52.

R. Arnou and R.A. Norris’s works, which have demonstrated that central philosophical problems did not find an Aristotelian solution in Theodore. Norris, for example, showed that Theodore did not have an Aristotelian understanding of the relation between “body” and “soul”: if this was the case, then the soul should be seen as the body’s form, and consequently the soul’s independence and immortality must be denied, but—as with the contemporary Neo-Platonists—for Theodore the body and soul were clearly two distinct “things”. When we also bear in mind that Stoicism and Aristotelianism had disappeared as philosophical schools by the 4th and 5th centuries—while elements of their teaching from the beginning of our era onwards had been absorbed first in Middle, then in Neo-Platonism—it would actually come as a surprise to find a true “Aristotelianism” among the Antiochene theologians. The Aristotelian influence that in fact we find in Theodore cannot, as far as I can see, be interpreted to mean that Theodore based his theology on Aristotle, and this

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101 See Arnou 1936; Norris 1963.

102 Norris 1963, 22–23, 127–28, 149–59. Altogether Norris (1963, 125–59) demonstrated that Theodore’s theology was not based on actual studies of philosophical anthropology; Theodore was primarily an exegete. He nevertheless accepted elements from contemporary philosophical anthropology, and the reason that he criticised such elements in some of his writings was because he believed them to be at odds with the teaching of Scripture.

103 Cf. Norris 1963, 4–7. Cf. Gottschalk 1987 on the interest in Aristotle and the integration of Aristotelian terms and concepts into all the philosophical schools from the 1st century BCE onwards. However, Norris may not be right in thinking that the Peripatetic tradition had completely disappeared; Themistius, who belongs in the period after Porphyry, is probably to be understood as a non-Platonic commentator on Aristotle (see the discussion in Blumenthal 1996, 22–23, 37–38, 56, 144, 155, 172, 213 n. 47).

104 Following Arnou, Wickert (1962, 157 n. 1, 189–90 n. 107a) also thought that there was a Platonic element in Theodore’s theology. In connection with Wickert’s (1962, 45–61) treatment of the “rational character” of Theodore’s exegesis of Paul he noted (45–46) that Theodore did indeed turn against metaphysical speculation, but (47–52) he nevertheless found that Theodore was interested in definitions and a classification of species and genera, and (57, 85) that he established syllogisms. However, the question is whether this is not merely superficial knowledge of Aristotelian logic. Wickert (1962, 63ff., 92–95, 105) also thought that there are individual Aristotelian elements in Theodore’s ethics. Finally, when Wickert (1962, 157–58) believes that Theodore’s tenacious grip on the concrete was “Aristotelian” rather than “Platonic”, we are dealing with a very loose definition. Many scholars, however, are willing to accept this loose Aristotelianism: Dewart (1971, 4–8) emphasised that Theodore had only a limited knowledge of philosophy from the schools of Libanius and Diodore, but she thought (9–11) that it nevertheless makes sense to say that the Antiochenes and Theodore were marked by a down-to-earth Aristotelian-Stoic method, though not an Aristotelian-Stoic doctrine. In relation to
judgement can also be extended to his teacher Diodore and other great Antiochenes.\footnote{Diodore may in fact have had a genuine knowledge of philosophy; the titles of some of his works could suggest so (the \textit{Suidas Lexicon} Δ 1149, Διόδωρος, Adler 1967, 103.1–23; cf. Amand 1973, 467–69), and Diodore’s work against Bardesanes and astrology were stamped with philosophy (see below p. 140). Dewart (1971, 7–8), however, claimed that in Diodore’s \textit{ascetarium} the focus was on the study of Scripture and only to a very limited degree were the studies concerned with secular literature (she refers to Leconte 1957), Schweizer (1942, 64–65, 66–67) observed a Neo-Platonic-Aristotelian influence on Diodore, but cf. here Schäublin 1974, 31f. Cf. also Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 101–3: Theodoret of Cyrus’s knowledge of Plato and Aristotle was second-hand and very limited; however, he stressed positively the Platonists to the disregard of the Peripatetics. On the Antiochenes and philosophy see also McLeod 1999, \textit{passim}, but esp. 17, 87–115, 120–21.} Bearing this in mind we must ask whether Sickenberger’s understanding of Titus as an “Aristotelian” should not be revised. As I will show in the following, however, Sickenberger was right in thinking that Titus employs a considerable degree of Aristotelian logic, merely that his “Aristotelianism” must not be read as being in opposition to his “Platonism”.

In the period after Sickenberger a number of individual articles and sections in larger studies were published that contributed to an understanding of Titus’s philosophy and theology; some of these ignored Sickenberger’s theory of Titus’s “Aristotelianism”, however, and not all of them even seemed to know of his work. Thus, several traced the origin of the various ideas in Titus’s work to Stoicism and Platonism respectively, and Sickenberger himself was already also well aware that Titus drew on Stoic ideas.\footnote{Sickenberger (1901, 97) mentions that in \textit{Contra Manich.} II.4 (Gr. 28.4f.), II.3 (Gr. 30.6f.) and in a scholium to Lk. 18.20ff. Titus defines the nature of virtue negatively “ganz im Sinne der Stoiker”.} For instance, Titus was included in K. Gronau’s study from 1922 on the theodicy of the Early Church, a work which was especially borne by an interest in proving...
the dependence of the Church fathers on Stoic theodicy. This was also true of Titus’s theodicy, which originated, to be precise, from Posidonius of Apamea. Moreover, in his work on the history of Greek Christian literature A. Puech also found Platonic elements in Titus, but similarly noted that areas of Titus’s work had a Stoic ring.

R.P. Casey’s encyclopedia article on Titus hardly contained any new view, but nevertheless deserves mention for its clarity and completeness, thanks to the writer’s intimate knowledge of *Contra Manichaeos*. Casey lauded Titus’s high level of learning and eloquence, stating that


In addition, Casey often repeated Sickenberger’s emphasis on the non-Augustinian character of Titus’s anti-Manichaeism:

Im Grunde ist seine Ethik rationalistisch und griechisch und himmelweit von Augustin und der Theologie der Gnade entfernt, aber ihr moralischer Gehalt und ihre Lehre von Lohn und Strafe sind spezifisch christlich.

Casey clearly preferred Augustine, but when the same view was expressed in J. Gross’s major work on history of the doctrine of original sin, the evaluation was different. This work, based on source criticism and comprehensive studies, is still indispensable for anyone engaging with the history of the doctrine, though this does not change

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107 Gronau 1922, 17–18. Gronau did not document this dependence on Posidonius, and I have not attempted to prove his claim. A certain caution is also advisable here, since the reference to Posidonius should probably be seen as reflecting a period of scholarship rich in hypotheses now dismissed—and strongly criticised in Reinhardt 1921; 1926.


109 Puech 1930, 560 n. 1 referred to *Contra Manich. II.37* (PG 18) = Gr. II.63–65 (on the world order).

110 Casey 1937, 1587.

111 Casey 1937, 1588.

112 Gross 1960. Titus does not appear to be included in 20th century surveys previous to Gross of the history of the doctrine of original sin, e.g. not in Tennant 1968 (orig. 1903); Williams 1927.
the fact that the author’s interpretations are problematic. Gross emphasised that his work was a historical one, free of ties to a particular confession; guided by reason it sought only the truth.\textsuperscript{113} Yet it is clear enough that the studies were in reality governed by a topical interest in disgracing the doctrine, so that man could optimistically devote himself to belief in progress. Gross also stated that he hoped to render mankind

frei vom Alpdruck der Furcht vor dem willkürlich zürnenden und strafenden Erbsündengott; frei von der lähmenden Vorstellung, in fremde Schuld und Strafe verstrickt, einem allgemeinen und unaufhalt- samen sittlichen Niedergangs preisgegeben zu sein; frei für die ermuti- gende Erkenntnis, daß, im ganzen gesehen, der Weg der Menschheit kein Niedergang ist, sondern ein Aufstieg; ein Aufstieg freilich, der sich nicht geradlinig, sondern wellenlinig vollzieht.\textsuperscript{114}

To this end he would prove that the doctrine of original sin was unknown in the Bible and the entire pre-Augustine theology. Pelagianism was thus largely a continuation of the older theology:

Steht doch die gesamte griechische Tradition auf dem Boden eines ausgesprochenen Schöpfungsoptimismus, der mit dem augustinischen Erbsündenpessimismus schlechterdings unvereinbar, ja die Hauptwurzel des Pelagianismus ist. Daher der unüberbrückbare Gegensatz zwischen Ost- und Westkirche hinsichtlich der Erbsünde... \textsuperscript{115}

Gross now linked this fact with anti-Manichaeism; thus, he believed that until the beginning of the 5th century man’s ethical freedom was the sole interest of oriental theologians because of the battle against Gnostic and Manichaean dualism and fatalism; the consequences of the primeval sin were of less interest.\textsuperscript{116} Most importantly, none of the pre-Augustinian theologians allowed for an inherited sinful guilt or a lack of original justice. Most of them agreed on an “Erbübellehre”, which meant that death and the other physical evils were regarded as punishment in consequence of the primeval sin; however, this doctrine—particularly among the Alexandrians and the Cappadocians—became an “Erbverderbnislehre”, according to which Adam and Eve’s successors were tainted with \textit{concupiscentia} as an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Gross 1960, 11.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Gross 1960, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Gross 1960, 205.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Gross 1960, 214.
\end{itemize}
inherited ethical weakening, but not as a guilt. Gross divided the Antiochenes into two groups: Diodore and Chrysostom were closer to the Alexandrians and Cappadocians, while Theodore of Mopsuestia was further away from them through claiming in some of his writings that man was created as a mortal being from the beginning.

It was in this context that Titus (together with Hegemonius’s *Acta Archelai*) entered the picture as a kind of forerunner of Theodore. Gross followed Sickenberger in defining Titus as belonging to the Antiochene School (“der nach seiner ganzen geistigen Einstellung zu den Antiochenern gehört”). He then presented a fine outline of Titus’s teaching on man’s ethical freedom; for Gross, however, it was more a question of Stoicism than Aristotelianism in Titus:

Gross further emphasised that in Book III Titus expressly distances himself from the traditional “Erbbüel- und Erbverderbnislehre” by claiming that the historical condition of mankind is as God would have it from the beginning, and we have thus lost nothing with Adam’s disobedience; Gross’s knowledge of these chapters built at this juncture on Sickenberger’s summary. Finally Gross actually proposed that Theodore of Mopsuestia’s renowned teaching on the two Ages (“states”, κατάστασεις) owed its origin in fact to Titus:

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117 Gross 1960, 179–90.
118 Gross 1960, 190–205.
119 Gross 1960, 176.
120 Gross 1960, 177–79.
121 Gross 1960, 179.
122 Gross 1960, 179.
123 Gross 1960, 194.
Various surveys of the history of the doctrine of original sin published after Gross neglected to include Titus;\textsuperscript{124} on the other hand Titus is mentioned en passant in P.F. Beatrice’s work, which certainly was marked by the same negative evaluation of the doctrine of original sin as in Gross, but otherwise differed from him in finding the doctrine of original sin pre-Augustinian. Beatrice thought that Augustine’s “original sin” was essentially the same as \textit{concupiscientia}, and being bound to the semen it was transferred through sexual intercourse and thus in a real sense was physically inherited. The roots of this belief lay with Julius Cassianus and his heretical Enratites, whom Clement of Alexandria treats in \textit{Stromata} III.13ff. (91ff.);\textsuperscript{125} and it was further developed by the Messalians. There are traces of this doctrine among individual ecclesiastical writers, such as Origen and Didymus the Blind, but mainly it was opposed by the Greek Church fathers as being both heretical and an uneducated, stupid and vulgar popular belief. In deriving Augustine’s doctrine from Manichaeism the Pelagians continued another aspect of the Eastern Church’s polemic, namely the attempt to identify the doctrine of original sin with the Manichaeism doctrine of evil, but this identification was incorrect. The Manichaeans’ cosmological dualism with its coeternal principles is quite different from the dualism of the Enratites and Messalians, who held that evil was the result of the Fall of Adam and would be brought to an end at the resurrection of the dead—and this was the case despite a number of similarities between the Manichaeans and the Enratites and the fact that the Manichaeans were influenced by the Enratite tradition.\textsuperscript{126}

Theodore of Mopsuestia’s understanding of death as being natural was typical of Greek patristics and in line with most of Clement of Alexandria’s statements. In this context Beatrice also included Titus, \textit{Contra Manichaeos} III.21 (\textsuperscript{127}→ Ch. XI.41), which, like Gross, he knew from Sickenberger’s summary and which, as he pointed out, lies closer to Theodore both geographically and chronologically than Clement. Finally he noted that “[d]ottrina analoga viene presentata anche in un altro documento siriaco coevo, le \textit{Constitutiones Apostolorum}”.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{124} Thus Rondet 1967; Testa 1970. Both writers are far removed from Gross’s evaluations.

\textsuperscript{125} Stählin 1906, 238.9ff.

\textsuperscript{126} Beatrice 1978, esp. 243–59.

\textsuperscript{127} Beatrice 1978, 244 n. 4.—As early as 1904 Turmel compared Theodore’s
Although Beatrice’s studies are singularly interesting, it is not possible to delve further into them here; I will merely mention that his interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin as sexual desire transferred via sexual intercourse is in my opinion a caricature, just as the genealogy of the doctrine from the En克拉ites and Messalians is hardly tenable either. The question is whether we should not—to a far greater degree than Beatrice will admit—search for the preliminary stages of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin among the early orthodox Church fathers, and whether Beatrice does not distort the picture by portraying Theodore’s (and Titus’s) position as typical. In particular Gross’s presentation of the Greek Church fathers has recently come under fire from the Catholic theologians, L. Scheffczyk and M. Hauke, and theirs is the more legitimate interpretation in my opinion, despite the fact that they are wide of the mark in imagining “orthodoxy” and “heresy” to be two separate worlds. Scheffczyk and Hauke demonstrate how the Greek history of doctrine contains forms of thought similar to Augustine’s doctrine, and thus they claim that many of the Eastern Church fathers came close to Augustine’s position through other conceptual systems. As Eastern preliminary stages of the later doctrine they also underline, for example, that the death which is a consequence of the primeval sin is not merely a physical death but also the spiritual death of the soul, or that Irenaeus and other Greek Church fathers imagined that mankind is “in Adam” and therefore participates in his sin and fall.

statement with the Constitutiones Apostolorum, as well as with Theophilus of Antioch and Paul of Samosata (Turmel’s work has unfortunately remained unavailable to me, but cf. the later ed., Turmel 1931, 75–77). The similarity between Theodore and Theophilus’s thought was by and large rejected—and rightly so, in my opinion—in Slomkowski (1928, 129–31), who also stressed that our knowledge of Paul of Samosata’s anthropology was too limited for a firm position to be taken on it in this context. Conversely, Slomkowski admitted similarities between the Constitutiones Apostolorum V.VII and Theodore’s position. Also Gross (1960, 179) compared Titus’s position with the Constitutiones Apostolorum; see also further below pp. 414–15.

128 Cf. also the criticism of Beatrice in Lorenz 1980; De Simone 1980; Bonner 1981; Den Boeft 1981.
130 Scheffczyk 1982 and Hauke 1993, passim.—These motives and similar ones, however, are summarised by Hauke (1993, 709) into the concept of “Erbunheil”: “Kraft der Ursünde befindet sich jeder Mensch in einem Zustand, in dem er des von Christus geschenkten Heiles bedarf.” Hauke (1993, 709–14) further states that the more privative “Erbunheil” also approaches a concept of sin and in particular contexts it includes the idea of mankind’s common sin in an unsystematised way.
Hauke excludes the Antiochenes and Titus from his study, but in return they are treated in Scheffczyk’s book, which understands “the Antiochene School” broadly and includes, for example, Eusebius of Caesarea, Cyril of Jerusalem and Epiphanius.131

Scheffczyk does not believe Gross was right to claim that writers such as Hegemonius and Titus denied a general “Verfallenheit”:

Diese Linie, welche auf eine Verfallenheit der Welt nach oder auch schon in Folge der Adamssünde ausgerichtet war, findet auch keinen Abbruch durch die Tatsache, daß bestimmte, nicht unbedeutende Theologen dieser Schulrichtung über den Problemkomplex der Adamssünde schweigen, selbst wo sie die Fragen der Hamartiologie berühren. Dieses Schweigen muß nicht als ein der Menschheitsstunde widerständiges und ablehnendes Verschweigen gedeutet werden.132

As for Titus, Scheffczyk bases his case on the first two books, noting that Titus links his teaching on the image of God in man to free will, but like Petitdidier some 300 years earlier he also points out that in II.16 Titus states, “daß der Mensch das Gutwerden nur mit Gottes Beistand zu verwirklichen vermag” (→ Ch. XI.20), and with an implicit criticism of both Sickenberger and Gross he continues:

In diese mehr philosophisch gehaltene Apologetik paßt offenbar zwar die Auffassung von der Vernunftgemäßheit der Tugend und der Naturwidrigkeit der Sünde hinein, nicht aber die geheimnishaftge Spannung zwischen Sünde und Gnade in einer übergreifenden Heils- und Unheilsgeschichte. Wo im Rahmen einer philosophischen Anthropologie und Freiheitslehre solche tiefer gelegenen theologischen Schichten nicht erreicht wurden, sollte man aber die betreffenden Autoren auch nicht zu förmlichen Gegnern einer Natursünde oder einer sich anbahnden Erbsündenauffassung stempeln. So erscheint es auch nicht begründet, Titus von Bostra als direkten Gegner einer Erbübel- oder Erbverderbnislehre auszugeben, weil er nämlich im dritten Buch seiner Kontroverschrift davon spricht, daß „wir von Anfang an . . . für die Lebensart geschaffen wurden, nach der wir leben, und der Ungehorsam das Geschöpf nicht änderte“ (III 21). In einer Abhandlung, die gegen den Manichäismus vor allem die Unverschräntheit des menschlichen Wesens oder der Natur unter dem Einfluß des Bösen betonen möchte, hat eine solche Aussage eine gewisse positive Beweiskraft für sich. Sie spricht auch nicht grundsätzlich gegen die gläubige Gnaden- und Sündenauffassung, die ja auch im Punkte der Erbsünde so geartet ist, daß sie keine innerliche und

132 Scheffczyk 1982, 163.
wesenhafte Verderbnis der geschaffenen Natur meint (weshalb später Augustin nur ungern von einer “Naturstinde” sprach). 133

Scheffczyk adds, however, that accounts like Titus’s are examples of “eine zu starke Fixierung auf eine gegnerische Position”. 134 With regard to Theodore of Mopsuestia on the other hand Scheffczyk accepts that here a genuine denial is to be seen of the doctrine of original sin; in this connection Gross’s suggestion that the doctrine of the two Ages could originate with Titus, is transposed into a fact. 135

It is regrettable that like Beatrice before him, Scheffczyk has been unaware that nine years previously Nagel had already published the Greek text of Contra Manichaeos III.7–29 (Nagel 1973), that is, the text on which both Sickenberger and Gross had in particular based their evaluation of Titus, and that already in 1966 Nagel had analysed in summary form the argumentation in this section of Titus’s work. 136 The text is exceedingly interesting and, as we shall see, serves to undermine the main idea in Scheffczyk’s interpretation of Titus.

Since Gross’s work, all the other contributions to an understanding of Titus as a theological and philosophical writer have in one way or another been determined by an interest in Titus through a comparison with other anti-Manichaean works. 137 This is the case already with the work mentioned above by I. Hadot, which in a comparison between Simplicius’s polemic against the Manichaens and other anti-Manichaean works demonstrated how Titus and the Neo-Platonist Simplicius employed the same Aristotelian distinction in their attacks on Manichaeism. 138 In so doing she became the first to document Sickenberger’s claim for Titus’s use of Aristotelian logic—apparently without a knowledge of Sickenberger’s book.

Hadot’s work was largely concerned with Simplicius, but it may also be said to represent an example of an increasing interest in

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133 Scheffczyk 1982, 163–64; the quotation from Contra Manich. III is, as Scheffczyk himself states, borrowed from Sickenberger.
134 Scheffczyk 1982, 164.
137 The importance of the Church fathers’ anti-Manichaean polemic was especially emphasised in Nagel 1977.
138 Hadot 1969, 44 (the Aristotelian distinction between e.g. white as substance and accident); Hadot refers to Titus in PG 18, I.22, 1097C = Gr. I.25, 16.21–22.
comparative studies of anti-Manichaean literature. Yet scholarship on anti-Manichaean literature is still in its infancy, despite the long-standing and intensive research into the problem of “Augustine and Manichaeism”.139 Greek and Syriac anti-Manichaean literature has not aroused much response, apart from the Manichaean scholars who acquired some information on Manichaeism from these sources while remaining unconcerned about the genre in its own right.

Although the ostensible purpose of E. Beck’s study of Ephrem the Syrian’s polemic against Manichaeism140 was also concerned with information on Manichaeism, its strength actually lies elsewhere. Beck incorporated both Augustine and a large amount of comparative material in Greek, including Titus, to illuminate and supplement Ephrem’s texts. The aim of Beck’s book, however, was to present the entire material from Ephrem’s polemic, which would serve to present the Manichaean system as closely to Mani’s original version as possible. Beck therefore sought to distinguish between what was justifiable and unjustifiable in the Church fathers’ criticism of Manichaeism. Measured in relation to this aim Beck’s book is unfortunately a failure, for it barely includes any original Manichaean literature, which is absolutely essential for the purpose, but if we ignore its aim, then as a study of anti-Manichaeism as such it is a pioneering work; it contains, for example, in-depth analyses of passages in Titus of Bostra that scholarship has so far left unexplored, and in the present context Beck’s contribution to an understanding of Titus’s philosophical position must be underlined.

Beck’s basic view is that Titus was a philosophical eclectic;141 in his teaching on the four elements (Contra Manichaeos II.50–54) Titus rejected Aristotle’s theory of elements and instead followed Empedocles and the Stoics, though on one point he followed Empedocles against the Stoics.142 Stoic influence also revealed itself in Titus’s references to κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι143 and his cosmological usage of the term τόπος.144

139 The subject is of course not only Augustine’s anti-Manichaean writings; see the overview of the most important studies in Van Oort 1995, 289–90 n. 1, as well as the articles in Van Oort, Wermelinger and Wurst 2001.
140 Beck 1978; on this subject see also Mansour 1984.—Beck has also published short studies of Ephrem’s polemic against the Bardesanites (Beck 1978a) and Marcionites (Beck 1978b).
143 Beck 1978, 85 with n. 62.
144 Beck 1978, 70.
When Titus bases his criticism of the Manichaean myth on the essential kinship between the knower and the object of knowledge, Beck speaks of “[eine] Gebrauchsphilosophie stoischer Färbung”; in addition, Titus’s understanding of ethical action, where the will is subject to reason, is “genuinely Greek” and with a Stoic cast. On the other hand Beck described Titus’s doctrine of “the parts” of the soul as Platonic. He also drew attention to Titus’s ability to use the term ὀσφα with greater philosophical precision than other Christian polemicists against Manichaism, and to the fact that in Contra Manichaeos IV.19 Titus precisely points out that ὀλη is not alive nor has any movement of its own accord, according to Aristotle, as is the case with ὀλη according to Mani (→ Ch. XI.46).

Titus also received considerable attention in a valuable article by S.N.C. Lieu in 1986, “Some Themes in Later Roman Anti-Manichaean Polemics”, which describes a number of themes in both Christian and Neo-Platonic anti-Manichaean literature. In this context Lieu also dealt with Titus’s theodicy in Book II. A similar article by S. and G.G. Stroumsa from 1988, which was concerned with Christian, Neo-Platonic, Zoroastrian and early Islamic anti-Manichaean polemic, also contains many references to Titus.

A further work by G.G. Stroumsa on Titus and Alexander of Lycopolis is apparently of an earlier date but was not published until 1992. According to Stroumsa, Titus understood Manichaemism in a philosophical context and as an attempt to solve the problem of evil; the Manichaeans were also able from early on to develop a highly sophisticated theoretical argumentation for their dualism. Titus himself was not a philosopher, but according to Stroumsa he had been well trained in rhetoric and possessed a certain knowledge...
of general philosophical terminology and arguments, both Platonic and Stoic. In Books I–II Titus employs a rational argumentation against dualism, claiming universal value since he is arguing only from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι; this term is admittedly Stoic in origin, but Titus uses it in a broad rather than a technical sense: κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι means the rational grounds as to why dualism is unconvincing. However, the chapters in Titus’s theodicy that argue for God’s Providence in the form of a cosmic harmony and are therefore concerned with such phenomena as earthquakes, disease or wild animals, have a Stoic stamp. Yet it was Stroumsa’s view that “Titus’s major philosophical frame of reference remains Platonism”, as is clear from Titus’s concept of God: according to Stroumsa, Titus partly attacked Manichaeism’s corporeal view of God, claiming instead that God was incorporeal of nature, and partly claimed that the concept of ἀρχή of necessity implies “unicity”, so that dualism is logically impossible.

Through a comparison with Alexander of Lycopolis Stroumsa also sought to place Titus’s view of “matter” philosophically. He believed that Alexander’s somewhat un-Platonic view was that matter should be derived from the first principle and could not therefore be regarded as evil, though he failed to explain what the origin of evil was otherwise. Moreover it was Alexander’s otherwise sound Platonic view that matter has no real existence. Nor did Titus think that matter is linked to evil; since the world is created by God, who by definition is good, no part of the world at all is evil. It is not matter but evil that has no objective existence. Evil is sin and comes from the weakness of the free will. Stroumsa added that from Basil the Great and Augustine onwards this negative concept of evil become the standard solution in Greek and Latin patristics and later in Neo-Platonism too; Christian theology thus appears to have been quicker to draw a conclusion that was only potentially contained in Neo-

154 Stroumsa 1992, 338: “Titus, on his part, while no philosopher, is the bearer of a good rhetorical education, and shows a certain knowledge of κοιναί philosophical vocabulary and arguments—both Platonic and Stoic”.
156 Stroumsa 1992, 342–43.
159 Stroumsa 1992, 342, 343.
Platonism’s hierarchical thought. Summarising, Stroumsa maintained that Manichaeism was not a challenge to Alexander and Titus respectively on the same point: the issue concerning the status of matter (and “the nature of intermediary powers”) was the challenge for Alexander, who represented “an emanationist ontology”, whereas theodicy was the challenge for Titus, since the problem of evil demanded a justification of the Demiurge in “a creationist ontology”. The central similarity between the two writers was that both wanted to defend Providence.

K. Fitschen’s study of Serapion’s *Adversus Manichaeos* from 1992 also contains a valuable comparison between motifs in that book and those in other anti-Manichaean works, including Titus. Fitschen’s study was already available to W.W. Klein, who in 1991 published the first monograph on Greek anti-Manichaean literature, another book which deserves the epithet ‘pioneering’. Klein also noted that work on the Christian anti-Manichaean literature had hardly begun; only a few critical editions and translations exist. The entire literature has been examined almost solely by Manichaean scholars seeking information on Manichaeism, in particular fragments of original Manichaean texts. Since this information is scanty and not particularly trustworthy,

hätte es nahegelegen, die Antimanichaica als geistesgeschichtliche Quellen für die Fortsetzung des Kampfes gegen die Gnosis und für das sich konstituierende Christentum zu erforschen

but no scholar of the History of Religions, of Byzantine culture or patristics has noticed the significance of this literature.

Specifically, Klein studied only Greek Christian works whose explicit subject was the religion that Mani founded, including of course original Greek works that are now only preserved in translation (e.g. parts of *Acta Archelai* or Titus), and he began with an overview of these works. His main purpose, however, was to demonstrate their importance by gathering their arguments systematically according

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163 Stroumsa 1992, 343.
164 Stroumsa 1992, 345.
to the main themes of the polemic or the apologetics\textsuperscript{169} in order finally to collate the results as regards the aims and methods of the polemic.\textsuperscript{170}

Klein himself mentioned a large number of areas that he was unable to cover in his study, such as the question of the inter-dependence of the anti-Manichaean texts, or the origin of the arguments in Christian polemic against the Jews, Gnostics and Marcionites and in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, including Neo-Platonic anti-Manichaean texts. Furthermore Klein dealt neither with the issue of how the anti-Manichaean concern influenced the exegesis of many of the Church fathers, nor with the question of the polemic as a source of knowledge about Manichaeism.\textsuperscript{171}

The present study sets out to make a contribution in some of these areas, including the issue of inter-dependence in anti-Manichaean texts. But I hope especially to answer the question of the origin of some of the philosophical arguments.\textsuperscript{172}

Here it should be noted that it is a common feature of the limited studies of Titus’s philosophical background that have been published since Sickenberger’s work appeared that they emphasise Titus’s use of doctrines derived from several philosophical schools. When Beck chose the term “eclecticism” to describe Titus’s standpoint, he possibly intended it merely as a description without any real evaluation. In the history of ancient philosophy the term was otherwise often used to indicate that philosophers in the period from c. 100 BCE to c. 200 CE arbitrarily took over various doctrines and juxtaposed them without regard to their philosophical coherence. Since this assessment has often rested on a superficial knowledge of the writers in question, it is now used less often.\textsuperscript{173} Among the Church fathers the term is particularly applied to Clement of Alexandria, who in \textit{Stromata} I.7 (37.6) describes his philosophy as a “selection” (\textit{\v{e}klektik\v{o}n}) of the good thoughts to be found in the teachings of the various schools of philosophy.\textsuperscript{174} However, Lilla has convinc-

\textsuperscript{169} Klein 1991, 51–204.
\textsuperscript{170} Klein 1991, 205–28.
\textsuperscript{171} Klein 1991, 3–5.
\textsuperscript{172} At this juncture, where I present an overview of Titus scholarship, I can also mention that I have produced a brief outline which can be seen as a preparatory study of the present monograph (Pedersen 1996a).
\textsuperscript{174} Stählin 1906, 25.2. See e.g. Donini 1988, 16, 17, 20, 31, 33.
ingly established that Clement was no greater an “eclectic” than his contemporary pagan Middle-Platonists. What is important to note is that just because a philosophy contains elements of various origin, it does not mean that it is per se uncritical or inconsistent. Of course, the question of coherence in the philosophers’ thought cannot be immediately identified with the question of philosophical coherence in the Church fathers; in particular one must observe that many Church fathers had no intention of being philosophers. For example, even though Irenaeus’s concept of God is marked by popular philosophical ideas, and he sees no clash between revelation and reason, he clearly lacks a consciousness of philosophical problems. On the other hand, one must realise partly that it was not philosophical problems that Irenaeus wished to solve, and partly that as one of the first writers to seek to show the unity of the two testaments, he possessed no fully-fledged concepts and solutions, but had to feel his way. Other Church fathers, especially Origen, were better schooled philosophically, but otherwise it is often just a matter of isolated philosophical arguments being applied ad hoc. Thus the individual arguments of the Church fathers, insofar as they are “philosophical”, can naturally be evaluated as philosophy, and the result in the opinion of some critics leaves a lot to be desired; another side of the issue is to what extent did the Church fathers adopt philosophical doctrines that did not allow what may be regarded as the true intention of Christianity to flourish—instead of criticising them.

It is nevertheless not unreasonable to suggest that in his first two books Titus himself wishes to be a philosopher. True, he does not use the word as such, but his programme is concerned with pre-

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176 Irenaeus’s philosophical knowledge was strictly limited and rested largely on doxographical material; yet he nevertheless employed a range of rational arguments of philosophical origin whose content helped to determine his idea of God. On the other hand Irenaeus appears to have received a good rhetorical education (see further in Grant 1967, 158–69 [= 1949]; Schoedel 1959; Meijering 1975, 19–38; Vallée 1981, 12–16).
177 Hugo Koch, who otherwise endeavoured to find as much consistency in Irenaeus’s ideas as possible, remarked (1925, 213): “In der Tat kann einen dieser doctor constructivus et confusus des Frühkatholizismus zur Verzweiflung bringen, wenn man klare und scharfe Begriffe bei ihm sucht.” Also D’Ales (1916, 185) thought that it was just as difficult to orient oneself in Irenaeus’s position as it was in a jungle.
178 See e.g. Stead 1976a; 1982.
senting a universal rational argument without including the Bible. If therefore Titus has employed philosophical arguments inconsistently, in that he has selected them arbitrarily in order to attack Manichaeism, they rebound on himself, measured by his own yardstick. On the other hand, inasmuch as Titus does not draw up a philosophical system, it can never be fully determined whether or not he was merely an “eclectic”. In what follows, however, I shall build on Stroumsa’s view that “Platonism” was Titus’s “major philosophical frame of reference”. In relation to the whole of Titus’s age it is by far the most likely assumption. Instead of regarding Titus as an “eclectic” the working hypothesis must be that the Stoic and Aristotelian elements in Titus appear because such elements were integrated into the Platonism of the day. On the other hand I shall not consider the degree of inconsistency in Titus’s philosophy but merely suggest that such inconsistency as there is in Books I and II of Contra Manichaeos is due rather to ineptitude than to a consistent method.

As can be seen, the relevance of the question of Titus’s philosophical position naturally follows on from the history of scholarship in the area, and it is of interest to note that just as some of the Manichaean-orientated Titus scholarship revolves around the relation of his sources to philosophy, so does the patristic Titus scholarship focus on Titus’s own relation to philosophy. This similarity makes it probable that the two lines of Titus scholarship have more in common with one another than has otherwise been outlined within the scholarship traditions. The division into two types of question—what does Titus tell us about Manichaeism, and what did he himself believe?—is meaningful enough, but a rigid separation between them cannot be maintained; they are internally linked and all the time must be related to one another.

The question of Titus’s relation to the doctrine of original sin is connected both to his anti-Manichaeism and to his philosophical orientation. If Titus really did reject a “doctrine of original sin”, was it linked to his confrontation with Manichaeism, to philosophical influences or to both? These are the various strands that I shall attempt to bring together in my interpretation of Titus.
5. Text transmission and history of editions

Titus of Bostra wrote his work in Greek, but only a part of the Greek original is preserved.\textsuperscript{179} One of the two important manuscripts is $G = \text{Congregazione della Missione urbana di S. Carlo, Genoa, cod. 27 (also 37)}$, a parchment codex from the 11th century that has never been edited,\textsuperscript{180} and which on f. 8–78 contains Τίτου ἐπισκόπου κατὰ Μανηζέων, which is the same part of Titus that was published in De Lagarde 1859, 1.1–69.27 (I.1–III.7), although $G$ f. 16r–37v contains a lengthy interpolation between ἀνέκδοτα and ἡ ἀγέννητος, Gr. 11.4 that has been transmitted in all manuscripts dependent on $G$.

The first of these is $A (= \text{Biblioteca angelica, cod. lat. 229})$ from the 17th century.\textsuperscript{181} The second is $B (= \text{cod. vat. gr. 1491 [olim 1522]})$, an unpublished paper manuscript from the 16th century, which according to Nagel contains the Titus text f. 13r–112r (and the interpolation 22v-55r).\textsuperscript{182} The third, which is indirectly dependent on $G$, is $H (= \text{Hamburg, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. phil. 306 [olim Stadtbibliothek, Philosophi gr. in fol. XVI]})$; this too is a paper manuscript from the 17th century which formerly belonged to Lukas Holste, who either acquired it or copied it in the Vatican library. $H$ is a copy of $B$ and contains the Titus text on pp. 25–202 (and the interpolation on pp. 42–99).\textsuperscript{183} The fourth and last is the Greek Titus text ff. 192–260r in the manuscript Vat. lat. 6221 from the beginning of the 17th century, which according to Poirier seems to go back to $G$ via $B$.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{179} The following presentation is based on Brinkmann 1894; Sickenberger 1901, 8ff.; Casey 1928; Nagel 1967, 8–16; Nagel 1973, 285–93; Poirier 1989–1990; Poirier 1990–91; Poirier and Sensal 1990a.

\textsuperscript{180} The manuscript was mentioned for the first time in Pitra 1888, 44–46; cf. 57–63, where on the basis of a collation of the text of $G$ and Basnage’s text in PG 18 Pitra carried a list of variants in $G$ which, however, is incomplete (Pitra 1888, 59 n. 3). There is a description of $G$ in Ehrhard 1893, 204–5, and in Palau 1996, 49–65.

\textsuperscript{181} Casey 1928, 102 n. 11; Nagel 1967, 9 n. 28; Poirier 1989–1990, 367.

\textsuperscript{182} According to Nagel 1967, 9; $B$ is described in Giannelli 1950, 10–12 (1491).

\textsuperscript{183} Described in Omont 1890, 361–62. See also the catalogue Philologica hambur- gensia, 6 No. 15.

\textsuperscript{184} See Sickenberger 1901, 11; but esp. Petitmengin 1988, 132 (who states that the Greek text is accompanied by a Latin translation by Jean Matthieu Caryophillus); Poirier 1989–1990, 368; Poirier 1990–91, 325 (the copy of the Latin translation of Titus is not by Caryophillus, but it is corrected by him; the Greek Titus-text is
As mentioned above, Torres’ translation of Titus into Latin was published in 1604 and reprinted in 1610 and 1618; it is now easily available in Migne PG 18, 1069–1258. Torres drew on a Greek source, the text of which was identical with the text in G, according to Casey. Torres’ translation has no text-critical importance according to Nagel, but in my opinion it can be used with caution as an aid to the interpretation of Titus. Moreover, Torres understood already back then that the interpolation created a break in the line of thought in the text and he therefore excised it, though he unfortunately came to omit a little piece of Titus’s text (corresponding to Gr. 10.36 [from δουὴ]-11.4 [up to and including αἰῶνας; see PG 18, 1087B]); he placed the excised passage, which he continued to regard as a part of Titus’s work, partly at the end of Book I (in PG 18, 1115A [from “Si vero vultis”] to 1132C) and partly as Titus’s Book III, in that he considered III.1–7 to be no more than a “Praefatio in librum tertium.”

Torres’s solution to the problem of the interpolation was taken up in Basnagle’s editio princeps of the Greek text from 1725, which built on Johann Friederich Winckler’s copy of H. Basnagle also added Torres’s translation, even though it was based on a different manuscript than H. Together with Torres’s translation Basnagle’s edition was reprinted by Andreas Gallandi in 1769 and (from Gallandi) in 1857 in Migne PG 18, 1069–1258 (and later reprints of Migne). Finally, Basnagle’s text was reprinted in Athens in 1959 (from Migne’s printing).

De Lagarde’s observation that the interpolation was missing in the Syriac version of Titus meant that it could not belong to Titus’s Contra Manichaeos, and he therefore removed it from the Titus text in his new edition of H from 1859, already mentioned several times

copied by Jean de Sainte-Maur): since the manuscript only contains Titus until III.7, it is also dependent on G, probably via B.

183 Canisius 1604, 31–142.
186 In Nagel 1967, 14–15 there is a more detailed outline of how the individual parts of the interpolation are arranged in Torres. Cf. also Brinkmann 1894, 480–81.
187 Basnagle 1725, 56–162.
188 Gallandi 1769, 269–350. In addition Oratio in ram. palm. (see below p. 129) was published in Gallandi 1769, 350–56.
189 Titos Βουστροιν etc. in Βιβλιοθήκη Έλληνον Πατέρων καὶ Εκκλησιαστικών Συγγραφέων: XIX. Contra Manich. is on pp. 12–108 and Oratio in ram. palm. (cf. below p. 129) on pp. 109–16.
above. De Lagarde consigned the interpolation to an appendix (De Lagarde 1859, 69.28–103.16). Nagel says of De Lagarde’s new edition of H:

Die Edition LAGARDEs ist trotz mancher Nachteile—subjektiv bedingt durch die übliche Manier seiner Textausgaben, objektiv durch den jungen Textzeugen—immer noch die einzig brauchbare Ausgabe.192

The question now was from which text did the long interpolation actually stem.193 The problem was solved in 1894 by August Brinkmann, who proved that the interpolation belonged to Serapion of Thmuis’s Adversus Manichaeos, which through a mistaken exchange of quires and leaves in G had not only entered the Titus text but had done so in disorder.194

The second of the two important Greek manuscripts is V = Athos Vatopaedi No. 236, an unpublished parchment codex from the 12th century,195 in which f. 59v–95v contain Τίτου ἐπισκόπου κατὰ Μανιχαίων; in other words this includes, in addition to De Lagarde’s edited text, the conclusion of III.7, III.8–29 and the beginning of III.30. In the catalogue of manuscripts at the Vatopedi Monastery from 1924 the title is incorrectly given as τοῦ αἰώνος κατὰ Μανιχαίων and is therefore assigned to Serapion’s preceding Adversus Manichaeos (Σεραπίωνος ἐπισκόπου Θμουήσεως κατὰ Μανιχαίων).196 However, Casey proved what the correct title was, and could thus verify both De Lagarde’s and Brinkmann’s results, for V does not contain the interpolation, but gives f. 64v the text ἀιώνας ἡ ἀγένητος without a break. Thus V is independent of G, B and H; but in Casey’s opinion G and V are copies of a common, vanished manuscript. Finally Casey showed that the interpolation is found again in the order reconstructed by Brinkmann in the Serapion text of V.197

On this basis Nagel noted that a critical edition of the Greek text cannot build on either B or H, but only on G and V. Where G and

192 Nagel 1967, 16. Casey 1928, 105: “Lagarde’s text is at best an accurate copy of H, to which a few happy conjectures have been added.”

193 Dräseke (1887) was the first after De Lagarde to take a stance on the problem, but his solution that the interpolation contained George of Laodicea’s lost anti-Manichaean writing was wrong; cf. Brinkmann 1894, 487 n. 1.

194 Brinkmann 1894.

195 Eustratiades and Arcadios 1924, 52 points to the 11th cent., but Casey 1931, 3; Nagel 1973, 292 n. 16; and Poirier 1989–1990, 367 date V to the 12th cent.

196 Eustratiades and Arcadios 1924, 52.

197 Casey 1928.
Chapter Three

$V$ disagree, the Syriac version should be consulted.\(^{198}\) From Nagel himself comes an *editio princeps* of $V$’s text to Titus III.7–30; this part of Titus’s Greek text is only preserved in $V$.\(^{199}\)

From the publication of Torres’s translation it was clear that Titus’s work originally comprised four books, because Torres also added a translation of an old, brief summary of all four books.\(^{200}\) In its entirety, however, Titus’s work is only preserved in the Syriac translation, $Sy$ = British Museum add. 12,150, a manuscript from Edessa which the scribe himself dates to 411 and which is therefore considered to be the oldest preserved Syriac manuscript. It also contains Pseudo-Clement’s *Recognitiones*; Eusebius of Caesarea’s works, *Theophania*, *History of the Martyrs in Palestine*, and *Panegyric on the Christian Martyrs*, as well as a martyrology. The Titus text is found on f. 72b-156a in the manuscript and under the title

\begin{center}
“... The discourse of Titus *Against the Manichaeans*” (in De Lagarde 1859, this title printed on the page before $Sy$ 1) and the subscript

\begin{center}
“... here end the four discourses of Titus *Against the Manichaeans*, translated from Greek into Aramaic” ($Sy$ 186.14–15).\(^{201}\)
\end{center}
\end{center}

The individual books contain a clear division into chapters, which De Lagarde and later Nagel have enumerated as a chapter division and transferred to the Greek text, which is also followed here.

$Sy$ was published by De Lagarde (1859a), but the edition does not live up to the requirements that must be made of a critical edition, because De Lagarde was only interested in an exact reproduction of the manuscript.\(^{202}\) Nagel’s Habilitationsschrift, however, also contains

\(^{198}\) Nagel 1967, 72.

\(^{199}\) This *editio princeps* exists in the unpublished Habilitationsschrift (Nagel 1967, 81–114) and was published in Nagel 1973. However, the first part of III.7 (from έπαρδον to έπερεχθονά) is also preserved in $G$ and in the manuscripts dependent on $G$ and has thus been included in Basnage and De Lagarde’s editions.

\(^{200}\) Torres’s translation of these summaries into Latin introduced the Titus-text in Canisius 1604, 34–35, and similarly the Greek original of the summaries is placed before the actual Titus-text in both $G$ and $V$, and Basnage’s (1725, 59) edition of them from $H$ also placed them first. However, in Migne, PG 18, 1257–58 they appear last, and De Lagarde (1859, III–IV) relegated them to his foreword.

\(^{201}\) The manuscript is described in Wright 1871, 631a–633b (DCCXXVI) (on Titus’s work Wright 1871, 632a); a photograph from a page of the Titus-text is found in Hatch 1946, 171. Cf. also more distantly Gressmann 1903, 43–55; Gressmann 1904, XI–XIII, XX–XXIV. Vööbus 1965, 15 suggests that the translations of the manuscript originate from the School of Edessa.

\(^{202}\) Rahlfs 1928, 53–54; Nagel 1967, 13. De Lagarde 1859a has also been reprinted
a new edition of Sy’s version of III.7–29, as well as the beginning of III.30 (i.e. corresponding to the part of V that Nagel edited on the same occasion), together with a German translation. 203

Despite the help afforded by De Lagarde’s editions scholarship on Titus has remained slight, as can be seen from the historical summary presented here. This is presumably due to the inadequacy and unavailability of these editions, and De Lagarde himself was aware of the need to make the full text available; he therefore planned a translation into German, but unfortunately it never came to anything.204

At least five times in the course of the last hundred years plans have been drawn up for a critical edition of the entire Titus corpus, or at least of the Greek text, but each time these plans have stranded. The first time, around 1900, the intention was that Brinkmann and L. Nix should produce an edition; although the project fell through, Nix did manage an unpublished translation in German of the Syriac version of Titus.205 Casey also planned an edition,206 and in this case it also looks as if the project was actually nearing completion when the manuscript disappeared into the depths

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203 Nagel 1967, 26–80; however, only the German translation has been published in Nagel 1973. With regard to Nagel’s Habilitationsschrift it must be emphasised that it also contains a very valuable introduction (Nagel 1967, 1–24) and indexes (Nagel 1967, 115–203).

204 See the foreword in De Lagarde 1859a; Rahlfs 1928, 57. According to Rahlfs (1928, 57 n. 3) a handwritten concordance is a preliminary work to this translation. The concordance is the most important testimony to De Lagarde’s continued interest in Titus, and it is to be found in “Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen”. The concordance and two other relevant notes are also mentioned with the numbers Lagarde 53–55 in Die Handschriften in Göttingen, Universitäts-Bibliothek (Verzeichniss der Handschriften im preussischen Staate; I,3). Berlin 1894. These relate firstly to the concordance to De Lagarde 1859, alphabetically arranged according to Greek words, and with references to the Syriac (No. 55), secondly to De Lagarde’s own copy of his edition of Sy (1859a) with a few additions (No. 53), and thirdly to his own copy of De Lagarde 1859, where on pp. 1–7 he has handwritten some very minor improvements of the text (No. 54). I have acquired copies of this material and also used it to some extent (as regards the concordance). My attention to the material was originally drawn by Byard Bennett.

205 Nagel 1967, 13 (it was available to Nagel in manuscript); Nagel 1973, 292 n. 21. Nix’s translation of (most of) Contra Manich. III.30–IV in type was kindly made available to me in 1994 by Professor Paul-Hubert Poirier. Cf. also Sickenberger 1901, VI, 10 n. 7, 12.

206 Casey 1937, 1588. On the other hand Casey 1928, 109 n. 22 mentions plans for an edition by Casey and F.C. Burkitt.
of the sea on a ship that was torpedoed in the Second World War.\textsuperscript{207} An edition was also planned by H. Lietzmann and A. Baumstark and again by C.R.C. Allberry and H.H. Schaeder.\textsuperscript{208} After Allberry’s death, the task of continuing Allberry’s edition was taken up by A. Böhlig.\textsuperscript{209} Until recently P.-H. Poirier and C. Sensal were also preparing a French translation of \textit{Sy}, but oral reports have informed me that this project has also been abandoned. Some articles were published in connection with this project, however.\textsuperscript{210} Meanwhile, a new edition from E. Hunter of the Syriac text of Titus in the series \textit{Syriaca} of \textit{Corpus Fontium Manichaeorum} has recently been promised.\textsuperscript{211}

In short, no collected translation of Titus into a modern language has ever seen the light of day, even though short passages have been translated in many of the studies to which the present book refers.\textsuperscript{212}

This account of the Titus tradition is not quite complete. In addition to the manuscripts \textit{G}, \textit{V} and \textit{Sy}, a number of fragments of \textit{Contra Manichaeos} exist, preserved in other works, as follows.

Firstly, in his \textit{Biblioteca} Photius excerpts a writing by the tritheist Stephanus Gobarus (after 560), who quotes Titus I.15 (Gr. 8.31–35 \textbf{→} Ch. XI.6).\textsuperscript{213} Interestingly, a comparison of \textit{G}, \textit{V} and \textit{Sy} shows

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In an e-mail (24th Oct. 2001) S.N.C. Lieu has referred me to the brief biography of Casey in Birdsall and Thomson 1963, 9, which says: “Returning to the U.S.A. in 1940 he was torpedoed in the Athenia and lost the notes of his previous fifteen years work.” Lieu himself adds: “It does not say specifically that he had finished his GCS edition but from his other writings and comments I have picked up from an earlier generation of scholars (most of whom are no longer alive), I learned that he was busily editing the final version of the Athos text of Titus for GCS when he left for the US.”
\item Reitzenstein 1931, 47; Nagel 1973, 292 n. 21. See also Lewis 1984, 11, 60–61 n. 1, 80. Some of Allberry’s drafts from the Schaeder-Allberry-project are preserved, incl. an incomplete Syriac-Greek index found among his papers in the Faculty of Oriental Studies Library, Cambridge which I have occasionally used in the studies behind the present book. I owe this information originally to S. Giversen.
\item According to a letter from Böhlig of 26th August 1953 to Allberry’s widow, quoted in Lewis 1984, 11.
\item Thus a study of the way \textit{Sy} translates from Greek: Poirier and Sensal 1990a (cf. here already Gressmann 1903, 45 n. 2); as well as Poirier 1989–90 and 1990–91. Poirier also generously gave me access in 1994 to the provisional translation of Books I–II (Poirier and Sensal 1990; a translation of the Syriac version to French with a critical apparatus).
\item Clackson, Hunter and Lieu 1998, ix.
\item It would take up too much space to note all these pieces, but see also the English translations of Titus II.7, PG 18, 1145A–C (\textbf{=} Gr. II.15, 32.30–33.12); II.14, PG 18, 1160C–1161C (\textbf{=} Gr. II.24, 41.4–42.14); and II.22, PG 18, 1177B–1180A (\textbf{=} Gr. II.41–42, 50.22–51.16) in Walsh and Walsh 1985, 53–57.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that on certain points this fragment and Sy differ in the same way from $G$ and $V$—the fragment thus appears to contain earlier readings than $G$ and $V$.

Secondly, John of Damascus carries a number of quotes from Titus of Bostra in his *Sacra Parallela*. Migne, PG 18, 1257D–1264A publishes 5 fragments (from Codex Rupefucaldinus), and in Pitra there are 6 fragments from Codex Coislinianus 276, which represent the original form of the first book of the *Sacra Parallela*. Pitra also published his collation of Codex Rupefucaldinus with Codex Coislinianus 276 in connection with two further fragments contained in both these manuscripts. In passing it should be noted that Pitra’s edition contains many errors, which, however, were later corrected by Casey.

The *Sacra Parallela* fragments are as follows: Fr. I, PG 18, 1257 D–1260C is identical with Fr. III, Pitra 1888, 52–54 and is found again in IV.99–101, Sy (part of the fragment → Ch. XI.50–51). Secondly, Fr. II, PG 18, 1260D–1261A comes from II.15, Gr. 32.37–33.2. Thirdly, Fr. III, PG 18, 1261AB is from II.27, Gr. 43.18–32, and is also found in Codex Coislinianus 276, the variants of which were edited in Pitra 1888, 63 and Casey 1928,109. Fourthly, Fr. IV, PG 18, 1261C–1264A comes from II.48–49, Gr. 56.23–57.2, and is also found in Codex Coislinianus 276, the variants of which...
were edited in Pitra 1888, 63 and Casey 1928, 108–9 (part of the fragment → Ch. XI.30–31). Fifthly, Fr. V, PG 18, 1264A comes from IV.91, Sy (→ Ch. XI.48).

All these fragments are already identified in PG, with the natural exception of the two from Book IV.

With regard to Pitra’s fragments Fr. I, Pitra 1888, 51 comes from I.18, Gr. 10.35–11.4; Fr. II, Pitra 1888, 51–52 does not belong at all to Titus’s work but is a fragment from Serapion of Thmuis’s *Adversus Manichaeos*. Fr. III, Pitra 1888, 52–54 (with corrections in Casey 1928, 107) is also found as mentioned as Fr. I, PG 18, 1257D–1260C and again in IV.99–101, Sy (part of the fragment → Ch. XI.50–51). Fr. IV, Pitra 1888, 54–56 (with corrections in Casey 1928, 107–8) is from II.21, Gr. 37.15–38.26. Fr. V, Pitra 1888, 56 (with corrections in Casey 1928, 108) comes from II.43, Gr. 52.7–23. And finally, Fr. VI, Pitra 1888, 57 (cf. Casey 1928, 108) is from II.16, Gr. 34.10–14 (part of the fragment → Ch. XI.20). Pitra also identified Fr. I, IV and V, and also Fr. III with Fr. I in PG.

Thirdly, various unpublished quotations from Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos* also exist in Syriac manuscripts, which I have not consulted, however.

As can be seen, the conditions for the provision of a new critical edition have long been present. The confusing interpolation in *G* is no longer a problem. *A, B, H* and Vat. lat. 6221 are based solely

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218 Cf. Sickenberger 1901, 13 n. 1.
219 See Sickenberger 1901, 8 with n. 7.
220 i. A fragment of what corresponds to IV.39, Sy 148.4–9, but in another translation, exists in a Syriac florilegium which is preserved in two manuscripts (British Museum Add. 14,532 from the 8th cent., Wright 1871, 955b–967a [DCCCLVIII] and British Museum Add. 14,533 from c. 10th cent., Wright 1871, 1005b–1008b [DCCCLXIII], esp. 1007b): see Van Roey 1984, 131 (cf. Poirier and Sensal 1990a, 310 n. 19).

ii. A quotation in a manuscript from the 11th cent., British Museum Add. 14,731 (described in Wright 1871, 852a–855b [DCCXXVII]) from “Titus of Bostra: . . . fol. 73 a” is mentioned in Wright 1871, 855a; it is included as a quotation in “[a] treatise of Moses bar Kiphā bishop of Moṣul and Nineveh, on freewill and predestination, divided into four discourses.” (Wright 1871, 853ab).

iii. A quotation in a manuscript from the 8th or 9th cent., British Museum Add. 14,533 (described in Wright 1871, 967a–976a [DCCCLXIX]) from “Titus of Bostra, . . . fol. 179 a” after “[e]xtracts from Didymus of Alexandria, ... “Epiphanius, the Ancoratus” and “Severus, hom. epithron. xxi.” (Wright 1871, 975a).
on \(G\), so that the only Greek text transmission of significance lies in \(G\) and \(V\) (ignoring a few fragments). A critical edition can therefore be based on \(G\), \(V\) and \(Sy\)—but unfortunately it still does not exist. It might therefore seem hazardous to publish a study of the theology and sources of Titus of Bostra, when the critical edition of his work is still outstanding. Conversely, however, it might be argued that one of the reasons why no critical edition has ever reached publication is that \textit{Contra Manichaeos} has not been regarded of particular significance. If this is true, it is to be hoped that studies such as the present one will invest the work of a new edition with sufficient prestige that it will one day be completed.

It would be irresponsible of me if my studies were undertaken without regard to the fact that the best edition of the Greek text (De Lagarde 1859) is only an edition of the late manuscript \(H\). I have thus attempted to secure my results through limited, text-critical work that concerns itself solely with those passages that have been translated or quoted directly in the present study or are otherwise central to my argument. Where there are deviations from De Lagarde’s text, I have included the passages in question in Ch. XI together with a critical apparatus and a translation, and I have also attempted to give these passages a little more extensive context so as to afford the reader independent access to central ways of thinking in Titus. Where there is no deviation from De Lagarde’s text, the original text and translation are not included in Ch. XI.

By ‘deviations’ from De Lagarde’s text I mean firstly, those places where there is a different text in \(G\) and/or \(V\) (since I have acquired copies of these manuscripts)\textsuperscript{221} from De Lagarde 1859. Where \(G\) and \(V\) differ, I have also consulted \(Sy\). I have used De Lagarde’s edition (De Lagarde 1859a), but also collated it with a copy of the original manuscript; in so doing, I have discovered other errors, which are also dealt with in Ch. XI. Taking into consideration the fact that \(G\) and \(V\) are medieval manuscripts and closely related to each other, whereas \(Sy\) was written shortly after Titus’s Greek text was written down, I have deemed it necessary to pay regard to those places

\textsuperscript{221} When Casey (1931, 4) writes that “\(G\) has suffered badly from damp and is in parts entirely illegible”, it agrees with my copies, even though it affects only brief passages. In the worst cases I have only been able to check the De Lagarde text from \(V\).—Otherwise I only know \(H\) from De Lagarde’s edition (1859—and from Basnage’s); and I have not consulted the manuscripts \(A\), \(B\) and Vat. lat. 6221.
where Sy appears to build on a different text form than that on which G and V otherwise agree. Here, however, it is often difficult to decide whether apparent differences between Sy and the Greek text transmission are due to the style of the translation, the translator’s inadequacy or a genuinely different text. A thorough examination of the translation style was thus required before Sy could be included in depth, and my inclusion of this version, though it may prove of some help, does not empty it of further possibilities.\footnote{Poirier and Sensal 1990 has been a valuable introduction to this inclusion of Sy.}

It should also be mentioned that in some cases the text of H may seem better than G and V, which must be due to the transcriber’s own improvements, and if these improvements are plausible,\footnote{E.g. Ch. XI.8 n. 1, n. 3; XI.11 n. 3, n. 7; XI.14 n. 4+n.a); XI.20 n. 2; XI.23 n. 2, n. 9; XI.27 n. 1; XI.32 n. 7, n. 12, n. 14.} and especially if they are supported by Sy;\footnote{E.g. Ch. XI.2 n. 1, n.3; XI.12 n. 2; XI.14 n. 6; XI.15 n. 1; XI.18 n. 2; XI.19 n. 5; XI.20 n. 1; XI.23 n. 11.} I have retained them in the text. The same goes for the few cases where H supports V against G.\footnote{E.g. Ch. XI.1 n. 2; XI.2 n. 2, n. 4; XI.3 n. 2; XI.12 n. 3; XI.34 n. 5.—The fact that H contains sound improvements of the text is also mentioned in a single case by Allberry (1939, 130–31 n. 2), who notes that the emendation (in relation to G) appears for the first time as a marginal gloss in B, from where it has been transferred to H. It is thus conceivable that the good emendations in H actually originate in B.}

I must also underline that the passages in Ch. XI where I have attempted to improve De Lagarde’s text do not meet the requirements of a new edition, but they nonetheless give a better foundation for further work with the text.

In addition to G, V and Sy other passages have been of importance for this study, namely those contained in the fragments in Photius, Biblioteca and in Sacra Parallela. In the latter case there are also some fragments from Books III–IV that have had particular relevance for my studies and are the only ones representing the Greek text.

With regard to the part of V found in Nagel’s editions (1967, 1973) a modern, critical edition of Titus already exists, based on V+Sy. I have therefore limited myself to including some passages where I have been able to correct a few minor errors in Nagel, but I have also mentioned some of Nagel’s remarks about divergences in relation to Sy, especially when it was a question of variants dependent on dogmatics that were of particular interest for my study.
A separate case is Book III.7, Gr. 69.5–25, which was re-edited in ed.N 296.1–298.6 (V+H+S), but where the text also exists in G, which Nagel has not included. In this case I have therefore decided that the entire passage should be thoroughly collated (→ Ch. XI.34).
CHAPTER FOUR

THE HISTORICAL AND LITERARY CONTEXT FOR
TITUS OF BOSTRA’S CONTRA MANICHAEOS

1. Introductory remarks

As already stated, it is a guiding principle of this study to search for the links between the ideas in Contra Manichaeos and the context of Titus of Bostra. Admittedly we are not particularly well-informed about this context, but a certain amount of material does exist which can be brought together and made relevant for my interpretation.

Starting with a few remarks on Bostra and the province of Arabia I shall first attempt to gather certain relevant information on the position of Christianity and the Catholic Church in Bostra. This material will form the background for an exposition of the scattered information that we possess on the violent conflicts in Titus’s time between Catholics and pagans. This information can be illuminated by a remark in Contra Manichaeos which together with information from Jerome and Epiphanius contributes to a closer dating of the work. Finally, Jerome’s information that Titus also wrote other works than Contra Manichaeos will be the occasion for a brief Excursion to look into which other texts have been attributed to Titus.

Secondly, I am concerned with the fact that Titus’s work belongs within the genre of ancient Catholic heresiology that had formed a particular branch in the form of anti-Manichaean literature. My focus is especially on a minor group among the anti-Manichaean writers who by and large correspond to what has been described “the Antiochene School”, because there is a variety of material that indicates that Titus of Bostra may have had a special association with them. A further Excursion contains various theories on patristic sources that Titus of Bostra may have used.

2. The province of Arabia, conflicts between pagans and Catholics and the dating of Contra Manichaeos

Bostra is the Graeco-Latin form of the name of the city of Buṣrā, which lay in the Nabataean Hawrān, and which is also mentioned
as Βοσσορρα in 1 Macc. 5.26.28, because it was destroyed by Judas Maccabaeus in 163 BCE. In 106 CE Emperor Trajan changed the Nabataean Kingdom that he had conquered into the province of Arabia (Arabia provincia), and Bostra became its capital, with the provincial governor’s residence and the headquarters of the Third Legion of Cyrenaica (legio tertia Cyrenaica), also known as the Bostra legion. Bostra became a polis, and soon after a colonia, and finally a metropolis under Emperor Philip the Arabian.¹

Bostra was thus a Roman city-state, which by virtue of its origins nevertheless contained a number of different ethnic groups. The names of its citizens in the city’s inscriptions testify to several Semitic groups, in particular of course Nabataeans, but there were also Safaïtes as well as other groups. In addition, there is a large amount of material comprising Greek and Latin names, bearing witness to the hellenisation and romanisation of the city.² According to 1 Macc. 5.45, Judas Maccabaeus led all the Jews of Gilead into Judea, but later (documented from the 3rd cent. CE) Bostra contained a substantial Jewish population.³

Together with this Jewish element Bostra’s proximity to Palestine makes it probable that Christianity reached the city relatively early, although no contemporary witness testifies to this—only late legends.⁴ Nevertheless, Christianity must have gained a considerable footing by the first half of the 3rd century, since Origen travelled to Bostra in 214–15 at the request of the city’s Roman governor (Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica VI.19.15–16), and shortly afterwards we know the name of the city’s Bishop, Beryllus, who corresponded with the Bishop of Jerusalem (Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica VI.20.2) and was influenced by Monarchianism. However, at a synod in Bostra that took place under Emperor Gordian III (238–44) Origen managed to guide Beryllus back to orthodoxy (Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica

¹ On Bostra see Sickenberger 1901, 1; Aigrain 1924, 1161ff.; Kindler 1983; Bowersock 1983; Sartre 1985. Our knowledge of Hawrān has been greatly increased in the last 30 years thanks to extensive archaeological activity; cf. Kindler 1983; Bowersock 1983; Sartre 1985; Graf 1997—all with further references.
² Sartre 1985, 141–52.
³ Cf. Kindler 1983, 2–3, 9; Sartre 1985, 45–48, 151, 158–59. The inscriptions do not reveal anything about the Jews of Bostra, but they are known from the Talmud.
⁴ See Aigrain 1924, 1159–61; Devreesse 1945, 211; Sartre 1985, 99 with further references.
VI.33,1–4). From this time there is also further documentation of so-called heresies in the province of Arabia, but in addition to Beryllus we have also other evidence of ante-Nicene Catholic bishops and of theological activity in Bostra. Later we know that the Bishop of Bostra, Nicomachus, took part in the first ecumenical synod in Nicaea in 325 and that Bishop Antonius of Bostra was present at the synod in Serdica in 343.

In its 6th canon the synod of Nicaea recognised the ancient rights of Antioch (which in later terminology points forward to its role as a “patriarchate”) without going into further detail about them; from a later time we know that these rights included Arabia, since Bostra occupied the sixth place among the great metropolises of Antioch, and this may already have been the case in Titus’s time.

Whether or not Bostra had a clear position in Titus’s time in relation to the church at Antioch, there is not a shadow of doubt that Titus was the central Catholic figure in the province of Arabia, for the 4th and 5th canons of the synod of Nicaea already assume the existence of ecclesiastical provinces with metropolitans. The two canons thus prove that the Church was already taking over the provinces and provincial boundaries of the state.

Even though paganism had strong and old roots in Bostra, Catholic Christianity at the time of Titus seems to have matched its power

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6 Such as the Arabian heresy that Origen refuted at a synod between 244 and 248 (Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* VI.37; Bardy 1955, 139), and which *Dial. cum Heracl.* (Scherer 1960) is perhaps connected to. Sartre 1985, 101 is also right that it is likely that there were Jewish-Christian heresies like Ebionites and Elchasaites in Bostra, even though this is not documented (cf. Aigrain 1924, 1174); Mani came from a Mesopotamian branch of the Elchasaites.
7 See Sartre 1985, 101–2; Froidevaux 1962; Renoux 1979 on the problem concerning the Hippolytus who may have been Bishop of Bostra in c. 260.—Bishop Maximus of Bostra was one of Paul of Samosata’s judges at the synods in Antioch in 264 and 268 (Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* VII.28,1 and VII.30,2 [Bardy 1955, 212, 214]).
8 Aigrain 1924, 1172; Devreesse 1945, 211–12, 227; Sartre 1985, 104. See Sartre 1982a, 360–62 (no. 9439); Sartre 1985, 104 on whether the ἐπίσκοπος John who is mentioned in an inscription from Bostra that contains a dating corresponding to 352–53 CE was the city’s Bishop.
10 The synod of Nicaea’s 4th and 5th canon: see Joannou 1962, 26–27.
in the city, provoking serious tensions in which Titus, as the city’s Bishop, must have been directly involved. In addition to the long-standing existence of a church with a bishop, Catholic power in the city must be attributed to a presumed massive increase in Christian numbers after Constantine the Great began to favour the Catholic Church.\footnote{11}

In 356 Emperor Constantius II had prohibited some of the manifestations of the pagan cult,\footnote{12} and it seems as though subsequently the pagans in Bostra were forced to undergo certain violent penalties such as destruction of their temples; that at any rate is what they later claimed under Emperor Julian the Apostate, since some of them accused Orio, one of the city’s Christians, of being responsible. The same Orio had been Constantius’s governor in Arabia (\textit{Praeses Arabiae}) and was an old friend of Libanius, who protested Orio’s innocence; some of the pagans probably held Orio responsible for the enactment of such strict laws as those which Constantius’s governor was bound by, while others believed that Orio had demonstrated moderation in his implementation of these measures. For those who held Orio responsible, the hour of revenge came under Emperor Julian, who appointed as provincial governor (\textit{Praeses Arabiae}) Belaeus, a rhetorician. Libanius tells of these events in letters to Belaeus from 362–363: Orio’s brother had been exiled, his family scattered and his house plundered, while his fields lay fallow.\footnote{13} Belaeus’s clear anti-Catholic rule also meant, as epigraphical material shows, that sanctuaries in Hawrān were reopened or newly established.\footnote{14}

A letter from Emperor Julian, addressed to the citizens of Bostra and issued in Antioch on 1st August 362,\footnote{15} makes it probable that

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\footnote{11} The inscription material from Bostra testifies to the city’s pagan cults; see Sartre 1985, 154–58; Bowersock 1986; Bowersock 1990, 9–10, 18; on Hawrān’s cults see Sourdé 1952. In the country paganism survived for a long time, in some places until the end of the 6th cent.; see Trombley 1993, 34, 37–39, 315; 1994, 117, 316–79, 384 on the long process of Christianisation. See Emperor Julian’s Titus-quotations below p. 124 on the Christians’ power.


\footnote{13} Libanius, \textit{Ep.} 763, Foerster 1921, 688–89; \textit{Ep.} 819, Foerster 1921, 739–41; cf. Seeck 1906, 97, 394, 397; Puech 1930, 555; Sartre 1982, 104; Sartre 1985, 105.


what happened to Orio had a broader effect. In the first half of the letter the Emperor does not make concrete mention of Bostra; he begins the letter with the hope that the Galileans’ leaders would be more grateful to him than to his predecessor (i.e. Constantius II), for while he had been a persecutor (i.e. of the Nicenes), the exiles were now coming home under Julian, and confiscated wealth could be regained. The Emperor emphasises that no one must be forced to participate in worship of the gods. Nonetheless, he writes, the clerics, who cannot bear the loss of their tyranny, are exciting the masses against worshippers of the gods. He is therefore issuing an edict to all the people that they must not create trouble on the provocation of the clerics, nor must they throw stones or disobey the authorities; at the same time he stresses that they may continue to hold services and prayers.

In the second half of the letter Julian states that he is at pains to point this out to the citizens of Bostra in particular, because in their letter to him Bishop Titus and the clerics have blamed the masses for the trouble, whereas they themselves have called for calm. The Emperor then quotes Titus’s letter directly:

> Although the Christians are a match for the Hellenes in numbers, they are restrained by our admonition that no one disturb the peace in any place.\(^{16}\)

On this basis the Emperor appeals to the citizens of Bostra to drive Titus out of the city, since he is insulting them by assuming to himself the honour for their self-discipline. The Emperor then closes the letter with the call for all sides to remain calm. Those who have strayed from the truth should respect the worshippers of the gods, but they for their part should not outrage and plunder the homes of those who have strayed—the treatment of Orio suggests itself here—but should show tolerance and pity them rather than hate them. Finally, in a remark on the worship of martyrs shortly before the end of the letter—which unfortunately has been only partially

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\(^{16}\) καί τοίς ἔχοντας ἄντων ἐφημέρη σαφεῖς ἡμέρας μηδένα μηδαμοῦ ἀτακτεῖν (Bidez 1960, 195.1–3). English transl. Wright 1923, 133.
preserved by the Christian copiers—the Emperor appears again to sharpen his tone against the Christians.

This letter ought to create difficulties for scholars who, like many writers since the Enlightenment, imagine that Emperor Julian was in principle a supporter of religious freedom in the modern style. For the Emperor’s many assurances of tolerance are revealed as hypocrisy with the distortion of an isolated quotation from Titus’s letter.\(^\text{17}\) What is of interest in the present context, however, is not so much the moral evaluation of the famous Emperor as the fact that in line with his policy in general, he again attempts to create an internal split in the Catholics’ ranks, this time between the clergy and the people. Of equal interest too is the information on Titus and the Catholic Christians’ position in Bostra that can be deduced from the letter. Firstly, in terms of numbers the Christians can be equated with the pagans,\(^\text{18}\) and secondly, relations between the two groups have been thoroughly poisoned, with Titus drawn into the forefront of the confrontation.

We do not know whether the Emperor’s demand for Titus’s expulsion was acted on, but if that was indeed the case, the Bishop must have returned swiftly, since barely a year later the Emperor was killed (26th July 363) in the middle of the war against the Persian arch-enemy and was succeeded by Emperor Jovian, a Christian. What we do know for sure is that as Bishop of Bostra Titus was present at a synod in Antioch at the end of 363 which in a letter to Emperor Jovian recognised the Creed of Nicaea.\(^\text{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) Bidez (1960, 126) emphasises quite rightly that Voltaire selected a poor example when in his attempt to rehabilitate the Emperor he referred precisely to this letter.\(^\) What in reality lay behind Julian’s violent reaction to Titus’s letter is hard to say; the letter is not preserved, but perhaps Titus was trying to have Belaeus removed. However, it may also have been a more consistent move in the Emperor’s policy, if he really did attempt to have other bishops expelled (cf. Sartre 1985, 105).

\(^{18}\) This is how Von Harnack (1924a, 702 n. 2: “eine wichtige statistische Notiz”) understood the passage; similarly Trombley 1993, 110, 228; 1994, 317, 349 (Trombley 1993, 228 correctly states this is a quotation from Titus’s letter that is preserved in the Emperor’s letter, whereas Trombley 1994, 317 incorrectly refers the estimate of the number of Christians and Hellenes to the Emperor himself). But if “the Hellenes” means only the educated pagan population of Bostra, this is not a statement that says anything about the total numerical strengths between the two population groups in Bostra. The statement can still confirm that Christianity was just as strong as paganism among the people of influence.

\(^{19}\) See further below pp. 142–43.
Titus did not write his major work *Contra Manichaeos* until after Emperor Julian’s death. This can be concluded from a passage in the work which mentions the Emperor in the past tense in connection with an interpretation of natural disasters as an example of God’s training in piety:

But even if the cities collapse, because ungodliness is growing—as also actually lately (happened) in the time of that very ungodly (man), who also called to mind the error of the idols—sin is being destroyed and the error that went against God is being diminished (II.28, Gr. 43. 34–37).^{20}

Titus is referring here to the earthquake in 362 which struck Nicomedia and Nicaea.^{21} In addition to the light thrown on the question as to when Titus concluded the writing of *Contra Manichaeos* the passage is of particular interest in view of our knowledge of Titus’s role during the Emperor’s pro-pagan policy in the province of Arabia. Since we know that Book II of *Contra Manichaeos* is also aimed at the pagans, Titus must presumably be reckoning that since Emperor Julian’s defeat and death he can persuade pagan groups to accept that the earthquake was a judgement on the Emperor and his politics.

In addition to the remark in *Contra Manichaeos* II.28 Jerome’s mention of Titus in *De viris illustribus* CII is of importance for the dating of *Contra Manichaeos*:

Under the princes Julian and Jovian, Titus, Bishop of Bostra, wrote powerful books Against the Manichaeans and (also) some other books. He died under (Emperor) Valens.^{22}

Since Valens died in 378, Titus himself must have died at the latest in that year, from which we also know the name of his successor, Badagius (who as early as 381 was replaced by his rival, Agapius).^{23} *Contra Manichaeos* was therefore written between 363 and 378. Since

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^{20} καὶ πόλεις δὲ καταπίπτοσιν, ἑπιφυσισμένης ἁσβείας (οἷς δὴ καὶ πρώην ἐπὶ τοῦ λίαν ἁσβεθάντος καὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τὴν πλάνην ἀναμνήσαντος), φθείρεται ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ μειοῦται ἡ κατὰ θεοῦ πλάνη.


^{22} “Titus, Bostrenus episcopus, sub Iuliano et Ioviano principibus fortes *Adversum Mani- chaeos* scrisit libros et nonnulla alia. Moritur sub Valente.” (Richardson 1896, 48).

Epiphanius’s _Panarion_, written between 374 and 377, also mentions and makes use of Titus. Contra _Manichaeos_, however, must have already been finished and published before 377, probably indeed a number of years before. Jerome, however, says that _Contra Manichaeos_ was written under Julian and Jovian, and taking this literally means that the lengthy work came into being in the period 361–64 and was concluded under Jovian around 363–64. Titus’s statement in _Contra Manichaeos_ II.28 that the earthquake and Emperor Julian’s restitution of paganism had taken place “lately” can mean many things; but it probably refers to events no more than a year old. It is possible, though, that Jerome was being imprecise and that _Contra Manichaeos_ was not finally concluded and published until a few years after Emperor Jovian’s death.

Whatever the case, it is clear that the work was finished a few years after Titus had been involved in violent conflicts with the pagans of Bostra, and it is therefore in a way surprising that it was not against them but against the Manichaeans that Titus took up his pen. To my knowledge Titus’s authorship is the only proof of the existence of Manichaeism in Bostra, even though we have a number of testimonies to other so-called heresies in Bostra and the province of Arabia. As we shall see, however, the pagans are never far away in _Contra Manichaeos_, and below we shall consider whether it was not Titus’s strategy in relation to pagans and Catholics that led him to turn against the Manichaeans.

However, such a view accounts only partially for Titus’s attack. From another angle _Contra Manichaeos_ may be seen in the context of the other heresiological and especially anti-Manichaean literature of the Early Catholic Church. This finds expression not only in the province of Arabia, but throughout the Syrian-Palestinian region, where Catholic writers were carrying on a controversy against Manichaeism. Through this and other circumstances Titus might well be numbered with a group of other contemporary writers.

24 See above p. 67.
Excursion: Other works by Titus

From the above quotation of Jerome in *De viris illustribus*, it appears that Titus must also have written other works than *Contra Manichaeos*. However, the fact that Jerome mentions the title of *Contra Manichaeos* shows that Titus’s contemporaries also regarded it as his most important work. In the following I will deal briefly with the discussion of these other works.

The Greek original of a *Commentarii in Lucam*, the title of which states that it was written by Titus of Bostra and other fathers, was first published in 1624. The title does not claim that it is a text by Titus, nor is this the case. But it does include, as Sickenberger has proved, genuine fragments of *Homiliae in Lucam* written by Titus; these are found again in catenae on Luke. Through his examination of the catenae on Luke, Sickenberger was able to separate off the fragments attributed to Titus, and then in a comparison with *Contra Manichaeos* he could determine that the majority of them were genuine. In addition to this there are nine fragments in a *Catena in Danielem* which are also attributed to Titus, and which in Sickenberger’s opinion are genuine and may well come from *Homiliae in Lucam*. In this connection it should be added that Sickenberger was able to demonstrate that in *Homiliae in Lucam* too Titus’s position is anti-Manichaean. Finally, Sickenberger included a version of those Lk. and Dan. scholia which were by Titus. Later scholars have added further fragments and comments to this edition.

A Palm Sunday sermon *Oratio in ramos palmarum*, which is also ascribed to Titus of Bostra, is in all probability not genuine, and the same can be

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26 See Sickenberger 1901, 16–41 on the history of editions, transmission of manuscripts and origin. This *In Luc.* was to have been reprinted in 1866 in Migne, PG 162, but the volume went up in flames before publication: see Cavallera 1912, 10, 110; Bardenhewer 1913, 52–54; Hopfner 1936, 847b.

27 Sickenberger 1901, 41–118; cf. Sickenberger 1898. Cf. also Von Soden’s (1911, 579ff.) criticism of Sickenberger and Sickenberger’s response (1903).

28 Sickenberger 1901, 130–34.

29 Sickenberger 1901, 81ff.


31 Thus Reuss 1976 was able to add six fragments from a *Catena in Luc.* to which Sickenberger had no access. A Coptic *Catena in Luc.* also contains fragments that are ascribed to Titus (ed. De Lagarde 1886); Sickenberger 1901, 139 was inclined to think them spurious, but Bellet 1957 claimed that these fragments come from an authentic source, even though they are translated very loosely. On Arabic Titus fragments commenting on Mt. see Iturbe 1969–70 (Iturbe 1970, XXV, 300).

32 The text is printed in Migne, PG 18, 1263–78 (from Gallandi 1769, 351–56); a single manuscript attributes it to Hesychius of Jerusalem, and it is re-edited in Aubineau 1980, 715–77. There are also Georgian (Van Esbroeck 1975, 78–79) and Church-Slavonic translations (Hannick 1981, 268). The text is clearly not written by Titus: see Sickenberger 1901, 134–36; Casey 1937, 1591. Van Esbroeck 1975,
said for certain of an interpretation of the parables of the Unjust Judge and the Pharisee and the Tax Collector. However, Sickenberger kept an open mind on whether some Syriac fragments of a *Sermo in epiphaniam* attributed to Titus are genuine.

3. Heresiology and anti-Manichaeism

Perhaps it was not until the Manichaeans came into contact with the Roman Empire around the middle of the 3rd century—while Mani was still alive—that they met the Early Catholic Church in earnest. Even though we do not find the first sign of a literary Catholic reaction until half a century later, it is nevertheless correct to say that the Church was by now armed and ready to confront its opponents, who, like the Manichaeans, claimed to represent true Christianity and to have solved the problem of evil. Already a hundred years earlier, and without realising it, Justin Martyr with his *Syntagma against all heresies* had established a new Christian, literary genre, which later through Irenaeus, Tertullian and Hippolytus among others had come into full bloom and helped to a great extent to form the Catholic theological profile and mentality.

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78–79, 249 defended its authenticity, but was refuted by Aubineau 1980, 724–32. According to Aubineau it cannot be by Hesychius of Jerusalem either.

33 Sickenberger 1901, 137.

34 Ed. in De Lagarde 1863, 94–95 and (with Greek retrotranslation) Rucker 1933, 82–87. Cf. Wright 1871, 646b (British Museum Add. 12,156); Sickenberger 1901, 138–39.

35 The Manichaeans’ own traditions of their early days do not apparently mention relations with the Early Catholic Church, but instead depict Mani’s background in, and clash with, a non-Catholic Christian group of Baptists who claimed Elchasai as their founder. The Manichaeans must surely have met Catholics, but we cannot be sure of when they came to realise that they constituted a formidable opponent.

36 Justin himself mentions his (now vanished) *Syntagma in Apol.* I.26,8 (Krüger 1915, 22.1: σύνταγμα κατά πασῶν τῶν γεγραμμένων ἀρέσεων). On this work see Le Boulluec 1985, 35–91. Heresiology clearly forms a special genre with fixed themes and common rules; cf. e.g. Le Boulluec 1985, 15–16; cf. more distant Brox 1986, 283–87. On heresiology see e.g. Koschorke 1975; Aland 1978; Vallée 1981; Le Boulluec 1985; 1985a.—It must be emphasised that of course there are two types of heresiology: works against “all heretics”, e.g. Justin, and works against individual heresies, e.g. Tertullian’s *Adv. Marc.* Most anti-Manichaean heresiology belongs to the latter type.
On the clash with Manichaeism W.W. Klein rightly remarks that “[d]er Schwerpunkt des Kampfes fällt ins 4. Jahrhundert, wo die Basis für die Diskussionsinhalte gelegt wird.”37 By this time, however, the Catholic theologians had already staked out their basic territory in relation to syncretistic, dualistic versions of Christianity that could also be employed against the Manichaeans, despite the fact that on many crucial points their mythological system differed from the older opponents of the Catholic Church—for instance, in its “radical dualism”. Orthodoxy now had to define itself in relation to new heresies such as Arianism. Even so, we must not underestimate the significance of anti-Manichaean writers in this period, for although its two major theological doctrines—monotheism and man’s ethical freedom—had long been established by earlier heresiologists as the corner-stones of a theodicy, these doctrines could not only be elaborated and refined, but would undoubtedly have lost their power if they had not continually been reformulated. The reason for the need of this continuous reformulation was that Manichaeism was a real danger, as is clear from the large number of anti-Manichaean texts that were produced.

This can be demonstrated by means of an overview of the most important anti-Manichaean texts from the eastern part of the Empire in the 3rd and 4th centuries, and including a few 5th century writers of interest. This overview may also help to narrow the focus on to which particular anti-Manichaean writers Titus may have been especially linked.

A papyrus contains what is thought to be the oldest anti-Manichaean writing in existence; it is in the form of a pastoral letter from the last decade of the 3rd century, originating perhaps from the chancery of Theonas, Bishop of Alexandria at the time (282–300). Here we also find for the first time the wordplay on Mani’s name and μανία that Titus would later use again and again.38

Two anti-Manichaean texts from the beginning of the 4th century are not Catholic, however, but pagan. With regard to genre, Emperor Diocletian’s edict against the Manichaeans, which prob-

ably dates from 302, belongs outside the literature that we are dealing with, but it nevertheless deserves to be mentioned in this context, because already here we meet the idea that Manichaeism is suspect, because it comes from Persia, the arch-enemy of the Empire. Probably from the same time we know of a Platonic polemic against Manichaeism which is particularly related to the more educated Christian polemic as we later meet it, for example, in Titus, namely Alexander of Lycopolis’ *Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio*. From a much later date we also have a testimony to a Platonic attack on Manichaeism, and it is not impossible that sharing this common enemy has had a mediating effect on the rapprochement between Neo-Platonists and Catholics in Late Antiquity.

Perhaps in the decade after 303 Eusebius of Caesarea in Palestine found the occasion to treat Manichaeism in *Historia ecclesiastica* VII.31,1–2. Eusebius also used the wordplay on μανία but in a more advanced way, playing on the similarity between the Greek form of the name Mani, Μάνης and μανείς, 2nd aorist participle of μαίνομαι, “be mad” (because of the iotacisms they are pronounced identically, apart from the stressed accents); moreover he emphasised that Mani was a barbarian and from Persia. Also these ideas are to be found in Titus.

The oldest comprehensive anti-Manichaean writing by a Catholic hand comes from Athanasius’s friend, Serapion, who wrote *Adversus*...
some time after 326; Serapion was Bishop of Thmuis in Lower Egypt. The date is relatively late, but the work is swiftly followed by other texts. I have been unable to prove that Titus may have used Serapion.

From the same time comes Hegemonius’ *Acta Archelai*, which was written in Greek but now only exists in its entirety in a translation...
into Latin.\footnote{Ed. Beeson 1906. Eng. transl.: S.D.F. Salmond in Roberts and Donaldson 1993a; Vermes 2001.} The work must have been written before Cyril of Jerusalem used it in his \textit{Catechesis} VI from c. 348–50. Lieu and other scholars also refer to the possibility that the use of the term \textit{όμοοσιος} in \textit{Acta Archelai} may mean that it was written after the synod of Nicaea in 325, and Lieu adds that perhaps it was written after 330, since Eusebius of Caesarea did not draw on it in his section on Manichaeism in \textit{Historia ecclesiastica} VII. But the arguments are not persuasive. As regards localisation, however, Lieu is convincing when he shows that \textit{Acta Archelai} reveals a correct knowledge of the Syrian-Mesopotamian region that perhaps tells us where the writer came from.\footnote{Lieu 1988, 73; Lieu in Vermes 2001, 6–7, 16–23. Apart from Cyril of Jerusalem as a \textit{terminus ad quem} the arguments for a closer dating are weak. The reference to Eusebius is valid only as an \textit{argumentum e silentio} (cf. Lim 1995, 76 n. 25) and furthermore ignores the possibility that the chapter on the Manichaeans in the 7th book of \textit{Hist. eccl.} may have already formed part of the first edition, and the \textit{όμοοσιος}-argument seems less secure, since the term is not used of the Trinity, but to characterise the Manichaeans’ views.—Lieu (1988, 74–76; in Vermes 2001, 13–16) argues persuasively against there being a Syriac version behind the Greek \textit{Acta Arch.}—Cf. also Scopello 2000 on \textit{Acta Arch}.} As I shall demonstrate in the following, I believe it is probable that Titus knew of \textit{Acta Archelai} and to a limited degree drew on it.

Cyril of Jerusalem’s above-mentioned attack on the Manichaeans in \textit{Catechesis} VI, Ch. 20–36 from around 348–50 is based on both \textit{Acta Archelai} and on individual personal experiences.\footnote{Cf. Klein 1991, 29. Ed. Reischl 1848, 182–207. Modern German transl.: Hæuser 1922, 94–119.}

The question of the sources and dating of another \textit{Contra Manichaeos}, by Didymus the Blind (c. 313–98), are unclear, according to Klein; he mentions that parallels to other Didymus-texts and patristic literature, including Titus, could form the basis of a solution. Didymus’ writing is without doubt directed against the Manichaeans, even though they are only mentioned explicitly in the title. His knowledge of Manichaeism has recently been the object of a thorough examination by Byard Bennett.\footnote{Klein 1991, 18; Bennett 2001. Bennett also refers to the similarities between Didymus’s anti-Manichaeism and passages in Titus; cf. Bennett 2001, 43, 46 n. 32, 50 n. 45. I have similarly noted some parallels between Didymus and Titus (see below pp. 241, 279–80, 292). Ed. PG 39, 1085–1109; a new unpublished ed. by Bennett is mentioned in Bennett 2001, 38 n. 1.}
Klein has noted that the 7th section of Pseudo-Athanasius’s *Sermo contra omnes haereses* is also concerned with the Manichaeans. According to Klein, the text clearly originates from Alexandria too, since it both demonstrates similarities with the genuine Athanasius-writings and with Didymus; Klein indicates a dating around 360.

Already Augustine believed that Basil the Great of Caesarea was among those attacking the Manichaeans, and that is probably also the case with Basil’s homily *Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*, which Klein wishes to date to around 370, even though the Manichaeans are not explicitly named.

The lack of direct mention of the Manichaeans in the writings of Didymus and Basil supports É.M. Buytaert’s view that Eusebius of Emesa’s discourse, *De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione*, is aimed at the Manichaeans. This discourse is preserved in a translation into Latin as the first text in ms. T. 523, and two fragments in Greek are also preserved in Theodoret of Cyrus’s *Eranistes*, which states that they derive from a λόγος by Eusebius of Emesa. The subject of *De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione* seems to be the existence of free will, and here Paul’s conversion is the most important example; on the way, however, Eusebius takes the opportunity to speak of Christ’s impassibility (also in Theodoret’s two fragments). In this context Eusebius also has Christ condemn certain christological heresies, starting with Paul of Samosata (mentioned by name) and the Arians, and followed by two more heresies, the one claiming that Christ did not assume a body, and the other that Christ was not born of a virgin in order to save the body of the virgin. The two

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48 PG 28, 513–16.
51 *De arbitr.* was edited in Buytaert 1953, 13–43; and Theodoret’s two fragments in Buytaert 1949, 9*-15*. Buytaert 1948, 25–89; 1953, XXXVIIIff has argued that the texts in T. 523 are actually translations of writings by Eusebius of Emesa (the argument for the authenticity of *De arbitr.* and Theodoret’s two fragments is to be found in Buytaert 1948, 29–40). In the following I will give a more extensive account of Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus; this is due to a particular interest in the question of the links between these writers and Titus.
53 Theodoret: see Buytaert 1949, 15* ([II 4]); *De arbitr.* [38]: Buytaert 1953, 40–41.
54 Buytaert 1949, 15* ([II 4]): εἶπες ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέλαβον σῶμα, *De arbitr.* [38], Buytaert 1953, 41.4–5: “Dixisti quia non assumpsisti corpus”.
55 Buytaert 1949, 15* ([II 4]): εἶπες ὅτι οὐκ ἐγεννήθην ἐκ παρθένου, ἵνα σῶσω τὸ
last heresies were regarded by Buytaert as being Marcionite and “Gnostic” respectively, but it was also his view that the heretics who are attacked in the main section of *De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione*, are the Manichaeans. For the text attacks precisely the heretics who deny free will, and maintain that God should have created our nature better, that nature is evil.

Buytaert regarded as significant the mention of Eusebius of Emesa’s polemic against heretics, which is named by Epiphanius and Theodoret of Cyrus. According to Theodoret, Eusebius wrote against the Marcionites, and in the introduction to *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* (PG 83, 340A) and in I.26 (PG 83, 381B) Theodoret states that Eusebius wrote against Manichaeism, a claim that is also mentioned by Epiphanius, *Panarion* 66.21.3 (Holl 1933, 49,1–3). This anti-Manichaean writing was in Buytaert’s opinion identical with *De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione*, and he drew attention to the fact that neither Theodoret nor Epiphanius states that the titles of Eusebius’s heresiological works were *Adversus Manichaeos* and *Adversus Marcionem* respectively.

This argument is persuasive but not conclusive: Eusebius’s attack on heretics who deny man’s free will fits the Manichaeans particularly well, because this view was always ascribed to them by the Church fathers, but the same could be said of the Valentinians too. On the other hand the doctrine that Creation is evil could equally

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σώμα τῆς παρθένου, *De arbitr.* [38], Buytaert 1953, 41.6–7: “Dixisti quia non sum natus ex virgine, ut salvarem corpus virginis”.

56 Buytaert 1948, 32, 35, 39.

57 *De arbitr.* [13], Buytaert 1953, 21.25.


59 *De arbitr.* [14–17], Buytaert 1953, 22.18–25.8. Buytaert 1948, 35–36, cf. 70 claims that these views must be Manichaeans.

60 Theodoret, *Haeret. fabul. comp.* I.25, PG 83, 377A mentions Eusebius of Emesa as one of those who wrote against the Marcionites (even though *Haeret. fabul. comp.* I.25 is specifically concerned with Apelles, Potitus, Prepon and others, it is clear enough that the remarks beginning in 376C, which are introduced with the words Πλείστοι μέντοι κατὰ τίνα τῆς σσεβείας συνέγραψαν, are about the Marcionites as such, who are treated in I.24–25, PG 83, 372D–377A; cf. Buytaert 1949, 21).

61 Cf. below p. 138 on Theodoret’s mention of Eusebius of Emesa’s anti Manichaeism.

62 Buytaert 1948, 36.


64 See p. 173.
be a Marcionite view. Nor is the possibility that Buytaert is right diminished by his inadequate knowledge of Manichaean Christology. If *De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione* really is the anti-Manichaean text, we must simultaneously note that like other Church fathers Eusebius has not used original Manichaean texts in his refutation; all the charges that are made against the heretics are standard fare, without the particularity that is linked to a heresiology that is related to sources. A glance at some of Eusebius of Emesa’s other anti-heretical remarks shows that in the other discourses, preserved in Latin, they offer the same impression. Nor do the scattered remarks

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65 Thus Buytaert is wrong to state (Buytaert 1948, 36–37) “Même l’excursus sur l’impassibilité du Christ est peut-être, dans l’intention de l’auteur, une apologie contre le manichéisme. En effet, pour Mani et ses adeptes, le Christ n’est qu’un prophète. Pour Eusèbe, le Christ est impassible parce qu’il est Dieu.” On the contrary, the Manichaean’s theology was “docetic”. But also in another way Buytaert has proved how the *excursion* can be understood in the context of *De arbitr.* (see 1948, 34). Buytaert’s closing remarks on the two “docetic” heresies are also superficial: any of them could just as well be “Marcionite” or “Manichaean”, and it is impossible to decide which misunderstanding has made Eusebius separate them.

66 If Buytaert 1949, 19–23 is right that Theodoret’s remarks in *Haeret. fabul. comp.* are to be understood to mean that he has had direct access to Eusebius of Emesa’s writings against the Marcionites and the Manichaeans, just as Theodoret directly uses the anti-Manichaean writing in *Eranistes*, then Eusebius’s anti-Manichaean writing cannot have been Theodoret’s source for the detailed knowledge of Manichaeism in *Haeret. fabul. comp.*

67 *De Fil.* [I 3], Buytaert 1953, 45.22–46.17 distances itself from the heretics’ chasteness, fasting and virginity and from their attack on the Creation; this could refer to both Manichaeans and Marcionites; cf. further remarks in the same text mentioned in Buytaert 1948, 40–41; Hanson 1988, 389; correspondingly in *De mart.* [9] and [20], Buytaert 1953, 156–57, 164; cf. Buytaert 1948, 70. The remark in *De apost. et fide* [19], Buytaert 1953, 337.7 on the heretics who split off the NT from the OT could just as well be directed against the Manichaeans as against the Marcionites, who are mentioned in Buytaert 1948, 47, 48 with further references. Also in *De incorp.* [5], Buytaert 1957, 161.12–15 the heretics could be both Manichaeans and Marcionites. The same is true of the heretical attack on the OT mentioned in *De hom. assumpt. II* [4–6], Buytaert 1953, 373.5–374.15, which Buytaert 1948, 57–58 believes refers to the Marcionites; here we find again the problem concerning God’s question to Adam in Gen. 3.9 (cf. below pp. 223–24). The heretics in *Adv. Sab.* [7], Buytaert 1953, 109.19ff. are in Buytaert’s (1948, 85) opinion Marcionites, but could also be Manichaeans. Also in *De cal.* Buytaert (1948, 64) finds anti-Marcionite polemic. In *De quinque pan.* [9], Buytaert 1953, 202–3 Eusebius attacks heretics who hate the Creation and maintain that the Son is the Son of another God; Buytaert (1948, 71) refers to this as “La doctrine manichéenne et marcionite”; here perhaps Marcionism is the most probable heresy, but one can also with Hanson (1988, 389 n. 3) assume that “it is likely that Eusebius, like many of his contemporaries, could not or would not distinguish between Manichaeans and Marcionites.” Cf. also the remarks in Buytaert 1948, 73 on *De arb. fici* [10–15], Buytaert 1953, 262–66. Polemic against those who think that God is corporeal (*De incorp. et invisib.*
about heretics in Eusebius’s *Commentarius in Octateuchum* appear to give the impression of a better knowledge of them.\(^68\)

*De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione* must have been written before 359, the date of Eusebius of Emesa’s death. He was a pupil of Eusebius of Caesarea, who, as we have seen, already took part in the polemic against the Manichaeans. We are even given the feeling of a circle that regarded the fight against Manichaeism as a major task when we consider other works of a similar character by both Eusebius of Emesa’s friend, “the Arian” George of Laodicea,\(^69\) dated before his death in 360,\(^70\) and by Diodore of Tarsus (died before 394), who was a kind of pupil of Eusebius of Emesa.\(^71\)

Among later writers who mention both George and Diodore’s lost anti-Manichaean texts, as well as that by Titus of Bostra, two passages are of particular importance and deserve to be quoted here, since I shall often return to them in what follows. The first is by Theodoret of Cyrus, who in his attack on Manichaeism in *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* I.26 refers to other literature on the subject, and here it is striking how he couples Titus with Diodore, and George with Eusebius of Emesa:

The best advocates of piety, Titus and Diodore, wrote against the madman’s impiety, Titus as shepherd for the church of the citizen of

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\(^{68}\) See below pp. 369, 371–79.

\(^{69}\) George’s writing against the Manichaeans is mentioned in the introduction to Theodoret, *Haeret. fabul. comp.* PG 83, 340A and in I.26, PG 83, 381 (quoted in the following); in Epiphanius, *Haer.* 66.21.3, Holl 1933, 49,1–3; and in Heraclianus in Photius, *Bibl.*, cod. 85 (65a36–65b38) (Henry 1960, 9–10), which is also quoted in the following. See Bardenhewer 1912, 263–64; Hanson 1988, 388 on George’s friendship with Eusebius of Emesa.

\(^{70}\) This is presumably the case, even though Hanson (1988, 350) points out that we cannot be sure that all the information on an Arian Bishop, George of Laodicea, refers to the same person. George was a very common name, and there were several towns named Laodicea. Besides see also Hanson 1988, 382, 388; Wiles 1989, 277 on Eusebius of Emesa and George of Laodicea’s year of death.

\(^{71}\) Jerome, *De vir. illustr.* CXIX, Richardson 1896, 52: “Diodorus, Tarsensis episcopus, dum Antiociae esset presbyter magis claruit. Extant eius *In Apostolum commentarii* et multa alia ad Eusebii magis Emiseni charactern pertinenta, cuius cum sensum secutus sit, eloquentiam imitari non potuit propter ignorantiam saecularium litterarum.” It has also been proved that Diodore used texts written by Eusebius (see Petit 1979, 284; Romeny 1997 with further references).
Bostra, Diodore as ruler of the Cilicians’ metropolis. But the Laodicean George also wrote against this impiety, a man who admittedly was leader of Arius’s heresy, but who was (also) trained in philosophical knowledge. As too was the Phoenician Eusebius, mentioned above.\textsuperscript{72}

Is Theodoret hinting that Titus, Diodore, George and Eusebius of Emesa belonged to a common circle? We might also ask whether he is suggesting that in particular George and Eusebius’s anti-Manichaean texts were of a philosophical character?

The second passage is from Photius, who in his \textit{Biblioteca} mentions a Bishop Heraclianus of Chalcedon (c. 500),\textsuperscript{73} the author of 20 books against the Manichaeans refuting the writings that they called \textit{The Gospel}, \textit{The Book of Giants} and the \textit{Treasuries}. Heraclianus listed his predecessors in the battle against the Manichaeans, namely Hegemonius, Titus of Bostra, George of Laodicea, Serapion of Thmuis and Diodore of Tarsus. Below is the central passage in Photius’ summary:

But he refutes the book that among the Manichaeans is called \textit{The Gospel}, and \textit{The Book of Giants} and the \textit{Treasuries}. He also lists the many who wrote before himself against Manichaeus’s impiety: Hegemonius, who wrote out Archelaus’s controversies with him, and Titus, who indeed believed that he wrote against the Manichaeans, but who rather wrote against Adda’s writings, but moreover also the Laodicene George, who has used almost the same dialectical arguments against impiety as Titus used, wrote against impiety, as did Serapion, Bishop of Thmuis, and Diodore, who has battled against the Manichaeans in 25 books, and who in his first seven books believes that he is refuting Manichaeus’s \textit{Living Gospel}, but does not succeed; instead he refutes the book written by Adda which is called \textit{The Bushel}. In the remaining books he clarifies and elucidates the (correct) use of the scriptural passages which

\textsuperscript{72} Katà δὲ τοῦ Μάνεντος δωσιςβείας συνέγραφαν οἱ ἀριστοὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας συνήγοροι, Τίτος καὶ Διόδωρος, ο μὲν τὴν Βοστρηνίων Ἐκκλησίαν ποιμάνας, ο δὲ τὴν Κιλίκιαν ἱθύνας μητρόπολιν. Συνέγραφε δὲ καὶ ο Λωσιδικέως Γεώργιος, άνήρ τῆς μὲν Ἀρείου προστατεύων αἰρέσεως, τοῖς δὲ φιλόσοφοις ενεπθήρεμος μοναχῆσαι. Πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ ο Φωίνης Εὐσέβιος, ού καὶ πρόσθεν ἐμνήσθην. (\textit{Haeret. fabul. comp.} I.26, PG 83, 381B). Cf. Klein 1991, 46. Theodoret also mentioned Eusebius of Emesa, Titus, Diodore and George among his sources in the introduction to \textit{Haeret. fabul. comp.}, PG 83, 340A.

\textsuperscript{73} Photius, \textit{Bibl.}, cod. 85 (65a36–65b38) (Henry 1960, 9–10). The 7th century is \textit{terminus ante quem} for Heraclianus, since Sophronius of Jerusalem mentions him in a fragment that is preserved in Photius, \textit{Bibl.}, cod. 231 (287a25–27) (Henry 1967, 66). Cf. Sickenberger 1901, 7; Alfàric 1918, 66, 100; Henry 1960, 9 n. 1; Sfameni Gasparro 2000, 549 (5th–6th cent.) on the dating of Heraclianus.
the Manichaeans appropriated for their own purpose. And that (is how it was with) Diodore. But after he has mentioned these “fathers”—as the most devout Heraclianus calls them—he has admittedly noted in passing those things that are feebly said by them, but what (is said) that is inadequate he conscientiously completes, and the things (that are said) adequately he praises, impartially accepting them and also compiling things from them which have been thought through by himself.74

Even though Heraclianus may have wished to prove himself a more learned heresiologist than his predecessors, his information is so accurate that it is unlikely that it was pulled out of thin air. It therefore requires further comment, part of which will appear below. Although both George and Diodore’s anti-Manichaean works are mentioned in other sources,75 Heraclianus is the only one who provides concrete information on the content of the two works. What he writes about the relation between Titus and George’s works, could mean that the one was dependent on the other, and in that case it must be Titus who drew on George, since the latter died in 360, whereas...
Titus’s work was not completed until after 363. Perhaps the reason why Heraclianus mentions Titus before George was that he did not wish to emphasise that Titus was dependent on an Arian author.76

In Photius’s summary, however, no direct link is established between Titus and Diodore’s anti-Manichaean works, though the fact that according to Heraclianus both carried on a controversy against Adda suggests a parallel situation in relation to Manichaeism. We have already noted that Titus shared his interest in anti-Manichaeism and ethical freedom of choice with Eusebius of Emesa, and we can presume that this defence of man’s ethical freedom was also central to Diodore’s anti-Manichaean work, just as in Eusebius’s De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione; that at any rate is the case in another heresiological work by Diodore about which we are better informed, namely his attack on astronomers, astrologers and fate, which was directed against the Bardesanites among others.77

Apart from Pseudo-Athanasius, Epiphanius of Salamis is the first to include a section on the Manichaeans in a work “against all heretics”, namely his monumental Panarion, written in the years 374–77, mainly in Judea, in which the lengthy Ch. 66 is concerned with the Manichaeans.78 Here Epiphanius made extensive use of large

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76 It is true that Photius’s summary gives the impression that Heraclianus refers to all his predecessors, including George, as “fathers” (and thus authorities), but the summary may well be simplifying here; in other words Heraclianus could have known of George’s heresy and has therefore only been referring to the four others as “fathers”.

77 This work is mentioned in the Suidas Lexicon Δ 1149, Διόδωρος, Adler 1967, 103.13: Κατὰ ἀστρονόμων καὶ ἀστρολάγων καὶ εἰμικράμενης, and is extensively paraphrased in Photius, Βιβλ., cod. 223 (200b–222a) (Henry 1965, 8–48). A quotation from the work also exists in Immanuel a-Sahlar’s Hexaëmeron (quoted in Abramowski 1949, 69). Barhadbešabba, Hist. eccl. XVII.3 [139], Nau 1932, 315.13 also mentions Diodore’s work Contra Chald., and similarly Abdišo’s Catal. XVIII (Assemani 1725, 29.3; transl. Badger 1852, 365).—When Diodore asks in this work what sort of γένεσις it is that creates a Manichaean or the Valentinians (Photius, Βιβλ., cod. 223 [218b] [Henry 1965, 37]), the question also contains an irony, since the Manichaeans and Valentinians were regarded precisely as determinists.—See also regarding Diodore’s work Ermoni 1901, 433–36; Amand 1973, 59, 61, 461–79; Drijvers 1966, esp. 70–71, 176; Schäublin 1974, 43–44.—Also the understanding of Bardesanes as an enemy Diodore may well have “inherited” from his teacher: for Eusebius of Emesa attacked Bardesanes by name already in his In Oct. (see Fr. XXII, Romeny 1997a, 265–71, cf. Romeny 1997a, 12, 15 [also in Petit 1993, 113–14, no. 682]), but possibly on a false premise; see the discussion in Petit 1993, 114 n. (i); Romeny 1997a, 269–70.

78 Ed. Holl 1915; 1922; 1933; Ch. 66 in Holl 1933. Modern English transl.: Williams 1987; 1994.
areas of the preceding literature, above all Hegemonius, but also, as we have already noted, of Titus of Bostra.

Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus show that anti-Manichaean polemic was common among those writers who are generally counted under the Antiochene “School”. Often included with them is Severian of Gabala, who in c. 400 wrote a work against the Manichaeans. It is also interesting to note that anti-Manichaeism was not entirely foreign to Diodore’s own pupils, John Chrysostom (344–54–407) and Theodore of Mopsuestia (died 428). In John Chrysostom’s exegetical sermons the battle against the Manichaeans is of great importance. Occasionally Theodore of Mopsuestia also mentions the Manichaeans, but not very often, it is feasible, however, that an anti-dualistic work such as Theodore’s against Zoroastrianism must have been, renewed many of the Antiochenes’ anti-Manichaean themes. Finally, it should be mentioned that the battle against Manichaeism played a major role in the authorship of Theodoret of Cyrus (c. 393–c. 466) and not only in his heresiology Haereticarum fabularum compendium; thus Viciano has examined how Theodoret’s

79 In Cent. et contra Manich. et Apoll.; ed. in Aubineau 1983. See also Klein 1991, 36–37 with further literature references.
80 Theodore and Chrysostom were received into Diodore’s School, the so-called “asceterium” (Socrates, Hist. eccl. VI.3.1–7, Hansen 1995, 313–14; Sozomen, Hist. eccl. VIII.2.6–8, Bidez 1960a, 350–51; see further on this “asceterium” in Leconte 1957).
81 See also Alfaric 1918, 58; Klein 1991, 5, 44 n. 130 with further references. Cf. also Amand 1973, 502–3; Gross 1960, 186.
82 See e.g. Hom. cat. V.8 (Tonneau 1949, 111); XIII.8 (Tonneau 1949, 381); In Tim. I, 4.1–3 (Swete 1882, 139); cf. In Gal. 1.4–5 (Swete 1880, 5 with note); 5.13 (Swete 1880, 94 with n.); 5.19–21 (Swete 1880, 99 with n.). Cf. Wickert 1962, 50, 172–73, more distant 165 with n. 45; Norris 1963, 202; cf. Bultmann 1984, 124. It is also of interest to note how Theodore attacks unnamed determinists in In Rom. 9.9–13 (Staab 1933, 143.18–144.8); cf. Wickert 1962, 83ff.
83 Cf. Dorner 1853, 34 n. 10.—The work is mentioned with the title περὶ τῆς ἐν Περσίδι μαγικῆς, κοί τῆς ἐν εἰσηθείας διαφορά in Photius, Bibl., cod. 81 (63b32–64a9) (Henry 1959, 187), who claims that it consisted of three books. From Photius’ overview it is clear that the writing attacked the “Zurvanist” version of Zoroastrianism, which also differed from Manichaeism’s radical dualism, and that the writing presented the correct Christian cosmology. However, the work may have given Theodore the opportunity to argue for the non-substantial character of evil. The only fragment of the work that is preserved in Dadiño Qatraya’s In Isaïam Skét. XV.16–18 (Draguet 1972, 270–77; transl. Draguet 1972a, 208–14; cf. Scheinhardt 1968, 188ff., esp. 192–96), deals however with the soul’s fate after death. Theodore’s work against the Magians is also mentioned in Abdiño’s Catal. XIX (Assemani 1725, 34.2; transl. Badger 1852, 365) and in Chron. Sear. LIII [178], Scher 1910, 290.
clash with Manichaeism influenced his Pauline exegesis.\textsuperscript{84} It is tempting to imagine that the battlefront against Manichaeism in these writers was not only provoked by the real Manichaean threat, but that it was also a tradition that was passed down from teacher to pupil, and that this was because Manichaeism had gained a special position within theological thought, i.e. the role of representing determinism and an (impossible) solution to the question of theodicy.

Finally, within the Roman Empire but not employing the Greek language we find Ephrem the Syrian (c. 306–73), the author of prose refutations of, and hymns against, the Manichaens, the Marcionites and the Bardeanites.\textsuperscript{85}

Here it must emphasised how many of the 4th century Christian anti-Manichaens lived in the broad Palestinian-Syrian region, including Eusebius of Caesarea, Hegemonius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Eusebius of Emesa, George, Diodore, Titus, Epiphanius and Ephrem; on the verge of the 5th century we also find Severian. Only Theonas, Serapion, Didymus and Pseudo-Athanasius wrote in Alexandria and Egypt, and Basil in Asia Minor. This geographical distribution may mean that Manichaeism was stronger in the Syrian-Palestinian region than in Egypt (it is only the climate that explains why we have found so many Manichaean texts only in Egypt), but it also raises the question of whether it is likely that there was a widespread exchange of texts and viewpoints between the Syrian-Palestinian writers.

Of particular interest here is the fact that a small group among the Syrian-Palestinian anti-Manichaens were personally linked through friendships or teacher-pupil relationships; this includes Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius of Emesa, George of Laodicea and Diodore of Tarsus. It is possible that there is a connection between Titus and this group, and in this context it is also worth considering Titus’s part in the “Arian controversies”, since both the contemporary bishops, George and Eusebius of Emesa, like Eusebius of Caesarea formerly, played a role in these controversies.

Here, however, the only tangible fact is Titus’s presence in 363 at the synod in Antioch, which in a letter to Emperor Jovian acknowledged

\textsuperscript{84} Viciano 1992. The anti-Manichaean concern, according to Viciano 1992, 206ff. is the reason why Theodoret rejected the doctrine of original sin. Cf. also Klein 1991, 45–46.

the Creed of Nicaea and the ὀμοόσπος formula together with the interpretation ὀμοός κατ’ ὀψίαν τῷ πατρί. Together with among others Acacius of Caesarea (also a pupil of Eusebius of Caesarea) and Meletius of Antioch Titus of Bostra co-signed the documents. In my view, this conditional recognition of the Creed of Nicaea sits well with the picture of Titus as a conservative theologian that Sickenberger painted on the basis of passages in Contra Manichaeos and Homiliae in Lucam: Titus clearly distances himself from actual Arianism, but demonstrates an anxious caution and dissociation from bold inquiry, just as he prefers to speak of the likeness of the Father and the Son and never uses ὀμοόσπος. This conservative position is in reality not so far from Eusebius of Emesa’s, despite Eusebius being more reflective than Titus on the point.

As mentioned, Sickenberger defined Titus’s exegesis as “Antiochene”, and it is also my view that the anti-Manichaean circle of which I believe we can glimpse the contours has quite simply been the same as that which is conventionally called “the Antiochene School”. “The Antiochene School” was an intellectual current that

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87 Sickenberger 1901, 98–103. Cf. Casey 1937, 1588: “Es ist wahrscheinlich, daß seine Haltung eher konservativ als haeretisch war” etc.—It should be mentioned that Jülicher 1902, 81–82 thought that Sickenberger made Titus’s standpoint in the Trinitarian controversy approach too closely that of orthodoxy: Titus’s standpoint was roughly the same as Eusebius of Caesarea’s.

88 See Grillmeier 1979, 453–57; Hanson 1988, 387–98; Wiles 1989. However, Titus appears to distance himself further from Arianism than Eusebius of Emesa; e.g. on the question of the divinity of the Spirit, see Hanson 1988, 395f. on Eusebius and cf. the material on the Holy Spirit collocated by Sickenberger 1901, 103–6; to this can be added Contra Manich. IV.84, § 4 169.12–17:

(“For so too our Saviour speaks: ‘There is no good but the one God alone’. This is a case where His goodness undergoes no change at all. But that one [i.e. our Saviour] is also good like Him, that one who says this about his Father, since he is from Him. But also the prophet says of the Holy Spirit: ‘Your good Spirit will lead me on the smooth earth’.” According to Baumstark [1935, 278, 293] the first quotation [Mt. 19.17/Mk. 10.18/Lk. 18.19] is from Diatessaron, the second from Ps. 143.10 [= 142.10LXX]).

89 Sickenberger 1901, 15–16, 111–114.
was particularly held together by common exegetical principles, and which can at least be traced back to Eusebius of Emesa, but may also be older.\textsuperscript{90} My interest tends more towards a group united by a common theological interest in defending man’s ethical freedom than a group united on the same exegetical principle; to some extent, though, we are speaking of two descriptions of the same group. However, this vague theological agreement on the defence of ethical freedom does not correspond to what is known as Antiochene theology, i.e. the particular Christology that receives its clear distinguishing mark with Theodore of Mopsuestia. It is highly doubtful whether such a Christology exists at this point, and it is certainly not in Titus. “[T]he definition of the Antiochene School as a \textit{Richtung} alleviates the necessity of dogmatic unity”, Romeny claims;\textsuperscript{91} the absence of an “Antiochene Christology” cannot therefore be used to justify Titus’s omission from the Antiochenes. If it is nevertheless correct that alongside the common exegetical principles we can say that it was common to the Antiochene theologians to lay great stress on man’s freedom of choice and to reject every idea of determinism or fatalism, it may then very well be that this was the common feature that was later instrumental in creating Antiochene Christology.

The defence of ethical freedom, however, was a concern that on the one hand the Antiochenes shared with the entire Early Church and on the other actually united them with Origen; moreover, insofar as the Antiochenes’ concerns are seen to be determined by their common front against allegedly determinist heresies such as the Bardesanites and Manichaeans, they are following a similar line to

\textsuperscript{90} There is agreement that the designation “the Antiochene School” does not cover a particular institution but rather a “school of thought”. Some scholars, e.g. Drewery (1978, 104–9), distinguish between an older and a younger Antiochene School, where the older School includes Theophilus of Antioch, Paul of Samosata and the presbyter Lucian, and the younger School Eustathius of Antioch, Marcellus of Ancyra, Diodore of Tarsus, Flavian of Antioch, John Chrysostom, Nemesius of Emesa, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, John of Antioch and Theodoret of Cyrus. Cf. Romeny 1997, 127ff.; 1997a, 89ff.; Viciano 1996, 370–71, who gives an account of other similar distinctions. An actual teacher-pupil tradition can only be documented beginning with Eusebius of Emesa, and it is therefore doubtful whether it makes sense to speak of an “Antiochene School” before Eusebius of Emesa; Romeny (1997, 127–28; 1997a, 89–90) observes that the above-mentioned “Antiochene” writers before Eusebius are precisely those about whom we know least, but he nonetheless holds that there are “few grounds for drawing the line before Eusebius.” (Romeny 1997, 128; 1997a, 90).

\textsuperscript{91} Romeny 1997a, 10.
the attacks on the alleged determinism of Valentinianism by Justin, Irenaeus, Clement and Origen, among others. On this point the Antiochenes may well have been influenced from several directions, but in particular Eusebius of Emesa was a direct link with the tradition from the Alexandrians through his pupil relationship to Eusebius of Caesarea. Despite this community of ideas with the other Church fathers and especially the Alexandrians, we nevertheless sense that the Antiochenes’ emphasis on man’s ethical freedom is, if possible, even stronger than that of the other Church fathers, because they lack an accompanying interest in man’s reason as contemplative and “related to God”.92 A partial explanation of this fact could be that the battle against allegedly determinist heresies grew to be so widespread among the Antiochenes that ethical freedom became the only concern that was of interest.

Titus’s relationship to the group in question could have been a purely literary dependence without further personal contact, i.e. conditioned by his use of George of Laodicea’s work against the Manichaeans. But the possibility of closer personal contacts should also be considered, e.g. that Titus received his education from Eusebius in Caesarea. Geographically and chronologically this is perfectly possible, and even though it could never be proved, it would most assuredly explain a string of similarities that have been, or will be, mentioned in this study: similarities in the portrait of Mani, in the sympathy with Origen, in the possibly broad knowledge of pagan literature, the similarity with the quaestiones-genre, the historically orientated exegesis, the political theology in Homiliae in Lucam, and similarities in the interpretation of the Paradise narrative.93 To this may be added further material that perhaps suggests that Titus had access to Eusebius of Caesarea’s Chronicon and Historia ecclesiastica (see the following Excursion).

The theories laid out here on Titus’s relationship to a group of early “Antiochene” writers will prove to be of relevance to this study, particularly in the examination of the following questions. Did any of the writers in this group more or less share the marked philosophically-orientated theology that Titus of Bostra introduced in Contra

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92 This special point in connection with Theodore is very clearly presented in Norris 1963, 129–46, 157–59, 169–72, 191, but I believe that to a wide degree it also covers writers such as Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus.

93 See below pp. 153, 156, 166–68, 172, 253–54, 255ff., 369–71 on all these points.
Manichaeos, and if so, does this demonstrate that the anti-Manichaean problems and strategies that were determinant for Titus also helped to steer the theological development in a wider geographical and cultural context?

Excursion: Possible use of various patristic sources in Titus

With the single exception of Origen, Titus never mentions earlier Catholic writers. In so doing he has made it truly difficult to establish anything about his sources. Yet his knowledge of other works on heresy is clear from the number of standard arguments that resurface in Contra Manichaeos. Thus Titus’s charge in III.69–72 (Sy 116.31–119.5) that pagan philosophy is without validity because it is divided into heresies is traditional polemic: for it was common in the literature of Late Antiquity to attack pagan philosophy precisely because it was divided into heresies.94 The theological purpose in withdrawing the epithet of ‘Christian’ from the heresies by designating them according to their heresiarch (III.71–72) was also common.95 When Titus claims in Contra Manichaeos IV.17–21 that Mani has stolen his teaching from others, it is no more than a heresiological topos,96 just as the feature that Mani uses Aristotle wrongly (Contra Manichaeos IV.19) is a heresiological topos.97 But these traits do not allow us a closer definition of Titus’s sources. However, in three passages from the part of Contra Manichaeos which is only preserved in a Syriac translation there is information that perhaps can help us to identify certain patristic sources.

In several places Titus includes Mani alongside earlier heretics; in III.68.71 we are given the names Marcion, Basilides and Valentinus. Already this fact shows that, as we might expect, Titus was informed about previous heresiology; thus in III.68 Titus appears to present a doxographical “catalogue of heretics” common to patristic literature, though it is only by implication that Titus uses the idea here of a heretical succession or διαδοχή;

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94 A line of argument on the basis of the philosophers’ διαφωνία has roots in philosophy itself and appears e.g. in Philo and many of the Church fathers (see Grant 1967, 159 [= 1949, 41–42]; Tardieu 1984, 351; Le Boulluec 1985, 52–58; Brox 1986, 257; Mansfeld 1988, 89–102 [esp. references 92 n. 41]).
95 Cf. Le Boulluec 1985, 52–64, 158–67; Dörrie 1976, 510. The two motives are already linked together in Justin, see Dial. XXXV,6 with reference to Dial. II,1 and Apol. I.4,8; I.7,3; I.26,6 (on this see also Van Winden 1971, 42–45). Cf. e.g. Athanasius, Contra Ar. I,2–3 (PG 26, 16A–17A).
96 This occurs among others in Irenaeus (e.g. Adv. haer. I.27,4; II.14); see Brox 1967a, 267–71 (“Bestreitung der Originalität”); Le Boulluec 1985, 123–24. At the same time Titus also turns it into a charge against Mani that he is the inventor of “new” teachings! (Contra Manich. IV.21) (cf. Klein 1991, 142, 164).
97 See Brox 1967a, 271–73 (“Mißverständniss und Mißbrauch der Quellen”).
The information on Basilides in III.68 is of particular interest and is the first passage I shall deal with. Titus states that in contrast to Marcion, Basilides, from whom the so-called Gnostics (γνωστικοί) derive (Sy 116.20–21), even dared to assume that the OT comes from evil (Sy 116.21–22). Mani differed from Basilides, who lived before him, only on (the question of) the form (σχημα, Sy 116.23) of the creation, otherwise they both spoke out in agreement with each other about the principles (θεωρει, Sy 116.24) (Sy 116.23–24).

To the best of my knowledge, the remark that the so-called Gnostics come from Basilides, is to be found in only two other places in Jerome. Firstly, in Jerome’s translation of Eusebius of Caesarea’s Chronicon, where we read: “Basilides haeresiarches in Alexandria commoratur. A quo gnostici”. The Greek original of Eusebius’s Chronicon is not preserved in its entirety but an Armenian translation also exists. As we know, it is the Christian epoch that is contained in the last section of the Chronicon, but unfortunately we cannot say that either the Armenian or the Latin version are faithful renderings of the Greek original. Moreover, in the Armenian version we lack the information that a group by the name of “Gnostics” derive from Basilides. In his monograph on Basilides Winrich Löhr therefore suggests that the information was constructed by Jerome. “Die Formulierung dürfte von Hieronymus stammen”, he writes, and notes that it also appears in Jerome’s De viris inlustribus, where we read: “Moratus est autem Basilides, a quo Gnostici, in Alexandria temporibus Hadriani”. Because the information also appears in Titus, which Löhr is not aware

99 Jerome’s translation; Helm 1956, 201.1–2ff.
100 See Schöne 1900; Mosshammer 1979; Barnes 1981, 111ff.
101 The Armenian version in German transl.; Karst 1911, 220: “Basilides erschien als Sectenleiter zu jener Zeit.”
102 Löhr 1996, 36.
103 Jerome, De vir. inlust. XXI; Richardson 1896, 20. The remark in De vir. inlust. is presumably based on Jerome’s version of the Chron., which, as Löhr (1996, 36 n. 133) mentions, is older than De vir. inlust.—Bar Kochba is also mentioned immediately after Basilides in both De vir. inlust. XXI, Richardson 1896, 20, in Jerome’s translation of the Chron. (Helm 1956, 201.3ff.) and in the Armenian translation (Karst 1911, 220).—I also reject Löhr’s (1996, 36) suggestion that with the information that the Gnostics originate from Basilides, “wird möglicherweise das bei
of, it is nevertheless possible in my opinion that it existed in the Greek original of Eusebius's *Chronicon*.\(^{104}\) If so, we can say that Titus has had access to the *Chronicon*, but this is a poor result, for there is not much else in the *Chronicon* that could be used in *Contra Manichaeos*, which is barely concerned with history and chronology. Moreover, the other remarks in *Contra Manichaeos* III.68 on Marcion, Basilides and Valentinus cannot come from Eusebius’s *Chronicon*,\(^{105}\) nor from Eusebius’s renowned *Historia ecclesiastica*.\(^{106}\)

Yet Titus’s remark that Basilides and Mani spoke in agreement with each other about the principles (ἁρμ.\(^{\iota}\)) could perhaps be seen as a clue to another, far more important, source. As I have already implied in my previous paraphrase, on this point we must be aware that the Syriac term ḡw translates the Greek ἀρχαί, i.e. “principles”, which in Titus’s context must mean the first, fundamental principles behind the entire universe. This in turn means that Titus believes that, like Mani, Basilides was an adherent of a radical dualism, a doctrine that both good and evil were eternal principles.

Apart from this passage in Titus I am aware of only one other text which claims that Basilides shared with Mani a doctrine of good and evil as eternal principles. This is the *Acta Archelai* LXVII.4–LXVIII.4

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Simon Magus anhebende irenäische Schema der Ketzersukzession... verlassen*. The ancient term γνωστικός did not carry the modern technical meaning of “Gnostic” (cf. e.g. Khosroyev 1995, 145 n. 414; Williams 1996, 31–43). The information in the *Chron.* comes rather from a superficial reading of precisely Irenaeus; e.g. in *Adv. haer.* I.28,2 Irenaeus speaks of heresies with a lawless practice that come from Basilides and Carpocrates, and then in I.29,1 of a large number of Gnostics; in II.13,8 Irenaeus mentions first Basilides’s School and then “the rest of the Gnostics”; cf. also the remarks on the Gnostics and Basilides in II.31,1; finally Irenaeus speaks in IV.6,4 of Marcion, Valentinus, Basilides, Carpocrates, Simon and the rest of those who are unjustly called Gnostics. My theory that on this point the *Chron.* builds on an erroneous reading of Irenaeus cannot, however, be reconciled with the opinion of Grant (1980, 9, 40, 84), who believes that Eusebius had not yet studied Justin and Irenaeus when he wrote the *Chron.*, because in it he does not mention any heretics before Basilides.

\(^{104}\) This is apparently also the view of Helm (1956) since he does not add an asterisk.

\(^{105}\) Titus cannot have found anything in the information on Marcion and Valentinus in Eusebius’s *Chron.* (see Helm 1956, 202.8–9.20–21 and Karst 1911, 221).

\(^{106}\) Neither the information on Marcion and Valentinus in *Hist. ecc.* IV,11; IV.18 nor on Basilides in IV.7 would be sufficient.
which claims that Basilides was one of Mani’s predecessors, and, in roughly the same formulation that Titus employs, that Basilides lived before Mani. With the aid of two quotations from Basilides, one of which contains a long so-called “barbarian myth” that has certain similarities with the Manichaean myth, *Acta Archelai* seeks to prove that, like Mani, Basilides had taught a radical dualism.

In my opinion Löhr has convincingly shown that Basilides does not reveal himself as a dualist in the above quotations, and that dualism in the barbarian myth, which Basilides includes only as a subject worthy of discussion, had already been subjected to a philosophical interpretation that had toned down its dualism. In other words Hegemonius has misunderstood his quotations, and it is purely as a result of this misunderstanding that Basilides can appear to maintain a dualism of the same type as Mani’s. If Löhr is right, it is most likely that *Acta Archelai* was one of the texts that Titus used when he wrote his *Contra Manichaeos*. It is improbable that both Hegemonius and Titus misunderstood in the same way and by chance the comparability between Basilides’ and Mani’s fundamental doctrines. Not everything that Titus wrote about Basilides—or Marcion and Valentinus—can be found in *Acta Archelai*, and it might be objected that the feature which I have just introduced is insufficient documentation for

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108 Cf. *Acta Arch.* LXVII.4 (LV) (Beeson 1906, 96.10–12): “Fuit praedicator apud Persas etiam Basilides quidam antiquior” (Beeson 1906, 96.10–11) and Sy 116.23:

109 See Löhr 1996, 219–49.—Von Zittwitz’s (1873, 471–72) view that the passage on Basilides should not originally have belonged to *Acta Arch.*, is not convincing; nor was the end of the passage accessible in his time (cf. Traube 1903).
110 Titus’s information on Mani and Basilides’s disagreement on “the form of the creation” is not to be found in *Acta Arch.*, but Titus himself may have accepted it on the basis of *Acta Arch.* by being more sharp-sighted than Hegemonius in observing the difference between the Manichaean and the barbarian myth in question. The myth ends with the words “Et haec est ista, quam cernimus, creatura.” (*Acta Arch.* LXVII.11 [LV], Beeson 1906, 97.21), and Archelaus concludes shortly after: “In his enim de mundi conditione conscripsit secundum quod Scythianus senserat.” (*Acta Arch.* LXVII.12 [LV], Beeson 1906, 97.23–24).—Scythianus was according to *Acta Arch.* Mani’s precursor.

On the other hand neither the information that according to Basilides the OT is evil in origin, nor the information on Marcion and Valentinus comes from *Acta Arch.*, not even indirectly. When Archelaus among earlier heretics in *Acta Arch.* XLI.8 (XXXVII) (Beeson 1906, 61.5) names “Valentiniani aut Marcionis aut Tatiani aut
source dependency. I will therefore turn to another passage from *Contra Manichaeos* which also makes it likely that Titus depended on *Acta Archelai*. The passage in question is to be found in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.86, where Titus apparently presents a Manichaean interpretation of 1 Cor. 13.9–10, in that he writes:

Paul said that he (only) knows a little out of much, and he (only) prophesies a little out of much, but when perfection comes, (then) that which was a little comes to an end. Now because he speaks through me, perfection has been introduced precisely through me, and also that which was a little is being repaired and cleansed (Sy 169.34–170.3 → Ch. XI.47).

This quotation is especially interesting because it is in the 1st person singular and clearly must have been intended as spoken by Mani. At first glance one might imagine that it came from one of Mani’s own works or from the *Kephalaia*-literature. Both in Augustine (*Contra Faustum* XV.6; XXXII.17) and in the Manichaean Felix (*Contra Felicem* I.X) we can also read that Mani invoked 1 Cor. 13.9–10.

We also find the same information in *Acta Archelai* XV, and XLI. Ch. XV is particularly interesting: Mani has finally arrived in the city of Carchar in Mesopotamia, and the rich Marcellus has arranged a public disputation in which Mani is first allowed to present himself and his message. Here we can read the following in Vermes’ translation:

and, as Paul who was sent before me said, he “knew in part and prophesied in part”, thus reserving for me that which is complete, so that I might destroy that which is in part.\(^\text{111}\)

Yet another quotation in the 1st person singular! Is Titus in fact quoting from *Acta Archelai*? One must observe here that although the two quotations are very close to one another, there are nonetheless certain differences. Thus at the end of the *Acta Archelai* quotation we are told that Mani “might destroy that which is in part”, “hoc quod ex parte est destruam”, which follows the text of the Greek Bible (καταργηθήσεται) (13,10), whereas in

\[^{111}\text{Vermes 2001, 59–60. Acta Arch. XV.3 (XIII) (Beeson 1906, 24.4–7): “sicut et qui ante me missus est Paulus ex parte scire et ex parte prophetare se dixit, mihi reservans quod perfectum est, ut hoc quod ex parte est destruam.”}\]
Titus we read that “that which was a little is being repaired and cleansed”. The use of two verbs in *Contra Manichaeos*, i.e. ἐστὶν and ἀνέβαινεν, is presumably a so-called hendiatys translation, which is often found in the Syriac translation of Titus, i.e. out of regard for semantic precision the Syriac translator renders a single Greek concept with two Syriac words. I am unaware, however, of which Greek concept is being referred to, though it cannot have been καταργήθησαι. The reason why the Titus text does not have a word that corresponds to καταργήθησαι at this point is because, in contrast to *Acta Archelai* Titus has quoted the whole of 1 Cor. 13.9–10 in the previous sentences, while at this juncture *Acta Archelai* shortens the quotation from Paul.

This is admittedly a minor variant, but it seems a more important difference that the quotation in Titus states that Paul “speaks through me”, and that “perfection has been introduced precisely through me”; these formulations are not found in this form at this point in Hegemonius. However, much further on in the disputation (*Acta Archelai* XLI), in distancing themselves from the heresiarch, the men who have been appointed judges between Mani and the Catholic Bishop Archelaus, return to the question of 1 Cor. 13.9–10. Here we find the remarks:

Therefore when you said that the Paraclete was present in Paul and that the Paraclete attested everything, why did Paul say: “We know in part and we prophesy in part; but when what is perfect comes, what is in part shall be abolished.”?\(^{112}\)

Here we at least find the point that the Paraclete spoke through Paul, and since Mani claimed to be the Paraclete, Titus may have improved the quotation from *Acta Archelai* XV with this detail. The improvement may be due to Titus finding that the line between the quotation from Paul and Mani’s interpretation was not marked clearly enough in the formulation from *Acta Archelai* XV.\(^{113}\) Another possibility is that the Latin translator of *Acta Archelai*

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\(^{112}\) Vermes 2001, 106. *Acta Arch.* XLI.2 (XXXVI) (Beeson 1906, 60.9–12): “Unde cum dixeris in Paulo fuisse paracletum et ipsum omnia consignasse, quare dixit: *Ex parte scimus et ex parte prophetamus; cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, id quod ex parte est destructur?*” See in general *Acta Arch.* XLI.2f. (XXXVII) (Beeson 1906, 60.9ff).

\(^{113}\) Cf. Vermes’s note on the translation of ‘reservans’ in *Acta Arch.* XV (2001, 60 n. 34): “Our translation attempts to keep an ambiguity as to whether ‘I’ or Paul is the subject of this verb.”
XV shortened the Greek original, the more complete text of which is preserved in the Syriac translation of Titus.

If it is true that Titus had access to *Acta Archelai*, it means that with all the information on Manichaeism that is common to Hegemonius and Titus, we must reckon that Titus can simply have borrowed it from the former. This rule is true, for instance, of *Contra Manichaeos* IV.47, where Titus states that the Manichaeans used Jesus’s words about the two trees, for the information is also found in *Acta Archelai* V.114 Or when Titus speaks in I.9 of the adamantine wall (τὸ ἀδάμαντινον τεῖχος, Gr. 5.9) that will close off the Kingdoms of Light and Darkness from each other, he may have read already in *Acta Archelai* XXVI (XXIII).115 In both cases we are dealing with genuine Manichaean material, but this does not necessarily mean that Titus himself found it in the Manichaean texts which he undoubtedly had access to. He may also have used *Acta Archelai* on other points.116

Whatever the case, Titus has made use of Hegemonius’s work to only a limited extent. However, his procedure in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.86 means that we must reckon with the possibility that in similar fashion he may have plundered other anti-Manichaean works long vanished, for information on Manichaeism.

The third and last passage from *Contra Manichaeos* that I wish to bring into the discussion is to be found in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.12 (Sy 134.22–135.17), where Titus seeks to prove that Mani lived long after Christ. He is interested in documenting this fact because Mani claimed to have been sent by Christ as an apostle and Paraclete with the aim of removing all the passages in the NT that relate or refer to the God of the OT (→ Ch. XI.45). According to Titus, however, it is unlikely that God would have allowed such a length of time to pass since Christ before He sent out one who could cleanse Christ’s words of interpolations.

114 Beeson 1906, 7. As is well known, the Manichaeans actually used this parable.
115 Beeson 1906, 38.11–39.10.—The adamantine wall is also known from Serapion of Thmuis and in fact comes from Manichaean mythology (see references in Klein 1991, 63 and Gardner and Worp 1997, 149).
116 Cf. also Baur 1831, 31.—The Manichaean attack on Deut. 4.24, which Titus mentions in *Contra Manich.* III.7.62, does not appear in *Acta Arch.*, but does so in Cyril’s *Catech.* VI.27 (Reischl 1848, 190–93), where there is the debate between Mani and Archelaus (cf. Von Zittwitz 1873, 471). Cf. on this point the possibility mentioned by Lieu (in Vermes 2001, 8), “that Cyril was using a divergent or more extensive version than the one reproduced by the Latin *Acta*.”
Titus states that Christ’s bodily birth happened at the time when Augustus was Emperor (§134.34–35), and that his passion and ascension took place in Tiberius’s 18th year (§134.35–135.1). From Tiberius to Decius, who persecuted the Church violently, there are 213 years (§135.2) (§135.1–2). Until then Mani was unknown, as Titus can prove (§135.3–4), because Origen, the Church’s teacher and presbyter, who lived until Decius, does not mention Mani, even though he does not omit a single one of the heretics who fought against the Catholic Church; so, Mani lived after Origen (135.4–8).

This passage is singular in that Titus mentions a previous Catholic theologian by name, and it is worth noting that Origen is described positively throughout as a man of the Church. Unfortunately the passage hardly tells us anything about how many of Origen’s writings Titus had actually read,¹¹⁷ for what can Titus mean by saying that Origen has mentioned every one of the heretics that fought against the Catholic Church? Unlike Irenaeus and Hippolytus Origen never wrote a single polemic “against all heretics”.¹¹⁸ Of course Titus may be referring to the running polemic against heretics that is found in most of Origen’s works, but this polemic has hardly the systematic and complete character that could form the basis for Titus’s deduction. The evidence speaks in favour of Titus referring to a work that contemporary theology wrongly attributed to Origen. There are two works

¹¹⁷ Material outside Contra Manich. favours the argument that Titus had read the great Alexandrian theologian. Titus’s knowledge and appreciation of Origen is confirmed by Photius, Bibl., cod. 232 (291b18–21) (Henry 1967, 79), who relates Stephanus Gobarus’s florilegium (cf. Bardy 1947, 22), but Stephanus could of course be referring precisely to Contra Manich. IV.12. Cf. more distantly Sickenberger 1901, 39, 114 on Origen-Titus. In Hom. in Luc. Titus borrows historical, geographical and other entries from Origen, but otherwise, because of his non-allegorical hermeneutics Titus does not draw on Origen to any great degree. —Although Sickenberger is right in saying that Titus does not allegorise much, this does not preclude his appreciation of Origen; cf. the Origen admirer, Eusebius of Caesarea, whose exegesis was also historicising (see Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 38–39). It is also of interest to note in this context that by the beginning of the 4th cent. the Antiochenes knew and were influenced by Origen; Eustathius of Antioch refuted him, and Acacius and Eusebius of Emesa were pupils of Eusebius of Caesarea, who as mentioned admired Origen and had access to his library (see Romeny 1997a, 92–93).

¹¹⁸ Remarks in Epiphanius, Theodoret and Pamphilus could admittedly suggest that Origen wrote a work of heresiology (see Bardenhewer 1914, 166–67), but Bardenhewer’s conclusion (167) can hardly be disputed: “Aber wenn nicht samt und sonders, so sind doch jedenfalls die meisten dieser Angaben auf jene beiläufige Polemik gegen Häretiker zu beziehen, wie sie fast allen Schriften des Origenes eigen ist.”
that in this context are possible candidates. The first is Adamantius’s dialogue *De recta in Deum fide*, which already in the 4th century had been attributed to Origen.\footnote{Bakhuyzen 1901, XIII–XV; Bardenhewer 1914, 292–99; Clark 1992, 168–71 with further references (cf. perhaps also Epiphanius, *Hær.* 66.21.3, Holl 1933, 49.1 with Holl’s note and Lieu 1994, 202).} Yet nor does this text appear to have the character that could justify Titus’s deduction.\footnote{Nor here could Titus have found the information on Marcion, Basilides and Valentinus for *Contra Manich.* III.68.} The second is Hippolytus’s *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, which from an early date was circulating under Origen’s name. Precisely this text is of a character that could justify Titus’s deduction, and already in 1863 De Lagarde suggested that this was the work to which Titus was referring. This is the most likely solution, but I should mention that I have been unable to find other places in *Contra Manichæos* where it might seem that Titus has used *Refutatio*. Even though Books 2–3 of *Refutatio* are missing, eight other books are preserved that ought to have left their mark. Did Titus only consult the work just the once, and solely to check on whether it included Mani?\footnote{It is perhaps because *Ref.* circulated very early under Origen’s name that Epiphanius did not draw on the writing (see Bardenhewer 1914, 563–64; Vallee 1981, 41, 63).—De Lagarde 1863, 94 n. 1 suggested that Titus was referring to *Ref.*—The information that Titus brings in III.68 on Marcion, Basilides and Valentinus is also different from the account in *Ref.* and therefore unlikely to come from that source.}

If Titus really did know *Acta Archelai*, he must have chosen to ignore it, since on the basis of *Refutatio* he deduced that Mani lived after Origen. If he had trusted *Acta Archelai*, he could have settled for referring to the work’s dating of Mani under the Roman Emperor Probus, who reigned from 276 to 282,\footnote{*Acta Arch.* XXXI.8 (XXVII) (Beeson 1906, 44.22–24) and XXXII.1 (XXVIII) (Beeson 1906, 45.4).} a dating that is not entirely misplaced if it is true that Mani died in 276 and not 274. Despite Titus ignoring the dating in *Acta Archelai*, it is nevertheless possible that he borrowed the general argument from this text! For in *Acta Archelai* XXXI.6–8 (XXVII) Bishop Archelaus attacks Mani in the following way: Mani . . . says that he is the Paraclete who was predicted by Jesus would be sent, and by so saying perhaps in ignorance he will allege that Jesus is a liar. For Jesus who had said that soon afterwards he would send the Paraclete, is found after three hundred years and more to have sent this man, according to the testimony that he himself provides. What will those people say to Jesus on the day of judgement that have departed this life in between that time and the present? Surely they
will present these statements to him: “Do not torture us if we have not fulfilled your works. For why, when you promised under Tiberius Caesar that you would send the Paraclete, to ‘convict us of sin and of judgement and justice’ did you only send him under the Roman emperor Probus? Why did you leave us as orphans, when you yourself said: ‘I shall not leave you as orphans’, when you yourself said that you, soon to depart, would send the Paraclete?”

This is an argument very similar to Titus’s own, but at the same time this passage can perhaps explain why Titus ignored its dating: he may have found it problematic because of Hegemonius’s transparent nonsense. From the ascension of Christ to the time of Probus was not “three hundred years and more”; the statement refers rather to the real point in time that Hegemonius wrote *Acta Archelai*.

Titus must also have ignored Eusebius’s *Chronicon*, where the beginning of Manichaeism is similarly dated to the time of Probus. Titus also follows a different dating from Eusebius when he writes that 213 years passed from the passion and ascension of Christ in Tiberius’s 18th year to the time of Decius who persecuted the Catholic Church. It is true that Jerome’s translation of Eusebius’s *Chronicon* also places the crucifixion in Tiberius’s 18th year, and the Armenian translation dates it to the 19th year (cf. Lk.

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123 Vermes 2001, 85–86.—Beeson 1906, 44.15–24: “dicens se esse paracletum qui ab Iesu praesignatus est mitti, in quo mendacem ignorans fortasse adseret Iesum; qui enim dixerat se non multo post missum esse paracletum inventur post trecentos et eo amplius annos misisse hunc, sicut ipse sibi testimonium perhibet. Quid dicent Iesu in die iudicii illi qui iam vita exesserunt ex illo tempore usque nunc? Nonne haec apud eum allegabant: Noli nos cruciare si opera tua non fecimus? Cur enim, cum promiseris sub Tiberio Caesare missum esse paracletum, qui argueret nos de peccato et de iudicio et de iustitia, sub Probo demum Romano imperatore misisti? <Cur> orphanos dereliquisti, cum ipse dixeris, non dereliquam vos orphanos, cum ipse dixeris te, mox ires, missum esse paracletum?”

124 Helm 1956, 223.25–26; Karst 1911, 227. Presumably on this point it is Eusebius’s *Chron.* which is Hegemonius’s source; cf. Holl 1933, 14, note.—It is unconvincing when Grant (1972, 433; 1980, 84–85, 94; cf. Barnes 1981, 192, 369 n. 14–15) suggests that Eusebius’s dating alluded to the arrival of the Manichaean mission to Eleutheropolis in Palestine which is mentioned in Epiphanius, *Haer.* 66.1,1 (Holl 1933, 13.21–14.4), for Epiphanius dates this mission to the time around the 4th year of Emperor Aurelian’s reign. When Epiphanius also mentions Emperor Probus (*Haer.* 66.19.9, Holl 1933, 44.16; 66.20.3, Holl 1933, 47.11; 66.78.1, Holl 1933, 119.7), he is drawing on Eusebius’s *Chron.* (Holl 1933, 14, note), as Grant (1972, 432 n. 6) himself also mentions.
3.1–2.23; Jn. 2.13, 6.4, 11.55), but none of them contain Titus’s information that 213 years passed from the crucifixion to Decius. Both versions state that there were 220 years from the crucifixion to Decius.\textsuperscript{125}

There are other remarks by Titus in \textit{Contra Manichaeos} IV.12 that one could imagine were taken from Eusebius’s \textit{Historia ecclesiastica}. Also in his work Eusebius wrote that the crucifixion took place in Tiberius’s 18th year (I.10); Origen is mentioned as a presbyter (VI.8 and 23); naturally Decius’s persecution is treated, and in this context Origen’s suffering and death are mentioned (VI.39); this rhymes less well with Titus, however, when we read later that Origen died at the time when Gallus succeeded Decius (VII.1). Titus’s understanding of Origen as a man of the Church could well have its source in the apology for Origen in \textit{Historia ecclesiastica}. But another possible source could be the \textit{Apologia pro Origene} in six books, jointly written by Eusebius and Pamphilus and only partially preserved.\textsuperscript{126}

We have now come to the end of the three passages from \textit{Contra Manichaeos} that I wished to discuss, and they have also resulted in theories on at least four early patristic works which Titus may have used. The most probable theory is that Titus drew on \textit{Acta Archelai},—and it is also the most interesting, because it shows how Titus’s portrayal of Manichaeism not only has its source in his meeting with original Manichaean texts, but is already formed by earlier anti-Manichaean heresiology. With regard to the other theories it is very reasonable to assume that in \textit{Contra Manichaeos} IV.12 Titus


\textsuperscript{126} Titus’s information that Origen lived until Decius must mean on a strict interpretation that Origen died under that Emperor. In that case the information agrees with Photius’s summary of Pamphilus and Eusebius’s work in \textit{Bibl.}, cod. 118 (92b14–19): \textit{Φασὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ὅ τε Πάμφιλος μάρτυς καὶ ἔτεροι πλείστοι, οἵτινες ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν ἑωρακότων Ὀρεγένην τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἁνδρός ἥκριθαντο, διαβοήσα ἀρματωρέ τὸ βίου ἐξεληλυθήναι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς Καισαρείας Δεκίου τὴν κατὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἁμότητα πνέοντος.} (Henry 1960, 90–91) (the alternative idea that Origen survived Decius’s persecution, as Photius states in what follows [92b19–24; Henry 1960, 91], comes according to Nautin 1977, 101–2 from the Greek version of Jerome’s \textit{De vir. inlustr.}). However, Grant (1980, 16, 20, 77–79) argues that the account in \textit{Hist. eccl.} VI.39 still contains traces that show that like Pamphilus and Eusebius’s \textit{Apologia}, it originally had Origen dying during Decius’s reign. If Grant is right, then this could also be the older version of \textit{Hist. eccl.} that was Titus’s source. Eusebius’s \textit{Chron.} also refers to Decius’s persecution and Origen’s occupation as teacher, but this text mentions neither his position as priest, nor his fight against heretics, nor his death (cf. Grant 1980, 16), and cannot therefore be Titus’s source on this point.—Also relevant to the question of whether Titus knew Eusebius’s \textit{Hist. eccl.}, are the similarities in the understanding of Mani that I noted above (p. 131).—Incidentally, as it now stands, the reference to Mani’s appearance in \textit{Hist. eccl.} VII.31 could almost give the impression that it took place under Emperor Diocletian!
is referring to Hippolytus’s *Refutatio*; this is of less importance, however, because Titus does not otherwise seem to be influenced by that text. Finally, it is a possibility, but no more than that, that Titus used Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Chronicon* and *Historia ecclesiastica*. This possibility may yet tell us something about Titus’s position in the history of Early Catholic theology.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE AUDIENCE FOR CONTRA MANICHAEOS AND THE PORTRAYAL OF MANICHAEISM THAT TITUS WISHED TO PRESENT TO THEM

1. The two audiences

The previous chapter was mainly concerned with material outside Contra Manichaeos that could serve the interpretation of the work; thus it was suggested that the information on Titus’s role in the contemporary local conflicts between Catholics and pagans in the province of Arabia could explain his intentions to attack the Manichaeans while addressing the pagans. The point was also made, though, that as a literary heresiological work Contra Manichaeos belongs in a broader Catholic context, and that it seems particularly suited to being grouped with various “Antiochene” anti-Manichaean texts.

The possible link between Contra Manichaeos and relations to both pagans and to a widespread type of Catholic literature reminds us of its basic division into on the one hand Books I–II—where the Bible is hardly ever quoted—and on the other hand Books III–IV, which are dedicated to the interpretation of the Bible. It is clear that the most fundamental interpretation of Contra Manichaeos must take up a position on this structure.

In two passages, however, Titus actually explains this structure; the first is in the opening chapter of Book I, where he writes (I.1, Gr. 1.22–30):

1 I have found only the following direct, but general, references to the Holy or Divine Scriptures: Contra Manich. I.1 (Gr. 1.27–28); II.20 (Gr. 37.4); II.42 (Gr. 51.4–5). But in addition to these there are a number of covert allusions to the Bible: see Gen. 1.26–27 and Contra Manich. II.11 (Gr. 31.3–4); Gen. 1.31 and Contra Manich. II.1 (Gr. 26.4), II.2 (Gr. 26.10–11), II.7 (Gr. 29.14.18–19); perhaps Mt. 13.1–9.18–23/Mk. 4.1–9.13–20/Lk. 8.4–8.11–15 and Contra Manich. II.43 (Gr. 52.25–26); Jn. 1.5 and Contra Manich. II.36 (Gr. 47.26–27; cf. De Lagarde 1859, 126); perhaps Jn. 14.6 and Contra Manich. II.37 (Gr. 48.4); 1 Cor. 9.25–26/Phil. 3.14/1 Tim. 6.12/2 Tim. 2.5, 4.7/Heb. 12.1/Jas. 1.12/1 (1 Pet. 5.4 and Contra Manich. II.22 (Gr. 39.7–10.34–35); perhaps Phil. 4.7 and Contra Manich. II.48 (Gr. 56.36); perhaps 1 Tim. 4.7 and Contra Manich. I.17 (Gr. 10.12); 1 Tim. 6.10 and Contra Manich. I.29 (Gr. 18.34–35) (cf. Poirier and Sensal 1990, 51 n. 311); perhaps 1 Tim. 6.16/1 Jn. 1.5 and Contra Manich. I.23 (Gr. 14.5–6), II.37 (Gr. 48.5–7).
For the teaching of the Catholic Church endeavours to give priority to (the point) that it is pious to confess with full vigour that God is innocent of the injustices that exist among men. When we examine in what way we sin, since God does not wish us to do so, we do not accuse God of great things, since like him [i.e. Mani] we wish to defend Him with regard to minor things. On the contrary: since we possess the very way of truth both from the Holy Scriptures and from the common concepts, we are walking assuredly towards the examination that is thus constituted, and by sincerely directing the charges against ourselves, we make the demonstrative proof in defence of God a pious one. (→ Ch. XI.2)

As can be seen Titus derives “the way of truth” from two parallel and equally important sources: “the Holy Scriptures” and “the common concepts”. The fact that Titus believes the truth to have two sources explains the peculiar structure of his work, as he himself presents it in the second passage at the beginning of Book III (III.1, Gr. 66.28–37):

What has now been said above—both from their actions and from the common concepts—may perhaps strengthen the mind, also in all those outside the Church, so that it in no way sanctions the madman’s blasphemy against the Creator of all things; but because he has set an other trap for those who are from the Church, both fearful and dangerous, by violating certain words from the Holy Scriptures for his own false narrative, the time is now also ripe to set in motion refutations from the Divine Scriptures against him to strengthen those who believe (and) in defence of those who are occasionally led astray by him through outlandish and highly improbable interpretations. (→ Ch. XI.32)

Already here we see that Titus is not writing to the Manichaeans as such, but to groups that need to be protected from them. Moreover, it is clear that the first source of truth, “the common concepts”, κοιναννοια, is only used in Books I–II, while the other source, the Bible, is brought into play in Books III–IV. Titus believed that he could construct a line of argument without a specifically Christian foundation that would unite both Catholic Christians and non-Christians and protect the common rationality in both parts. In other words the argument in the first two books lays claim to universal validity, which is why it is not Bible-based, for it is to be read also by non-Christians. Since Titus regards his argument in the first two

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2 Stroumsa (1992, 339–40) also emphasises that Books I–II are a rational refu-
books as decisive within its area, his approach cannot be explained through the rhetorical technique of placing the weaker arguments before the stronger.

The question therefore remains as to why it was important for Titus to warn pagans against Manichaeism. Sickenberger’s suggestion that Titus wished to convert them to Christianity is untenable; firstly it is not what Titus says in III.1, and secondly a line of argument which is not specifically Christian would not have served this purpose. At the most it might have made his readers sympathetic towards its author and possibly therefore amenable to later Catholic mission—and to the arguments in Books III–IV.

Part of the explanation for Titus’s use of a universal rather than a specifically Christian line of argument might very well be found in Book III.1, where he claims that the Manichaeans are endeavouring to proselytise among pagans. He speaks of Mani, but he means Mani’s disciples (Gr. 66.39–67.4):

Among the Greeks he does not overthrow their teachings, but he raises the lesser evils to the greater standing of impiety and (thus) he instructs a worse kind of Greekness; in them [referring either to ‘the lesser evils’ or to ‘teachings’] he has inserted an addition of his own inventions, in that he carries his claim round to nearly everyone with a similar tenet on evil and unreliable doctrines . . . (→ Ch. XI.32)

“Ἐλληνισμὸς and ἐλληνικόν mean here “pagans with Greek culture” and “Greek paganism” and perhaps refer to all the pagans in Bostra, whether or not they were of Semitic origin. Titus is thus addressing
the same groups of “Hellenes” that were exposed to Manichaean mission, and it therefore seems likely that we are speaking of groups who were open to both Manichaean and Catholic preaching. And indeed there are a number of testimonies that the Manichaens had a mission field not only in the Catholic Church but also among the pagans. If I understand the passage correctly, Titus is claiming that the Manichaens are looking for affiliations with contemporary paganism and Alexander of Lycopolis’s *Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio* in particular contains evidence of the same approach in Egypt. Thus the actual presentation of the Manichaean myth in Alexander’s *Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio* II–IV (Brinkmann 1895, 4.23–7.26) appears to be adapted to people with a more philosophical taste in that the names of the Manichaeans gods/hypostasings of the deity are for the most part replaced by philosophical concepts. Alexander writes that the more cultivated Manichaens refer to similarities between their own myth and Greek mythology (*Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio* V, Brinkmann 1895, 8.5–11), and finally he states that the Manichaens have been able to convert some of his fellow-philosophers (*Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio* V, Brinkmann 1895, 8.12–16).7

If the Manichaens were partially successful in their mission to the province of Arabia, their activities must have been especially harmful to the Catholics in the area. As became clear in the last chapter, the relationship with the pagans was already extremely tense, and now the pagan circles that were most favourably disposed towards the Catholics even risked being gripped by a movement that was particularly inimical to Catholicism.

It would be interesting to see if we could confirm this theory of a Manichaean mission to the pagans through a closer examination of Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos*. Can we gain so strong an impression of some of Titus’s Manichaen sources that we can see how they

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6 Cf. also Titus, *Contra Manich. IV.2* (Sy 129.25–26): “when he wishes to spread out and set his snares against the pagan Greeks” (τὸ ἀνοικτὸν ὄχλόν ἔτοιμον ἐπιθέειν ἀπὸ τῶν πάγαν Ἰουών).
7 Cf. also Decret 1978, 102 on Augustine’s claim of a Manichaean attempt to link themselves to the pagans.—Even though we are dealing with a source that must be used with caution, it should be mentioned that also Mark the Deacon speaks of such attempts to link up with the pagans in his discursive account of the Manichaean Julia in *Vita Porph.* 85–91, Grégoire and Kugener 1930, 66–71; cf. Klein 1991, 222 n. 34.
addressed the pagans, or at least how they contained something that especially appealed to them? And is it possible to discover in Titus’s work a counter-strategy that aimed partly at creating a distance between the Manichaeans and pagans and partly a rapprochement between the latter and the Catholics? Before we turn to answering these questions, however, we must look a little more closely at the audience for Books III–IV.

One of Titus’s audiences for Books I–II is educated pagans with an interest in both Catholicism and Manichaeism, but a Catholic audience is also clear from the fact that Titus did not write two works (one for pagans, one for Christians). III.1 links the first two books to the last two and states directly that the former were also aimed at Christians—and in Books III and IV he refers to his presentation in the first two books (in III.18 he refers to his previous explanation as to why death is a benefit).

But could not Books III–IV also be addressed to pagans, even though Titus explicitly claims something else? Here we must remember that in Books I–II Titus in no way seeks to hide his Christianity or to butter up the pagans. From the start, I.1 makes it clear that it is a representative of the Catholic Church who is speaking, and in II.28 Titus suddenly directs an attack at Emperor Julian and his restitution of “the error of the idols”, which in Arabia under Belaeus had found particular expression. The attacks on the pagan Greeks in III.69–74 and IV.18–21 could well be addressed therefore to the pagans themselves, a reasonable assumption since the chapters answer pagan questions to the Christians among other things. In that case we must imagine Titus hoping that Books I–II were sufficiently attractive to his pagan readers for them to wish to read on in Books III–IV, and it is indeed quite possible that they did so, if it is true that the same pagan readers were open-minded towards both Manichaeism and Catholicism.

However, it is clear from Books III–IV that Titus was writing primarily to protect those who believed in the Scriptures but had been led astray by Mani’s distorted and improbable interpretations, as Titus also states in III.1. It seems then, that Titus’s other audience

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8 Titus states explicitly in *Contra Manich.* III.1, Gr. 66.31–37 that the last two books are written for the sake of believers (→ Ch. XI.32), and this is also implied in III.3, Gr. 67.35–68.10, as well as in IV.32, Sy 144.35–145.2.

9 See above p. 123.
was Catholic Christians under the influence of Manichaeism, or whom Titus at least believed to be affected by Manichaeism. In other passages he also states explicitly that his work is not addressed to the Manichaeans, for example in IV.112:

I have, however, not even given myself up to the labour of this book in the hope that I will be able to convert those who are severely enchanted and whose mind has withered and become idle (as a result) of them [i.e. the Manichaeans; lit. "(resulting) from them"], but so that I may warn those who are stable and watchful away from the corruption and harm of these people; and especially, that they escape from those who worship idols, concerning whom the Apostle Paul openly prophesied in another passage: ... (Sy 184.33–185.3)\(^{10}\) (1 Tim. 4.1–5 is then quoted)

Titus is seeking to warn in advance those who are stable and watchful to beware of Manichaeism; they are to avoid the Manichaeans, who in truth are idolaters. The groups that Titus is advising here could well have been confronted with Manichaean teaching, even though for tactical reasons Titus claims to be warning them in advance and also praising them with terms such as "stable and watchful".\(^ {11}\)

Corresponding distinctions are to be found in other places too, such as in IV.23, where in connection with the question of Christ’s descent Titus comments that he is not speaking “to those who are caught in an incurable disease, but to those who are like us” (Sy 139.34–35).\(^ {12}\) We find a similar distinction in IV.79; here the problem is Satan, whom Titus believes is a created being, a fallen angel, and he adds:

But those adherents of that mad Mani say in their uncertainty: “Who was the teacher of this rebellion, or who let all this evil come and put it into his mind?”\(^ {13}\) But this uncertainty is honest among those who

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\(^{10}\) When Titus claims on the contrary in Contra Manich. III.1 that it is “the less intelligent” (Gr. 67.8 [→ Ch. XI.32]) who allow themselves to be deceived by Mani, it is a further example of a rhetorical tactic in a different context.

\(^{11}\) The meaning of these Manichaean questions is that if the Devil was originally
are not already caught in Mani’s error. But among those against whom
our discourse is (directed) it is all the more blindly, erroneously and
ignorantly said. Nevertheless it is perhaps necessary to give an answer
to this (question) which has been raised \( \text{(Sy 166.31–167.2).} \)

When Titus says that the uncertainty is honest among those who
are not caught in the Manichaean error from the very first, he is
acknowledging that such uncertainty may be an expression of a gen-
quine cognitive interest. However, in the real Manichaens who have
their own creed, Titus can only see blindness and errancy.

Titus’s formulations suggest that he is concerning himself with
Catholic groups who have scruples about the Manichaean questions
without having affiliated to Manichaeism; Titus wishes to be accom-
modating towards such groups and acknowledge their right to ask—
in order naturally to give them the answer that will convince them
that they should not become Manichaens. It is also conceivable that
Titus is tactically wise in “buttering up” these groups so as not to
antagonize them. In conclusion, we can emphasise that the audience
in Books III–IV is not the Manichaens as such, but rather Christians
who were being threatened and gripped by Manichaean propa-
ganda.\(^{15}\) It is therefore true of all four books that although Titus
wrote against the Manichaens, he never wrote to them.

This fact also explains why Titus at no point seeks to win over
the Manichaens, but only to destroy them, and also why he relates
the Manichaen myths. This would have been unnecessary if the
work was addressed to the Manichaens, who of course already knew
them.

\(^{14}\) a good angel and consequently is not evil by nature, then evil must come from
some other figure who instructed the Devil in wickedness.

\(^{15}\) This detail can to a certain extent be compared with fact that many of the
anti-Jewish writings in the Early Church were in reality directed against judaizing
Christians, cf. Simon 1996.—Cf. also Sickenberger 1901, 110–11 on Titus’s inter-
est in immunising his audience against Manichaeism in both \textit{Contra Manich.} and
\textit{Hom. in Luc.}
In addition to influencing pagans, the major aim of the work is to protect the Catholics’ own flock, and in so doing it does not differ from many other heresiological works of the Early Church: already in the Preface to Book I of *Adversus haereses*, Irenaeus makes it clear that his purpose is to protect the more simple believers against Valentinians and other heretics. Epiphanius’s audience was hardly the heretics themselves, since his aim was clearly to frighten his readers away from any kind of contact with them whatsoever. In *Contra Faustum* I.1 Augustine explains that he is writing his work because a copy of Faustus’s anti-Catholic writing had been read by the brethren, “who called for an answer from me, as part of the service of love which I owe to them.”

Thus it is clear that *Contra Manichaeos* was not written to the real Manichaeans, but to two ambivalent groups, namely, pagans with an open attitude to both Manichaeism and Catholicism, and Catholics with an open attitude to Manichaeism. Ostensibly both parts of the work are addressed to Catholics, and only the first part to pagans; in reality, however, Titus’s hope and aim was that the pagan audience would concern themselves with the second half of his work too.

If the assumption is right that Titus had in reality imagined that his two audiences should read the whole of *Contra Manichaeos*, then the two parts of the work fit together well. The Summary of Contents of the four books of *Contra Manichaeos* also shows that the same arguments and forms of thought appear throughout the work. Even though the emphasis may be shifted in the process, and even though much is unclear, it is hardly likely that Titus’s theology in its entirety can be regarded as inconsistent, or that the work is just a collection of ad hoc arguments. But if *Contra Manichaeos*—despite its division into a general and a biblical part—is a coherent work to be read by both audiences, the question is whether there was something else

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16 Cf. Vallée 1981, 72–73. It looks on the contrary as though the heretics are also one of Hippolytus’s audiences in Ref. (cf. Vallée 1981, 52).

17 Transl. by Richard Stothert in Schaff 1887, 155.—“desiderauerunt et iure caritatis, per quam eis seruimus, flagitauerunt, ut ei responderemus.” (Zycha 1891, 251.10–12).—Cf. finally also Ephrem the Syrian’s heresiological motives in composing hymns against and prose refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardesanes, according to Drijvers (1966, 128–29): “The point is that the Hymns were destined for the ordinary ‘congregation’, who with these Hymns were to attack the Bardesanites with their own weapons, . . . [t]he Prose Refutations, on the other hand, were meant for an intellectual elite.”
that united these groups apart from their vulnerability to Manichaeism. Perhaps this question can best be answered if we examine the portrait of Manichaeism that Titus wished to draw for his readers. What was he trying to warn them against, and what did he believe he could persuade them to shun? When this has become clear, we can perhaps begin to gain an idea of where Titus expected to gain support among both groups, as well as why both were attracted to Manichaeism.

2. Titus’s portrayal of Manichaeism as barbarism, irrationalism and as a philosophy

The question now is whether certain elements in Titus’s portrayal of Manichaeism can reveal what were the generally accepted cultural values among his intended pagan and Catholic readers, and furthermore, whether it is true that he set out to create a cultural distance between the Manichaeans and the pagans and thus a rapprochement between the latter and the Catholics.

Several different features in *Contra Manichaeos* can be seen as the means to an alliance between pagans and Catholics, such as the argumentation with the aid of the pagans’ own philosophy, one which Titus also shares to a considerable extent, and perhaps also the style, which according to an expert, however, hardly won plaudits from the educated.18 Here, though, the essential point is Titus’s attempt to create this alliance by establishing a joint antagonism towards the Manichaeans. Various *topoi* in Titus’s work can thus be understood as attempts to create a cultural distance between the Manichaeans on the one hand and the Catholics and educated pagans on the other. Firstly, Titus makes a point of presenting Mani as a “barbarian” and “barbaric” (e.g. I.1 [Gr. 1.8], I.2 [Gr. 2.15], I.11 [Gr.

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18 Aimé Puech (1930, 559–60; quote 560) praised the intellectual content of Titus’s work, but did not assess his stylistic abilities very highly: “La valeur littéraire du traité est par contre assez médiocre. Titus compose et écrit avec clarté; mais il est monotone, et ne cherche guère à parer son style. Il use cependant parfois assez bien de l’ironie, par exemple quand il persifle le Dieu de Manès à la fin du premier livre. L’expression, sans aucune recherche de purisme, n’est pas non plus d’un vulgarisme choquant. Les tours qui, dans le syntaxe, sont incorrect par comparaison avec l’usage classique, sont assez nombreux, mais sont aussi de ceux qui ne sauraient beaucoup surprendre en ce temps.”
6.8], I.12 [Gr. 6.27], I.23 [Gr. 14.24–25], I.26 [Gr. 16.23], I.40 [Gr. 25.1], II.52 [Gr. 58.22], III.1 [Gr. 67.16–17], III.66.68, IV.19.20.21.43; here Puech has pointed out significantly that in Titus’s eyes Mani is not only a heretic but also a barbarian; Mani’s teaching destroys the Platonist and (Catholic) Christians’ teaching that God is good.19 As mentioned previously, the description of Mani as a “barbarian” is precisely the same as the one that is found in Eusebius of Caesarea’s Historia ecclesiastica VII.31,1–2 and aims above and beyond the specifically Catholic polemic against the “heretics”.20

But it is only a particular pagan evaluation of the “barbarian” that Titus chooses. Of course a negative assessment of “barbarian” was a possibility in Graeco-Roman culture, but so was a positive evaluation. It did not therefore follow that the origin of Manichaeism in the Kingdom of Persia was necessarily to its detriment. Already in ancient Hellas the Greek philosophers had regarded eastern religious cosmologies and ethical doctrines, including those of the Persians, as a residue of man’s original knowledge of the universe, and one could therefore use the barbarians’ venerable philosophy, φιλόσοφία βάρβαρος, to prove the truth of one’s own philosophy. In a number of cases the early Christian writers were therefore also interested in reckoning their own wisdom among the “barbarian”.21 Instead Titus uses Manichaeism’s barbarian origin to explain its irrational nature; in I.12 he speaks of the discrepancy between Mani’s barbarian error and the “common concepts” (κοινὲς ἐννοιαὶ) (Gr. 6.25–29) (→ Ch. XI.4), that is, man’s universal knowledge. Mani has “invented” (ἐπινοεῖ) his barbarian impiety (I.2, Gr. 2.16), he “fabulates” (μυθολογεῖ) I.2, Gr. 2.25–26), his stories are a “fabulation” (μυθολογία, I.9, Gr. 5.8; μῦθος, I.26, Gr. 16.32.35), the Manichaeans “fantasise to no purpose” (I.15, Gr. 8.31 [→ Ch. XI.6]). In I.17 Titus declares

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19 Puech 1930, 559.
20 To brand heresiarchs merely because of their barbarian origins is, according to Opelt and Speyer (1967, 282) a patristic topos, but the only example before Eusebius’s treatment of Mani is Tertullian’s mention of Marcion in Adv. Marc. I.1,4, and as far as I know, it is indeed rare in older times. After Eusebius the idea of branding Mani as a “barbarian”, as Klein 1991, 142 draws attention to, also occurs several times in Acta Arch., e.g. “barbare” in Acta Arch. XL.5 and 7 (XXXVI) (Beeson 1906, 59.19 and 27) or the whole description of Mani in Acta Arch. XIV.3 (XII) (Beeson 1906, 22.24–23.1).
that Mani does not escape from “the poetic myth” (τὸν ποιητικὸν . . . μύθον, Gr. 10.14), and that he “fabulates” (μυθολογεῖ, Gr. 10.13) like an old crone (γραφὼς)22 about how the earth is borne by Atlas, and how the rain showers result from the pearls of sweat on the archons of matter. It is superfluous to refute this kind of thing. Here Titus also mentions that Mani’s language is Syriac (Gr. 10.12–17).23

It is therefore not surprising that when he reaches a certain point in Mani’s myths Titus several times allows a remark to fall that this is ridiculous (e.g. I.10 [Gr. 5.37]). In II.1 he declares that he would be a laughing-stock among all the sages if he should attempt to verify the fictions in Mani’s teaching (Gr. 25.36–26.1).

Mani’s teaching is “mad”, and Titus uses the above-mentioned wordplay Μάνις—μανάει to emphasise it (passim).24 For a writer such as Titus, who “thinks Greek”, Mani’s “madness” presumably also implied a lack of moral reason, which is the basis of the good action.

The entire portrayal shows that Titus wishes to employ the distinction in philosophy between rational knowledge and “myths” to polemicise against the Manichaeans; indeed the very oldest criticism

22 The expression is proverbial in ancient literature, and Titus may have it both from 1 Tim. 4.7 (τοὺς δὲ βεβήλους καὶ γραμμάτεις μύθους παρατίθεν), to which Irenaeus alludes in Adv. haer. I.16,3 (τοῖς γραμμάτεσι μύθοις, “his anilibus fabulis” [Rousseau and Doutreleau 1979, 262]; the Greek text preserved in Epiphanius, Haer. 34.13,1 (Holl 1922, 26.12)], where it refers to the Valentinians’ teaching, and from pagan literature; e.g. Plato, Theaet. 176b; Gorg. 527a; Celsus says that Gen. 2–3 is μύθον τινα ώς γραφεί δυσχρόουμου (Contra Cels. IV.36 [Borret 1968, 274]); in Contra Cels. V.20 Origen claims that it is the philosophers rather than the Christians who believe in γραμμάτεις λόγους (Borret 1969, 62). According to Acta Arch. LXIV.5 (LIII) (Besson 1906, 93.10) Mani’s teaching is like “anilibus fabulis”, and in Contra Faust. XIII.6 Augustine says of Manichaean teaching: “fabula illa est longa et uana, puerile ludibrium et muliebre auocamentum et aniculare deliramentum continens” (Zycha 1891, 383.25–384.1). Further references to pagan and Christian writers can be found in Pease 1968, 341. The occurrence of the expression among heresiologists is also noted in Scopello 2001, 213, who, however, has overlooked its classical roots.

23 Perhaps this is also meant as an example of Mani’s barbarism? Hegemonius, Acta Arch. XL.3–6 (XXXVI) (Besson 1906, 59.19–27) writes that as a Persian barbarian Mani only mastered the Chaldean language, whereas at the miracle of Pentecost the apostles spoke every language; so Mani lacked the Holy Spirit (cf. Klein 1991, 148). But we cannot be sure that Titus’s view is the same, for in Contra Manich. III.35 he appreciates the separation of languages at the Tower of Babel as positive.

24 Cf. Puech 1930, 559 n. 2; Klein 1991, 143–44: the wordplay is quite common in nearly all Christian anti-Manichaeans, cf. above pp. 130–31 (but it does not appear in Acta Arch.).—In addition, most of these motifs are common to heresiologists; they were later to be used as never before by Epiphanius of Salamis, see Vallerie 1981, 73, 83, 89, 91.
of popular religion and mythological cosmogony in Greek philosophy was based on this contrast.\textsuperscript{25} Titus was probably aiming to set up a cultural difference between on the one hand people of culture, being the Catholics, and pagans with their stamp of Greekness, and the Manichaeans on the other. Titus associates universal validity with Catholic Christianity and both of these entities with Graeco-Roman culture and in this way he places the Manichaeans outside the context as barbarians, together with the Romans’ enemies, the Persians. A comparison with other contemporary sources reveals that because of the Romans’ wars with the Sassanid empire Manichaeism came under suspicion, since it was of Persian origin.\textsuperscript{26}

But Titus does not settle for writing off Manichaeism as barbarism and irrationality. Simultaneously in I.1 he can also acknowledge a legitimate apologetic motive in Mani, namely the wish to release God from the responsibility for sin. It is worth noticing that after writing off the “fables” in I.17 as ridiculous, he declares that the question of Providence is still a serious problem. We find exactly the same approach in I.42–II.1. Without the distinction between fables and serious philosophical and theological problems in Manichaeism Titus’s work would hardly needed to have been so long, but it would clearly also have lost its significance. Titus’s arguments for there being only a single principle, his theodicy and defence of man’s ethical freedom would be superfluous. But nor would Contra Manichaeos have made an impression on the readers who were open to Manichaeism. However, the acknowledgement that serious philosophical and theological questions can be raised in connection with Manichaeism does not mean that true answers are also to be found in this area;

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\textsuperscript{25} See Jaeger 1960, 10, 12, 19, 42, 69.—Since Titus argues without Scripture in his first two books, \muyologe\=\text{"\textsuperscript{a}n does not have the same meaning as in Athanasius, De inc. 3: ”\‘\text{"\textsuperscript{a}nologe\=\text{"\textsuperscript{a}n’ ist bei Athanasius das menschlich willkürliche Reden über Gott, das im Gegensatz zum göttlich inspirierten Reden steht” (Meijering 1989, 48 with further references).}

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. above on Diocletian’s edict (…); see also Lieu 1992, 121–50; Klein 1991, 137–39. Shorty before Titus wrote his work, Emperor Julian had gone to war against the Persians. But it must be added that even though Titus repeatedly calls Mani a barbarian, it is only in IV.19 that he explicitly links him to the Persians. However, Mani’s background in the Persian Kingdom may have been so well-known to his contemporaries that the association to the Persians followed quite naturally from calling Mani a barbarian. Reitzenstein (1931, 47) takes a different line: “statt \‘\text{"\textsuperscript{a}P\text{"\textsuperscript{a}r\text{"\textsuperscript{a}s sagt er nur \‘\text{"\textsuperscript{a}b\text{"\textsuperscript{a}r\text{"\textsuperscript{a}r\text{"\textsuperscript{a}r, das Wort, das auch den Ungebildeten oder Stumpfsinnigen bezeichnen kann.”
Indeed Titus does not seem to acknowledge the existence even of partially true answers.

Often Titus misunderstands the Manichaeans or imputes to them beliefs they have never held, but he is hardly acting in bad faith. He draws on original Manichaean writings and has undoubtedly only wished to create a controversy against what the Manichaeans really believed. But probably his sources could not tell him what he wished to know, and furthermore his entire polemical purpose and conviction that he had right on his side prevented him from quietly and impartially attempting to acquaint himself with the views of his opponent; such an approach would also be quite foreign to his or any mind in classical Antiquity. Titus’s work is a polemical treatise and a refutation, not an open discussion. It is equally important, however, to note that when Titus employs philosophical arguments to refute the doctrines of Manichaeism, they are simultaneously subjected to an interpretation. His written Manichaean sources are used to answer questions that were probably beyond their authors’ horizons.

It would nevertheless be wrong only to say that Titus forces foreign problems onto the Manichaeans; the fundamental question of evil was a problem common to the Manichaeans and the philosophical tradition, and from its earliest days Manichaeism contained important forms of thought that were of philosophical origin. The Manichaeism that Titus met also employed—with a missionary aim that I shall attempt to prove—even more ideas and values that were philosophical in origin. He knows also, however, that he is forcing the Manichaean myths into a foreign context; as we shall see, for instance, he is fully aware that the Manichaean concepts οὐσία and ὡς do not mean the same as they do in the philosophical tradition. In fact, to a degree that is indeed what Titus seeks to demonstrate; this is what his criticism is aimed at. The philosophical concepts have universal validity, and the mythology of Manichaeism thereby loses any meaning. For Titus therefore it would have made no sense either if we imagined, anachronistically, someone asking him whether Manichaeism could be another “language game” or, like Baur, a mythical poem. For Titus the truth was one.

The portrayal of Manichaeism that Titus draws in the above summary may possibly also tell us something about his audiences. The intended pagan and Catholic readers perhaps agreed that they belonged in a rational Graeco-Roman cultural environment in sharp contrast to the barbarians’ irrational world. At the same time they
were troubled by the theological and philosophical questions that the Manichaeans raised—questions about evil and Providence, in short the question of theodicy. Of course Titus also seeks to influence his readers into distancing themselves from barbarian irrationality, but it is hardly credible that this influence should not at heart be seen as an appeal to attitudes already present.

3. Titus’s portrayal of Manichaeism as determinism and immorality

This appeal to beliefs already held by pagans and Catholics also reveals itself in another aspect of Titus’s polemic, namely the attempt to draw a portrait of Manichaeism as a deterministic system and an immoral practice. This aspect has already been richly documented in the above Summary of Contents of Contra Manichaeos: Titus interprets Manichaeism to mean that whoever commits evil deeds is determined by a preponderance of evil matter; it is noteworthy, however that in Contra Manichaeos there are precious few direct quotations from Manichaean sources to support this interpretation. It is important to realise, though, that Titus’s interpretation means that Manichaeism is a direct danger to the morality of the entire society. If virtue and vice are a question of nature, all appeals to ethics are redundant. No honourable pagan can therefore reject Titus’s polemic as extraneous or an internal Christian controversy.

In this indirect way Manichaeism is a danger to morality. In two places, however, Titus goes on to claim that it is also only in appearance that the Manichaeans themselves live a moral existence. In reality they are quite immoral (Contra Manichaeos II.56; IV.43). It must be said, though, that in comparison with much other Early Church heresiology this theme complex is very poorly represented in Titus’s work.

In this context we must also consider whether Titus has wanted to imply that the Manichaeans constituted a socio-political threat. Stroumsa claims that the reason Alexander of Lycopolis and Titus wished to defend Providence, it was because dualism meant anarchy, and he assumes that this attitude also had political implications.27 We must recall here that there is nothing to suggest that Titus himself sought a conflict with Emperor Julian; on the contrary, he even

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wrote to the Emperor that he was ensuring calm in Bostra. In *Homiliae in Lucam* Titus also gives expression several times to a pro-imperial “Byzantine” attitude.\(^28\) It is difficult, however, to get beyond pure guesswork in connection with this theory. As mentioned, in Book II Titus refers alleged Manichaean accusations against the Creation, which among other things has to do with the injustice in the discrepancy between rich and poor, or that evil people rule others. One might think that these statements might also be political statements, but this is extremely unsure, for their function is precisely to be theoretical accusations against the Creator on a par with the charge that it also rains for no reason in the desert, on uncultivated soil or in the sea without there being talk of socio-political demands or the like.\(^29\) Even though the Manichaean have not fought for any alternative political or socio-economic system, it nonetheless makes sense to say the fact that in the eyes of the leading forces in society these accusations must have made Manichaeism unsuitable as ideological legitimation.

By virtue of Titus’s polemic in these areas falling so well into line with his interests, it must also be reasonable to ask the question whether the accusation of “determinism” is not merely pure imagination. It cannot of course come as a surprise to anyone that much of Titus’s attack does not hit home; the accusation of immorality is a clear case in point, but Titus touches only lightly on this accusation. The fact that many of the arguments to prove that Manichaeism is inconsistent have no substance—for instance, the charge that ὃλη, matter, is ἀλογος, i.e. without knowledge and reason\(^30\)—hardly shakes the basic opposition that Titus would maintain exists between himself and his opponents. More seriously on the other hand is the question of whether Manichaeism really was the deterministic system that Titus believed it to be.

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\(^28\) Thus too the so-called political theology/Augustus theology: Sickenberger 1901, 115–16 (cf. on this Jülicher 1902, 81); Peterson 1951, 138–39 n. 141; Ernst L. Fellechner in Schindler 1978, 52, 54.

\(^29\) Of course one can compare the accusations against the social order of being unjust with the example of social frustration that I myself have found in a Manichaean text (see Pedersen 1996, 262) and assume that they are also founded on concrete problems; this is not necessary, however.

\(^30\) Beck (1978, 56–57, 61, 64, 83–84) is right in stating that this claim does not agree with the Manichaean myth. Beck suggested that it is Titus’s own deduction on the basis of a Manichaean passage concerned with the lack of γνώσις, i.e. the γνώσις that those souls that are caught by ὃλη lose, and which the saving νοῦς, being Jesus, again grants them (Beck 1978, 57).
Suspicion is already aroused by the fact that what is a common point of attack for Christian anti-Manichaeans, clearly continues an older heresiological polemic, especially against the Valentinians, but also against other “Gnostics”. In this context much recent research doubts that the attack has any substance, even though we cannot speak of a consensus. Whatever the truth or untruth over the question of the doctrine of the Gnostics, it is at any rate clear that the Church fathers’ defence of free will against “determinists” are also a continuation of a philosophical polemic, for instance, of Carneades’ anti-fatalist and anti-Stoic argument and perhaps also of polemic against Platonic doctrines on irrational parts of the soul. It is tempting to conclude that the anti-Manichaean Church fathers are merely prolonging a heresiological cliché.

This conclusion would seem to be confirmed by the original literature of the Manichaeans, which often lays claim to man’s freedom and sense of responsibility; the importance in Manichaean texts of themes such as ethical commandments, penance and eternal perdition would seem to render it impossible for Manichaism to have been a deterministic doctrine. In general scholars of Manichaism have also rejected the Church fathers’ claim, or possibly modified it significantly. It was definitely the Manichaean’s view that human

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31 See e.g. Klein 1991, 19, 35–36, 108–112, and esp. 113–25; Aland 1973, 435 (with reference to Titus). This is also true of Augustine, who for instance in Conf. claims that as a Manichaean auditor he believed that his soul was innocent and that it was another, foreign nature in him that sinned (Conf. V.X, 18; Verheijen 1981, 67).

32 It is not necessary to summarise the whole discussion in the present context; a few references will suffice. An overview of the older literature is found in Koschorke 1978, 224–27. See also Diïle 1982, 150–57; Trumbower 1989; Trumbower 1992; Marksches 1992, 146–49; Strutwolf 1993, 104–54; Williams 1996, 189–212; Lühr 1992; Lühr 1996, esp. 186–90, but also 50–52, 57, 63, 81, 101–1, 106, 125, 148–49, 151, 157, 173–74, 177, 181, 316, 325.

33 Cf. Amand 1973; Lühr 1996 (see references in previous note).

34 Cf. below pp. 309–10.

35 See Baur 1831, esp. 162–202, more distantly 156–57, 263–64, 268, 330–33, 445, 491–92; Asmussen 1965, 16–19; Puech 1977, 189ff.; Pedersen 1996, 378–84; Magris 2001.—It is in itself clear that when, for example, Augustine accuses the Manichaean of abolishing free choice, the form of the accusation is a polemical attack, not a description of Manichaean thought, but this does not exclude that as a description it is also correct. We must note, however, how Augustine can bring quotations from Mani, who claims free will, but only to conclude that Mani contradicts what is his real opinion (De nat. boni 42; quotes from Ep. fund.).—However, all aspects of the problem are far from having been examined in depth.—It should also be noted that in Contra Manich. IV.19 Titus links Manichaism to astrological fatalism. If, however, Jones’ (1997, 197–98) interpretation of the ἐπίτροπος—which
wickedness stems from demonic forces in the body which have captured the soul, and “dark” and “light” are clearly described in Manichaean texts as matter or quasi-material elements, but the Manichaeans also wished to lay claim to the individual, the existential and singular, irrespective of how great this interest was in a tense relationship to Manichaean ontology.\textsuperscript{36}

One could therefore assume that the charge of determinism was unsubstantiated, that in this case—and perhaps rightly so—a logical conclusion was drawn from the Manichaeans’ ontological premises that they themselves never drew. But it is not as simple as that. At any rate two Manichaean texts exist which claim that sinful souls are determined for perdition.\textsuperscript{37} It follows from this that the Church fathers really were attentive to a tendency in the direction of “determinism” that could also influence the Manichaeans’ own speculations. However, the Church fathers, including Titus, never refer to the precise speculations that appear in the texts in question, and it is therefore most likely that they actually had not read Manichaean texts in support of determinism.

Since determinism is only rarely mentioned in Manichaean texts, which at the same time have unreflectively claimed man’s free will, and if indeed the Church fathers had no precise knowledge of Manichaean determinism, these factors must affect the relations that scholars have sought to establish between Manichaeism and patristics.

This is true in the first place of the above-mentioned theory that the Eastern Church fathers insisted so strongly on the free will because they were faced with a deterministic opponent.\textsuperscript{38} Insofar as the Church fathers made these opponents out to be even more deterministic than they actually were—so that they become in a sense a kind of literary

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Manichaeism contains fundamentally a tension between “essence” and “existence”, as I sought to demonstrate in an earlier work (Pedersen 1990) which in the main I still stand by.
\item \textsuperscript{37} M 2/II/ (Andreas and Henning 1934, 849–53) and \textit{Kephalaia} Ch. 40 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 104.21–105.14); see further Pedersen 1996, 385–92.—Incidentally, Böhlig (1986, 27) presumes \textit{inter alia} influence from Stoic determinism on \textit{Kephalaia} Ch. 90 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 223.17–228.4).—The recently edited Ch. 138 of \textit{Kephalaia} (Funk 1999, 340.20–341.24) is important for a reconsideration of all these problems.
\item \textsuperscript{38} See above p. 91.
\end{itemize}
ideological construction—this particular explanation is partly weakened, even though the actual idea of the deterministic opponent naturally may have continued to steer the Church fathers to some extent. In addition to this we should note that the Manichaean texts only claim man’s freedom as part of an ethical appeal but otherwise independent of this they ascribe evil to a primordial principle and locate it in matter and the body, whereas the doctrine of man’s freedom in the Catholic writers has the central function of giving a different explanation of the origin of evil and of keeping the world and the body free of accusations of evil. As such the doctrine of free will is a genuine response to the Manichaeans, who maintained that if evil does not stem from another eternal principle, then it must stem from God Himself (e.g. in Képhalaia Ch. 120 [Böhlig 1966, 286.24–288.18]). For the Church fathers evil was fully and totally a product of man’s free choice. In this way it is therefore still possible to claim that the importance of the doctrine of free will in Eastern theology is also linked to a genuine ideological challenge from the Manichaeans.

Secondly, the above-mentioned theories that the Pelagians were right in their assumption that there was a connection between the Manichaeans’ and Augustine’s concepts of concupiscentia\(^{39}\) must be modified. One can still discuss Clark’s view that there is a similarity between the biological and sexual aspects of the Manichaeans’ concept of sin and that of Augustine,\(^{40}\) but when in her later work she also appears to accept that there was such a thing as “Manichaean and astrological determinism”,\(^{41}\) caution should be advised; on this point the Pelagians’ accusations were strongly marked by clichés.

Summarising we can say that Titus’s charge against the Manichaeans of being determinists and immoral is first and foremost an expression of his own interest in persuading certain pagan and Catholic groups to distance themselves from Manichaeism. The fact that Titus was able to reckon on such an effect must mean that none of these groups was interested in undermining the morality of society. It is furthermore conceivable that these groups were fascinated among other things by the strict morality of the Manichaeans, in particular by the ascetic life of “the Elect”. For there is absolutely no evidence

\(^{39}\) See above pp. 89–90.
to suggest that Titus had any ground for his accusation of immorality among the Manichaeans. The case is slightly different with the charge of determinism. Titus had no precise knowledge, but he did glimpse—and not unrightly so—a deterministic tendency in the Manichaean system. From the impression we can gain today from the original literature of the Manichaeans, however, it would seem that the deterministic tendency clashed with other—and stronger—Manichaean interests, with the result that in this area Titus did not meet the unambiguous response that he expected.
As I have previously stated in this work, the question of which Manichaean texts Titus actually used\(^1\) in *Contra Manichaeos* can probably not be separated completely from the purpose of his work. The very fact that the history of scholarship has revolved around a special relationship between philosophy of Late Antiquity and, respectively, Titus’s source material and his refutation of its content rendered it probable that there was a link of particular significance. Does Titus’s source material have a special stamp that can explain important elements in his refutation strategy?

*Contra Manichaeos* was written in order to immunise certain pagan and Catholic circles against a two-pronged Manichaean missionary effort aimed at each of these groups. On the assumption that the values which Titus found suitable to win over the intended pagan and Catholic readers to his side could also be used to give a preliminary description of these readers, I have suggested that they felt themselves linked to an ostensibly “rational” Graeco-Roman cultural context which contrasted with the barbarians’ irrational world at the same time as they were troubled by the theodicy problems that were being introduced by the Manichaeans. Titus’s readers also set store by morality and perhaps on this very point were impressed by Manichaeism. This description of the situation thus turns out to contain a set of problems which were also found in the treatment of the history of scholarship on the work, namely the importance of contemporary philosophy.

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\(^1\) That Titus really has used Manichaean texts is clear from both his remarks and the content of his information and ostensible quotations. Moreover in some cases in *G* and *V* a system of horizontal dashes or small signs is used in the margin for every line with presumed Mani-quotations, apparently something like παράγραφοι; thus the following are marked in *G*: Gr. 9.13–22, 68.12–27, 69.19–22 (in this latter case, though, the intention was probably to mark the Gen. quotation), and the following in *V*: Gr. 9.13–31, 26.8–9, 68.12–27. However, whether the system can be traced right back to Titus himself must remain very unsure.
These observations alone are sufficient to advance the hypothesis that the Manichaean texts which Titus referred to in his work played a particular role in the Manichaean mission to pagans and Catholics to which he was reacting. In itself the Summary of Contents of Contra Manichaeos (cf. Ch. II) shows that “theodicy problems” must have been prominent in the Manichaean texts that he drew on, but it would be especially worthwhile to see if we can achieve so clear a picture of these texts that we can say for sure whether they tried to present Manichaeism as “rational” and “philosophical”. We must also ask whether the texts in question presented Manichaeism as attractive because it laid particular emphasis on morality.

2. Heraclianus’s information and Adda’s works

The examination of Titus’s Manichaean sources must take as its starting-point Photius’s above-quoted mention of Heraclianus of Chalcedon’s refutation of the Manichaens.\(^2\) My commentary on this Photius-passage has so far concentrated on the information that it contained concerning anti-Manichaean heresiology; it also contains important information on Manichaean literature, however, and it is that which we shall now focus on.

Heraclianus himself claims to have opposed three or four Manichaean works (The Gospel, The Book of Giants and the Treasuries) that we know from other texts were written by Mani himself, though only fragments of them are preserved. The Gospel is without doubt the same as The Living Gospel; Heraclianus himself writes the full title a little further on, when he mentions Diodore. The Book of Giants is another of Mani’s writings, and the Treasuries (τοῦ Θησαυροῦ) refers among other things to the title of Mani’s work, The Treasury/The Treasury of Life, but also shows that Heraclianus used the so-called Little Treasury.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) In Haer. 66.13,6, Holl 1933, 35.9–10 Epiphanius speaks of both a Θησαυρός and a μικρός Θησαυρός, and also Cyril of Jerusalem and Nilus of Ankyra know of several Treasuries (see Alfaric 1919, 48). Cumont suggested that The Little Treasury was a summary of The Treasury of Life (Cumont and Kugener 1912, 157), while Alfaric (1919, 48) believed that we are dealing with a supplement.—Lieu (in Vermes 2001, 10), however, identifies Heraclianus’s Treasuries with “the Pragmataia”; I have been unable to find a justification for this identification.
Of particular interest is Heraclianus’s information on Titus and Diodore’s use of Adda’s works. On the strength of Heraclianus’s apparently wide knowledge one would imagine that the content of his remark about Titus was that Titus incorrectly believed that he was writing against Mani himself, but instead we are presented with the almost meaningless remark that Titus was rather writing against Adda than against the Manicheans—almost meaningless because Adda was himself a Manichean.\(^4\) We should therefore consider whether Μανιχαῖος in line 65b7 should not be corrected to Μανιχαῖον, which would bring Heraclianus’s criticism of Titus into line with his criticism of Diodore. The present Photius text must nevertheless probably be retained, for the very title of Titus’s work (Against the Manicheans, not Against Manichaeus) favours Μανιχαῖος as the original text.\(^5\) Heraclianus’s remark must therefore mean that although Titus believed that he was writing against many Manicheans, in reality he was writing against only one.

Furthermore, we note that Heraclianus claimed that Titus attacked Adda’s works in the plural, and not just a particular one. With regard to Diodore’s vanished work on the other hand, Heraclianus claims that it was written to refute a single work of Adda’s that had the title Μόδιος, The Bushel, but that Diodore believed himself to be writing against Mani’s Living Gospel. If Heraclianus is right, it is possible that Diodore was in error, since among heresiologists Μόδιος had been circulating under the wrong title of The Living Gospel. A further possibility is that the mistake stemmed from the fact that Μόδιος had the same structure and content as The Living Gospel.\(^6\)


\(^5\) Both \(G\) and \(V\) give the work the title Κατὰ Μανιχαῖον, and this title must be original, since there is very early testimony to this effect; it corresponds to Sy’s Κατὰ Μανιχαῖον and Jerome’s Adversum Manichaeos in De vir. inlustr. CII (cf. above p. 112 and p. 126).

\(^6\) Alfaric 1919, 98 writes as follows about Heraclianus’s remark on Μόδιος: “D’après ses indications, cette œuvre avait le même objet que l’Evangile vivant de Mani. Elle étudiait donc la vie du Christ et son enseignement. Peut-être tirait-elle son titre du texte de Matthieu (V, 15)”. Lieu 1992, 92 on the other hand has suggested a different explanation for the title Μόδιος. Reitzenstein (1931, 46) thought that Μόδιος had been a critical work concerned with single verses from the Living Gospel.—Sfameni Gasparro 2000, 549 accepts Alfaric’s hypothesis and goes on to suggest that perhaps Μόδιος was intended to present the teaching of The Living Gospel.—Evidence that The Living Gospel dealt with Jesus’s life and teaching, as Alfaric says, can be found in al-Birūnī’s information on the contents in Chronology of Ancient Nations III (Sachau 1879, 27); VIII (Sachau 1879, 190–91) (other fragments of The
Adda is not an unknown figure; from many both Manichaean and anti-Manichaean texts he is known as one of Mani’s own disciples. In the present context, however, there is no need for a detailed prosopographical account of where Adda is mentioned or what we know about him; all that is important here are the sources which refer to Adda’s authorship. These include firstly a number of Iranian Manichaean fragments, M 2 (R I, 1–33); M 216c+M 1750 R/9/–V//13; M 18220, which claim that Mani sent Adda as a missionary to the Roman Empire, where he wrote works attacking non-Manichaean religious communities; indeed he even got all the way to Alexandria. M 2, R I, 9–11 find Mani sending the Gospel (i.e. Mani’s Living Gospel) “and two other writings” to Adda, information that we are of course tempted to apply to the theory of a link between MÓðiov and The Living Gospel, which would nevertheless be too bold, since Adda was also sent two other writings and in general as a leading Manichaean must have known the whole of Mani’s authorship.

Secondly, there is a work by Adda which is mentioned in certain abjuration formulae for use by Manichaens who wished to convert.

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Living Gospel: See for example Adam 1969, 1–2; CMC 65.23–70.10 [Koenen and Römer 1988, 44–49].—When Heraclianus states that Diodore did not refute the Manichaean interpretation of the Bible until the last 18 books, we see a possible similarity to the structure of Titus’s Contra Manich., which likewise does not move on to biblical interpretation until the last part, but it must be noted that if Alfaric is right, then Diodore must also have concerned himself with biblical interpretation in the first seven books.—Perhaps a revaluation of the problem surrounding The Living Gospel and MÓðiov will be possible when the Coptic-Manichaean Synaxeis-Codex is edited; see Böhlig 1968a; Mirecki 1988; 1994; King 1992.

8 Andreas and Henning 1933, 301–2; Sundermann 1981, 17–18; M 216c+M 1750: Sundermann 1981, 25–26 (here Sundermann restores the lacunae in his translation, so that the writings are by Adda [V/5/–/8/]); M 18220: Sundermann 1981, 36–41; 13941 + 14285, V/14/–/15/ (Sundermann 1981, 36) also mentions a letter from Adda to Mani.
9 Andreas and Henning 1933, 301–2; Sundermann 1981, 17–18; cf. Sundermann 1987, 70ff.—Khosroyev (1995, 132 n. 388) partly doubts the historicity of M 2, because the text does not give precise information of all the details, and a certain reservation is certainly in order here: “Unter Berücksichtigung, daß dieser Text an sich keineswegs als historisch zu betrachten ist (z.B. war es dem Autor des Textes unwichtig—oder er besaß keine Kenntnis mehr darüber—, welche Texte genau Mani dem Adda geschickt hat, als letzterer im Römerreich predigte—‘das Evangelium und zwei andere Schriften’: R I,10—, oder in welchen Ländern genau Adda verweile) . . .”
to the Catholic Church. Zacharias of Mitylene’s *Capita VII contra Manichaeos* anathematises “Addas and Adimantus” (Ἀδᾶς καὶ Ἀδείμαντος) as the first among Mani’s disciples (*Capita* 2,36) and it then anathematises “the book which refutes the Law and the holy Moses and the other prophets composed by Addas and Adimantus” (τὴν κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ἁγίον Μωϋσέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προφητῶν Ἀδᾶς καὶ Ἀδείμαντος συγγραφήν, *Capita* 2,45–46),\(^{10}\) and this is continued in the *Long Abjuration Formula* that is dependent on the *Capita* (1468B, 1466D).\(^{11}\) *Capita* appears to regard Addas and Adimantus as two different persons. Later it is added that Mani and his disciples, Addas and Adimantus, do not believe in the mystery of the divine incarnation (*Capita* 4,112–15).\(^{12}\) The *Short Greek Abjuration Formula*, however, regards Addas and Adimantus as the same person and knows that he was sent out as a missionary.\(^{13}\)

Thirdly, we know from Augustine of a work by Addas, or rather Adimantus, which he refutes in *Contra Adimantum*. In his *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* Augustine himself testifies that Adimantus was identical with Addas,\(^{14}\) and this information must be regarded as certain.\(^{15}\) In North African Manichaeism Adimantus seems to have occupied a special position after Mani himself as a theological teacher; that at least was the judgement of the Manichaean Bishop, Faustus

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\(^{10}\) Lieu 1994, 236.

\(^{11}\) Lieu 1994, 237, 239.

\(^{12}\) Lieu 1994, 242. See also the comments in Lieu 1994, 263–64, 270.


\(^{14}\) Augustine, *Contra adv. leg. et proph.* II.12,42 (1321–22): “Adimanti opus est, illius discipuli Manichaei, qui proprio nomine Addas dictus est” (Daur 1985, 131). Cf. Alfaric 1919, 105; Chatillon 1954; Decret 1986–94; 1986–94a; Tubach 1995.—This is the same work that is refuted in *Contra Adim.*; it is referred to in *Contra adv. leg. et proph.*, thus in II.12,41 (1294–98; Daur 1985, 130) and as mentioned in II.12,42 (1320–32; Daur 1985, 131). The reason that Adimantus’s work is referred to in *Contra adv. leg. et proph.* II.12,42 is that the codex that contained “the opponent of the Law and the prophets” whom Augustine refuted also contained two other texts: firstly a writing that claimed God had not created the flesh; only the beginning of this text appeared in the codex, and Augustine clearly did not know the writer (*Contra adv. leg. et proph.* II.12,42 [1306–20]; Daur 1985, 131), and secondly Adimantus’s writing (cf. Raveaux 1987, 133–34). Alfaric’s assumption that the first writing was also by Adimantus (Alfaric 1919, 105–6, 143) is thus unjustified. Alfaric (1919, 105–6) also suggested that this first writing was identical with the Chinese-Manichaean *Traité*, which can hardly be the case, however (see Sundermann 1992, 13).

\(^{15}\) Alfaric 1919, 104–5; Merkelbach 1984; 1985; Tubach 1995.
of Milevis, in one of the excerpts from Faustus’s anti-Catholic work which is preserved in Augustine’s *Contra Faustum*:

As the learned Adimantus, the only teacher since the sainted Manichaeus deserving of our attention, has plentifully exposed and thoroughly refuted the errors of Judaism and of semi-Christianity...\(^\text{16}\)

Faustus could be referring to a number of texts by Adimantus, but the one that is mentioned in *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* and refuted in *Contra Adimantium* has without doubt been one of them.\(^\text{17}\) In *Retractationes I,XXII (XXI)*, Augustine also refers to this text as follows:

> At the same time certain dissertations came into my hands that were written by Adimantus, who had been Manichaeus’s disciple; he had composed the dissertations against the Law and the prophets, endeavouring to show that the Evangelical and Apostolic Scriptures ran counter to them.\(^\text{18}\)

Of course *Contra Adimantium* offers a closer impression of Adimantus’s work. It appears to have been in the form of “antitheses”, using selected biblical texts to demonstrate the radical opposition between the OT and the NT. It seems therefore as though there were distinct similarities between Marcion’s *Antitheses* and the text by Adimantus which Augustine refuted in *Contra Adimantium*.\(^\text{19}\) Yet perhaps Adimantus’s arguments against the OT were not always gathered in a single volume, as was the case with the book that Augustine drew on in *Contra Adimantium*; they may have circulated among the Manichaeans as sin-

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\(^{\text{16}}\) *Contra Faust.* I.2; Zycha 1891, 251.22–252.3: “Satis superque in lucem iam traductis erroribus ac Iudaicae superstitionis simul et semichristianorum abunde detecta fallacia a doctissimo scilicet et solo nobis post beatum patrem nostrum Manichaeum studendo Adimanto non ab re uisum est...” Transl.: Richard Stothert in Schaff 1887, 156.


\(^{\text{18}}\) “Eodem tempore uenerunt in manus meas quaedam disputationes Adimanti, qui fuerat discipulus Manichaei, quas conscrisit aduersus legem et prophetas, ulert contraria ei euangelica et apostolica scripta demonstrare conatus.” Mutzenbecher 1984, 63–64 (1–5).

gle sheets. Incidentally, until Ch. XII in Contra Adimantum Augustine speaks of “the Manichaeans”—and only from then on of Adimantus, but it seems certain enough (cf. the title of the work and Retractationes) that he was polemising specifically against Adimantus’s book.

Some scholars seek to identify Μόδιος with the work by Adimantus that Augustine refuted, but if Μόδιος was a text that was linked to The Living Gospel, this is improbable, since Contra Adimantum does not suggest that Adimantus’s work was connected with The Living Gospel. On the other hand, by virtue of its content Adimantus’s work could very reasonably be identified with the book mentioned in the abjuration formulae that attacked the Law and the prophets. Since this work attacked Judaism and Catholicism, its content corresponds well with the mission situation that the Iranian sources depict: Adda was writing works that attacked the non-Manichaean religions. These sources, however, speak without specification of several works composed by Adda, just as Heraclianus claims that Titus wrote against a number of Adda’s works.

Nagel has asserted that Heraclianus’s claim that Titus used Adda cannot be tested, since not one line by Adda is preserved, and this is true in a way. Nevertheless there is the possibility of comparing Augustine’s Contra Adimantum with Titus’s Contra Manichaeos. Does this make it probable that the bishops of Bostra and Hippo Regius—at least in part—refuted the very same work of Adda?

Contra Adimantum is constructed in such a way that Augustine presents the “antitheses” one at a time and then refutes them. If we compare this approach with his summary of the content of Adimantus’s writing in Retractationes I,XXII (XXI), it seems likely, as mentioned, that like Marcion’s famous work the writing consisted of texts partly from the OT and partly from the gospels and Paul which were placed counter to one another. The structure of Augustine’s work is such that a comparison must rest on the quotations from the Bible. Are there in Titus’s long work certain places stating that the

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23 Thus Sfameni Gasparro 2000, 549 n. 21.
24 Thus also Tubach 1995, 171.
Manichaeans used passages from the Bible in the same way as Augustine claimed that Adimantus did? Such a comparison has produced the result that in only two cases is there such a similarity:

1) In *Contra Adimantum* VIII Augustine asserts that the Manichaeans found an antithesis between Ex. 21.24 ("eye for eye, tooth for tooth") and Mt. 5.38–40 ("You have heard that it is said, 'eye for eye and tooth for tooth.' But I tell you etc."). *Contra Manichaeos* III.76.77.87 is concerned with a corresponding Manichaean use of these texts. But precisely because Jesus himself in the gospel emphasises the difference between his commandment and the passage in the Law, the passage was a titbit ("gefundenes Fressen") for Manichaeans; to set up a radical opposition was obvious, and this means that the passage cannot prove that the two heresiologists drew on the same source.26

2) In *Contra Adimantum* XII,4–5 Augustine observes that the Manichaeans used 1 Cor. 15.50 ("flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God"), but otherwise omitted to quote 15.39–50, and, if I understand Augustine rightly, launched a further attack on 1 Cor. 15.51–53. Titus says in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.97 that the Manichaeans used 1 Cor. 15.50 to deny the resurrection of the dead, and that on this basis they rejected the previous verses, nor did they turn to the following ones. Although there is a real similarity here between Titus’s source and Adimantus, it is in itself not sufficient for the claim that Titus’s source is Adimantus. The Manichaeans naturally used the same biblical verses to substantiate their teaching, and therefore a whole raft of similarities is required before a literary dependence is rendered likely.27

In addition, two other parallels may be mentioned that illuminate the problem:

3) In *Contra Adimantum* X Augustine states that the Manichaeans found a contradiction between Ex. 25.2–8, where God will dwell in an earthly sanctuary to which the Israelites will bring offerings, and Mt. 5.34–35, where heaven is God’s throne and the earth His foot-

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26 Also *Acta Arch.* XLIV.9 (XL) (Beeson 1906, 65.19–21); XLVII.1 (XLII) (Beeson 1906, 69.12–14) presents Mani as claiming the contradiction between Ex. 21.24 and Mt. 5.38–40.

27 Cf. *PrB* II, Allberry 1938, 121.9; also *Acta Arch.* XLIV.4 (XL) (Beeson 1906, 66.9–12) presents Mani as using 1 Cor. 15.50. Here the Manichaeans were part of an old tradition: according to Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* V.9,1 all heretics used 1 Cor. 15.50 to attack the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.
stool. Can the God whom Jesus speaks of live in such a sanctuary? Augustine adds that the Manichaeans also referred to 1 Tim. 6.16, where Paul says that God lives in unapproachable light. *Contra Manichaeos* III.75 now shows that also Titus’s source used Mt. 5.33–37, but in a quite different sense. In Titus’s source, building on Jesus’s words, the subject was a prohibition against oaths, which was in contradiction of Lev. 19.12. Thus nothing speaks in favour of the same source being used.

4) There are certain similarities between Augustine and Titus’s argument: for instance, both bishops apply 1 Cor. 15.51 against the Manichaeans’ interpretation of the previous verse (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.99 and *Contra Adimantum* XII.5), and one can also compare their use of Rom. 8.3 in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.95 and *Contra Adimantum* XXI respectively. These passages, however, indicate a similarity between the two bishops’ interpretation that has nothing to do with their sources; it is of course because they were both Catholics.

There are therefore only two real similarities between Adimantus and Titus’s source. In both places we are dealing with interpretations that by virtue of the conceptual world of Manichaeism were quite natural for Manichaeans; the two similarities may therefore be coincidental. At the very least they cannot hold up a theory that Augustine and Titus used the same source. It must also be noted that both Augustine and Titus concern themselves with a long series of other passages in the Bible that have been used by their sources. If the source was the same, one might expect more similarities than the few that there are. And this is also true, even though Augustine testifies that he did not refute all of Adimantus’s work in *Contra Adimantum*. The application of passages from the Bible in both *Contra Adimantum* and *Contra Manichaeos* is so extensive that it is unlikely that they did not make greater use of the same passages if both works were attacking the same source.

Since Adda was probably the author of a number of writings, it is nevertheless still a possibility that Titus was dependent on one or more of these, just not on the work that Augustine refuted. Unfortunately we have no possibility of checking this, though there

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remains a not completely arbitrary method with which to separate the Adda sources in Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos*. For—with every reservation as regards the historicity of all our sources—we do possess some of Adda’s theological contours, and we can ask whether these contours fit the Manichaeism that Titus is attacking: 1) Adda’s authorship came about in a missionary situation and was therefore markedly polemical against other religious traditions. 2) *Contra Adimantum* seems to show that Adda re-used the Marcionite idea to posit antitheses between the OT and the NT. Adda can therefore also have advanced other antitheses in his writings. 3) Adimantus is treated by Faustus as a crucial theological authority; it is therefore natural that many ideas in North African Manichaeism in fact originated with him, and this could mean to a particular degree the Marcionite ideas, such as a radical criticism of the OT’s image of God or theories about interpolations in the NT. 4) According to the *Capita VII Contra Manichaeos* Adda and Adimantus, like Mani, did not believe in the incarnation. Adda may therefore have criticised this dogma in particular. 5) Perhaps Adda wrote his *Módiow* as a kind of commentary on Mani’s *Living Gospel*.

The problem with these five points is that both Mani himself and other Manichaeans may have shared them. For instance, we know that Mani himself was concerned with the Marcionites in *The Treasury of Life* and he may therefore also be thought to have used Marcionite ideas in his authorship.\(^\text{29}\) Despite this reservation the five points could still function in an examination of *Contra Manichaeos* on the assumption that some of them can be combined with an attempt to render probable that Titus’s source was not texts by Mani himself: for in that case, on the strength of Heraclianus’s information, Adda must be singled out as the most likely source.

3. *The Manichaean source in Contra Manichaeos I + III.4–5*

However, the problem is not just whether the five points that characterised the Manichaean Adda can fit some of the Manichaean texts

\(^{29}\) See Pedersen 1993, 168. In this context I take the opportunity to state that I now doubt the correctness of the interpretations of M 28 I Rii, 33–37 (Hymn 2, strophe \(m\); see the new edition in Skjærvø 1995, 246) that I adduced in Pedersen 1993, 167 n. 7; an alternative interpretation of the very obscure strophe is also to be found in Skjærvø 1995, 244.
which Titus appears to have used. The main interest now centres on the more important questions of how far it is possible to gain an impression of the nature of these texts, and whether we can distinguish at all between them. A really systematic examination of these questions has not been undertaken so far, even though there are rudiments in some authors, especially Reitzenstein, and I am aware that the present contribution can be no more than an initiator of further discussion.

My starting-point is Baur’s observation on the character of Titus’s presentation of the Manichaean myth. Of course it is very much mythological and concrete, for instance when Titus can state in I.42 that God fills up the abyss from which matter comes with earth, but Baur was right in the sense that Titus’s presentation brushes off the mythological names and, by simplifying, blurs the distinctions between the individual divine hypostases, as can be seen from the following brief overview: thus in I.6 the two principles are described as θεός και ἕλπις, φως καὶ σκότος, ὁγαθόν καὶ κακόν (Gr. 4.16), while the designations “Father of Greatness” and “Prince of Darkness” never appear in Titus.—The Primal Man (“First Man”) is described simply as a certain δύναμις (I.17, Gr. 9.18), but at the same time it is mentioned that this power was given a name (Gr. 9.18), apparently a covert reference to the name “Primal Man”.30—The soul (ψυγή), which is to be regarded as Primal Man’s five sons or “armour”, is not distinguishable from Primal Man himself (I.17 [Gr. 9.31ff. → Ch. XI.8] and I.36 [Gr. 23.8–9]).31—It is not mentioned that the Creator God, “the Living Spirit” is an independent hypostasis; we are only told that ὁ ὁγαθός is δημιουργός (I.17; Gr. 9.35–36 → Ch. XI.8).—The Third Messenger” is referred to most cryptically in Titus’s excerpt in III.5 as the one “who had firstly revealed himself for the redemption of the soul, once the door had been opened” (Gr. 68.20–21 → Ch. XI.33).

This complete blurring of mythological names cannot be regarded as Titus’s own work, since, as demonstrated above, he is extremely

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30 Cf. Baur 1831, 56.—Reitzenstein (1931, 55–56) supposed here, “daß Titus in seiner Vorlage hier einen Namen bzw. eine Wesensbezeichnung fand, wie etwa Ανθρωπος, Adam oder Ormuzd”. It would go completely against Titus’s intention, however, if he himself had omitted the name!

31 On this point Titus’s presentation very much resembles that of Alexander of Lycopolis (cf. Baur 1831, 51–52).
interested in emphasising Manichaism’s character of fables. Nor is the blurring of mythological names in agreement with Titus’s polemic in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.21, where it is claimed that Mani worshipped many gods, but gave them barbarian names; only in this did he differ from the pagans:

Also because one especially can find the error of idolatries of many gods with him, even more than among the pagans, he who openly writes in his books: “I worship the gods, i.e. those ones which greatly are very many and cannot be numbered.” And he enumerates foreign and barbarian names and he only seems to be different from the pagans in the wording of new names. But as regards the multitude of those which are worshipped by him, this man is a shameless teacher of paganism (Sy 139.3–9).\(^\text{32}\)

Either Titus has had no access whatsoever to Manichaean texts that contain the barbarian names that he speaks of in IV.21, or he uses different texts in the first half of *Contra Manichaeos* from those in Book IV.

The abandonment of the mythological names and the blurring of the differences between some of the hypostases now corresponds so precisely to the presentation of Manichaism which we know from Alexander of Lycopolis that we can be in no doubt that the same motive exists in Titus’s source as has been established in Alexander’s: with a view to a mission in educated, philosophically interested circles in the Roman Empire, these being both among Christians and pagans, the attempt has been made to present Manichaeism as more philosophical than mythological. Reitzenstein may be right that Titus’s reproduction is a little less abbreviated and a little more mythological than Alexander’s, but we are speaking only of a minimal degree of difference. Already on this premise it is quite improbable that Titus’s source for the first half of *Contra Manichaeos*’s should have been one of Mani’s own works. On the other hand Titus is here using a source that has appealed to exactly the same elite groups

\[^{32}\text{Cna htwl aay |gs ah|lad atwRkpd Yy}[wf Pad Lfm oapn|j twld Nm ryty Jkcm tyaryty Ygsd Nwnholw o ah|la Nwnhol Ml ana dgsd oYhwbtk|b Btuk tyalgd uNybcjtm alw Bf Nyaygs dwjlb apn|j Nm Cyrpd rbtsmw anm ayrbrbw ayRkwn ahmc |w oatd|j ahm|cd atlmb atwpnjd anplm xmwj ald Nydgtsm hnmd Nwnh od Nyd atwaygsb °°° arbg anh wh yhwtya\]
that he himself targets: Christians and pagans with a taste for philosophy. *Contra Manichaeos* IV.21, however, reminds us that there were also other pagan circles for whom the mythological element in Manichaeism was particularly attractive.

Holding firm to Baur’s observation makes it possible to find some characteristic features that are common to the Manichaean material that is used in Book I and in III.5. Moreover we can note that by and large Titus presents the Manichaean myth in the right narrative order in Book I; together with the common characteristics just mentioned this fact suggests that Titus has chosen more or less continuously to take excerpts from the same source. In Book II on the other hand there is no continuous mythological account, and it must therefore remain unclear whether Titus used the same Manichaean source for Book II as for Book I.

In *Contra Manichaeos* III.4, however, we note that Titus was in possession of a text where a chapter had the heading, περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης πρωτοπλαστίας; Titus was in doubt as to whether this text was written by Mani or one of his disciples (in III.38 Titus again refers to this text and reiterates his doubt as to who the writer was [Sy 103.13–15]). The text dealt with the creation of Adam, and Titus brings two quotations from it in III.5. It is likely that the same text has also been used in Book I, because the presentation fits so perfectly together with the alleged Mani-quotation in I.38, where a plurality, apparently the archons, have planned to create the body in order to bind the soul, since they have realised that they themselves will perish when the light is gradually removed from them.33 In the Manichaean excerpts in Book I, however, we find no allusions to the Bible, whereas III.4–5 is obviously somehow related to Gen. 1–2. Similarly, the Bible is the subject in the Manichaean excerpts in the rest of Book III and in Book IV. The question now is whether Titus used the same Manichaean source in Book I + III.4–5 as in the rest of Book III + Book IV. This question is admittedly somewhat crudely formulated, but can serve as a presentation of the problem for the time being.

Some factors favour the theory that it is at least partly the same source that is being used in Books I, III and IV. In Book I Titus may have excerpted his source himself so that allusions to the Bible

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33 The similarity between I.38 and III.5 was already noted in Baur 1831, 134–35.
were omitted because they would have been ill-suited to his programme that the first half of the work should only argue on the basis of the “common concepts”. When in IV.40–43 he suddenly returns to several of his themes from Books I and II, this might very well be explained by this argument. But other factors point in a different direction and in my opinion must weigh more heavily; primarily it is a question of certain differences between the texts that Titus summarises or quotes in III.4–5 and III.7 respectively (→ Ch. XI.34):

1) The quotations in I.38 and III.5 do not relate directly to Gen. 2; in the very same style as the preserved original Manichaean texts that recount the creation of Adam, they tell a “new” creation myth that can stand on its own, without regard to the fact that in its historical origin it was based on Gen. 2.34 On the other hand the text that Titus summarises in III.7 deals directly, though critically, with Gen. and Ex. 2) I.38 + III.5 narrate a myth authoritatively, while III.7 asks critical questions and employs logical arguments. 3) In I.38 + III.5 Adam is formed by a group of archons, but in III.7 man is created by one figure, the God of the OT, who belongs to evil. This difference is not decisive, for a comparison with original Gnostic and Manichaean sources would make it likely that the God of the OT was regarded as the leading archon in a group of archons, and yet III.7 makes no mention of any other archons.

These differences do not prove that I.38, III.4–5 and III.7 cannot possibly originate from the same written source. We might imagine a source that alternates between its own myths and a criticism of Gen., but this is less likely in my opinion. Consequently we can now distinguish between two different Manichaean sources: in Book I + III.4–5 Titus used a Manichaean source that reproduced the Manichaean myth, but in a superficial way presented it as more philosophical than mythological. In III.7 on the other hand Titus employed another Manichaean35 source that asked critical questions of Gen. and Ex.

The source that Titus used in Book I + III.4–5, for example, he calls a βιβλος (I.21; Gr. 12.22) and το γράμμα (I.22; Gr. 13.6–7),

34 See however the remarks in Feldmann 1987, 35–36, 84.
35 It is true that Nagel (1980, 57) doubts the Manichaean character of this source; this problem will be dealt with below pp. 250–51.
and sometimes he says that it was written by Mani (for example I.6; Gr. 4.15), while at other times, as Sickenberger first pointed out, he merely refers to “the Manichaeans”. Sfameni Gasparro is right in stating that with the expression ὁ τὰ τοῦ μανέντος συγγράφων φησιν in I.21 (Gr. 13.2 → Ch. XI.10) Titus decides that the work was not written directly by Mani himself, but Titus does not implement this solution, as is particularly clear when he is in doubt in III.4 (Gr. 68.10–11) and III.38 (Sy 103.13–15) who is the writer of the chapter on the creation of man. These remarks also show that Titus was interested in reproducing his sources honestly.

Titus’s irresolution must be because the information in his sources confused him. It is now clear that such a work as *Kephalaia* would be able to explain this doubt. Here the speeches are put into the mouth of Mani himself, who speaks in the first person, but the framework around the chapters and the introduction to the work make it clear that *Kephalaia* only pretends to convey Mani’s oral teachings. Schmidt and Polotsky’s theory that *Contra Manichaeos* III.4–5 contains a fragment of *Kephalaia*, has therefore a touch of probability about it: for Titus states precisely that he is now dealing with a *kefãlaion*, and the heading περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης πρωτοπλαστικῶς has the same form as the headings in *Kephalaia*. The theory could now be further combined with Tardieu’s theory that *Kephalaia* in one sense or another stems from Adda; the theory has recently received Funk’s cautious support. But apart from the fact that the chapter from which Titus quotes is not among the chapters from *Kephalaia* that have so far been published, *Kephalaia* does not have to be the only Manichaean work that was divided into chapters with headings that announce the contents. If *Contra Manichaeos* III.4–5 comes from the same work

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36 Tardieu 1987, 134 with n. 73; Funk 1997, 152–55.—Alfaric’s comparison with the Chinese-Manichaean *Traité* in which Adda (Ato) asks questions of Mani (see above p. 80), could here acquire renewed relevance, precisely because the Chinese-Manichaean literature (including the *Traité*) constitutes a close parallel, both in form and content, to the Coptic-Manichaean *Kephalaia* (cf. Funk 1997, 151–52). Cf. also Sundermann 1992, 13–22.

37 Böhlig’s identification with *Kephalaia* Ch. 55 is untenable; the chapter’s form may be related to *Contra Manich.* I.38 and III.5, but it is not two different translations of the same text. This is also true of the following two related chapters in *Kephalaia* (Ch. 56, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 137.12–144.12; Ch. 57, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 144.13–147.20).

38 In this context it is of interest to refer to Wurst (2001, 307–13), who in the first place points out that when Faustus of Milevis’s work, which Augustine refutes
as the Manichaean quotations in Book I, as I believe, there is moreover no question of quotations from Kēphalaia, which definitely does not blur the mythological names.

My theory that Titus uses the same source in Book I as in III.4–5 means that this source was not written by Mani himself, which in turn is supported by Sfameni Gasparro’s suggestion that when the source in III.4–5 does not mention that man came into being through the demons’ intercourse, but on the contrary claims that man was “formed”, it was because the offensive myth should be concealed.39 Moreover, for the most part the theory is in line with Bennett’s arguments for the existence of a Greek-Manichaean written source containing quotations from Mani’s Living Gospel, which was also used by other non-Manichaean writers. At the same time, however, it must be underlined that Bennett’s study is so far less than complete: it ought to contain more parallels between non-Manichaean writers

39 Admittedly we must note that in Ep. fund. Mani introduces the description of the creation of man by making the Prince of Darkness say to the other demons that he will form an image (“imaginem fingam”, Zycha 1892, 385.6–7), but that in what follows he makes man be created through cannibalism and sexual intercourse (Augustine, De nat. boni 46, Zycha 1892, 384.29–386.17 = Feldmann 1987, 16–20, frg. 9). We find the same ambiguity in, for example, the Middle Persian Manichaean text M 7980–M 7984 (= T III 260), which is probably a part of Mani’s Sábuhagān (thus Boyce 1960, 132–33; Sundermann 1979, 97 n. 10), where Ûz says that she will “form” (dys’n) man (e V I 9; Andreas and Henning 1932, 193, new ed. in Hutter 1992, 81); in what follows we then find the well-known account. When Contra Manich. I.38 and III.5 has the demons forming man, it could therefore merely be because Titus was quoting a small part of a longer myth from his original sources. But this approach would conflict with Titus’s interest, which is to stress that Manichaeism consists of grotesque fables.—In Kēphalaia Ch. 55 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 133.4–137.11) and Ch. 56 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 137.12–144.12) it is also merely a question of Adam and Eve being “formed” (πλάσσειν) (for example, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 133.19, 137.16–17, 138.11.17), and of being “the formed” (πλάσμα) (for example, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 134.10, 137.18.22, 138.21); here neither cannibalism nor sexual intercourse are mentioned. In Kēphalaia Ch. 57 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 144.13–20) Adam is both “formed” (πλάσσειν) (for example, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 144.18) and “begotten” (νητό) (for example, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 144.19), but the latter in reality is not explained. Nor are cannibalism or intercourse mentioned in Kēphalaia Ch. 64 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 157.1–158.23).
than just their common teaching on the division of primordial space into four parts corresponding to north, east, west, and south.⁴⁰

The theory that this source might derive from Adda is attractive but also difficult to lend any more weight to. The source’s blurring of mythological names for tactical reasons could fit Adda’s task as a missionary, but one could also claim that such a blurring demands so powerful an acquaintance with Hellenistic Mediterranean culture that it is unlikely in so early a missionary from the Aramaic-speaking community in Mesopotamia. This observation is in turn uncertain, because we do not know anything about Adda’s background or his qualifications.⁴¹

In this context it is natural to take up a position on Baumstark’s theory that Titus of Bostra’s Manichaean source was originally written in Aramaic and is partially preserved in Sy.⁴² Admittedly it is not decisive for the validity of my proposal so far whether his theory is right or not, for one can also imagine an Aramaic-Manichaean text blurring the mythological names out of regard for an educated audience. However, it is not so easy to imagine as an original Greek-Manichaean text, and that is why Baumstark’s theory is not irrelevant. A position on Baumstark is also natural in continuation of Bennett’s arguments that Titus (and other writers) only used a Greek-Manichaean written source.

A final position and possibly a definitive rejection of the theory would require that every single one of Baumstark’s examples be

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⁴⁰ Perhaps the divergences between the versions in the non-Manichaean writers mean not only that they are internally independent of one another but also that they did not (in every case) use the same written source. It is striking, for example, that there is no trace in Titus of the marked feature from Severus’s version that the Kingdoms of Light and Darkness are designated as the Tree of Life and Death respectively. The theory that Theodoret and Titus used the same written source is encumbered with the difficulty that Theodoret himself states that Titus is one of his sources (see above pp. 137–38).—The subject of Theodoret’s sources in the section in question also deserves a new examination; Acta Arch. is evidently among them (Lieu 1988, 73; cf. Viciano 1992, 198 n. 2); it seems as though the arguments contained in Von Zittwitz’s (1873, 494–503, 521–26) theory that Acta Arch. (mainly the Turbo-account in Acta Arch. VII–XI, Beeson 1906, 9–19), Theodoret and John of Damascus (Dial. contra Manich.) used the same Manichaean source may be much better employed to show that Theodoret and John both used Acta Arch. and John also used Theodoret.

⁴¹ Bennett’s theory that Titus used a Greek-Manichaean written source with quotations from The Living Gospel could of course be developed into a theory that this written source was identical with Μόδιως, but caution is advised.

⁴² Baumstark 1931; see above p. 83.
tested. I have not done this, but I have examined a number of them and found that they are unconvincing; other observations and considerations point in the same direction. I am therefore very sceptical about the validity of Baumstark’s result.

Thus, we must note that when the translation of *Contra Manichaeos* I.12, *Sy* 9.6 employs a \( \text{νΔ} \), which indicates a quotation, at the beginning of one of Titus’s own arguments, it means that *Sy* has misunderstood the text and believed it to be a Manichaean quotation; such a misunderstanding is difficult to square with the theory that *Sy* had access to Titus’s allegedly Aramaic source!

One of the central passages in Baumstark’s argument is to be found in III.5 (Gr. 68.18–24; *Sy* 83.35–84.7 \( \rightarrow \) Ch. XI.33). According to Baumstark the Greek text contains a number of contradictions that do not appear in *Sy*.\(^{43}\) Thus according to Baumstark the Greek text has the archons sending down a power involuntarily and turning themselves into a formation that can outfox the souls. Baumstark was wrong, however, for the Greek text contains hardly a self-contradiction and makes good sense in relation to the generally known Manichaean myth.\(^{44}\) The construction καταπέμψας... ἐμόρφωσέν normally implies that καταπέμψας comes before ἐμόρφωσέν. We are thus dealing with two different events, and therefore there is no difficulty in the ‘sending down’ being ‘in consternation’ and ‘involuntarily’, whereas the ‘formation’ is an expression for a cunning intention.

The first event is described with the words τὴς γενομένης κινήσεως ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ φανέντος πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὴν λύτρωσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς θύρας πρῶτον ἀνοιγείσης ὑπ’ ἐκπλήξεως ἄκων καταπέμψας τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναμιν: here we learn that the Manichaean hypostasis or god who normally bears the name “the Third Messenger” reveals his figure, which the text apparently describes as though the door had been opened (presumably to the Kingdom of Light). This revelation is to be regarded as a divine trick, because the Messenger’s beauty arouses the sexual desire of the archons imprisoned on the firmament, so that they pollute and abort, and the semen and abortions contain part of the swallowed light (the soul), which is thereby released and falls down to the earth. It is clearly this that the text is referring to with its

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\(^{43}\) Baumstark 1931, 36–39.

\(^{44}\) See for example Polotsky 1935, 254–56 on these well-known myths about ‘the seduction of the archons’ and the creation of man.
mention of the power which the archons in consternation involuntarily sent down (i.e. to earth). The “movement” that is previously mentioned probably refers to the Messenger then setting in motion the Column of Glory and “the ships”, i.e. the sun and moon, with a view to them purifying the light particles that had now fallen to earth and leading them back to the Kingdom of Light.

The other parts of the text portray the second event: the Messenger’s success frightens the archons, who through the sexual act have come down to earth and as a counter-move form from their own, swallowed, demon children the human body, so that it resembles the figure of the Messenger. By resembling the Messenger the body “fits” the soul, so that it is deceived into remaining in the material world. Baumstark is of course right in noting the problem that the text does not distinguish between the archons who involuntarily sent power down to earth and their ‘descendants’, i.e. the archons who formed themselves and made a copy on earth; but this problem also exists elsewhere in reproductions of this myth.45

In the Greek text’s depiction of the creation of man Baumstark found yet another internal contradiction:

Jeder soll sich selbst als Seelenköter abgebildet haben, woraus sich ebenso viele Gebilde ergäben, als es eben Archonten der Hyle sind, und gleichwohl ist dann auf einmal von einem einzigen gemeinsamen Gebilde, Adam, die Rede. Wollte man hier ausgleichen, so müßten natürlich die Sonderabbilder der einzelnen Archonten das zeitlich Frühere sein und doch heißt, gerade Adam ausdrücklich ihr erstes Gebilde.46

But this contradiction can nevertheless be resolved, for the myth does distinguish between the demon children and the first human couple.

The other half of Baumstark’s argument—that Ἑρωδιακόν should contain a different text without the contradictions in question—does not hold either, unfortunately. The first apparent contradiction between the involuntary ‘sending down’ and the conscious ‘formation’ may just


46 Baumstark 1931, 37.
as well be said to exist in Sy: the words ęv ompiler ęl ęv oun ęc, “by their consternation which was not by their will” also refer to the archons and—as in the Greek text—deal presumably with the emission of the immanent power. Baumstark’s translation blurs the fact that the other apparent contradiction (between the archons forming themselves into many beings and the formation of a single copy) may equally be claimed to exist in Sy. For Baumstark translates ἡμῶν in Sy 84.5 as “seine Hypostase”, when it is much more likely that the word has a reflexive sense and merely translates the Greek ἑαυτὸν (Gr. 68.22).

The whole of Baumstark’s argument is thus unsound; he provides no convincing grounds for Sy not being at this point a translation from a Greek original, which of course does not exclude the possibility that at certain other points Sy may have preserved a more original form of the text.47

There are also grounds for caution when Baumstark points out in some instances that the Syriac text is clearer than the Greek, for this could be caused by the Syriac translator attempting to clarify his original, or quite simply because the Greek textual tradition, which is much younger than Sy, has been corrupted.48 In certain cases Baumstark has quite simply not understood the Manichaean meaning of the text, so that there is absolutely no question of the Greek text being unclear.49 On some points Baumstark does not

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47 This is true for example of ἡμῶν in Sy 84.5, which perhaps renders an original ἑαυτῶν or ἡμῶν ἐν ὑμῖν in Sy 84.6–7.

48 Both explanations are thus possible in relation to an example from Contra Manich. III.7 (i.e. a text which I refer to another of Titus’s sources than that used in Book I and in III.4–5), namely ἀρχήν ἀρχῶν in Gr. 69.10, which is rendered more clearly in Sy 84.31 (→ Ch. XI.34). However, Baumstark (1931, 31) exaggerates somewhat when he writes: “Die abgerissene Kürze des Griechischen wird hier eigentlich erst auf Grund der volleren syrischen Fassung recht verständlich.”

49 This is the case in another example from Contra Manich. III.7 where instead of the Greek text ἡ ἀγνοοῦντα λέγειν ἀνάγκη τὸν θεόν ἀγνοεῖ περιβεβληθῆς (Gr. 69.10–11), “or one must say that God was ignorant and endowed with ignorance”, in Sy 84.31–32 the text reads, ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐμαύθη μοι τῇ ἂν ἴσχι ἐγένετο, “or he did not know, and it is not likely that God is thrown under ignorance” (→ Ch. XI.34). This was one of the instances where Baumstark (1931, 39–41) claimed, “daß die Form der griechischen Zitate des Titus mitunter auf Korruptelen der aramäischen Vorlage beruht, welche der in die syrische Übersetzung eingebettete Wortlaut nicht aufweist”, and more specifically he thought that an omission of the negation ἐκ in Titus’s original would be sufficient to explain the Greek text. Baumstark was unaware therefore that the Greek text
realise that the Greek and the Syriac text give to the same extent excellent (Manichaean) meaning, so that it is impossible to choose between them.\textsuperscript{50} Baumstark’s results are occasionally shaken by the fact that he only relies on De Lagarde’s edition of the Greek text (1859), that is, the late manuscript $H$. When καὶ οὔποτε μὴ οὐχὶ πράγματα παρέχουσαν αὐτῷ (Gr. 1.13) is apparently translated by $S_{y}$ as $\infty \imath \lambdabeta \alpha \mu \nu \omega \rho \iota \nu \lambda \nu \alpha \nu \nu$ $\kappaappa \pi \tau \alpha \iota \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \alpha \iota \lambda \iota \omega \m ( \text{“and which never even ceases from harming him.”}, S_{y} 2.12–13), this is seen by Baumstark as an example of the expression (οὔποτε) being weaker in the Greek text, but sharper in the Syriac.\textsuperscript{51} Here, however $G+V$ read οὖπότε, which corresponds to $S_{y}$ (→ Ch. XI.1).

Finally, it must be added that whereas in connection with biblical quotations it is likely enough and a well-known practice from other contexts to use the text from the familiar translation (as Baumstark believed $S_{y}$ had done with the biblical quotations in Titus’s texts), the same can hardly be claimed for the Manichaean quotations, which from the translator’s point of view were derived from heretical books that he has not necessarily had access to and which have possibly not been so well-known among his readers that it was necessary to use the assumed original Aramaic version with which, according to Baumstark, they should already have been familiar.

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from a Manichaean point of view must give the best sense: in the Manichaean myth Darkness lacks foreknowledge—in contrast to the highest Manichaean God, the Father of Greatness (see for example Titus, Contra Manich. I.22, Gr. 13.6–9). In the present context the intention is to prove that “God” in Gen. 2–3 is the Prince of Darkness, but because there is a polemical attack on the Gen. text, the designation “God” must be maintained for the time being (cf. also that on the basis of 2 Cor. 4.4 the Manichaees could use the word “god” figuratively about the principle of evil: Titus, Contra Manich. IV.108, $S_{y}$ 183.26–184.6 [cf. Beck 1978, 47]; Contra Faust. XXI.1, Zycha 1891, 569.11–18; PsB II, 56.31ff.; cf. Wurst 1995, 119 n. 3).—The text of $S_{y}$ is thus not the original but a variant dependent on the Catholic point of view (cf. Nagel 1967, 18: “Dogmatisch bedingte Varianten”).
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\textsuperscript{50} In Contra Manich. III.7 the Greek text (Gr. 69.14) claims that it was to man’s advantage that he was obedient to the serpent’s advice, whereas $S_{y}$ 84.34–35 claims that it benefited man to disobey the Creator (→ Ch. XI.34). The texts say the same thing, but from different points of view. There is therefore no reason to agree with Baumstark (1931, 40) and assume that Titus's Greek text must be explained through the assumption that the negation $\setminus$ was omitted in his hypothetical Aramaic manuscript, while the Syriac translator used a manuscript in which the negation was preserved.—It is of course still possible, indeed probable, that Nagel (1967, 82; 1973, 296) is right to assume that $S_{y}$ reproduces a more original Greek text than $G$ and $V$.

\textsuperscript{51} Baumstark 1931, 28.
In so saying, I do not wish to suggest that there are not also good arguments in Baumstark’s article. Thus when he points out that Sy’s rendering of the Greek θηρίον in Gr. 9.23.34; 17.38 (partly → Ch. XI.8.12) with ζωον, “reptile”, in Sy 12.34; 13.11; 23.14 is “more original” (the Greek text refers to an “animal” that is held fast by an incantation), he is probably right. The wrong θηρίον must be because an Aramaic prototype has not been adequately understood, but Titus’s source may nonetheless be a Greek-Manichaean original that employed metaphors and mythology from an older Aramaic-Manichaean prototype. However, Baumstark’s further argument is untenable, when he claims that Titus’s Manichaean quotations must stem from an Aramaic original on the grounds that the translation θηρίον is explicable, if the original built on a manuscript that contained a variant reading from the manuscript that Sy has used, i.e. the variant ζωον, “serpent”, which in Titus’s original had been corrupted into ζωον, “living”. The argument is problematic, for (as Baumstark himself also hints) ζωον should probably rather be translated with ζωον, “living being”. The Syriac equivalent of ζωον, however, is ζωον.53

It is thus far from obvious that the Manichaean source that I believe can be distilled from behind Contra Manichaeos Book I + III.4–5 was originally composed in Aramaic. Since with its missionary goal the text sought in a superficial way to present Manichaeism as more philosophical than mythological by concealing the names of the individual divine hypostases and simplifying their number, it would suit a Greek-reading public best, even though this argument cannot be decisive. The missionary purpose of the Manichaean text is also clear, in that it apparently seeks to hide the offensive idea that man has been begotten by the demons. Despite the text’s attempt to hide the mythological stamp, it contains in reality a presentation of the Manichaean myth, beginning with the two principles and ending with eschatology, and it probably does not directly refer anywhere to biblical texts.—By virtue of the text’s link to the Manichaean mission, Adda would be a natural candidate for its authorship (cf.

52 Baumstark 1931, 30–31; Baumstark (1931, 41) convincingly refers to Ps. 58.5f. (LXX 57.5f.): θυμός αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑμισίν τοῦ ὀφέως, ὡσει ἀσπίδος κοφῆς καὶ βυσσίστις τὰ ὅτα αὐτῆς, ἥτις οὐκ εἰσακούσεται φωνὴν ἐπιθύμων φαρμάκου τε φαρμακευμένου παρὰ σοφῶν.

53 Cf. Baumstark 1931, 41.
point 1 above), but this is far too insecure a basis on which to claim anything about the author of the text.

The Manichaean text that Titus used in Book I + III.4–5 attempted to present Manichaecism as being precisely “rational” and “philosophical”. The text’s real interest, however, was to present the narrative sequence of the Manichaean myth, so it does not appear to focus on ethical questions, even though this impression may only be due to the fact that Titus did not need such passages for his refutation. In any case we must be aware that despite a certain determinist tendency the purpose of the Manichaens’ dualistic myth—notwithstanding Titus’s claim to the contrary—was to conclude with an ethical appeal.

4. Other Manichaean sources in Contra Manichaeos Book III–IV

The delimitation between a particular Manichaean text that Titus has used in I + III.4–5, and another text that has been used in III.7 raises the question of Titus’s Manichaean sources in the rest of Book III and in Book IV, i.e. all the material that ostensibly reproduces the Manichaens’ view of the biblical writings. Laying III.7 to one side for the moment—which I shall return for separate treatment—I shall instead focus on the other material. In some cases my accounts of this material will be somewhat summary, since readers can make use of the more comprehensive account in Ch. II.

It is important here to note that the portrait which Titus paints of Mani’s criticism of the Bible has a striking similarity to Marcion’s biblical criticism, as it is presented in particular by Tertullian. Thus Titus maintains that Mani did not deny that the events which the OT speaks of actually took place (III.4), but that he assigned the OT to the principle of evil and the NT to the good; however, the NT had become mingled with matter, so Mani himself had purged the NT of these passages (III.2; III.8; IV.1.12–13.33.44).54 In the NT Mani appears to have concerned himself only with the gospels and Paul’s epistles. Titus also states that Mani had predecessors, including Marcion (III.3; III.8; III.68; IV.12.33). All these views are

54 That Titus’s information here resembles Marcionism is also underlined by Fitschen (1992, 54 n. 146).
indeed very close to what has been passed on about Marcion.\textsuperscript{55} Titus, though, does not mention that according to Mani the Judaists stood behind the material interpolations, just as Marcion claimed; in general the presentation seems rather to suggest that against their will the gospel writers falsified the NT, because in certain places they were affected by their material nature.

Titus’s classification of Mani alongside previous heretics shows that he was aware of earlier heresiology, and it remains a possibility that his portrayal of Manichaeism is coloured by this knowledge. I have previously shown the likelihood that Titus knew Hippolytus’s \textit{Refutatio} and Hegemonius’s \textit{Acta Archelai}, but he seems hardly to have used the former, while \textit{Acta Archelai} does not contain much material on earlier heresies. Titus may have known other heresiological works, including vanished literature, as I suggest is the case with George of Laodicea’s anti-Manichaean work.\textsuperscript{56}

Not only must we consider whether Titus drew on earlier heresiology; occasionally it seems as though his information on the Manichaeans is no more than his own assumption. Indeed both possibilities seem sustainable in \textit{Contra Manichaeos} IV.35–36, where readers are in doubt as to whether by virtue of their hypothetical form the objections of the Manichaeans have not simply been constructed by Titus himself. Moreover, the interesting reference to the angels’ bodies in Gen. 18 as an analogy to Jesus’s body may have been drawn from earlier heresiology; it is well-known from the Marcionites, though it may of course also be Manichaean.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Von Harnack 1924 with further references.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. below pp. 417–19.

\textsuperscript{57} Tertullian, \textit{Adv. Marc.} III.9 (Evans 1972, 194–99) and \textit{De carne Christi} III.6–9 (Kroymann 1954, 876.35–878.3); Ephrem, \textit{Exp. Ev. conc.} XXI.3 (Leloir 1953, 312 [Armenian text], 223 [transl.]; Leloir 1966, 375 [French transl.]; McCarthy 1993, 318 [Engl. transl.] [the chapter is missing in the manuscript with the Syriac original edited by Leloir 1963; 1990]) (cf. Von Harnack 1924, 286\textsuperscript{*}). In \textit{Hom. cat.} V.8 (Tonneau 1949, 111) Theodore of Mopsuestia attacks the Marcionites, the Manichaeans, the supporters of Valentinus and the rest of the heretics for their docetic Christology; he writes that they claim that what Jesus bore in the world corresponds to the prophets’ vision or the form in which the three men appeared to Abraham.—But it is also possible that here Titus is actually drawing on genuine Manichaean sources; for in \textit{Contra Faust.} XXIX.1 it is possible that Faustus is also referring to Gen. 18 when he says that Jesus could very well have appeared to, and spoken to, people without ever having been born, since Faustus’s teachers have shown that angels have often appeared to and spoken to people. Is he thinking here of Adda/Adimantus?
do not cover all of Titus’s material in the last two books, however, because the presentation is so full of quotations and summaries, and Titus appears to be interested in building honestly on his sources.

The claim that the NT had been interpolated is also found among the North African Manichaeans, such as Faustus (for example *Contra Faustum* XXXII.1–2 and 7; XXXIII.3), although unlike Marcion the North Africans did not possess a NT that was cleansed of the ostensible interpolations, see *Confessiones* V.XI.21:

They asserted that the Scriptures of the NT had been tampered with by persons unknown, who wanted to insert the Jews’ law into the Christian faith. They were incapable of producing any uncorrupted copies.58

At first glance Titus gives the impression that he has been in possession of such a NT copy, for example when he speaks in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.33 of large lacunae in the text; in these cases Mani connected the surviving passages. On closer inspection, however, it seems that Titus could not have had access to such a NT; indeed it is unlikely that such a ‘purged’ Manichaean text ever existed. When Titus writes that Mani himself claims to have deleted large parts of the NT (*Contra Manichaeos* III.8; ed.N 300.12–13 → Ch. XI.35), we cannot assume that Titus possessed such a copy of the NT in which these elements had been removed; more likely Reitzenstein was right that Titus possessed only a book in which Mani first claimed to have removed parts of the NT, then gave examples of which elements ought to be excised and which should be retained—with an interpretation added to the latter. For already in III.8 Titus states that Mani wanted to use those parts of the NT that he had allowed to remain, because he believed they testified to the same things that he himself had said (ed.N 300.10–12), which suggests that Titus’s source was concerned with how the “remaining” passages in the NT should be interpreted. Titus’s formulation in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.45 (Sy 151.8) hints perhaps that Mt. 6.45 together with a particular Manichaean interpretation introduced the source that he used, which hardly fits any specimen of the gospel

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58 Transl. Chadwick 1991, 86.—“cum dicerent scripturas noui testamenti falsatas fuisset a nescio quibus, qui Iudaorum legem inserere christianae fidei uoluerunt, atque ipsi incorrupta exemplaria nulla proferrent.” (Verheijen 1981, 69); similarly in *De mor. ecl.* XXIX (61).
genre. Among other examples we find according to *Contra Manichaeos* IV.22 that when Mani not only rejected the birth narratives of Jesus, but also raised questions concerning the contradiction between Jesus’s Davidic descent from Joseph and his birth by a virgin, we are not dealing with a new gospel writing but with a text which argues. The same is doubtless true of the claim that the revelation of Christ was only an illusion, while the remark that Mani connected those passages that he allowed to remain may only mean that the text was arguing for a context between them (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.33). As we have seen, the quotation from Mt. 6.45 was linked to a dualistic interpretation (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.45) and the same was the case in connection with Lk. 6.43–45 (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.47). The quotations from Jn. 15.18–19 and 17.14 were used to legitimise accusations against the Creation (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.50).

In the Manichaean text which Titus used, Mani claimed to have removed the passages in the NT that referred to the God of the OT (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.12). He rejected the birth narratives (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.22) and also apparently the account of Jesus’s circumcision (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.33), as well as Jn. 1.14a (*Contra Manichaeos* IV.35). Only the beginning of Mt. 6.24 (“No man can serve two masters”) was quoted, while the continuation “You cannot serve both God and mammon” was passed over (*Sy* 151.8–12). In *Contra Manichaeos* IV.46 Titus writes that Mani deleted (תְּנַשֵּׁל, *Sy* 152.4) verses such as Jn. 1.3 and 1 Cor. 8.6, which show that there is only one principle, whereas he used Mt. 6.45 to show that there are two, although the verse deals with something quite different. The question is whether this “annihilation” means anything more than that Titus’s source omitted to mention Jn. 1.3 and 1 Cor. 8.6?

Was this work really from the pen of Mani himself? Here again we find the same lack of clarity as in the first two books: even though Titus often refers to “Mani”, he also talks about “the Manichaeans”. Now and again he speaks of questions that had been put to him, and here he might be referring to an oral source (for example *Contra Manichaeos* IV.57; IV.79; IV.85). In *Contra Manichaeos* IV.89 Titus claims that the Manichaeans invoke Mt. 20.16 and thus follow their master’s madness; does this mean that Titus knew of the application of the verse from both oral and written sources? It is also confusing when Titus states in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.87 that the Manichaeans refer to 1 Cor. 9.22 as a reason for being allowed to sacrifice during persecutions, whereas earlier, in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.11, he attributes
the same interpretation of 1 Cor. 9.22 (and 9.19) to Mani himself. The ambiguity is also revealed when Titus slips over from ‘Mani’ to ‘the Manichaeans’ in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.96, whereas in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.90; IV.97 and IV.106 he refers only to Manichaeans. In *Contra Manichaeos* IV.111 we hear that the Manichaeans invoke Gen. 1.2, as also other literature claims to be the case, but perhaps Titus’s subsequent formulations here are aimed at the difference between the Manichaeans and Mani, in which case the latter did not himself use this passage in the OT.

However, there are also summaries and quotations in Titus that must be understood as Mani-quotations. This is true above all of the quotation in the 1st person singular in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.86, which I suggested above was taken from *Acta Archelai*. But also the quotation in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.12 must be imagined as issuing from Mani:

“For I have come and been sent out to restore and <cleanse> the gospels because in them—even in those—is also (some) of the inter-mingling”, as he says, “of evil.” (Sy 134.28–29 → Ch. XI.45)

In *Contra Manichaeos* III.8 we gain the impression that Titus has been sitting with a self-aware prophet who has spoken in the 1st person singular:

But he says in his defence that he has not undertaken to excise most of the new covenant in vain. (ed.N 300.12–13 → Ch. XI.35).

Also the above-quoted passage from *Contra Manichaeos* IV.21 on the worship of several gods must be a Mani-quotations.

If we lay to one side the special question as to whether Titus did not just borrow the Mani-quotations in *Contra Manichaeos* IV.86 from Hegemonius, we can consider whether the other quotations were

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60 See above pp. 150–152.
already quotations in Titus’s source, if this was a text written by a Manichaean, for example Adda’s Μόδιος, as Reitzenstein believed. In favour of this theory one could say that Titus’s source was characterised by polemic against the Catholic canon and scriptural interpretation, and that it used the same ideas with roots in Marcionism that were widespread in North African Manichaeism, and moreover that it attacked in particular the doctrine of the incarnation. If Μόδιος was a kind of commentary on Mani’s Living Gospel, it could explain the direct Mani-quotations and also fit in with some of our information on the content of The Living Gospel. Even so, on this point Reitzenstein’s theory remains very insecure.

Finally it must be stated that there are three places where Titus formulates himself in such a way that we might believe that he really did possess some of Mani’s original works. The most important passage is in Contra Manichaeos III.9. At first Titus speaks more vaguely about the Manichaeans’ books, claiming that they are hiding them because a lie loves to conceal itself (ed.N 300.15–302.3), but then he turns to Mani’s Treasury (“his madness’s so-called Treasury”, τὸν ἱερὸν ἱλουργὴν τῆς μανίας ἰδιωσὺρων, ed.N 302.4–5) in a way that perhaps means that he himself was in possession of the work (ed.N 302.4–9). This Treasury could, as Nagel presumes, be Mani’s well-known Treasury of Life. But as mentioned previously a Manichaean work also existed with the title the Little Treasury, and we cannot exclude the possibility that Titus confused the two texts.

The two other passages are places where Titus speaks of Mani’s epistles and psalms. But here it is not clear whether Titus himself had access to this literature.

61 According to al-Bīrūnī’s Chronology of Ancient Nations VIII (Sachau 1879, 190), in The Living Gospel Mani claimed to be the Paraclete. However, Titus could also have found Mani’s claim to be the Paraclete in Acta Arch.

62 Titus has already expressed the same idea in a passage in Contra Manich. I.17 that is missing in the Greek text (Gr. 10.17), but which is preserved in Sy (cf. also Poirier and Sensal 1990, 32 n. 209): “For he has concealed his books and has placed them in darkness because he feared the refutation which would be (made) against them on the basis of [lit. from] them.” (Sy 13.32–34 → Ch. XI.9).—This might be a heresiological topos known from Hippolytus; cf. Vallée 1981, 53.

63 Nagel 1973, 302 n.

64 See above p. 178.

65 Thus in Contra Manich. III.1: “Like an apostle of Jesus Christ among those who are barbarians by kin he who is a barbarian both by kin and intelligence now and then sends his impiety (Gr. 67.15–17: ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ ἐκ ἀπόστολος ἦς ὁ χριστός ὁ βαρβάρος τὸ γένος ὁ βαρβάρος καὶ γένος καὶ γνώμην τὴν ἀσέβειαν ἐπιστέλλει); cf.
The conclusion must be that in the rest of Book III and all of Book IV Titus has used Manichaean sources that relate directly to the Bible, and it is my view that particularly in Book IV Titus uses a text that argued for the excision of certain passages in the gospels and Pauline epistles and the retention of others. His text contained interpretations of the retained passages in the Bible, polemic against the doctrine of the incarnation, and, if not written by Mani himself, at least quotations by him. Since the text was thus markedly polemical against Catholicism and used Marcionite ideas, it is this text above all among Titus’s Manichaean sources that could have been written by Adda.

It is debatable whether this source too was especially aimed at presenting Manichaeism as “rational”; moreover it must have been particularly well-suited to the mission among Catholics, but less so among pagans, even if there had been an interest in Christian traditions in pagan circles. On the other hand we must suppose that the consistently dualistic interpretation of the words of Jesus and Paul in the Manichaean sources was to result in an ascetic “separation” from the material, corporeal world, in other words a complex of ethical themes that was the complete opposite of what Titus expresses.

So far I have laid aside the source that is used in Contra Manichaeos III.7, apart from distinguishing it from the source that is used in Contra Manichaeos III.4–5. However, Contra Manichaeos III.7 contains an example of anti-Catholic, Manichaean polemic that originates from a number of value judgements and ideas that were also shared by contemporary, educated pagans and Catholics. For this very reason the polemic was an exceptional challenge to Titus, who responds with a comprehensive refutation.

Lieu 1988, 86; 1992, 88. In Contra Manich. IV.44, Sy 150.33–35 Titus mentions both Mani’s psalms and his epistles, which he claimed were long-winded. Titus may of course have found the introduction Μανιχαϊκὸς ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ to the epistles in Acta Arch. V.1 (VI) (Beeson 1906, 5.22.25), where, however, only one epistle is mentioned; besides it is a question of whether the introductions in Mani’s epistles have not been so well known that Titus can have received information about them orally.
5. The Manichaean criticism of the Creator God in Contra Manichaeos III.7

a. Introduction

I shall begin with a translation of the passage in Contra Manichaeos III.7 that deals with the Paradise narrative (Gr. 69.5–25/ed.N 296.1–298.6; in Nagel’s verse division III.7,1–9). It is important in the present work to gain a precise understanding of this text and its basis in the history of ideas in order to speak more principally about how the relation between certain “heretical” and “orthodox” interpretations of Gen. 2–3 should be regarded. On this background the aim is then to clarify what culturally-determined values and ideas Manichaeans and Catholics in this context felt themselves called to explain, as well as whether we can here uncover specific strategies in relation to the surrounding pagan society.

(1) He [i.e. Mani] thus also doubts why the whole world came into being, but as for man he strives to demonstrate that he is not God’s creature. (2) He [i.e. Mani] examines also other things foolishly: “In what way,” he says “has God given Adam a commandment?” (3) For one of two reasons: Either He knew that he would transgress, (and in that case) He not only gave the commandment in vain but was also responsible for it [i.e. the transgression], (4) or one must say that God was ignorant and was endowed with ignorance, so that the commandment was indeed given, but by (the principle of) evil as a plot against man, as he [i.e. Mani] believes, and by none other. (5) But it has been of the greatest benefit and has set man free when he followed the serpent’s advice, which he [i.e. Mani] claims was the angel of the good. (6) “For man was blind,” he says, “but when he had tasted the forbidden, he saw that he was naked, and he made use of the clothing that he found, and he learned to know good and evil.” (7) Thus he [i.e. man] has above all benefit from transgressing the order from the one who created him with guile. (8) “But how”, he says, “can it be fitting for God to say, ‘See, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil, and now, lest he ever stretch out his hand to take from the Tree of Life and eat and live forever!’?” (9) “For,” he says, “if it is possible to take away immortality, then He is jealous (φιλόσπορος) who expels the man from Paradise and excludes him from sharing the Tree of Life, from which the participant could forever possess immortality.” (→ Ch. XI.34)

In III.7,10–15 Titus enumerates other blasphemies against the OT in the Manichaean text (Cain and Abel, the Flood, Sodom, the patriarchs’ polygamy, the ten plagues of Egypt, the theft of the Egyptians’ jewels, the fire on the mountain and Moses).
In III.7,1 Titus claims that Mani doubts (Ἐπαπορῶν) why the world has come into being; ἐπαπορέω means “raise a new doubt or question”. It is this question which in III.10,1 Titus calls the first of the aporiae (πρώτη γὰρ τῶν ἐπαπορήσεων αὐτῆς, ed.N 302.11). Titus thus presents Mani as one who doubts or questions. Such a “sceptical Mani” is not a common understanding of him, as we know from the fragments of Mani’s own writings or from the other Manichaean literature, in which Mani is rather the omniscient revealer.

Assuming that Titus’s source really has raised sceptical questions, however, we can imagine that their purpose was to undermine the world-picture of the orthodox and thus clear the way for another cosmology that was not to fall foul of sceptical questions itself. The relationship between criticism and revelation in Manichaeism may be understood in this way, and as we shall also see, there is a parallel with Augustine’s path into Manichaeism, as he himself depicts it in Confessiones III. Titus is also aware that the questions stem from a prejudice when in Contra Manichaeos III.29,13 he explains that Mani is a φιλαίτιςος, one who loves to make accusations.

Titus formulates it in such a way that the question of why the world came into being occurs as a summary of the previous presentation in III.4–6; in these chapters, however, Titus has only been concerned with the Manichaean claim that man is not God’s creature. We must in reality therefore return to Books I–II to find a presentation of “the first aporia”. It is thus only the remark that Mani strives to show that man is not God’s creature that summarises III.4–6. The formulations also show that Titus knows all about the finer nuances in the Manichaean myth; while man is created by the archons of matter, the world is created by the good God as a necessary evil in that the already mingled mass of good light and evil matter had been organised so that the light could gradually be freed from the matter. The world is thus a rather ambiguous quantity, for although it is created or formed by God, it is not an expression of what He Himself could have wished. From Titus’s view of the world and God the Manichaean standpoint is offensive.

66 Liddell, Scott and Jones 1968, 610a.
67 The ambiguity in the Manichaens’ understanding of the created world is admirably illustrated in Titus’s summary in I.17: the universe is created from a mingling of the power from the good and from matter (Gr. 9.25–27), “manifestly by the good one, for the evil does not concern itself with the genesis of the world.”
Since III.7,1 is merely a summary of the content of Books I–II and Book III.4–6 respectively, it is not until the passage from III.7,2 that Titus brings what he himself states are direct quotations. Perhaps these quotations are in reality interwoven with his summary of the source, but it is also conceivable that the whole passage is a single direct quotation in which he only adds remarks such as φησίν, ὡς οἶεται, φησί.68

In III.7,2 Titus begins by saying that Mani “examines” or “discusses” (κινεῖ) foolishly, and in this way Titus again depicts Mani as a curious philosopher. However, this picture has a factual justification, for as I will attempt to show, the question of whether God knows the future, and whether He contains φθόνος has philosophical roots. In III.7,2–9 it is claimed that (I) God was (a) ignorant, because He did not know beforehand that man would violate the prohibition, and (b) jealous, because He banished man from Paradise and the Tree of Life; it is further claimed that in this connection (II) the serpent was the angel of the good, and (III) that the violation was a liberation, because man (a) saw that he was naked, and (b) knew good and evil. On the basis of God’s ignorance the text moreover concludes that this God was evil, and that the prohibition was a plot against man.69 Thus Titus’s source evaluates nearly all the figures

68 In favour of the text being Titus’s summary rather than a direct quotation could be the stylistic feature that Titus appears to favour the phrase διὸν γὰρ θέτερον (III.7,3; Gr. 69.8) = διὸν γὰρ θέτερον in Sy 84.29; thus it is repeated in I.18, Gr. 10.36; I.29, Gr. 18.22 and in IV.102, Sy 180.8. However, this one single feature is insufficient to claim that Titus is summarising instead of quoting direct. For the expression is quite common; cf. for example διὸν θέτερον in Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. VI.27, Reischl 1848, 192.

69 I do not think it possible to understand both alternatives in the texts as merely hypothetical, as Baur proposed (see above p. 76); the text develops to such a breadth on the second alternative that it is clear that it decides in favour of it.
and events differently than is the case in the traditional, Catholic exposition of the Paradise narrative; only the text still appears to value the actual Garden of Eden with the Tree of Life positively.

b. Discussion of the non-Catholic polemical interpretations of the OT

*Contra Manichaeos* III.7,2–9 is closely related to a number of other “heretical” Gnostic texts which—in comparison with “orthodox” or Catholic Christian exegesis—also reevaluate a range of figures and events in the Paradise narrative. These texts exist partly in several Nag Hammadi tractates, partly in the heresiologists’ reproduction, and they also contain value reversals of other OT texts, partly corresponding to the content of Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos* III.7,10–15. Moreover, occasionally there are such value reversals of the Paradise narrative in the original Manichaean literature, though it must be emphasised that there are no such exact parallels to III.7,2–9 as are to be found in certain Nag Hammadi tractates.

It is thus natural to interpret *Contra Manichaeos* III.7,2–9 in the context of these related texts, and since they have been the subject of much discussion, it will be necessary by way of introduction to draw out some important positions from the history of scholarship beginning with Hans Jonas, who treated the Gnostic and Manichaean texts which revaluate large parts of the Paradise narrative under the heading, “Gnostische Allegorie”. As his first point Jonas claimed that we are dealing with a particular type of interpretation, which he characterised as an aggressive-polemical “Umkehrung”. Jonas believed that the Gnostics used allegory as a conventional method, but that from the inside they destroyed the conservative purpose that had been its intention. For instance, the purpose of the Stoics’ allegorical interpretations had been that mythological content was blurred in favour of the philosophical ideas, but that the formal value-structure which the mythological figures occupied in relation to each other should simultaneously be maintained, and in this way they could continue to pretend to be in agreement with the original intention of the myth. In relation to a rational criticism of mythology they were thus pretending to “save” the myth, while at the same time sanctioning their own rational cognition by the “ancient” wisdom that they had themselves projected onto the myth. Although Jonas thus regarded allegory as a usurpation of myth, he nevertheless thought that on a more fundamental, ontological level the original
myths and their allegorical interpretations in fact shared a common view of the world, by which he presumably was thinking of an “immanent”, affirmative attitude. The “Gnostic allegory” on the other hand sought to demonstrate an opposition to the tradition and to reevaluate the significance of the individual figures in the myths, and its real point and deeper principle was quite simply paradox, and in a way blasphemy. In reality it was no longer a question of an allegory, i.e. a distanced, literary treatment of the mythological original, but of a new mythological course in which the ruling cosmic gods were dethroned and new non-cosmic gods installed. Precisely because the Gnostic allegory in reality created new myths, it was furthermore possible for the original to be forgotten and thus for the reinterpretation to live on as an independent myth; in Jonas’s opinion this was the case with a Manichaean myth about Adam which is preserved in some of the excerpts in the Nestorian writer Theodore bar Kônai’s Liber Scholiorum. In Theodore’s Manichaean excerpts, which are generally taken to be written by Mani himself, the serpent had, according to Jonas, been replaced by Jesus and there is no longer an allusion to any source in Gen. Here it has doubtless already been forgotten how this type of myth came into being.70

It is also important to draw attention to an article by Nagel from 1980 which points out that the Gnostic texts also contain other interpretative methods and tendencies than the polemical in relation to the OT. The recurrent feature of Jonas’s aggressive-polemical type of interpretation is not a particular method of interpretation, according to Nagel, but a particular tendency, and in connection with the Paradise narrative this tendency is only in evidence in four Nag Hammadi tractates (Testimonium veritatis [NHC IX,3]; Hypostasis Archonton [NHC II,4]; De origine mundi [NHC II,5] and Apocryphon Johannis [this important text exists in two versions: the short version is in BG 8502,2 and NHC III,1, while the long version is in NHC II,1 and NHC IV,1]).71 The polemical type of interpretation can be further

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71 Nagel’s analysis also includes other texts, heresiological and Manichaean, but for the sake of clarity I mention only the Nag Hammadi texts at this point.—I refer in the present work to the edition of Test. ver. in Pearson 1981 and to the
divided into three sub-groups: 1) The openly scornful rejection of figures and events in the OT (*Testimonium veritatis*). 2) Expositions which by making the figures and events change roles and functions contradict the meaning claimed by the texts themselves (*Hypostasis Archonton; De origine mundi*). 3) A corrective exegesis in close affiliation with 2), which, however, involves direct criticism of the words of Scripture (*Apocryphon Johannis*). According to Nagel, despite the differences among the aggressive-polemical interpretations there is a constant that unites them, namely the positive value reversal of the Tree of Knowledge: all the texts make it the decisive event in the history of salvation that man ate of this Tree. The evaluation of the serpent on the other hand is variable; although its role as the one who saves man by persuading him to eat of the Tree is necessary, the texts do not agree on the extent to which the one who had this role was the serpent. The value reversal of the Tree of Knowledge is similarly the distinctive mark that separates the aggressive-polemical type of interpretation from a different type found in other Gnostic texts, and which Nagel designates as the aetiological or typological interpretation of the OT. Within this latter type, which Nagel believes to be strongly Christian influenced, it was a disaster that man ate of the Tree of Knowledge, while the Tree of Life is evaluated positively.

Finally I shall outline Michael Allen Williams’ view of these allegedly “aggressive-polemical value reversals” or “protest exegeses” that

editions of *Hyp. Arch.* and *De or. mund.* in respectively Layton 1989 and 1989a. *Apocr. Joh.* in BG 8502,2 is edited in Till 1955. *Apocr. Joh.* in NHC II,1; III,1 and IV,1 is edited in Krause and Labib 1962, and *Apocr. Joh.* in NHC II,1 also in Giversen 1963. A synopsis of *Apocr. Joh.* in NHC II,1; III,1; IV,1 and BG 8502,2 now exists in Waldstein and Wisse 1995, which also includes new readings; in the following I also refer to the pagination of double pages and lines in this synopsis.—*Test. ver.* dates presumably from the period 180–312/13, most likely from the middle of the 3rd cent., and was originally in Greek (Koschorke 1978, 91 n. 1, 109; Koschorke 1978a, 96); it must also be mentioned that Pearson assumes that the relevant passage in the present context, *Test. ver.* 43.23–49.28, constitutes an older, perhaps pre-Christian, source, which together with *Hyp. Arch.* and *De or. mund.* should be derived from a common archetype (Pearson 1972, 469; 1981, 106, 138).—The dating of *Apocr. Joh.* is debatable; Waldstein and Wisse 1995, 1, 7–8 believe that the short version was written in Greek at the beginning of the 3rd cent., while the long version dates from a redaction later in the same century.

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73 Nagel 1980, 61–64.
74 The designation “protest exegesis” was created by Kurt Rudolph (1967; 1980, 313–15) for the ostensibly polemical expositions which he sought with the aid of a Weberian theory to explain as a protest from the declasse, powerless scribal cir-
characterise interpretations of the Paradise narrative and other narratives in the OT as presented in his *Rethinking “Gnosticism”* from 1996. Williams notes that within the group of “Gnostic” texts that are claimed in particular to contain value reversals, no systematic revaluation as such ever takes place, only totally selective adjustments, transpositions and reworkings of the original narrative. A number of subjects are not revaluated at all. It follows that the point of these texts is not, as Jonas maintained according to Williams, to turn the meaning of the text upside down; we are not dealing with “reversal as the principle, reversal as protest, and so on”, but rather with a selective reversal. Moreover Williams claims that in those passages where the Gnostic texts “revaluate” in relation to the tradition, it is nearly always a question of passages in the OT that have already long ago in the Jewish tradition been regarded as “problems”. These were passages which, probably as a result of influences from Hellenistic, philosophical ideas of divine transcendence, had come to be regarded as offensive or unworthy, for example the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms or the prohibition against acquiring knowledge of good and evil—for knowledge of the good was central to philosophy. There is sufficient testimony that these passages were also a problem for the Catholic Christian writers in the 2nd century. It is thus Williams’ view that the “revaluations” in the Nag Hammadi tractates must only be understood as an attempt at a “hermeneutical problem-solving”, a different attempt, for example, than Origen’s allegorical interpretations.

Let me now quote a passage from the Nag Hammadi text called *Testimonium veritatis* 47.13–48.15 that has been seen as a typical example of “protest exegesis”:

But what sort is this God? First [he] envied Adam that he should eat from the tree of knowledge. And secondly he said, ‘Adam, where are you?’ And God does not have foreknowledge, that is, since he did not know this from the beginning. [And] afterwards he said, ‘Let us cast him [out] of this place, lest he eat of the Tree of Life and live for ever.’ Surely he has shown himself to be a malicious envier. And what kind of a God is this? For great is the blindness of those who read,

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75 Williams 1996, 60–63 (quotation 63).
76 Williams 1996, 63–76.
and they did not know it. And he said, ‘I am the jealous God; I will bring the sins of the fathers upon the children until three (and) four generations.’ And he said, ‘I will make their heart thick, and I will cause their mind to become blind, that they might not know nor comprehend the things that are said.’ But these things he has said to those who believe in him [and] serve him!77

In Williams’ opinion it is not a question of the writer’s interest here being to revaluate the meaning of the texts, but rather to retain certain fundamental values, such as the value of intellectual insight and a concept of God that does not involve ignorance, jealousy and vindictiveness. The problem is that taken literally the text contradicts these values, and the writer’s solution is to persist in a literal understanding on these points, but (in the following, though not quoted here) to allegorise the serpent as a Christ-typos. The writer’s purpose is one of edification. If the text contains a protest, it is only a protest against identifying the deity that is depicted in the problematic passages with the true divinity.78

There is no doubt in my view that Williams is right that the formation of the Gnostics’ new myths, which were based on, for example, Gen. 1–3 often takes its origin in the fact that by virtue of presuppositions stemming from Hellenistic philosophy this text was regarded as offensive. Nevertheless Williams distorts the picture when he maintains that what is at stake in the texts that “revaluate” some of the subjects in the OT can merely be placed on the same footing as, for example Philo’s and Origen’s allegories. He is right that in the same way as the Jewish and Catholic Christian writers, these Gnostics wished to solve the problem of the offensive passages in the OT, and he is also correct in claiming that they share substan-

77 Ουκ ἐνίην ἦτοι τι πεντευτεριτορίνη, ἡ ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυν ζησυ

78 Williams 1996, 75–79.
tially the same presuppositions derived from the philosophically influenced idea of God and the problem of theodicy. The designation “hermeneutical problem-solving” is not wrong, yet it does not involve so very much, since the crucial point is that the problems could be solved in fundamentally different ways. Jonas is right to assert that there is a conservative interest to be traced in the traditional allegories of Antiquity, namely a wish to be able to pretend that they were reproducing the innate meaning of the myth. It was important that one could feel oneself to be in accordance with the tradition.\footnote{Williams presents a somewhat unfair summary of Jonas’s view of the traditional allegorizing: “Jonas insisted that in spite of the huge liberties for which most ancient allegorical interpreters of myth and Scripture are deservedly famous, in spite of their seemingly arbitrary manipulations of the tradition, nevertheless the aim was to rescue the central truths and values of the tradition of which the allegorist was still respectful” (Williams 1996, 54–55). The summary is of course not quite fair, for it was clearly Jonas’s opinion that the traditional allegorists only pretended to reproduce the myths’ own meaning; on the other hand it was on a different level that he also believed that myth and allegorist shared a world view.} In the Gnostic texts that we are dealing with here, there is no pretence of actually being in accordance with the whole tradition; parts of the OT are “demiurgic”.\footnote{But it is clear that these groups feel themselves in agreement with another tradition which presumably also goes back to primeval times, namely the tradition of the highest God, for example Seth’s tradition.—Nagel 1980, 50 stresses that the Gnostics never claimed that events in Gen. 2–3 were humbug or “unhistorical”; their problem was how these events were to be interpreted.} There really is aggression, polemic and protest, and protest not only against a different interpretation, but also against other interpreters, i.e. the Christians and possibly the Jewish groups that would not accept these Gnostic interpretations. This is explicit in Testimonium veritatis, where we read of “the blindness of those who read” (48.2–4) or “those who believe in him (i.e. the demiurge, NAP) [and] serve him” (48.13–15). This vehement aggression is also manifest in the “blasphemy litany” in Tractatus secundus Magni Seth (NHC VII,2) 62.27–65.2, where it becomes clear that in this polemical tradition there are tendencies that could lead not only to a partial, but also to a complete rejection of the OT as Holy Scripture.\footnote{Thus Bethge 1980, 104–6.—I refer here to the edition in Pearson 1996.} However, this difference between a traditional Catholic and a polemical heretic view of the OT seems to originate in a deeper, more fundamental difference: thus there is a correspondence between the Jews’ and the Catholic Christians’ conservative
attitude to the tradition and their theodicies, their view of the Creator and the world, and a correspondence between the anti-cosmic Gnostics’ rejection of part of the tradition and their rejection of the Creator.

As mentioned Nagel has shown that the four Nag Hammadi tracts, *Testimonium veritatis*, *Hypostasis Archonton*, *De origine mundi* and *Apocryphon Johannes* together with different heresiological accounts share the fundamental common feature that they reevaluate the eating of the Tree of Knowledge positively, so that this becomes the fundamental event in the history of salvation. Williams derives this positive evaluation from the philosophy’s appreciation of knowledge. However, if particular philosophical presuppositions are an adequate explanation of Gnostic value reversals, it becomes impossible to understand why Catholic writers who clearly shared the same assumptions nevertheless failed to reach the same value reversals in their interpretations as the Gnostic writers. For example it is clear enough that a group of Catholic writers agreed that “knowledge of good and evil” is valuable and good, yet they did not interpret Adam and Eve’s disobedience as a deliverance; their “solution” was that eating from the Tree was prohibited because Adam and Eve were not yet ready to receive the valuable Knowledge. In this way they maintain that the disobedience was a fall.82

It thus seems as though behind the different interpretations there lies a deeper, more fundamental presupposition than merely a positive philosophical appreciation of the knowledge of good and evil. The solution to the problem is determined by deep-lying, different convictions, which in a sense could be called different “confessions”. The vastly dissimilar doctrines on God in relation to the world are hardly derived from the interpretation of these texts, but are rather the principle that conditions this interpretation.

The following examination will also involve the view that the polemical interpretations of the Paradise narrative have as their context value judgements of philosophical origin in Graeco-Roman cul-

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82 E.g. Theophilus claims in *Ad Autol*. II.25 that the Tree of Knowledge and its fruit were good, but that man ate of the tree too early; it was thus the disobedience that was evil (Grant 1970, 66, 68); correspondingly in the *Hymni de parad. XV* Ephrem praises the Tree of Knowledge, but nonetheless claims that Adam ate its fruit too early and in sin (esp. stanzas 2–3 and 5–9; Beck 1957b, 62–64; transl. Beck 1957c, 57–59). Cf. also *Diogn*. 12.2–8. Other examples in Alexandre 1988, 255. Cf. below pp. 332–33.
I would nonetheless question whether these value judgements are sufficient explanation for the character of the interpretations. The context of these value judgements can provide a partial explanation, however, and here it is particularly interesting that this context, in connection with the polemical character of these texts, suggests that they derive from groups who sought to distance themselves from traditionalist Christianity and possibly Judaism while at the same time wishing to show their concord with educated culture.

I shall now attempt to place Contra Manichaeos III.7 in a more detailed relation to possible philosophical assumptions, to related non-Catholic interpretations of Gen. which also contribute to a clarification of the question of Titus’s Manichaean sources, as well as to Emperor Julian’s related polemic against “the Galileans”, which is moreover of interest because of the pagan “renaissance” in the province of Arabia during his reign.

c. The philosophical and Marcionite background for the idea of the Creator’s ignorance

In Contra Manichaeos III.7,2–4 a disjunction is established: either God knew beforehand that man would transgress His prohibition, or He did not. The consequences of these two positions are then drawn: if He knew, then the prohibition was not given seriously, and God Himself was responsible for the transgression. Here it is not clear whether the idea is that God’s foreknowledge means that man’s action was predetermined, or that God was responsible because He did not prevent an event that He knew in advance would happen. The second possibility, and one with which the writer aligns himself, is that God did not know that man would violate the commandment; God is therefore evil, and the prohibition was a plot against man. Here the text operates with two implied premises, namely that the real God must have knowledge of the future, and that “knowledge of good and evil” is a good thing; thus whoever forbids man from acquiring this knowledge is evil.

The argument is clumsily organised; the writer ought to have divided it in two. The explanation may be that he has brought together two lines of thought. On the one hand he has taken over an argument that is known from the Marcionites, which presumed that it was a misfortune for man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge and concluded that the God of Gen. lacked goodness, foreknowl-
edge and power, since He did not prevent the catastrophe. Also this argument was structured as a disjunction, and this fact also suggests that the argument in *Contra Manichaeos* is taken from the Marcionite one. On the other hand the author of Titus’s text has also taken over the argument that since knowledge of good and evil is positive, whoever forbade man to acquire this knowledge must be evil, whereas whoever helped man to acquire the knowledge must have been good; as mentioned above, this argument had already long been used in certain Gnostic interpretations of Gen. 2–3.

The two most important testimonies that the Marcionites argued in this way are to be found in Tertullian’s *Adv. Marcionem* II.5,1–2 and IV.41,1. As has often been noted, their argument is based on Epicurus’s proof that there is no divine Providence in the world, 

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83 *Adv. Marc.* II.5,1–2 (Evans 1972, 96, 98): “Iam hinc ad quaestiones omnes, o canes, quos foras apostolus expellit, latrantes in deum veritatis. Haec sunt argumentationum ossa, quae obroditis. Si deus bonus et praescius futuri et avertendi mali potens, cur hominem, et quidem imaginem et similitudinem suam, immo et substantiam suam, per animas scilicet censuram, passus est labi de obsequio legis in mortem circumventum a diabolo? Si enim et bonus, qui evenire tale quid nollet, et praescius, qui eventurum non ignoraret, et potens, qui depellere valeret, nullo modo evenisset quod sub his tribus conditionibus divinae maiestatis evenire non posset. Quod si evenit, absolutum est e contrario deum neque bonum credendum neque praescium neque potentem; siquidem in quantum nihil tale evenisset, si talis deus, id est bonus et praescius et potens, in tantum ideo evenit quia non talis deus.”—*Adv. Marc.* IV.41,1 (Evans 1972a, 496): “noli iam de creatori circa Adam retractare quae in tuum quoque deum retorquentur; aut ignorasse illum, qui non ex providentia obstitit peccatum, aut ob obstipserit non potuisse si ignorabat, aut noluisse si et sciebat et poterat; atque ita malitiosum judicandum, qui passus sit hominem suum ex delicto perire.” Cf. also *Adv. Marc.* I.22,8–9; II.6,1; IV.38,1–2.

84 Lactantius, *De ira Dei* 13,20–21 (102–11): “20. Quod si deus ratio uera est, quam Stoici nullo modo uidere potuerunt, dissoluitur etiam argumentum Epicuri. Deus, inquit, aut uult tollere mala et non potest, aut potest et non uult, aut neque uult tollere mala et non potest, aut et uult et potest. 21. Si uult et non potest, inbecillus est, quod in deum non cadit; si potest et non uult, inuidus, quod aque alienum est a deo; si neque uult neque potest, et inuidus et inbecillus est ideoque nec deus; si et uult et potest, quod solum deo conuenit, unde ergo sunt mala aut cur illa non tollit?” (Ingremeau 1982, 158, 160). See the references in Pease 1968a, 1222 on the question of Lactantius’s sources.—Cf. Sextus Empiricus’s *Hyp.* III.9–11 [Mutschmann 1958, 135–36 [121.12–29]]: ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πάντων προνοεῖ, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ὁρὰ πάντων προνοεῖν λεγῆσθαι ὁ θεός, εἰ δὲ τινὸς προνοεῖ, διὰ τὸ τῶν μὲν προνοεῖ, τῶν δὲ οὐ· ἢτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μὲν, οὐ δύναται δὲ, ἢ δύναται μὲν, οὐ βούλεται δὲ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν καὶ ἱππόλετο καὶ ἱδυνάτο, πάντων ἄν προνοεῖ· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ὁρὰ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μὲν, οὐ δύναται δὲ, ἀσθενεστέρος ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας δι’ ἢν οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὁν ὁ προνοεῖ· ἐστὶ δὲ παρά
proof that was generally known at the time and also often used against its original intention.85 Von Harnack believed that Tertullian had found the argument in Marcion’s Antitheses;86 this is, as Quispel shows, rather uncertain,87 but in my opinion Quispel’s own attempt to prove that Tertullian’s source was Theophilus’s lost writing Adversus Marcionem (see Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica IV.24), is not successful either.88 I would similarly reject the theory that Tertullian himself

83 As examples of Christian literature where this proof is used mention can be made of Minucius Felix, Octavius 12.2; Pseudo-Clement, Rec. II.54 (cf. Gronau 1922, 31). Titus himself uses elements of the proof against the Manichaeans’ eschatology in I.40 (Gr. 24.31–25.1) (cf. even the remark οὕτω γὰρ ὀσθενεῖς ἐκκυμάτζετο οὕτωθεν φύσιν κατείχετο in Hom. in Luc. 10.211, Sickenberger 1901, 194). Also John of Caesarea employed this argument against the Manichaeans (Disp. 27 [1325C–D], ed. Aubineau in Richard 1977, 121; cf. Klein 1991, 72–73, 129). References to pagan writers are found in Gronau 1922, 29–30 n. 1 and Pease 1968a, 1222–23. In De nat. deor. Cicero for example makes C. Cotta, who represents the Sceptical Academy, use related arguments against the Stoic teaching on Providence. The Stoics believed that God had given man reason and thus the possibility of acting freely; man himself, therefore, and not God, was responsible for what was ethically evil, which for the Stoics was the only real evil (see Pohlenz 1948, 100–1; Pohlenz 1949, 57–58).

However, on the assumption that reason is the gift of the gods, Cotta (De nat. deor. III.25ff. [65ff.]) maintains that since the gift is chiefly used for evil deeds, it would have been better that man had never received it; particularly in III.31 (76ff.) Cotta makes it clear that the gods ought to have known beforehand that man would misuse the gift. Cf. the notes in Pease 1968a, 1141ff. In III.39 (92) Cotta even applies an argument that seems to be based on Epicurus’s; see on this Pease 1968a, 1222–23. The discussion of theodicy in Antiquity of course forms the background for Leibniz’s Théodicée; see the references in Gronau 1922, 29 n. 1.

86 Von Harnack 1924, 77–80, 88, 105–6, 269*–70*, 271*–72*.

87 Quispel 1943, 83–84.

88 Quispel believed that the source of Tertullian’s Adv. Marc. II was Theophilus’s Adv. Marc., an argument he adduced by comparing particular lines of thought in Book II with Theophilus’s preserved Ad Autol. (Quispel 1943, 34–55); as Quispel was aware (1943, 51), the similarities that he found between the texts constituted only a “possibility”. Secondly, Quispel saw particular similarities between Adv. Marc. II.5–6 and Irenaeus’s Adv. haer. IV.37–39 (Quispel 1943, 46–50), without claiming, however, that Adv. haer. could be Tertullian’s source (Quispel 1943, 52–54). Quispel then accepted Loofs’s theory that in Adv. haer. IV.37–39 Irenaeus used a particular source that Loofs referred to with the letters IQT, which was identical with Theophilus’s Adv. Marc. (Quispel 1943, 50; cf. Loofs 1930, 24ff.), and Quispel could therefore assume that this writing had been the source for both Irenaeus and Tertullian (Quispel 1943, 51–52). This must be regarded as Quispel’s main argument, but it is untenable. For Quispel (1943, 53–54) emphasises that Adv. Marc. II.5
construed the argument on the basis of individual and unconnected Marcionite views,\footnote{This possibility was suggested by Naumann (1934, 337–38; cf. Mühlengberg 1979, 106–7), who thought that the proof was formulated by Tertullian himself with the aim of both making the individual points in his opponents’ argument clearer, and establishing a division of points that Tertullian himself could draw on in his refutation of these objections. Naumann stated that the philosophical proof must have been well-known to Tertullian from his rhetorical activity, and that Tertullian himself used the proof in a number of passages.—It is true that Tertullian often uses the Epicurean-Sceptical proof for his own purpose (thus in \textit{Adv. Marc.} I.11.6–7; I.17.4; I.22; IV.41.1; V.29.4; \textit{Adv. Hermog.} 10.2–3; cf. also \textit{Adv. Hermog.} 14; 16; \textit{De carne Chr.} III.1; \textit{Adv. Prax.} 10.9; cf. Gronau 1922, 30 n. 1; Naumann 1934, 338 n. 3; Meijering 1977, 37–38). This usage is, of course, as Naumann assumed, yet more testimony to how widespread the original Epicurean proof was at the time, but it cannot determine whether the Marcionites also used it.—I do not think that the remark in \textit{Adv. Marc.} II.5.1—that man is not just the Creator’s “image and likeness” but actually His “substantia” by virtue of his possession of a soul—which is developed and refuted in II.9 has been inserted into the original proof by Tertullian. On the basis of Tertullian’s \textit{De an.} (3.4; 4; 11.2; 22.1–2; 24.2) Quispel (1943, 103) thought that Tertullian was in reality attacking Hermogenes; Waszink (1947, 7*-14*; see also 180–200), who has reconstructed Hermogenes’s teaching on the soul, has moreover shown that Tertullian’s response in \textit{Adv. Marc.} II.9 directly refers to his lost writing against Hermogenes’s \textit{De censu animae}. I nevertheless believe that we are dealing with a Marcionite teaching in \textit{Adv. Marc.} II.5 and II.9: thus as Waszink reconstructs Hermogenes’s argument, this does not correspond to the teaching that Tertullian attributes to the Marcionites; in Tertullian’s actual reproduction of the Marcionites’ teaching in II.9,1 there is furthermore no question of πνοή (Gen. 2.7a)} for in \textit{Adversus Marciomen} I.22 and IV.41,1 Tertullian states that he is using the Marcionites’ own proof against themselves. Tertullian would not have formulated it in this way unless he had

deals with God’s goodness, omnipotence and foreknowledge, just as \textit{Adv. haer.} IV.38,8 deals with God’s power, wisdom and goodness, but the argument from these three attributes comes from the Epicurean proof which as mentioned was common knowledge at the time, a point which Quispel overlooked; this similarity does not therefore imply that Irenaeus and Tertullian had the same source (cf. for example also Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} V.4.1; cf. Meijering 1975, 35–36).—Furthermore, there is some disagreement on the correctness of Loofs’s theory: Hitchcock 1937 wished to reject it out of hand; however, his argument (1937, 138–39) that Irenaeus did not use a particular source in \textit{Adv. haer.} IV.38, is not conclusive; cf. Widmann 1957, 163 n. 2, 165. Some scholars recognise that Loofs succeeded in distinguishing a particular source IQT in Irenaeus, but they doubt that IQT was Theophilus’s \textit{Adv. Marc.} (see the references in Kretschmar 1956, 27 n. 3; cf. Widmann 1957). In this context it must be noted that it was not Loofs but Bousset who originally claimed that \textit{Adv. haer.} IV.37–39 was an independent “treatise” that Irenaeus had taken over (Bousset 1915, 278; cf. Loofs 1930, 9, 24), and that this theory presumably is tenable in itself without necessarily implying that \textit{Adv. haer.} IV.37–39 belongs to IQT or comes from Theophilus’s \textit{Adv. Marc.} However, Quispel’s argument that Tertullian’s \textit{Adv. Marc.} II.5–6 and Irenaeus’s \textit{Adv. haer.} IV.37–39 have the same source only makes sense if Irenaeus’s source originally attacked the Marcionites.—I myself believe that the theory that Irenaeus depended on Theophilus can still explain certain factors (see below pp. 230, 355–57).
been convinced that the proof was used by the Marcionites. Further testimony in this direction is that other sources also attribute the same or kindred arguments to the Marcionites. Irrespective of the point that there is no reason to assume that the Marcionites learned the argument directly by reading Epicurean or Sceptical literature, we must not in my opinion trivialise the importance of their employment of this widespread argument; it is still proof that they were not simply “radical Paulinists”, but that their horizon and assumptions

being translated as *spiritus*; not until Tertullian’s response in what follows is this translation mentioned on which Hermogenes built.

90 Jerome, *Dial. contra Pelag.* III,6 (PL 23, 603B) thus attributes to Marcion the same argument (cf. Von Harnack 1924, 274*); Von Harnack, who believed that Jerome is here building on Origen, claimed that most of Jerome’s information on Marcion comes from Origen and Tertullian (Von Harnack 1924, 274*, 395*; the belief that the information is generally from Origen and Tertullian Von Harnack has probably taken from Zahn 1892, 426–32). In this case *Dial. contra Pelag.* III,6 could well be Jerome’s free rendering of *Adv. Marc.* II,5,1–2 and IV,41,1. On the other hand Ephrem the Syrian’s *Contra Marc.* I, Mitchell 1921, 57,42–58,8 (transl. Mitchell 1921, XXVII) contains an independent source claiming that the Marcionites put the question: why did the Creator create, if He was one and knew that Adam would sin against him; also here the argument is on the basis of God’s foreknowledge.

91 Gager (1972, 54–55) believed that Marcion must have found the argument in Epicurus’s writings, which would confirm Tertullian’s claim that Marcion’s idea of the supreme Alien God, who did not (before Jesus’s arrival) intervene in the course of the world was inspired by Epicurus’s teaching that the gods exist in complete tranquillity and do not intervene in the course of the world. This claim appears in *Adv. Marc.* I,25,3; II,16,2–3; IV,15,2; V,19,7 (cf. also Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* III,24,2; cf. more distantly *Adv. Marc.* I,27,1–2 (cf. Wolmann 1971, 36; Meijering 1977, 81); cf. also Jerome, *In Es.* VII,XVIII,1/3, Adriaen 1963, 274,5ff. In *De praescr. haer.* 7,3 and 30,1, however, Tertullian, as Meijering (1977, 76) points out, that the same Marcionite concept of God should come from Stoicism. It is Tertullian’s recurrent charge that the heretics have their doctrine from philosophy. Meijering 1977, 76 rightly remarks: “Tertullian bietet natürlich keine objektiv historische Genealogie der Lehre Marcions.” See also Meijering 1977, 75,78, 82–83, 129ff.— Also Wolmann (1971, 32, 36–37) thinks that most of the central lines of thought in Marcion are due to Epicurean influence.

— Meijering (1977, 38, 75–76, 100) rightly refers to the fact that Epicurus’s argument was generally known, and that one could grasp the argument without in terms of content being influenced by Epicurus; rather was Marcion in philosophical terms an eclectic, according to Meijering. However, we must be aware that the Marcionite argument is used to deny that there is a Providence in this world. *Seen in isolation*, the use is in accordance with the original intention with the proof. It is thus testimony to the context into which Marcionism came into being.—A different point is that in the Marcionite (and in general the Christian) context(-s) the concept of “Providience” acquired other meanings than at any rate in philosophical systems such as Stoicism and Platonism: the problem had to do with a personal God’s foreknowledge, while the systems mentioned did not envisage a personal God, and therefore understood πρόνοια as a mechanism and not as God’s caring, saving
were also determined by a widely-known concern with problems regarding God’s foreknowledge and the presence of evil in the world.

Without doubt Marcionites set great store by their possession of this proof, which transferred a well-known and powerful argument to the Bible. Thus Marcion’s highly independent disciple, Apelles, employed other versions of the proof which are also comparable with Contra Manichaeos III.7. This can be seen from some fragments that are preserved in Ambrose’s De paradiso, and which probably come from Apelles’s Συλλογισμοί; these show that Apelles used a dialectical method,92 and that his main interest was finding problems in the Scriptures. Apelles’s overall solution to these was a theory that the majority of the OT was fables (for example, the story of Noah’s ark), which came from the Angel of Fire who appeared to Moses and who was the God of the Jews, but that other parts of the OT came from other beings, including Christ.93 It is unclear how Apelles regarded the Paradise narrative itself, but since he was considerably occupied with it, Von Harnack thought it most likely that he did not view it as pure fable.94 If this is true, then the fragments in De paradiso ought to give us the outlines of Apelles’s interpretation of the story.

power in the life of the individual; cf. Dörrie 1977, esp. 62–63, 87. Chrysippus, for instance, is said to have believed that Providence is God’s will, and God’s will the chain of cause and effect, ergo Providence and fate are only two words for the same thing (Theiler 1966, 56–57).

92 Probably the Συλλογισμοί were only concerned with the Pentateuch; in the fragment in De parad. 5,28, where Ambrose writes directly “quorum auctor Apelles” (Schenkl 1896, 284,18), he states that it comes from the 38th book [without doubt of the Συλλογισμοί]; the work was thus very long, and even so the fragment only concerns the Tree of Life at the beginning of Gen.. Von Harnack has rendered it probable that seven other fragments in De parad. also come from Apelles (6,30; 6,31; 6,32; 7,35; 8,38; 8,40; 8,41). According to Von Harnack Ambrose was hardly in possession of Apelles’s own writing; his source was doubtless Origen (Von Harnack 1890); on Von Harnack’s research into Apelles see Von Harnack 1874; 1890; 1900; 1924, 177–96, 404*–20*.

93 Von Harnack claimed that while Marcion did not doubt the truth of the OT but only whether the writings dealt with the supreme God, his pupil Apelles regarded the OT for the most part as a forgery, a collection of fables: most of it came from the Angel of Fire, but other parts were from the Creator (another angel) and yet further parts from Christ himself (Von Harnack 1924, 179, 189, 191–93; Waszink 1947, 300), however, believed that the Angel of Fire and the Creator were one and the same.—Ambrose also treats Apelles’s objections as quaestiones, but of course gives a different “solution” to these problems. See further on the quaestiones-genre below pp. 253–54.

94 Von Harnack 1924, 193 n. 1 (from 192).
The fragments in *De paradiso* 6,31 and 32 (esp. 6,31) presumably show that since the God of Gen. 3 is unjust, He is different from the just Creator of the world, in other words, He is an even lower being. But it is also possible that for the sake of the argument Apelles is presupposing the Catholic doctrine that only the Creator of the world is just. The fragment in *De paradiso* 8,41 does not determine the case; Apelles merely wishes to show that on the basis of the presence of evil in the world the God who allows it is not good. The fragment in *De paradiso* 7,35 proposes that the God of Gen. was the cause of death; after the humans had eaten of the Tree, this God must either have been so cruel that He would not forgive them, since He could, or so weak that He could not. Here it is uncertain which of the alternatives Apelles prefers, but perhaps it was the ‘cruel God’ solution if it is otherwise true that he considered that Gen. dealt with a lower being than the Creator of the world. However, Apelles is here using the proof of Epicurus, though simply without including God’s foreknowledge; this he does on the other hand in *De paradiso* 8,38:

Another problem. Did God know that Adam would violate his commands? Or was He unaware of it? If He did not know, we are faced with a limitation of His divine power. If He knew, yet gave a command which He was aware would be ignored, it is not God’s Providence to give an unnecessary order. It was in the nature of a superfluous act to give Adam, the first created being, a command which He knew would not at all be observed. But God does nothing superfluous. Therefore, the words of Scripture do not come from God. This is the objection of those who do not, by interposing these questions, admit the authenticity of the Old Testament.

Apelles’s disjunction, which has to do with God’s foreknowledge in relation to the transgression, is completely the same as in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7; but the two texts do not draw the same conclusions.

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95 Cf. Von Harnack (1924, 193 n. 1 [from 192]).
96 Transl. by Savage 1985, 315. The original text in Schenkl 1896, 294.9–17: “Iterum quaestio: sciebat praevaricaturum deus Adam mandata sua an nesciebat? Si nesciebat, non est ista diuinae potestatis adseritio, si autem sciebat et nihilominus sciens negligenda mandavit, non est dei aliquid superfluum praecipere. superfluum autem praecepit primoplasto illi Adae quod eum nouerat minime seruaturn. nihil autem deus superfluo facit; ergo non est scriptura ex deo. hoc enim obiciunt qui uetus non recipiunt testamentum et has interserunt quaestiones.” Cf. Von Harnack 1890, 116–17; Von Harnack 1924, 415*–16*.
(although when Apelles says that it was superfluous to give the command at all if God knew beforehand that it would be violated he reaches the same conclusion as Contra Manichaeos III.7, which states that in that case the commandment was given in vain). Moreover, the fragment in De paradiso 8,40 also argues that since God either lacked foreknowledge or goodness, He was different from the good God, but the fragment seems to argue partly in relation to Gen. 1.26–27.97

It is of interest to note that the fragment in De paradiso 5,28 could be interpreted to mean that Apelles believed that the Tree of Life, which had more power for giving life than the Creator’s breath (Gen. 2.7), represented the highest God. The fragment in De paradiso 6,30 claims that it is not wrong if one refuses to obey a command that is not good. The Tree of Knowledge of good and evil was good, since God has this knowledge (Gen. 3.22), therefore the command was unjust. If the line of reason is not just to show that the Paradise narrative is inconsistent, this can mean that Apelles considered it a salvation event that man ate of the Tree. Correspondingly it may be one of the purposes of the fragment in De paradiso 7,35 that death does not come from the Tree of Knowledge, but from the God of Gen.. If these considerations are right, then Apelles’s understanding of Gen. 2–3 has moved away from Marcion, but then again it is possible that Apelles merely wishes to demonstrate the single point that the prohibition was unjust.

The portrait in Contra Manichaeos III.7 of an ignorant Creator God in Gen. 2–3 also corresponds to that in a number of Nag Hammadi and heresiological texts that depict the ideas of similar groups; the ignorance is “proved”, however, on a different basis than with the Marcionites and in Contra Manichaeos III.7: it is not linked to the circumstance that the Creator should have known beforehand that His prohibition would be transgressed, but to other factors, and in particular to His ignorance that there is a higher God than Himself. Moreover God’s question in Gen. 3.9, “Where are you?” is seen as proof of His ignorance—also incidentally among the Marcionites. Already in Jewish texts the question constituted a problem.98 The

97 Also the heretical question in Clement of Alexandria’s Strom. VI.12 (96.1) (Stählin 1906, 480.6–9) is reminiscent of these disjunctions.

98 Gen. 3.9 was thus a problem in several Jewish rabbinical texts (see the references in Pearson 1972, 468 n. 1) and in Philo’s Quest in Gen. I.45 and Leg. all.
Nag Hammadi-texts regard omniscience, or, as Testimonium veritatis puts it, knowledge of the future (πρόγνωσις), as a divine attribute, and it is therefore revealing that with this question the God of Gen. shows Himself to be ignorant. This ignorance is here linked to a little, isolated detail, and is thus not connected with the theodicy problem in the same way as the Marcionite arguments above, which emphasise God’s ignorance of the catastrophe which decisively changed the living conditions of man.

When Contra Manichaeos III.7 claims, on the basis of Gen. 3, that God lacked foreknowledge, it is operating with concepts and ideas that have philosophical roots. The argument, however, is best mediated via the Marcionites; Contra Manichaeos III.7 diverges from the Marcionite version, which Tertullian among others knew, by taking the disobedience positively, but it is possible that already the Marcionite Apelles had moved in the same direction. The Marcionite influence on Contra Manichaeos III.7 could indicate that Titus’s source was a text by Adda.

3.17 (51ff.). The verse was similarly a problem for the Catholic Christians, and it does not always have to be raised by non-Catholics, see for example Justin Martyr’s Dial. XCIX; cf. also Origen, De orat. XXIII.3 (Koetschau 1899, 352.5–6). On the other hand Theophilus in Ad Autol. II.26 (Grant 1970, 68) is without doubt polemising against a heresy that could be the Marcionite. At least Tertullian claims in Adv. Marc. II.25.1–3 and IV.20.8 that the Marcionites used Gen. 3.9 to show the Creator God’s ignorance, but Tertullian rejects this interpretation of the question and presents another (cf. De ieiun. 6.7) (cf. Von Harnack 1924, 89, 269*–70*; Quispel 1943, 41–42; Meijering 1977, 131). The assumption that the Marcionites used Gen. 3.9 in this way seems to be confirmed by how Dial. Adamant. I.17 (815c), Bakhuyzen 1901, 36.13–14 also has the Marcionite Megethius using it (cf. Von Harnack 1924, 269*). Also in the Nag Hammadi tractates Test. ver. 47.19ff.; Hyp. Arch. 10 (90.19–21) and De or. mund. 105 (119.26–27) Gen. 3.9 witnesses to the Creator’s ignorance. According to De or. mund. 105 (119.29–30) the question in Gen. 3.11 is also asked “in ignorance” (καί οὐκ εἰπὼν ἄντικερκίᾳ); Test. ver. concludes from 3.9 that the Creator did not have πρόγνωσις, “foreknowledge” (cf. also Williams 1996, 71, 280 n. 69 on the problems with the interpretation of Gen. 3.9).— Cf. here Pseudo-Clement, Hom. III.38.2, where Simon Magus calls the Creator ἀπρόγνωστος (Rehm 1953, 70.24) and claims that there is an other, good God, who is πρόγνωστικός (Rehm 1953, 70.27) (cf. III.39) (cf. Pearson 1981, 164 n. to Test. ver. 47.21).—When Didymus the Blind’s In Gen. 90.9–91.11 (Nautin 1976, 210, 212) deals with a reinterpretation of Gen. 3.9 (cf. Hammond Bammel 1989, 75), it is reasonable to assume that in fact he is polemising against an exegesis that from the question inferred the Creator’s ignorance, though this is not said directly. See above p. 136 concerning Eusebius of Emesa.
The philosophical and Gnostic background for the idea of the Creator’s φθόνος

In *Contra Manichaeos* III.7,9 Titus refers to his source as claiming that the Creator was “envious” or “jealous” (φθονερός), when He banished man from the Tree of Life and Paradise. However, in III.27,8, where Titus sets out to refute this charge, he does not employ the term φθονερός, but βασκακανία, which can mean malice, witchcraft and “the evil eye”, though it is also close to φθονέρια in meaning. But to translate φθονερός as “envious” is problematic. W.C. van Unnik has devoted some study to the meaning of the term φθόνος and has pointed out that it could be used in two ways: 1) About a feeling of dislike for another person, when one covets what the other has that one lacks. 2) About a feeling for someone who lacks what one has; this feeling involves not sharing one’s material or spiritual possessions with him. The direction and effect of φθόνος may therefore be completely different. It is unproblematic to render the first meaning with the term “envy”, insofar as “envy” precisely designates the “feeling of disappointment and ill will (at another’s better fortune)”; but dictionaries do not mention a meaning of “envy” which corresponds to the second of the meanings that Van Unnik points out; in turn this meaning can almost be covered by the term “jealousy”. Notwithstanding that the translation “envy” contains advantages by virtue of its etymology and tradition, it is of some significance in the present work to distinguish between the two meanings, and here therefore I will only use “envy” (and the corresponding verbs

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102 Hornby 1974, 292. Cf. the *Oxford English Dictionary*; V, 316–17, which acknowledges broader senses of “envy”, but regards them as out of date.
103 The *Oxford English Dictionary*; VIII, 206–7 gives the meanings thus (207): “[s]olicitude or anxiety for the preparation or well-being of something; vigilance in guarding a possession from loss or damage.” . . . “The state of mind arising from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry” . . . “in respect of success or advantage: Fear of losing some good through the rivalry of another”. As far as I can see, this meaning could also be covered by “avarice”, since the *Oxford English Dictionary*; I, 814 mentions the sense figuratively: “[e]ager desire to get or keep for oneself”.
104 “Envy” comes from the Latin invidia, which in classical Latin texts is also used to render the evil-minded feeling of grudging others what oneself possesses. “Envy” is also used to translate this sense of φθόνος, e.g. in Bury’s (1929, 55) translation of Plato, *Tim.* 29e, and corresponding verbs and substantives are used in Giversen and Pearson’s above-quoted translation of *Test. ver.* 47.13–48.15.
and adjectives etc.) about the inimical feeling against those who possess what one lacks, while “jealousy” (and the corresponding adjectives etc.) will be employed for the inimical feeling against those who want what one has and is unwilling to share. In the Manichaean interpretation of Gen. 3.22 in Contra Manichaeos III.7 the term “jealous” must therefore be used, for the idea is not that God envies man anything that He Himself lacks but on the contrary, that He begrudges man something that He Himself possesses. For the term “jealousy” can be supplemented by “grudge” and “begrudge”, which also contain the intended meaning. One objection to this translation method is admittedly that “jealous” is also used to translate the Latin-Greek zelus/ζήλος, whence the word originates etymologically, but in the present context this problem can be solved simply by mentioning the Greek term ζήλος in the contexts where it is the subject under discussion.

It is well-known that writers in Ancient Greece such as Herodotus and Sophocles entertained the idea that the gods intervened negatively if a man was gaining some happiness or success that momentarily raised him above his mortal status; in such situations the writers use the terms φθόνος and φθόνος. Classical philologists, however, seem to disagree on the extent to which this meant that the gods were animated by hateful, irrational feelings. Within certain areas of the Greek philosophical tradition this idea under all circumstances was interpreted to mean that the gods were unjust, and the idea was therefore rejected, as in Plato (φθόνος γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἑτέρου ἕναν τῶν ἑκάστων, Phaedrus 247a; ἀνευ φθόνος, Epinomis 988b5; ἀγαθός ἦν, ἀγαθὸς δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδένος οὐδέποτε ἐγγίζεται φθόνος, Timaeus 29e). Plato linked this motive both to the creation of the world and to the acquisition of knowledge.

For Plato, God was identical with the Idea of the Good, and “goodness” excludes φθόνος, as he explains in Timaeus 29e, where he introduces a theodicy: the Demiurge was good and without φθόνος and therefore created the world as good as was possible. Φθόνος

105 The Oxford English Dictionary, VI, 901: “grudge . . . trans. To be unwilling to give, grant, or allow (something); to begrudge.”

would have meant that the Demiurge did not wish to create a good world. Goodness without φθόνος meant without reservation to create a good world, even though it was not completely possible, which is not the fault of the Demiurge; his Creation consisted of stamping the “receptacle” (Timaeus 51a) which Aristotle already identified with “matter” (De caelo III,8 [306b18–19]) with order, which is only partly possible.—In Phaedrus 247a and Epinomis 988b5 the idea is that the deity will not maintain a barrier between Himself and man by withholding his divine knowledge. This concept of God’s teaching and upbringing also means that the old idea of the punishment of the gods acquires a new content: the gods punish not to revenge but to improve (De republica II,379–380). 107

Epicurus’s denial of the existence of a divine Providence is undoubtedly directed against Plato, among others, but also his concept of God implies that the divinity is not invisus, a term which as mentioned is equivalent to φθόνος and βάσκανος. 108

There is perhaps a genuine similarity between the Greek idea of the gods’ φθόνος, which Plato had rejected, and Gen. 3.4–5.22. Gen. 3.22 can be read to mean that Yahweh begrudges man eternal life, and if one sees it in this way, Yahweh’s prohibition against eating in Gen. 2.17 has the same cause, for in Gen. 3.22 He indeed says that because the command has been violated, so that man has become like the gods, He will expel him from the Tree of Life. Thus Yahweh confirms the serpent’s claim in Gen. 3.5 that the prohibition was issued in order to prevent man from becoming like God. 109 This real

107 Milobenski 1964, 21–27; Dörrie 1976, 516–17; Runia 1986, 137, 139; cf. also Koch 1932, 180–201.—Aristotle himself refers thus to his teacher when in Met. I,2,12–14 (982b28–983a5) he explains that it is not “presumption” if man occupies himself with knowledge of the first, divine principles; the poets are lying when they say that the deity is φθόνος, which is impossible (ἀλλ’ οὐτὲ τὸ θείον φθονερόν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί). Cf. Milobenski 1964, 22–23; Johansen 1991, 429.

108 The fragment of Epicurus in Lactantius, De ira Dei 13,20–21 (see above n. 84) denies that the deity is invisus; corresponding to Tim. 29ε invidus here means that the deity can remove evil, but will not do so; the term βάσκανος is used in the same way in the passage in Sextus Empiricus (Hyp. III.9–11) (see above n. 84). Cf. Milobenski 1964, 25 n. 16. Mejering (1975, 35 n. 22) thinks that Epicurus’s argument in Lactantius, De ira Dei should be seen in the context of Plato’s sentence in Tim. 29ε that the Demiurge was good and without φθόνος.—Epicurus’s gods were without φθόνος, because φθόνος is a painful passion (Milobenski 1964, 97–105).

109 Yahweh’s refusal to let man come up to the level of the gods (cf. also Gen. 11.4–7), is, according to Gunkel (1977, 17), the same idea that was widespread in ancient Greece.
similarity between Gen. 3.4–5.22 and the Greek idea of the gods’ φθόνος may have seemed striking to Alexandrian Jews in the 1st century CE. At any rate in Quaestiones in Genesim I.55 (to Gen. 3.22) Philo raised the question among others of how the word of God in Gen. 3.22 is to be understood, when there is no φθόνος in God; here Philo is clearly alluding to Phaedrus 247a and Timaeus 29e. In line with Timaeus 29e, 30a Philo’s preliminary answer consists of a denial that God should participate in evil, or that He should begrudge immortality to the good man; a clear sign of this is that as a benefactor He created the world by ordering the disordered and passive matter. The real answer, however, is that so long as man stayed away from evil, he could enjoy what leads on to piety or immortality, but when he began to turn towards evil, he did not gain immortality, for it is not fitting to immortalise evil, nor is it beneficial to the wicked man, for the longer he lives, the more wicked he becomes, and the more harm he does to himself and others. It is possible that Philo has not reckoned that man literally had dwelt in a Garden of Eden, but the answer may also be read to mean that man could have gained immortality in the garden, just as it explains God’s motive when He expelled man from it. The question of why God allowed man to turn to evil is not raised directly, but we are perhaps to think that the soul in accordance with Platonic doctrines occupies an intermediate position between matter and higher things, and that it can move in either direction of its own accord.

Philo only touched on the question of God’s φθόνος in connection with the expulsion from the Tree of Life, but Jewish texts also exist in which the Devil claims that God’s motive in forbidding man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge was φθονερία or βασκανία. Van

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110 Marcus 1953, 32–34; Mercier 1979, 122–27; Petit 1978, 53–55 (cf. Runia 1986, 136, 139, 146; Alexandre 1988, 331).—Philo often mentions that God is without φθόνος, but only here in relation to the Paradise narrative. Alluding to Tim. 29e he stresses in Quod Deus sit immutabilis 23 (107–8); De op. mund. 5 (21–22), 25 (77); De plant. 21 (91) that God is without φθόνος, and that His goodness is the cause of the creation. In De spec. leg. 2.45 (249) and Quod omnis probus liber sit 2 (13) he quotes Phaedr. 247a. Also in De Abr. 36 (203–4); Leg. all. 1.26 (80) and 3.72 (203) Philo states that God is without φθόνος. See also Runia 1986, 131–40 with further references; cf. also Van Unnik 1973, 40–45; Williams 1996, 70–72, 280 n. 73.—Incidentally the idea of God’s ωφθονία is to be found in different passages in Josephus, see Van Unnik 1971, 33f; Van Unnik 1973, 45.

111 Thus Vita Ad. et Ev.; Apoc. Mosis 18,4 = Armenian version I.18, the fundamental part of which is regarded as Jewish and is perhaps from the first half of
Unnik showed how widespread was the idea in the Hellenistic world (and particularly in the 2nd century CE) that certain persons “out of φθόνος” withheld their awareness of secret knowledge from others. He therefore believes that the use of the φθόνος-motif in Gen. 3 arose on Greek soil, perhaps in a diaspora community, as he knows of no such similar use in the Hebraic or Aramaic linguistic area.

This sounds reasonable, but in that case it is also natural to understand the charge against God of acting out of φθόνος on the basis of the philosophical discussion of God’s φθόνος. Jewish groups had been influenced by a philosophical image of God that had affinity with the problems of theodicy.

In some of the Nag Hammadi texts this problem of the Paradise narrative being read in the light of philosophical ideas about the nature of God is solved by positing that the Creator’s φθόνος in Gen. 2–3 means that He cannot be the highest God. In Testimonium veritatis it is both the prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge and the expulsion from the Tree of Life that are due to φθόνος. In 47.15–16 the author remarks that with His prohibition the Creator has demonstrated that He is jealous (Σ[ω]λ[φθον]ι) of Adam, and in 47.29–30 he notes that the Creator in Gen. 3.22 proved Himself “a jealous begrudger” (ΟΥΡΑΚΣΑΝΟΣ . . . ἄρεισφθονι). In De origine mundi and Hypostasis Archonton φθόνος is only used in connection with the prohibition; in De origine mundi 103 (119.5) and Hypostasis Archonton 9 (90.8) the “beast” (ΤΩΡΠΙΟΝ, De origine mundi 103 [118.26]; the text’s designation for the serpent) and the serpent respectively explain the 1st cent. CE (L.S.A. Wells in Charles 1964, 126–27; Van Unnik 1972, 126).

Thus in Apoc. Mosis 18,4 we read: τούτῳ δὲ γνώσκον ο θεός, ότι έστους ομοίοι αὐτοῦ, φθόνοναυν ὑμῖν καὶ εἰπεν· οὐ φάγεις ἐξ αὐτοῦ (Von Tischendorf 1966, 10; transl. [Wells] in Charles 1964, 146); the Armenian version I.18: “Gott weiss, dass, wenn ihr davon esset, ihr sein werdet, wie Gott, zu erkennen das Gute und das Böse. Und indem er eifersüchtig war auf euch, darum gab er euch nicht die Erlaubnis, von diesem zu essen.” (transl. Preuschen 1900, 13) (cf. Van Unnik 1972, 126–27). In the late book Pirke Rabbi Eliezer 13 from the 9th cent. the serpent claims that the prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge is due to γάτα τῆς, “the evil eye” (Luria 1852, 32b; transl. Friedlander 1965, 94; Strack and Billerbeck 1974, 138); cf. Van Unnik 1972, 127 n. 1; Pearson 1972, 468 n. 5. Pearson (1972, 468) points out that γάτα τῆς is the equivalent of βασκανος; cf. that βασκανος etc. in Greek means to bewitch with the evil eye etc., see Liddell, Scott and Jones 1968, 310ab.


113 Van Unnik 1972, 127. Pearson (1972, 468) seems to have a different view, but I cannot see why the late text Pirke Rabbi Eliezer 13 does not just reflect a Greek idea.
that the prohibition was issued because God or the highest archon was jealous (ἐφονεί). Finally, Simon Magus claims in Pseudo-Clement’s *Homiliae* III.39,3 that Gen. 3.22 shows the Creator God was jealous (φθονεί).

There are two orthodox texts from the 2nd century CE that are linked to this material; Theophilus’s *Ad Autolycum* II.25 rejects the opinion of some that God’s prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge was due to φθονος, and in *Adversus haereses* III.23,6 Irenaeus rejects the view of others that God banished Adam from the Tree of Life because He begrudged (inuidens) him it. When Loofs and Van Unnik see no direct connection between these two texts because they refer to two different trees, they are probably right in the sense that *Ad Autolycum* II.25 was hardly the source behind *Adversus haereses* III.23,6, but if one merely sees the similarity between the two texts as evidence that Irenaeus was dependent on a different, now lost, text by Theophilus, then the similarity is rather important, for it is clear that if one interprets the serpent’s words in Gen. 3.5 to mean that the Creator issued the prohibition out of φθονος, then Gen. 3.22 must be interpreted as the Creator’s own confirmation that the serpent was right, and at the same time Gen. 3.22 must mean that from the same motive the Creator will now prevent man’s access to the Tree of Life. By virtue of Gen. 3.22 everyone who attributes φθονος to God in connection with the one tree must also do so in connection with the other tree.

It is therefore also untenable of Van Unnik to derive only the idea that out of φθονος God forbade man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge from the contemporary idea that some “out of φθονος” could withhold awareness of secret knowledge from others. It is not just a matter of jealousy of knowledge, but also of jealousy over eternal life. The φθονος motif in these texts is concerned with the right

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115 Much later Didymus the Blind’s *In Gen.* (probably with Origen as his source?) claims that according to the Ophites the prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge was because God was jealous; see further below p. 235.

116 Theophilus’s *Ad Autol.* II.25: Grant 1970, 66.—Loofs 1930, 70–71 (71: “Denn es handelt sich... bei Irenaeus und Theophilus um ganz verschiedene Dinge: hier um das Verbot des Essens vom Baume der Erkenntnis, dort um die Vertreibung aus der Nähe des Baumes des Lebens”; Hitchcock [1937, 139] appears to have overlooked this remark [his reference to Loofs 1930, 69 nr. 8 is also an error].—Van Unnik 1972, 126.
understanding of God; the true God must be without jealousy in every respect.

To acquire a more detailed impression of the portrayal in the Nag Hammadi texts of the inferior Creator it might be useful to include two other motifs. For in the first place the Nag Hammadi texts ascribe φθόνος to the Creator not only in the sense that He will not share what He possesses, but also in the sense that He bears a feeling of hatred against those who possess what He lacks, in other words the feeling of envy. This “φθόνος-motif” must, as Van Unnik has rightly seen, have a different origin from the first, since the direction and effect of φθόνος are quite different. We find the motif of envy, for instance, in De origine mundi 6 (99.2–11), where the Shadow envies (κωῇ) what is mightier than itself, and thereby engenders Envy (πικώῃ). Similarly, in De origine mundi 28 (104.13–15), where “all the authorities of chaos” envy (κωῇ) Sabaoth because of his light, and in De origine mundi 36 (106.19–24), where Yaldabaoth envies (κωῇ) Sabaoth and engenders Death (πικώῃ is again in De origine mundi 37 [106.30] begotten by Death). Likewise in Hypostasis Archonton 30 (96.3–8) where Yaldabaoth envies (κωῇ) Sabaoth, which becomes the beginning of Envy (πικώῃ), which engenders Death. The last two passages show that we are dealing here with the Jewish idea of the Devil’s φθόνος which has been transferred to the Creator: the Devil envied man his gifts from God, and as a serpent he therefore tempted him, whereby death came into being;—in continuation of the same

Moreover Von Harnack (1924, 271*) and Drijvers (1978, 47–48) thought that the remarks in Irenaeus’s Adv. haer. III.23,6 and Theophilus’s Ad Autol. II.25 were aimed at Marcion, but Van Unnik’s (1972, 125–26) reservation, because terms such as φθόνος are not used in accounts of the Marcionites, is here well-founded.

Van Unnik 1972.
Van Unnik 1972, 123–24.
Van Unnik 1972, 128. Thus also Beyschlag (1966, 48–67, 98–100, 299–303; 1974, 147) and Pearson (1972, 468; 1981, 163), who, however, does not distinguish between the two φθόνος-motifs and therefore also finds the entire origin of the idea of the Creator’s φθόνος in the idea of the Devil’s “envy”; this, however, is not tenable. Beyschlag is sharply criticised in Van Unnik 1972, 131; cf. Beyschlag’s response (1974, 146–47 with n. 35).

Thus Wis. 2.24; see further references to Josephus and to Jewish apocrypha and rabbinical texts in Beyschlag 1966, 48–52; Pearson 1972, 468; Van Unnik 1972, 128–32; Kronholm 1978, 91–92 n. 19.

Insofar as banishment from the Tree of Life means that man is refused eternal life, and some of the Gnostic groups believed that this was due to φθόνος, it was natural that the two motifs were coupled together: the Creator envies man and brings about death through jealously withholding the Tree of Life. However, the
Jewish idea the orthodox Christians’ texts also claim that the Devil envied and tempted man.121

Secondly, the Nag Hammadi texts also ascribe to the Creator the quality of being “jealous”, ζηλος, on the basis of Ex. 20.5 (θεος ζηλωτης), 34.14; Deut. 4.24; Nah. 1.2 (cf. Is. 45.5–6.22, 46.9, where ζηλωτης is not used); in the Nag Hammadi texts this “jealousy” is an expression for the Creator God’s overweening pride and ignorance. The heresiologists also testify that both Gnostic groups and Marcionites used Ex. 20.5 in this way.122 According to Van Unnik ζηλος is different from φθόνος, although they are often connected. ζηλος is a vox media and can be both a virtue and a vice, while φθόνος is always a vice. The Creator God’s boast has to do with rivalry, not envy.123 Although Van Unnik is doubtless right that there is a slight difference of meaning between ζηλος and φθόνος, we must be aware that several Nag Hammadi texts translate the two words with the same Coptic word, көв, and that Emperor Julian juxta-source material does not couple the two together in this way, which seems to confirm Van Unnik’s view (when De or. mund. 109 [120.15–16], in connection with the archons realising that by eating of the Tree of Knowledge Adam is more powerful than them, speaks of “a great envy” [ΟΥΗΟΣ ΙΚΩΠ] that was brought into the world solely because of immortal man, it is natural to link this to the fact that in 111–112 [120.24–121.13] they banish man from the Tree of Life; it is stated there, however, that their motive is fear. In De or. mund. 113 [121.13–15] the archons envied Adam and wished to lessen his lifespan; this, however, is after the banishment).124

121 Concerning patristic literature one could simply write passim, but as examples mention may be made of Irenaeus, Dem. 16; Adv. haer. V.24.4; Origen, In Rom. VI.6.36f. (Hammond Bammel 1997, 481); Methodius, De auct. XVII.4–5, Bonwetsch 1917, 190.11–15; John Chrysostom, Hom. in Gen. XVI.2–4 (PG 53, 127, 129–130). Also 1 Clem. 3.4; Theophilus, Ad Autol. II.29 (Grant 1970, 72) has death being instituted through envy, but they state that it came about when Cain murdered Abel (cf. Beyeschlag 1966, 48–67; Theophilus, but not Clement, mentions the Devil here).—In Contra Manich. III.10–29 Titus does not mention that the serpent’s/Devil’s motive for tempting man was “envy”, but he refers (III.29.8) to the fact that he will later present a precise account of the Devil; in this account he also mentions the Devil’s envy (ΡΕΚΡΩ) against mankind (IV.60–61; Sy 159.9.13.16.18), though without referring directly to Gen. 2–3 (cf. above p. 57).

122 E.g. in Hyp. Arch. 23 (94.21–22); 26 (95.4–5) (Yaldabaoth; here, however, there is no question of “jealousy”; Test. ver. 48.5 (ΡΕΚΡΩ); Apocr. Joh. (short version: BG 44.14–15, cf. 44.18 [Yaldabaoth Saklas; ΡΕΚΡΩ]; long version: II 13.8–9, cf. 13.13 and IV 20.22–24, cf. 20.29 [Yaltabaoth; ΡΕΚΡΩ] [Waldstein and Wisse 1995, 78–79: synopsis 34.6–7, cf. 34.12]); Tract. Magni Seth II 64.18–23 (the Archon; ΡΕΚΡΩ); Irenaeus Adv. haer. I.29.4; Tertullian Adv. Marc. II.26.1; IV.27.8 (“zelotes”; cf. May 1987–88, 146 n. 66, who criticises Mühlenberg 1979). Cf. more distantly Irenaeus Adv. haer. I.30.7 “Ζελαντεμ αυτην Ιαλδαβαοθ” (Rousseau and Doutreleau 1979, 372; cf. Van Unnik 1972, 125).

poses the terms φθονερός and βάσκανος with ζηλοτυπέω and juxta-
poses ζηλωτής καὶ βάσκανος.124

Van Unnik has demonstrated that the two different forms of φθόνος
as well as ζηλος each have a different origin. He therefore splits
them, and in so doing loses the context, which is quite indefensible,
because it is the same figure, the Creator God, to whom the same
texts ascribe φθόνος as "jealousy", φθόνος as "envy" and ζηλος. In the
interpretation the immediate context of the concepts should rank
above their origin. The three attributes express the Creator’s inferi-
ority and pettiness, both in relation to man and to the higher pow-
ers, thereby presenting an image of an incomplete being who is
controlled by his passions, by πάθη.125 Moreover, the inferior Creator
of the Gnostic and Marcionite texts also has His positive counter-
part in their supreme God, who in some testimonies is also singled
out for His ἀφθονία.126

It is the same inferior Creator that we meet in Contra Manichaeos
III.7. On the background of the parallels that we have now exam-
ined, we can add that it is of less importance that Contra Manichaeos
III.7 explicitly only links the banishment from the Tree of Life with
the φθόνος-motif: since the prohibition against acquiring knowledge
was a plot (ἐπιθουλή) against man, this probably implies that the
motive in this context was also φθόνος.

124 On Nag Hammadi see previously p. 231, and on Emperor Julian see below
p. 250.

125 On this point Beyschlag (1974, 147) is right: φθόνος is a “Grundzug des
Unvollkommenen, Mangelderhaften, Unruhigen gegenüber der wahren göttlichen
Vollkommenheit, Ruhe und Güte”. But this contrast must be understood on the
background of Greek philosophy.

126 Thus in Valentinian texts (Ev. ver. 18.36–40 [NHC I,3]; Tract. trip. 62.20,
70.26 [NHC I,5] [cf. Van Unnik 1973, 16–19], among the Marcionites (Van Unnik
1973, 21 n. 75 refers to the fact that on the subject of Marcion’s “good God”
Pseudo-Tertullian, Carm. adv. Marc. I.84 states: “Sed parcit cunctis, uitam non inui
d uli.” [Willems 1954, 1423]) and among the Archontics (Epiphanius, Haer. 40.4,8
[Holl 1922, 85.10]).
c. The positive evaluation of man’s acquisition of knowledge in Gnostic texts

Since the prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge is derived in many texts from the inferior Creator’s φθόνος, it is not merely because features in the Paradise narrative make such an interpretation natural, but first and foremost because ideas of God at the time had been influenced by Plato’s denial that God would withhold any knowledge from man. This does not mean that the writers had read Plato or were philosophers, but that ideas with roots in philosophy had spread beyond their original context and had become generally accepted. It was therefore natural for the authors to evaluate the eating of the Tree of Knowledge positively, and this feature they employed in their polemic against the traditional Judaeo-Christian Creator God.

According to Nagel the positive revaluation of the Tree of Knowledge is the one constant that unites the aggressive-polemical texts (for example Testimonium veritatis 47.17–18; De origine mundi 91 [116.28–29]; 103–4 [118.24–119.19]; Hypostasis Archonton 9 [89.31–90.19]; Apocryphon Johannis [the short version: III 28.6–9 and BG 57.8–12; the long version: II 22.3–5, and IV 34.5–8]).\(^{127}\) Nagel makes this revaluation central, and it cannot be denied either that as a consequence of it a whole range of other figures and factors in the narrative must also be revalued so that those texts which undergo this revaluation possess a markedly common stamp.

Contra Manichaeos III.7 also belongs among them, for although the text does not directly mention the Tree of Knowledge by name, it is indisputably the tree in question, and the transgression also leads to the benefit that man gets to know good and evil and becomes seeing. Because the serpent mediates knowledge, that too is also positively revalued.

Nagel points out that although all the texts that evaluate the Tree of Knowledge positively need a figure that performs the task which the serpent has in Gen. 3, valuation of the serpent varies. In Testimonium veritatis 45.23–49.28 the serpent is the one who brings the redeeming knowledge (45.31–46.9) and is identified with Christ (49.6–10); also in Hypostasis Archonton 9 (89.31–32; 90.6) the serpent is the bringer of redeeming knowledge. From heresiological literature testimony to this high evaluation of the serpent as the one who procures for man

the crucial knowledge is to be found among others in Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* I.30.5 and 7 and 15, in Hippolytus, *Refutatio* V.16–17, in Pseudo-Tertullian, *Adversus omnes haereses* III.1 and in Epiphanius’s *Panarion* 37. Other Nag Hammadi tractates admittedly regard whoever made Adam and Eve eat of the tree as a mediator of redeeming knowledge, but show antipathy towards concluding that this mediator was a “serpent”; this is perhaps the case in *De origine mundi* 103 (118.24–26), which does not speak directly of “the serpent”, but of “the beast” and it is certainly the case in *Apocryphon Johannis* (short version: III 28.16–23, 30.14–22 and BG 57.20–58.7, 60.16–61.7; long version: II 22.9–15, 23.26–35 and IV 34.15–21, 36.20–37.4), which claims that what was said by the serpent according to Gen. was in reality said by Christ. The serpent was an instrument for Yaldabaoth, and therefore Christ made use of an eagle when he approached the human couple to make them eat of the Tree of Knowledge. These texts give a positive valuation of the serpent’s function in Gen. 3, but since for the authors of the texts “serpents” are symbols of evil, they must gloss over or deny that the beast was a serpent.

In *Quaestiones in Genesim* I.39 Philo rejected the idea that in Gen. 3.7 Adam and Eve were physically blind; since all the animals and plants were created perfect, it is not credible, according to him, that man alone should have lacked one of the body’s superior parts such as the eyes, and when Adam gave the animals names in Gen. 2.19–20, we must suppose that he could see them. Instead Philo suggests that ὅθολαμοί refers to the vision of the soul through which alone are perceived all good and bad, noble and shameful things, and all

128 Holl 1922, 50.15–62.14.—Didymus the Blind’s *In Gen.* can also be included here, even though it is not a heresiological work. *In Gen.* 81.4ff. (on Gen. 3.1–5) claims that every heresy that is called “Ophitic”, has its origin in the wrong interpretation of God’s prohibition, which claims that the prohibition did not seek to prevent the first people from being harmed, but rather to prevent them from becoming gods. This interpretation was introduced by the Devil, who maintained that through his prohibition God was ὅθολος. Didymus also notes that such heretics claim that God wanted man to live in evil, since whoever does not know good and evil commits evil deeds, and that the heretics honour the serpent, because it taught people the good things (Nautin 1976, 188) (cf. also *In Gen.* 82.12–14 [Nautin 1976, 192]: the Devil deceived the woman into assuming the ὅθολος of God).

129 Cf. above p. 229. In this text there is probably an Aramaic wordplay at work: Eve (אָוָי) – teach (אָוָי) – live (אָוָי) – beast (אָוָי) – teacher (אָוָי) – serpent (אָוָי); see Böhlig and Labib 1962, 73–74, notes.

opposites. There is also, however, an irrational eye that is called opinion (δόξα). In Quaestiones in Genesim I.40 Philo makes it clear that it was precisely this δόξα, the beginning of evil, that was opened, so that the mind conceived the world as alien. Thus at one and the same time Philo is able to spiritualise the eyes that were opened, and to insist that if God’s prohibition was violated, the consequences could only be negative.\footnote{Cf. also Williams 1996, 71.}

Some of the Nag Hammadi texts also claim that the eyes which were opened were the soul’s, but in contrast to Philo they do not believe that it was a lower cognitive ability that was opened. Thus in Testimonium veritatis 46.7–8 the expression τῆς προσόντων is used,\footnote{Cf. Pearson 1981, 160; Williams 1996, 71.} cf. also 46.12–13; in De origine mundi 103 (118.34–119.1) and 104 (119.11–13) it is νοῦς that is opened, cf. also Hypostasis Archonton 9 (90.8–10).

As is also clear from these varying valuations of the serpent, the Gnostic texts have not aimed at a consistent revaluation of all the elements in the Paradise narrative. They concentrate on the Creator, and here the problem of the idea that it should be the true God that hindered the acquisition of knowledge is of particular significance for them. That not all the elements are revalued is also clear from the fact that only in a single case is the positive revaluation of the Tree of Knowledge countered by a negative revaluation of the Tree of Life. In Testimonium veritatis, for instance, the Creator has the same motive, φθόνος, for preventing man from eating of the Trees of Knowledge and Life, but the text fails to explain the relationship between the two trees: while Testimonium veritatis has quite a lot to say about the Tree of Knowledge, the only function of the Tree of Life is apparently to provide the writer with the opportunity to criticise the Creator. But at least there is nothing in Testimonium veritatis that could prevent those who used the text from regarding the Tree of Life as a symbol of salvation.\footnote{Nor is there a negative revaluation of the Tree of Life in De or. mund. 111–112 (120.24–121.13); Hyp. Arch. does not mention the Tree of Life. On the other hand in Apocr. Joh. the Tree of Life is revalued negatively (short version: III 27.14–28.6 and BG 56.10–57.8; long version: II 21.24–22.2, and IV 33.14–34.5 [Waldstein and Wisse 1995, 124–27: synopsis 57.6–58.2]).} The same deliberations can be applied to Contra Manichaeos III.7, which, however, by virtue of its argumentative form deals somewhat hypothetically with the question of the Tree of Life.
f. Comparison with the original Manichaean literature

In the above documentation of the background for *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 in philosophical ideas and in Jewish and non-Catholic texts I have deliberately excluded Manichaean texts, the better to subject them to a particular examination. As mentioned previously, in referring to the original Manichaean literature, Nagel has contested that *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 quotes from any one Manichaean text at all. The question now is to provide insight into how this literature interprets the Paradise narrative, i.e. the fragments of Manichaean texts from Turfan and Egypt. Secondarily, excerpts and summaries in non- and anti-Manichaean literature can also be included when there is reason to believe in a reliable tradition. To begin with, however, my intention is to omit Augustine’s anti-Manichaean oeuvre, since we find such striking parallels there with *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 that a special examination will provide the most profitable results.

Not a single original Manichaean text is preserved which expounds Gen. 2–3 in its entirety, but in several places there are hints at expositions of these chapters. This means that we cannot be completely sure that in Mani’s own works, which were canonical for the Manichaeans, there was a complete exegesis of Gen. 2–3. We can only say for sure that Mani claimed that Jesus himself had instructed Adam, for in Mani’s *ӈбухрагăn* we read that Xradešahr (i.e. Jesus) gave the first male being wisdom and knowledge. And even if Mani actually did make a complete presentation based on the Paradise narrative, we cannot be certain that it took the form of an interpretation of Gen. 2–3: though resting on Gen. 2–3 it may have omitted to deal with the text and instead have taken the form of a new and independent presentation of the primal events. That is precisely the case with the Manichaean myth about Jesus and Adam which is found in excerpts of Theodore bar Kônai’s *Liber Scholiorum*, and which most scholars believe to come from Mani himself. According to these excerpts, “Jesus the Luminous” awakened Adam

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135 Cf. Jonas’s view mentioned above.—Feldmann (1987, 93) regards it as an open question whether Mani, who otherwise rejected the OT, had knowledge of the Paradise narrative, and whether he understood it historically or interpreted it allegorically or in some way or other built it into his system. Perhaps it is his disciples, under pressure from the Christians, who are the first to concern themselves with it?
and set him free, gave him knowledge of the divine world and the
state of the soul and allowed him to eat of the Tree of Life. This
myth is also known from the Arabian writer Ibn an-Nadîm’s *Fihrist al-‘ulûm*; in his version Jesus, who is accompanied by another god,
sets both Adam and Eve free, after which he instructs Adam. No
tree is mentioned, however.

Already these small differences demonstrate that the Manichaeans’
interpretations of the Paradise narrative differed from one another.
The explanation could be that Mani probably had his own inter-
pretation, but omitted to account for a number of details and also
allowed many questions to remain open, and that the Manichaeans
believed they had the freedom to embellish further, provided that
they did not directly contradict their master: according to this line
of thought, if Mani only mentioned Adam expressly, for example, it
would not be a contradiction to add Eve. This theory fits in with
general tendencies in other traditions of religious interpretation which
rest on a canonical, authoritative text. The theory implies that we
may expect the later Manichaeans to develop Mani’s presentation
in fairly different directions, but that certain common features would
also remain.

If we accept that Theodore bar Kônai preserved Mani’s own pre-
sentation, then Mani made Jesus take over the function of the ser-
pent in mediating knowledge to Adam, but left it open as to whether
Jesus was also the serpent himself. At the same time we note that
the Tree of Knowledge has been replaced by the Tree of Life, but
that “the eyes that were opened” in Gen. 3.5.7 as a result of man
eating of the Tree of Knowledge are here a consequence of him
eating of the Tree of *Life*. Theodore moreover has Jesus waking

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136 Theodore bar Kônai, *Liber schol.* 11, Scher 1912, 317.15–318.4; the Tree of
Life is mentioned in Scher 1912, 317.28.—See also Rose 1979, 69–76 concerning
this myth.
137 Flügel 1862, 91.
138 Cf. also the deliberations in Feldmann 1987, 95.
139 Assuming that in Theodore bar Kônai, *Liber schol.* 11, Scher 1912, 318.1 we
read *rj* and not *†n* (cf. Scher’s [1912, 318] note 1 and Pedersen 1988, 164
n. 27).—If this is right, then Mani himself has already blurred the difference between
the two trees, and it is therefore inadequate of Nagel (1980, 57 n. 26, 69–70) to
think that the Manichaeans did not believe that the “Jesus the Splendour” let Adam
eat of the Tree of Knowledge, but rather of the Tree of *Life*.—According to Nagel
(1980, 62, 69–70) as a symbol of salvation the Tree of Life is a Christian element,
whereas the idea of the Tree of Knowledge as a symbol of salvation expresses the
aggressive-polemical tendency and is a non-Christian Gnostic idea.
Adam from sleep and raising him up, and also an-Nadîm has Jesus lifting Adam up; here we find without doubt that Adam’s sleep in Gen. 2.21ff. is being interpreted as the well-known Gnostic symbol of the “sleep of forgetfulness”.

The reason why Mani left open the question of who Jesus was may have been his aversion to saying that the Saviour was a serpent; we have already seen that in Apocryphon Johannis the eagle took over the serpent’s function, and that De origine mundi only spoke of “the beast”. This antipathy has received even stronger expression in a large number of Manichaean texts where the serpent is placed directly on the side of Darkness, even though it is seldom mentioned in connection with the Paradise narrative. Against these texts it is of little consequence that a single text states that like all other living beings serpents also contain the divine elements of light.

Several Manichaean presentations deemed it sufficient merely to say that Jesus revealed himself to Adam, and perhaps also Eve, and gave them knowledge. Other presentations, however, prefer to

140 Cf. perhaps Kêphalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 179.6–8.—This motif is found in Hyp. Arch. 8 (89.3–17), where the spiritual woman wakes Adam and makes him get up, and in De or. mund. 85–86 (115.30–116.8), where Zoe-Eve makes Adam come alive and raises him up so he opens his eyes; cf. also Apocr. Joh. (short version: III 28.23–30.14 and BG 58.8–60.16; long version: II 22.15–23.26 and IV 34.21–36.21 [Waldstein and Wisse 1995, 128–35: synopsis 59.3–62.7]).

141 Such texts exist in PsB II, Allberry 1938, 60.18–19, 149.12–13.22–25, 156.27–30, 183.1, 192.26, 217.4 (and 43.9 in Wurst 1996, 106–7); cf. perhaps Kêphalaia, Böhlig 1966, 287.7–8; Funk 1959, 302.1–2. In one case it is the same hymn, which alludes to the Paradise narrative (Allberry 1938, 149.9) and regards the serpent as demonic (Allberry 1938, 149.12–13.22–25).—In Severus of Antioch’s 123rd Homily, which contains fragments of a Manichaean text, the principle of Darkness is compared with a pig and a serpent (Cumont and Kugener 1912, 97.6–98.1 = Brière 1960, 152.22–154.24) (cf. Nagel 1973a, 163–65; Nagel 1980, 57).—In Hymni contra haer. XVII.1–3; XVIII.3 and 9–11; XXI.3 and 6 and 8–9 (Beck 1957, 60.7.10.20; 64.1; 66.1–2.11.19.22; 74.6; 75.4.8.23; 76.5.7.9) Ephrem attacks heretics who among other things include the serpent with the evil nature (cf. Kronholm 1978, 86–90); they could be Manichaeans, but in XXI.10 (Beck 1957, 76.13–21) it appears that the polemic is confined to the Bardesanites and Marcionites; the subject is also found in XLIII.4–6 (Beck 1957, 171.11–25), where the polemic is against the Marcionites. In Ad Hyp. II, Mitchell 1912, 118.31ff., however, Ephrem claims that the Manichaeans maintain they could defeat the evil one in the serpents and scorpions with the aid of sorcery, which is clear testimony of a negative Manichaean assessment of serpents.—Other relevant references to anti-Manichaean texts in Bennett 2001, 47 with n. 37–38.

142 According to Kêphalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 208.19–20 serpents also contain “the Cross of Light”.

143 Only Adam is mentioned in PsB I, Giversen 1988, pl. 181.21 and in Kêphalaia,
follow the Gnostic tradition, in which Eve is the revealer, but in such a way that it is Jesus who reveals himself through her;¹⁴⁴ one presentation seems to identify Jesus with another Manichaean divine hypostasis, Primal Man.¹⁴⁵ The Manichaeans may omit to define which tree Jesus allowed Adam to eat of,¹⁴⁶ but they often follow Mani in making the Tree of Life a symbol and guarantee of salvation;¹⁴⁷ nor are they far from Mani when they link salvation to the Tree of Knowledge.¹⁴⁸ There is no need to assume, however, that

Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 56.24–26; 59.27–28, while Kephalaia, Böhlig 1966, 268.2 also mentions Eve.

¹⁴⁴ Thus Kephalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 53.18–54.9; 94.3–4.8–9 (cf. Van Lindt 1992, 188); PsB I, Giversen 1988, pl. 60.3.8; 266.23–25.32; the Sogdian-Manichaean text M 129 (cf. Sundermann 1994 with further discussion); and the Long Abjuration Formula 1464B/C (Lieu 1994, 241).—Sundermann (1994, 322) concludes cautiously: “Hier liegt also ein in Schriften des östlichen wie des westlichen Manichäismus bezeugtes Mythologumenon vor, das zum Urbe stand der Lehre gehören dürfte.” I suggest instead that this myth too is a “further development”.

¹⁴⁵ In the late Middle Persian-Manichaean text S 9 (a31–b14 [R]) we are not dealing with Jesus but “Primal Man” (Ôhrmîzd) (see Salemann 1912, 9; translation and remarks in Henning 1932, 221–24).

¹⁴⁶ Thus PsB I, Giversen 1988, pl. 72.25–26.

¹⁴⁷ In PsB II Jesus is the fruit on the Tree of Life (Allberry 1938, 185.10.21ff.) or the Tree of Life itself (Allberry 1938, 116.7; 154.22f.27ff.). In Kephalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 20.3–5 Jesus the Splendour is the fruits of “the good tree” (Mt. 7.17–20; Lk. 6.43–44), and according to Kephalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 53.27 apparently before he came to Adam and Eve, Jesus the Splendour has planted the Tree of Life that will produce good fruit (other references in Feldmann 1987, 94 and Rose 1979, 76). The salient point in the Manichaeans’ imagery is that the Tree of Life could also be identified with the Kingdom of Light itself (see Severus of Antioch 123rd Homily [Cumont and Kugener 1912, 96.5; 100.1; 127.6 = Brière 1960, 152.12, 154.9, 166.9]; correspondingly the Kingdom of Darkness is called the “Tree of Death”, “the bad tree” or the “tree of darkness”; Cumont and Kugener 1912, 96.7; 104.2; 104.8–105.1; 112.1–2; 117.7; 118.1.4; 122.8; 123.2 = Brière 1960, 152.16, 156.1.5–6, 158.28, 162.6.9.11, 164.13.25–26). Cf. further Waldschmidt and Lentz 1926, 29–31, 97. “The Tree of Life” is also mentioned in Kellis, Text A 2, 40 (Gardner 1993, 40).—Cf. Nagel 1980, 69–70.

¹⁴⁸ In Kephalaia, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 15.12–13 Adam ate of the Tree of Knowledge, so that his eyes could see. Another example of this idea is found in the allegorical exposition in Acta Arch. XI.1 (Beeson 1906, 18.1–5 [Greek = Epiphanius, Haer. 66.29.1, Holl 1933, 66.6–10], 18.15–19 [Latin (X)], where the world is the Garden of Paradise, and the trees in it are the desires and other deceptions, but the tree in Paradise, by which mankind knows the good, is Jesus, i.e. his γνῶσις, which is in the world. He who receives from it separates good from evil. Cf. Feldmann 1987, 94. Baur’s idea that the Manichaeans had originally in this way only understood the Paradise narrative allegorically (see above p. 76) is hardly tenable: the narrative in Theodore bar Kônai is not an interpretation but a new myth that claims to tell of a “real” salvation event (cf. on this point Rose 1979, 70 and concerning Acta Arch. XI.1 Rose 1979, 75–76).
the Manichaean texts believed in two salvatory trees, if one accepts that the Manichaean texts quite simply identified the Tree of Knowledge with the Tree of Life. This is natural enough, since Gen. 2.9, 3.3 sets the two trees in the same place, namely in the ‘middle’ of the garden.

In *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 it is simply stated that after eating of the Tree man who was blind could now see he was naked, and used the clothing that was to hand (Gen. 3.7); it is not possible for us to decide whether we are speaking of physical or only of “spiritual blindness”. In *Contra Manichaeos* III.24, however, Titus presupposes that the Manichaean text intends a physical blindness, which he then confronts with his own allegorising interpretation of the vision of reasoning (III.24–25). It is possible that here Titus unconsciously misunderstands his source, which like himself may have believed that the eyes of cognition were being opened. At any rate there are several Manichaean texts that spiritualise blindness and the eyes that were opened.150

The original Manichaean texts thus accord with *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 in regarding Adam’s eating of the Tree of Knowledge as a salvation event, but regardless of the points of contact the distance to *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 is still great. As pointed out by Nagel, there are no clear parallels to the description of man’s Creator as being without foreknowledge of the violation of His prohibition or as being ruled by φθόνος and βασκονία.151 It must be mentioned, however,

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149 Thus Rose 1979, 73–75; Pedersen 1988, 164–165. Cf. further Pedersen 1996, 306–11. A weak testimony in this direction is *P.B* I, Giversen 1988, pl. 98.16–17, where I read {ιηηὴ ποιμὴν θίης ποιμῆς τῆς θηλασίας θηλασίας. ἐλ. | μή τῆς ἀνάλα ἐπιρρήσεως ης προκηρύσσος θης ἀνάλα... [and (?) the Tree of the Life is the knowledge of the Paraclete (παρακλήτου)...]. . . . from the joy are his fruits (καρπῶν) from . . .” (cf. Gardner 1993, 49). The “Paraclete” here is Mani. This is a poetic text, but it shows that the Manichaeans associated the Tree of Life with knowledge.—As a parallel example it may be mentioned that the Ophitic diagram found in *Contra Cels.* VI.33 (Borret 1969, 260.9) has perhaps also identified the two trees: τὸ τῆς γνώσεως ξύλον καὶ τῆς ζωῆς (thus Alexandre 1988, 255, otherwise Chadwick 1980, 349).

150 Thus *P.B* II, 25.6–11, 149.9 (cf. Nagel 1980, 55–56); *P.B* I, Giversen 1988, pl. 266.26–31; and probably also *Rophitas*, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 15.12–13. The late Middle Persian-Manichaean text S 9 (a16–18 [R]; b5–14 [R]) can probably also be understood along these lines (see Salemann 1912, 9; translation and remarks in Henning 1932, 219, 223–24).

151 Cf. Nagel 1980, 55–57.—On the other hand we find similar ostensibly Manichaean questions of God’s foreknowledge in other anti-Manichaean texts; the Manichaean question in Didymus, *Contra Manich.* XII (PG 39, 1100D; cf. Klein 1991, 125; Bennett 2001, 40f.), as to why God created anything that would be harmful in the future, is alluding to the creation of the Devil. Similar questions
that it is a fundamental feature of the Manichaean myth that before the forces of Darkness have taken any initiative, the Father of Greatness has already planned a counter-measure; the history of salvation is controlled by the Father of Greatness, whose victory is assured. The forces of Darkness cannot be imagined to possess this foreknowledge. The texts do not ascribe jealousy to the Creator, but they do ascribe envy to matter.

Finally, none of the Manichaean texts treated so far directly relate themselves critically and polemically to the source in Gen., as does *Contra Manichaeos* III.7. Instead they narrate the “new” myths. One explanation for this, however, could be that we are dealing here with devotional literature that was not intended for use in the confrontation with the Early Catholic Church. Other texts may have had this purpose, and if that is so they are reflected at a single point in the *Manichaean Psalm Book*, which I have so far excluded, where there is a clear polemic against the biblical text and the Catholic interpretation:

When Adam and Eve were created and put in Paradise, who was it that ordered them: ‘Eat not of the Tree’, that they might not distinguish the evil from the good? Another fought against him and made them eat of the Tree.

The context shows that the argument here is that the one who gave the command was the God of the OT, who is only “the God of this aeon” (see the *Manichaean Psalm Book* II, Allberry 1938, 56.31ff.,

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152 See also Pedersen 1996, 185–88 with further references.

153 This refers to the φθόνος of Darkness against the aeons in *PsB* II, Allberry 1938, 79.24, and in this sense Titus also uses φθόνος in relation to the “sons of matter” in *Contra Manich.* I.21 (Gr. 12.34). Satan’s φθόνος is mentioned in *Man. Hom.*, Polotsky 1934, 76.13, 91.7. Particularly important is *Kēphalaia* Ch. 73 (Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 178.24–180.26) “On the envy of matter” (*ἐτρεχόμενος ἡμετρητής, 178.25*); here φθόνος is made the first nature, which came into being in the worlds of Darkness, and in the text Mani describes the Manichaean history of salvation, in which the φθόνος of Matter played the inimical role. The text also mentions the φθόνος of Matter against Adam, but unfortunately the text is fragmentary (*Kēphalaia*, Schmidt, Polotsky and Böhlig 1940, 179.6–8). If the lacuna is to be restored, as the editors propose, this φθόνος refers to Adam’s sleep in Gen. 2.21ff.; at any rate it does not refer to the eating prohibition or the banishment from the Tree of Life.

154 ἶττεργετονιμένη ἄλλη ἡμετρήτης ἀγωνία *[2]ηχήθη[ρα]λειενος οιη πετμιέτ* ἄτοτοιοι ξεί πεπροφομιλ αίρειεν ξει ποιητμένης *σιμετρογομοι ἥρποις* (PsB II, Allberry 1938, 57.7–10,—Allberry’s transl.).
cf. 2 Cor. 4.4). The tree is obviously the Tree of Knowledge, which here enables evil to be separated from good. The hymn refers anonymously to “another” who fought against this God and persuaded Adam and Eve to eat of the tree. This “other” has the function of the serpent in Gen., but the obscure expression could suggest that this writer too has had an aversion to saying that the Saviour was a serpent. The “other” could, however, be Jesus. It is also interesting that the hymn immediately goes on to allude probably (the Manichaean Psalm Book II, Allberry 1938, 57.11) to Ex. 20.5; Is. 45.6; 46.9, which as mentioned were Gnostic and Marcionite “proof passages” of the Creator’s ignorance and overweening pride.

It is not quite the same presentation which is found in the hymn in question and in Contra Manichaeos III.7, but the polemical and anti-Catholic character of the hymn is of interest. For Mani’s “new myth” about Jesus bringing knowledge to Adam was clearly based on older critical interpretations of Gen. for polemical purposes. The psalm, so to speak, takes the myth back to its historical starting-point as “protest exegesis”.

g. Comparison with Augustine’s portrayal of Manichaeism

The texts that were examined in the previous section might lead some to doubt that Contra Manichaeos III.7 actually contains genuine Manichaean quotations. But it is a different matter the moment we turn to Augustine’s anti-Manichaean authorship. The most important work here is Augustine’s Contra Faustum, because this text contains direct excerpts from Faustus of Milevis’s anti-Catholic writing, his Capitula; these extracts therefore have the same weight as most

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156 When the psalm in the following (PsB II, Allberry 1938, 57.11–14) asks who led Adam astray and crucified the Saviour, if the God of the OT really is God, the reference cannot be to the “Fall of Man” in which Adam ate of the Tree of Knowledge. It must be the fall that is narrated in an-Nadim, Fihrist, Flügel 1862, 92, where Adam had intercourse with Eve after having received instruction from Jesus. Cf. also Man. Hom., Polotsky 1934, 68.14 and TM 393, 16ff. (Henning 1944, 138, 140), where Adam fell no fewer than three times. That the Manichaeans regarded Adam’s intercourse with Eve as his “fall” is also testified to in Augustine; see further Baur 1831, 151–57; Feldmann 1987, 94, 129 n. 70; cf. also M 7983 in Andreas and Henning 1932, 199 (d I R II, 1ff.; new edition in Hutter 1992, 93–95).—It is moreover interesting that the questions in PsB II, Allberry 1938, 57.11–14 have close parallels in M 28 I Ri, 19–23 and Rii, 24–28 (Hymn 2, strophe b and x); see the new edition in Skjærvø 1995, 245, 246 (cf. 243, 244).

157 See Alfaric 1919, 121–23.
of the original Manichaean texts that have been found in the 20th century, and cannot be written off as the misunderstanding or distortion of an opponent.

In *Contra Faustum* XXII.4 we hear the accusations against the Creator of ignorance and jealousy that we sought for in vain in other Manichaean texts; thus Faustus declares of the OT:

> These books, moreover, contain shocking calumnies against God himself. We are told that he existed from eternity in darkness, and admired the light when he saw it; that he was so ignorant of the future, that he gave Adam a command, not foreseeing that it would be broken; that his perception was so limited that he could not see Adam when, from the knowledge of his nakedness, he hid himself in a corner of Paradise; that envy made him afraid lest his creature man should taste of the Tree of Life, and live for ever . . .

The passage is introduced with a particular interpretation of Gen. 1.4, but then we find precisely the two central points from *Contra Manichaeos* III.7: God lacked foreknowledge, because He did not know that His prohibition would be violated, and God was jealous, when He cut man off from the Tree of Life. In addition to this we also find the well-known feature of Gnostic-Marcionite literature that God’s ignorance “is proved” by His question in Gen. 3.9. In what follows Faustus also attacks the polygamy of the patriarchs, the cruelty against the Egyptians and the theft of their jewellery (*Contra Faustum* XXII.5), corresponding to *Contra Manichaeos* III.7,12–13.159 The familiar accusation from Gnostic and Marcionite texts against the Creator of ζηλος is also found in Faustus’s attack on the God of the OT who demanded sacrifices, and, he adds, who was “jealous if they were offered to any one but himself”.160

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158 Transl. Richard Stothert in Schaff 1887, 273.—“Et sane fieri potuit, ut quemadmodum de deo in pudenter idem tanta finxerunt, nunc eum in tenebris ex aeterno uersatum dicentes et postea miratum cum uidisset lucem, nunc ignarum futuri, ut praeceptum illud, quod non esset seruaturus Adam, ei mandaret, nunc et inprouidum, ut eum latentem in angulo paradisi post nuditatem cognitum uidere non posset, nunc et inuidum ac timentem, ne, si gustaret homo suus de ligno uitate, in aeterno uieret . . .” (Zycha 1891, 593.18–25). Cf. Rottenwöhrer 1986, 118.—Stothert translates with “envy” where, as mentioned, I would have preferred “jealousy”.

159 These charges can similarly be traced back to the older Gnostic and Marcionite polemic, which I shall not detail here; the Paradise narrative is of particular interest in the present work.

On the other hand, there is no positive assessment of the serpent in Faustus of Milevis; on the contrary, in the only passage where he speaks of the serpents, he says that the Catholics will surround the Manichaeans “like children of the wily serpent”\(^{161}\). But Augustine’s response to Faustus can be interpreted to mean that the Manichaeans could use the serpent as both a positive and a negative symbol:

Do you call us children of the serpent? You have surely forgotten how often you have found fault with the prohibition in Paradise, and have praised the serpent for opening Adam’s eyes. You have the better claim to the title which you give us. The serpent owns you as well when you blame him as when you praise him.\(^{162}\)

Just as in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7 the Manichaeans are believed to have praised the serpent for opening the eyes of man.—In *Contra Faustum* XV.9 (Zycha 1891, 436.15–17) Augustine states explicitly that the Manichaeans thought that the serpent was Christ.\(^{163}\)

Following on from *Contra Faustum* mention must be made of Augustine’s *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.XXVIII.42.1–4 we find the same question of God’s foreknowledge in relation to Adam’s transgression as in Faustus and in *Contra Manichaeos* III.7:

Accordingly, what do they have that they can censure in these books in the Old Testament? Let them ask according to their custom, and let us bring the answers that the Lord considers worthy that we give: ‘Why did God create man, whom He knew would sin?’\(^{164}\)

\(^{161}\) Transl. Richard Stothert in Schaff 1887, 156.—“ex more parentis sui serpens captiosis”; *Contra Faust*. I.2; Zycha 1891, 252.5–6.


\(^{163}\) Cf. Feldmann 1987, 95; Decret 1970, 299–300.—It must be emphasised that Titus does not say that the serpent was Christ, but speaks only of the angel of the good. Rose (1979, 75) suggested here that Titus’s source had spoken indeterminately of a “messenger of light”, which Titus interpreted as an angel of light. Another possibility is that Titus found an identification between Christ and the serpent so offensive that he had no wish to mention it.

In what follows Augustine makes the Manichaean ask further questions, which do not, however, have any direct parallels in Titus. According to Augustine the Manichaeans also claimed that the Creator issued his prohibition because He begrudged the human beings the knowledge of good and evil:

\[
\text{... and they invent (the idea) that some god or other from the people of Darkness, as they affirm, gave the command, as though He begrudged men knowledge of good and evil.}\]

Explicitly Contra Manichaeos III.7 and Faustus only linked the φθονος-motif to the banishment from the Tree of Life. But I see no reason to doubt that Augustine’s information that the motif was also linked to the prohibition against eating of the Tree of Knowledge, should be right: as already underlined, it is natural to think that if God acted out of φθονος in the one case, He must have done so in the other.

Finally Augustine also claims in this text that the Manichaeans regarded the serpent as Christ:

\[
\text{But nothing describes and indicates these things more strongly than the serpent saying: “You shall not suffer death; for God knows that on the day you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened.” Thus they indeed believe that the serpent was Christ...}\]

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166 The closest comparison is with the treatment of the Devil in Book IV, e.g. the Manichaean question in Contra Manich. IV.79, but we do not find the exact same question.

167 “. . . et deum nescio quem gentis tenebrarum, sicii affirmant, illud praeceptum dedisse confingunt, tamquam invideret hominibus scientiam boni et mali.” (De Gen. contra Manich. II.XXVI,39.4–7; Weber 1998, 164).

The views that Faustus and *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* share must at least have been maintained among the North African Manichaeans. There is therefore no reason to introduce improbable theories, such as that Augustine drew on *Contra Manichaeos III.7* in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*. This theory also runs adrift when we note that *Contra Manichaeos III.7* and Faustus mention the same version of the φθονος-motif, but *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* a different one.\(^{169}\)

Also in *De haeresibus* XLVI,15 (151–53) Augustine maintains that according to the Manichaeans the serpent was Christ, who persuaded man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, and here moreover we are told that “the eyes of cognition” were opened:

> But they confirm that Christ was the one whom our Scriptures call “the serpent”, by which they claim that (Adam and Eve) were illuminated, so that they opened the eyes of cognition and distinguished between good and evil... \(^{170}\)

If one is willing to accept Augustine’s claim that the Manichaeans identified Christ with the serpent, then there are a number of parallels between North African Manichaeism and *Contra Manichaeos III.7*. It is probable that Faustus drew on the same Manichaean work as Augustine himself used in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* and *De haeresibus*,\(^{171}\) and that it is the same work that Titus gives us a fragment of. This

\(^{169}\) Titus’s *Contra Manich.* was translated into Latin and used by Augustine, if one is to believe an unpublished monograph by A. Zacher (Zacher 1961; cf. Ries 1988, 187), which unfortunately has not been available to me. However, Zacher’s results are summarised and commended in Carrozzi 1988, 21–22, 28. Carrozzi (1988, 21, 28) maintains that Titus’s work circulated in North Africa in a Latin translation, and he refers (1988, 21, 28) to a number of similarities between *Contra Manich.* III.7,1–9 and *De Gen. contra Manich.* These include a supposed similarity between the disjunction in *Contra Manich.* III.7,3–4 and the disjunction in connection with Gen. 1.3–4 in *De Gen. contra Manich.* I.VIII,13.3–4 (“dicunt enim: ergo non noverat deus lucem aut non noverat bonum.” Weber 1998, 79). The context, however, is completely different. Carrozzi further refers to *De Gen. contra Manich.* II.XXVI,39.1–7 and II.XXXVIII,42.1–4.—Sfameni Gasparro (2000, 555), who also finds the hypothesis of Augustine’s dependence on Titus unnecessary, seems to assume that Carrozzi has derived the theory of a translation of Titus into Latin from Jerome, *De vir. instr.* CII, but if this is the case, the theory is easy to reject: Jerome of course read Titus in Greek.


\(^{171}\) Cf. also *De Gen. contra Manich.* I.VIII,13.1–4 with *Contra Faust.* XXII.4 (Zycha 1891, 593.19–20).
text was doubtless a work by Adda/Adimantus to whom Faustus himself referred as an authority at the beginning of his own work, but it was a different work from the one by Adimantus that Augustine refutes in *Contra Adimantium*.\(^{172}\) Perhaps Augustine was not aware that the text he used in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* and *De haeresibus*, was also written by Adda?

When Adda reached the Roman Empire as a missionary, he threw himself into the fight against the non-Manichaean religious communities, meaning primarily the well-established Catholic Church. Already Mani had made use of earlier “protest exegesis” interpretations of Gen. by “heretics” as material in his myth concerning Adam’s salvation, but because he did not find himself in a geographical area where the Catholic Church was strong, he did not perhaps think it necessary to insist on the myth’s polemical relation to the Gen. text, which was not a scriptural text for him or one that needed to be known by his supporters. Mani could therefore also avoid taking up a position on whether Jesus had been the serpent. Adda’s situation, however, was different. His mission field had to comprise both older Gnostic and Marcionite groups and the numerous Catholics. The protest exegesis character of Mani’s myth had therefore again to be made explicit, and in this context a decision had to be made on the relationship between Jesus and the serpent; Adda chose to identify them as one and the same.

Adda’s works enjoyed success and proceeded to form the basis of the subsequent Manichaean mission in the Roman Empire. The book of his that primarily deals with Gen. and Ex., circulated in the province of Arabia and Latin North Africa among others, and it became a goldmine for oral agitation and new Manichaean missionary texts. Faustus used it in his anti-Catholic writing, and some of the arguments that convinced the young Augustine in 373 doubtless stem from this book; these include the charge against the polygamy of the patriarchs (*Confessiones* III.VII) and the punishment of Sodom (*Confessiones* III.VIII), but also the charge, based on Gen. 1.27, against the Catholic God of being anthropomorphic (*Confessiones* III.VII).\(^{173}\)

\(^{172}\) Otherwise Augustine should have omitted these sections when he wrote *Contra Adim.*, for the motifs in which we are interested are not found there. The accusation against the Creator of ζηλος shines through, however, when Adimantus claims an incompatibility between Ex. 20.5 and Mt. 5.45, 18.22 (*Contra Adim.* VII,1) and between Ex. 20.5, 34.14 and Jn. 17.25 (*Contra Adim.* XI).

Augustine’s story shows precisely why Adda’s writing was a success: it based its charges against the OT on suppositions that all well-educated people in the Mediterranean world shared, on cultural assumptions with their roots in philosophy which once had to be defended by a minority but which had long since become common property and self-evident mental goods. Adda’s work could therefore very well appeal to pagan circles which shared the same suppositions.

h. Comparison with Emperor Julian’s treatise: Contra Galilaeos

In addition to the above comparisons, Contra Manichaeos III.7 can also be compared with the fragments from Emperor Julian the Apostle’s book Contra Galilaeos, which are preserved in Cyril of Alexandria’s Contra Julianum from c. 435;\textsuperscript{174} as mentioned Nagel has actually suggested that Titus is in fact polemicising against this book.

In Contra Galilaeos, Fr. 13 (75AB), Fr. 15 (86A), Fr. 16 (89AB), Fr. 17 (93DE, 94A) the Emperor maintains that the stories in Gen. 2–3 should be regarded as “fables”, and to this end he seeks to demonstrate the consequence of seeing them otherwise. Here Julian has probably used ideas from a Gnostic source for his polemic;\textsuperscript{175} the question is, however, whether this source could not equally be Adda’s work. Common to the Emperor, to Contra Manichaeos III.7 and to Testimonium veritatis is at the least that they attribute ἐγνοια, φθόνος and βοσκανία to the Creator, and evaluate the serpent positively.

According to the Emperor, when God says in Gen. 2.18 that He will create woman as man’s helper, He must have been unaware that rather than be a help, woman would be the cause of him losing his happy life in Paradise.\textsuperscript{176} Thus in contrast to Testimonium

\textsuperscript{174} In what follows I refer primarily to the edition of the Contra Gal. fragments in Masaracchia 1990 (which contains fragments numbered 1–107), but also to the edition in Neumann 1880 (transl. Neumann 1880a).

\textsuperscript{175} Already Brox (1967) assumed that when Julian attributed ignorance and φθόνος to the Creator and glorified the serpent, these ideas stemmed from the Gnostics, though not directly: rather, the Gnostic interpretation had been included in a general arsenal of anti-Catholic arguments and via this route had found its way to the Emperor. Test. ver. was not yet available to Brox, but Koschorke (1978, 108, 149, 150–51; 1978a, 107 n. 72, 108 n. 76) could point out that the fragments mentioned in Julian’s Contra Gal. from a formal angle and in regard to anti-Catholic tendency contain the closest parallel to Test. ver. 45.23ff; cf. also Pearson 1981, 106–7.

\textsuperscript{176} Contra Gal., Fr. 13 (75A) (Masaracchia 1990, 101–2, 252; Neumann 1880, 167; 1880a, 5–6); Fr. 17 (94A) (Masaracchia 1990, 105–6, 253; Neumann 1880, 169; 1880a, 7).
veritatis Julian does not prove God’s ignorance on the basis of the question in Gen. 3.9. Nor does Contra Manichaeos III.7 justify the Creator’s ignorance on the narrow basis of His creation of woman; it is because He was unaware in general that man would violate His commandment. But the Emperor and Titus may have chosen to quote two different arguments from the same text.

It is on the basis of both God’s prohibition and Gen. 3.22 that the Emperor concludes that this God is jealous;\(^\text{177}\) by resting his accusation on both Gen. 2.17 and 3.22 the Emperor’s presentation corresponds most closely to Testimonium veritatis.

The positive valuation of the serpent is found in Contra Galilaeos, Fr. 17 (93D), and is summarised as follows, perhaps by the Emperor himself: “so that the serpent was a benefactor rather than a destroyer of the human race.” ( ámbtov ópÌν ενεργετην μαÌλλον ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ λυμεóνα τῆς ἄνθρωπίνης γενέεως εἶναι);\(^\text{178}\) the Emperor regarded knowledge of good and evil as necessary for man’s moral insight (φρόνησις) (Contra Galilaeos, Fr. 16 [89AB], Fr. 17 [93DE, 94A]).\(^\text{179}\) It may be noted that the Emperor—as in most of the other related texts—regards the Tree of Life in a positive light.\(^\text{180}\)

The Emperor published his book immediately after he had departed from Antioch in the spring of 363, and considering that the pagan reaction played a major role in Arabia, it is credible that the book soon reached the province, where Titus, also by virtue of his clash

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\(^{177}\) βάσκανος: Contra Gal., Fr. 17 (93E) (Masaracchia 1990, 105, 253; Neumann 1880, 168–69; 1880a, 6); ζηλοτυπήσα: Contra Gal., Fr. 17 (94A) (Masaracchia 1990, 106, 253; Neumann 1880, 169; 1880a, 7); φθόνηροῦ and βάσκανον: Contra Gal., Fr. 17 (94A) (Masaracchia 1990, 106, 253; Neumann 1880, 169; 1880a, 7). It can be seen that the Emperor places the terms φθόνερος and βάσκανος on an equal footing with ζηλοτυπήσα; later the Emperor deals with Ex. 20.5; Deut. 4.24 (Contra Gal., Fr. 29 [152C] [Masaracchia 1990, 125, 259; Neumann 1880, 188; 1880a, 20] and Fr. 30 [155CD] [Masaracchia 1990, 126, 260; Neumann 1880, 189; 1880a, 20]), and here he makes the equation ζηλοτυπήσα καὶ βάσκανος (Contra Gal., Fr. 30 [155D] [Masaracchia 1990, 126; Neumann 1880, 189; 1880a, 20]). Van Unnik should probably have emphasised more strongly how much all these terms in Late Antiquity were associated with one another.

\(^{178}\) Masaracchia 1990, 105, 253; Neumann 1880, 168; 1880a, 6; transl.: Wright 1923, 327.—In contrast to Neumann Masaracchia does not regard the passage quoted as part of the Emperor’s own text.

\(^{179}\) Masaracchia 1990, 104, 252, 105–6, 253; Neumann 1880, 168–69; 1880a, 6–7.

\(^{180}\) It is outrageous that God banished man from the Tree of Life (Contra Gal., Fr. 17 [93E] [Masaracchia 1990, 105, 253; Neumann 1880, 168–69; 1880a, 6]); to eat of the Tree of Life would have led to immortality (εδώλαντος εκ θυμου γένηται, Contra Gal., Fr. 17 [94A] [Masaracchia 1990, 106, 253; Neumann 1880, 169; 1880a, 7]).
with the Emperor, must have been interested in a refutation. If Titus is in fact at loggerheads with the Emperor, as Nagel believes, it could be an expression of a general polemical technique in Antiquity (and particularly among heresiologists) to refute a contemporary enemy by projecting him into a previous heresy,\textsuperscript{181} but it is a problem that Titus himself does not state that this is what he is doing. The theory is superfluous, however, if as I believe, Titus is in fact polemizing against a Manichaean text. Yet even so, the similarity between \textit{Contra Manichaeos} \textsc{III}.7 and \textit{Contra Galilaeos} is still of interest: for the fact that the Emperor could take over a Gnostic protest exegesis is a good demonstration of the apparent commonality of values between pagans and Gnostics/Manichaean which also found expression in Bostra, and served to provoke Titus’s response.

\textbf{i. Problems and different solutions}

Titus’s source, a text by Adda, united an argument that the Marcionites used to prove that the God of Gen. lacked foreknowledge, since He did not prevent man from being disobedient, with an argument in which knowledge of good and evil is positive and the Creator who forbade man from acquiring this knowledge was jealous. Already in the Greek philosophical tradition the theodicy problem was linked to the question of God’s foreknowledge and φθόνος, and the non-Catholic “heretical” traditions that Titus’s source continued must be understood on the background of this tradition; they were meant to solve the problems that arose when the Paradise narrative was confronted by a philosophical concept of God. This does not exclude the question of an interpretative type of “aggressive-polemical” text; the solution which these myths propounded implies that a whole range of figures and events had to be revaluated, and such a value reversal had of necessity to involve a confrontation with, and a polemic against, those groups that could not accept it.

Titus’s Manichaean sources asked the (also philosophical) question, whence come the evil things (Πόθεν (λέγοντες) τὰ κακὰ; I.4, Gr. 3.26; I.16, Gr. 9.3–4 (→ Ch. XI.7); II.1, Gr. 26.8–9). The question is often testified to by opponents as being Manichaean (see for example Augustine, \textit{Confessiones} \textsc{III}.VII,12 [“unde malum”]).\textsuperscript{182} There is no

\textsuperscript{182} Verheijen 1981, 33.— Cf. also \textit{De lib. arb.} I.II,4,10–11, Green 1970, 213, where
reason to doubt that the Manichaean really did pose such questions and presented their doctrine as an answer or a solution, and in this way continued the tradition described so acutely by Tertullian in the famous passage *De praescriptione haereticorum* 7.5:

The same subject-matter is discussed over and over again by the heretics and the philosophers; the same arguments are involved. Whence comes evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? and in what way does he come? Besides the question which Valentinus has very lately proposed—Whence comes God?

It was in fact also these questions that Adda raised in relation to the Scripture, presenting his assertions as solutions to questions or aporiae. Because of the biblical context the question was not purely philosophical, yet nor was it purely grammatical and philological. The aporiae stemmed from the text being subjected to ideas that in the final instance were of philosophical origin and linked to the context of theodicy, among others.

Williams is thus right to some extent when he speaks of “hermeneutical problem-solving”, but the phrase is also inadequate, because it obscures the crucial difference between this solution and other, “orthodox” solutions: the “orthodox” or Catholic and the “heretical” interpreter may well raise the same questions in a text from the same philosophical premises, but whereas the “heretic’s” solution involves a partial or total rejection of the OT as Scripture and thus a break with and protest against the traditionalist religious community, the “orthodox” solution means that the entire OT is claimed as a holy text and there must therefore be no break with the tradition, even if the result in effect means a radical reinterpretation of that tradition. Last but not least, we should observe that despite the common premises the theological content of the solutions is very different.

Augustine claims that it was the question of the origin of evil deeds, which drove him into Manicheanism in his youth.—Further references in Puech 1949, 152 n. 271.

183 Cf. e.g. *Kephalia* Ch. 120 (Böhlig 1966, 286.24–288.18), which claims that the point of origin for the myth, radical dualism, is the best answer to the origin of evil.

There are several reasons for this: Titus’s application of philosophy, for example, is much deeper and more conscious than that of his opponents, but in particular we should note that even though the problems in Titus and Adda, for instance, could be determined by the same, originally philosophical, premises, the solutions are reached through what I have chosen to call, in a figurative sense, different creeds.

It is nevertheless a fact that there was general agreement between the so-called “heretics” and the “orthodox” on the formulation of problems; indeed, we might even say that the “heretics” contributed to the exegesis and theology of the “orthodox” in the formation of problems. In this context it must be emphasised how Titus allows his source, which both raises problems and offers solutions, to function precisely as a collection of problems: Titus acknowledges the problems, but rejects the solutions. In this way Contra Manichaeos III takes on a certain similarity with the contemporary Christian quæstiones-genre—or προβλήματα καὶ λύσεις-genre,185 which seem to have been particularly popular in the Syrian-Palestinian region and often concerned itself with the interpretation of Gen.

In this context we must remark that a number of scholars have believed that non-Catholic works such as Marcion’s Antitheses and even more so Apelles’s Συλλογισμοὶ, by referring to aporiae in the Scriptures have stimulated the emergence of this genre. However, the genre already had a predecessor in Philo’s Quaestiones in Genesim and Quaestiones in Exodum (Ἐπιστάσεις τε καὶ διώλυσεις to Gen. and Ex. is mentioned in Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica II.18,1 and 5), which as stated had already raised the question of God’s φθόνος in relation to Gen. 3.22.186 Moreover it is important to note that also the

185 Titus’s presentation is also coloured by a rhetorical quæstiones-tradition in that Titus himself on the way raises questions from which he can develop his exposition. The questions can be understood not just in continuation of the aporiae in the Manichaean texts, but also arise from another orthodox exegesis or the philosophical tradition, or they are just “rhetorical” questions that serve merely to take the presentation further.

186 The quæstiones-genre is first clearly represented among the Catholic Christians from the 4th cent., even though already in the 2nd cent. Tatian wrote a book about Problems in the Scriptures to which his pupil Rhodon promised to give solutions (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. V.13,8), and even though Origen often used an aporetic method, which incidentally was often linked to the clash with Apelles. The model for the genre, however, is the pagan quæstiones, and generally it is concerned more with philological than philosophical-theological problems, which suggests that the
Gnostic “dialogues”, as shown by Rudolph, may be to a great extent accounted as *quaestiones*-literature, and to them belong also the Manichaean *Kephalaia* and Faustus of Milevis’s *Capitula*.\(^{187}\) In the present context, however, it is essential to stress the difference between on the one hand Gnostic dialogues, including the Coptic *Kephalaia*, and on the other hand works such as Marcion’s *Antitheses*, Faustus’s *Capitula* and Titus’s hypothetical Adda-source: the first type of work offers edifying revelatory responses for use in one’s congregation, while the latter type employs critical argument or polemic to a much greater degree to shake aberrant religious traditions.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

TITUS OF BOSTRA'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

1. Titus’s knowledge of philosophers and philosophical texts

As I have attempted to show, since it seems likely that the Manichaean mission among pagans and Catholics in the province of Arabia made use of texts which presented Manichaeism as rational Christianity and attacked Catholic Christianity with arguments of a philosophical origin, Titus of Bostra may himself have been provoked to use the very same strategy, but now against Manichaeism itself. Catholicism was rational Christianity, and Manichaeism could not stand up to a philosophical counter-attack.

The actual content of Titus’s counter-attack could not avoid being determined by the Manichaean mission strategy, but it is worth noting that what became important for Titus in Book III was not the profound ideas of Manichaean faith but rather the Manichaean attempts to call Catholic Christianity in question through arguments of philosophical origin. These questions were intended to lead Catholic readers to the ideas of the Manichaean faith, but Titus claimed to provide better answers to the questions while holding the OT and the one Creator God in respect. The purpose of this chapter is to achieve a clearer picture of Titus’s own philosophical position, which includes weighing up possible influences from Platonism, Stoicism and Aristotelianism in relation to one another. In this context it would be useful to be able to point directly to the actual philosophers and the philosophical texts that Titus knew for sure, but unfortunately it has proved extremely difficult to achieve any certainty in this area. Various passages are nevertheless of interest; Jerome believed Titus to be acquainted with pagan literature, Titus himself mentions some names and information about philosophers, and finally Aimé Puech has proved beyond dispute a literary connection between a passage in *Contra Manichaeos* and one of Plato’s dialogues. A natural starting-point for an exposition of Titus’s philosophical position is an interpretation of these passages.

Already in Titus’s immediate posterity he was regarded as a
Christian writer who made particular use of pagan philosophy, as can be seen for example in Jerome’s letter to the rhetor, Magnus, from c. 399. Here Jerome seeks to show that Church writers have the right to acquire and quote from pagan literature, and he therefore invokes Scripture and the apologists and then refers to various individual writers who have made use of pagan literature, including among others Eusebius of Caesarea, Eustathius of Antioch, Athanasius of Alexandria, Eusebius of Emesa, Triphyllius of Cyprus, Athanasius (the Sophist) and the confessor Serapion (of Thmuis), as well as Titus of Bostra together with the Cappadocians Basil, Gregory and Amphiloichus, all of whom filled their books to such a degree with the philosophers’ doctrines and propositions that one hardly knows which to admire the most in them: their secular erudition or their knowledge of the (Holy) Scriptures.1

Jerome’s understanding may rest on the fact that in Contra Manichaeos IV.19 Titus mentions both Xenophon and the two most important philosophers of Antiquity by name:

But Xenophon writes that “the sages of the Persians of old believed in two opposing principles”, so that it was from there that this man [i.e. Mani] had a closeness to barbarism. Aristotle, however, spoke about “matter”, but he did not give this name to some living principle as (it is the case with) this “matter” of his [i.e. Mani], (he) who uses and introduces an alien name which does not belong to himself. But, corresponding to the likeness of the name, he [i.e. Aristotle] called that which is not alive and does not have any movement of its own accord “matter”. This man [i.e. Mani], however, altered the use of the false name (so that it designated) “evil”, and he is not only ungrateful in (the matter of) his theft, but he is also a miserable knave who alters something which is not his own into a fraud. But Plato <taught>, more and more in error, with a clear term the transmigration of souls (Sy 138.4–14 → Ch. XI.46).2

In reality Titus is not quoting Xenophon directly, but can only refer to Araspes’s words about the two souls in Xenophon, Cyropædia

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1 qui omnes in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos referserunt libros, ut nescias, quid in illis primum admirari debes, eruditionem saeculi an scientiam scripturarum. (Jerome, Ep. LXX, Hilberg 1910, 700–8; the mention of Titus and the quotation in Ep. LXX.4, Hilberg 1910, 706.13–707.3); cf. Sickenberger 1901, 5.

2 Cf. also on this passage Jackson 1925, 256; Allberry 1939, 132 n. 1; Casadio 1992, 121.
VI.1,41. For Titus, the fundamental dualism between the two principles is closely connected with an anthropological dualism; as we shall see, he came very close to claiming that the Manichaeans have a doctrine of two souls. Moreover the passage here is the only one in which Titus explicitly links his accusation against Mani of being a barbarian with his origin inside the Persian Empire.\(^3\)

Titus’s interest in emphasising the difference between Mani’s ἓλη and Aristotle’s concept of matter corresponds to Alexander of Lycopolis’s accentuation of the difference between ἓλη in Mani and in Plato and Aristotle; although Alexander is also interested in stressing that matter is not movement, there is so great a difference between Alexander and Titus in their choice of words that a dependency relationship is unlikely.\(^4\)

With regard to Titus’s remark that Plato taught ἐπιβαίνειν ἐκκαθάρισθαι (Sy 138.13), the transmigration of souls, it is simply a common criticism among the Church fathers.\(^5\) What Titus tells us here about Aristotle and Plato is not wrong, but it is difficult to determine where his information originates. Its sparse, summarising character could suggest that it comes from a doxographical manual, but it cannot be the one by Aetius.\(^6\) As will be shown, it is at any rate doubtful

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3 See below concerning the two souls according to the Manichaeans pp. 299–300.—Incidentally Acta Arch. LXVII (LV), which has Basilides maintaining a radical dualism, regards him as a Persian (LXVII.4; Beeson 1906, 96.10–11).


5 There is thus no question of a criticism of Plato’s doctrine concerning the soul as such, as Sickenberger 1901, 111 claims; he is wrong in thinking that Titus’s remark is testimony to an “Antiochene anti-Platonism”.—Apart from this, as Jackson 1925, 256 pointed out, the term ἐπιβαίνειν ἐκκαθάρισθαι corresponds to μεταγγίσιμος, the favoured Manichaean term for the transmigration of souls.

6 In Augustus’s time Aetius compiled a doxographical manual that was used by Philo; in the middle of the 2nd cent. CE it was edited and attributed to Plutarch; another form was used by Stobaeus in the 5th cent. Aetius, Plac. I.9.1–7 (= Stobaeus, Eclog. I.11,1.3.5 and Pseudo-Plutarch, Plac. I.8) (Diels 1879, 307–8) has the heading Περὶ ἑλῆς; what ἑλῆ is, is explained thus: “Ὑλὴ ἐς τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρώτῃ γενέσει καὶ φθορά καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς (Diels 1879, 307a19–21, 307b5–7).” Pseudo-Plutarch summarises Plato and Aristotle’s view thus (Stobaeus refers only to Plato): Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ἑλὴν σωματοειδῆ ἀμορφον ἀνέδειον ἀαγχηματίστουν ἀποιον μὲν ὄσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἱδίᾳ φύσει, δεξαμενήν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὀνομα ιδῆν καὶ ἐκμετατόχως καὶ μητέρα γενέσθαι. Οἱ δὲ ὡθοὶ λέγοντες ἢ γὰρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα τὴν ἑλήνι οὐκέτι ἀμορφον
that Titus has read Aristotle, yet his knowledge has probably been sufficient for him to have been able to formulate the sentences quoted on Aristotle’s concept of matter.

Very puzzling is another passage in which Titus apparently mentions a pagan philosopher by name. As an example of a philosophical group which any given Greek could feel sympathy for, Titus speaks in *Contra Manichaeos* III.69 (Sy 117.16) of κρονς, “Creon’s”.

The problem here is that no Greek philosopher named Κρόνις has apparently ever existed. Could it be that the name merely signifies a fictive philosopher, somewhat like “so-and-so”, or is it possible that Titus is referring to the leader of a local philosophy school in contemporary Bostra?

The discovery of a passage in which we can see the direct use of a philosophical source is due, as mentioned, to Puech, who pointed out that the account in *Contra Manichaeos* II.24, PG 18 = II.44, Gr. is inspired by the myth that Protagoras tells in Plato’s *Protagoras* 320c–322d. Thus, in a passage of some length there is almost a word-for-word similarity between the two writers: using the same Greek terms practically all the time Titus and Plato mention first the powerful wild animals, then the weaker animals that are swift of foot, both the armed and the unarmed that are somehow given protection, the birds that are protected by their wings, and other creatures that are protected by living underground. Every animal is therefore looked after (*Contra Manichaeos*, Gr. 53.7–12 and *Protagoras* 320d8–321a1). To combat the changing seasons some of them received thick fur and tough skin to guard against the winter chill or the summer heat and to serve as a portable bed (*Contra Manichaeos*, Gr. 53.14–18 and *Protagoras* 321a3–7). Some were given a low fertility turnover, while those that were often eaten by others were given a high procreative ability (*Contra Manichaeos*, Gr. 53.18–21 and *Protagoras* 321a8–9).

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7 Smith 1879–1901, 3720 merely remarks “nom. viri, forte Creon, Tit. Bostr. 117.16.”

8 None of the persons of this name mentioned in Pauly—Wissowa XI,2, 1709–10 and Pauly—Wissowa Suppl. IV, 1048–60, were philosophers and could fit in with Titus’s remark.

9 Puech 1930, 559–60.
321b5–6). Both writers also mention the various foodstuffs for all the animals (Contra Manichaeos, Gr. 53.21ff. and Protagoras 321b2–4). Whether Titus is building on Protagoras or, as is perhaps more likely, on another text that has made use of Protagoras’s myth to demonstrate the wisdom in nature,\textsuperscript{10} this passage shows that Titus was a writer willing to paraphrase his original source word for word and present it as his own text. Ancient writers were admittedly not possessed of the cult of originality of our time, even though a conventional way to attack a writer was to accuse him of “stealing” from others; but whatever the case there is a difference between how “transcriptive” the ancient writers were. If Titus includes an unoriginal paraphrase here, it is likely that he also does so in other places, where no control is possible.

However, genuine knowledge of Titus’s philosophical position can only be gained by analysing certain more comprehensive and basic passages.

2. Titus’s concept of God and his basic philosophical position

The question of God or the first principle was fundamental in Greek philosophy, particularly towards the close of Late Antiquity. The Catholic Christian apologists assumed that this “philosophical monotheism” formed an analogy to Judaeo-Christian monotheism, and it therefore became one of their most important weapons; this linking of two “monotheisms” is altogether of fundamental significance in the history of ideas, since it was on this level that it became a fulcrum for the merging of the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian cultural heritages.

In order to draw nearer to Titus’s philosophical position it is therefore natural to examine his teaching on God, so as to illuminate the basis of the rest of his theology and his cultural fellowship with the pagans that he invoked in his battle against Manichaeism. For this purpose Book I of Contra Manichaeos is especially relevant; in particular a treatment of Book I chaps. 1–13 could form a good starting-point for understanding Titus’s concept of God and some of his

\textsuperscript{10} I find this explanation the most likely, because we do not otherwise get the impression from Titus that he was a reader of the classic philosophical works.
other basic definitions. In I.1 Titus acknowledges the heretics’ point of departure; they wish to “remove the causes of men’s sins from God” (Gr. 1.1–2 → Ch. XI.1), and their aim was in itself “holy and truthful” (Gr. 1.2 → Ch. XI.1). Their solution, however, was wrong; they should have given man the blame for the fact that he sins, but instead they denied that God’s Providence reveals itself in everything, and thus “they plunged into the greater and heavy sickness of impiety” (Gr. 1.3–8 → Ch. XI.1). Mani was the worst; “he wanted to show God to be innocent of the evil”, and he therefore claimed evil is almost equal to God, uncreated and living (Gr. 1.8–15 → Ch. XI.1). According to the Catholic Church God is also innocent of man’s sinning (Gr. 1.22–24), and just like the heretics Titus will put forward a “demonstrative proof in defence of God” (Gr. 1.30 → Ch. XI.2). As I have hinted, the core of the proof is that sin is man’s own fault; Mani’s solution, which makes evil an independent principle, contains the indecent idea for the concept of God that anyone should be able to oppose God for ever (Gr. 1.20–21),11 and this moreover implies that sins cannot be cured, i.e. man cannot be improved ethically (e.g. I.1, Gr. 2.3–6, and I.2, Gr. 2.15–38). Titus thus accuses the Manichaeans of being determinists.12

The Manichaeans, however, did not settle for blaming God for the sin of man; they also asked from where did evil things come (Πόθεν (λέγοντες) τὰ κακά; Gr. 3.26),13 and assuming that the world was a mixture of good and evil, on this basis they censured most of Creation for being evil; e.g. they claimed that beasts of prey were both useless to, and harmful for, men (I.3, Gr. 2.38–3.24; I.4, Gr. 3.24–31).

It is becoming clear that Titus presents Manichaeism in such a way that it may be perceived as a theoretical solution to two of the problems of Greek philosophy: the problem of a theodicy and the origin of evil.14 It is true that these problems were central for

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11 The teaching that anthropomorphisms are not “appropriate” (θεοπρεπὲς) to God has its roots as far back as Xenophanes and was central to the Church fathers’ theology (cf. Jaeger 1960, 49–51); when Titus uses this motif (οὐ τί ἄν γένοιτο τῶν πρεσβῶν περί θεοῦ λογισμῶν ἄλλοτριότερον), he therefore seems to be stressing that Mani is pulling God down into a polytheist sphere, where the titans wage war on the gods, etc.

12 Concerning this accusation see above pp. 171–76.

13 Cf. above p. 251.

14 Because of the existence of evil God’s Providence was doubted by the Epicurean and Sceptical philosophers; cf. above (pp. 217–18).
the Manichaeans, but they are of course not just philosophical problems but are also linked to other cultural traditions such as the Jewish or the Iranian. Nevertheless it is probable that the Manichaeans whom Titus is attacking also wanted to associate their own questions with the philosophers’ ones. The difference between the Manichaeans and Titus’s treatment of the question of evil lies in his distinguishing two aspects of it, namely the question of human sin and the question of evil in nature. The latter kind of evil is not actually evil, according to Titus. Here he is pursuing a philosophical, particularly Stoic, distinction and already on this point he is hoping to establish an anti-Manichaean community with educated pagan readers.

The Manichaeans’ solution to the problems is their well-known doctrine of two basic, opposing principles, and therefore Titus wishes to begin by showing that a doctrine of two principles, including even two opposing principles, is unacceptable for the “natural concepts” (I.5, Gr. 4.11–14 → Ch. XI.3). In continuation of this Titus then presents a number of arguments that there can only be one single principle. In a number of cases it is possible to demonstrate how these arguments continue a philosophical tradition.

Thus Titus seems to be continuing old patristic and philosophical arguments, when he turns against the Manichaeans’ doctrine that the two principles limit one another, and instead he seeks to show that God is uncircumscribed (ἀπερίληπτος) and everywhere (I.7, Gr. 4.18–28). The Manichaean teaching that the two principles are each in their own place wavers in the face of the question of whether the principles are greater and older than the places, or vice versa; perhaps the places are uncreated and not principles, or perhaps there are four uncreated principles (I.8, Gr. 4.28–5.3). These arguments are already to be found in Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianos 8; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses II.1,2, II.3,1; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem I.11,2–3, I.15,2–6; Adamantius, De recta in Deum fide II.1 (822ab),

15 Cf. above p. 252.
16 Cf. Gronau 1922, passim (“das physische und moralische Uebel”), but esp. 31ff.; Pohlenz 1948, 100; 1948a, 57.
17 The Church fathers were in agreement that God was uncircumscribed and not tied to a particular place, see e.g. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. V.11 (71.2–5; 74.4–5) (Stählin 1906, 374.4–24, 376.5–13) or Origen, De princ. I.1,6 (Koetschau 1913, 20.24–23.14). This doctrine comes from Middle Platonism; see Lilla 1971, 215–16.
18 Bakhuyzen 1901, 60.12–20, 62.1–18.
and were common in anti-Manichaean polemic\textsuperscript{19} and Early Church polemic in general; their origin, however, is debatable.\textsuperscript{20}

Considerable interest centres around certain chapters in which Titus applies Aristotelian logic and distinctions that were particularly used in the ancient commentaries on Aristotle; in addition to demonstrating Titus’s knowledge of this philosophical tradition these chapters also introduce certain anthropological definitions that will be of significance later in this study.

In *Contra Manichaeos* I.11–12 (Gr. 6.17–32), where Titus is calling into question that the Manichaeans’ two principles can be opposites, he bases his argument on the fact that the names (ονόματα) of the two principles (“substance” [οὐσία]) and their description (υπογραφή) (“living and uncreated” [ζωσά τε καὶ ἄγένητος], Gr. 6.27) are the same (→ Ch. XI.4).\textsuperscript{21} In the same way Porphyry, *Commentarius in Categorias* juxtaposes “name” and “description”: “I claim that everything possesses both a name and either a definition or a description.”\textsuperscript{22} Here Porphyry is explaining Aristotle’s treatment of homonym, synonym and paronym in * Categoriae* I (1a1ff). According to Aristotle synonyms have both the same name and the same account (λόγος) of essence corresponding to the name (τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τούνομα λόγος τῆς ὀψαίς ὁ ἀντός, * Categoriae* I [1a6–7]). According to the ancient commentaries on Aristotle λόγος here means both “definition” (ὁρισμός) and “description” (ὑπογραφή); Porphyry says that we are also spea-

\textsuperscript{19} E.g. in Alexander of Lycopolis, *Contra Manich. opin. disp.* VI, Brinkmann 1895, 10.7–11 (although the subject here is “matter” not “place”, the argument is closely related; see further Beck 1978, 70ff.; Klein 1991, 54, 59–68.

\textsuperscript{20} See the argument in Grant 1966, 105–10 (cf. Stead 1976, 132–33). Referring in particular to *Adv. Marc.* and *Dial. Adamant*. Grant (1966, 109–10) believes that the one of Athenagoras’s arguments that has to do with God’s “place” was originally formulated as a semi-philosophical “answer” to Marcion. Malherbe (1970) on the other hand believes that Athenagoras’s arguments are based on Middle-Platonic sources. The existence of a similar argument in Alexander of Lycopolis (see previous note) points in my opinion in the same direction, unless one assumes that Alexander had access to Catholic heresiology, which is hardly likely.

\textsuperscript{21} In this context Titus also writes some brief remarks on semantics: according to him names (ονόματα) signify (σημαντικά) things (πράγματα), in that they predicate (κατηγορεῖν) what they are “as far as it is possible” (ὡς ἐνδέχεται, Gr. 6.24) (I.11, Gr. 6.23–25). Here Titus appears to be ignoring Aristotle’s theory in *De int.* I (16a1–18), where language does not signify things directly but the concept in the soul that stands for the thing. However, such simplifications also appear elsewhere among Titus’s contemporaries (see further Lloyd 1991, 36–37).

\textsuperscript{22} Transl. by Strange 1992, 38. Busse 1887, 60.15–16: Φημὶ τοίνυν ὁτι παντός πράγματος ὄνομα καὶ ὀρισμόν ἢ υπογραφήν ἐχοντος, . . .
ing of synonyms when there is merely a common “description”. 23
Titus apparently believes that the Manichaeans’ two principles are
“synonyms” (though he does not use this term). 24

Titus continues this way of arguing in Contra Manichaeos I.13, where
he operates with a large number of Aristotelian concepts, including
the categories of substance (οὐσία) and quality (ποιτίς), as well as
the predicables genus (γένος), species (εἶδος), difference (διαφορά) and accident (συμβεβηκός); 25 the last-mentioned term is admittedly not men-
tioned directly, but it is presupposed when Titus speaks of qualities
that come into being (ἐπισυμβαίνειν) and are absent (ἀποσυμβαίνειν). 26

23 Simplicius, In Cat. Ch.1 (Kalbfleisch 1897, 29.16ff.) explains that when Aristotle
in Cat. I (1a1ff.) speaks of λόγος and not ὀρθός ὀρθός, it is in order to include the
descriptive explanation (λόγον δὲ ὀτὸν εἶπεν καὶ σύχι ὀρθῶν, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ὑπογραφικὴν ἀπόσωσιν). Cf. Hadot 1990, 50 n. 23, 76ff. Simplicius here is speaking of homonyms;
it is of course unnecessary for him to repeat the explanation of these concepts in
connection with the synonyms, where the same must be true (cf. Hadot 1990,
Lloyd 1991, 44.

24 Naturally Titus is forcing the Manichaean mythology into a context that is
foreign to it; this makes a “refutation” easy. But we must be aware that Titus has
of course meant that when the Manichaeans’ myths play out in a spatial context,
they must stand the test of universal logic. Cf. also how Augustine, as a pious
Manichaean, attempted to make his God “fit in” with Aristotle’s Cat. (Conf. IV.XVI,28,
Verheijen 1981, 54).

25 In Top. Aristotle reckons with the following predicables: definition (ὅρος, ὀρθός ὀρθός),
property (τὸν), genus and accident (Top. I,4 [101b17–23]; I,5 [101b38ff.]); however, in
Isag., Busse 1887, 1.4–5 (and passim), Porphyry added species and difference, but omitted
definition (see Warren 1975, 11, but cf. Strange 1992, 8). Moreover, the very
term pradicabilium (predicable) was not formed until the Middle Ages.—In Contra Manich.
I.24 Titus also uses Aristotelian concepts; here he summarises all corporeal
things in different species, which in the end are gathered in the highest genus, the
body (Gr. 15.26–16.4 → Ch. XI.11).

26 Titus uses ἐπι- and ἀποσυμβαίνειν in such a fixed way that it appears tech-
nical: see the use of ἐπισυμβαίνειν in I.13 (→ Ch. XI.5), partly alone (Gr.
7.1.2.3.3–4.17.26), and partly (Gr. 7.13) in tandem with ἀποσυμβαίνειν (Gr. 7.14),
further the use of ἐπισυμβαίνειν in II.8 (Gr. 29.31), more distantly the pairing of ἐπι-
(Gr. 45.14) and ἀποσυμβαίνειν (Gr. 45.15) in II.31 and the pairing of συμβαίνειν
(Gr. 46.30) and ἀποσυμβαίνειν (Gr. 46.31) in II.34 and (Gr. 47.33) in III.37. Aristotle
of course used terms such as συμβαίνειν and συμβεβηκὸς, but not ἀποσυμβαίνειν,
and only ἐπισυμβαίνειν in Rhet. III (1426a6) and Anal. pr. II,16 (64b29) (according
to Herrmann Bonitz’s “Index Aristotelicus” in Bekker 1870). Sextus Empiricus’s use
of ἐπισυμβαίνειν in Adv. Math. IX.371 (Mutschmann 1914, 289 [463.29]); XI.130
(Mutschmann 1914, 403 [572.2]) does not illuminate Titus, but Plotinus’s use of
ἐπισυμβαίνειν in Enn. VI.3.8 does. Especially close to Titus’s technical use, how-
ever, is Sextus Empiricus’s pairing of συμβεβηκότα/συμβαίνειν and ἀποσυμ-
βεβηκότα/ἀποσυμβαίνειν in Adv. Math. VII.281–82 (Mutschmann 1914, 65
[251.26–30]), cf. also Simplicius, In Cat. Ch. 7 (Kalbfleisch 1897, 172.3). Among
Catholic writers there is a particularly close parallel in Contra Ar. III,65 (PG 26,
In *Contra Manichaeos* I.13 (Gr. 7.4–5 → Ch. XI.5) Titus states that it is permissible to find contrary qualities in the existing things, but not contraries to substances: cf. * Categoriae* V (4a10ff.); VIII (10b12) and V (3b24–29). Titus then gives examples of contrary qualities. White/black are in the first place not contraries—as colours they both belong to the same genus—but on the other hand they are contraries, and precisely as contraries they provide pleasure for the eye (Gr. 7.5–10 → Ch. XI.5). So they are not contraries in all circumstances.—Titus has doubtless acquired this idea from an intermediary, but otherwise white/black is one of Aristotle’s favourite examples of quality in * Categoriae* (see e.g. * Categoriae* IV [1b29]; V [4a10–23]; VIII [10b12–18]; XI [14a20–22]).

Titus’s next example has to do with virtue and vice: these are contraries (Gr. 7.11–12 → Ch. XI.5), but both belong to the same genus, namely “state” (ἐξεικόν) (Gr. 7.12–13 → Ch. XI.5). In * Categoriae* VIII (8b29) Aristotle precisely affirms that virtue is a ἐξεικόν, and in * Categoriae* VIII (8b27–28) that ἐξεικόν is a species of quality.28 Similarly, in *Ethica Nicomachea* I,13,20 (1103a3–10) Aristotle writes that virtues are ἐξεικόνες, and in *Ethica Nicomachea* II,5 (1105b19–1106a13) virtue and vice are counted as ἐξεικόνες. On this point, however, there is a difference between Titus and Aristotle. In addition to emphasising that virtue and vice belong to the same genus, Titus states that they are also in the same substance, that is, the soul, and that there they can both come into being (ἐπισυμβαίνειν) and be absent (ἀποσυμβαίνειν), “since the soul that they are in finds itself first in one mood, then in the other” (Gr. 7.14–15) (Gr. 7.12.13–17 → Ch. XI.5). So virtue and

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460B), where Athanasius says of the Arians: περὶ . . . τὸν Θεὸν φρόνησιν καὶ βουλὴν καὶ ἐορθὴν καὶ ἑκατοτόμην ὡς ἐξεικόνα καὶ ἀποσυμβαίνουσαν καὶ ἀποσυμβαίνουσαν ἀκόμη καὶ ἀποσυμβαίνουσαν ἢ ἀριστοτέλειος γίνεσθαι μυθολογοῦσι (cf. Meijering 1974, 67, 83). Cf. also ἐπισυμβαίνειν in *De decr.* 12 (PG 25, 444C); *Ep. ad Aeg. et Lib.* 16 (PG 25, 573B); *Contra Ar.* I,14 (PG 26, 41B); I,20 (PG 26, 53B); *De syn.* 52 (PG 26, 788B).—Cf. more distantly John Chrysostom, who in *In Rom. Hom.* XII,6; PG 60,503 claims that sin is not a δύναμις ἐννοιστατος but the evil deed that always arises and disappears (ἐπιγνωμενὴν τι καὶ ἀπογινωμενὴν ἡκί). Athanasius also used the term ἐπιγινωσκεῖν to express accidental being (see Meijering 1974, 67–68 with references)—other instances in Löhr 1996, 157 with n. 3.—The fact that Titus uses a terminology that differs from Aristotle perhaps suggests he has not actually read Aristotle himself.

27 Cf. * Cat.* VII (6b15–16), where virtue and vice are treated as “relatives”; virtue and vice can be referred to both relatives and qualities, see * Cat.* VIII (11a20ff.) (cf. Porphyry, * In Cat.,* Busse 1887, 114.1ff.; Busse 1887, 140–41).

28 ἐξεικόν is actually genus for virtue and vice, but in relation to the category of quality ἐξεικόν is a species.
vice are qualities which are true at one point in time, but not at another; they are in other words accidental. Titus is thus interested in stressing that virtue and vice are not stable or permanent qualities. However, when Aristotle spoke of virtue and vice as ἐξετας, he intended to say that they constituted something more lasting or stable; in *Categories* VIII (8b26–28) not only ἐξετας but also διάθεσιςς, “disposition”, are a species of quality, and the difference between them is that ἐξετας is more lasting and stable than διάθεσιςς. Admittedly the various ἐξετας, including the virtues, can be displaced, but it is difficult; διάθεσιςς on the other hand, meaning for example, cold, heat, sicknesses etc, change quite rapidly, except in the cases where they happen to remain for so long that they become second nature and thus a ἐξετας. For states (ἐξετας) are also dispositions (διάθεσιςς), but dispositions are not always states (*Categories* VIII [8b29–9a13]). The idea is that a man becomes virtuous by practising virtue through a series of single acts; these must not be an unconscious habit, but must each be performed with intention, so they can be judged morally; by forming a state, however, the previous acts come to influence the choices to be made in new situations. Thus Titus appears to use ἐξετας more in the sense in which Aristotle uses διάθεσις in *Categories*, while at the same time still applying ἐξετας to describe virtue and vice. 

But since Aristotle also believed that ἐξετας could be displaced, there is no real difference between him and Titus on this point but more a contextually conditioned difference over what is to be emphasised. Titus’s presentation thus accords well with what an accident is according to Porphyry: “What comes into being and passes away apart from the destruction of the substratum is an accident.” The reason for Titus’s interest in emphasising that ἐξετας can be absent from the soul, is, as I shall now show, that his presentation is concerned

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29 In these questions the Stoics had (at least in certain contexts) a divergent terminology. A “state” that did not permit “more or less” (i.e. it could not be intensified or the opposite) they called διάθεσιςς; the virtues were such διάθεσιςς. The “states” that allowed “more or less” the Stoics on the other hand called ἐξετας (see Simplicius, *In Cat.* Ch. 8 [Kalbfleisch 1897, 237.25–238.32] [= Von Arnim 1923, 129–30 (*SvF* II, 393)]; Ch. 10 [Kalbfleisch 1897, 402.19–26] [= Von Arnim 1923a, 57 (*SvF* III, 238)]; more distantly Porphyry, *In Cat.*, Busse 1887, 137.39–138.1ff; on this see also Rist 1969, 3; Stead 1977, 124–25; Diile 1982, 64–65; Strange 1992, 115 n. 320; 152 n. 486; Forschner 1995, 61ff.). As can be seen, Stoic terminology cannot explain Titus’s presentation.

with a difference between the created substances and the uncreated substance.

Titus thus says that virtue and vice come and go, i.e. are accidental qualities; later he also describes them as “separable qualities” (Gr. 7.32–33 → Ch. XI.5). Titus’s next example therefore has to do with quality as “inseparable” (ἄχωριστός). In the case of milk and ravens, white and black are respectively inseparable from their substances, but no one has ever designated the milk or the ravens by these colours (Gr. 7.17–25 → Ch. XI.5). This is good Aristotelianism, even though there turns out to be a terminological difference between Titus and certain passages in Aristotle. I have already mentioned that Titus does not use the term συμβεβηκός, accident, at all but only speaks of virtues and vices which “come and go”. In Aristotle accident means for the most part “separable accident”, corresponding to Titus’s qualities which “come and go”; but occasionally accident means the proper and necessary function of a thing, though without it being part of the definition of that thing, and posterity speaks therefore of the “inseparable accident” (συμβεβηκός ἁχώριστον). For example in Isagoge Porphyry distinguishes between the separable and the inseparable accident, where the act of sleeping is a separable accident, whereas being black is inseparable both in a raven and an Ethiopian, without being part of their definition. It is clear that Titus’s “inseparable quality”, after which the substance is not named, corresponds to the “inseparable accident” that does not enter into the definition. It is also worth noting that Titus and Porphyry use the same example (“the raven” [κόραξ], which perhaps suggests that we are dealing with traditional examples from elementary philosophical instruction.

All Titus’s examples are simply to show that contraries only concern the qualities (whether they “come and go” or are “inseparable”), not the substances themselves. But this is true solely of the created substances, for the uncreated substance (God) has no qualities at all:

31 Thus Aristotle mentions this meaning of accident in Met. III,1,8 (995b19–20); V,30,4 (1025a30ff.); Anal. post. I,6–7 (75a18–19, 75a39–75b2). Cf. also Stead 1977, 129, 141–42 with n. 12, 145, 151 n. 22.
33 The example comes again in Isag., Busse 1887, 16.20–17.2; cf. Busse 1887, 17.12; 21.15–17; 21.20–22.3; moreover 19.19; 22.5ff.
34 Titus says that one can find contrary qualities (“a contrariety in the qualities”)
But in respect of God every quality is rejected, because none of the things that He is called is something else beside Him, for He is simple and uncompounded (Gr. 7.33–35 → Ch. XI.5).35

Even though Titus’s teaching that God is a simple substance without qualities has a certain connection to the negative theology of Platonism in Late Antiquity, it must primarily be said to continue Aristotelian ideas, precisely because it maintains that God is a substance.36

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35 Titus admits, however, that purely intellectually or conceptually (τῇ εννοίᾳ, Gr. 6.37, 7.35) it is possible to distinguish between God’s being (τὸ εἶναι) and God’s quality (τὸ τούτῳ εἶναι) (Gr. 6.37–7.4, 7.35–36 → Ch. XI.5).

36 See Aristotle, Met. VII,1,5 (1028a31); XII,7,3–4 (1072a31ff) (cf. Meijering 1974, 81) (incidentally Plato also writes in Rep. 380d that God is ἀπλός). Aristotle thought that God belongs to the category of substance (Eth. Nic. I,6,3 [1096a23–25]). Already in Clement of Alexandria we find a negative theology in which God is beyond all categories (esp. Strom. V.11 [71.1–5] [Stählin 1906, 373.24–374.24]; V.12 [81.5–82.4] [Stählin 1906, 380.18–381.13]; in Strom. V.12 [81.5–6] Clement underlines that God is without any accident; Früchtel 1937, 592 has proved that the same passage is found almost word for word in Alkinoos, Did. X (165.4–8), which must at least mean that the two writers have used the same source (cf. Lilla 1971, 214–15; Wyrrwa 1983, 269–72; Pannenberg 1996, 77–78; Dörrie 1976, 187–88). The Platonic tenet (e.g. in Alkinoos and Porphyry) that Aristotle’s categories cannot be applied to the highest principle (see Dörrie 1976, 187–88; cf. 300–1) is not quite the same as Titus’s teaching that quality only concerns the Creation; his view does not rep-
It is now clear that when Titus underlines in particular that virtue and vice are “separable qualities” that may be present or absent, it is in order to stress the difference from God, for whom “goodness” is not a quality that He possesses, but is what He is; we find the very same idea in Origen, for example. Thus Titus’s disinterest in

resent a completely negative theology, since despite everything God is a substance.—When Titus says that “none of the things that He is called is something else beside Him”, it is also reminiscent of a Platonic theory which in the end goes back to Xenophanes’s attack on the anthropomorphisms of popular religion. Xenophanes appears to have written that God “is wholly sight, wholly mind, wholly hearing” (οὖλος ὀράτη, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ’ ἀκούει [Diels and Kranz 1951, 135, B 24 (= Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. IX.144, Mutschmann 1914, 246 [422.26])]; the quotation is also testified to elsewhere, see further Schoedel 1959, 26; Grant 1967, 104). This understanding of God was already quite widespread in Greek patristics; thus in Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.13.3: “Multum enim distat omnium Pater ab his quae proueniunt hominibus adictionibus et passionibus, et simplex et non compositus et similimembrius et totus ipse sibimetipsi similis et equalis est, totus cum sit sensus et totus spiritus et totus sensuabilitas et totus ennoia et totus ratio et totus auditus et totus oculos et totus lumen et totus fons omnium bonorum” (Rousseau and Doutrelaud 1982, 114, 116); cf. also I.12.2; II.13.8; II.28.4; IV.11.2 (cf. Schoedel 1959, 26, 28–29; Grant 1967, 104–5). Also Clement of Alexandria, Strom. VII.2 (5.5) (Stählin 1909, 6.1–2; VII.7 (37.6) (Stählin 1909, 29.14–15) (cf. Grant 1967, 104). In Ref. I.14.1 Hippolytus also refers to the Xenophanes quotation, but in this case it is not an example of Hippolytus’s own opinion, but a summary of Xenophanes’s teaching.—As can be seen, in the passage quoted Irenaeus, like Titus, emphasises that God is “simple and uncompounded”; this formulation appears to have been a topos in Platonic and Christian literature, cf. e.g. Origen in Contra Cels. IV.14 (Borret 1968, 218, more distantly De princ. I.1.6 (Koetschau 1913, 21.11–12.17–18.19–20, 22.1). Cf. also but more distantly Alkinoos, Did. X (166.5–7). In Basilides’s extremely negative theology these two attributes are negated just after one another (οὐ χύλωσθαι, οὐ συνθέσθαι, Hippolytus, Ref. VII.21.1 [Wendland 1916, 196, 16]). “Uncompounded” is an amplification of “simple”, in that “compounded” means compounded of substance and qualities (accidents), as is clear, for example, from passages in Athanasius, thus Ep. ad Afr. 8 (PG 26, 1044B) (τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ μὴ θέλειν εἶναι ποιητής ἰδια, and if one therefore uses these concepts about God, one is saying that God is σύνθεσται ἐκ ποιητῆς καὶ οὐσίας, even though God in reality is not σύνθετος, but ἀπό ἑκείνης οὐσίας, ἐν ἦν οὐκ ἐν ποιητῇ [cf. Meijering 1974, 81]) or De Decr. 22 (PG 25, 453C: Εἰ μὲν οὖν τόν Θεόν ἠγείρετος τις εἶναι σύνθετον, ὡς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ συμβεβηκός...;) (cf. also that God is not σύνθετος in Ep. ad Aeg. et Lib. 16 [PG 25, 573B]).

37 Based on 1 Tim. 6.16 Origen thus emphasises in In Jo. II.18 (124–25) [Blanc 1966, 288–91] that since only God has immortality, none of the rational creatures substantially (οὐσιοδοξος) possesses immortality as a συμβεβηκός ἐχθριστος. In other places Origen similarly emphasises that only God is good οὐσιοδοξος/ substantialiter, while created beings can only be good κατὰ συμβεβηκός/ accidentaliter, their goodness is something that comes and goes (see Contra Cels. VI.44 [Borret 1969, 286]; De princ. I.2.4 [Koetschau 1913, 31.16–32.2]; I.2.10 [Koetschau 1913, 44.11–21]; I.2.13 [Koetschau 1913, 46.11–48.3]; I.5.3 [Koetschau 1913, 72.19–73.6]; I.5.5 [Koetschau 1913, 77.19–78.5]; I.6.2 [Koetschau 1913, 80.10–14]; I.8.3 [Koetschau 1913, 100.11–101.3]; II.9.2 [Koetschau 1913, 165.17–24]; IV.4.8 [Koetschau 1913, 360.10ff]; IV.4.10 [Koetschau 1913, 363.14ff]). Correspondingly Origen explains
emphasising that virtue and vice as ἐξετάζει are relatively lasting or stable stems from this particular approach to the problem.

On the basis of the account that I have now summarised Titus then builds up his criticism of Manichaean teaching: since the two principles are both named and described identically (as a “living and uncreated substance”), they cannot be opposites, nor can they possess besides the contrary qualities of “good” and “evil” when the uncreated substance does not have qualities: those things which God is called coincide with His substance (Gr. 6.32–7.4, 7.31–8.16). The two substances are therefore either both good or both evil. Only ironically does Titus accept that both could be evil, for his opinion is that the uncreated is also good (Gr. 7.36–8.3). So the two good uncreated substances must be the same and be the cause of all else:

But if being is in complete accord with being, then that is one which alone is in truth and which is the origin of everything’s being.” (Gr. 8.15–16).38

Thus Titus maintains that God is a simple, uncompounded substance and therefore without qualities. This concept of God probably has Aristotelian roots, but must without doubt be understood on the background of the Platonic tradition as continued by earlier Catholic writers. A few brief remarks will serve to outline the context in which Titus’s concept of God is to be understood.

Among the Platonic philosophers the status of the first principle was debated for a very long time. Many Middle Platonists believed that the first principle was υονδάζει; this was the doctrine of Aristotle, according to which God is υονδάζει and a simple substance who has Himself as the object of His thought (Metaphysica XII,6–10 [1071b3–1076a4]); also Xenocrates (396–314 BCE), the second leader of the Academy after Plato, claimed that God is υονδάζει, perhaps influenced by Aristotle. The Middle Platonists made the object of God’s thought

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38 εἰ δὲ τὸ ὃν τῷ ὄντι πάντως ὁμόλογον, ἐν τῷ καὶ μόνον ἀληθῶς ὃν τοῖς πάσι τοῦ εἶναι ἄρχον.
Plato’s “ideas”, which thus became “God’s thoughts”; also this tenet, which is not Aristotelian, may come from Xenocrates, even though it is first testified to in Philo. The doctrines that God has Himself as the object of His thought or that He contains all ideas, appeared to threaten other important doctrines, which had to do with the transcendence, simplicity and unity of God. The Middle Platonists found these doctrines expressed in different places in Plato’s dialogues; above all they built on a passage in *De republica* (VI,509b9), where he writes that:

> the good is not being [or “substance”], but lies beyond being and exceeds it with regard to dignity and power (οὐκ ὁντος τοῦ ἄραθος, ἀλλ’ ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὁντος πρεσβείας καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος),

and on the first hypothesis in Plato’s *Parmenides* (137c–142a), where the one is denied all predicates. Since being and thinking in the Platonic tradition are similar or even identical, the question arises of whether the highest principle does not transcend both ὁντος and νοῦς. Already in the first Academy this question had probably been in dispute, as a fragment suggests from one of Aristotle’s exoteric works (*De Oratione*, Περὶ εὐχής): “God is either mind or also beyond mind” (ὁ θεὸς ἢ νοῦς ἐστίν ἢ καὶ ἐπέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ). Moreover there was disagreement among Platonic philosophers on who the Creator (the Demiurge) that Plato speaks of in *Timaeus*, actually was; only a few of them (e.g. Atticus) made the Demiurge the first principle. While the Middle Platonists did not reach any common resolution of these problems, such a solution is to be found in Plotinus’s metaphysical system, where the one is both beyond ὁντος and νοῦς, so that νοῦς becomes the second hypostasis and is identified with the Demiurge.\(^\text{39}\)

On the background of Plato’s dictum in *De republica* VI,509b9 and the general disagreement among the Middle Platonists it is not surprising that the Catholic writers also hesitated when faced with the

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question of whether God is beyond οὐσία and νοῦς. For the Catholic philosophers the problem was further complicated by the challenge that the philosophical concept of God had to be combined with the ideas of God that could be found in Scripture. Already from a biblical background “substance” (οὐσία) for the Catholic writers must be the most appropriate designation that could be used about God; for God says ὢν εἰμὶ ὁ ὢν in Ex. 3.14LXX (cf. Wis. 13.1).

Thus Clement of Alexandria alludes several times to De republica VI,509b9: the true dialectic ascends to the οὐσία, which is the mightiest of all, and then dares to go beyond (ἐπέκεινα) to the God of the universe (Stromata I.28 [177.1]). The mightiest οὐσία is the Son (Λόγος).40 Similarly, Clement explains in Stromata VII.1 (2.2–3) that the Son is the timeless, beginningless beginning (ἀρχή), who is the first fruit of all existing things; through him we can apprehend the transcendent principle (τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον), the Father of the world.41 Although Clement does not directly deny here that God is an οὐσία, it nevertheless seems implicit.42 Occasionally, on the other hand, Clement claims that God is being, for example in Paedagogus I.8, where he admittedly first (71.1) writes: “but God is one and beyond the one and above the Monad itself” (ἐν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἕνος καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδο) (as elsewhere in Clement μονάς here denotes the Son). Clement continues, however, by claiming that God alone is in truth, who was, is and is to come (Rev. 11.17), for which reason He also has received the name of ὁ ὢν (Ex. 3.14) (71.2).43 One possible interpretation is that Clement regards the Father as being, because the Father is νοῦς,44 but it is difficult to make this

40 Stählin 1906, 109.7–9; see on this Wyrwa 1983, 128–31. See also Pannenberg 1996, 78–79 on the Church fathers’ attitude to these questions.

41 Stählin 1909, 4.5–7.—Although the Son contains the world of (Platonic) ideas as “God’s thoughts” (see e.g. Strom. V.3 [16.3] [Stählin 1906, 336.8–9] and further Lilla 1971, 201–12), Clement can also underline the Son’s transcendence in relation to the world and the world of ideas; referring to Eph. 1.21, Phil. 2.9, he writes in Strom. V.6 (38.6) that the Lord is above the world, indeed even beyond the intelligible (ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοητοῦ) (Stählin 1906, 352.13–14), cf. the interpretation in Wyrwa 1983, 130.

42 Cf. Whittaker 1969, 93–94: when the Son in Strom. VII.1 (2.2–3) is ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, then τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον must be ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.


44 See Protr. X (98.4) (Stählin 1905, 71.25); Strom. IV.25 (155.2) (Stählin 1906, 317.11); V.11 (73.1–3) (Stählin 1906, 375.11–21); thus Lilla 1971, 222–24. Wyrwa
interpretation accord with Clement’s negative theology; moreover he also maintains that God is above all thought and thus cannot be grasped by human reason e.g. in *Stromata* V.10 (65.2): “For the God of the universe, who is above all speech, all conception, all thought...”\(^{45}\)

In *Stromata* V.12 (82.1–2), however, Clement attempts a solution which hardly, as Whittaker believes, can be said to be an expression of quandary. All our designations for God, such as the one, the good, ō νῶς, the being itself, Father, God, Creator, Lord, do not express God’s name, but merely refer to the power of the Almighty.\(^{46}\)

It is thus only figurative when Clement calls the Father ō ὀσία; Clement’s real intention is that He is beyond ō ὀσία. This understanding of God is thus rather different from Titus’s view.

On the other hand Titus seems to have been in line with Origen’s views in *De principiis*, where he states that the Father is νοῦς (mens); also “Monad and unity” (μονὸς καὶ ἕνας) are predicates that Origen sets on the Father, and therefore he also speaks of the Father’s substantia and natura. This natura, however, is *simplex* (*De principiis* I.1,6).\(^{47}\)

The Father is also *incomprehensibilis* and *inaestimabilis*; if we are to perceive or understand God, we must assume that He is much better than our perception of Him (*De principiis* I.1,5).\(^{48}\)

Only the Son contains the world of (Platonic) ideas (*De principiis* I.2,2–3).\(^{49}\)

But in passages in *Contra Celsum*, Origen treats the issue of God’s transcendence in relation to substance as an open question, e.g. in *Contra Celsum* VI.64, he discusses the issue of God’s transcendence and proposes

\(^{45}\) Stählin 1906, 369.26–27; transl. by William Wilson in Roberts and Donaldson 1994, 460. See Lilla 1971, 217–20; Wyrwa 1983, 270. Wyrwa finds allusions here to Phil. 4.7 and Eph. 3.20.—Also *Strom.* II.2 (6.1) (Stählin 1906, 115.28–116.4) must mean that God is above ἐννοοῖα.

\(^{46}\) Stählin 1906, 380.25–381.3; cf. Whittaker 1969, 94.

\(^{47}\) Koetschau 1913, 20.24ff.

\(^{48}\) Koetschau 1913, 20.5ff.

\(^{49}\) Koetschau 1913, 28.13–31.4.
that the Son is “the substance of substances” or “the idea of ideas”, and that the Father is beyond all this, thereby implying that the Father is beyond every οὐσία, including intelligible οὐσία.50

If one wishes to maintain that God is both a substance and transcendent, one could turn to Athanasius’s solution, which was that it is only every created οὐσία that God transcends. According to Athanasius God is the one and the being (τὸν ἐνα καὶ ὄντα, Θεὸν λέγω, Contra gentes 3.23), but nevertheless in Contra gentes 2.6–7 Athanasius writes that God “is beyond all being and human thought” (ὁ ὑπέρεκεια πάσης οὐσίας καὶ ἀνθρωποτύπου ἐπινοίας ὑπάρχων);51 here οὐσία is expanded with ἐπινοία, corresponding to the expansion with νοῦς. However, in Contra gentes 35.3 (“being above all created being”, ἐπέκεινα πάσης γεννητῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχων) and in Contra gentes 40.12 (“beyond all created being”, ὑπέρεκεινα πάσης γεννητῆς οὐσίας)52 it becomes clear that here Athanasius understands οὐσία as “created substance”, which includes both the material world and the angels and other intelligible beings. Meijering has pointed out that Athanasius often uses the word ἐπινοία in connection with the worshipping of idols (e.g. Contra gentes 2.4); correspondingly, in Contra gentes 2.6–7 it may mean “perverted imagination” rather than “thought”, making it a polemical remark against the worshipping of idols: unlike the pagans’ gods the true God is beyond every creature and man’s perverted imaginations.53

Clement and Origen were perhaps in doubt as to whether God

50 Ζητητέον δὲ καὶ, εἰ οὐσίαι μὲν οὐσίων λεκτέων καὶ ἰδέαιν ἰδεῶν καὶ ἀρχὴν τῶν μονογενὴς καὶ προτότοκων “πάσης κτισίσεως” ἐπέκεινα δὲ πάντων τῶν τῶν πατέρα οὐσίων καὶ θεόν (Borret 1969, 340). Similarly Contra Cels. VII.38 (Borret 1969a, 100): Νοῦν τοῦν ἡ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας λέγοντες εἶναι ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀρέσι καὶ ἀκόμη καὶ τῶν τῶν ἄλλων θεόν... See Whittaker 1969, 92–93; Stead 1977, 140–41, 152, 161–62, 168, 169 with n. 23, 186–87, 277. A similar unclarified formulation is perhaps also found in In Jo. XIX.6 (37) (Blanc 1982, 68); through Logos, the truth, one reaches τὸ ἐννεά τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ ὑπέρεκειαν τῆς οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ φύσει τοῦ θεοῦ.
51 Transl. by Thomson 1971, 7.
52 Transl. of Contra gent. 35.3 in Thomson 1971, 95, and transl. of Contra gent. 40.12 in Thomson 1971, 111.
53 Meijering 1974, 6–8, 126; Meijering 1984, 15–16; Stead 1977, 161.—Meijering (1974, 7; 1975, 9–10) and Van Winden 1971, 73 believe moreover that we already find the sense of “beyond created οὐσία” in Justin, Dial. IV,1 and perhaps in Irenaeus, Dem. 3. Concerning Justin on the other hand Whittaker 1969, 91–92 believes that there is the same uncertainty as he observes in Clement and Origen.— As far as I can see, Origen’s solution in In Gen. III (Philoc. 23,20, Junod 1976, 198) points in the same direction; here God is seen as a νοῦς ἀγγελικός, who is ὑπέρ πάσαιν φύσιν (see also on this passage n. 4 in Junod 1976, 199; Benjamins 1994, 81 n. 58).
was a substance or beyond substance, but it is clear that Titus unambiguously maintains that God is a substance. Titus’s teaching on the transcendence of God is contained in the distinction between created and uncreated substances, and therefore he could just as well have used Athanasius’s reinterpretation of Plato, *De república* VI.509b9. Except that he did not know of it. The only allusion to the Plato passage is to be found in *Contra Manichaeos* III.11,3, where Titus writes that God is “wise beyond all conception” (σοφὸς πάσης ἐννοίας ἐπέκεινο, ed.N 304.18–19 → Ch. XI.36), and here Titus has completely omitted any talk of God being “beyond substance”, doubtless because he prefers to say that God is an uncreated substance. According to Titus, God thus differs from the other substances by in the first place being simple and without qualities, and in the second place by being the only one to be uncreated.54

The terms ἄγενντος and γένντος can be translated as “uncreated and created” or “unoriginated and originated”. Already in Plato it is a fixed predicate of the world of phenomena that it “becomes” (e.g. *Timaeus* 27d), and Titus is keeping for the most part to this philosophical tradition when he claims that God alone is ἄγενντος.55 The difference between that which is and that which becomes is also fundamental to Titus’s ontology, but at the same time other passages in *Contra Manichaeos* show that γένντος must have a further dimension of meaning, so that Titus nevertheless believes otherwise than Plato; he represents a Christian (Catholic) ontology. For according to Titus God allows the non-existing things (τὰ μὴ ὄντα) to have a share in being; the unoriginated things have come into being from the non-existing (III.10,4 and 13; III.11,1–2).56 In Titus these for-

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54 As far as I can see, Titus does not say anywhere outright that God is νοῦς; thus on this significant point he does not use Aristotelian ideas. But he does say that God’s ineffable σοφία has created and ordered the whole world (e.g. II.2, Gr. 26.16–17; II.48, Gr. 56.20), and he can speak of God’s σοφία and the ineffable and incomprehensible νοῦς (II.48, Gr. 56.24–25 → Ch. XI.30). Elsewhere, however, he can claim that God’s wisdom transcends νοῦς: “But what can we then say about God’s wisdom—being beyond every intellect—which it is fitting that we both stand in awe of and honour both when we understand it and when we do not?” (Gr. 56.36–37 → Ch. XI.31). Another expression for God’s transcendence is found as mentioned in II.37 (see above p. 29 and below p. 325).—The Aristotelian features in Titus’s concept of God are altogether selective; thus we do not find anything about God being the unmoved telos for all movement etc.

55 See further Lebreton 1926.

56 See also the brief remarks in IV.4 (things are created by God, etc.
mulations must be aiming at the doctrine of the Early Church on creatio ex nihilo: God is almighty and free; he has not created the world from eternal matter. Admittedly these phrases do not in themselves exclude the idea that the world is formed from an eternal matter; for they need mean no more than that the world did not come into being until in some way or other it was created. But in Titus’s time patristic philosophy had already a history of using the phrases as a formula that rejected the central Platonic doctrine of eternal matter.\(^{57}\) Already therefore it is probable that Titus’s formulation has a precise ontological meaning, but Titus adds explicitly that God does not need material (\(\tilde{\omega}l\eta\)) in order to create (III.10,15).

The use of \(\tilde{\omega}l\eta\) at the creation is both a Manichaean and a philosophical tenet, and in III.11,1 a doubt is introduced: there are those who doubt how anything can come into being from non-existing things (i.e. maintaining ex nihilo nihil fit); Titus, however, declares that there is not time to speak against those who make this objection. Probably in this context he is thinking of his philosophically inspired opponents; if they were Manichaeans, Titus would doubtless have found the time to respond.

Although Titus thus rejects the Platonists’ doctrine on eternal matter, he shares their interest in a theodicy, and therefore the ideas from Timaeus are nonetheless important for him. Thus in III.10,1 Titus explains that the reason that the world has come into being is God’s creative goodness\(^{58}\) (cf. Timaeus 29d–e). God did not need the Creation, but as a blessing He gave the non-existing a share in being and in being good (III.10–III.11,2; cf. III.18,2). Moreover it is Titus’s opinion that God then put into order all that he had created (III.11,3–5; IV.111); in this way elements from the Platonic doctrine that the

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\(^{57}\) Cf. May 1978.

\(^{58}\) Titus here refutes “the first doubt” (III.10,1), by which he means the first questions or the first doubt from Mani’s side, to which he referred in III.7.1: “he thus also doubts why the whole world came into being…” (→ Ch. XI.34).
Demiurge put order into matter, can be preserved.⁵⁹ Titus is very careful in his formulations: God is a creator by nature, but this does not mean that He creates out of a necessity of nature, ὀνέγκη... τὴς φύσεως (ed.N 302.13) (that is, that God has to create and is not free); rather it means that he does not deliberate or learn by experiment (III.10,2).⁶⁰ Titus also emphasises God’s independence by underlining that it is not a question of God Himself needing the Creation; God is perfect (III.10,3.8–9). Precisely because God must not be dependent on the things He creates and provides benefits for, these things must be created or originated, because being good God needs something to be good towards, He created (III.10,4–15).⁶¹

Titus’s concept of God, which involves there being only a single principle, has obvious philosophical roots; these roots, however, seem to have a somewhat composite character. Titus does not follow the form of negative theology dominant among the Platonists, where God is beyond ὑσία. For Titus God is a substance, a view that also has a biblical background but which in a philosophical context is particularly Aristotelian, even though it was also continued by certain Platonists. When Titus further defines God as a simple substance, i.e. a substance without qualities (accidents), he is also continuing Aristotelian and Platonic ideas, and it is probably his opinion that God is νοῦς, even though he does not state this explicitly.

In spite of his teaching on God’s substantial nature Titus claims

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⁵⁹ As is common in patristic exegesis (see May 1978, 146–47), Titus explains in IV.111 that Gen. 1.2 refers to the unformed world, which, however, had already been created (Gen. 1.1) (§§ 184.18–22).—Titus also alludes to Tim. 29e elsewhere, see below...  The logical contradiction between Athanasius’s teaching of creatio ex nihilo and his use of Tim. 29e, as observed by Stead 1980, 389 n. 2 and Meijering 1989, 51, can also be extended to Titus: in Plato it makes sense to say that the Demiurge will not withhold anything from the chaotic matter, but it is difficult to see the meaningfulness in claiming that the Creator will not withhold anything from the absolute nothingness: “Für Missgunst ist die Existenz desjenigen, dem man etwas missgönnt, unerlässlich, aber nach Athanasius existiert vor der Schöpfung ausser Gott ja gerade nichts”. Meijering believes that the Catholic writers used Tim. 29e, because it was a useful weapon in the polemic against Marcion, but that “diese Waffe... auch gegen die Lehre von der Schöpfung aus dem Nichts verwendet werden könnte, darum kümmerten orthodoxe Theologen sich offenbar nicht.” (Meijering 1989, 51).

⁶⁰ God does not therefore create like a human artist, which is a set theme in Early Catholic literature; see further May 1978, 75, 163–64, 173.

⁶¹ Also these ideas are traditional in Early Catholic literature; see thus Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV.13,4; IV.14,1; cf. May 1978, 179.
that there is a fundamental ontological difference between God and the other substances, and this view contains both peculiar Christian (Catholic) and Platonic elements. Ontologically Titus thus distinguishes between the one, uncreated substance and the other substances that are created from nothing. There is no eternal matter. In this regard Titus is a Catholic Christian, not a Platonist, but his Christian ontology is Platonising insofar as it integrates a number of elements that derive from Platonism. The Creation is divided into both an invisible, incorporeal part, and a visible, corporeal part; God and the invisible creature are both incorporeal. Titus’s thinking is also based on the difference between that which is and that which comes into being.

Our examination so far seems to have confirmed the picture of Titus’s philosophical position which I outlined above in the section on the history of scholarship. Titus’s concept of God is probably taken from a Platonism that integrates Aristotelian elements, but with Christian modifications. In this context I have not found examples of Stoic elements in Titus’s thought, but these exist in other contexts and accord well with the fact that the Platonism ofLate Antiquity also contained many ideas of Stoic origin.

If the Aristotelian elements in Titus’s concept of God are mediated via Platonism, this may also be true of the more extensive use of elements from Aristotelian logic, which we noted particularly in Contra Manichaeos I.13. However, this observation does not determine whether Titus actually read Categoriae and other works by Aristotle or merely works by other writers who employed Aristotelian concepts and forms of thought. Thus, for example, the Platonist Alkinoos (“Albinus”—from the middle of the 2nd cent. CE) incorporated Aristotelian logic into his Didascalicus (Vff.), but assigned the entire philosophy to Plato; however, by the 4th century it is perhaps equally imaginable that Titus indeed read Categoriae, if he was educated at a real philosophical school. Categoriae introduced the collection of

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62 I am attempting here to apply Meijering’s distinction: “Gibt es also keine christlichen Platoniker, so gibt es doch platonisierende Christen” (Meijering 1975, 13 [quotation]–14, 135).

63 See e.g. below pp. 280, 306–7.

64 Titus is naturally an educated man with school training, but this does not necessarily mean that he has trained among philosophers. For a certain amount of philosophy was incorporated in an education in rhetoric. See further on philosophical schools in Marrou 1965, 308–22.
Aristotle’s writings on logic and was assiduously commented. In the philosophical schools it was probably at an early time that *Categoriae* became the basic introduction to philosophy;65 at any rate as a result of the efforts of Plotinus’s pupil Porphyry (c. 233–305) *Categoriae* became the standard introduction to logic in the Neo-Platonic schools, together with Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, an introduction and elementary commentary on *Categoriae*; incidentally, *Isagoge* and *Categoriae* retained this function for over a thousand years. Porphyry also wrote two proper commentaries on *Categoriae*; the shorter one is preserved, while the longer one is lost, but Simplicius’s *Commentarius in Categorias* contains material from earlier lost commentaries.66 We saw above that some of Titus’s concepts and lines of thought were amenable to interpretation with the aid of these texts.

It is far from certain, however, that Titus himself was educated at a philosophical school, and we must also note that the Church fathers only rarely appear to have had a solid knowledge of Aristotle. Stead believes that in the 2nd–3rd century CE the commentaries on Aristotle were hardly read by other than experts, and that *Categoriae* was not especially well-known; at any rate the Church fathers seldom mention this text, and what they know of Aristotelian logic appears to come rather from doxographical works and other popular manuals. Admittedly in *Refutatio* VII.15ff. Hippolytus refers directly to *Categoriae*; but Clement has only second-hand knowledge of Aristotelian logic, including the definition of homonyms and synonyms that was also widely known because it had been included in textbooks on grammar; it is therefore also mentioned in the works of other Church fathers. Also more philosophical concepts were incorporated into rhetorical works that were in general use for teaching.67 This situation had not changed significantly in the 4th century.

I also regard it as unlikely that Titus was educated in philosophy.

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65 Gottschalk 1987; cf. also Lloyd 1955–56, 64; Strange 1992, 7–8, 32 with n. 13.  
67 Stead 1963, 54–55; Stead 1977, esp. 110–13, 117, 125, 141; Dihle 1987, esp. 69. It is in *Strom.* VIII.6 (17.1ff.) (Stählin 1909, 90.9ff) that Clement presents his second-hand knowledge of Aristotelian logic. In *Strom.* VII.16 (101.4) (Stählin 1909, 71.18) it is Chrysippus whom Clement gives prominence to as the great dialectician, while Aristotle is underlined for his knowledge of nature.—Also Origen’s use of Aristotelian ideas appears second-hand and moreover very limited; see Bardy 1932a.—Runia 1989 does not illuminate the question, because it has to do with a doxographical question (“Aristotle in the Greek Patres”, not “Aristotelianism in the Greek Patres”).
In the above chapters I drew attention to several peculiarities in Titus’s terminology. It is true that we could explain why Titus uses the Aristotelian term ἔξεις to claim that virtue and vice are not stable or permanent qualities, but it remains an open question as to why Titus does not use the term “synonyms”, if that is what he is speaking of in connection with the two principles having the same name and description. Why does Titus not use the precise technical term accident (συμβεβηκός), but speaks instead of qualities that come (ἐπισυμβαίνειν) and go (ἀποσυμβαίνειν)? Why does he speak of the “inseparable quality” and not the “inseparable accident”? It would suggest that Titus had not actually read Aristotle himself, as one must assume would have been the case if he had been educated in a Neo-Platonic school. Nevertheless, even though Titus did not attend a philosophical school, his library may well have contained philosophical textbooks. Thus the concept ὑπογραφή suggests that Titus knew of a text from the same philosophical tradition as the commentaries on Aristotle. “The raven” is used as an example of the same subject in Titus and in Porphyry’s Isagoge. But Isagoge is hardly Titus’s direct source; there are also too many terminological deviations between this text and Titus’s account. However, the whole of Contra Manichaeos I.13, with its examples of milk and ravens, bears the stamp of an “introductory textbook”. We might therefore consider whether Titus used a now-vanished philosophical textbook in the same style as Porphyry’s Isagoge. Titus’s account in Contra Manichaeos IV.19 of Aristotle’s teaching on matter, treated above, could even be based on this textbook. It is a much simpler hypothesis, however, to assume that Titus’s imprecise terminology is due to the fact that he is building on an earlier anti-Manichaean writing, presumably by George of Laodicea, which combined Porphyry’s Isagoge with other material. Titus, who did not himself have first-hand knowledge of this literature, did not always understand which of the concepts were the central technical terms that he should adduce in his summary of George’s argument. Similarities with Didymus’s polemic could perhaps also support the assumption that Titus is building on an earlier text, in that they could both be dependent on a third writer, but this is uncertain and could be explained in other ways.

68 See above pp. 256–58.
69 Titus, Contra Manich. I.13 has similarities to Didymus, Contra Manich. I (PG 39,
3. The “common concepts”

Above I quoted Contra Manichaeos I.1 where Titus derived “the way of truth” as much from the “common concepts” (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) as from the Bible (→ Ch. XI.2); in III.1 he further explained that up to this point his presentation in the first two books was based on the “common concepts” and that this should strengthen the mind (νοῦς), also in those outside the Church, so they did not approve of the blasphemy against the Creator. He would now turn his attention to the issue of the interpretation of the Bible (→ Ch. XI.32). Titus is thus claiming to present a universal argument that is just as relevant for Catholics as for non-Catholics. He has a practical purpose for this approach, namely to alienate pagan groups in relation to the Manichaean mission and instead to forge an anti-Manichaean alliance between the Catholics and the pagans. But the very fact that Titus believes a universal, non-specific Christian argument is possible and legitimate is extremely interesting. His approach seems more to resemble medieval scholasticism than early patristic theology in that he apparently reckons on a ratio, which can be distinguished from the Scriptures’ auctoritas and be treated independently of it. Nevertheless, on this point it is also possible to find more or less complete analogies to Titus’s approach in the major early patristic writers.

Titus would not have found the term κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι in the Bible; it is, as Beck and Stroumsa point out, of Stoic origin, where it signals an argument ex consensu omnium gentium, which was used amongst others to claim the existence of the divine. Titus, however, uses not only κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι but also a number of other terms which in advance could be thought to mean the same or could be limited in their meaning in relation to κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι. Already now we must note that Titus never explains what these terms precisely refer to, which makes an interpretation rather difficult. By way of introduction an overview of the entire terminology will therefore be useful.70

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70 Cf. also Poirier and Sensal 1990a, 317.
I. Κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ

I.1 τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν (Gr. 1.28 → Ch. XI.2),

καὶ ἐννοια (§ 3.1).

I.7 τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν (Gr. 4.26–27),

καὶ ἐννοια ἐννοια (§ 6.14).

I.12 τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν (Gr. 6.28–29 → Ch. XI.4),

καὶ ἐννοια ἐννοια (§ 9.5).

I.15 τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας (Gr. 8.34–35 → Ch. XI.6),

καὶ ἐννοια (§ 12.3).

I.17 τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν (Gr. 10.25–26),

καὶ ἐννοια (§ 14.8).

III.1 τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν (Gr. 66.29 → Ch. XI.32),

καὶ ἐννοια (§ 82.5).

II. Αἱ κατὰ φύσιν ἐννοιαι

I.5 αἱ κατὰ φύσιν ἐννοιαι (Gr. 4.12–13 → Ch. XI.3),

καὶ ἐννοια ἐννοια (§ 5.30–31).

III. Φυσικοὶ λογισμοί

I.11 οἱ φυσικοὶ λογισμοί (Gr. 6.17),

καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ λογισμοὶ (§ 8.25).

IV. Οἱ κατὰ φύσιν λογισμοί

II.44 τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν λογισμοὺς (Gr. 52.33),

καὶ λογισμοὶ λογισμοῦ (§ 65.31).

V. Κοινὴ δόξα

II.12 κοινὴ δόξα (Gr. 31.31),

καὶ ἀλήθεια (§ 40.11).

II.23 τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν (Gr. 40.12–13 → Ch. XI.24),

καὶ ἀλήθεια (§ 50.33).

II.39 τὴς κοινῆς δόξης (Gr. 50.9–10),

καὶ ἀλήθεια (§ 62.26).

VI. Κοινοὶ λογισμοί

II.62 τοὺς κοινοὺς λογισμοὺς (Gr. 63.39–64.1),

καὶ λογισμοὶ (§ 78.35).

VII. Φυσικαὶ ἐννοιαι

IV.91 τῶν φυσικῶν ἐννοιῶν (PG 18, 1264A → Ch. XI.48),

καὶ ἐννοια (§ 172.13).

VIII. καὶ ἐννοια

IV.45 (§ 151.23).

A priori it is improbable that all these terms should each be technical in the sense that they had different meanings. Before I move
on to determining the meaning of the terms in each individual case, I shall include some information on the history of the common concepts and suchlike, which can form the basis of an interpretation.

The general rhetorical argument that refers to a universal *consensus* was first introduced into Greek thinking when the philosophical interest through the Sophists began to gather around a common human nature. The universal idea of “the gods” could thereby be regarded as “natural”, as is the case in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, where Socrates claims that the idea of the gods is implanted or innate in everyone (*Memorabilia* I.4,13–16). For Aristotle, common opinions and *consensus* were part of the phenomena that are altogether the starting-point of philosophy; they may be valid as criteria of the truth, because they too express nature, the common structure for all people, whose highest expression is reason. Aristotle therefore reckoned both with opinions that are generally shared by all mankind and with opinions on which there was only *consensus* among philosophers. The common *consensus* served amongst others to confirm theories that could be established on the basis of other, stricter grounds.

The *consensus hominum* argument was also further developed by the Stoics with their teaching on *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*, where it was linked to a systematic theory of cognition and psychology.71 Scholars disagree, however, on how these *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι* should be situated and understood in relation to other Stoic concepts and the Old Stoic teaching in its entirety. The disagreement comes about because the source material is insufficient; we possess only fragments of Old and Middle Stoicism, and only late Stoic writings are preserved in their entirety; various interpretations can be briefly named. According to Bonhöffer’s theory, which almost everyone has now abandoned, the common concepts are innate to man, albeit only in embryo, and are developed independently of the sense perception.72 Instead on the basis of the Old Stoic view that cognition can only be achieved through sense perception, it follows that every concept comes into being through the central commanding organ of the human soul, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, apprehending the general characteristics in a long series

of similar “presentations” that are stored in the memory but which originally arose through movements outside man when he perceives through his senses. Προλήψεις or “natural concepts”, φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, are a group of undeveloped concepts that are formed naturally or unconsciously in the child, and in Sandbach’s opinion κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι are to be understood as the sub-group of προλήψεις that is universal. Pohlenz on the other hand claimed that those common concepts which are value judgements, although not innate, do not originate solely from the perception of the external world but also from man’s inner perception of himself; e.g. the idea of “the gods” is also to be regarded as a προλήψεις, developed from man’s inner perception of himself, namely as a reasoning by analogy from the inner feeling of inadequacy and dependence. According to Todd, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι must definitely not be regarded as a sub-group under προλήψεις, but as generalisations formed on the basis of προλήψεις and shared by all people. While the “natural concepts” are criteria of truth in relation to the “presentations”, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι constitute an a posteriori criterion of truth for theories which on another basis (presumably as logical deductions) are established by the reason.\(^{73}\)

Whether or not the Stoics’ “common concepts” were a sub-group under προλήψεις, the distinctions were eradicated when other philosophical movements, e.g. Middle Platonists and Peripatetics, took over Stoic terminology, and the distinction was no longer made between κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι and προλήψεις. Frequently the common concepts were regarded precisely as innate ideas, thus also in Cicero, through whom they acquired tremendous historical influence on thinking in the west.\(^{74}\) Insofar as this terminology and

\(^{73}\) Sandbach 1996; Pohlenz 1948, 54–59; Pohlenz 1949, 32–35; Todd 1973.—An account of later scholarship debate, which however does not take into consideration all the relevant contributions, is also to be found in Kugelmann 1986, 113–21.

the meanings linked to it were also adopted by Catholic writers, we must assume that the mediation to them may have taken place via many and various philosophical schools and not merely via the Stoics. In order to understand the degree to which the reception of this terminology was a matter of course for the Church fathers, it is imperative to realise that even though the NT texts do not speak directly of κοινὰ εὐνομία, we nevertheless find there certain fundamental ideas which have their origin in a Stoicism watered down into popular philosophy and which continued into the time of the Church fathers in the general culture of the educated. For the Church fathers there was a clear coincidence of canon and culture in this area. Of particular importance here is Rom. 2.14–15, where Paul envisages a natural ethical knowledge, and Acts 17.22–31, where man is in kinship with God and where God can be known from the order of the world, an idea which again is found in Rom. 1.19 ff. The inner knowledge in Rom. 2.14–15 corresponds to the common, ethical concepts.75

It therefore comes as no surprise that almost all patristic theologians subscribe to a meaningful, universal “knowledge” of God; God could be known through the order of Creation, man was in kinship with God, and man had a lex naturae in his inner being. This complex of ideas was roughly what in later times was called “natural theology”,76 except that we must be aware that in general the Church

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75 Cf. e.g. Pohlenz 1948, 317 (and 1949, 158), 377 (and 1949, 183–84), 402–4; Michel 1978, 100–1, 121–26; Barr 1993, 21–57; Pannenberg 1988, 87, 131–32.—See Schelkle 1959, 53–55, 58–60, 81 ff. concerning the Church fathers’ understanding of Rom. 1.19 ff.; 2.14–15.—There are of course also other texts in the canon that could point forward to ideas of a universal ethical knowledge and knowledge of God, e.g. in the OT and in the Apocrypha, which were part of LXX and canonical for the Church fathers; cf. Barr 1993, 58–101.—In this context Gen. 1.26–27 was also a central text for the Church fathers, because their interpretation of the image of God in man as a predisposition for reason (see further below pp. 321–26) was naturally linked to the reference to use of natural law in Rom. 2.14–15.—In passing, it should be noted that ideas of κοινὰ εὐνομία among the Church fathers should not be confused with their use of the idea of consensus in canon law, e.g. in connection with the election of bishops and conciliar decisions (cf. Oehler 1969, 254 ff. concerning this idea of consensus).

76 The concept theologia naturalis is admittedly from Antiquity, but it was originally not formulated in contrast to a “supernatural” theology, nor did it refer to a knowledge of God that has its source in man’s nature, but to a knowledge of God’s nature. The modern meaning has arisen partly through the term being used about Cicero’s interpretation of the Stoic κοινὰ εὐνομία as “innate ideas”, partly through this “innate knowledge” being related to a “supernatural knowledge”, the “special revelation”. To shed light on the history of the concept, including modern theological
fathers did not conceive of the relationship between “natural theology” and the revelation of Christ as being between a “natural” and a “supernatural” knowledge of God. For the natural knowledge of God is also “revealed”, in that it is the same Logos that first shows God to man’s inner being and through the Creation, and later as incarnate shows God to man. These are degrees or steps in the one and same knowledge of God.77 When already Justin Martyr claimed that all peoples have a common ethical knowledge of what is just and sinful, but in consequence of the bad influence of society and evil spirits have lost, or rather suppressed, these “natural concepts” (tà φυσικά ἐννοιαί),78 he must be understood in the context of his well-known teaching on man’s reason as part (λόγος σπορά or σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου) of the divine Λόγος which this has sown or implanted (ἐμφύτως) in man and in the philosophers; “it is in the nature of man to know good and evil” (Apologia II.14,2).79

Justin was apparently only interested in an innate common ethical knowledge, but in the case of another early apologist, Athenagoras, innate reason also had a physical aspect, a link with the nature and purpose of the creation and man.80 The κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ ideas swiftly became very much part of the general thought of most of the Church fathers, and since Titus was presumably influenced by Alexandrian theologians, a limitation of comparative material to the Alexandrian Church fathers Clement and Origen is therefore meaningful.81

Clement of Alexandria believed that by virtue of their innate reason all people are disposed towards knowing God; to some degree this

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78 Dire. XCIII,1 (Archambault 1909a, 94, 96), cf. also Dire. XLVII,2 (Archambault 1909, 210); cf. Pohlenz 1948, 408; Spanneut 1957, 253.
knowledge may be said to be acquired, but all acquire it, because their reason originates from God and is predisposed to achieving this knowledge.\textsuperscript{82} The universal human reason also contains a natural, ethical knowledge,\textsuperscript{83} and it is also in other contexts the basis of further knowledge.\textsuperscript{84} Clement explained the universal mind by referring to the biblical creation narratives.\textsuperscript{85}

According to Origen, Christianity differs from paganism by cor-

\textsuperscript{82} In \textit{Strom.} I.19 (94.1–7) Clement presents four different explanations of the origin of philosophy. The second possible explanation (\textit{Strom.} I.19 [94.2] [Stählin 1906, 60.15–18]) is the reference to a knowledge of God by virtue of a “natural concept” (φυσική ἐννοια) or a “common intellect” (κοινὸς νοῦς). As pointed out by Molland 1936, 65–75 the four possible explanations should not be regarded as alternatives that exclude each other.—Cf. also \textit{Strom.} V.13 (87.2ff.) (Stählin 1906, 383.21ff.).—Man is thus disposed to know God, but beyond the knowledge of God that the philosophers could achieve through their human reason, Clement also states that they received a special, divine inspiration (see Lilla 1971, 16–18).—Clement can say that the general pre-philosophical knowledge of God is “innate and not learned” (ἐφωτιστὸς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως); immediately after, however, he understands it as acquired, in that it arises from the child’s fear (later developed through reasoning of one’s own power), and on this point Clement’s view is close to Stoicism. The original knowledge of God is common to all peoples, and Clement understands it as a προληπτικός, a preconception, or faith, πίστις (\textit{Strom.} V.14 [133.7–9], Stählin 1906, 416.17ff.). Cf. Molland 1936, 67; Kugelmann 1986, 121; Prümm 1937.—The pagans’ general knowledge of God is of course very undeveloped and hazy; cf. \textit{Strom.} V.14 (134.3), Stählin 1906, 417.19–21; VI.8 (64.5–6), Stählin 1906, 464.7–12.

\textsuperscript{83} See e.g. \textit{Protr.} X (95.3) (Stählin 1905, 70.5), where Clement claims that a rational consideration of the good presupposes “an innate faith in the good” (τοῦ ἐγναθοῦ ἐφωτινοῦ . . . πίστιν), or \textit{Strom.} I.29 (182.1) (Stählin 1906, 111.18–19), where Clement distinguishes between a law that is given together with the creation and is nature’s law, and a law that is given later and is learned; both are from God and in reality are one and the same law.

\textsuperscript{84} See e.g. \textit{Strom.} VIII.3 (7.5) (Stählin 1909, 83.30) or VIII.1 (2.4) (Stählin 1909, 81.1–2), where Clement requests examinations to find the truth, examinations on the basis both of Scripture and the κοινοὶ ἐννοιοῦ; cf. Lilla 1971, 13 n. 1. Cf. also \textit{Strom.} VII.16 (95.9) (Stählin 1909, 68.1–5): as an analogy to Clement’s distinction between the simple faith of the church, where one has only tasted Scripture, and “the Gnostic’s” developed knowledge of truth he says that in ordinary life the expertise of craftsmen surpasses the “common concepts” (κοιναὶ ἐννοιαι) of ordinary people.

\textsuperscript{85} According to Clement human reason is the πνοὴ ζωῆς which according to Gen. 2.7 God breathed into man (\textit{Strom.} V.13 [87.4], Stählin 1906, 383.20–384.3; V.14 [94.3], Stählin 1906, 388.10–11). By virtue of this breath it is excluded that man can be completely without a concept of the deity (θείας ἐννοιας) (\textit{Strom.} V.13 [87.4]; to this original spiritual equipment Christians are given the Holy Spirit in addition (\textit{Strom.} V.13 [88.2]) (Stählin 1906, 384.5–6). Cf. Lilla 1971, 13–14; Wyrwa 1983, 283–84.—When man according to Gen. 1.26–27 is created κατ ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, it means that man’s νοῦς (τὸ ἴδιμονικόν) is an image of the divine εἰκόν, which is Ἀργος or God’s Son (\textit{Strom.} V.14 [94.4–5], Stählin 1906, 388.13–16). Cf. Lilla 1971, 14–15.
responding to the natural cognition of God. He thus emphasises that the Christian faith is in harmony with κοινὰ ἐννοια; for ἡ κοινὴ ἐννοια demands that one does not imagine God as corruptible, nor does one honour Him through man-made statues.86 The “natural concept” of God has a rather precise content: God is incorruptible, simple, uncompounded and indivisible, even though the Epicureans have not clearly understood this.87 The natural knowledge God has its origin both in the contemplation of the universe and in the fact that all rational creatures have a share in the divine Λόγος; from this it follows that by nature they have certain κοινὰ ἐννοια, which imply an ethical consciousness, a common lex naturalis. Through the common concepts the natural law is written in man’s ἡγεμονικόν as his conscience, and this law develops with increasingly greater clarity through the maturation of reason.89 It is thus clear that for Origen

86 Contra Cels. III.40; Borret 1968, 94. Cf. Koch 1932, 49–50; Chadwick 1984, 104.
87 Οὐδὲ γάρ δεδουλεύεται οὐδεὶς τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐννοιαν ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀσυνθέτου καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου (Contra Cels. IV.14; Borret 1968, 218).
89 Lex naturalis/lex naturae, see e.g. In Rom. II.6–7 (8–9) (Hammond Bammel 1990, 130–38); III.2, where the distinction is made between the written laws of the cities, the Mosaic Law and the inner, natural law (Hammond Bammel 1990, 203–13; Scherer 1957, 130–38); III.3–4 (6–7) (Hammond Bammel 1990; 221–35; Scherer 1957, 144–56); VI.8 (Hammond Bammel 1997, 496–506); cf. also Schelkle 1959, 81–82 on Origen’s interpretation of Rom. 2.14.— Cf. the interesting passages in Philoc. 9 (esp. 9.2–3, Harl and De Lange 1983, 352, 354, 356, 358), which probably also come from Origen’s In Rom., see Hammond Bammel 1981. Note esp. Philoc. 9.2.11–14, Harl and De Lange 1983, 354: Παρὰ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται νόμος ὁ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐνσωματωμένος τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ, ὡς ὀνομάζει η ἡγεμονία, ἐγγεγραμμένος τῇ καρδίᾳ λόγος, προστατικός μὲν ὁν ὑποτείνει, ἀπαρχερικός δὲ ἀν ὁν υποτείνει. and 9.2.19–23, Harl and De Lange 1983, 354: ὁ γὰρ γραπτός ἐν ταῖς καρδίασις νόμος καὶ ἐν ἐθνικῷς φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιούσιν οὐκ ἄλλος ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φύσει ἐγγεγραμμένον τῇ ἡγεμονικῷ ἡμῶν, καὶ τριῶντορο μετὰ τῆς συμπληρώσεως τοῦ λόγου ὅσπερ ρεῖ γνωστοῦ.— Cf. also Contra Cels. I.4 (Borret 1967, 84); V.37 (Borret 1969, 110, 112, 114); VII.46 (Borret 1969a, 124); VIII.52 (Borret 1969a, 288); De princ. III.1.3 (Koetschau 1913, 197.11ff., 198.9ff.); In Gen. III (Philoc. 23.9, Junod 1976, 160); In Matth. ser. 59 (Klostermann 1933, 134.19); Hom. in Num. X.3 (Baehrens 1921, 74.19); Hom. in Luc. XXXV.1 (Crouzel, Fournier and Périchon 1962, 412); In Cant. cant. I (Baehrens 1925, 91.9), II (Baehrens 1925, 160.1). Cf. further In Jo. I.37 (273) (Blanc 1966, 169), where Origen—resembling Stoicism—thinks that the child’s primitive concepts are further developed; this is also God’s work: Logos can be in man in regard to the completion of the concepts that happens in everyone who has moved beyond childhood; cf. In Matth. XIII.16 (Klostermann 1935, 221.1–5). Cf. Koch 1932, 52–53; Pohlenz 1948, 426–27; Pohlenz 1949, 205; Benjamins 1994, 124.
the most important aspect of the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαὶ was to be found within morality and religion, though he appears also to have recognised the common concepts in other areas.90

Of particular interest in the present context is De principiis IV.1.1, because κοιναὶ ἔννοιαὶ and evidence (ἐνάργεια) from visible things are here explicitly distinguished from Scriptural evidence as a different source of cognition;91 this division resembles Titus’s view, but is naturally already implied in the other passages in Origen and in the other Church fathers considered in the present context. It differs from Titus, however, in that the idea is not to treat the two sources of knowledge separately, but on the contrary to combine and allow each to shed light on the other.92 A combination does not exclude the possibility of dividing the argument into a “rational” and a “scriptural” side, as is the case in De principiis III.1: first Origen develops the idea that the preaching of the Church implies man’s free choice (αὐτεξούσιον),93 but then he declares that to grasp what free choice is, one must first unfold its concept (ἔννοια).94 The development of this “concept” is admittedly a re-examination of the doctrine of free choice implicit in the faith, but this re-examination takes place as a strictly rational line of argument, in which Origen does not use Christian articles of faith or biblical passages;95 the conclusion also begins: “Reason (ὁ λόγος) thus shows” etc.96 On the other hand, in the remainder of De principiis III.1 the argument has the character of biblical interpretation.97 The similarity to the structure of Titus’s work lies in the recognition of the possibility of a purely rational line

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90 This is admittedly not the case according to Koch (1932, 52–53), but in Contra Cels. IV.48 (Borret 1968, 392) the animals, according to the common concepts of all, are irrational, and here the “common concepts” are not to do with morality and religion.

91 Koetschau 1913, 292.9.—Cf. Pohlenz 1949, 206.

92 See Koetschau 1913, 292.8–293.1.—In Contra Cels. I.4 Origen also claims an agreement between the two kinds of cognition.

93 De princ. III.1.1 (Koetschau 1913, 195.4–9).

94 De princ. III.1.1 (Koetschau 1913, 196.1–2).—Cf. here Berner 1982, 156.

95 De princ. III.1.2–5 (Koetschau 1913, 196.3–201.2).

96 De princ. III.1.5 (Koetschau 1913, 201.2–6).

97 De princ. III.1.6–24 (Koetschau 1913, 201.7–244.9).—De princ. III.1.6 contains special arguments for the result from III.1.2–5; in III.1.7–23 Origen discusses some apparent counter-arguments drawn from Scripture; III.1.24—the final section—summarises all the results in Ch. III.1; these results, however, are not identical with the result in III.1.5, but go beyond it.—Cf. also Perrone 1992, 34ff. concerning Origen’s twofold argument on the basis of reason and Scripture.
of argument, which disregards revelation, but the difference is also patent: rational argument serves to illuminate a doctrine derived from Scripture and must then be compared with the Scripture’s testimony in order to be valid.\footnote{Already in De princ. I. Praef. (Koetschau 1913, 7–16) Origen envisages areas which the preaching of the Church does not clearly illuminate, and he also refers here to the use of a purely rational argumentation, e.g. in De princ. I. Praef., 10 (Koetschau 1913, 16.13–15).} We are thus only speaking of an incomplete parallel to Titus’s separation of universal and scriptural argument. The possibility of separating rational and scriptural argument is without doubt present in Origen, but he does not realise it, unlike Titus.

As far as I can see, however, Titus’s form of argument also has a narrower heresiological background besides the background in the idea of the “common concepts” in philosophy and in Alexandrian theology. This heresiological background is obvious in Irenaeus, the first known Catholic writer to refute heretics by referring to universal reason. Irenaeus did not refer to “common concepts”, but more to what he termed “[a] sound mind”,\footnote{“Sensus... sanus”/Ο... ὁμοίως νοοῦ (Adv. haer. II.27,1; Rousseau and Doutreleau 1982, 264).—Transl. by Roberts and Rambaut in Roberts and Donaldson 1989a, 398.} a kind of “common sense”. In itself the presentation of the heretical systems in \textit{Adversus haereses} Book I revealed their lack of inner cohesion, so that Irenaeus can conclude: “They have now been fully exposed; and simply to exhibit their sentiments, is to obtain a victory over them”.\footnote{Detectio autem eorum haec est, siue adversus eos victoria est sententiae eorum manifestatio (Adv. haer. I.31,3; Rousseau and Doutreleau 1979, 388).} In \textit{Adversus haereses} I.16,3 Irenaeus writes to the recipient of his book that he knows that this recipient when reading of the Valentinians’ teaching will laugh heartily at such follies, even though they should in fact be wept over. In addition he calls them “old crones’ fables”. In \textit{Adversus haereses} II.26,3 Irenaeus deals with those who would count up sand and pebbles, the waves of the sea and the stars of heaven and then speculate on the cause of the numbers they have found, and he asks:

\begin{quote}
would not his labour be in vain, and would not such a man be justly declared mad, and destitute of reason, by all possessed of common sense?\footnote{“nonne in uanum laborans et delirus hic talis et irrationalibilis ab omnibus qui sensum habent iuste dictetur? (Rousseau and Doutreleau 1982, 262).—Transl. by Roberts and Rambaut in Roberts and Donaldson 1989a, 398.}\
\end{quote}
Here common sense is set up against philosophical and scientific speculation, which Irenaeus believes is the core of the heresies, and if, as is probable, he is influenced here by the Sceptics, he is using the philosophical doubt to refer the reader to the rule of faith.\textsuperscript{102}

Since Irenaeus also assumes a natural, innate knowledge of God,\textsuperscript{103} it is logical to link this to his idea of man’s sound non-philosophical reason.—Also Titus’s refutations on the basis of \textit{koina\nobreakdash\��\nnoiai} draw on this rhetorical “common sense”; as we have seen, Manichaeism is precisely “ridiculous nonsense”. But as we shall see, Titus is clearly referring to a reason that is open to and developed by philosophy.

If we now return to \textit{Contra Manichaeos}, we can first of all demonstrate relatively easily that a number of the listed terms that Titus uses do not have different technical meanings. At the close of I.5 Titus declares that he will begin by showing that both a doctrine of two principles in general and a doctrine of two principles in conflict with each other are unacceptable to the “natural concepts” (\textit{ai kat\'\a\nobreakdash\phi\nu\si\nu\nnoiai}, Gr. 4.12–13 \textsuperscript{\textit{\rightarrow}} Ch. XI.3). In connection with the argument in I.11ff. already referred to—that the two principles cannot be opposites, when they have the same name and the same description—Titus first declares that the “natural thoughts” (or “reasonings”) (\textit{o\i\f\nu\si\koi\logismo\i\}) would hardly be able to allow anything like that (I.11, Gr. 6.17); and then in I.12 (Gr. 6.28–29) he states that Mani’s view shows that for him the consequence (\textit{\ek\kol\ou\th\i\a}) from the common concepts (\textit{koin\nu\i\nnoiai}) has been destroyed (\textsuperscript{\textit{\rightarrow}} Ch. XI.4). From this we can conclude that both \textit{koin\nu\i\nnoiai} and \textit{ai kat\'\a\nobreakdash\phi\nu\si\nu\nnoiai} as well as \textit{o\i\f\nu\si\koi\logismo\i\} in these contexts must mean almost one and the same. It is thus probable that \textit{o\i\f\nu\si\koi\logismo\i\} and \textit{ai kat\'\a\nobreakdash\phi\nu\si\nu\nnoiai} as well as \textit{ai kat\'\a\nobreakdash\phi\nu\si\nu\nnoiai} and \textit{f\nu\si\koi\nnoiai} are no more than stylistic variants; on this background \textit{koin\nu\i\nnoiai} and \textit{f\nu\si\koi\nnoiai} in II.62 is probably also merely a new variant. We are left with \textit{koi\nu\i\h\d\ddot{o}\xi\a}, where we cannot yet say that this is just a stylistic variation.

\textsuperscript{102} Grant 1967, 163–64 (= 1949, 46–47); Schoedel 1959, 24; cf. Brox 1966a, 201–8.

\textsuperscript{103} “Inuisibile enim eius, cum sit potens, magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem omnibus praestat potentissimae et omnipotentis eminentiae.” . . . “tamen hoc ipsum omnia cognoscunt, quando Ratio mentibus infixus moueet ea et reuelet eis quoniam est unus Deus, omnium Dominus.” (\textit{Adv. haer.} II.6,1; Rousseau and Doutreleau 1982, 60).
For the most part, therefore, the meaning that Titus confers on these terms has nothing to do with variants; more often it is purely for stylistic reasons or out of sheer forgetfulness that he employs them. But another question of course is whether the terms always mean the same; κοινὰ ἔννοια could indeed mean different things in different contexts.

In I.1 and III.1 Titus states that the argumentation in Books I–II is for the most part based on κοινὰ ἔννοια; from I.1 it is also clear that κοινὰ ἔννοια is a “way of truth” (→ Ch. XI.2, XI.32). In which way the common concepts can function as a way of truth is then hinted at elsewhere.

In I.5 the question is, whether the “natural concepts” (αἱ κατὰ φύσιν ἔννοιαι) “allow for” (παραδέχομαι, Gr. 4.12, and δέχομαι, Gr. 4.14) two principles in the existing things (→ Ch. XI.3), i.e. the truth of the Manichaeanc teaching is being determined by whether or not it can be accepted by these common concepts. Correspondingly in I.11 the issue is whether the “natural reasonings” (οἱ φυσικοὶ λογισμοί) “allow for” (παραδέχομαι, Gr. 6.17) two opposite substances. In I.12 and in the same context we hear that ἡ ἀκολούθια (Gr. 6.29) from the common concepts (κοινὰ ἔννοια) has been destroyed for Mani (→ Ch. XI.4). Here the precise meaning of the term ἀκολούθια is important. Sy translates it with a Greek loanword ρύθμιον (Sy 9.5), i.e. τάξις, “order”; Torres translates with “consecutio”. The translation “logical consequence” is probable; for the Stoics it was by virtue of the concept of ἀκολούθια, succession or consequence, that man could draw inferences from empirical data, and the concept was moreover important in connection with physics and ethics;104 in addition I assume that τῶν κοινῶν ἔννοιῶν is here a “genitivus originis”.105 In which case Titus is claiming that the Manichaeans are incapable of drawing consequences from the common concepts, and these must indeed be considered as a primeval form of knowledge upon which secondary consequences should be built.106

105 Smyth 1984, 331 §1410.
106 On this background it is possible that there is a slight difference of meaning between οἱ φυσικοὶ λογισμοί in I.11 and κοινὰ ἔννοια in I.12; λογισμοί could correspond to ἡ ἀκολούθια.—In favour of interpreting Titus’s term ἀκολούθια in a more precise philosophical sense is its use among Early Church theologians: Titus’s line of thought corresponds to Athenagoras’s (or Pseudo-Athenagoras) in De res. XIV,1–2 (Pouderon 1992, 268); cf. also Spanneut 1957, 208; cf. also the use of
In I.17 Titus declares that Mani’s presentations are put together without the κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ, and that they bring about their own (αὐτῶματον) refutation among wise men (Gr. 10.25–27). The context shows that he is referring to the “fables” (the mythological material) and to the main point of Mani’s teaching, dualism. In claiming that Mani’s teaching brings about its own refutation among wise men, Titus is presumably referring to the philosophers’ demand for logical coherence; in other words, Manichaeism is full of contradictions. Here too Titus appears to be juxtaposing the common concepts with logical coherence.

In the contexts under treatment Titus thus claims that the “common concepts” and the consequences from them imply that there can only be one principle or one God, but he does not make it clear which element in his arguments is a “common concept”.

Nor is it clear what κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ means quite precisely in I.15. Titus claims here that the Manichaeans call the good principle “incorruption” (ἀφθαρσία) and the evil “corruption” (φθορά). If indeed the evil is φθορά, one must then ask what it corrupts or destroys. According to Titus there are only two possibilities: the evil destroys either something else or itself. If it destroys something else, it can only be the good (since there are only two principles), but that is impossible, for the good is indeed ἀφθαρσία. If on the other hand the evil destroys itself, it cannot of course exist or be everlasting. Precisely because the evil is corruption, its existence is excluded, “for it is impossible that corruption is incorruptible according to what the common concepts intend” (Gr. 8.34–35 → Ch. XI.6).

Here it is a reasonable possibility that the “common concepts” are quite simply ἀφθαρσία and φθορά. In that case Titus claims that the Manichaeans are using the two concepts meaninglessly, in conflict with their common meaning. But the problem with this interpretation is that despite all the uncertainties, the earlier tradition with the term “common concepts” seems to have aimed at certain transcending, generalised concepts, and I therefore assume that at this

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107 It is possible that it is only Titus’s conclusion that evil must thus be φθορά. The argument corresponds to Didymus, Contra Manich. II (PG 39, 1088B–1089B), but whether this is due to a common source is an open question. Cf. also Klein 1991, 55, 75–76.
point by κοινοὶ ἔννοιαι Titus means something on the lines of a universal concept of logical coherence in the use of concepts.

In the passages treated so far Titus has claimed that the common concepts necessitate the existence of only one principle. However, it is not only monotheism that is implied in the common concepts, but also God’s presence everywhere and God’s uncircumscribed nature: in I.7 Titus points out that Mani’s teaching is outside κοινοὶ ἔννοιαι, which instills (ὑποβάλλω) in us the knowledge that God is everywhere, and that his nature is uncircumscribed. Here then, Titus is maintaining that men have a common knowledge of God’s nature. We are reminded of Origen’s view in Contra Celsum IV.14, mentioned above, where the “natural concept” of God also turned out to have a rather precise content.

In IV.91 we find the expression φυσικοὶ ἔννοιαι in the context of Titus’s exegesis of Paul; Titus explains what faith in God means and claims that the Mosaic Law ranks below the faith that itself established a law; “. . . and (faith) of its own accord finds what is pleasing to God, and it is not the case that it learns (this) from outside.”

In continuation the Greek text is preserved, because it was quoted by John of Damascus in his Sacra Parallela:

Faith in God is a knowledge of God through the visible Creation and the natural concepts, together with the affection for and love of Him according to the cognition of virtue and vice—which is pleasing to God. (→ Ch. XI.48).

I take this passage to mean that faith in God is equated with a developed knowledge of God that has come into being from several sources. On the one hand there is the knowledge of God that is gained through the visible Creation and the natural concepts, and on the other hand affection for and love of God, which in one way or another is contained in the ethical cognition that Titus calls ἐπιστήμη. It is reasonable to interpret this as Titus’s distinction between a knowledge of God that has come about as an inference on the basis of the order and rationality of the Creation, and a knowledge of God that is inward and innate. Something else that the passage probably tells us is that Titus does not regard the natural knowledge

108 o ἄρει τοῦ ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἦλθεν καὶ ἐκείνη τῆς ἡμῶν ἡμῶν καιρῶν (Sy 172.11–12).
of God and faith as two different types of knowledge, but rather as steps in a development where the earlier steps are contained in the following ones.

Titus also speaks of “common concepts” and suchlike in connection with his defence of the Creation. In II.38–41 he refutes Mani, whose mockery ostensibly also falls on the wild animals that are supposed to be evil. Titus claims partly that God wishes to chastise us with the wild animals, partly that “evil” is an ethical entity that can only be used about rational creatures; the animals merely follow their nature. Moreover, snake poison for example, which should be “evil”, can also be used in curative medicine. In II.44 Titus refers to the fact that in the chapters in question, with the aid of “reasonings in accordance with nature” (τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν λογισμοῖς) he showed that the animals were neither evil nor came from the evil, but that they are beneficial for men by instilling fear. At this point the “reasonings” appear to aim at secondary reflections which accord with the observation of animals and human beings; this is not an innate knowledge, but more a natural knowledge, inasmuch as it is derived from nature.

The same meaning is to be found in II.62. Ostensibly Mani criticised the oxen, which have a soul from the good, slaving for the farmers (Gr. 63.35–38). Titus objects that if the earth had not been cultivated, man would not be able to get food and survive (Gr. 63.38–39), and it must thus be natural for domestic animals to slave for man, to whose use they have been entrusted (Gr. 64.2–3). Mani has therefore invented his accusations against the Creation contrary to the common reasonings (κοινοὶ λογισμοὶ) (Gr. 63.39–64.2). Titus thus assumes that what has a purpose for man already from the hand of nature must be his purpose, i.e. God has created domestic animals in order for them to slave for man, and it is this way of arguing that he calls a common reasoning.

Without Titus having a completely firm terminology, it thus looks as if he reckons with a form of basic, natural, common human knowledge; closely connected with, and building on, this knowledge are a number of consequences and reasonings. In IV.45 (§ 151.5–29), where the original Greek text is not preserved, Titus also seems to believe in a common human knowledge of an anthropological condition, namely that man can make himself a slave of his passions. Titus deals with the interpretation of Mt. 6.24, where Mani interprets the two masters as the two principles (§ 151.5–11). Titus points out that the text does not refer to two principles, but to God and
mammon (Sy 151.11–12). Mammon describes a passion of the mind\(^\text{109}\) and not another principle (Sy 151.12–16); it is through our own will that we often allow the passions to control us, just as we can free ourselves from them (Sy 151.16–20.26–29). Here Titus is referring to Rom. 6.12, where Paul warns the faithful against letting themselves be controlled by sin (Sy 151.20–21). The common concepts also know of the use of such meanings, such as that the soul’s passions stand as masters of itself (Sy 151.22–24), and it is common to say that a given person can be a slave of wine or controlled by his anger (Sy 151.24–26). On this, Titus finds his view confirmed both by Scripture and by common knowledge and ordinary manners of speaking.

We come now to Titus’s use of κοινὴ δόξα. In II.39, in connection with the question of whether the wild animals derive from the evil principle, Titus seeks to show that this principle does not exist at all. Here he builds on the assumption that according to Mani evil is without reason,\(^\text{110}\) and he argues inter alia in the way that evil cannot recognise its own evilness and cannot therefore be evil; the designations “good and evil” presuppose that one knows them both in relation to one another, and whoever knows the good does not have an evil nature. Titus states that nor do we call an insane person evil who kills someone with a sword but does not know what he is doing. It is clear to all as a judgement and a common, natural consequence (κρίσις αὐτῆς κοινῆς καὶ φύσεως ἀκολουθίας, Gr. 50.5–6) that we do not call someone evil who does not know what he is doing. From other contexts it is obvious that Titus distinguishes between “judgements”, which characterise decisions on the basis of previous reflection, and innate knowledge.\(^\text{111}\) But even if Titus is not thinking directly of an innate knowledge, he is nevertheless aiming at an everyday consensus, and he therefore derives a common, natural consequence from it. Titus concludes that Mani has posited evil outside the common opinion (κοινὴς δόξας, Gr. 50.9–10); by this Titus is presumably referring to the consensus mentioned, both the judgement and its consequences.

In II.12 Titus attacks the view that some people cannot be held

\(^{109}\) Cf. p. 314 below concerning this expression.

\(^{110}\) See above p. 172.

\(^{111}\) See below pp. 308, 313.
responsible for their evil deeds, because they are controlled by the passions. One of Titus’s counter-arguments is that when, according to κοινὴ δόξα with the help of laws, human society punishes those who act evilly, it shows that the perpetrators are not forced by their nature, but have chosen the offence with intent and are therefore worthy of punishment. The use of punishment thus reveals a consensus regarding man’s responsibility. The argument is a common one, deriving from Aristotle.¹¹² Κοινὴ δόξα describes the consensus that is contained in the laws of society.

In II.23 Titus is concerned with Manichaean view that death is evil, which is exemplified by death in war. In this context he remarks:

But how could they scold death, when it indeed releases the soul from matter, according to the deceiver’s teaching? That is why death is in no way an evil according to common opinion. For that which of necessity befalls everyone is not evil. (Gr. 40.10–14 → Ch. XI.24).

First Titus finds a contradiction in Manichaeanism: why should death be evil if it means the release of the soul? By speaking of “the teaching of the deceiver” Titus shows that he does not consider death in quite the same way; a further point, however, is that for Titus death really is a refreshment. I shall return to Titus’s view of death;¹¹³ for the time being it is sufficient to note that because one can observe that death is nature, all agree, according to Titus, that death is not evil.

In conclusion we can say that Titus does not explain what the common concepts actually are, and that for this reason there is something loose and imprecise about his use of this terminology; often it works as a summary of the content of an argument. It nevertheless seems that for Titus the common concepts are a base for his argumentation from which he can draw consequences that thereby also become “common” and “natural”; perhaps in some cases there is a

¹¹² In Eth. Nic. III,5,7–9 (1113b21–1114a2) Aristotle finds his arguments for man himself being responsible for his actions confirmed by the law-makers punishing the law-transgressors. This is also the case when the transgressors act in ignorance, but are themselves responsible for their ignorance (e.g. if their ignorance can be traced back to their decision to drink themselves senseless). Here there is hardly any difference from Titus’s view in II.39, for Aristotle himself states that one does not punish those who were not the cause of their ignorance (see Eth. Nic. III,5,7 [1113b24–25]).
¹¹³ See below pp. 343–52.
difference in nuance between “concepts” and “reasonings”, namely that the latter correspond to the consequences. The common concepts have something to do with a logical coherence, and they imply that there is only one God, and that He is uncircumscribed and present everywhere. In a single passage Titus distinguishes between knowledge of God from the natural concepts and from the Creation; here it is reasonable that the first knowledge of God is innate. In the same passage Titus seems to believe that this innate knowledge of God can be incorporated into a more comprehensive knowledge of God, which he calls faith. The common concepts also imply a knowledge of man in relation to his passions. Finally, the term κοινά δόξα seems to have a further and even more imprecise meaning than the “common concepts”, in that its aim is altogether one of consensus.

On this background and following on from G.G. Stroumsa one can claim that Titus was more a rhetorical than a philosophical polemicist. But it is nevertheless debatable as to whether this evaluation is not too hard. Titus has not managed to reflect on and systematise his use of all the concepts, but this need not mean that his purpose, or important parts of it, could not have been expressed more consistently and yet remain the same. Titus does not otherwise make use opportunely of polemical ad hoc-arguments; views that he presents in one context often also tune up in new contexts, and he is not content merely to use polemic, but often also puts forward his own positive opinions.

However, an examination of Titus of Bostra’s philosophical views cannot be limited to an account of the concept of God and the other common concepts. A further central area is the nature of man and the character of ethical action. Here again we find certain themes already treated above, namely the accidental character of good and evil and the question of man’s innate knowledge.

4. Titus’s philosophical psychology

Regarding Titus’s psychology it must be reiterated that even though he really does grapple with some of the problems of his time, he does not succeed in working out a particularly precise or detailed conception, which is partly due to his insistence on maintaining a rhetoric against other views. Another problem that impedes an interpretation is his unstable use of concepts. Titus does not give any
coherent presentation of his anthropology; instead it must be strung together from various remarks in sundry places. However, a reasonably clear purpose and the contours of a coherent view can nevertheless be seen.

As mentioned, the real interest in Chapter I.13 is to show that there can only be one uncreated οὐσία, not two. In the context, however, it was necessary to give examples of created οὐσίαι, and as an example Titus included the soul, which precisely qua created οὐσία has accidental qualities, namely ἔξεις such as virtue and vice, which “come and go”, i.e. can be separated from the soul.

Thus the soul is an οὐσία, but a created οὐσία, and for Titus this presumably means that it is not pre-existent. Nowhere does Titus write that it should be so, and various brief remarks in Book IV suggest at least that Titus did not follow Origen’s favourite Platonising hypothesis. Thus in IV.30 Titus writes that both the soul and the body are God’s work (ἐν 143.35–144.1), and in IV.28 Titus states that the body is a friend of the soul and not only because it has come into being together with the soul (ἐν 143.16–17), but also because it helps the soul to good actions (ἐν 143.16–17). The passage hints that the soul is created together with the body. It must be added that in II.22 Titus expresses himself in a somewhat ambiguous way, in that on the one hand he writes that God grants existence and birth to non-existing souls, yet on the other hand that He thereby “gives” them something (→ Ch. XI.23), which seems to presuppose that they somehow already exist. But here we are facing the phenomenon already remarked upon that Titus uses a Platonic form of expression which does not really make sense within his thought universe.

Although souls are not immortal, but created from nothing, it is, however, not their nature to die (IV.39, ἐν 148.5–6). The soul’s immortality is central in Titus’s understanding of death; at the death-event the soul is separated from the body, and at the final day Titus imagines that the soul is united again with resurrected, now uncorrupted bodies (IV.99–101, ἐν 178.6ff. and partly → Ch. XI.50–51). Although Titus differs from Platonism by teaching that the soul

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115 See above p. 276 and below p. 344.
116 See further below pp. 343–44.
is created from nothing, he nevertheless approaches it with his teaching on the soul's immortality, and this proximity to Platonism becomes even clearer when we examine the soul's nature as Titus perceives it; for according to him the soul is incorporeal (ἀσώματος, I.32, Gr. 20.17 \(\rightarrow\) Ch. XI.13) and immutable (ἀμετάβλητος, I.32, Gr. 20.24 \(\rightarrow\) Ch. XI.13). On this point Titus is clearly Platonising, but when we press deeper into his psychology, it turns out to contain elements that stem from other philosophical schools.

Titus imagines Mani’s teaching to be that the soul is compounded or mixed (I.29, Gr. 18.2–5; I.32, Gr. 20.11–16.22–31 \(\rightarrow\) Ch. XI.12–13), and he therefore attacks this position; it is apparent, however, that on this point Titus has no positive knowledge, but is guessing;\(^{117}\) these passages cannot therefore tell us anything about the Manichaeans’ understanding of the soul,\(^{118}\) but they are still of interest for the

\(^{117}\) Beck (1978, 122) also observes that this is a “purely subjective” suspicion from Titus’s side; he believes moreover that the hypothetical way in which Titus presents his suspicion suggests that the Manichaeans did not in fact believe this—in his time and in his area. Cf. Klein 1991, 99. However, it is hardly reasonable to conclude otherwise than that Titus’s sources could not answer his questions. Nor can it be excluded that Titus’s guess is actually his own interpretation of the statement δύο φύσεις ἐκατέρτις ἡμίν ὀψις, which we find in II.13, Gr. 31.34 \(\rightarrow\) Ch. XI.19), and which we might better imagine he found in his Manichaean sources. Cf. also the Manichaean’s interpretation of Rom. 7.23 in IV.90 (see above pp. 60–61).

\(^{118}\) Baur (1931, 164–65) otherwise included these passages from Titus to shed light on Augustine’s accusation against the Manichaeans for teaching two souls (esp. in De duab. anim.), but thought that Titus was not speaking of two souls but of one and the same soul, which has taken a foreign element into it (otherwise in Bianchi 1988, 311 n. 3). Baur (1831, 162–77) also doubted that on this point Augustine was reproducing the authentic Manichaean teaching, which has since been widely debated; see further Bianchi 1988 and Sundermann 1992, 22–24 with further references; cf. also Klein 1991, 99, 106; Fütschen 1992, 45.—It must also be emphasised that the doctrine of two souls was one of the problems, and a standard accusation in Late Antiquity; see thus Origen, De princ. III.4 (Koetschau 1913, 263.11–270.29) together with references in Langerbeck 1967, 50–56; Görgemanns and Karp 1992, 603–5 n. 3, 886; Dihle 1982, 77–78, 199–200; Deuse 1983, 71 n. 34, 80, 91, 215; Dillon 1996, 175, 376, 448–49.—Also the “Messalians”, who like Titus (in his description of Manichaeism) used metaphors of mixing, were accused of teaching two souls; see further Stewart 1991, passim, but esp. 170–203 on “mixing language” in Pseudo-Macarius.

Beck (1978, 122–23) establishes convincingly that Titus’s reasoning builds on a Platonic distinction between a rational and irrational part of the soul (he believes on the other hand that the North African Manichaeans that Augustine refuted had moved further on to an evil soul by personifying matter). In the light of Origen, De princ. III.4, Koetschau 1913, 263.23–264.11 Titus’s charge can be detailed as follows: we are not dealing with the third theory mentioned by Origen, “anima nostra, cum una sit per substantiam, ex pluribus tamen constet”, but with the first
understanding of Titus. He states, for example, that according to the Manichaeans man's body is from evil and man's soul from good (I.29, Gr. 18.3–4 → Ch. XI.12), and then guesses that the Manichaeans either teach that the soul is homogeneous (μονοειδής, I.29, Gr. 18.5; I.32, Gr. 20.14–15 → Ch. XI.12–13) from the good principle, or that it is a “composition of contraries” (σύνθεσις τῶν ἐναντίων, I.29, Gr. 18.5; I.32, Gr. 20.14 → Ch. XI.12–13) or “mingling of contraries” (κράσις τῶν ἐναντίων, I.32, Gr. 20.12–13 → Ch. XI.13).119 The first possibility, that the soul is homogeneously good and has been mixed with the evil material body, is refuted by Titus on the basis of the two premises that the Manichaeans believe that matter was without consciousness or mind before it was mixed with the good,120 and that the evil is sin, which presupposes knowledge and consciousness; for it follows from this that it is the connection with the good that can first have made matter evil (I.29–30).121 Titus refutes the second possibility by saying that if the soul consists of a good and an evil part, the evil things i.e. the sins, must nonetheless stem from the good part, for this must be the rational part, and sin demands consideration (I.32, Gr. 20.11–16 → Ch. XI.13).122 As is clear here, and becomes explicit in what follows, Titus, as correctly seen by Beck, works on the basis that a distinction between a good and an evil part of the soul must be a Platonic distinction between τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ ἀλόγιστον in the soul (I.32, Gr. 20.29–31 → Ch. XI.13).123

Theory of two souls, for Titus attacks precisely a teaching in which substance is not one. This theory, however, must be understood in context with Plato’s Tim., cf. Langerbeck 1967, 50–56.—That Titus is referring to a real doctrine of two souls is also rendered probable by his inclusion in Contra Manich. IV.19 of Araspes’s statement on the two souls in Xenophon, Cyropaed. VI.1.41, see above pp. 256–57 and → Ch. XI.46.

119 Titus thus treats the terms σύνθεσις and κράσις as synonyms; in De gen. et corr. I,10 (327a30–328b22) Aristotle on the other hand distinguished between a “mixture”, μίξις or κράσις (these terms are synonymous, see De gen. et corr. 328a8–9), and a “compound”, σύνθεσις. In De an. I,4, however, Aristotle also includes discussions where the terms are synonymous; De an. I,4 (407b30ff.): ἄρμονίαν γὰρ τινα ἀρτήν [i.e. the soul] λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι εἰς ἐναντίων. Titus’s formulation is perhaps inspired by this, but the theory that he hypothetically ascribes to the Manichaeans has more to do with the views that Aristotle refutes in De an. I,5 than those that he refutes in I,4.

120 This premise, however, is hardly tenable; see above p. 172.


This does not necessarily mean, however, that Titus himself distinguishes between τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ ἀλλόγιστον in the soul; he only says that if the Manichaeans believe such and such, this teaching must hang together with a teaching concerning λογιστικὸν/ἀλλόγιστον. Perhaps Titus is interested in lumping the Manichaeans together with certain Platonists, and it is conceivable that he makes use of arguments from an internal Platonic polemic. If such a doctrine implies a composition (σύνθεσις) in relation to substance (κατ’ οὐσίαν), that at least is not Titus’s view:

The soul is incorporeal, however, in that it in no way permits a composition with regard to substance, and particularly not a composition of contraries. (I.32, Gr. 20.16–18 → Ch. XI.13).

Titus apparently believes that it is only corporeal substances that can be compounded (and thereby corruptible and mortal). Titus then moves on to attack a new point of view which also implies that the soul is compounded:

For those who believe that it [i.e. the soul] is composed from differences have not introduced a substance that is diversified and different in relation to itself, but on the basis of visible things they have written about its activities, in that they could not make one simple and comprehensible account about it. (I.32, Gr. 20.18–22 → Ch. XI.13).

This view is hardly identical with the (hypothetical) Manichaean one; in connection with the Manichaeans Titus also spoke of a σύνθεσις of ἑναντία, whereas here he mentions a σύνθεσις of διαφορά: It is not clear whom the reference is to. Nor is it clear whether Titus merely wishes to defend the teaching of the persons in question against distortion and otherwise only criticises them mildly, or whether he believes that by speaking of the soul as composed from differences they have actually wished to introduce a diversified substance, but that they failed, since all that they have managed is merely to describe the soul’s activities on the basis of the visible things. Moreover Titus’s actual description could resemble a programme

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124 It is Beck’s (1978, 150–51) view that also Titus himself at this point supports the doctrine of parts to the soul.

125 In other words they have not introduced a variegated substance or claimed that the soul is different in relation to itself, but merely on the basis of visible things they have written about its activities; however, in all circumstances it must be a criticism that they could not make a simple, understandable λόγος of it.
through which, on an empirical basis, one draws conclusions con-
terning the soul’s nature.

Titus continues by stating:

For even if it [i.e. the soul] is different—first in this way and then in
that way—in relation to itself through the different qualities that it
assumes, nevertheless it is according to its substance God’s work and
immutable . . . (I.32, Gr. 20.22–24 → Ch. XI.13).

Here it appears that the soul’s activities are the same as its quali-
ties, and thus we are back with the soul being an ὀψία with accidental qualities, ἐξεῖς such as virtue and vice, which “come and go”
or can be separated from the soul. Under no circumstances will Titus
accept that one can speak of “parts of the soul”,126 and he believes
that this point finds excellent expression in a distinction between the
one indivisible soul, and its mutable qualities or activities.

To express that the soul is an ὀψία with accidental qualities, Titus
now uses in II.7–8 the particular distinction between καλός and
ἀγαθός.127 Man’s ὀψία is from nature, from the Creator’s hand, nei-
ther good nor bad, but beautiful. The infant is thus neither good
nor bad, corresponding to gold and precious stones that are beau-
tiful, but not good. Good and evil are accidental qualities which
must be acquired and which do not exist before they are done in
practice; they come partly through upbringing and partly through
the choices that reasoning (λογίσμος) or calculation (πρόθεσις) make.

126 When Titus nonetheless occasionally speaks explicitly in what follows of “parts
of the soul”, it is, as far as I can see, his attempt to enter hypothetically a line of
thought which he imagines could be the Manichaean: thus he writes in I.32: “Hence,
when desire is dangerously stirred either from the body alone or also from the part
of the soul that belongs to evil . . .” (Gr. 20.31–33 → Ch. XI.13), but it is not
Titus’s opinion that there should be such a μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς: in the first place it is
clear that when speaking of the part of the soul that is in contact with evil, Titus
must be referring to the previously mentioned hypothesis that Mani believes in
something irrational (ἀλόγιστον) that belongs to evil (κακία) (I.32, Gr. 20.30 → Ch.
XI.13), and secondly it is clear that all of Titus’s subsequent reasoning results in
his conclusion that on the one hand sin is due neither to the body nor to some
part or other of the soul, and on the other hand that irrational evil does not exist
at all: “Hence it is clear that the sins are attributed to the soul’s reason on good
grounds and not to the body or any other part of this [i.e. of the soul], so that
the irrational evil has got rid of being the cause of the evils that are among us,
because this evil does not exist either . . .” (I.32, Gr. 21.2–6 → Ch. XI.13). Also
“the best part of the soul” (τῷ ἐβελτίων μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς), referred to in I.35, Gr.
23.1, must only be understood as the position that Mani’s views imply.

(II.7, Gr. 29.9–18 → Ch. XI.16; II.8, 29.28–34). A short passage is of interest here to illuminate the origin of the distinction between καλός and ἀγαθός:

In fact according to this explanation man is on the one hand beautiful, indeed “very beautiful”, both in substance and in his very essence, but the good that is added through virtue alone is acquired through toil. (II.7, Gr. 29.18–20 → Ch. XI.16).

The same distinction turns up again in IV.84, one of the chapters in Titus’s long dissertation on the Devil (IV.57–85). The Devil fell through his pride and rebellion, but his nature did not alter (Sy 168.18–19). For the Devil’s nature was, being a work of God, from the beginning beautiful (καλός), but it was neither good (καλός) nor evil (κακός), for good and evil depend on free choice (Sy 168.19–31).

And Titus continues:

Now it is possible to see also the Scripture which says: “God saw the whole which He had made, and behold! It was very beautiful”,—clearly it speaks in relation to their substantial nature.128 For goodness is given in addition by the choice of the mind to those who have a mind in them (Sy 168.31–34).129

The passage makes it clear that also λίαν καλὸς in II.7 must be an allusion to Gen. 1.31aLXX (καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα, ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἴδω καλὰ λίαν), despite Titus’s declared intention to argue without the use of Scripture in Books I–II. Without doubt the distinction is originally based on the interpretation of LXX.130 Normally καλὸν also seems to refer to the ethically good, and I have not otherwise been able to find Church fathers who apply this distinction;131

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128 ισοζωή (Sy 168.32); presumably ἱσοζωή, which altogether is used extensively here in IV.84 (see Sy 168.23.28.29; 169.1.2.2.4), renders the Greek ὑπόστασις (cf. Gr. 45.16 and Sy 56.32, and more distantly Gr. 30.38; 32.28; 40.7; 45.14; 47.10; 57.27–28 and Sy 39.13; 41.19; 50.27; 56.30; 59.3; 71.27), but it is uncertain: e.g. αὐτὸς in Gr. 1.17 and ἐναντίων in Gr. 68.22 are rendered by ἱσοζωή in Sy 2.17 and 84.5.

129 οὐδέποτε ἐναι ὡς, ταύτης τῇ ἐν οἷς ἐναντίων καὶ ὡς ἐναντίων ἔσται ἢ ποιήσεις τῆς ὑπόστασεις, καὶ ἐναντίων συνεκινήσεως οὕτως τοῦ τός αὐτῶν συνεισφέρεται ἵσος.

130 It is thus also definite that in II.1, Gr. 26.3–5 (… μία δὲ ἀρχή τῶν ὄλων καὶ εἰς θεὸς ὁ τὰ πάντα ἐνυπορήσας καλὰ τε καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας ἀξίως.) Titus is alluding to Gen. 1.31, as also assumed by Klein 1991, 90. In addition we again find the allusion to Gen. in II.2, Gr. 26.11–12: πάντα δὲ καλὰ λίαν … κατεσκευασμένα, … cf. also IV.4, Sy 130.26–27.— Cf. also, 1 Tim. 4.4.

131 For example Philo writes in De op. mund. 47 (136) that the first man was
it should be mentioned that Plotinus referred ἄγαθόν to the One and καλὸν to lower things, but this distinction does not really have the same point as in Titus. On the other hand it is clear that Titus’s point is also to be found in other Church fathers; it is just not expressed through the distinction καλὸς—ἄγαθος. It would therefore be reasonable to conclude that the distinction is Titus’s own work, but it is nevertheless unlikely: it does not belong in II.7–8, because Titus’s own programme is not to argue on the basis of Scripture, and in IV.84 it is unnatural to introduce it suddenly in connection with the Devil. Rather, it would be natural that the distinction came at the beginning of Book III, where Titus interprets Gen., but there on the other hand it is missing. In other words Titus

132 Plotinus, Enn. VI.9. According to Van Winden 1971, 74 this teaching originates with Plotinus. — Already Aristotle distinguishes in Met. XIII.3,10–11 (1078a31–b6) between τὸ ἄγαθὸν and τὸ καλὸν (cf. Tarán 1981, 42) where τὸ ἄγαθὸν admittedly is ἐν πράξει, and τὸ καλὸν is ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, but no line to Titus is likely here either. — Titus is drawing not on Stoicism, at least not terminologically, even though there are of course similarities of content, cf. Pohlenz 1948, 116 (on the Stoic Zeno’s view of man): “Nur sein Denken und Verhalten unterliegt darum dem sittlichen Werturteil der Mitmenschen, deren Consensus die Handlungen, die der menschlichen Natur und dem Vernunftgesetz entsprechen, als ‘schön’, als καλά, anerkennt, und die gegenteiligen als ‘häßlich’, αἰσχρά, verwirft. So nannte ja der Hellene das, was wir als ‘sittlichgut’ oder ‘sittlichschlecht’ bezeichnen. Zenon war das eigentümliche ästhetische Empfinden, das einen Hellenen wie Plato zur Gleichsetzung von Gut und Schön trieb, innerlich fremd; aber den Sprachgebrauch hat er natürlich festgehalten.”

133 The point of Titus’s distinction lies close to the point of the other distinctions, e.g. Irenaeus’s distinctions between εἰκών and ὠμοιόσις, between πνεῦμα and πνεῦμα etc. (see Koch 1925; cf. below p. 325).—That the underage child’s soul knows neither good nor evil is a general idea in Greek patristics; cf. Gross 1960, 44, 72, 78, 81, 94–95, 99, 104–8, 123, 132, 170, 186, 213–14; Hauke 1993, 53, 55, 97, 101, 102, 248, 268–71, 421, 423, 483 n. 312, 550–53, 575–76, 647, 654–59, 690, 712–13, 714, 717.—See above pp. 268–69 on man’s goodness as accidental in Origen.
has introduced this distinction unsystematically but where it seemed appropriate.

However, to return to the main purpose, Titus’s polemic against the soul containing both τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ ἀλλόγιστον must of course be set within the ancient discussion of whether the soul is a unity without “parts”. Plato reckoned on parts of the soul, μέρη, but was already criticised by Aristotle, who preferred to speak of “faculties”, δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς. In general the Middle Platonists followed Plato, while on this point the Neo-Platonists were closer to Aristotle.134 The material that Titus uses probably stems from Middle-Platonic sources; here one can at least find clear expression for the view that the soul is compounded, σύνθετος, and not homogeneous, μονοειδής,135 and moreover in Severus one can find a polemic against the division into a rational and irrational part of the soul which has certain similarities with Titus.136 Explicitly, as far as I can see, however,  

134 Plato occasionally envisaged three parts of the soul, e.g. τὸ λογιστικὸν; τὸ θυμοειδής; and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν in Rep. 434d–441c, but in Tim. 69c–72d he lumps together the two irrational parts of the soul into one, corresponding to the theory that Titus hypothetically ascribes to the Manichaeans. Aristotle criticised Plato inter alia in De an. I,5, esp. 411b5–10. See Deuse 1983 and Blumenthal 1996 on Middle- and Neo-Platonists. Cf. also Tertullian, De an. 14ff, Waszink 1947, 17ff. and Waszink’s comment (1947, 209ff., esp. 215).  

135 See thus Plutarch, De virt. mor. 3, 441Dff., which is quoted in Deuse 1983, 105 n. 45. Titus, however, is not claiming either that the soul is μονοειδής, and this could be because he believed that although it has no “parts”, it nonetheless has “faculties”; for example, in the much later work of John Philoponus, the two theories that the soul is μονοειδής or that it has faculties are couched as opposites, see Philoponus, In De an., Hayduck 1897, 33.7–12: ἀλλ᾽ επειδὴν εὑρώμεν ὀτι οὐσία ἐστί, πάλιν ἲπτομεν πότερον σῶμα ἢ ἀσώματον, καὶ εἰ σῶμα, ἀπλοῦν ἢ σύνθετον, καὶ εἰ ἀσώματον, χωριστον ἢ ἀκροστίον· καὶ πότερον μία ἐν ἐκάστῳ ψυχῇ ἢ πολλαί, καὶ εἰ μία, μονοειδής ἢ πολυδύναμος, καὶ τὸ τῶν δυνάμεως διαφορά· (cf. De an. I,1, 402b1ff.); cf. Blumenthal 1996, 76, 199 n. 8.—However, Titus nowhere states that the soul has “faculties”.  

136 In a fragment preserved in Eusebius, Praep. ev. XIII.17 the Middle Platonist Severus (perhaps c. 200 CE) believes that Plato’s teaching that the soul is composed of an impassible and a possible substance, must be relinquished, because it implies that the soul is corruptible. Ἄλλα γὰρ οὐκ ἦστι ψυχὴ τρίτον τι πράγμα ἐκ δύο ἐναντίων ἀλλάζων σύνθετων, ἀπλοῦν δὲ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ φυσεὶ ὁπλαῖς καὶ ἀσώματον· Severus writes in XIII.17.4 (Mras 1956, 240), and here, despite certain differences there are also similarities with Titus in terminology and content (cf. also Tertullian, De an. 14.1, Waszink 1947, 17). Note too that just as Titus uses σύνθετος and κράτεις synonymously, Severus in XIII.17.2 (Mras 1956, 239) also parallels the elements which are τὰ . . . κρατήνσα καὶ μυθένσα with the soul, which is composed of impassible and possible substance, even though it is not here, but later, that he uses συνθήμα. When οἱ . . . πολλοὶ according to Severus in XIII.17.5 (Mras 1956, 240) infer the soul’s παθητὴ ωὐσία and mortality from the presence of πάθη, there is
we do not find in Titus Aristotle’s or Severus’s solution\textsuperscript{137} that the soul has faculties (δυνάμεις) instead of parts (μέρη).

The Stoics’ interests were related to these tendencies, insofar as—they understood the soul as an organic, vitalistic unity. Nevertheless the Stoics spoke of eight parts to the soul, μέρη, only that these “parts” should be understood as functions of the one soul: the five senses, as well as the power of speech and procreativeness were streams of πνεῦμα, which emanated from and were controlled by the eighth part, τὸ ἕγεμονικόν. Within τὸ ἕγεμονικόν moreover the Stoics distinguished between different faculties (δυνάμεις). According to Pohlenz, however, it was not until Chrysippus that Stoic psychology was driven into extreme monism and intellectualism. Chrysippus rejected any idea of an irrational part or faculty of the soul. Every aspect of the soul’s life was interpreted here as the soul or τὸ ἕγεμονικόν (which is identified with διάνοια and λογισμός) in a particular state. It is a question of constantly changing qualitative states (the category πῶς ἔχον), which involves among other things that also the passions are διάνοια in a particular state.\textsuperscript{138}

Titus is influenced by Stoic ideas in several regards. Thus the idea of the one substance of the soul that takes on different qualities already resembles the Stoic idea of ἕγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον; however, as previously demonstrated, Titus here uses Aristotelian concepts. It turns out in addition that Titus believes that the soul contains a particular “mind”, which he unsystematically designates with a series of names including λογισμός, λογικόν, λογιστικόν, which in I.32 (Gr. 20.31–21.3 → Ch. XI.13) for example, are used indiscriminately, or νοῦς (e.g. in I.34, Gr. 22.21.31). Titus does not give us any explanation, however, as to what status this mind has in the soul, when it is not a “part”.\textsuperscript{139} In I.35 it even seems that Titus envisages not

\textsuperscript{137} Eusebius, \textit{Praep. ev.} XIII.17.6, Mras 1956, 240: τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνεργούσας δυνάμεις.


\textsuperscript{139} In II.7, Gr. 29.20–28 Titus even uses Plato’s image from \textit{Phaedr.} 247c of the charioteer and horses, but even though he allows the charioteer to be νοῦς (τὸν ἡμίσιον νοῦν, Gr. 29.26), he uses the image so freely that we cannot conclude anything about “parts of the soul” (→ Ch. XI.16). Also in III.13.9 man’s natural rea-
only the mind of the soul but also a mind of the mind, so to speak. For he talks of τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡγεμονικότατον τοῦ νοῦ (Gr. 22.36–37) and of τὸ . . . ἡγεμονικότατον τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διανοίας (Gr. 22.38–39). Here διάνοια does not, as is otherwise the case, seem to denote “thought” or “intention”, but to be synonymous with νοῦς; what is especially noteworthy, however, is that Titus distinguishes λογιστικὸν/ἡγεμονικότατον within man’s νοῦς; the aim of the superlative ἡγεμονικότατον, ‘super-commanding’, is presumably the same. Either Titus has identified ψυχή and νοῦς, or there is also in a way a further νοῦς within νοῦς. But whatever the case, the term τὸ ἡγεμονικόν is Stoic in origin.

Here then it is interesting that Titus can also identify this commanding centre in the soul with the heart; at least, in IV.84 (Sy 168.34–35) he quotes Lk. 6.45 (cf. Mt. 12.35) and explains in the context the meaning of καρδία, heart: “and the term ‘heart’ indicates the authority and the mind’s ability to govern” (καρδία ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ καρδιακὴ καταδεικνύει, Sy 168.35); soon after he juxtaposes, and perhaps also distinguishes between, “mind” (μάντη) and “heart” (καρδία) (Sy 169.2–3). It was precisely the Stoics’ view that the whole of τὸ ἡγεμονικόν was concentrated in the heart. However, Titus’s polemic against a doctrine of a soul of parts was not concerned with how the soul’s commanding rational centre is to be understood in relation to the soul as such, but with the fundamental distinction between a rational and an irrational part of the soul. But according to Titus the soul’s commanding mind is awarded the responsibility for sin, which he believes the Manichaeans refer to an irrational part of the soul. For the idea that sin originates in an irrational part of the soul is for Titus yet another example of the

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140 Thus perhaps also in I.34, Gr. 22.13, where διάνοια could be a synonym for the following λογισμός, which presumably denotes the same as νοῦς.

141 Cf. also IV.47: in Lk. 6.45 Christ calls the heart a treasury because of the freedom of the will (Sy 152.21–22).

142 See further Pohlenz 1948, 87–88. As Pohlenz also notes, the Stoics could of course here lean on the role of the heart in everyday language and popular ideas, which on this point were closely related to biblical ideas of the heart (cf. Lk. 6.45), see Baumgärtel and Behm 1938; Dihle, Jacob, Lohse, Schweizer and Tröger 1973.
Manichaean determinism that acquits man himself, and this determinism precludes Titus’s own theodicy that the guilt is man’s. Altogether Titus’s interest in man’s rationality is always concerned with its moral responsibility.

According to Titus it is not possible for an action (πράξεις), e.g. an evil action (a sin), to be carried out merely by desire (ἐπιθυμία) being set in motion; from the point of view of desire it is only a matter of a reflection (ἐνθομησίας) which need not go any further, since at one and the same time it blazes up and goes out. For desire to lead to action a preliminary consideration (σκέψεις) and deliberation (βουλή) are required in man, and then a decision (κρίσις) and a choice (αὐρίσκεις) of action (πράξεις), which is performed by the mind of the soul (λογισµός, λογικόν etc.) (I.32, Gr. 20.31–21.3 → Ch. XI.13). Titus seems to envisage two processes in man here, partly that desire is moved and partly a rational process that proceeds in two steps: first a consideration of the aim of the action (σκέψεις/βουλή) and then a decision (κρίσις/αὐρίσκεις), which finally concludes with a third step, the action itself. The rational consideration thus takes priority over the will, but both are rational acts.

Since Titus now identifies on the one hand virtuous and rational acts and on the other hand evil and irrational ones, but derives sinful actions from the rational planning and choice of the mind, it means that the irrational action is performed by man’s mind with full knowledge; for the alternative would be that there was an irrational part of the soul:

143 It also seems as if Titus is willing to completely reduce the reason’s area of operations to that of practice; when he states in I.24 that neither we nor the angels have a part in seeing God κατ’ οὐσίαν (Gr. 15.22–23 → Ch. XI.11), he is at least writing off the possibility of the highest form of contemplation.

144 In most cases the expressions σκοπός (e.g. Gr. 22.13.11.18.26.29), διάνοια (e.g. Gr. 22.27.34) and πρόθεσις (e.g. Gr. 29.30.32), which are used in other contexts, seem to denote the same step as σκέψεις/βουλή. But as mentioned διάνοια can also mean the mind itself.

145 Seen in the context of the history of ideas, Titus’s concept of the will is of course pre-Augustine; cf. Dihle 1982 (German: Dihle 1985): although as far as I can see Titus envisages volition as a phenomenon, he is still so close to classical philosophy that this will is regarded as a natural continuation of the planning by the intellect. The will cannot therefore be evaluated morally independent of the evaluation of the aim of the action. Cf. Titus, who in I.34 with several examples explains that it is the underlying purpose (σκοπός) that decides whether an act is righteous or wicked: e.g. both the murderer and his judge kill, “but the purpose separates what is done” (ό δὲ σκοπός διότι τὸ πρωτότοκον, 21.39–22.1) (21.37–22.1).
For if the soul, through not knowing the quality of the desire, had moved on to act irrationally, one could definitely claim that the things which are done irrationally are brought about as though they were from the irrational part (of the soul). (I.32, Gr. 21.8–11 → Ch. XI.13).

This passage is best illuminated by another in II.3:

And with a word of reproach sin is well named as being committed “against reason”—which as a matter of fact can be applied everywhere—so that all that is committed “against reason” is sin, even if it takes its origin in those things that are in accordance with nature. (Gr. 27.6–9 → Ch. XI.15).

Reason can be applied everywhere, also against itself. Precisely because they have their source in reason certain actions are sinful or irrational, despite their source being in nature. When Titus here claims that reason can be used irrationally, it is clear that he is repeating the Stoics’ ideas of the “irrational movement” (ἀλογος κίνησις) of reason, which is against true reason (παρα των ὑρθων λόγων), and which was directed among other things against Plato’s idea of an irrational part of the soul. Plato’s interpretation of Socrates’s teaching of οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει (e.g. Gorgias 467c ff.; Protagoras 358b–c) implies precisely a determinism in Timaeus 81e–87b, especially 86b ff., where sicknesses, errors and moral evils are derived from weaknesses in the body and the parts of the soul that are most closely linked to it. In Timaeus 69c–d determinism is linked to the irrational part of the soul: in the body another kind of soul is lodged, namely the mortal, which has fearful and unavoidable passions within itself (ἀλλο τε ἐίδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῇ...το θνητόν, δεινό καὶ ἀνοιγκαί καὶ ἐκατωτῷ παθηματι ἐχον, Timaeus 69c). These views are close to what Titus imagines that the Manichaeans believed, and it turns out that Titus’s strategy is to identify Manichaeism with particular tendencies in Platonism. Here

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146 The quality (ποιότης) of the desire must mean here, “the kind of desire in question”; the expression cannot be aimed at the quality of “vice”, for that is precisely the result of the mind’s choice, whereas desire precedes the choice.

147 Cf. II.46: παρα λόγων, Gr. 55.24; τω παραλόγω, Gr. 55.27; παραλόγως, Gr. 55.37. Cf. also that in III.28,5 Titus can write of Eve, who was tempted by the Devil (the serpent): λόγῳ γὰρ ἐπαιτηλῷ ὡς λόγου μετέχουσα καὶ γνώσεως μεταφέρεται. (ed.N 342.11–12), cf. also III.29,6 ἑπιβούλῳ γνώμῃ (ed.N 344.18). Cf. also IV.60–61.64.


149 Cf. Langerbeck (1967, 52–56), who shows how the anti-heretical polemic in Clement of Alexandria and Origen includes precisely such passages in Plato. Cf. perhaps also Löhr 1996, 81, 100–1.
therefore Titus is presumably continuing a polemic that was originally directed against Platonists, and elsewhere he also appears to be continuing an attack on Platonic doctrines regarding the evilness of matter. Indeed Titus also rejects directly the doctrine that οὐδείς ἔκων ἀμαρτάνει:

However, if the reasoning faculty on the one hand often chooses desire, in that it has voluntarily subjugated itself to a bad way of life, and then once more rejects desire, when a fear, of whatever kind, or at least a desire for virtue that draws towards itself, restrains it [i.e. the reasoning faculty], it is clear that it is the reasoning faculty alone that as its own actions both perform those that are done beautifully and those that are done differently. (I.32, Gr. 21.11–16 → Ch. XI.13).

150 In Contra Manich. I.21 Titus quotes from a Manichaean book that describes the point in Mani’s myth when the demons of darkness or matter see the beauty of light and desire it. Titus objects that it is good to desire or love the good (cf. also the related arguments in I.23–25; cf. Klein 1991, 57–58). This type of argument is not particular to Titus but is found in a number of anti-Manichaean writings, e.g. Alexander of Lycopolis, Contra Manich. opin. disp. IX, Brinkmann 1895, 15.9–16.8; see further Baur 1831, 46–49; Beck 1978, 82, 85, 87–88; Villely 1985, 245–46; Klein 1991, 73, 75. The form of the argument that evil cannot be evil if it desires the good appears in Aristotle in Met. XIV,4 (1092a1–5), where he attacks the Platonic view that there should be a (material) principle that is evil and yet can receive the good; in that case the material principle participates in and longs for the good which destroys it (… καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἄγαθον χάρων εἶναι, καὶ μετέχειν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ φθαρτικοῦ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἔναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον). It is possible that Aristotle’s argument in facts comes from Speusippus (thus Dillon 1996, 15). Speusippus denied that in an ethical sense the One (τὸ ἕν) could be called “good” and the Multiplicity (τὸ πλῆθος) “evil”. Merlan (1968, 96–140) has argued that Ch. 4 in Iamblichus’s De comm. math., Festa 1975, 15.6–18.12 comes from Speusippus; this chapter posits two principles, the One and the Multiplicity, and argues in this way among others that the Multiplicity is not evil or ugly: even though the One is not in a real sense “good”, we praise it for its self-sufficiency, and because it is the cause of beauty in numbers. Since the Multiplicity naturally receives the One, it is illogical to describe it as evil or ugly; on the contrary, the Multiplicity should also be praised (Festa 1975, 16.2–9). Tarán (1981, 86–107), however, disputes that Ch. 4 in Iamblichus’s De comm. math. comes from Speusippus; instead he proposes that the chapter was perhaps written by “a Neopythagorean or Neoplatonic sympathizer”, and that the writer has at least used Aristotle’s Met. (Tarán 1981, 107; moreover the argument in Met. 1092a3–5, according to Tarán [1981, 343], also comes from Aristotle and not Speusippus). On the other hand Merlan’s hypothesis is defended in Dillon 1984 (cf. Dillon 1996, 430). It is not possible here to deal more closely with the problem; whatever the case, the anti-Manichaean argument is of philosophical origin, whether contrived by Speusippus or Aristotle. The argument can also be independent of both, insofar as it, as pointed out by Merlan (1968, 114), goes back to Plato, Symp. 203e and Lysis 217b.

151 Cf. e.g. also II.46, Gr. 55.32–33 (τῶν πρᾶπτοντα… ἐκόντα πλημμελοῦντα).—Titus admittedly connects sin to ignorance, error or madness: man sins out of ignorance (II.22, Gr. 39.22–23 → Ch. XI.23). Men received penitence and forgiveness,
First and foremost the passage raises the question of what entity ἐπιθυμία, “desire”, actually is in Titus. Does he in reality believe that desire is an irrational impulse from a lower part of the soul, or a faculty within it, which can hardly be consistent with his other statements?

The mind or reasoning power can choose desire, apparently understood as a wicked way of life, but it can also reject this (wicked) desire, among others through a desire for virtue that draws towards itself. In other words the mind relates itself to contrary desires. In this context we can also recall the passage from I.32 referred to above, where it is said that ἐπιθυμία may be “moved”, yet without the contribution of the reasoning power will nevertheless remain in its place, because it is only a reflection (ἐνθομένομαι) which flares up and goes out at one and the same time (Gr. 20.31–21.2 → Ch. XI.13).

The purpose of these passages becomes clear in II.13, however, where Titus returns to his theory that the Manichaeans regard the soul as being compounded of contraries, but now in the formulation “that two opposing natures exist in us” (Gr. 31.34 → Ch. XI.19), which is again a conclusion drawn from “thinking (ἐνθομένομαι) first bad things, then good things” (Gr. 31.34–35 → Ch. XI.19). Titus’s task is thus to present an alternative explanation for the presence of these contrary thoughts, and as its point of origin this explanation is based on one of firmest assumptions in Titus’s polemic, namely that from nature man is gifted with the knowledge of good and evil. This fundamental assumption must without doubt be related to the idea of “common concepts”, understood to mean in the area of ethics. God has handed over virtue and vice to man himself “in because they are in a body and fell “into error” (ἐμπληκότα) (IV.108, §y 183.9–11). Cf. also Titus’s wordplay on Mani’s name (see above p. 168). But ignorance does not mean that man sins involuntarily, since Titus does not believe that ignorance comes from an irrational part of the soul: the soul or the reason are responsible for their ignorance.

152 This ἐπιθυμία ... ἀρετής (Gr. 21.14) could be inspired by Gal. 5.17, where the apostle actually also reckons that the spirit can desire in opposition to the flesh.—Cf. also I.34, Gr. 22.23, where Titus mentions a πόθος τῆς ἀρετῆς.

153 Cf. also the conclusion, II.13, Gr. 32.19–22 → Ch. XI.19.

154 Stroumsa and Stroumsa 1988, 50 thus note pertinentely that the natural knowledge of good and evil that Titus is discussing is “in the field of ethics, the equivalent of the koinai ennoiai in epistemology.”—Cf. the earlier Church fathers, e.g. already in Justin the “natural concepts” have to do with a common ethical knowledge (see above p. 285), or lex naturalis in Origen (see above p. 287).
that He has beforehand placed knowledge of both (qualities) in his nature” (II.3, Gr. 26.38–39 → Ch. XI.14), in the sense of possibilities that man is free to realise in practice:

Therefore man is honoured through freedom to both virtue and vice, in that he possesses by nature the knowledge of these two, which can be performed but which do not exist until they are performed. (II.9, Gr. 30.21–24).  

It is reasonable to conclude that this knowledge is quite simply “innate”, and it is probably also the intention, even though in Titus we can also find the view that children just like the animals lack cognition and are thus not rational creatures, a view that again places Titus close to Stoicism. The theory of the natural knowledge of good and evil also seems to have the advantage for Titus that it permits him at adhere to Plato and Chrysippus’s philosophical insight that the evil is necessary in order to know the good, or, as Titus formulates it in II.36, the knowledge and the power to choose and to realise the lie is necessary, so that the truth, which is stronger than the lie, can also be chosen (Gr. 47.2–32).

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155 ἐλευθεροτητι τοιχαροῖν τετίμηται ἀνθρώπῳς ὁρετής τε καὶ κακίας, τούτων φύσει τὴν γνώσιν ἔχουν δυναμένοι πρακτίζειν, πρὶν δὲ πρακτίζειν μὴ ἀντων. — Cf. also II.7, where Titus presupposes that God has gifted man’s φύσει with both power and knowledge of virtue and vice (Gr. 29.20–22 → Ch. XI.16). — That knowledge of good and evil is contained in man’s nature is also important in Book III’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative (e.g. III.15,5; III.17,11; III.18,3; III.18,7; III.23,9; III.23,11–13; III.23,17; III.28,1–3; III.29,1–2; III.29.5), see below pp. 321–26 — Natural knowledge of good and evil is not for man alone but for all rational beings that are created (IV.83), including the Devil (IV.60–61) and the demons (IV.64).

156 At least as far as I understand II.40 (Gr. 50.10–22), in particular the remark πρὶν δὲ γνῶναι, <νόητοι υπάρχον>, σωδέτερον τὸν ἄκρον κυλεῖται, Gr. 50.17–18 → Ch. XI.28. Cf. also II.7, Gr. 29.11ff. → Ch. XI.16.


159 However, because this has to do with truth and falsehood, Titus would hardly be able to define them both as accidental qualities; the entire interest in II.36 concerns the idea that just as darkness in the corporeal world is without substantial existence, an absence of light (cf. Stead 1977, 140), so is the case with falsehood. — Cf. also other formulations of Titus’s view in II.4 (Gr. 27.20–28.18): the possibility of vices also allows for the virtues; “But if anyone will object that just like God we ought to be unable to experience the contraries (of the virtues)—both intemperance and injustice—, this person is saying nothing other than that we ought not to be human beings.” (εἰ δὲ τις ἀντιλέγοι ἀς δέον ἡμᾶς ἀνεπιδέξτως εἶναι τῶν ἑναντίων ἀκολουθίαις τε καὶ ἀδικίαις ὁσπέρ ὁ θεός, οὐδὲν ἔτερον ὁ τοιοῦτος λέγει ἢ ὡς δέον εἶναι ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, Gr. 28.12–15). Cf. also II.39 (Gr. 49.19–50.10),
The explanation as to why human beings conceive wicked and virtuous thoughts alternately is that since the knowledge of both is natural to us we are of necessity moved towards thoughts of them. It is an advantage that we cannot escape thoughts of evil things, because that enables us to have a basis on which to make a better choice (II.13, Gr. 31.35–38 → Ch. XI.19). Because man is gifted with knowledge of justice and injustice, thought will quite naturally take both into consideration. On such a basis the intention (πρόθεσις) inclines in the direction it will as a voluntary movement, but, Titus emphasises, if there was no possibility of inclining towards the wicked, there would be nothing praiseworthy about virtue (II.13, Gr. 31.39–32.4 → Ch. XI.19). If we relate this presentation to the one above in I.32, it seems clear that ἐπιθυμία or the ἐνθυμησις that is linked to ἐπιθυμία is not to be understood as an impulse from an irrational part of the soul, but as an intellectual consideration directed towards a natural, given knowledge of good and evil. In II.13 Titus also finds occasion to stress yet again that the process he has described esp. 49.35–37: “For every proof is the contrary of its contrary, (the proof that) precisely [takes place] through cognition and judgement, but it is clear that without cognition neither of them exists for the other.” (→ Ch. XI.27).

Here, however, it relates to given possibilities for action, as detailed in the following: the thought moves towards different possibilities that can happen, and it considers them with the help of the natural knowledge of good and evil in order thereafter to make its choice, see Gr. 32.8–11: ... ἡ ἐνθυμησις ... ἀναγκαίως κυνείται πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι ἐνδεχόμενα, οὐ διαζωμένη πρὸς αὐτὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει φυσικῆ ἐπιβάλλουσα τούτοις (→ Ch. XI.19).—The reflection is presented in the context of a comparison with the mind’s differentiation between visual impressions that can lead to evil or good actions (Gr. 32.5–9 → Ch. XI.19).

Whereas Gr. 32.3 reads ἐνθυμησις, so the reference is to the thought’s examination of available knowledge, ἆγα 40.25 reads ἅ τι <κακός>, which presumably renders ἐπιθυμία. But here ἄγα may well have been the original reading, for the intellectual examination of fundamental knowledge is apparently, what Titus understands by ἐπιθυμία.—Titus applies the term ἰσόπω in Gr. 32.4, which actually refers to the dipping of the scales to one, to the direction that one decides on, and he uses as a full parallel the corresponding substantive ἰσόπη in II.11, Gr. 31.13; in a philosophical context the terms are originally Stoic, but were used by this time by both Platonic and Catholic writers, see further Dihle 1982, 58, 193 n. 54, 213 n. 10, 221 n. 65, 223 n. 72, 227 n. 82, 227 n. 84, 231 n. 107; Meijering 1974, 75–76; Blumenthal 1996, 81.—When Titus links praise and blame to voluntary actions, it is obvious to refer to Aristotle, e.g. Ἔθικ. Νόμ. III,1,1 (1109b30f.: καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνον καὶ ψυχόν γνωμένον, ...).

It is presumably also because we naturally have knowledge of good and evil and are therefore of necessity moved towards thoughts of virtue and vice that Titus can say in I.34 that the desire for sinful actions is innate (ἐμφυτος) in us (Gr. 21.29–30).
does not mean that the soul consists of different parts but must be understood as activities of the soul (Gr. 32.4–5 → Ch. XI.19).

Titus thus proves himself to be Stoicising: in a monistic way he manages to relate everything to the autonomous processes of reason; only the one element of external events remained that thought related itself to given possibilities for action. Even though it is thus clear that wickedness and vice are the passions or sufferings of reason ("for wickedness and vice are the suffering of the reasoning power", πονηρία γὰρ καὶ κακία λογισμοῦ πάθος [II.39, Gr. 49.20–21]), the given possibilities of action or the external circumstance are nevertheless the conditions of man, and in this context we must perhaps also understand the remark quoted from II.3 that sin is committed against reason, even if it originates in things that are in accordance with nature (Gr. 27.9 → Ch. XI.15). Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is actually a Stoic term, that Titus also uses in the following:

For the irrational use of the things that are in accordance with nature brings about sin, whereas the reason within us examines the things that are in accordance with nature, and therefore the sin that is committed is not unnoticed. (II.3, Gr. 27.9–12 → Ch. XI.15).

The meaning of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is best illustrated by II.45–46, where Titus seeks to refute Mani’s "accusations" against, for example, lethal iron or death itself of being evil. In II.46 (Gr. 55.18–37) it becomes clear that τὰ κατὰ φύσιν are quite simply all created things, the law or nature of which cannot be changed, and which are not evil but which the mind can use irrationally. This is true of iron and wood, but it is also true, for example, of adultery or murder, where Titus additionally explains that the murder brings about death, which is something natural, and that it is only the murderer who has used his reason irrationally who should be charged. One can also compare this with II.58 (Gr. 61.37–62.13), where τὰ κατὰ φύσιν amongst others is exemplified in food and wine and the sexual drive, which

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163 Titus also concerns himself with sin in a being without a body, like the Devil: the cause of the Devil’s fall was pride, for as an incorporeal being he had no corporeal desire (IV.74, Sy 164.5–22), but as with all rational creatures this was a desire that built on the misuse of natural reason (IV.82, Sy 167.29–168.7; Klein’s reference and interpretation [1991, 116 with n. 276] are here misleading).

164 See, for example the indexes in Pohlenz 1948 or Forschner 1995. According to Forschner 1995, 149 n. 42, however, the Stoics had taken the term from the Old Academy; cf. Pohlenz 1948, 118.
is not evil but must be used with temperance. Only debauchery is sin, “For it is not the use of the things that are in accordance with nature that bring about sin” (οὐ γὰρ τῶν κοτά φύσιν ἡ χρήσις ποτεῖ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, Gr. 62.6–7).—With this in mind we are presumably approaching the question of Titus’s view of the body.

“For man,” writes Titus in II.36, “is nothing other than soul and body” (ἀνθρωπος . . . γὰρ οὐδὲν ἑτερον ἡ νοῦν τε καὶ σῶμα, Gr. 47.5–6). In his defence of the body against the Manichaeans’ attack in IV.27–28 (Sy. 142.14–143.24) Titus explains that the body is the instrument (δργανον) of the soul. In this definition, however, lies an ambiguity: on the one hand the body has no power, on the other hand we are clearly speaking of an instrument that by virtue of its nature is difficult to use; this, however, is what is good about it. The body has been given the nature that it can be a temptation or an object of desire; Titus writes for example:

. . ., even if it [i.e. the body] has, by its nature, certain enticements towards lusts,—something which is necessary because of procreation (IV.27, Sy. 142.31–32).

It is not only for the sake of procreation, however, that there are difficulties with the body; it is also quite simply so that virtue can exist, for virtue is to be understood as the control of the body:

For (the body) is not evil, seeing that it is an assistant to the soul in the performance (of something leading) to virtue. For a human being

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165 Although sin is defined as an intemperate use of the natural, one must not of course believe that virtue is a temperate use of the same, but one might believe that Titus is defining virtue, which is a rational activity, as an expression of man’s nature, so much the more because in Stoic style he can elaborate that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, e.g. in II.16: “But in general it is neither happy to be rich nor pitious to be poor, because he alone is happy to whom belongs the soul’s steadfast good deed in relation to virtue, whether this be rich or poor.” (Gr. 34.7–10 → Ch. XI.20). However, Titus distinguishes in II.38 between the intemperate use of the natural, which is sin, the temperate use, which is not sin, and abstinence, which is above nature, but not against the natural.

166 Outside Contra Manich. Titus at any rate uses the term ὁργανον about the human body in Hom. in Luc. 1.80', Sickenberger 1901, 147, cf. 97, but presumably ὁργανον in Contra Manich. IV.27, Sy. 142.25 and IV.28, Sy. 143.22 renders ὁργανον.—Also the definition of the body as ὁργανον was found in the philosophical tradition, cf. Blumenthal 1996, 94 and 201 n. 2.—However, in IV.100, Pitra 1888, 54 (= PG 18, 1260C3–4) Titus uses another term ἐργαλειον, which also means “instrument”, about the body (→ Ch. XI.51); also here Sy. 179.7 translates with ὁργανον.

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does not possess chastity, uprightness, or any other part of virtue, apart from the body and (the body’s) inclination, which is stirred to (do) the opposite of what is in its nature; it gives to the soul pretexts for virtue in that it [i.e. the soul] drags (the body) in a contrary direction. Hence the body is a friend of the soul—not only because it was established with it, but (also) because it gives (the soul) success through its guidance. For it [i.e. the body] does not harm (the soul) when it is stirred to desire, but it (actually) helps (the soul) [or: is helped by (the soul)], in that it is controlled and held back by it. This matter of the body’s being controlled by the soul is nothing other than virtue (IV.28, Sy 143.11–20).168

So Titus believes nevertheless that the body contains a “proclivity” to the opposite of virtue, a conclusion that is in some tension with other of his statements, however; but precisely because the body gives the soul the opportunity for struggle and thus for virtue, it is evaluated positively, and this point also justifies the bodily resurrection at the last day:

For it would not be right if the one [i.e. the body] which toiled together with the soul for virtue should not enjoy the rewards of victory together with her (IV.39, Sy 148.7–9).169

This does not mean that the resurrected body will continue to contain passions, as Titus makes clear in IV.99, where fortunately most of the Greek text is preserved in John of Damascus’s Sacra Parallele.170 The resurrected people will not be caught up in corporeal passions (κατὰ τὸν λόγον, Sy 178.8 → Ch. XI.50,1), and the risen flesh will not

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168 In all essentials I owe the translation of this difficult passage to Sebastian Brock (in a letter dated 20th October 2001).

169 The beginning of IV.99 (Sy 178.6–13 → Ch. XI.50,1) is not among the excerpts in John of Damascus (Pitra 1888, 52f. = PG 18, 1257Dff. → Ch. XI.50,2), which does not begin until the point that corresponds to Sy 178.13. However, in what follows there are continued divergences between the Greek text and the Syriac translation.
be endowed with passions (σὰρξ ἐμπαθης); a heavy body will not live together again with the passions, etc. 171

If one now thinks that Titus’s picture of sin as brought about by the considerations and choice of the mind is an expression of a naive image of man, one should also add that this image achieves a greater depth through Titus assigning great significance to εἴης, habits and upbringing. Thus he presupposes in I.33 that also those who train themselves in chastity have a εἴης to desire (ἐπιθυμία), which is stirred (Gr. 21.20–23). But he maintains that one can hinder the desire of nature through the reasoning power, from which it follows that the reasoning power is both that which sins and that which does good, and that the reasoning power is what knows both virtue and vice (Gr. 21.25–29). In II.11 he claims that virtue and vice can suddenly appear in man where they have otherwise not been present by virtue of long-continued practice (συνήθεια), which proves that they are determined by the will (προαιρετικῶς); virtue acquired is thus in danger of being lost, if one shows even the merest indifference (Gr. 31.7–17). In II.12 Titus then introduces the objection against this presentation that there are people who wish to refrain from bad deeds without being able to (Gr. 31.17–19 → Ch. XI.18). Titus explains this fact by saying that just as it is difficult to remove a long-standing bodily suffering (πάθος), it is not easy either to drive out a εἴης in the soul that is not good but which through long custom has become stiffened unless a good passion (πάθος) that is greater comes in and drives out the passion that had previously been received (Gr. 31.19–23 → Ch. XI.18). 172 The line of thought that a given person is after all responsible for a vice which cannot be removed simply by a decision because it is the result of him not training in virtue, is also found in Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea III,5,13–14 (1114a12–21), who also makes the comparison with bodily illnesses, though not in quite the same way. We do not find in this passage of Aristotle the idea of the good πάθος driving out the bad, but at least it is hardly Stoic.—In II.3 we find another expression of Titus’s viewpoint:

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171 Pitra 1888, 53 = PG 18, 1260A1–4 → Ch. XI.50,II.
172 Examples of such good passions which can overcome the bad habit are either fear of punishment, or calling the law to mind, see Gr. 31.23–29.
So if we train our immanent reason hard like a body for the exercise of virtue, we make it healthy and strong through a well-measured movement. But if we do not regard it as worthy of training and care, it becomes weaker from illnesses and in the end, because it is neglected, it becomes lame. (Gr. 27.12–16 → Ch. XI.15).\textsuperscript{173}

It is clear enough that the idea that the reason must be trained in virtue has ancient roots in Greek culture, but the fact that in \textit{Contra Manichaeos} Titus uses concepts such as \textit{εξείς} and \textit{προορίσθησις} (\textit{προοριστικός}) makes it probable that he is particularly continuing the traditions with roots in Aristotle’s ethics, which placed a special emphasis on the moral significance of \textit{θος}, but which had been disseminated to both the Stoics and the Platonists.\textsuperscript{174}

I have now attempted to give an outline of Titus’s philosophical views, mainly though not exclusively, on the basis of Books I–II. It should by now be clear that Titus actually drew many of his fundamental views from contemporary literate culture, which cannot be called opportunism or disingenuousness, when he claimed that large parts of what he had to say could be presented independently of Scripture as “common knowledge”. The reason that he resorted to such a presentation, which was unusual for a Catholic writer at the time, is the particular conditions in Bostra, where the Manichaean mission was influencing the already strained relationship between pagans and Catholics, and where the Manichaecans in polemic against Catholic Christianity sought to present themselves as representatives of rational Christianity.

Even though Titus’s presentation independent of Scripture and on the basis of the common concepts was unusual, it was made possible by the previous generations of Catholic theologians, who in principle had accepted an innate knowledge in man. Nor was Titus’s incorporation of philosophical forms of thought and concepts new to theology. Yet the philosophical element in Titus’s understanding of Christianity was not merely a continuation of the tradition, but

\textsuperscript{173} Cf. e.g. also II.13, Gr. 32.16–17 (→ Ch. XI.19).—In IV.30, Sy 144.1 the soul’s error is attributed to its “negligence” (\textit{σκέψις}).

\textsuperscript{174} Cf. e.g. Dihle 1982, 55, 63, 105, 134, 240 n. 81. Cf. e.g. also that the cultivation of the soul and the earth can be compared both in \textit{Eth. Nic.} X.9,6 (1179b23–26) and in \textit{Contra Manich.} II.6, Gr. 27.18–20; II.13, Gr. 32.17–19 (→ Ch. XI.19). Cf. also Sickenberger 1901, 83–85 on the concept \textit{προορίσθησις} in Titus.
also the result of an actual strategy. This becomes clear when we note that Adda’s philosophically-oriented problems were so important for Titus that he was willing to make a significant revision of the traditional interpretation of the Paradise narrative which brought it into better accord with philosophical assumptions.
CHAPTER EIGHT

TITUS OF BOSTRA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PARADISE NARRATIVE

1. Introductory remark

In the last chapters we saw how Titus could relate to Adda’s questions on Gen. 3, because these sprang from a set of values with roots in philosophical traditions from the cultures of Mediterranean world which Titus also shared. It was appropriate to call the questions a “protest exegesis” since they not only contained a protest against the traditional interpretation of the text but also against the traditional exegetes and their God. These questions are not merely devotional; they are meant to shake their audience and thereby pave the way for an alternative explanation of God, evil, the world and man. Titus, however, would give a different set of answers to the questions, which allowed his readers to retain their creed.¹

In this context Adda’s attack was directed against the first article of faith, and it is also only this article that Titus defends in Contra Manichaeos III.10–29, through a theodicy that seeks to show that the creation of the world and of man was good and rational, and that the course of events in the Paradise narrative was similarly good and rational, an expression of God’s Providence. Curiously, in the process Titus almost completely loses sight of the second and third articles. Protology and eschatology are not linked. It is true that God’s οἰκονομία is a keyword, but God’s plan aims only towards the individual himself being able to return to Paradise through virtuous effort (Contra Manichaeos III.22,2–3 and III.31). Titus is so engaged in finding God’s good intent in permitting the very first sin that this sin loses its seriousness and cannot therefore be presented as a justification for the incarnation. An apparent exception appears in Contra Manichaeos

¹ The “creed” refers here not to a particular confessional formula but to the main points which—against both Marcionites and Gnostics—already in the 2nd cent. had become established as “rule of faith”, that is, the Trinitarian confession with God the Father as Creator.
III.29.7–8 (ed.N 344.19–346.5), where Titus compares the serpent’s ignorance of God’s oikovna in Adam’s transgression with the ignorance by the rulers of this world of God’s greatest oikovna in the crucifixion (1 Cor. 2.8). But on closer examination we note that these are merely two examples of God’s divine dispensation being compared: there is no organic connection between them, as there would have been if the intent was that the transgression had been permitted with a view to the crucifixion.

The theory that it was precisely because of the anti-Manichaean bias that in the 4th and 5th centuries the Eastern Church toned down the “doctrines of original sin” and emphasised the “free will” can find some support in Titus’s work; admittedly in Titus these tendencies are carried to extremes, but simultaneously the extremism shows precisely how a theodicy that is too attached to the creation can come to weaken the significance of the redemption. It is important, however, that such a theory does not tacitly and anachronistically presuppose that the theologians of the Eastern Church ought really to have had the same doctrine of original sin as Augustine. What should be asserted, according to the theory, is firstly that because Eastern theology was also interested in asserting the necessity of the Saviour, it was aware of ideas of a catastrophic Fall resulting in man’s alienation from God. These ideas resemble Augustine’s doctrine without being identical to it, and they serve a similar purpose; Hauke’s term “Erbunheil” is therefore a more adequate concept. Secondly, the theory claims that there was a tension between these “ideas of original sin” in the Eastern Church and its interest in the “free will”, and that they did not manage to coordinate the soteriology and the theodicy into a coherent interpretation, in brief, that also the synergism is an unclear and imprecise doctrine, full of tensions.

2. The image of God in man

Titus’s reproduction in III.7.1–9 (→ Ch. XI.34) of the question ostensibly from Mani but in my opinion originally formulated by Adda, began as mentioned with a doubt as to why the world came into
being (III.7,1); this fundamental problem is therefore the first to be solved by Titus, namely in III.10–III.11,5. I have already taken the opportunity to deal with these sections in the previous pages, and I will therefore settle here for pointing out that Titus’s response alludes to Timaeus 29e and emphasises the fundamental point throughout the theodicy that God is good.

In III.7,1 Titus also summarised his presentation in III.4–6 by showing that Mani held man to be created from the principle of evil. In III.6 Titus had already stated that man is “in fact the most regal and most qualified to rule of all living creatures in the corporeal world” (το βασιλικότατον και ἄρχικότατον πάντων δὴ τὸν ἐν τῷ σωματικῷ κόσμῳ ζῷων, Gr. 69.2–3), and in III.11,6–III.12 he defends man on this premise and thus links together the creation of the world and of man by stating that the sole use of all created things is to exist for the sake of man. For Titus, man’s position as ruler within the cosmos is clearly central—man being “that part of the world which to the highest degree is its own master”, τὸ κυριώτατον τοῦ κόσμου μέρος, III.11, ed.N 306.14–15), as he concludes from Scripture; in III.13,1–2 he follows Gen. 1.26 in connecting man’s creation in God’s εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις with the fact that he is set to rule over the animals (ed.N 308.11–15). This position as ruler, the createdness κατ’ εἰκόνα, is contained in the fact that man is by nature gifted with reason; by virtue of his reason he is in contrast to all the animals a citizen of the world (III.13,3). It is clear that Titus is asserting the same philosophically-influenced teaching on man as in Books I–II, only now with explicit reference to Scripture.

The image of God in man has not only to do with his particular position in relation to the animals; the same is true of the command-

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3 See above pp. 275–76.
4 ἀρχαὶ ἄρα κατεσκευάσθη τῶν ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ λογικὸς τῶν ἄλλων, ὁ συνεύρετος τοῦλεγονδροχειμενον, ὁ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῇ φύσιν ἔχων., ed.N 308.16–19.
5 Compare Contra Manich. III.13,3 (previous note) with II.3, Gr. 26.34–27.2, esp. 26.34–39:

“So over this [i.e. the world] God has set man as a rational citizen, even though he is only part of the whole. Everything else, which can neither look towards virtue nor vice, God has kept to Himself to control, but He has brought it about that virtue alone or vice should depend on himself [i.e. man], in that He has beforehand placed knowledge of both (qualities) in his nature...” (→ Ch. XI.14). Parallel with this and in contrast to the animals man is here a citizen by virtue of his reason, which is his nature.
ment not to eat of the Tree, which “Mani” (Adda) precisely criti-
cised. For man it is an honour and a cognitive source of God to
receive a commandment (III.14). This raises the question of the rela-
tionship between the image of God in man and the commandment.
The image of God, which must be regarded as an innate knowl-
edge,6 anticipated the commandment to obey the Creator, but this
passive knowledge had precisely to be translated into action and
trained through the keeping of a commandment (III.15, partly →
Ch. XI.37). The commandment is thus interpreted as an ascetic exer-
cise in obedience, a promise of temperance (III.23–24, partly → Ch.
XI.43), a view which in Titus’s time is also found in Basil the Great.7

Also on another point the doctrine of man’s natural knowledge of
good and evil could appear to be in conflict with the Paradise nar-
rative; for at first sight the narrative appears to regard this knowl-
edge as a supernatural knowledge linked to a tree that was not
acquired until man ate of it. According to Titus, however, “the Tree
of the Knowledge of good and evil” only got its name because man
was to learn to practise his innate knowledge of good and evil by
not approaching it; for the commandment not to eat of the Tree
had only a coincidental link to the Tree itself (III.23–24, partly →
Ch. XI.43). Nevertheless Titus also respects the view that the Tree
really caused the eater to know good and evil, provided this only
means that the innate knowledge was increased (III.29,1–5).8 Titus
also has problems with God’s statement that Adam has become “like

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6 Cf. above pp. 311–12.

7 Basil the Great claims in Quod Deus non est auctor malorum 9 that the Tree was
in existence to the end that a commandment could be given that would test our
obedience, the virtue of self-control (PG 31, 348CD). More specifically the com-
mandment is to be regarded as a commandment to fast (Quod Deus non est auctor
malorum 7 [PG 31, 344D]; De ieiun., hom. I,4 [PG 31, 168B]). Cf. Gross 1960, 141;
Hauke 1993, 461.

8 Perhaps Titus also has an interest here in simply advancing several possible
solutions to a problem; in that case it is an interest which is typical of his time; cf.
Romeny 1997a, 18–19.—The view that the Tree itself contains cognition is well-
known, e.g. from Theophilus, Ad Autol. II.25, which confirms that the Tree of the
Knowledge of good and evil was good, and that its fruit was good. The Tree did
not contain death, which instead was the result of the disobedience. In the Tree
there was nothing other than cognition, but cognition is good if it is used properly
(Grant 1970, 66). Like Titus Theophilus states that cognition is good, but unlike
him he believes that cognition really was in the Tree. Theophilus, however, sees it
as negative that man was disobedient and that he acquired cognition too soon
one of us, to know good and evil” (Gen. 3.22), but he solves them by arguing that the reference is to Adam’s original nature and not that Adam first acquired the knowledge through his disobedience (III.28).9 And again: the fact that Eve already had knowledge could actually raise the question of how she could be seduced by the serpent, assuming a reliance on the Socratic-Platonic teaching that oúdeiz ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει, but the problem is overcome by Titus through speaking of something like a deceptive reason that can seduce (III.28,5, ed.N 342.11–12).10

In III.13,10 Titus summarises the image of God in man in three points; (1) man’s rule over nature (both the animals and himself), (2) man’s reason and (3) man’s freedom.11 These three definitions are merely aspects of the same fact—the rule is precisely reason and freedom. There is therefore hardly any divergence from the teaching in Contra Manichaeos II.11, where it is otherwise only freedom that is underlined as the content of the image of God in man:

In this way God then has honoured man by creating him in His own image, in order that he can be an emulator of God through the freedom of his will just as He Himself is good through the freedom of His nature, in that man does not keep away from sinning because of his weakness of nature, but honours virtue through his freedom. (Gr. 31.3–7 → Ch. XI.17).12

The passage is one of the places in Books I–II where in spite of his own programme Titus nonetheless alludes to Scripture (Gen. 1.26–27); perhaps he thought that also the pagans would agree with his idea of the image of God in man.13

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9 See esp. III.28,1, “But this (word), which has been spoken by God, ‘See! Adam has become like one of us, to know good and evil’, refers to the natural Creation, (as it was) from the beginning, (and it is) not (the intention) that he (only) through the disobedience reached the knowledge of virtue and vice.” (ed.N 342.1–4: Τὸ δὲ ἱδοὺ Ἀδὰμ γέγονεν ὡς εἰς ἐξ ἡμῶν τοῦ γινόμενον καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν πρὸς θεοῦ λεγεμένον τὴν εἶ σφρης πλασίαν τῆς φύσεως σημαίνει, οὕτως πρὸς ἐκόψαντος αὐτοῦ διά τῆς ἀπεθείας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴς τε καὶ κακίας γνῶσιν.).

10 Cf. above p. 309.

11 “... for which reason it is also testified by Scripture that because of both (his) natural position as ruler and possession of reason and freedom (man) is created in God’s image” ὅπεν καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ δεδήμιουργήθηκε πρὸς τῆς γραφῆς ὁμολογήται διὰ τὸ ἀρχικὸν τε καὶ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐλευθέρων τῆς φύσεως., ed.N 310.9–12).

12 The remark that man does not refrain from sinning as a result of a weakness in his nature presumably means that it cannot be because of a weakness in his nature that man omits to sin—it must instead be due to an act of freedom.

13 Cf. also Plato’s definition of κόσμος as εἰκόνα τοῦ νοητοῦ in Tim. 29a–c, 92c.
The context (II.8–10) is that the right thing to say is that God cannot commit evil—not because He is weak, but because He never wishes to, and His nature is immutable. It is for this purpose that the passage builds in a distinction between God and man in the relationship designated by the phrase, “the image of God”: God is good through the freedom of nature, but man must imitate God, i.e. strive to be good, through the freedom of intention or of the will.

Titus’s interpretation of the image of God in man as rule, reason and freedom continues widespread traditions within ancient Judaism and patristics that were linked to particular philosophical definitions of man and were thus generally known in Titus’s time. Also the distinction in Contra Manichaeos II.11 between God and man in the relationship designated by “the image of God” (the freedom of πρόθεσις in man—the freedom of φύσις in God) probably originates in the preceding tradition; the similarity with definitions in other Church fathers points in this direction. If the elements in Titus’s

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14 This idea appears again in II.37, where, however, it can be formulated in this way: “Accordingly He who has made the natures is above (His) nature and is Himself free of natural necessity.” (οὐκοῦν φύσεως μὲν ἐπάνω ὁ φύσεως κατασκευάσας, ωτὸς δὲ φύσεως ἀνάγκης ἐλεύθερος., Gr. 48.22–24). These definitions correspond factually to the presentation in Contra Manich. I.13 (see above pp. 266ff).

15 The understanding of man’s goodness as something that is to be acquired through endeavour reappears in Titus’s theory in II.7 on καλὸς and ἀγαθὸς, which was based on Gen. 1.31 (see above pp. 302–5 and → Ch. XI.16). It would have been natural for Titus also to present this theory in Book III, but the fact that this is not the case may be due to Titus working with different sources to which he did not relate completely freely.

16 See Jervell 1960 on ancient Judaism, Gnosis and Paul; a survey of the doctrine of the image of God in man among a number of important Church fathers is to be found in Struker 1915 (the development up to and including Irenaeus); Hamman 1987; cf. also Cairns 1953. Among individual studies see Bernard 1952 (on Athanasius); Burghardt 1957 (on Cyril of Alexandria); Crouzel 1956 (on Origen); Fantino 1986 (on Irenaeus); Leys 1951 (on Gregory of Nyssa); Sullivan 1963 (on Augustine). Cf. also Dihle 1980 concerning the Church fathers’ teaching on free choice.—The interpretation of the image of God as dominion follows already from Gen. 1.26 itself, (cf. Ps. 8); see further Sir. 17.1ff.—See Hamman 1987, 106–13 concerning Philo.—Justin Martyr, who as mentioned believed that mankind has a common ethical knowledge (see above p. 285), emphasises in Apol. I.28,3; I.43,8 that God has created the human race with reason and the ability to choose the true and the good; explicitly, however, he does not link this anthropology with man’s creation κατ’ εἰκόνα, but see Irenaeus in Dem. 11; Adv. haer. IV.4.3; IV.37–39.—Unlike many Eastern fathers (already the Valentinians [Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.5,5] and Irenaeus [esp. Adv. haer. V.6,1; V.16,2]), Titus does not draw a particular distinction between εἰκόνα and ὁμοιόμορφος.

17 Titus’s definitions resemble both the somewhat different doctrines in Irenaeus
teaching on the image of God are therefore traditional, it becomes of interest which elements he does not take over, and here we note that Titus does not give the εἰκόν-theme any clear christological or ecclesiological point.  

3. **God’s foreknowledge and man’s disobedience**

God’s immutable good nature and man who must first become good, are the two fundamental components of Titus’s interpretation of Adam and Eve’s disobedience. Titus believes that they both support each other and point in the same direction: God must always have wanted man to leave Paradise, because precisely this path made his moral progress possible.

Adda’s disjunction in III.7.2–9 proposed as the first possibility that God knew beforehand that Adam would violate His commandment (III.7.3), but Adda preferred the second possibility, an ignorant God who in reality was the principle of evil (“To be sure, God, who gave the order, knew what would happen . . .”, ed.N 314.7 → Ch. XI.37). According to Adda, this possibility had to mean that the commandment not to eat was given in vain, and that God was the cause of the violation; these are conclusions which, as we shall see, Titus was unwilling to draw. In my opinion, the explanation for Titus’s belief in God’s foreknowledge of the transgression is to be found in a number of remarks of great principle significance which show that God’s foreknowledge of the transgression is necessary for the very concept of God. The exegetical arguments for this foreknowledge in *Contra Manichaeos* III.20–21 are clearly secondary, supportive arguments, whether or not Titus himself has constructed them or taken them from the tradition.  

(cf. Meijering 1975, 19–30) and Athanasius (cf. Meijering 1974, 76). There are also considerable similarities with the doctrine of the image of God in man in Tertullian, which is precisely grounded in freedom of choice and action, but where God’s goodness is *natura*, while man is good by institutio (see *Adv. Marc.* II.5.5; II.6.2–4). Also in Augustine God is characterised with the phrase *non posse peccare* (cf. Lamberigts 1990, 283f. with further references).

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18 As one would expect by virtue of the influence from Paul (e.g. Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor. 15.45–49; 2 Cor. 3.18–4.6; Col. 1.15; 3.10), cf. e.g. Irenaeus.

19 Some of these arguments may well be older, yet at the same time of particular significance for Titus; with regard to the argument in *Contra Manich.* III.20.6–7
In III.21,3 Titus declares that from the beginning man was formed for his present state, and in III.21,4 he continues thus:

And (the acts of) disobedience did not alter the (human) creature, as if there was the one dispensation from the beginning, but another when the disobedience was known in God’s foreknowledge. (ed.N 326.11–14 → Ch. XI.41).

Oικονομία and πρόγνωσις must not be separated in such a way that God’s foreknowledge is to be understood merely as a passive perception of a future state of affairs that does not influence His plans, which on the other hand must be changed now that man has become disobedient; this of course also means that man must be changed. God’s plans have naturally from the very beginning been determined by what He knew beforehand.

Titus’s line of thought is in direct contrast to every form of doctrine of “original sin”, which must involve a change to the very Creation. The change that he is thinking of here is presumably mortality—Titus attacks the doctrine that man was destined to remain in an immortal primeval state, but that this state was lost—though the two thought complexes, mortality and “original sin”/distortion of the relationship with God, belong together—because, as we shall see, the immortal primeval state is also thought of as a sinless state. In another passage to which we shall return Titus also rejects the idea that the Creation was changed in the sense of being cut off from salvation or becoming “incurable”. Thus it is precisely the ideas of the Eastern Church, which Hauke has gathered under the concept of “Erbunheil”, that Titus rejects.

If God did not know that man would be disobedient, or if God’s foreknowledge and dispensation were two separate factors that did
not influence one another, this would have serious consequences for the concept of God: for it would mean that man’s disobedience had forced God to impose death on man and banish him from Paradise (III.22,1):

God was therefore not forced by man’s disobedience to prescribe death for him and remove him from Paradise, but on the contrary it pleased Him to take the starting-points in Himself, in the divine dispensation. (ed.N 328.5–8 → Ch. XI.42).21

Thus the alternatives are either that God was forced by events that were not anticipated or at least not included in His plans, or that the starting-point for God’s actions always lies within Himself, in His own plans, and thus that God is free in relation to this world. We can compare this with the question in III.16,1, whether God’s “will” or “purpose” (βοῦλημα) was not defeated by man’s disobedience (ed.N 316.8–10): if man’s disobedience was the precise opposite of God’s plans, then God was weak—and also from this angle He would have been forced to act through circumstances over which He did not have full control.22

These remarks should be understood on the background of Titus’s philosophical concept of God, as presented above:23 none of the things that God is called is anything beside Himself, since He is simple and uncompounded; consequently God’s foreknowledge and dispensation cannot pursue two separate paths. God is the uncreated substance, the cause of all else in existence, but God does not create out of natural necessity: God is perfect and does not need the Creation; correspondingly the starting-point for God’s actions lies within Himself, not in man’s disobedience. All events must both be anticipated and planned if God is not to lose His freedom. We can

21 That God should be forced is not a conclusion which the Manichaean text in III.7 draws, but the danger that Titus notes must be a consequence of God not knowing beforehand what would happen, and therefore having to kill man, since He had laid down the punishment of death for eating of the Tree; this also appears from Titus’s use of the word τοιόυτος.

22 As can be seen, Titus believed both that God takes Himself as the starting-point of His acts and that man’s free choice can be maintained. In the last resort this position is probably untenable, for even though God’s economy is just as eternal as His foreknowledge, man’s free choice will nevertheless be God’s starting-point, if it has to be maintained that this choice really is free.

also formulate this freedom as God’s immutability: if everything had not from the beginning been contained in God’s plan, then it must be changed continuously, which would mean that God lost His transcendence.

Titus’s explanation of why God gave man a commandment that He knew would not be kept is that the course of events promoted the development of morality; the preliminary disobedience was a necessary experience, which enabled a later obedience: man experienced being harmed so that he could later be more cautious. Man learned to know his freedom and the power to choose that lies in his nature. Only by knowing disobedience was man able to know its opposite, obedience. The reason why man was not to be forced was that he can only be praised for his good acts, if they are freely performed, and it is not possible for a free being to be always without sin; that is why God does not demand it (III.15,8–10.13–18; 16,1–3; 17,5–6; 18,7; 21,6).

This positive assessment of the disobedience also means that Titus must disclaim any doctrine of “original sin” and in general minimise the seriousness of Adam’s “fall”. This becomes explicit in a number of remarks which show that Titus was well aware of the Eastern ideas of “original sin” or rather “Erbunheil”: God may have humbled man after he had been disobedient, but He in no way excluded the free man—who from now on wants to live virtuously—from acquiring a good reputation (III.17,3, ed.N 318.3–5). Adam’s disobedience had no catastrophic consequences:

For when man had been disobedient, he did not then perish either or make himself incurable (III.17,7).

24 The passage in question (III.17,5) is admittedly rather different in Sy and V (→ Ch. XI.38): whereas Sy claims that the experience was necessary, V argues that it was almost necessary! The difference is clearly dogmatically conditioned; either Titus did not dare to go the whole length, while Sy has removed the indecisive, vacillating μονονουχ; or Sy retains the original text, which was too radical for V (it claims that evil is a necessity), which has therefore emended it. I assume here that Sy has preserved the original version, because this best fits in with the rest of Titus’s presentation.

25 This was indeed also Aristotle’s view (cf. above p. 213), which is generally common in the Church fathers, e.g. in Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV.37ff.

God did not provide Adam with a new legislation immediately after the disobedience, for by nature Adam already knew what was right and wrong (III.17,10–11). Nor did God advise Adam to repent (μετανοεῖν); he had no need to be healed for his disobedient action, because he did not remain in it (III.17,12–13). In other words we are not dealing with a Fall but with a single isolated sin.

The reason why Titus has to reject the idea that the creature was changed or became incurable is clearly because in his opinion this doctrine is hard to reconcile with the idea of foreknowledge; it therefore bears its flank to the Manichaean attack, for it was precisely God’s ignorance that Adda was keen to assert. It is thus important to note that Titus in no way claims that these ideas of Fall and original sin are Manichaean. For, as Beatrice has rightly pointed out, the Manichaean teaching on Adam contained no idea of a Fall, but rather of an evil nature that was linked to Adam from the time of his creation by the archons, and the very same event that we regard as a Fall was to their way of thinking a deliverance. Adda’s protest exegesis deals precisely with this. Titus wishes to write off a non-Manichaean position, an idea of fall and loss, which cannot be defended in the light of the Manichaean attacks. Whether he also wishes to insinuate that in the last resort this idea resembles Manichaean ideas of determining, physical evil is another matter; he never directly postulates such an equation.

Who could it have been that claimed that the Creation was changed and man became incurable through a Fall? If we confront the question with some of the theories that we mentioned in the summary of the history of scholarship, we might mention Beatrice’s Encratite Messalians or Scheffczyk and Hauke’s ideas from the Eastern Church of a Fall and a collective, spiritual death and suchlike. However, we must note that Titus does not attack the idea of biological, sexually-transmitted sin, and even though we must not exaggerate the significance of such an e silentio argument, there is at least no need to include Beatrice’s Messalians. It is rather that Titus is writing a polemic against such a strong tradition among orthodox theologians—as Scheffczyk and Hauke point out.27

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27 See on Beatrice, Scheffczyk and Hauke above pp. 98–101—Scheffczyk is right that Titus’s views were called forth by his anti-Manichaean errand, but they can nevertheless only be interpreted as a direct rejection of the ideas in the Eastern Church of a Fall and a collective, spiritual death.
The ideas of God’s foreknowledge, man’s freedom and moral development were admittedly well-known throughout the “orthodox” tradition of the Eastern Church, and one might therefore object that Titus is only saying what was already consensus and that he can hardly have opposed the tradition. The question, however, is not whether Titus’s ideas were new, but to what extent they were combined in a new way in his work. In the following sketch I shall attempt to show, through a selected number of examples from Early Church writers, that it is unlikely that Titus was saying the same thing as the mainstream writers. Titus chose particular elements in the tradition at the expense of others and wove them together in his own way; in so doing he came to create a new interpretation or, at the least, an interpretation that was only potentially present in earlier presentations.

4. Comparison with earlier writers

It is clear that the tradition awarded God foreknowledge, but it does not necessarily follow that it linked this foreknowledge to Adam and Eve’s transgression or reflected on it in connection with the Paradise narrative. The very idea of divine πρόγνωσις or πρόνοια naturally has both philosophical and biblical roots. In several places in the NT we read that God had already made His plan of salvation before the foundation of the world (esp. Rom. 16.25–26; 1 Cor. 2.7; Eph. 1.9–10; 3.9; Col. 1.26; 1 Pet. 1.20); on this background it would be reasonable to assume that God had anticipated the Fall of Man, since He knew that salvation would be necessary. This supposition makes it easier to understand why later Christian writers came to

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28 For practical reasons this sketch focuses not on immortality and death, but on the question of God’s foreknowledge and the evaluation of man’s transgression; not until the next section does the problem of death become a theme. Both sections moreover omit Eusebius of Caesarea and “the Antiochene School”, who are treated in a separate context in the following.

29 See e.g. Theiler 1966, 46–103 (“Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre”); Dörrie 1977 concerning the doctrine of Providence in philosophy. See also various articles in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament concerning the biblical texts: Behm 1942 (προνοεῖν, προνοών); Bultmann 1933 (προγνώσκειν, προγνώσεις); Michel 1954 (οἰκονομία); Schmidt 1954 and 1954a (ὀρίζω and προορίζω). The actual term ‘Divine πρόνοια’ is not used in the Bible. See further Dihle 1987; Dihle 1987a concerning the Church fathers’ doctrine of Providence.
think along these lines but it ignores what the texts explicitly say. We also find only few and incomplete reflections on God’s foreknowledge and the Paradise narrative in the earliest Church fathers.

Theophilus of Antioch is the first Christian writer from whose hand we have preserved something that resembles a commentary on the first chapters of Gen., and although we find in him an attempt to connect the Paradise narrative with God’s foreknowledge, this attempt cannot be said to constitute a precursor of Titus’s position, since it fails to deal with God’s foreknowledge of Adam and Eve’s disobedience in the garden. In *Ad Autolycum* II.28 Theophilus claims that God revealed Himself as προγνώστης by creating woman from man’s rib: God knew that errancy through the serpent would lead to the worship of many gods, and in order not to allow people the opportunity to believe that man and woman were created by different gods, He did not create woman separately.  

Theophilus’s explanation as to why God forbade man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, is also of interest in the present context, however. In the first place it states that Adam was not yet mature enough to receive the knowledge in the right way, because he was a child, and in the second place God wished to test man’s obedience, just as parents test children’s obedience; in short, God preferred man as an obedient child to remain in simplicity and innocence for a time. Knowledge should first be acquired when the ability to think had been developed for it. Regarding the view of man’s development Theophilus and Titus clearly share the evolutionary view of man’s morality, and therefore agree that Adam was inexperienced. But after that their ways part: in Theophilus there is no positive evaluation of the disobedience, on the contrary:

It was not that the Tree of Knowledge contained anything evil, but that through disobedience man acquired pain, suffering, and sorrow, and finally fell victim to death. (*Ad Autolycum* II.25).

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30 Grant 1970, 70.
31 For Theophilus rejected that the commandment was due to φθόνος (*Ad Autol.* II.25); see above p. 230.
32 *Ad Autol.* II.25 (Grant 1970, 66, 68).
33 οὐ μέντοι γε ὡς κακοῦ τι ἐχόντος τοῦ ἔξυλου τῆς γνώσεως, διὰ δὲ τῆς περαικοῆς οὐ ἄνθρωπος ἔξηντησεν πόνον, αδύνην, λύπην, καὶ τὸ τέλος ὑπὸ θάνατον ἐπέσεν. (Grant 1970, 68, translation 69).
Theophilus’s idea that man was destined to develop or grow is also found in Irenaeus. A number of Irenaeus interpretations are here of particular interest in that they claim that the disobedience was presented by Irenaeus as actually being beneficial, which in the present context would mean that Titus was closer to Irenaeus than Theophilus.

In Irenaeus there are a number of passages in which man and woman in the Garden of Paradise are regarded as children destined for development or growth towards perfection, and this idea is claimed to be incompatible with other passages that contain the so-called doctrine of recapitulation, according to which through the Fall the first two lost their likeness to God or their special spiritual capacity, which is first restored by Christ. If the recapitulation passages are incompatible with the development passages, it must mean that the transgression in the latter passages loses its character of “fall” and must rather be regarded as essential and useful for man’s growth. Titus’s emphasis that it was a natural necessity that Adam was without experiences, so that the disobedience was necessary, which meant a minimalisation of the seriousness of Adam’s “fall”, can in that case be compared with the passages in Irenaeus (e.g. in Adversus haereses IV.38,4) which claim that the cause of the first human beings’ disobedience was their weakness, in that they were children, or (e.g. in IV.40,3) that the disobedience originated in negligence, not in wickedness.35—But development and recapitulation are not incompatible ideas in Irenaeus; they are compatible if one agrees with many more recent Irenaeus scholars and assumes that what was lost at the Fall was admittedly not a perfect state but was nevertheless a foretaste or anticipation of the final status of the saved.36 This means that if Titus was inspired by the development passages in Irenaeus, he detached them from their more comprehensive context.

Of further interest for a comparison with Titus is Hugo Koch’s related attempt to reconcile Irenaeus’s various ideas on development and recapitulation. Koch actually disputed that recapitulatio could mean “restitution”, Adam and Eve did not lose a perfection which they

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34 Thus already Wendt 1882, 20–30, esp. 28; similarly Von Harnack 1931, 588–96.
35 See further on these passages e.g. Hauke 1993, 201–2, 211–13, 226–28, 268–71, 275.
37 Koch 1925, 198–99.
were in possession of, but only one that they had a prospect of. In this context Koch claimed that according to Irenaeus Adam and Eve’s transgression was already from the beginning a part of God’s plan for the world and salvation. Man was created to be saved by Christ, and the Fall was in the context an educational necessity, because man was to be brought to realise that incorruptibility is not something one can possess by nature.38 This interpretation, which on this point can receive support from passages such as *Adversus haereses* III.20,1; III.22,3; III.38,4; V.36,1 (cf. V.21,3), is not without true elements, and as such there also appear to be real similarities between Irenaeus and Titus: God knew beforehand that Adam would violate his commandment, and on that background Irenaeus was also able to find a positive purpose in the Fall, though this purpose had more to do with a negative experience than a step in a progression. Fundamentally, however, I do not believe that Koch’s interpretation is tenable: admittedly what Adam and Eve lost was not perfection itself, but nor was it merely something that was presented to them as a prospect. In the Garden of Paradise Adam and Eve were in possession of a real “foretaste” of the final state of salvation.39 Bearing this in mind, the crucial differences between Irenaeus and Titus again become apparent. Titus did not see Adam’s act of disobedience as a decisive break or fall, but only as a useful experience; the educational purpose of the disobedience was therefore to be found in its contribution to man’s own virtuous effort. For Irenaeus on the other hand the teaching of the Fall was that man became aware of his own limitation; this is clearly a more sceptical attitude about man’s own efforts. It is also important to note that even though Irenaeus already believed that God must have anticipated the Fall, he does not need to have concluded that it was a necessary link in His Providence; rather Irenaeus imagined that with His sovereign power God could extract something good out of an in itself evil fall.40 The distance between Titus and Irenaeus becomes even clearer when one

39 Irenaeus clearly claims a special intimate connectedness between God and man in the Garden of Paradise; see e.g. *Dem.* 12: the Logos itself was walking round the garden and talking to man and in this way anticipating the future. Man was immortal in Paradise, but the preservation of this immortality was dependent on the keeping of God’s law (Dem. 15). Cf. also the criticism of Koch in Hauke 1993, 215.
notes that in *Contra Manichaeos* III.17,12–13 Titus is perhaps in reality attacking Irenaeus. Here Titus claims that Adam did not need to do penance, but according to *Adversus haereses* III.23,5 Adam indeed did penance (fig-leaves as garments of penitence).—I will not reject out of hand the possibility that Titus may have drawn on several motifs from Irenaeus’s theology, but in that case it is not before he has detached them from their original context and meaning.

Although it is excluded that Titus can be influenced by Tertullian, a comparison is nevertheless of interest, because Tertullian concerned himself directly with the Marcionite question of God’s goodness, foreknowledge and power (*bonitas, praescientia* and *potentia*) in relation to Adam and Eve’s fall, and because Tertullian may have been influenced by Greek anti-Marcionite texts which Titus also knew. Corresponding to Titus’s answer Tertullian also allowed the Marcionites’ claim that the Creator possesses goodness, foreknowledge and power (*Adversus Marcionem* II.5,3–4), and that His foreknowledge also embraced the Fall of Man (*Adversus Marcionem* II.5,4). Since God could have prevented the Fall and yet it nevertheless took place, the explanation must be sought in man, whom God had equipped with the freedom of choice and the power to act (*Adversus Marcionem* II.5,5–7). The Fall was thus man’s own fault and not God’s (*Adversus Marcionem* II.6,1; II.6,8). If God gave man free will, it was implicit that he could use it as he wished; otherwise his will was not free. In other words by

41 Hauke (1993, 228) rightly rejects the claim that Irenaeus’s idea of Adam’s penance should be an attempt to render the Fall of Man harmless (thus e.g. Gross 1960, 90); on the contrary it expresses a powerful consciousness of guilt. This interpretation would correspond to Titus’s polemic. But Titus could also be imagined to be attacking others than Irenaeus. Another possibility is Theophilus’s *Ad Autol.* II.26, where God’s question in Gen. 3.9 is interpreted to mean that God was not ignorant but wished to give Adam the occasion for *metànoia* and *ἐξομολογήσις* (Grant 1970, 68). The same interpretation of Gen. 3.9 was presented in Titus’s time by Eusebius of Emesa (partly in the discourse *De hom. assumpt.* II [4–6], Buytaert 1953, 373.5–374.15, see above p. 136, partly in *In Oct.* on Gen. 4.7, Hovhannessian 1980, 39).—Titus’s distance from Athanasius, *De inc.* 7 is also clear and instructive: according to Athanasius penitence would have been good, if Adam’s transgression had only been a sin without the ensuing corruption, which was not the case, however. On the other hand, for Titus the sin is so superficial that it was not even worthy of penitence, and the whole idea of a subsequent catastrophic state of corruption in which death is not just natural but also a punishment, is in contrast to his positive conception of death as God’s benefaction. Cf. also Meijering 1989, 82–85 concerning *De inc.* 7.

42 “certe ipsam transgressionem, quam nisi praescisset, nec cautionem eius delegasset sub metu mortis” (Evans 1972, 98).
creating man God voluntarily limited His own freedom and power. Of course God knew that man would abuse his freedom, but if He intervened when Adam and Eve were about to abuse it, He would not have retained a consistency and fidelity towards His own decision; He would be abrogating His own will, which was that man should be free. According to Tertullian, the reason that God does not avert that which is not His will, namely the Fall of Man, is because He wishes to preserve that which is His will, namely man’s freedom (Adversus Marcionem II.7). And from this we can clearly see that even though Tertullian just like Titus argued for God’s foreknowledge of the Fall, he believed the reference to man’s freedom was a sufficient theodicy; Tertullian did not see any difficulty in claiming that God foresaw an event which went against His plans.

If it is true that historically Titus’s theological position lies in the junction between Alexandria and Antioch, it must be of particular interest to include the Alexandrian Church fathers, Clement and Origen. In Clement, however, the first chapters of Gen. do not play so important a role that much can be gained by the comparison. It may be mentioned that like Titus Clement believed that God created man imperfect, but with the possibility of acquiring virtue and saving himself, though he does not appear to have regarded the disobedience as a positive step in man’s development.

Nor as far as I can see can Origen’s understanding of Adam’s fall be said to have anticipated Titus’s position, even though this is harder to determine, since the main source for Origen’s understanding of Adam’s fall, his Commentarius in Genesim, has for the most part been lost. On the whole, however, there is nothing to suggest that the particular features of Titus’s interpretation were shared by the great Alexandrian. Even though Origen was also sometimes interested in minimalising the extent of Adam’s sin, he did not take the

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43 Cf. above p. 144–45.
44 Strom. VI.12 (96.1ff); Stählin 1906, 480.
45 See e.g. Strom. II.19 (98.3–4); Stählin 1906, 167.1ff.
46 I will not go into the problem here of how the soul’s pre-existence, which Origen believed in, relates to Adam and Eve’s existence in Paradise, but I follow the view that the Paradise narrative in Origen cannot be reduced to merely an allegorical expression for the pre-existential Fall; see further Crouzel 1978; Bammel 1989; Hauke 1993 with further references.
47 In Hom. in Jer. XVI.4 (Nautin and Husson 1977, 142) Origen explains Gen. 3.8 by arguing that although Adam sinned, his sin was not extremely bad; that is
line that the disobedience was developmental; for example, Origen argues in his *Commentarius in Johannem* XIII.37 (236–43) that the rational creature was not imperfect in Paradise, but became so through the disobedience.\(^{48}\) Titus’s allegorical interpretation in *Contra Manichaeos* III.24–25 of Gen. 3.6–7—which argues that man could all the time see with his sense organs, so that he was seeing with his reasoning faculty when he was disobedient, and thereby demonstrating a useful cognitive growth—differs not only from Philo’s allegorical interpretation,\(^{49}\) but also from Origen’s, where it is precisely sensuous sight that we find in Gen. 3.7, and thus a “fall”.\(^{50}\) Even though Origen’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative does not therefore point forward to Titus’s view, there are nevertheless other aspects of his thought that may be said either to pave the way for Titus’s views or at least to add perspective to them.

Titus’s interest in claiming that God’s economy is everlasting, that man’s disobedience did not alter God’s plans, seems to be a particular elaboration of the Church fathers’ general interest in making the claim for God’s immutability and impassibility,\(^{51}\) which in Prestige’s words means, “that His will is determined from within instead of

\(^{48}\) Blanc 1975, 158, 160. Origen, however, appears to believe that the perfection in Christ will be far more solid than it was in Paradise before the Fall (see esp. *In Jo. XIII.37* (241), Blanc 1975, 160 with quotation from Heb. 5.14); cf. Hammond Bammel 1989, 83, 93 n. 101; Hauke 1993, 353–54. In general the whole of Titus’s interpretation is in conflict with Origen’s doctrine of “original sin” (on this see further Williams 1927, 208–31 [who wrongly locates this theory only in the last part of Origen’s life, his time in Caesarea]; Hammond Bammel 1989; Hauke 1993, 283–439).

\(^{49}\) See above pp. 235–36.

\(^{50}\) Origen claimed that the first human beings had not opened their physical eyes before the transgression: in *Contra Cels.* VII.39, Borret 1969a, 104.1ff. Origen states that Gen. 3.6 showed that man was capable of seeing with a kind of eye, the eye of the soul, while Gen. 3.5.7 dealt with another kind of eye, namely the sense organ. To begin with the human beings closed their corporeal eyes so as not to be distracted from seeing with the eyes of the soul; but then as a result of sin they later closed the eyes of the soul. Origen makes a similar distinction in *Hom. in Num.* XVII.3, Bachrens 1921, 157.6ff. between “the eyes of the earth” or “the sense of the flesh”, which are opened in Gen. 3.7 and the “better eyes” which are found in Gen. 3.6. Cf. Hammond Bammel 1989, 77. We find a corresponding interpretation in Didymus the Blind’s *In Gen.* 81.19ff. (Nautin 1976, 190, 192), 83.1ff. (Nautin 1976, 194).

\(^{51}\) See e.g. Grant 1966, *passim*, but esp. 111–14.
being swayed from without”. God cannot therefore contain feelings such as pity and anger, which would make Him dependent on the created universe. It is thus reasonable to compare Titus’s views with Origen’s anti-Marcionite remarks in De principiis II.4,4 that God does not contain παθή, anger or penitence, though Origen does not apply this viewpoint to the Paradise narrative.

As should by now be apparent, Titus believed both that God’s starting-point for His actions is Himself, and that man’s free choice can be upheld. In the last resort this position is probably untenable, for even though God’s economy is just as eternal as His foreknowledge, man’s free choice will nevertheless be God’s starting-point, if we are to insist that his choice is free, which must be irrenunciable, since this freedom to choose forms the core of Titus’s theodicy or “demonstrative proof in defence of God”. Titus’s wish to keep the divine foreknowledge and economy together should perhaps be interpreted as an attempt to take into account one of philosophical problems of his time, even though it is questionable whether he seriously takes up the problem, which is that on the one hand God’s infallible foreknowledge threatens to destroy man’s freedom of choice, while on the other hand man’s freedom of choice threatens to destroy the infallible foreknowledge. Titus does not even seem to have reflected on the character of God’s foreknowledge, such as whether, in line with contemporary philosophy, it is to be understood as thinking through a causal chain, that is, a true foreknowledge in time. Here he differs from Origen, who was pre-eminently interested in ensuring that God’s foreknowledge does not disavow the doctrine of the freedom of choice, and who thought that God’s foreknowledge indeed has to do with a causal chain. Although God’s foreknowledge is infallible, events in the future must not take place out of necessity. God’s knowledge is thus conditioned by future, contingent cognitive objects. Ostensibly, free choice is awarded priority; it is this that is the object of God’s foreknowledge, and only on this foreknowledge can God plan or predestine the path of the soul’s existence with rewards, pun-

52 Prestige 1952, 7.
53 “[a]ny such view leads straight to Manichaean dualism”, Prestige 1952, 6–8, quote 7.
54 Koetschau 1913, 131.24–132.11.
55 See further Theiler 1966, 46–103; Huber 1976.
ishments and so on. God’s foreknowledge does not preclude man’s free choice, as Origen pregnantly states, e.g. in *Commentarius in Genesim*:

And if it is necessary to say so, we should like to state that God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of the things that happen—for God has no contact with the one whom He has anticipated will sin when he sins—on the contrary—it is admittedly paradoxical yet nevertheless true—that what is going to happen is the cause of God’s foreknowledge of it, such as it is. For it is not because it is (cognitively) known that it happens, but it is known because it would happen. (*Commentarius in Genesim* III)\(^{56}\)

The argument that predestination—and in general what is ordered for man—is moreover subject to this foreknowledge seems to be justified particularly on the basis of Rom. 8.29f., where προέγνω is placed before προορίσεν.\(^{57}\)

However, Origen’s alteration to the causal sequence so that the future event becomes the cause of God’s foreknowledge contains for

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\(^{56}\) *Philoc.* 23,8, Junod 1976, 156: Καὶ εἰ χρὴ λέγειν οὕτω τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων (οὐ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται τοῦ προεγνωσμένου ἀμαρτησμένον ο θεός, ὅταν ἀμαρτήσῃ), ἀλλὰ παραδοξότερον μὲν ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐρώτημα, τὸ ἐσόμενον αἰτίαν τοῦ τοιάνδε εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἐγνωσταὶ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ ἐμέλλεν γίνεσθαι ἐγνωστα. Cf. also Benjamins 1994, 83–84; Koch 1932, 115–16.—Origen often repeats this view (see references in Junod 1976, 156–57 n. 1), cf. also *In Rom.* VII.6 (Hammond Bammel 1998, 591.89–91): “Nam et si communi intellectu de praescientia sentiamus non propter erit aliquid quia id scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est scitur a Deo antequam fiat.” (on this cf. also Pannenberg 1993, 478 n. 10).

This inversion of the causal relation is also mentioned in John Chrysostom, *In Matth. Hom.* L.X,1 (οὐδὲ ἐπειδὴ προείπε, διὸ τοῦτο γίνεται· ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴ πάντως ἐμέλλεν ἐσοβθή, διὰ τοῦτο προείπεν*; PG 58, 574) and Jerome, *In Hiezech.* I,ii,5 (Glorie 1964, 20); see Klinger 1966, 97 with n. 6. The same inversion is also mentioned in the late Neo-Platonists (see Huber 1976, 30–33; Gruber 1978, 389); Huber (1976, 31–32, 33) argues that the Church fathers found it in philosophical texts.

\(^{57}\) See Schelkle 1959, 309–10, more distantly 336ff.; Pannenberg 1993, 477–78; Benjamins 1994, *passim*, esp. 99–116, 138–47 concerning these remarks on Origen. Concerning the interpretation of Rom. 8.29f. see Origen, *In Rom.* VII.5–6 (7–8) (Hammond Bammel 1998, 582–93) and the fragment of *In Rom.* in *Philoc.* 25,1–3, Junod 1976, 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226.—The same view, though not presented as an interpretation of Rom. 8.29f., is already to be found up to a point in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* V.14 (141.3), Stählin 1906, 421.12–14; cf. Schelkle 1959, 308–9; according to Schelkle 1959, 310 the mentioned interpretation of οὕτω προέγνω, καὶ προορίσεν is instituted by Origen. Pannenberg 1993, 477–78 regards Origen’s presentation as a systematisation of the anti-Gnostic Church fathers’ general viewpoints and compares it (478–80) with that of Augustine, who rejected the idea that the predestination was dependent on God’s foreknowledge of man’s free choice. Origen’s view also corresponds on this point to the young Augustine, before he changed his view (see e.g. Nygren 1956, 42; Schelkle 1959, 311–12).
a Platonist a problem that perhaps Origen was himself aware of and which is formulated thus by Peter Huber:

Die Umkehrung der Begründungsrichtung lässt die Vorsehung abhängig werden vom Eintreffen oder Nichteintreffen menschlicher Taten. Damit scheint die Seinsordnung, in der das Ewige das Zeitliche begründet, in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt: das Zeitliche bestimmt das Ewige.58

As far as I can see, this problem also applies to Titus’s presentation, even though his wish to keep οἰκονομία and πρόγνωσις together is an attempt to maintain God’s immutability and transcendence.59

Because Athanasius in Contra Arianos II is explicitly concerned with problems concerning God’s foreknowledge, it is also relevant to include him in order to illuminate Titus’s position. As a fundamental element of his interpretation Meijering emphasises that in Contra Arianos Athanasius argues that although God is not subject to necessity, His will transcends the human accidental free will. God’s being and will are one.60 But according to Meijering, Athanasius does not answer consistently the question of how anything that happens in time can then be caused by God’s will; he sought nevertheless to prove that God’s decision to create is eternal, while time is created.61 But it becomes more difficult to argue such a case regarding the time after the creation, because here Scripture speaks clearly of God’s

58 Huber 1976, 35 with reference to Boethius’s De cons. phil. V,3,15 (“Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praesentiae temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dictatur!” Bieler 1957, 92). Huber (1976, 31 with n. 11, 35) interprets Origen’s remarks ει χρή λέγεται, παραδοξότερον μὲν ἄλληθες δὲ in In Gen. III to mean that Origen himself had been aware of the problem mentioned (otherwise in Benjamins 1994, 83ff.). See also Benjamins’s further remarks on Origen’s formulation (1994, 92–98).—The problem could perhaps have been solved with the aid of the apparently later Neo-Platonic model of thought, where it is not just a matter of God’s temporal foreknowledge, but of God’s eternal present knowledge (see further Huber 1976), but Titus probably did not know this model.

59 In Titus God’s economy is based on His foreknowledge, and since the same structure is found in Origen, it has doubtless directly or indirectly reached Titus via Origen, even though it was also formulated before Origen, though less pregnantly (cf. Pannenberg 1993, 477–78; Benjamins 1994, 104 n. 106).

60 See Meijering 1974, 66–85. Meijering shows how this speculation was generally accepted in the 3rd–4th cent. (e.g. in Plotinus). In this context I note that Titus also claims the same difference between man’s accidental goodness and God’s goodness, which is identical with His being (see above pp. 263–69). The free will is ambiguous and uncertain, because man can make decisions which go in different directions; this is not true of God, whose will is timeless (Meijering 1974, 72–85).

actions, which appear to take place in time; it was a problem for Athanasius how to maintain that these actions did not involve any change in God’s being.\textsuperscript{62} We shall not examine Athanasius’s various solutions here,\textsuperscript{63} but only the problem in \textit{Contra Arianos II,75–77} (PG 26, 305B–312B) that is particularly related to the Paradise narrative: God’s actions in time are a consequence of His eternal decisions. This means that God had already prepared the incarnation before the world came into being.\textsuperscript{64} Since He knew that man would violate the law and be banished from Paradise, in His goodness He prepared man’s salvation through His Logos, so that he could be saved from sin and death and live for ever (\textit{Contra Arianos II,75} [PG 26, 305B–C], II.76 [PG 26, 309A] and II.77 [PG 26, 309B–C]).\textsuperscript{65}

Meijering is doubtless right to say that Athanasius’s intention was “that God’s actions in time are a consequence of God’s decision taken in eternity”,\textsuperscript{66} but it is important to note that Athanasius does not fully implement his intention: even though God’s action in time is dependent on His eternal decision, this decision remains dependent on another event that is contingent and temporal, namely the Fall of Man.\textsuperscript{67} The argument therefore does not lead to Athanasius

\textsuperscript{62} Meijering 1974, 91–92.
\textsuperscript{63} Meijering (1974, 92–102) goes through the various solutions.
\textsuperscript{64} Meijering 1974, 102; 1975, 13, 143. Cf. further Cremers 1921, 63ff.; Roldanus 1968, 212–21.
\textsuperscript{65} Meijering 1974, 103. Here Meijering sees a contrast to \textit{De inc.} 6–8 and 11ff.: in \textit{De inc.} 4f. and 11f. God indeed anticipates the Fall, but will only save man through the revelation through the image of God, the harmony of the universe and the prophets, whereas in \textit{De inc.} 8 the decision of the Logos to incarnate is described as a decision taken in time; Athanasius has apparently since changed his mind (Meijering 1974, 42–43, 103).
\textsuperscript{66} Meijering 1974, 102.
\textsuperscript{67} Cf. Roldanus’s (1968, 212–21) presentation; see e.g. the remark in Roldanus 1968, 216: “Cela veut dire que, non seulement dans l’histoire de l’humanité, mais aussi dans le décret éternel de Dieu, l’incarnation du Fils pour la re-création de l’homme, dépend uniquement de la chute de l’homme, soit comme fait accompli, soit comme fait prévu”; Roldanus 1968, 220: Athanasius “ne détache jamais de la réalité du péché ce décret que Dieu avait pris déjà à l’origine des temps.” These remarks are also relevant in the present context, even though Roldanus’s presentation is directed towards a different problem, namely to reject interpretations of Athanasius which claim that according to him the incarnation was not primarily motivated by the Fall of Man. E.g. \textit{Contra Ar. II,54} (PG 26, 261AB) excludes that these interpretations can be right (cf. Roldanus 1968, 214).—In particular medieval scholasticism discussed whether the primary justification for the incarnation was the Fall of Man; some scholars, e.g. D’Alès 1916; Koch 1925; Altermath 1975, believe that this problem is relevant to Irenaeus. Presumably this is an anachronism, but
finding anything positive in the Fall, or including it as a beneficial part of God’s plans; he argues on the other hand that God anticipated a disruption to His plans. In the beginning men were καλοὶ (305B); deceived by the serpent they fell and risked remaining ψεκροί (305C); being weak by nature they required help and salvation (309B). God’s foreknowledge therefore did not imply that man is created with a view to mortal life, but only that the means to overcome this have been prepared from eternity.

A further example that theologians around the time of Titus accepted that God beforehand knew sin, is to be found in Gregory of Nyssa’s *Oratio catechetica magna* 37b–c (PG 45), where he rejects the Creator of man as being the cause of evil, being Himself ignorant of the future or being Himself subject to the impulse to evil. Of course God knew what would happen, but in spite of this anticipation of sin, it was nevertheless better that He gave man existence, since He could later save him and through penitence heal him. Although Gregory thus argued for God’s foreknowledge in connection with the Fall of Man, this did not lead, as the context shows, to him denying the immortal primeval state or the catastrophic nature of the Fall.

Summarising, it may be said that even though most of the elements that are included in Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative were already present in the preceding tradition, they were not linked together with a view to the purpose we find in Titus. The notion of development already exists, for example in Theophilus and Irenaeus; yet neither regarded the transgression as a necessity and in itself a beneficial step in man’s development. In denying that God’s plans were changed by man’s disobedience, Titus was admittedly expressing the general theology of the Early Church on the immutability of God, but in a new context.

However, a complete picture of Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative cannot be drawn without including his view of death. Apart from individual remarks, I have so far left this subject in parenthesis in order to give it fuller treatment below.

in any case Athanasius was quite in line with the Nicene Creed, which speaks of the incarnation δι’ ἡμῶς τούς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν.

68 E.g. in 309B God is compared with a wise master builder who predicts that his construction will be exposed to damage and therefore prepares how to mend the damage.
5. Death as a benefit

a. Titus’s view of death in Book II and Book IV

Because the Manichaean text claimed that God showed Himself to be φθονερός when He cut man off from the Tree of Life and immortality, the view of death is crucial if one is to show that man’s disobedience did not in fact have catastrophic consequences. According to Titus death is natural and a benefaction of God. Titus had already revealed this understanding of death in Book II, which thus becomes the natural starting-point for the present account.

I concluded above that according to Titus the soul is created, but is thereafter incorruptible by nature. From this it follows that it can only be the body that is actually corruptible. The Church fathers understood physical or corporeal death solely on the basis of an anthropology that distinguishes between soul and body, and they described death, understood as the death-event, as “the soul’s separation from the body”. Titus also accepts this description (ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχήν ἀπὸ σώματος, II.22, Gr. 39.15 → Ch. XI.23). It is this physical death that he is concerned with in detail in the comprehensive theodicy of Book II.

In II.22, where Titus deals exhaustively with war, he states that death in nature is not evil, since birth and death have been ordered by God through the law of nature, so that those who end their lives do not perish, while those who are born are added to those who already exist. For it would not be good, if God was content with giving existence and birth to those who already exist (cf. Plato, Timaeus 29e); on the other hand it is good to prepare those who do not yet

69 See pp. 298–99.
70 See e.g. Clement of Alexandria; Strom. II.7 (34.2), where θάνατος is used in the sense of τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχήν ἀπὸ σώματος (Stählin 1906, 131.2; III.9 (64.2); καὶ συνόδος ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἡ τούτων διάλυσις ἀκολουθεῖ (Stählin 1906, 225.25–26); VII.12 (71.3): ὁ θάνατος “χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος” (Stählin 1909, 51.18–19); Origen (In Jo. XIII.23 [140]: τὸν χωρισμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος [Blanc 1975, 106]; In Matth. XIII.9: καθ’ ὅν ἀποθνήσκοντι οἱ σύνθετοι ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος χωρισμένης αὐτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος . . . [Klostermann 1935, 203.25–28]; In Matth. ser. 138, Klostermann 1933, 283.17–18; further instances in Crouzel 1978, 25 n. 36). Methodius, De res. I.38,1: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ὁ θάνατος ἢ διάκρισις καὶ διαχωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος (Bonwetsch 1917, 280.3–4). This description comes from the philosophy; see e.g. Phaed. 67d χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. Cf. also Fischer 1954, 25–27, 34–38, 53.
exist to come into being, and God does so partly by allowing them to receive the entrance to birth and partly by letting those who have already been born and have sufficiently run through life’s arena, receive death as a rest after the race. For their struggle leads them not to destruction (cf. 1 Cor. 9.25–26; Phil. 3.14; 1 Tim. 6.12; 2 Tim. 4.7; Heb. 12.1), but they are led to the other side in accordance with what they deserve (II.22, Gr. 39.1–11 → Ch. XI.23); Titus is of course referring to salvation and damnation here.

Titus continues by explaining that since the death that is ordained by law in nature is not evil, in whatever way it comes, one should not otherwise examine the differing circumstances under which it occurs (as will be remembered, the context for the consideration is war), but one should realise that there is a way of death common to all who exist, i.e. the soul withdraws from the body, not without some distress and suffering, but remains for as long as its natural habitation survives unimpaired (II.22, Gr. 39.11–16 → Ch. XI.23). In this natural, common death, however, there is some fear present; the fear is necessary for there to be a suspicion of punishment. This is admittedly not present in everyone, but only present in those whose disposition is ready to sin in order to disturb this disposition. For he who is wise with regard to virtue is released from sinning and from believing that death is evil, whereas he who loves sin fears death out of the same ignorance that makes him sin (II.22, Gr. 39.16–26 → Ch. XI.23).

Those who wage war are themselves to blame for their visible punishment,—that is, that they fall—but in truth, Titus points out, death cannot possibly be called a punishment (τιμωρία), because through the common nature it is determined for all. Through God’s all-wise Providence death occurs in an admirable way; it is both a benefaction for those who fall in war, and for those who survive: it is a benefaction for the ungodly, because it puts an end to their sin, and it gives those who survive an example that there is something to fear. If any of the righteous should finally come to participate in war—which however Titus regards as quite improbable—and should actually fall, death is in a way the beginning of their crown of victory (cf. 1 Cor. 9.25; Phil. 3.14; 2 Tim. 2.5; Jas. 1.12; 1 Pet. 5.4). After death the pious will enjoy the fruits of their labour for virtue, and this is better than merely refraining from evil (II.22, Gr. 39.26–40.5 → Ch. XI.23).

Already in Ch. II.22 Titus has in a sense set out his full view of
the natural death; the following Ch. II.23 elaborates this view and it is from this chapter that I shall therefore emphasise various points. Titus’s Manichaean source had claimed that death “releases the soul from matter” (Gr. 40.11–12 and 40.34 → Ch. XI.24–25), but according to Titus the Manichaeans are thereby contradicting their own claim that death in war is evil (Gr. 40.10–12 → Ch. XI.24);71 moreover matter does not exist at all (Gr. 40.34 → Ch. XI.25). Titus’s main point, however, is that death is not evil; nor is it indifferent, but rather it is good (“Since death is now found to be good—and not merely not evil”, Gr. 40.32–33 → Ch. XI.25), and not because it releases the soul from matter (Gr. 40.32–35 → Ch. XI.25), but for the following reason: the generality of death proves that it is not evil but natural; it is also “the common opinion” (Gr. 40.12–14 → Ch. XI.24).72 If death was not determined for all people, it would have improper consequences: sweat would be the only reward that the righteous received for their exertions for virtue, while the unrighteous would be immortal in their sinful pleasures (Gr. 40.19–32 → Ch. XI.25). This passage together with II.22 (Gr. 40.3–5 → Ch. XI.23) also shows that in contrast to the Stoics Titus did not believe that virtue bears its own reward.

At different places in Book II Titus returns to these views,73 but he only rarely adds new aspects to them. A few points need to be made, however. When Titus disputes in II.22 that natural death is a punishment, he appears at first sight to be in conflict with Paul’s words in Rom. 6.23,—τὰ γὰρ ὄνειρα τῆς ἐμπροσθότητας θάνατος; but it is a point of view that Titus repeats several times. In II.17 he states that natural death can come without punishment, so that also in the form of the death penalty from which one can flee it is something other than the inevitable punishment that strikes those who act against the law (Gr. 35.34–38 → Ch. XI.21). The inevitable punishment must be the punishment after death. Also in II.28 Titus states that death “is not laid down by God in respect of men for punishment” (Gr. 44.7 → Ch. XI.26). Similarly in II.47, where Titus claims that


72 Cf. above p. 296.

73 E.g. II.17 (Gr. 35.34–38 → Ch. XI.21); II.19 (Gr. 36.15–28 → Ch. XI.22); II.28 (Gr. 43.37–38, 44.1–15 partly → Ch. XI.26); II.45 (Gr. 55.9–14); II.47 (Gr. 55.37–56.17 partly → Ch. XI.29).
death happens neither in order to harm the righteous nor to punish the unrighteous: what is natural cannot be a punishment (τιμωρία); natural death happens with a view to an example or to preventing the worst evils (Gr. 56.7–9 → Ch. XI.29). Titus’s strong-willed emphasis that natural death is not a punishment, raises the question of how as a Catholic bishop he could meet his obligation to Paul’s exposition.

Although natural death is never a punishment, Titus does admit that for the ungodly it is followed by a punishment. It would not be a giant step from this to say that even though physical death in itself is good, it may be qualified by what follows after death, and that is why for example it may be described as a “death of condemnation”. In Book II Titus says nothing explicitly to this end, but in IV.94, which deals with the interpretation of Rom. 7.24b (τίς με ρόσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου;), we find remarks that clearly point in this direction:

“Who”, then, “will deliver me from this body of death”, for—unless a strong goodness will shine forth in me—the body through the bodily passions <in my limbs> gathers for me natural death of condemnation. And he is calling it “body of death”—not because of this general death, but (because of) the kind of death which is from condemnation through the threat, if those (conditions) of sin will remain. (Sy 175.7–12 → Ch. XI.49)74

The idea of death as condemnation suggests itself by virtue of its exposition in Paul, where death is regarded as a “condemnation” of all people (Rom. 5.16 and 18) and is depicted as a contrast to the immortal life in Christ (e.g. Rom. 5.15–21).75 However, Paul claims that Adam’s transgression led to condemnation for all mankind, while Titus apparently wishes to distinguish ordinary death from the death

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74 See also further Schelkle 1959, 243–58 concerning the Church fathers’ interpretations of Rom. 7.24.

75 Death of condemnation can of course also find inspiration in many other passages in the Bible. In Wis. 2.23–24, which belonged in the Church fathers’ canon, we read that “for God created man for incorruptibility and made him an image of His own eternity; but through the Devil’s envy death came into the world, and those who belong to him experience it.” The idea that only the unrighteous “experience” death must imply that death is not just the corporeal death but also a punishment after death. Rev. 2.11; 20.6.14, which did not belong to Titus’s canon, if they followed Antioch in Bostra (cf. Metzger 1977, 44, 48, 65–66), calls condemnation “the second death”.

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of condemnation—and so Titus is still not in line with Paul’s presentation. Titus, though, does not treat the entire Pauline interpretation, which would be able to demonstrate how he has imagined he could solve the difficulties.

In II.19 we find that Titus can also use the word “death” about something other than “the natural death” and “the death of condemnation”:

But even if it should happen that someone is punished who is not only an innocent but also an admirable man, and he is thus punished for his virtue, what harm should it inflict on him who suffers this? For although it may be true that this is a charge against those who do (such a thing against him), yet it does not harm him, since he endures, even if he had to bear the consequences of the groundless punishment till death. For such a man has already beforehand because of his mortality taken care of what concerns life. For when nothing of what is pleasant or unpleasant for the majority is so for him, there is no reason why he who is like this has not become dead to life also even before death. He receives that which is considered an injury as a sign of grace, by which he hopes to obtain greater blessings after the present life than those which he seems to leave behind, and when he is about to be swiftly sent by his enemies towards (these greater blessings), then he has as his benefactors those who plot against him. And otherwise God’s allowance of painful testing is necessary among men, so that the choice of virtue can be more genuine, if anyone should not even fear death. (Gr. 36.15–28 → Ch. XI.22).

So Titus can say that one is “dead to life” (νεκρός τοῦ βίου), and here of course we are approaching the well-known early Christian ideas of “mortification”. We might therefore consider whether there is a hidden allusion here to Gal. 6.14 (‘Εμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο κακωθῆται εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι’ οὗ ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κύριω κόσμῳ)76 or passages such as Rom. 6.2.10–11; Col. 3.3. For it seems to be Titus’s intention that the person in question is precisely admirable because he is already living in the hope of the coming blessings, dead to life.

Titus’s considerations, however, are concentrated on physical death. Death as condemnation and the more spiritualising or metaphorical

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76 Cf. Theodore of Mopsuestia, In Gal. 6.14, Swete 1880, 108.20–24: “sed haec (inquit) mihi semper dignum gloriae reputari, id est, crucem Christi, per quem mihi praesens mundus uidetur esse mortuus, dum animo iam illa quae futura sunt considero. nam et ego praesenti uitae sum emortuus, in illis iam me conuersare existimans.”
“dead to life” do not receive much attention. It can be illustrative to compare Titus’s position with Origen’s. Clearly and explicitly Origen distinguishes between three forms of death: death to sin, the death of the soul and physical death. Death to sin and the death of the soul are spiritualising forms of death: death to sin means a dying away from sin, a mortification, and thus a good death. The death of the soul denotes sin understood as the soul’s separation from God, and this is an evil death. Physical death on the other hand is common to all people and is neither good nor evil, but somewhere in between or ethically indifferent.77

Titus’s reference to the righteous man who is dead to life bears a certain resemblance to Origen’s dying away from sin, but since the motif in Titus is only hinted at, it is unlikely to have had its roots in Origen’s firmly-constructed concept and doctrine; it is more likely sufficient explanation to refer to the Bible and the general

77 Thus e.g. Origen, In Rom. VI.6 (Hammond Bammel 1997, 479–83) (here two further meanings of “death” are added: the Devil and Hades as death); Dial. cum Heracl. 24.18–27.8 (Scherer 1960, 102–7); In Jo. XIII.61 (427ff) (Blanc 1975, 266, 268); In Matth. XIII.9 (Klostermann 1935, 203.23ff) (here referring only to the physical death and the soul’s death); further references and more detailed treatment in Crouzel 1978.—The doctrine of “the soul’s death” is not in conflict with the doctrine of the soul’s immortality, since “life” and “death” must be taken in two senses: The soul can at one and the same time be living and spiritually dead (cf. Dial. cum Heracl. 24.23ff.; In Jo. XIII.61 [427ff]) (just as Origen reckons with three kinds of death, he also reckons with two kinds of immortality: the soul’s ordinary immortality and immortality in relation to sin; see further Crouzel 1978, 81ff). Common to the three kinds of death is that they all constitute a “separation”—from sin, from God and from the body. The distinction between them is incidentally based on a Stoic distinction between virtue, which is good, the corporeal, which is indifferent, and the vice, which is evil (Crouzel 1978, 20–21).—Origen’s background in the Alexandrian tradition is obvious; with regard to the soul’s death Philo is thus one of the predecessors: esp. in Leg. all. 1.33 (105–108) he distinguishes between man’s and the soul’s death; man’s death means the separation of soul and body, while the soul’s death means that the soul is buried in passions and vices. When Gen. 2.17 uses the phrase to “die the death”; the reference is to the soul’s by being entombed in the body, which Philo, following Plato, regards as a punishment, apparently for a pre-existent Fall. The idea of “the soul’s death” also appears in Clement of Alexandria, e.g. in Strom. II.7 (34.2), where we find θάνατος in the sense of τὸν διαλύονται ψυχήν ἀπὸ ἀλληλείας (Stählin 1906, 131.2–3); III.9 (64.1): καὶ θάνατος ψυχῆς ἡ άμαρτία λέγεται (Stählin 1906, 225.18–19). Death to sin similarly appears in Clement of Alexandria, e.g. in Strom. VII.12 (71.3), where he speaks of cognition as a rational death that leads the soul away from the passions and separates it from them and guides it into the life of good deeds (ἡ γνώσις . . . ὁ λογικὸς θάνατος, ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἀπάσχον καὶ χωρίζων τὴν ψυχήν καὶ προσάγων εἰς τὴν τῆς εὐποιίας ζωῆς, Stählin 1909, 51).
Christian tradition of piety and ethos. Also death as condemnation can be compared with "the death of the soul", but again it is a problem that Titus only treats death as condemnation in a single place.

The physical death that Titus and Origen speak of is naturally the same phenomenon; as mentioned it is also described in the same way. But nevertheless on this point there turns out to be a decisive difference between them: for Origen the physical death was μέσος καὶ ἀδιάφορος θάνατος, Titus on the other hand declares that this death is not indifferent, but good. Thus the doctrine of the goodness of physical death does not come from Origen, but from other Christian traditions. We shall now see that in Titus's view it was this good, natural death that was instituted in Gen. 3, and we shall see from where this idea gains its origin.

b. Death did not harm man

Just like the Manichaean text that Titus is concerned with (III.7,8–9 → Ch. XI.34), so does his answer (III.27,8–9 → Ch. XI.44) link the two problems together, namely God’s ἐφοβονία and the explanation for death. Implicitly Titus connects the question of God’s φθόνος in Gen. 3.22 with the fundamental idea from Timaeus 29e that God being good has given man existence (III.18,2). Death thereby becomes a special problem within the larger context of theodicy, as can also be seen from the fact that Titus opens his entire refutation by referring to God’s creative goodness (III.10–11).

Titus underlines also that God is without φθόνος in other places where he is not interpreting Gen. 2–3. Titus stresses this fact at different points in order to demonstrate God’s open-handed Creation order, but in addition he does so in three passages where he explains that it was precisely due to God’s ἐφοβονία that He also gave the rational creatures freedom to commit evil; Titus could easily have

79 See Contra Manich. II.44 (ἐφόβονος, Gr. 53.22); II.45 (ἐφόβονος, Gr. 54.36); II.56 (τὸ ἐφόβονον, Gr. 60.29).
80 Thus Contra Manich. II.8 (Gr. 29.36): If the Creator not had given man power to perform the evil or to let it alone, He would seem out of φθόνος to have deprived him of the honour of himself defeating the evil and have deprived him of freedom.
included this aspect in *Contra Manichaeos* III.10–29, where, however, the motif of God’s *ἀφθονία* is incorporated only explicitly in connection with death and the banishment from the Tree of Life.

When the Manichaean text claims that death is due to God’s jealousy, it presupposes that death is to man’s detriment, and therefore the problem can also be raised in this way in *Contra Manichaeos* III.15,11:

But perhaps someone might say: “How the disobedience, of which the prescriber [i.e. God] was not ignorant, has harmed man!”

The harm that Titus is thinking of here is not that Adam was “incurable” (as in III.17,7), but rather the subsequent “punishment” (III.15,12), that is: death and tilling the soil (cf. Gen. 3.16ff.), which the Manichaean text regarded as a manifestation of God being jealous. At first Titus postpones his response to the question (III.15,12), but in III.18,1 he raises it again in order to concern himself in what immediately follows with the subject of death. Here, Titus takes as his starting-point the fundamental idea from *Timaeus* that God being good has given man existence (III.18,2). God has not only given Adam freedom of choice in relation to virtue and vice, but has also fashioned man with a body, so that he can dwell in a corporeal world (III.18,3),—the idea appears to be that mortality presupposes corporeality; for the soul is immortal by nature. Titus therefore also continues by directly adding that God wanted man to be mortal (III.18,4; ed.N 320.12 → Ch. XI.39).82 God has not without a pre-
text instituted the barrier of death for man (cf. Gen. 2.17); it was
ordained out of regard for the disobedience, which God knew of
beforehand, and it is necessary and very frightening (III.18,5–6, partly → Ch. XI.39).

Titus’s view of death is very much the same in Book II, to which
he also directly refers (III.18,10): admittedly death contains a (fearful)
suspicion of punishment, but it is also a wonderful and unexpected benefit for man from God’s side (III.18,9), because he
for whom it is a habit to live in deliberate wickedness does not con-
tinue to do so since he is not immortal; and vice versa, he who
exercises himself in the struggle for virtue has to abide patiently the
incessant sweat (of effort) (III.18,11 → Ch. XI.40). For the virtuous
also have a need of death. When Titus in III.18,7 claims that it is
impossible that free beings like men are always without sin, it is of
course not because he believes that they find themselves in the “state
of sinfulness”; this is merely an assessment of what is most likely,
for in III.19,4 Titus also imagines the possibility that all men through
toil and asceticism (“exercise”) really did live without sin. Even then,
death would also be necessary as refreshment after the labouring for
virtue.83

For the virtuous, death actually means a return to the Garden of
Paradise; and the experience of a better existence that Adam enjoyed
by being in Paradise, is necessary so that man can return to Paradise

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83 The important point for Titus seems to have been to maintain that from the
beginning man was destined for his present state, where virtue requires struggle
(indeed virtue only exists because it is won in battle); on the other hand how well
the individual people otherwise manage in this struggle is an empirical question.
When Titus in IV.100 expounds 1 Cor. 15.53, which begins with corruptibility and
mortality (Δεί γὰρ τὸ φθορτὸν τούτο ἐνδούσασθαι ἀφθορσιὰν, καὶ τὸ θηρίον τούτο ἐνδούσασθαι ὁμανασιαίαν), he also states that the body was originally heavy, earthy
and filled with fleshly desire, which was appropriate, because the soul should win
renown in the struggle for virtue (the original text is preserved in John of Damascus’s
Sacra Parallela): “but these souls of the saved will exist in blessedness after having
regained the body that was united with them. However, it is no longer heavy and
earthly and full of fleshly desire as it was in the beginning, when it was fitting that
(the souls) won renown in the struggle for virtue.” (Pitra 1888, 54 = PG 18,
1260C5–10; cf. Sy 179.8–11 → Ch. XI.51). Of importance here is that Titus neither
imagines that the body originally had the same status as the resurrected body will
be given, nor that it could have acquired this status; on the contrary, it was fitting
that it was an occasion for sin, so that the soul gained the possibility of perform-
ing virtuous actions.
and with even greater reputation (III.22,2–3, partly → Ch. XI.42).84

However, the idea that God wanted man to be mortal and promised him death for a disobedience which He knew would take place does not mean, according to Titus, that God is to blame that man dies. God was not the cause of the disobedience (III.17,3)85 since Adam fell of his own free will (III.17,8). God has allowed man to procure for himself the cause of death (III.19,1), because he is free, and in order for God in truth to show Himself as the benefactor through the means by which He appears to punish (III.19,2). But when God allowed man to procure for himself the cause of death, He did not intend that man should not appear to be created mortal (III.19,2). This remark may seem surprising, but must be interpreted to mean that man was created mortal because of something that happened later, and that death, which was already potentially present as mortality, did not become reality until man had been disobedient. This interpretation partly goes further than what can be found in Titus’s explicit formulations, but it receives some support from similar formulations and problems concerning the interpretation of Theodore of Mopsuestia.86

A further misunderstanding must be removed: it must not be thought that man’s disobedience was welcome to God, even though He wished man to be mortal. On the other hand the disobedience of itself elicited what was fitting and necessary from God’s side, and therefore the disobedience also demands such solicitude in order that after having got a beginning, it may also have a conclusion (III.19,3). The fitting, necessary solicitude here means death, the idea being that although God has allowed the disobedience, because there is a need for it, He is not the cause of it, because it is in itself an evil, and that God precisely accomplishes death in order to put an end to it.

84 The greater reputation is of course achieved by the virtuous life.—Incidentally, the idea of a return to Paradise comes again in III.31 in connection with the murder of Abel.

85 The Manichaean text which Titus refutes claimed, as stated above, that the consequence of claiming that God knew beforehand that man would sin must be that God was responsible for the sin, whether that means He did not prevent the sin, or that His infallible foreknowledge must imply that everything is determined (cf. p. 216); Titus seems here to regard it in the latter way, though he never works seriously with this old philosophical problem, but merely assumes that it is possible to claim both God’s foreknowledge and man’s freedom (cf. above pp. 328, 337–39).

86 See below p. 413.
c. The background to these ideas in the earlier tradition

In continuation of the previous sections the question now is to decide, through selected examples, whether Titus’s remarks on God’s ἀφθονία and his explanation of death fall into the tradition or are in some way or other new.

I emphasised above the Platonic roots of the ἀφθονία-motif, as well as how Philo explained, using exactly Timaeus 29e, that Gen. 3.22 is not a testimony to God’s φθόνος; already here Titus’s closeness to Philo is shown. I further argued that also the use of the φθόνος-motif in non-Catholic texts is to be understood in this philosophical context: the Creator God of the OT is jealous, φθονερός, and also governed by related passions such as envy and ζῆλος, but the true God must be good and not ruled by His passions, πάθη.

The belief that the true God is without φθόνος was common to Catholics and non-Catholics alike; their disagreement was over the Creator’s status. Titus is thus not the first orthodox Christian writer to claim God’s ἀφθονία or to claim it in an anti-heretical polemic; in the Catholic literature God is very often underlined as being ἀφθονος, without φθόνος, that is “open-handed” or “generous”, and even though this motif is not only used in anti-heretical contexts,87 a characterisation of the Creator as ἀφθονος may also have contained an unspoken attack against the heretics, in that it is not an unreasonable consideration to assume that the Platonising tendencies in the theology of the Early Church are concerned to a great

87 E.g. in Clement of Alexandria we find the motif in Paed. III.7 (40.3) (Stählin 1905, 260.6); Strom. II.18 (86.1) (Stählin 1906, 158.12); V.4 (24.2) (Stählin 1906, 341.2); V.10 (63.7) (Stählin 1906, 363.26–27—as a proverb); VI.11 (90.1) (Stählin 1906, 477.3); VII.2 (7.1–2) (Stählin 1909, 7.4–6) (cf. Van Unnik 1973, 27–31); in Origen we find it e.g. in Contra Cels. VIII.21 (Borret 1969a, 220) (here directed against Celsus’s use of it) and in In Jo. II.2 (17) (Blanc 1966, 218); in Eusebius of Caesarea e.g. in Dem. ev. II.3.38 (Heikel 1913, 67.19); III.4.21 (Heikel 1913, 114.1); IV.1.8 (Heikel 1913, 151.28); Praep. ev. XI.21.2 (Mras 1956, 47.1–12); XV.5.2 (Mras 1956, 356.6–7); in Athanasius in Contra gent. 41; De inc. 3; 42 (cf. Dörrie 1976, 516–17; Meijering 1974, 41–42, cf. 89; Meijering 1975, 13–16, 27–28 n. 22, 114–27, 133–46; Meijering 1984, 30, 135–36; Meijering 1989, 50–51, 295–96).—The use of the motif in texts close to the orthodox tradition such as the Od. Sal. may also be mentioned (3.6; 7.3; 11.6; 15.6; 17.12; 20.7; 23.4; cf. Van Unnik 1973, 3–32). Drijvers (1978, 41–48) believes that the Od. Sal. is here attacking the Marcionites; this argument in my view is not strictly binding, since there can also be other relevant “heretics”; cf. above pp. 225–33.—The motif is also found in Doctrina Silv. 101.17–20 (NHC VII.4); cf. Van Unnik 1973, 19–20.
extent with combating heretics who distinguished between the Creator and the highest God and used the φθόνος-motif in order to deny a divine order to the universe. 88

This motif is found not only in anti-Manichaean literature; 89 it is widespread in early heresiology. I have already mentioned Theophilus’s *Ad Autolycum* II.25, where it is explained why the commandment not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge is not due to φθόνος. 90 Also in Irenaeus the ἀφθονία-motif appears very often, and frequently for a polemical purpose against the heretics. 91 Most important in the present context is *Adversus haereses* III.23,6, where as mentioned Irenaeus rejects the idea that God drove Adam away from the Tree of Life because He begrudged (inuidens) him it, since here we are dealing

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88 Also in this context I cannot accept Van Unnik’s explanation of the frequency of the motif in Christian texts being the determining cause (cf. above pp. 230–31, 233). Van Unnik thinks that the surfacing of the motif is in the context of an upswing of religious “esotericism” which the Roman Empire experienced from the middle of the 2nd cent; those who did not gain a share in the secrets that brought salvation believed that they met with φθόνος, and if they did gain a share they wished to be assured that they were told everything, that they were informed ἀφθονία. This has to do of course with relations between people, but since God was the source of the saving secrets it was extended to Him (Van Unnik 1973, 47–50, 53–55). However, the motif is not only concerned with secret knowledge in the Christian texts.

89 Titus is not the only anti-Manichaean polemicist who uses the ἀφθονία-motif against the Manichaeans; cf. e.g. Augustine in *Contra Faust.* XXII.9, Zycha 1891, 597.22–25; cf. also Alexander of Lycopolis, *Contra Manich. opin. disp.* X, Brinkmann 1895, 17.3–4, who with an allusion to *Phaedr.* 247a directs a charge against the Manichaeans’ God: καὶ μὴν πάντα μὲν τὸ κακόν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χειρός ἀκέλπηται, ὁ ἔρως δὲ μάλα καὶ ὁ φθόνος. In what follows, though, it is the context between Titus and the earlier heresiology that is of interest.

90 See above p. 230 and p. 332.

91 In Irenaeus there is often clear influence of Plato, esp. *Tim.* 29e, cf. Meijering (1975, 19–30; 1974, 41–42; 1989, 51); this is the case in *Adv. haer.* III.25,5, where there is a direct reference to *Leg.* IV.715c–716a and *Tim.* 29e, where Plato is contrasted with Marcion (see III.25,3–4) and the other heretics (cf. Van Unnik 1973, 23; Meijering 1975, 15, 20; Meijering 1989, 51), and in *Adv. haer.* IV.38,3, where the allusion is to *Tim.* 29e (cf. Van Unnik 1973, 25–26; Meijering 1975, 20). In *Adv. haer.* V.24,4 Irenaeus alludes to *Phaedr.* 247a and contrasts God’s ἀφθονία with the Devil’s φθόνος, which presumably means that God’s ἀφθονία here refers to the absence of the feeling of hate in its forms of envy and jealousy (otherwise in Van Unnik 1973, 26–27, 33).—Also of interest is *Adv. haer.* V.4.1, where Irenaeus uses the “Epicurean” proof (see above pp. 217–19) against those heretics who claim another Father beyond the Creator; their God is not merely both weak and powerless, but even full of jealousy.—On the other hand passages such as *Adv. haer.* III, Praefatio; IV.1.2; IV.14.2; IV.16.5 do not necessarily contain allusions to the Platonic motif (see also Van Unnik 1973, 22–25 concerning these places).
with linking the φθόνος-motif to the explanation of death. Above I underlined the possibility that the similarity with *Ad Autolycum* II.25 could indicate that Irenaeus is drawing on a now vanished text by Theophilus. This view can now be strengthened through a comparison between Philo, Theophilus and Irenaeus.

In *Quaestiones in Genesim* I.55 Philo took *Timaeus* 29e, 30a as his starting-point to explain that God’s word in Gen. 3.22 does not imply that there is φθόνος in God; death was ordained in order not to immortalise evil. Although the explicit φθόνος-motif appears in another context in Theophilus, namely in *Ad Autolycum* II.25 in connection with the Tree of Knowledge, we nonetheless find an aspect of Philo’s explanation in *Ad Autolycum* II.26: when He banished man from Paradise God conferred a great benefit upon man, so that he did not remain in sin for ever. Within a delineated period of time man can through punishment atone for his sin, in order to be later recalled after having been disciplined. When man was twice placed in Paradise (Gen. 2.8.15), it is a mysterious way of expressing that he will return to Paradise after the resurrection and the judgement. Death can be compared with the remelting and recasting of a vessel that had faults; in death man is broken up potentially in order that he may at the resurrection be found to be sound, i.e. blameless, righteous and immortal. The significant resemblance to Philo’s presentation is the feature that banishment/death is defended with the argument that otherwise evil would be immortalised (Philo), or man would remain in sin for ever (Theophilus); but there is probably a further similarity in the writer’s terminology in that both speak of God’s “benefaction”. The crucial difference between them lies

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92 See above p. 230.

93 See above p. 228.

94 Grant 1970, 68: Καὶ τούτο δὲ ὁ θεὸς μεγάλην ἐυεργεσίαν παρέσχεν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, τὸ μή διαμεῖναι αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ ὄντα. ἄλλα τρόπῳ τινὶ ἐν ὁμοιωματί ἐξορισμοῖς ἐξέβαλλεν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου, ὥσας διὰ τῆς ἐπιτιμίας τακτῶ ἀποτίσας χρόνῳ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ παιδευθεὶς εἰς ὑστέρον ἁνακληθή. διὸ καὶ πλασθέντος τοῦ ἄνθρωποῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ μυστηριωδῶς ἐν τῇ Γένεσι γέγραπται, ὡς διὰ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τεθέντος· ἵνα τὸ μὲν ἀπεξ ἡ πεπληρωμένου ὑπὲ ἐτέθη, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον μέλλῃ πληροῦσθαι μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν καὶ κρίσιν, ὦ μήν ἄλλα καὶ καθάπερ σκέυος τι, ἕπαι πλασθὲν αὐτίκα τινὸς σχῆ, ἀναχωνεύεται ἢ ἀναπλάσσεται εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι καίνον καὶ ἀλόκληρον, ὡς τρίος γίνεται καὶ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ διὰ θανάτου· δυνάμει γὰρ τέθραυσται ἵνα ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει υψής εὐερθή, λέγω δὲ ἁσπίλος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ὁθάνατος.

95 Theophilus does not mention the Tree of Life explicitly, but speaks only about the banishment from Paradise.

96 Referring to the creation the Armenian translation of Philo uses an expression
in the eschatological purpose with which Theophilus invests death; Philo does not touch on the purifying function of death, nor on man’s return to Paradise. If we now include *Adversus haereses* III.23.6, Irenaeus on the one hand follows Philo by introducing the φθονος-motif and by speaking not only of the banishment from Paradise but also of the banishment from the Tree of Life, but on the other hand he repeats Theophilus’s eschatological point, combined with formulations that are closer to Philo:

Wherefore also He drove him out of Paradise, and removed him far from the Tree of Life, not because He envied him the Tree of Life, as some venture to assert, but because He pitied him, [and did not desire] that he should continue a sinner for ever, nor that the sin which surrounded him should be immortal, and evil interminable and irreparable. But He set a bound to his [state of] sin, by interposing death, and thus causing sin to cease, putting an end to it by the dissolution of the flesh, which should take place in the earth, so that man, ceasing at length to live to sin, and dying to it, might begin to live to God.

The fact that Irenaeus’s presentation seems to follow both Philo’s *Quaestiones in Genesim* and Theophilus’s *Ad Autolycum* can be explained if Irenaeus’s source was Theophilus’s *Adversus Marcionem*, which built on *Quaestiones in Genesim* but expanded Philo’s justification of God with an eschatological motif, and if one further assumes that *Ad Autolycum* contains abbreviated forms of more comprehensive arguments in *Adversus Marcionem*.

The complex of motifs in Philo, Theophilus and Irenaeus that are

which Mercier 1979, 124 renders as “benefactor”, and which Marcus 1953, 33 n. *m* believes renders εὐφρεντῶν; Theophilus uses the expression μετάλυμεν εὐφρεντῶν about death.—The original Armenian text (Aucher 1826) has unfortunately not been available to me.

97 Perhaps Theophilus is influenced here by Rom. 6.7 (ὅ γὰρ ἁπαθικῶν δεδικαίωτα ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας; cf. Schelkle 1959, 214), despite the fact that Paul seems to be thinking here of baptism as death and not ordinary death. Cf. also 1 Pet. 4.1.

98 Transl. by Roberts and Rambaut in Roberts and Donaldson 1989a, 457.—“Quapropter et eiecit eum de Paradiso et a ligno vitae longe transtulit, non invidens ei lignum vitaeae, quemadmodum audent quidam dicere, sed miserans eius, et non perseveraret semper transgressor neque immortale esset quod esset circa eum pecatum et malum interminabile et insanabile. Prohibuit autem eius transgressionem, interponens mortem et cessare faciens peccatum, finem inferens ei per carnis resolutionem quae fieret in terra, uti cessans aliquando homo uiuere peccato et moriens ei inciperet uiuere Deo.”, Rousseau and Doutreleau 1974, 460, 462.—In contrast to Roberts and Rambaut’s translation I prefer to use the term “begrudge”.

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pointed out here can be found again in later Christian writers. It is clear that here we are dealing with some form of dependence on the earliest presentations, though no attempt will be made here to adduce a direct genealogy.

Like Origen, Methodius distinguishes in his *De resurrectione* between physical death and what he calls “sin’s death”; physical death as a means of chastisement to conversion is to be regarded as good. Like Origen, Methodius distinguishes in his *De resurrectione* between physical death and what he calls “sin’s death”; physical death as a means of chastisement to conversion is to be regarded as good.99 According to Methodius, God saw that evil had become immortal through the Devil’s cunning and by making skin garments (Gen. 3:21) He clad man in mortality, so that the evil that had arisen in him should die through the dissolution of the body (*De resurrectione* I.38,5).100 God did not banish man from the Tree of Life because He did not want him to live, but in order to prevent evil from becoming immortal (*De resurrectione* I.39,5).101 Methodius is particularly interested in maintaining that it was always God’s purpose that man should be immortal, and in this context he appeals to God’s immutability, goodness and foreknowledge,102 which actually leads him to the exact opposite views of Titus.

Like Theophilus and Irenaeus, Methodius thus combines Philo’s motif of sin that must not be immortalised with the eschatological motif of the purifying death. Even though Methodius does not use the term φθόνος in these contexts, or explain that God did not act out of φθόνος, it is just as clear as in Theophilus that his errand is theodicy.

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99 Methodius, *De res.* I.38,2: καλὸν οὖν ὁ θάνατος, εἰ καθάπερ παισὶ πρὸς ἐπιστροφὴν δίκην πληγὴν εὐρέθη, οὕτω ὁ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁ σοφότατος, ἀλλὰ ὁ τῆς διαζέξεως τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τοῦ χορησμοῦ. (Bonwetsch 1917, 280.7–9).

100 Bonwetsch 1917, 281.11–282.2.

101 Bonwetsch 1917, 283.13–16. See further e.g. *De res.* I.39,6 (Bonwetsch 1917, 284.5–8); I.40,4–6 (Bonwetsch 1917, 285.2–11); I.41,1 (Bonwetsch 1917, 286.5–11); I.42,3 (Bonwetsch 1917, 288.13–289.8); I.45,5–6 (Bonwetsch 1917, 295.5–12).—Just like Theophilus previously, Methodius uses the remelting image in *De res.* I.43,2–44,2 about this fact (Bonwetsch 1917, 289.12–293.8). See also Methodius, *Symp.* IX.2 (Bonwetsch 1917, 116.9–17).

102 See *De res.* I.39,6: ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τῶν Χριστῶν ἀπὸ τῶν οὕρανων ἀπέστελλεν εἰς τὴν γῆν, εἰ ὁ λόγος ἱδέλε ζωῆς τῶν ἁθρόων ἁγενετὸν ἁπαθανεῖν εἰς τὸ παντελές; εἰ δὲ εἰς μεταμέλειαν φαινεῖ τοῦτο πεσοντεκέναι τὸν θεόν ὁ ἀντιλέγων, ἀσθενὴς αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος, μεταγινώσκοντα τὸν θεὸν εἰςάγων. ἀλλὰ οὔτε ἀσύνετος τῷ μέλλοντος ὁ θεὸς οὔτε κακοσιούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁκρος ἁγιός καὶ προηγούσκον τὰ μέλλοντα. ὦτε ὡσείν ἄρα διὰ τὸ μὴ σφέσθαι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα φαγόντα αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς ἐξεβάλεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νεκροθηναίνει πρῶτον θυατέρα τῆν ἁμαρτίαν, ἵν’ οὕτως μετὰ τὸ ἁπαθανεῖν ἐκτακείντος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐγερθεῖς ὁ ἁθρόως καθαρὸς φάγη ἡ τῆς ζωῆς. (Bonwetsch 1917, 283.16–284.8).
Another interesting example of the reappearance of some of these motifs in later writers is to be found in Didymus the Blind’s *Commentarius in Genesim* 110.24–26 (a commentary on Gen. 3.22), where in an allusion to *Phaedrus* 247a, Didymus claims that there is no φθόνος in God, and on this basis rejects the view that it was out of φθόνος that God cut man off from the Tree of Life. Instead he explains in the following (*Commentarius in Genesim* 111.1ff.) that only the evil ones are excluded from the Tree of Life, and that this is also for their benefit, because it can either drive them to conversion or at least guarantee that being evil they do not gain access to divine things.\(^\text{103}\)

The φθόνος-motif is obvious here and Philo’s motif is also suggested.

Titus’s position can now be determined more precisely through a comparison. In contrast to Theophilus, Irenaeus and Methodius, Titus does not seem to believe that death is a purification, but only that it is good for the sinner that he cannot do any more harm, which is also Philo’s motif. Instead of the purifying motif Titus introduces the idea of virtuous men who receive death as a rest after their labours; the return to Paradise thus happens solely as a reward, not through a purifying punishment. It is also clear that the purifying motif would be quite unable to find expression in Titus’s interpretation, because this motif presupposes precisely that Adam and Eve’s transgression was a real Fall, a serious sin, with far-reaching consequences; in Titus this transgression is only a minor matter.

Titus believes that some people do not sin, or do not seriously sin, so that the only purpose that death can be thought to have for them must be as a rest after labour. For Titus, physical death has no essential connection with sin, but rather with man’s status as an ethical being; death is necessary for both the sinner and the righteous man. Since it has always been God’s intention that man should be an ethical being in the struggle for virtue, it has always been His intention that man should die.

Above I interpreted Titus’s presentation as arguing that on the one hand God is not to blame that man dies, in that He was not the cause of the disobedience, but that on the other hand He had created man mortal, though this mortality was at first only potentially present, the purpose being that man himself should make it real. Without doubt Titus joins all the other Church fathers in tak-

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\(^{103}\) Nautin 1976, 260.
ing the view that it is man himself who is responsible for his own dying. The Creator is acquitted, even though he imposes death on man. As we shall see, Titus is otherwise not the only one to believe that from the beginning man was potentially mortal. What is particular about his position is his view that man was intended from the beginning to make this potential mortality real. I have already dealt with the question of man’s primeval state, that he was originally created with a real “foretaste” of the final state of salvation or quite imperfectly with a view to developing to perfection. It is clear, however, that the same problem can be formulated with immortality or mortality as its content.

Titus’s view must not be confused with Theophilus’s teaching in Ad Autolycum II.24–25 and II.27 that Adam was created neither mortal nor immortal. In II.24 Theophilus says that God created man to grow, become complete and having been made divine, enter into heaven. He continues:

for man was created in an intermediate state, neither entirely mortal nor entirely immortal, but capable of either state; similarly the place Paradise—as regards beauty—was created intermediate between the world and heaven.

In II.27 Theophilus rejects the idea that man by nature was created mortal, immortal or as nothing:

In fact, man was neither mortal nor immortal by nature. For if God had made him immortal from the beginning, He would have made him God. Again, if He had made him mortal, it would seem that God was responsible for his death. God therefore made him neither immortal nor mortal but, as we have said before, capable of both.

Adam could either through obedience win immortality or through disobedience become the cause of his own death. The difference

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104 See above pp. 332–37.
105 Transl. by Grant 1970, 67, original text 66: μέσος γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐγερόνει, οὐτε θνητὸς ὀλοσχερὸς οὐτε ἀθάνατος τὸ καθόλου, δεκτικὸς δὲ ἐκατέρων· οὕτως καὶ τὸ χαρίν τὸ παράδεισος, ὡς πρὸς καλλονήν, μέσος τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ γεγένηται . . .
106 Transl. by Grant 1970, 69, 71, original text 68, 70: οὔτε οὖν φύσει θνητὸς ἐγένετο οὕτε ἀθάνατος. εἰ γὰρ ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πεποίηκε· θεὸν αὐτὸν πεποίηκε· πάλιν εἰ θνητὸν αὐτὸν πεποίηκε, εὐδόκει ἢν ὁ θεὸς ἀείς εἶναι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ. οὔτε οὖν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν οὕτε μὴν θνητόν, ἀλλὰ, καθὼς ἐπάνω προειρήκαμεν, δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων . . .
from Titus is clear: in Titus it is stated unambiguously that man is mortal by nature, and in reality death was the only conceivable ending to the Paradise narrative. In Theophilus on the other hand Adam’s mortality or immortality is maintained as undecided; both states were real possibilities for the first person.

Theophilus's teaching perhaps came to him on the basis of Jewish ideas. To a great extent it resembles the views of the much later Nemesius of Emesa (c. 400), who, however, formulated it differently; instead of saying that Adam was neither mortal nor immortal before the Fall, but capable of becoming both, Nemesius argues that Adam was mortal, but capable of becoming immortal. Because immortality was a real possibility, Nemesius’ doctrine is not the same as Titus’s either, despite them both explicitly saying that Adam was mortal from the beginning.

It has been claimed that Nemesius’s doctrine comes from Origen’s Commentarius in Genesim, but this can hardly be the case, since as mentioned Origen seems to have believed that in an unstable way man was perfect in Paradise, which must also mean that he was immor-

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107 E.g. Theophilus may have been inspired by the doctrine that Philo presents in De op. mund. 46 (134–135), but in that case he has completely changed its meaning. According to Philo man constitutes a borderland between mortal and immortal nature in that he is compounded of a mortal body and an immortal soul. According to Theophilus, however, in the Paradisal state it was a question of whether this compound should be permanent or not. Cf. also Hauke 1993, 131–32 with further references.—Theophilus's idea that Adam was created neither immortal nor mortal, but in between could also have other Jewish roots: see the reference to the Palestinian Targum-tradition in Brock 1990, 58.

108 Nemesius’s De nat. hom. 1 (Morani 1987, 6.5–7.12), where further arguments are developed from a premise which is attributed to “the Hebrews” (presumably Philo in De op. mund. 46 [134–135], cf. Jaeger 1914, 141, and probably not Theophilus [as Grant 1970, 71 n. 2 believes]), and from which Nemesius then adduces the following as his own view: to “suppose man to have been created mortal, but capable of becoming immortal when brought to perfection by moral progress; which is the same thing as being potentially immortal.” (οτι θηντος μην κατεσκευασθη, δυνα-μενος δε εκ προκοπης τελειομενος αθανατος γενοσθαι, τοντεστι δυναμει αθανατος,, Morani 1987, 6.18–20). What follows (Morani 1987, 6.20ff.) shows that the idea is that this development towards immortality was aborted by the Fall of Man.—Even though Nemesius knew Philo, his own ideas are more likely taken from another writer, e.g. Theophilus.—There are also other testimonies to Christian doctrines that are very close to Theophilus's and perhaps influenced by him: thus Ephrem the Syrian, e.g. In Gen. Π.17 (Tonneau 1955, 34. 28–29); see further Gross 1960, 211–12; Kronholm 1978, 76–77; Brock 1990, 57–62.

109 See above pp. 336–37.—It is not possible to delve deeper into the particular problem of how the pre-existence of the soul that Origen claimed relates to Adam and Eve’s existence in Paradise; see further Crouzel 1978; Hammond Bammel 1989; Hauke 1993 with further references.
tal: just as perfection in Paradise lacked a firmness, so could immortality or incorruptibility in Paradise admittedly also be lost,¹¹⁰ but this is nevertheless a quite different understanding of the primeval state than what is found in Nemesius.¹¹¹

However, the question of in what sense Origen believed that man was originally immortal, immediately raises itself—was it immortality in relation to physical death or in relation to the soul’s death?¹¹² It is now clear that the state of immortality in Paradise was concerned first and foremost with the circumstance that the soul was not yet dead, i.e. had sinned; it was thus primarily the soul’s death that was instituted in Gen. 3.¹¹³ But this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that also physical death was instituted on the same occasion, which is precisely what seems to be the case.¹¹⁴ Nor does Origen’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative appear to constitute a preliminary stage of Titus’s view. The great Alexandrian believed in a fall and a rupture.

In this area Titus is thus even further from Origen than from Theophilus and Nemesius; he nevertheless shares the latters’ interest

¹¹¹ According to Jaeger (1914, 138–43), Skard (1936, 29–31) and Telfer (1955, 238–40) the passage in Nemesius comes from Origen’s In Gen. (otherwise in Koch 1932, 216ff.).
¹¹² Cf. above p. 348.
¹¹³ Se e.g. In Ἰοβ. XX.25 (220–30) (Blanc 1982, 264–71) (esp. 224–25), Hom. in Gen. XV.2 (Baehrens 1920, 128.24–129.1) or In Rom. VI.6 (Hammond Bammel 1997, 480–81), where through a quotation from Wis. 2.24 it is also clear that it is the death of the soul that is instituted in Gen. 3: “Et rursus separatio animae a Deo mors appellatur quae per peccatum unuit. Haec aperte mala est, quae et peccati stipendium nominatur. Hanc mortem Deus non fecit neque laetatur in perditione iuuum; sed inuidia diaboli mors haec introit in orbem terrarum.” See further also in Hammond Bammel 1989, 78; Hauke 1993, 370–73.
¹¹⁴ In In Rom. V.1 (Hammond Bammel 1997, 371) Origen explains that physical death is a shadow of the soul’s death, which always follows it: “Et per peccatum inquit mors; illa sine dubio mors de qua et profeta dicit: quia anima quae peccat ipsa morietur; cuius mortis hanc corporalem mortem umbram merito quis dixerit; quocumque enim illa incesserit hanc necesse est subsequei uelut umbrae corpus.” See further Crouzel 1978, 26–28; Hauke 1993, 373–74 with further references.—That the separation of soul and body is man’s φύσις does not imply that it was already his nature from the beginning (there are also Early Church theories claiming both that from the beginning death belonged to man’s φύσις, and that man was immortal from the beginning, since God’s grace suspended nature, thus Athanasius, De inc. 4–6).
in playing down the ideas of an extraordinary or elevated primeval state. We must note in this context how in III.26–27 Titus rejects theories that in Paradise Adam and Eve were still without flesh (ἀσαρκοῖ) and not mortal, because the time was still not ripe to reproduce children (III.26.1–2).

The question is, however, whether Titus himself nevertheless has freed himself entirely of these theories. For in III.27,7 he states it as his opinion that from the moment they had eaten of the Tree they regarded each other “in a more corporeal state” (σωματικοτέρος διαθέσει), an expression that recalls a phrase in Titus’s reproduction of the theories mentioned, namely that before Adam and Eve were disobedient, the time of a “fleshy state” (σαρκικής διαθέσεως, ed.N 338.4) had not yet come (III.26,1). If, however, Titus still believes in degrees of corporeality, the idea must be that the less corporeal flesh in question, before man and woman ate of the Tree, was already equipped with sense organs such as eyes. If Titus is thinking of a difference between a body of finer particles and a body of thicker particles, it would to some degree fit in with Adam and Eve finding themselves in his opinion somewhere else in the universe than on the physical earth, for he continues by saying that they then “were transferred to the earth, from which they were also formed in the beginning” (III.27,7), a statement which suggests that Titus believed that the Garden of Paradise was situated in the third heaven. But the interpretation seems to break down on the fact that precisely here Titus is stating that the body originally comes from the earth. Titus obviously believes that man was originally created on and of this earth and only secondarily removed up to Paradise in the third heaven. For the idea of a position in the third heaven is not necessarily connected to the theory of heavy and light bodies. Perhaps

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115 ... σωματικοτέρος διαθέσει λοιπὸν θεωμένος ἀλλήλους, ὅθεν καὶ μετατίθενται εἰς τὴν γῆν, ἄφ’ ἦς καὶ τὴν ἁρχὴν ἐπλάσθησαν, ed.N 340.11–13.—The idea that Paradise was situated in the third heaven comes originally from ancient Judaism and is shared, e.g. by Irenaeus, who identified the Garden of Paradise with the third heaven and the Paradise mentioned in 2 Cor. 12.2–4 (see Adv. haer. V.5,1). Origen too appears to have placed the Garden of Paradise in the third heaven (Hammond Bammel 1989; Hauke 1993, 207–8; 322ff.), and in Origen, or perhaps only in later Origenists, this position was connected with a theory that through successive falls the soul had become clad in increasingly rougher bodies (see further Hammond Bammel 1989).
Titus took the expression ἑωματικωτέρος διάθέσει from earlier theories, but he means something else by it; e.g. it may have been his view that the first human couple were indifferent to their corporeality before and until they ate.

Also in his understanding of death Titus appears to be breaking new ground in relation to earlier patristics. Like Origen he regards physical death as natural, but the fundamental difference is that whereas for Origen it is indifferent, for Titus it is good. Death is not a punishment, nor is it good in the sense that it purifies man of sin. Death is good because it puts an end to the sinner’s deeds and gives the righteous man rest. For there is no essential connection between sin and death.

Death is necessary for the ethical struggle that man has always had to wage, and it has therefore never been the intention that man should not die. It was not thus that man was immortal in heaven, nor was it thus that he could have become so. For Adam and Eve’s transgression was not a real Fall, but merely a bagatelle, in the last resort a useful experience.

6. Summarising remarks

It has now been demonstrated that Adda’s attack really did help to reshape Titus’s theology, or, as I actually believe, for another anti-Manichaean whom Titus relied on. Titus believed that he had to defend himself through a theodicy that surrendered certain important elements in the tradition and insisted on and combined the remaining elements in a new way. We cannot deny that the result very much resembles Pelagianism. Man was not immortal in Paradise, and was not changed or did not become incurable through his disobedience, which was not a Fall but a useful experience; this in the long view enabled him to return to Paradise through his own virtuous efforts. It was always the intention that man should die, and death is natural and good, not a punishment.

Titus’s polemic is directed not only against the Manichaeans, but also against the tradition, which in his opinion did not contain a convincing response to the Manichaean criticism. Scheffczyk is therefore mistaken in claiming that Titus was not a “direkten Gegner einer Erbübel- oder Erbverderbnislehre”. On this point the assessments by Sickenberger, Gross and Beatrice are more correct. Yet
nor are Gross and Beatrice right in arguing that a presentation such as Titus’s was typical of, or at least expressed, the genuine tendency in other Greek patristics. On the contrary, Titus’s criticism of the tradition is a testimony that he had moved a long way away from it. This does not mean that Titus was a “heretic” himself. He was concerning himself with an area of Church doctrine where no binding decisions had yet been made, and where he was therefore quite within his rights to revise the main tendency in the previously unclear mass of traditions, so much the more since this revision further contained a continuity, for Gross is of course right that Titus’s solution was a cultivation of one of the possibilities amid the tensions of theology in the Early Church.

To determine how great the similarities are between Titus’s theology and Pelagianism would require a specific examination which it is not my intention to conduct here. Doubtless there would be a number of differences too. It is perhaps a particular feature of Titus’s Pelagian characteristics that they are not only the result of a specific anthropology or ethic, but are also determined by his desire to safeguard the transcendence of God. Titus also believes in the necessity of help from God, which suggests a concept of grace, though not an Augustinian one: Petitdidier and Scheffczyk are thus right to point out that II.16 Titus states about man that

God has also made man for the sake of this good deed, in order that on the one hand he should receive existence from God, but on the other hand receive from himself the good in addition, through God’s assistance (Gr. 34.10–12 \( \rightarrow \) Ch. XI.20).

This assistance, this “synergy” from God’s side, is best illustrated in my opinion by Titus’s interpretation of Rom. in contra Manichaeos IV.90–95, where Paul’s text makes it necessary for Titus to emphasize grace (\( \kappa\sigma\tau\alpha\mu\alpha\)= \( \chi\alpha\pi\tau\varsigma \), Sy 173.20.22.24.25, 175.22-23.25). Titus, who always believes that the individual sins can lead to a sinful habit or \( \varepsilon\xi\iota\varsigma \) fastening itself to the soul, underlines that \( \kappa\alpha\lambda\nu \kappa\varepsilon\omega \kappa\tau\mu\alpha \), “another good passion/feeling” (IV.93, Sy 174.14) can overcome this habit. \( \kappa\varepsilon\omega \) presumably translates \( \pi\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma \), and the expression and line of thought seem to correspond exactly to \( \tau\iota \mu\epsilon\iota\zeta\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha} \gamma\omicron\tau\theta\omicron\nu \pi\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma \) in II.12 (Gr. 31.22–23 \( \rightarrow \) Ch. XI.18). Grace, or the good \( \pi\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma \) is much the same as the \( \kappa\alpha\lambda\nu \), “benefit” or “goodness” that we find in IV.94 (Sy 175.8.21, partly \( \rightarrow \) Ch. XI.49). Faith in God and love of God are “given in addition” (\( \epsilon\iota\omicron\mu\alpha\omicron\delta\alpha\omicron\omicron \), IV.94, Sy 175.33). Faith
demands that man receives something “extra” (κτυπεῖ, IV.95, Sy 176.19). And, as can be seen, Petitdidier was also right that this grace consists not only of the outward trials but also involves the inner effect on man. With these definitions Titus is moving some way beyond his “cooler”, rationalist understanding, corresponding to what I emphasised above, namely that in Contra Manichaeos IV.91 Titus may depict faith in God in a very intellectualist way, but he also stresses that it contains εὐνοµε and ἀγάπη towards God (→ Ch. XI.48).\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116} Cf. above p. 62, p. 293 and p. 317 concerning these Titus-passages.—The difference in Greek patristics between a Stoic-inspired, “unfavourable” attitude to πάθος and a more positive, Platonic-Aristotelian inspired view of πάθος is underlined in Ware 1989, and Titus’s view is at least to some degree illuminated by the texts to which Bishop Ware draws attention there.
CHAPTER NINE

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EXEGESIS OF GENESIS IN TITUS OF BOSTRA AND IN A NUMBER OF WRITERS IN “THE ANTIOCHENES SCHOOL”

1. Plan for the following comparison

The examination in the previous chapter revealed that many of the motifs that appear in Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative recur in the earlier and contemporary Church fathers, but it also showed that the motifs are combined in a new way and with a new purpose in Titus. The argument that God had anticipated the disobedience and therefore created man to become mortal, and that in reality the disobedience and death were beneficial and necessary is not found in its entirety in the writers under discussion. On this background it is reasonable to conclude that Titus—under the constraint of Adda’s arguments—was able to revise the traditional interpretation independently.

But the examination is only half finished, for even though Titus’s interpretation looks like a new departure in relation to the earlier tradition, it is not so different from the interpretation in certain texts by his younger contemporary, Theodore of Mopsuestia. As mentioned, the similarity between Titus and Theodore was noted by Gross, who suggested that Theodore had been influenced by Titus. However, one could also imagine that this similarity instead indicated that Titus and Theodore represented an older tradition, and in that case it would not be justifiable to claim that Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative came about in reaction to Adda’s criticism. It could be that in the face of this criticism Titus mobilised a number of interpretations that had already been formulated in another context, so that it would be wrong to see Titus of Bostra’s theology as an extreme example that the clash between Manichaeans and Catholics had a significant impact on Greek theology in the 4th and 5th centuries. It is also a possibility, however, that the hypothetical older tradition was precisely an anti-Manichaean tradition, so that the important point in Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise
narrative had already been formed as a reaction to Adda’s criticism. If this is the case, we are then back with views on which I have already focussed, namely that Titus of Bostra had a relation to the early “Antiochene School”, that this was characterised by an anti-Manichaean concern, and even perhaps that Titus had a literary dependence on George of Laodicea’s anti-Manichaean work.

The problem requires that a comparison be drawn not only between Titus of Bostra and Theodore of Mopsuestia’s interpretations of Gen. but also with the interpretation among other “Antiochene theologians”. For practical reasons, however, this examination will not include all the texts that could be relevant for a comparison, but limit itself to certain writers and texts. A brief, incomplete sketch of Eusebius of Caesarea’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative in Historia ecclesiastica and Theophania will form a “prologue”, so to speak, to what follows. As we have seen, one of this Eusebius’s pupils was Eusebius of Emesa, whose Commentarius in Octateuchum on Gen. among others, is known from an Armenian translation and from Greek catenae fragments; not only these Greek fragments will be included, but also other material that is only preserved in the Armenian version, where I build on specific excerpts from L. van Rompay and J.J.S. Weitenberg’s unpublished French translation, to which R.B. ter Haar Romeny has kindly given me access. Romeny is reworking this preliminary translation for publication. Eusebius of Emesa’s pupil, Diodore of Tarsus, also wrote a commentary, Commentarius in Octateuchum, which is only known in fragments and which I also include. Finally,

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1 One could also quite reasonably assign to the Antiochene theologians Nemesius of Emesa, who for practical reasons was treated in the previous chapter (pp. 360–62).
2 The Armenian translation appears in Hovhannessian 1980. That this text really is a translation of Eusebius of Emesa’s In Oct., was finally proved by Lehmann (1984); cf. Lehmann 1975, 17–18, 31–33; 1986; 1986a; 1987; 1989. A thorough account of the entire text tradition of Eusebius of Emesa’s In Oct. is to be found in Romeny 1997a, 19–33, including the catenae. Romeny 1997a also gives the reader to a certain extent the possibility of gaining an impression of the parts of In Oct. which are preserved only in the Armenian version.—In the present context it is not possible to go deeper into the questions on the relationship between the different catenae and compilations that comment on Gen. (and their relation to among others Theodoret of Cyrus’s Quast. in Oct. and Procopius’s In Gen.); it is particularly Françoise Petit’s scholarship and editing that have clarified these questions and made the texts available. In addition to Romeny’s account see Petit 1977; 1979; 1986; 1991; 1993; 1995; 1996; 1996a. Of special importance for the present work are the Catena in Gen., Ch. 1–3 (Petit 1991) and Collectio Coisliniana (Petit 1986).
3 I use the new edition of the fragments in Petit 1986; cf. also the earlier edition in Deconinck 1912, 84–173.—Diodore’s commentary, like Eusebius of Emesa’s,
Diodore’s pupil, Theodore of Mopsuestia, composed a *Commentarius in Genesim*, of which again there are only fragments, though these are preserved in several different contexts. It is unclear whether a particular catena fragment which is important in the present context (Petit 1986, no. 115) comes from Diodore’s *Commentarius in Octateuchum* or Theodore’s *Commentarius in Genesim*, so this fragment will be treated separately in a special section. Furthermore, the *Commentarius in Genesim* was perhaps already composed when Theodore was a young man, and it appears to have built on the commentaries of both Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore. Since Gross, Beatrice and Scheffczyk have, as mentioned, compared Titus precisely with Theodore, it is clearly of particular importance to include this commentary, but the ostensible similarities between Titus and Theodore are to be found even more in certain fragments that are said to come from a work that Theodore wrote against the adherents of the

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4 See primarily the thorough account in Devreesse 1948, 5–25 (together with Devreesse 1959, 174–77), which now needs a supplement and a revision, however. —The most important fragments are to be found in the following places: a brief characterisation of Theodore’s commentary appears in Photius, *Bibl.*, cod. 38 (8a22–25) (Henry 1959, 23); cod. 43 (9a13–17) (Henry 1959, 27); cod. 240 (322b27–30) (Henry 1967, 167); cf. Devreesse 1948, 5. Some fragments exist as direct quotations in John Philoponus’s *De op. mund.* (Reichardt 1897), cf. Devreesse 1948, 5–6. Other fragments appear in catenae and similar compilations, cf. Devreesse 1948, 6; see PG 66,636–45; PG 87,1, 21ff.; Devreesse 1948, 5–25; Devreesse 1959, 174–77; but esp. the new editions by F. Petit (see above p. 367). A number of fragments exist in the acts of the fifth ecumenical synod in Constantinople in 553; see Straub 1970, 64–66 (actio quarta 66–71). Other fragments are preserved in Syriac translation: Sachau 1869, 1–34; Tonneau 1953; Jansma 1962. Further fragments are to be found in Petit 1987. See finally the more comprehensive account in Petit 1987, 269–71.

5 An attempt to date Theodore’s works appears in Vosté 1925, who assumes that Theodore began by commenting on the OT as a young, i.e. as a pupil of Diodore and a young priest in the period 370–385. Vosté’s theory is that the NT commentaries were the last that Theodore wrote, and that this explains why the reaction against Theodore came late (Vosté 1925, 56). However, Vosté does not get any closer to dating the Gen.-commentary. His theory rests on a weak foundation, cf. McLeod 1999, 27–28. —As Diodore’s pupil Theodore must have known his commentary, but he seems also to have known Eusebius of Emesa’s *In Oct.*; see Romeny 1997a, 27, 28.
doctrine of original sin, and one which must have been composed when Theodore was an elderly man. Occasionally, however, I have also attempted with the help of other texts to illuminate individual aspects of these writers’ interpretations of the Paradise narrative. In conclusion I add some brief remarks on the interpretation of the Paradise narrative in the Constitutiones Apostolorum, which have sometimes been placed together with Theodore and Titus, and which therefore are not without interest for the present examination.

Of all the texts mentioned it is Eusebius of Emesa’s commentary which most obviously relates to the dualistic “heresies”, even though the theme is also present in Diodore as a clear continuation of Eusebius. The question is, however, whether certain problems with their roots in the anti-dualistic conflict are not also present in Theodore, even though they are no longer explicitly related to the conflict.

2. Outline of the interpretation of the Paradise narrative in Eusebius of Caesarea

Above I noted various similarities between Titus and Eusebius of Caesarea and his pupil, Eusebius of Emesa, and I further mentioned a somewhat loose theory that Titus could have been Eusebius of Caesarea’s pupil. Without in any way determining whether Eusebius of Caesarea should be assigned to “the Antiochene School”, it might at least make sense to begin with some remarks about Eusebius of Caesarea’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative.

The natural starting-point for a comparison must be Titus’s interpretation of the image of God in man. As I have underlined, Titus does not distinguish between εἰκόν and ὁμοίωσις, and man’s createdness καὶ ἑαυτόν in Book III has to do with his rule over nature, his reason and his freedom, whereas Book II only concentrates on his freedom. It is of decisive importance, however, that the image of God in man has as its starting-point an innate knowledge which

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6 The dating follows from the work being supposedly directed against Jerome’s Dial. contra Pelag. libri III from 415. Theodore died in 428.—See further below p. 407 on the transmission of this work by Theodore.

7 In addition to the passages that I treat in what follows, see references in Romeny 1997, 137–38; 1997a, 12, 15, 18, 93, 94, 253–58, 265–71, 277–85, 316–23.

8 See further the interpretations in Berkhof 1939, 102–13; Gross 1960, 163–68; Scheffczyk 1981, 152–54.
through voluntary obedience to the commandments develops man in virtue so that he comes to resemble God. Titus thus places the image of God in the ethical choices that are made by reason, and he does not appear to be particularly interested in the image of God as contemplation; and although he describes observance of the commandments as the mediation of the knowledge of God or as participation in the divine reason, he also emphasises that this participation has its limits.\(^9\)

Eusebius underlines the link between the image of God in man and man’s rule over the animals,\(^10\) just as Titus does. As in Titus, moreover, man’s rule is based on his capacity for reason, which is contrasted with the animal’s slavery under the law of nature, which shows that these exist for man’s sake.\(^11\) Even though there is only a difference of nuance here, it should be noted that to a greater degree than Titus Eusebius seems to stress that man’s createdness in the eikón and ὀμοίωσις is to be found in the kinship of the immortal soul with the Logos.\(^12\) On this point the inheritance from Platonism and Origen is probably stronger than is the case with Titus, who, as mentioned, seems more interested in the ethical realisation in the world of the image of God than in the transcendence of the soul. The influence of Origen is also present when Eusebius points out that by virtue of his reason, which is in kinship with the Logos, man on earth is destined to grow with a view to life in heaven.\(^13\)

Did Eusebius of Caesarea believe in a break at this point in man’s development, a catastrophic Fall? One of his presentations can at the least be read to mean that not just Adam but also his immediate successors lived a simple, holy life without polytheism, but this may only refer to Adam in Paradise before the Fall.\(^14\) In other pre-

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\(^9\) *Contra Manich.* III.14.3–6 (ed.N 310.17–312.6); these limits (ὡσον ἐνδέχεται, “as far as it is possible”, ed.N 312.3) perhaps correspond with the argument mentioned in I.24 (Gr. 15.22–23 → Ch. XI.11) where Titus rejects the claim that we have a part in seeing God κατ’ οὐσίαν (cf. above p. 308).

\(^10\) *Theoph.* I.48 (Lee 1842, [25.19ff.]; Gressmann 1904, 65*23ff.).


\(^12\) *Theoph.* I.68 (Lee 1842, [30.21–25]; Gressmann 1904, 70*17–23).

\(^13\) *Theoph.* I.40 (Lee 1842, [18.8–14]; Gressmann 1904, 57*34–58*6).

\(^14\) *Theoph.* I.42 (Lee 1842, [19.23–20.12]; Gressmann 1904, 59*17–60*4). The interpretation in Gross 1960, 164 assumes that Eusebius is referring both to Adam and to his immediate successors (as well as to the Hebrews), which is also possible. He may mean only Adam and the later Hebrews, however.
sentations, however, and most clearly in *Historia ecclesiastica* I.2,17–19, Eusebius claims that the consequence of Adam’s disobedience of God’s commandment was that he “fell at once to this mortal and perishable life, and exchanged the former divine delights for this earth with its curse” (*Historia ecclesiastica* I.2,18), and that through continued evilness his successors “destroyed” the innate reason of the soul (*Historia ecclesiastica* I.2,19). We are dealing with a process of decline which was introduced with the Fall of Man. Related to this account is a somewhat unclear passage in which Eusebius seems to imagine that the first human was a child who through obedience to God’s commandment could have been released from the earthly, corruptible life. This development was arrested by the Fall, however, and God therefore gave man a body that in the end could deliver him from corruptibility, presumably here Eusebius imagines that the soul in heaven was clothed in fine garments which at the Fall were replaced by a heavier body which through death could purify man from sin.

Also in Eusebius therefore we find a number of the elements that are contained in Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative; but there are still crucial differences: Adam originally had a real possibility through obedience to develop himself to immortality, and his disobedience was therefore a fall, a break with his purpose.

3. Comparison with Eusebius of Emesa’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative

Eusebius of Caesarea’s pupil, Eusebius of Emesa, did not devote much attention in *Commentarius in Octateuchum* to the image of God in man, but in another text he placed this image within man’s ruling functions, a feature which corresponds to presentations in both

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15 Bardy 1952, 10.
16 εἰς τούτων τῶν θυμῶν καὶ ἐπίκηροι βίον καταπέπτωκεν καὶ τὴν ἐπάρατον ταυτικὴν γῆν τῆς πάλαι ἐνθέου τροφῆς ἀντικατηλλάξατο . . . (Bardy 1952, 10).—Eng. transl. by Lake 1965, 21, 23.
17 Bardy 1952, 10.
18 *Theoph.* II.69 (Lee 1842, [30.26–31.9]; Gressmann 1904, 70*–71*).  
20 *De incorp. et invisib. Deo* [5], Buytaert 1957, 81–82. Cf. Schweizer 1942, 61 n. 239.
Eusebius of Caesarea and Titus of Bostra, but which is also insufficient for a closer comparison. With regard to the location of the Garden of Paradise, however, there is a clear difference from Titus, who as mentioned seems to have placed it in the third heaven; ostensibly Eusebius of Caesarea believed something similar. Characteristically on the other hand, it was Eusebius of Emesa’s view that the garden was on this earth, and despite disagreements on other matters this view was held by both Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia.\(^{21}\)

When Titus claims that man, being created in God’s image, already knew good and evil, and therefore argues that the Tree of Knowledge did not have that appellation because it contained this knowledge, but because man’s knowledge was exercised by not approaching it, his view corresponds exactly to Eusebius of Emesa’s: in *Commentarius in Octateuchum* on Gen. 2.9\(^{22}\) Eusebius explains that while the Tree of Life naturally mediated immortality to whoever ate of it, the Tree of Knowledge did not contain in its nature cognition of the contraries (i.e. good and evil). Eusebius attempts to prove this by arguing that already when man was forbidden to eat of the Tree of Knowledge under threat of punishment by death in Gen. 2.16–17, he must have been capable of knowing evil, namely in knowing that it was evil to eat of the Tree: it would have been superfluous to give man a commandment that he did not understand, and it would be outrageous (ἐποτος) to punish man with death for a transgression that was committed in ignorance. Man therefore already possessed the knowledge of good and evil not only before he ate but also before he received the commandment, and it could therefore look as though both the Tree and the commandment were superfluous.

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\(^{21}\) In the Armenian version of *In Oct.* on Gen. 3.24, Hovhannessian 1980, 36, a passage is preserved in which Eusebius of Emesa directly attacks the view that the Garden of Paradise should have been in heaven. That the garden is on the earth, however, is also clear from a Greek fragment in Petit 1991, 167–68 (no. 237 on Gen. 2.8); Hovhannessian 1980, 18,72–19,94. Diodore: see Petit 1986, 88 (no. 86). Theodore: see Petit 1991, 158–59 (no. 228) (= Devreesse 1948, 16 n. 4); Petit 1991, 159 (no. 229) (= Devreesse 1948, 16–17 n. 4); Petit 1991, 159–60 (no. 230) (= PG 66,637B3–8; cf. Devreesse 1948, 17 n. 2); Petit 1991, 160–61 (no. 231) (= PG 66,637B8–C11; cf. Devreesse 1948, 17 n. 2); Petit 1991, 176–77 (no. 252) (= Devreesse 1948, 17 n. 1; PG 66,637B3–8). Concerning all these writers see Romeny 1997a, 192–200 (Fr. V); more distantly 118, 128, 137.

It may be added that if one were to assume that the Tree itself contained knowledge of good and evil, this would mean that whoever prevented man from eating of it was jealous (φθονηρός), and that the commandment was superfluous because man would only be in need of laws and prohibitions when he had eaten of the Tree and thereby acquired the knowledge that allows him room for a free choice (τὸ συνεξούσιον). Of course it is not Eusebius of Emesa’s view that the Tree of Knowledge and God’s commandment against eating of it were superfluous, and he asks:

So how then is this to be understood? Man had a power of reason that was capable of receiving both good and evil, but did not have knowledge of them. When God wished to make room for free choice and cognition of the contrary (qualities) [i.e. good and evil], He showed them a tree and forbade them to eat of it, and He threatened them with death if they transgressed (the commandment), so they could understand that the act of violation is evil, and the act of obedience is good. The tree by which both these things became known was then rightly given its name after them, i.e. after obedience and disobedience.

It is important to note here that Eusebius clearly believes that the Tree of Knowledge, was in a sense a random tree that God used in order to train man, and that it acquired its name because that was the purpose it was used for. Moreover it is obviously the intention

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24 Εἶχον μὲν λογισμὸν δεκτικὸν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, τὴν δὲ γνώσιν οὐκ εἶχον. Ο δὲ θεὸς χώραν δοῦναι τῷ αὐτεξούσιῳ βοουλόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν γνώσιν, δένδρον ὑποδείξας ἀπαγορεύει τὴν βρῶσιν, ἀπειλήσας θάνατον παραβιάσοντες, ὡς ἂν εἴδειν τὸ παρακόσιον κακοῦ καὶ τὸ πεθαρμένον ἄγαδόν. Τὸ οὖν δένδρον διʼ οὗ τούτων ἐκάτερον ἐγίνοσκετο, ἐκ τούτων εἰκότως ἐκάλεσεν, τοῦτοστιν ὑπακοής τε καὶ παρακοής; Eusebius of Emesa, *In Oct. on Gen. 2.9* in Petit 1991, 171 (no. 243.1–7) followed originally straight after the text that Petit carries in no. 241 (see previous note), as can be seen both from the Armenian translation and from Procopius of Gaza’s *In Gen.* (PG 87,1, 161B–164A). No. 243 is erroneously attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia in Devreess 1948, 17 n. 3.—Cf. Irenaeus, who in *Adv. haer.* IV.39,1 states that man’s knowledge of good and evil is innate, but that he needs experience and training through the commandment, and that the good is obedience and the evil disobedience; presumably Eusebius of Emesa has been influenced by this directly or indirectly, but the particular interpretation of the name of the Tree of Knowledge is not found in Irenaeus.—In the continuation (Eusebius of Emesa, *In Oct. on Gen. 2.9* in Petit 1991, 171–72 [no. 243.7–19]) Eusebius seeks to render his interpretation probable by referring to a number of other passages in the OT where places receive names after the events that happened at them.—Petit 1991, 171 (no. 243) corresponds to Hovhannessian 1980, 21,159–22,188.
that the knowledge which man possessed beforehand is in fact only
to be understood as a disposition towards knowing good and evil;
this innate faculty to discriminate had first to be aroused to activity
through God’s commandment. Man does not gain knowledge by eat-
ing of the Tree, but by trying to keep the commandment. The sim-
ilarity to Titus lies of course in the fact that both bishops claim that
man already had cognition, before he ate as well as in the fact that
they both argue for this view by referring to the fact that the com-
mandment must have been given to an apprehending creature, and
that they furthermore both perceive the commandment as a form
of training and as a realisation of dormant knowledge; both more-
over claim that the Tree of Knowledge acquired its name from this
exercise.\textsuperscript{25}

Eusebius of Emesa thus introduces the φθονός- motif in connection
with the prohibition, but like Titus he also knows it in connection
with man’s banishment from the Tree of Life (Gen. 3.22–23), where
Eusebius relates the motif to unnamed heretics,\textsuperscript{26} who could be, for

\textsuperscript{25} In *In Oct.* in the Armenian version it is also mentioned in other places that
the knowledge was not in the Tree, and it is even stated in passage, on Gen. 3.5
that the opposite view was the Devil’s temptation: “Par conséquent, ce n’est pas
dans la nature de l’arbre que la connaissance se trouvait, mais Satan disait qu’elle
se trouvait là et il promettait que la nourriture du fruit leur donnerait la conna-
sance. Aussi, lorsqu’ils avaient mangé, ne savaient-ils rien de plus que ce qu’ils
savaient auparavant. Qu’est-ce qu’ils savaient auparavant? (Ils savaient) que s’ils
mangeaient, ils deviendraient mortels.” (Hovhannessian 1980, 31; Van Rompay and
Weitenberg’s translation). Thus Eusebius would not have been able to join the com-
promise that Titus accepts in *Contra Manich.* III.29, namely that the Tree could per-
haps increase the knowledge that man already possessed. Altogether Eusebius of
Emesa apparently prefers to argue that man’s dormant ethical knowledge once and
for all was made complete by God’s commandment. He therefore also rejects an
increase of knowledge through the act of disobedience; the serpent’s word in Gen.
3.5 that their eyes would be opened he would simply not have understood liter-
ally, as can be seen from the Armenian version of *In Oct.* on Gen. 3.5, Hovhannessian
1980, 29, in Van Rompay and Weitenberg’s translation: “Est-ce que peut-être
(ceux-ci) étaient fermés? Mais il désigne les yeux de l’esprit.” However, according
to Eusebius, this was only the Devil’s deception: he promised man a knowledge
that man was already in possession of; this is clear from a passage a little later in
*In Oct.*, Hovhannessian 1980, 31, in Van Rompay and Weitenberg’s translation:
“Est-ce que peut-être (ceux-ci) étaient fermés? Mais il parle du fait que des (êtres)
doués de connaissance seraient amenés à la connaissance.” When Gen. 3.7 actu-
ally speaks of the eyes being opened, it does not mean that the Devil’s words were
confirmed; in Gen. 3.7 it is not a question of the knowledge of good and evil, but
instead only of knowledge of nakedness (Hovhannessian 1980, 31–32, Van Rompay
and Weitenberg’s translation).

\textsuperscript{26} In Van Rompay and Weitenberg’s translation (the Armenian version of Eusebius
example, Manichaean. Eusebius of Emesa’s answer in its entirety is only preserved in the Armenian version, the introduction to which states that since the Fall meant that man sank into a mortal nature, God did not wish that with this nature man should live for ever, nor that sin should be rewarded. The continuation is also preserved in Greek, where it forms the second part of a composite fragment, the first part of which cannot come from Eusebius, even though it too employs the φθόνος-motif. In the present context it is Eusebius of Emesa’s part that is of course the most important:

Since he has now sinned once and for all, (God) does not want him to remain in the eternal life, in order that he does not in other circumstances too find the Devil trustworthy and God jealous (βάσκανως). For in that way he would also regard himself as God. But now he believed God, who said, “You shall surely die”, and he understood that he was weak by nature, but appreciated by God’s love of man.

The central question, however, must be how Eusebius of Emesa perceived Adam and Eve’s status before the Fall. Here there is help from the commentary on Gen. 2.25, which is also preserved in Procopius of Gaza. Eusebius explains Adam and Eve’s lack of shame over their nakedness by arguing that because they were immortal, they did not sense their own nakedness and therefore had no need of clothing. This state can be compared with the resurrection, where again there will be no need for garments, because the resurrected will be clothed in incorruptibility (cf. 1 Cor. 15.53). Their nature was changed to a mortal nature, and their immoral way of thinking (φρόνημα) was changed so that they felt their nakedness and had to live in shame. But this leads to a new problem. If Adam and Eve


27 The first part of the fragment (Petit 1991, 289–90 no. 450.1–9) says that the word of God in Gen. 3.22 was not spoken in jealousy (φθόνον), and instead explains God’s motive with the aid of the remelting metaphor, which illustrates the idea of death as purification (cf. above pp. 355–57).

were incorruptible, they had no need of food, yet God nevertheless actually gave them food (cf. Gen. 2.16). Eusebius’s explanation is that God gave the food beforehand, and that it was partly because of the commandment and the reward that follows from its observance, and partly because God knew beforehand the change in their free will and their nature. Thereafter Eusebius states that the food which they had no need of was given beforehand for the purpose of examination/test (δοκιμασία), which presumably refers to the test of whether man would refrain from eating of the Tree of Knowledge.

This fragment shows both the distance to Titus and the closeness. Both writers reject, in contrast to Eusebius of Caesarea, the claim that Adam and Eve did not have bodies of flesh, and in my view Titus also believes that Adam and Eve were indifferent to their nakedness; but in Titus there can be no question of the first humans being immortal and incorruptible. Their nature was thus not changed by their transgression; on the contrary, the institution of death was a realisation of their nature and destiny. This means that unlike Titus Eusebius of Emesa maintains the catastrophic nature of the transgression. There is otherwise nothing in the fragment to suggest that Eusebius of Emesa finds a beneficial purpose in the transgression. Admittedly, more or less like Titus, he believes that God anticipated the transgression and therefore prepared for the situation afterwards by giving food to the first humans, but there is nothing to suggest that he also drew the conclusion that the intention was that they should violate the commandment. Although Eusebius of Emesa is well aware of the general interest in the Early Church in maintaining God’s immutability and impassibility, unlike Titus this interest is not allowed to have a reforming effect on his interpretation of the Paradise narrative.

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29 Eusebius of Emesa’s In Oct. on Gen. 2.25 in Procopius of Gaza, In Gen., PG 87.1, 177C8–180A8, which, as Petit (1991, 216, n. to no. 318) points out, corresponds to Hovhannessian 1980, 24,252–25,291. Petit believes that the same view is expressed in another fragment (Petit 1991, 216 no. 318 on Gen. 3.1 [2.25]) which cannot be identified, but which claims that because Adam and Eve in the Garden of Paradise were held fast by grace, they did not have the passions of mortal nature, since they had not yet become mortal.

30 Further light is shed on Eusebius of Emesa’s view in this area by other fragments from In Oct. on Gen. 3.21, compiled as Fr. IX in Romeny 1997a, 211–18.

31 Among the anti-heretical problems in Eusebius of Emesa’s In Oct, Romeny (1997a, 18) mentions polemic against the views that God was not omniscient, or that God should repent, but these problems are not applied to the Paradise narrative, cf. above pp. 337–38.
Pointing in the same direction is a further passage in which Eusebius allows that although it was the Devil who spoke through the mouth of the serpent, the Devil did not have the power to transform the serpent’s nature and give it the power of speech. This was reserved for God, who both allowed the Devil to tempt the first human couple and opened the serpent’s mouth so that the Devil could use it. The reason was that God is “He who through the free choice procures garlands for the champions” (ὁ διὰ τοῦ αὐτεξοσύνου στεφάνους παρασκευάζων τοῖς ἀθληταῖς), i.e. God will test Adam and Eve and give them the opportunity to gain honour for themselves through virtuously resisting the temptation. The same was indeed later the case when God allowed the Devil to test Job. However, God anticipated that Adam would desire to become God, and He therefore threatened him with death and blamed him afterwards. The passage seems to show that Eusebius believes it to be a real possibility that Adam and Eve could have resisted the temptation, and there is nothing to suggest that he follows Titus in believing that genuine disobedience experiences were necessary for man’s moral progress.

Finally this interpretation appears to be confirmed by a passage in Eusebius of Emesa that is concerned with both Gen. 3.5 and 3.22. Here Eusebius explains that the word of God concerning man, who “has become like one of us”, actually means that man did not become so; the remark is ironical. In this context it is of less significance that at this juncture Eusebius chooses a solution that is


33 That Eusebius did not believe that disobedience experiences were necessary for man’s moral progress also appears from a passage on Gen. 3.5 in the Armenian version of In Oct. Hovhannessian 1980, 29–30, where in Van Rompay and Weitenberg’s translation we read: “Mais Dieu avait préparé pour eux par le commandement la connaissance du bien et du mal: la possession de la connaissance du mal, mais l’exécution de la pratique du bien. C’est cela que je (veux) dire: par la promulgation du commandement (Dieu) enseigna qu’il était mauvais de désobéir et que l’obéissance était bonne. Il prescrivit et proposa de goûter la pratique (du bien) en même temps que la connaissance du bien et de connaître seulement la pratique du mal, et de bénéficier sous deux aspects, de la pratique du bien—je veux dire l’obéissance—et de s’abstenir de ce qui y est opposé.” According to God’s plans there was apparently sufficient knowledge of the evil in the actual commandment, so that only the good needed to be realised in practice. The evil was not to be enjoyed or realised.

34 Cf. also Romeny 1997a, 209.
different from the one we met in Titus (namely that the reference is to man’s fundamental nature). What is important is that on this occasion man acquired his mortal nature, even though it had for him become possible to become immortal provided that he continued to keep God’s commandment: but man fell from immortality.

Everything thus favours the assumption that Eusebius of Emesa did not regard Adam and Eve’s disobedience as either beneficial or necessary; that is why it involved a change of their nature from immortality to mortality. The idea of such a change means beyond doubt that Eusebius also considered death to be a punishment. But this of course does not exclude the possibility that Eusebius may have interpreted the punishment of death to mean that it also acquired an aspect of benefit, and indeed this is precisely the case. Though I have not found any statement to suggest that Eusebius saw death as purifying, it is clear enough from the above quoted fragment no. 450 to Gen. 3.22 that he believed that Adam received death in order for him not to sin for all eternity, or more precisely, to continue to trust the Devil and believe God to be jealous; perhaps it is precisely this that Eusebius regards as God’s φιλανθρωπία. Yet another fragment appears to contain the idea that man should not sin for ever, even though Eusebius here stays fairly close to, and paraphrases, the text of the Bible.

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35 Cf. above pp. 323–24—What is in focus in Eusebius of Emesa’s interpretation is the dangerous claim that man should have become like God. Titus focuses instead on another dangerous problem, namely that apparently man was created without ethical knowledge.

36 Eusebius of Emesa, In Oct. on Gen. 3.5 (Fr. VIII in Romeny 1997a, 206–10), which in the Armenian version appears in Hovhannessian 1960, 32,513–33,548, though small fragments of the original text are also to be found in among others Petìt 1991, 288–89 no. 449, lines 15–16 and Petit 1991, 290–91 no. 452, lines 1–2 (Romeny 1997a, 206–8). Cf. concerning Fr. VIII also Romeny 1997a, 74, 80, 81; Lehmann 1986, 224–25.—That the disobedience in the Garden of Paradise resulted according to Eusebius of Emesa in a truly catastrophic Fall also clearly appears from many passages in In Oct. which are preserved in the Armenian version, e.g. Hovhannessian 1980, 30.

37 Cf. Eusebius of Emesa, In Oct. on Gen. 3.24 (Petit 1991, 299–300 no. 466): Neighbourship to Paradise was granted Adam (Gen. 3.24) by way of punishment, in order that when he saw Paradise, the flaming sword and the cherub, he could remember his banishment and strengthen his sons.

In spite of all this, however, it is probable that Eusebius of Emesa believed that man himself of his own accord should overcome the consequences of the catastrophe, i.e. himself come to act righteously and thus regain immortality as an assured reward after death. Of particular power therefore is a passage to which Romeny refers, in which Eusebius of Emesa rejects the argument that the righteous can inherit the curse of their fathers; sin and justice are individual qualities.\textsuperscript{39} To some extent this position, which sits somewhat uneasily with the understanding of the first disobedience as a catastrophic Fall, corresponds better to what we have found in Titus of Bostra.

4. \textit{Comparison with Diodore of Tarsus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative}

I have discussed above how Eusebius of Emesa’s pupil, Diodore of Tarsus, in a lengthy work directed an attack on the Manichaean Adda’s book, \textit{The Bushel}, and that the last 18 books of Diodore’s work dealt with the interpretation of the Bible. It would therefore be reasonable to expect to find an attack on Adda in the fragments of Diodore’s \textit{Commentarius in Octateuchum}, but this expectation may be premature. We have no firm evidence whatsoever on which to date Diodore’s anti-Manichaean work, and it could in fact be decades after \textit{Commentarius in Octateuchum}. Diodore may therefore have had no inkling of Adda’s book, when he wrote \textit{Commentarius in Octateuchum}.

On the one hand a fragment of Diodore’s \textit{Commentarius in Octateuchum} shows that his doctrine of the image of God continues Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Emesa’s apparent concentration on man’s ruling function, but on the other hand it also appears that Diodore is moving in new directions; the image of God is not so much located within the soul as such, but is more to be found in man’s position as ruler, τὸ ἀρχικὸν . . . τὸ ἐξουσιαστικὸν, together with the idea that the image of God is reserved for the male sex.\textsuperscript{40} Thus Diodore’s doctrine of the image of God in man does not immediately appear

\textsuperscript{39} Eusebius of Emesa, \textit{In Oct.} on Gen. 15.8 (Petit 1995, 48–49 [no. 952] and 50–51 [no. 954]; Hovhannessian 58,260–59,303; Procopius of Gaza, \textit{In Gen.}, PG 87,1, 337D5–340B11); Romeny 1997a, 17–18 with n. 54, which also refers to other passages that point in this direction.

to imply an innate law; but if we turn to the fragments of his commentary on Rom., Diodore at the least states, with reference to Rom. 2.14, that man has within himself the faculty to discriminate (τὸ διακριτικόν), which the law completes. The “inner” character of the law also appears in another way in a fragment from *Commentarius in Octateuchum* where Diodore claims among other things that God did not give Adam the commandment not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge with a sensuous voice, but in keeping with His particular influence imprinted (ἐντυπώ) both cognition of the law and obedience (ἀκοή) in him.

Presumably Diodore of Tarsus is building on Eusebius of Emesa when by way of introduction in a fragment commenting on Gen. 3.7 he explains that on the basis of this scriptural passage “some of the heretics” say that the serpent was a benefactor (εὐεργέτης) in getting Adam and Eve to eat of the Tree, because this led to the eyes of thought (διάνοια) being opened, and to man being imbued with knowledge of good and evil. These heretics are slandering God and praising the Devil, for they say that the serpent gave Adam and Eve a share in the things that God “begrudged them” (αὕτοίς ἐφθόνησεν). There are several similarities between this fragment and the passage in Titus’s *Contra Manichaeos* III.7, for even though the Manichaean quotation in Titus does not draw directly on the φθόνος-motif in connection with the Tree of Knowledge, but only with the Tree of Life, this line of thought is presumably to be understood, and a spiritualisation of the eyes that were opened is also without doubt what the text in Titus is speaking of (→ Ch. XI.34), even though Titus later brings a distorting interpretation. The heretics in question in Diodore could therefore well be the Manichaeans. Both Petit and Schweizer, however, refer to the Ophites, even though Schweizer is also aware that the Manichaeans are a possibility. Perhaps Diodore is quite simply referring to all the heretical groups

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42 Diodore, *In Oct. on Gen. 3.1* (Petit 1986, 107–9 [no. 106]).
43 Diodore, *In Oct. on Gen. 3.7*, Petit 1986, 113–15 no. 109 (109.1–8). However, a further decision on whether Diodore’s *In Oct.* on this point really builds on Eusebius of Emesa’s *In Oct.* requires a thorough comparison with the Armenian version of the latter text.
44 See above p. 241.
45 Schweizer 1942, 51 n. 109 believes that αἰρέτουκοι here must mean the Ophites; he refers to Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I.30,7, but remarks with reference to the myth in
that were presenting “protest-exegetical” interpretations, including the Ophites and the Manichaeans.

However, Diodore rejects the heretics’ interpretation with the justification that it was not good that the eyes were opened, for it gave Adam and Eve the knowledge that they were naked and led to them being ashamed of what they had done. The disobedience changed the nature of the first human couple, so that they became mortal, as God had threatened, but together with their nature other things were also changed that were to do with their way of thinking. Before Adam and Eve became disobedient, although they had bodies they did not sense that they were naked, since immortal beings have no need of clothing. Correspondingly the resurrected beings in the Kingdom of God will have no desire for marriage, food, heat and cold, clothing and nakedness etc., all of which belong to the mortal body. With the change in their nature, however, Adam and Eve plunged into mortality.46

This fragment shows first and foremost how Diodore’s ideas on the primeval state and the Fall continue those of Eusebius of Emesa; like him there is no positive content in the disobedience and opening of man’s eyes, and it is here that the distance to Titus clearly reveals itself. Finally it may be mentioned that as in Eusebius of Emesa God’s immutability and impassibility are an important doctrine in Diodore, who stresses that God has no passions—for instance He neither repents in a real sense47 nor is He ignorant,48—but who does not in the preserved fragments connect this problem to the Paradise narrative.

As long as one bases the interpretation on the fragments of Diodore’s work to which I have hitherto referred, Gross seems right in point-

Theodore bar Kōnai (see above pp. 237–38) that perhaps the reference is to “die manichäische Weiterbildung”. Petit 1986, 115 (no. 109), note (a) suggests that the sect is the one mentioned in Procopius of Gaza’s In Gen., PG 87,1, 184A10–12: εις ου και η των Ωμενων συνεστηκεν αιρεσις, θεοποιουντων τον φυσιν, ὡς εν αγχαθον τι προζενεν ημιν εθηλησαντα—Kamesar (1993, 160) also favours the Ophites.

46 Diodore, In Oct. on Gen. 3.7, Petit 1986, 113–15 no. 109.—In In Oct. on Gen. 3.21 (Petit 1986, 120–21 no. 118; cf. Romeny 1997a, 212–13) Diodore rejects the idea that the “coats of skin” should mean the flesh; he believes instead that they were created by God after Adam had received his mortal nature.


ing out that Diodore argued for an original immortal nature which through the disobedience was changed into a mortal one, and that herein lies the crucial difference between Diodore and his pupil Theodore.\textsuperscript{49} The problem may change tack, however, if a fragment that Gross refers to Theodore in fact turns out to come from Diodore.

5. \textit{Problems concerning Coisliniana, fragment no. 115}

Of particular importance but also problematic is the fragment Coisliniana no. 115 (Petit’s numbering) (\textit{Csl.} 115) on the following point; the tradition refers it both to Diodore and to Theodore, but in several works, including Gross’s, it has acquired without detailed discussion great importance for an understanding of Theodore’s theology. The interpretation of either Diodore’s or Theodore’s views is dramatically changed when the fragment is attributed to one or the other. By way of introduction I append a translation of the long fragment:

Because I have heard some ask the question, “If God knew beforehand that Adam would disobey, why did He then give him an occasion to be disobedient by presenting him with the commandment?”, I will answer that it was because God definitely knew that mortality would be profitable for men—for if they remained immortal, they would sin for all eternity—and moreover it would profit them in that when the body is dissolved in death, the body of sin is also dissolved together with it. However, God did not immediately give them this advantage, lest He be accused of not having given man immortality from the beginning. But first He gave them the commandment, which He knew they would not keep, in order to show that even though He offered them immortality by being obedient and threatened them with death for disobedience, they would distrust their Creator and benefactor to such a degree that they would not only hope to acquire immortality if they were disobedient, but would actually hope to receive the worthiness of the divinity. If their flesh had received immortality, how much the more should they not have believed that they would become gods through disobedience? For since the threat of death was not enough to make them keep the commandment, the secure possession of immortality would definitely have led to overboldness and perseverance in sinning, since the certainty of immortality would have

\textsuperscript{49} Compare the Diodore interpretation in Gross 1960, 179–81 with the Theodore interpretation in Gross 1960, 190–205.
encouraged them. First therefore God showed, by giving Adam the commandment and through his disobedience, that mortality is advantageous, and then He gave it to him, thus at one and the same time teaching men and not withholding the things that were to their advantage. For the very forming of man into the male and the female, which indeed shows that the procreation of children was potentially present from the very beginning (cf. Gen. 1.26–27), makes it clear that God had prepared man for mortal life. Thus the creation of man made ready for a mortal life, but the commandment which God granted trained beforehand man’s freedom of choice and gave his power of judgement an opportunity for self-chosen struggles and showed the advantage of mortality.50

The tradition is divided here, because some manuscripts assign this fragment to Diodore and others to Theodore; in Migne, PG 66 it is published under Theodore’s name, while Deconinck published it among the doubtful Diodore fragments, and thus the superscription is “Διοδόρου (?)” in Petit’s edition; she indicates which manuscripts support each of the two readings, and she adds “La tradition manuscrite hésite entre Διοδόρου et Θεοδόρου. L’accord des traditions C et Mo soutient l’attribution à Diodore, mais l’argument n’est pas décisif.”51

50 Επειδὴ τινων άκήκοα πυθαγομένων: εἰ προῆδε ὁ θεὸς ὅτι παρακούσει ὁ Ἀδάμ, τίνος ἔνεκεν τῇ δοσεὶ τῆς ἐντολῆς παρέσχε τῇ παρακοή πρόφασιν; τοσοῦτον ἐρώ, ὅτι μᾶλλα εἰδὼς ὁ θεὸς συμφέροσαν ἀνθρώποις τὴν θνητότητα—μένοντες γὰρ θάνατοι πεταίοντον  θάνατον,—καὶ ὅτι λυπηλεί τοῖς τοιούτοις, θανάτῳ λυμένου τοῦ σώματος, συγκαταλυθθεῖν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἔδωκε τὸ συμφέρον, ἵνα μὴ βλασφημήσῃ ὡς μὴ δεδωκὼς εἰς ἄρχος τὴν αθανασίαν—ἀλλὰ πρῶτον δίδωσι τὴν ἐντολήν, ἵνα οὐκ ἀνεξομένους ὑδεί, ἵνα δεῖξῃ ὅτι καὶ προεισενέκτος αὐτὸς ἀθανασίας ἄπο τῆς ὕπακος, καὶ θανάτῳ ἀπειλομένου διὰ τὴν παρακοήν, τοσοῦτον ἠπιστήσαν τῷ ποιήτῃ καὶ εὐφρενί, ὡς ἐπίσης εἰ παρακοόσαν, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἔσειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τῆς θεότητος ἀξίωμα προσλήφθηκεν. Εἰ καὶ ἡ σάρξ αὐτοῦ εἰλίθεσε τὴν ἀθανασίαν, πῶς οὐ μᾶλλον ἀν ἐπιείθησαν εἶναι θεοὶ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς; Ὑς γὰρ οὐκ ἠρκέσεν ἀπειλή θανά- του εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς ἐντολῆς, τὸ τῆς ἁθανασίας βέβαιον πάντως ἄν ἄδεης εἰς τὸ πατείν ἦν καὶ διηνέκες, τῷ τῆς ἁθανασίας ἀσφαλεῖ εὐπαρθηκόσαν. Πρῶτον οὐν δείκνυσι τῇ δοσεὶ τῆς ἐντολῆς καὶ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀδάμ, ὅτι συμφέρει ἡ θνητότης, καὶ τότε ταύτην δίδασκαν, ομοίως καὶ πειθὼν ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων οὐκ αφυστά- μενος. Ὁτι γὰρ τὸν θνητῷ βίῳ τὸν ἀνθρώπου πνεύματεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ ἀρρένου καὶ τοῦ ἡθὲς εὐνοικίας, ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τῆς παιδείας εὐθύς καὶ ἐκ πρότερος ἐπιδείκνυμεν. Ὦμος ἡ μὲν πλατύς ἦτοιμασθή τῷ θνητῷ βίῳ· ἡ δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς δόσις, καὶ τὸ αὐτεχώρου προεγόμεσαι, καὶ ἔδωκε τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν αὐθαρίστων ἀγάνων τὴν πρόφασιν, καὶ τὸ τῆς θνητότητος συμφέρον ἐδειξεν., on Gen. 2.16–17 and 3.1–7: Petit 1986, 118–19 (no. 115); also published in PG 66, 640C–641A and Deconinck 1912, 159–60 (Fr. 79).

51 Petit 1986, 118, 119.—Perhaps also relevant in this context is the argument of Schweizer (1942, 38) in connection with the catenae with Paul, which are attributed
Earlier the fragment was without further discussion part of the basis for descriptions of Theodore’s theology. Without assigning it to Diodore, however, Devreesse in his book on Theodore tried in a somewhat unclear manner to weaken its authenticity by merely writing: “Mais une objection se présente: Si Dieu savait qu’Adam violerait sa défense, pourquoi lui a-t-il donné l’occasion de pécher? La réponse de Théodore nous manque”. Devreesse’s laconic remarks are peculiar, because the fragment actually contains a comprehensive answer and they should be interpreted to mean that he did not think the answer was authentic, presumably because he compared it with the view of Adam’s primeval state which he believed he could conclude from some passages in Theodore’s commentary to the Pauline epistles: “créé immortel, Adam est devenu mortel par suite de son péché.” On the other hand, in a later work Devreesse was inclined to believe the entire fragment to be a genuine Diodore fragment, but without referring to or clarifying his earlier remarks. With regard to method it must also be said to be arbitrary to acknowledge that the question is genuine but not the answer: either Csl. 115 comes in its entirety from Theodore, or the fragment in its entirety must be rejected.

However, Devreesse’s remarks on Theodore’s view of Adam’s primeval state met with a vehement protest from Gross, who in connection with Csl. 115 claimed that the “answer” was also without doubt genuine, since it contains by and large the same views as in Theodore’s Commentarius in Epistulam ad Galatas. Here Gross referred to certain passages where the views are undeniably cognate to the

to both Theodore and Diodore: “Da Diodors Schriften leichter seinem berühmten Schüler unterschoben werden konnten als umgekehrt, ist sein Name außerdem lec-tio difficiilior.”

52 E.g. Jugie 1933, 353–56.
53 Devreesse 1948, 22; in n. 2 Devreesse adds: “Les chaînes ne donnent que la question: Nicéphore, 98 [P. G., 640 C-641 A]; Barb., ff. 70”–71, sous le nom de Diodore.” Devreesse would also locate various other Theodore-fragments in this context, see below pp. 385–86.
54 Devreesse 1948, 98.
55 Devreesse 1959, 156. In his earlier work Devreesse (1936, 218) also stated: “je pencherais très volontiers vers une restitution à Diodore.” However, elsewhere in the same work (1936, 380) he locates no. 115 under Theodore without saying anything like “the answer is missing”, which he later stated was the case in his book on Theodore (Devreesse 1948).—Also Schweizer (1942, 38 n. 8 [cont. from 37]) regarded it as probable that Csl. 115 was a genuine Diodore-fragment, and he used it to illuminate Diodore’s theology (e.g. Schweizer 1942, 58 n. 216).
present fragment in that they claim that from the beginning God created us mortal out of regard for this existence.\(^{56}\) Apparently, though, Gross was unaware of the possibility that Csl. 115 could be the work of Diodore, and that the similarities between it and the passages in Theodore that he himself adduced could also be explained by Theodore building on tendencies in his teacher. In continuation of Gross, Norris also regarded Csl. 115 as a genuine Theodore fragment and gave it considerable space in his interpretation of Theodore’s theology,\(^{57}\) as did Dewart\(^{58}\) and Scheffczyk.\(^{59}\)

An examination of the problem must pursue the following path: first one must point out the formal and stylistic features that could assign Csl. 115 to Theodore and Diodore respectively. Since I then take for granted that theologically speaking Csl. 115 could come from Theodore, the question arises as to whether it would be theologically impossible for it to come from Diodore.

In favour of Theodore’s authorship is the similarity with the fragments of Theodore’s *Commentarius in Genesim* which are preserved in Pope Vigilius’s *Constitutum de tribus capitulis* and in the acts of the *Concilium Universale Constantinopolitanum sub Iustiniano habitum*, the fifth ecumenical synod in Constantinople in 553 CE.\(^{60}\) Devreesse also

\(^{56}\) Gross 1960, 192–93; however, the difference, which Gross did not stress, is precisely that Csl. 115 actually claims that Adam was originally created immortal, even though immortality was not a secure possession. But also Theodore, as we shall see, is ambiguous on this point, and Gross proved beyond doubt that no theological grounds exist for rejecting the possibility that Csl. 115 could stem from Theodore.

\(^{57}\) Norris 1963, 182–84.—Koch (1965, 70) creates confusion by claiming that Csl. 115 comes from the acts of the fifth ecumenical synod in Constantinople in 553.

\(^{58}\) Dewart 1971, 38–39.

\(^{59}\) Scheffczyk 1982, 172.

\(^{60}\) Vigilius, *Constitutum*, ep. 83: Ch. LVIII, Guenther 1895, 283–84 (191–92); Ch. LIX, Guenther 1895, 284 (195); Ch. LX, Guenther 1895, 285 (197–98). *Concil. Univ. Const.*, Actio quarta in Straub 1970, 64–66; the passages in question are LVII.66–LXII.71, where LVII.66–LVIII.67 and LX.69 directly state that the quotations are taken from the book *De creatura*, and where the other fragments are placed in such a context that it is clear that they come from the same text. The passages LVIII.68; LX.69 and LXII.71 also appear only in the acts of the synod.—Devreesse (1930, 366–67) also assumed that the last part of LXII.71 had been forged by Theodore’s opponents, but later on he apparently gave up this assumption (Devreesse 1948, 23 n. 4 [cont. on p. 24]), and after the publication of new Syriac fragments of Theodore’s *In Gen.*, which among others contain the same text as the whole of LXII.71 (Tonneau 1953, 63), the authenticity of the passage is raised beyond all doubt (see further Sullivan 1956, 102–3). In my opinion this fact increases the probability that all quotations of acts of the synod from Theodore’s
assumed that the first five fragments of the acts of the synod had had their place in Theodore’s *Commentarius in Genesim* shortly after *Csl.* 115, or rather the “preserved” question in *Csl.* 115.\(^{61}\) From a theological point of view these fragments could agree with *Csl.* 115, but there are also interesting similarities in language and argument between *Csl.* 115 and the first of the fragments in the acts of the synod, which I therefore quote:

> It was therefore not involuntarily and without premeditation that God instituted death for men, nor was it in vain that He gave them access to sin,—for if He had not wished to, He would not have needed to do so. But because God knew that it was of benefit to us and even more so for all rational creatures [i.e. angels and suchlike] that He first allowed an access to evil and wicked things, but then destroyed them and introduced something better, He has divided the Creation into two states, a present and a future. In the (future) state He will lead all to immortality and immutability, but for the time being in the present Creation He sends us away to death and mutability. For if from the very beginning He had made us immortal and immutable, we would not have been different from the irrational creatures [i.e. the animals], in that we would have been ignorant of our own particular benefit. For since we did not know mutability, we did not know the benefit of immutability; since we were ignorant of death, we were ignorant of the advantage of being immortal; since we did not know corruptibility, we did not praise incorruptibility; since we were ignorant of the trouble with the passions, we did not admire impassibility. In brief, for I will not make a long speech: since we were ignorant of any experience of evil things, we could not acquire knowledge of the aforementioned good things.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{61}\) Devreesse 1948, 22 n. 2; Devreesse 1948, 22 with n. 3 would also place another fragment which is now edited as no. 418 in Petit 1991, 273 in this context. Cf. Devreesse 1936, 380.

\(^{62}\) “Nec igitur mortem non sponte et praeter iudicium suum intulit hominibus neque peccato aditum ad nullam utilitatem dedit, ( nec enim hoc fieri nolens non poterat), sed quoniam sciebat utile esse nobis, magis autem omnibus rationabilibus, prius quidem malorum et deterioriorum fieri aditum, postea autem deleri quidem haec, introduci autem meliora, ideo in duos status diuisit deus creaturam, praesentem et futurum, in illo quidem ad immutabilitatem et immutabilitatem omnia ducturus, in praesenti uero creatura in mortem et mutabilitatem interim nos dimittens. nam si quidem statim ab initio inmortales nos fecerit et inmutabiles, nullam differentiam ad inrationabilia habebamus, proprium nescientes bonum; ignorantes enim mutabilitatem inmutabilitatis ignorabamus bonum, nescientes mortem inmortalitatis lucrum
The introductory “igitur”, “therefore” (Straub 1970, 64.25), could refer to a preceding account, and this could very well be Csl. 115, which can indeed be said to claim that God did not institute death involuntarily and without premeditation. The two fragments also share a number of phrases: παρέσχε τῇ παρακοή πρόφασιν (Petit 1986, 118, no. 115.4) is reminiscent of “peccato aditum... dedit” (Straub 1970, 64.26); συμφέρουσαν, συμφέρει, τῶν συμφερόντων, συμφέρον (Petit 1986, 118–119, no. 115.5.22.24.31) recalls “utilitatem” (Straub 1970, 64.26) (there is also a similarity between Csl. 115 and another fragment of Theodore’s *Commentarius in Genesim*, where Csl. 115 says that God offered immortality through obedience and threatened man with death because of disobedience, and the fragment on Gen. 3.5, which has God making use of ἐπαγγελία καὶ φόβος,63 though here the similarity is very general).

But there is no absolute compulsion in these arguments, and in my opinion equally good stylistic arguments could be put forward for Csl. 115 being by Diodore. In favour of this is the formulation of a question or problem followed by an answer, a similar structure to most of the other fragments of Diodore’s *Commentarius in Octateuchum*, which appear to belong to the *quaestiones*-genre.64 But one could then ask, is Csl. 115 not in direct conflict with Diodore’s theology as we know it from the other fragments of *Commentarius in Octateuchum*?

There is in fact the difference between Csl. 115 and the first fragment of Theodore’s *Commentarius in Genesim* preserved in the acts of the synod that Csl. 115 believes precisely in Adam’s immortal primeval state. Adam was immortal, but immortality was something that could

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64 Schäublin 1974, 49–65; cf. Schweizer 1942, 51ff.; Viciano 1996, 378; cf. above p. 254, however, Theodore also uses such a form of presentation, e.g. in *In Rom.*; cf. Wickert 1962, 84–85. The question-answer form is not a compelling argument. The argument that Theodore should have composed commentaries, which in their entirety belonged to the *quaestiones*-genre, must nevertheless be considered unlikely, despite evidence in Syriac literature that points in this direction, cf. Clarke 1962, 10.—The expression τῶν περὶ τῶν Ἄδων (Petit 1986, 119, no. 115.22) is not decisive, since both Diodore (e.g. Petit 1986, 108, no. 106.12) and Theodore (e.g. Petit 1991, 220, no. 322.4–5) can speak of οἱ περὶ τῶν Ἄδων.
be lost; by contrast the first fragment seems to assume that God did not make men immortal from the beginning. The difference is not necessarily real, though, for perhaps the immortality that could be lost can from another angle be described as mortality. Moreover, as we shall touch on below, it is well-known that Theodore’s authorship on this point contains particularly frictional formulations.

It is indisputable, however, that precisely because Csl. 115 claims original immortality for Adam the fragment at least does not clash with Diodore’s view that Adam and Eve were immortal before they became mortal, as we find in the Commentarius in Octateuchum-fragment on Gen. 3.7, though a difficulty remains that this fragment rejects the idea that mortality and the perception of nakedness were beneficial consequences of the disobedience, while Csl. 115 regards mortality as “an advantage” that God has imposed on man. The disparity could be solved to some extent if we assumed that it is not in the same sense that the Commentarius in Octateuchum-fragment on Gen. 3.7 and Csl. 115 regard mortality as being to man’s harm or man’s benefit respectively. It could make sense that mortality belongs with the disobedience and as such is not good, for neither the Commentarius in Octateuchum-fragment on Gen. 3.7 nor Csl. 115 treat man’s disobedience as anything good. Since, however, the disobedience is inevitable, mortality is also beneficial in that it puts a stop to this disobedience.

I have been unable to find arguments sufficiently powerful to be called decisive that Csl. 115 should come from the hand of either Diodore or Theodore. Everything speaks for it probably coming from one or the other of them, and as such it remains an important testimony to the interpretation of the Paradise narrative within the Antiochene School; for this reason it is worth subjecting it to closer analysis and a comparison with Titus.

Fundamentally Csl. 115 differs from Titus’s position in not regarding the disobedience as a useful and necessary growth in knowledge, and in this it belongs to the earlier tradition in, for example, Origen.65 Nor does Csl. 115 seek to trivialise the act of disobedience in the Garden of Paradise; on the contrary, the fragment blames man’s disobedience in strong terms: man did not trust his benefactor’s words, but wanted himself to be God!

Csl. 115 begins by raising the good question as to why God gave Adam occasion to sin if He had foreknowledge of his disobedience. This question, which is assigned to an undefined group in the plural, is a new variant on the type of question that we have already seen posited by Marcionites and Manichaeans, and which had its roots in the earlier questions of the Epicureans and the Sceptics. Csl. 115 takes it for granted that God had this foreknowledge, and the fragment’s explanation as to why God nevertheless gave Adam occasion to sin is in the first place that mortality would be profitable to man. For if men had remained immortal, they would have sinned as immortal; in this Csl. 115 is merely continuing the tradition from Philo and Theophilus. Csl. 115 further claims that mortality is profitable to man, for when the body is dissolved at death, the body of sin is dissolved with it, an argument that we have already met in Theophilus, Irenaeus and Methodius. It is also sufficiently clear that Csl. 115 alludes to Rom. 6.6, where the body of sin is destroyed through baptism to Christ’s death, but that Csl. 115 does not directly refer to death in baptism, but to death as such. However, Csl. 115’s observation may perhaps be understood in a wider context, so that death, which is instituted in the Garden of Paradise, receives its real meaning by being linked together with Christ’s death and Christian baptism.

So far Csl. 115 has argued, rather traditionally, for mortality being a benefit (though the fragment does not use this term). The reason why God did not give men mortality from the beginning was in order to avoid the accusation of not making man immortal from the beginning, which in reality is the accusation of φθόνος. At first

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68 See above pp. 355–57.
69 In Diodore’s interpretation in In Rom. 6.1–4, Staab 1933, 85.11–17 “death” in Rom. 6.1ff. only refers to baptism’s sacramental death to sin and the world (cf. Schelkle 1959, 197–98, 201), but probably Diodore could also understand physical death in the light of baptism (especially with a freer application of the passage in a new context)? Interestingly, in Theodore we find the same remelting image as in Theophilus and Methodius (see above pp. 355–57), but there linked to baptism, and at the same time in such a way that baptism and the resurrection on the last day are associated: Theodore, Hom. cat. XIV.13, Tonneau 1949, 428–29. This could of course be an argument in favour of Csl. 115 being by Theodore, but again it is just as possible that Theodore is here continuing an idea from Diodore.
70 A little later (Petit 1986, 118 no. 115.14), however Csl. 115 calls God ῥυγάτης.
71 Like earlier writers such as Origen (see above pp. 337, 360–61) Csl. 115 claims
this line of argument does not answer the question asked, but *Csl.* 115 makes it clear that God did not merely wish to demonstrate His goodness by first creating man immortal; He was in general pursuing an educative purpose throughout the entire scene in the Garden of Paradise. The commandment, the occasion for the sin, was given precisely to demonstrate that man would become a sinner and thus to prove that mortality was not only beneficial but even had, prior to the disobedience and banishment from the garden, the educative value of training man’s freedom of choice (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) and giving his judgement (γνώμη) occasion for self-chosen contests. In these considerations *Csl.* 115 comes undeniably close to Titus. For although the fragment argues for an insecure immortality in Paradise and an offer that this immortality could become certain, and although it claims that the disobedience was evil, the primeval state nonetheless loses its meaning of being a state that in reality could have continued everlasting immortality: the purpose of the primeval state becomes a preliminary training in ethical obedience, and man is from the beginning destined for mortality.

The closeness of Titus and *Csl.* 115 becomes even clearer when we concentrate on the relationship between foreknowledge and mortality. Without a doubt *Csl.* 115 seeks to maintain that God was not responsible for the actual disobedience and that the punishment of death was therefore effected; for the text stresses that God left the choice to man, and that He had presented him with various consequences of the available choices. God anticipated that man himself would choose to fall, but He had not predestined him to fall. Implicitly this is the same view that we found in Origen and in Diodore’s pupil John Chrysostom: it is not God’s foreknowledge that is the cause of Adam’s Fall, but the Fall that is the cause of God’s foreknowledge. However, in the light of His foreknowledge God

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72 See above pp. 338–39.
could predetermine man to the mortal state that would be the consequence of his freely choosing disobedience. Correspondingly, in line with the tradition from Origen and general assumptions in contemporary Greek culture Diodore claims in his Commentarius in Epistulam ad Romanos that God’s foreknowledge already knows the future virtue and sin but does not revoke man’s freedom of choice and that God’s blessings and curses are based on this foreknowledge. This structure, consisting of foreknowledge of disobedience and predestination to death, corresponds exactly to the structure in Titus, and in addition both Titus and Csl. 115 employ the same argument: just as Titus believes that God’s promises in Gen. 1 must have aimed at a broader humanity, but there was first a need for procreation of children in the light of death, so Csl. 115 claims that already beforehand God had created man in two sexes, because generation was to succeed generation.

In summary we can say that in contrast to Titus Csl. 115 places greater emphasis on the immortal character of the primeval state, censures the disobedience and perhaps makes a reference to baptism. On the other hand Csl. 115 and Titus are agreed that despite His foreknowledge God cannot be held responsible for man’s disobedience, while simultaneously claiming either that the disobedience happened of necessity (Titus), or that God gave occasion for sin, which He knew would occur (Csl. 115). Both texts argue that from the very beginning the whole of man’s destiny has been an ethical battle for virtue with death as its ending. It is hardly wrong to say that Titus has managed to a far greater extent to cultivate this interpretation, one which fundamentally Csl. 115 also shares.

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73 This is the case in both Diodore’s commentaries In Oct. and In Rom. e.g. In Oct. on Gen. 9.24–25 in Petit 1986, 161–62 no. 164.1–13. Particularly clear is In Rom. 8.29–30, Staab 1933, 95.11–19, where completely in line with Origen (see above p. 339) Diodore emphasises that προγνώσκειν is before προορίζειν, and that God’s πρόγνωσις is not ἁναγκαστικὴ and does not invalidate τὸ αὐτεξόστος; cf. Schweizer 1942, 57–58; Schelkle 1959, 310, cf. 337–38.—Thus Diodore has not attempted to solve, and barely even reflects on, the old problem of whether man nevertheless has a free choice if God has infallible foreknowledge.—Diodore’s views on this are also continued by Theodore (see below pp. 402–3), so we cannot be helped here to decide the provenience of Csl. 115.

74 See above pp. 38, 326–27.
6. Comparison with Theodore of Mopsuestia’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative in his commentary on Genesis, illustrated by other Theodore fragments

The most important writer that should be compared with Titus is Diodore of Tarsus’s pupil, Theodore of Mopsuestia, who was undoubtedly the greatest of all the theologians of “the Antiochene School”. The problem with such a comparison, however, is the same that applied in Diodore’s case: our knowledge of Theodore’s understanding of the Paradise narrative is fragmentary because it builds on fragments! The two most important groups of fragments in this area come from respectively Theodore’s Commentarius in Genesim and from his work against the adherents of the doctrine of original sin, and it would surely be methodically incorrect to treat them under the same umbrella. As mentioned, it is possible that decades have passed between the two writings.

Both Gross and Scheffczyk claimed as stated that Theodore’s teaching on the two Ages, more precisely his view of “Adam’s primeval state”, was influenced by Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. Already for this reason a comparison is of interest, but here we are moving into a minefield, for there has been wide dispute as to what Theodore actually believed as regards Adam’s primeval state. Basically there have been two points of view in Theodore scholarship. Either it has been claimed that according to Theodore Adam and Eve were created mortal and mutable, and that the Fall of Man was a necessary consequence of mortality and indispensable for man’s growth as an ethical being.75 Or it is been claimed that the first humans were created immortal and that death was a consequence of the Fall of Man and thus not a part of God’s created order.76 In Norris there is an

75 Thus Von Harnack 1931, 151–53. Von Harnack (1931, 151) claimed that in Greek patristics only the Antiochene School, and in particular Theodore, decided on the one of Irenaeus’s two “conceptions”, which posited a developmental view of man (cf. above p. 333). Otherwise, according to Von Harnack, both conceptions continued to be held simultaneously, or the second conception, recapitulation or similar ideas was preferred.

76 Devreesse (1948, 98–103, cf. 109) claimed, for example, that Adam was created immortal, but became mortal in consequence of his sin. Theodore did not regard the state of Creation as the first Age, but rather the state of being a sinner. All fragments that suggest anything else are forgeries or spurious.
excellent survey of the scholarship in relation to this question.\textsuperscript{77} Some scholars have claimed that evidence for only one of these interpretations can be found in Theodore’s texts, but that at least is not so; it is beyond dispute that these texts contain two lines of thought that are hard to combine.\textsuperscript{78} On the one hand there are various passages in which Theodore claims that Adam was originally created immortal, so that there would not have been an existence like the present, if he had not become mortal through sin.\textsuperscript{79} It is reasonable to understand this type of passage in the context of those places where Theodore emphasises the catastrophic nature of the Fall of Man, that it was a break with man’s destiny as God’s image in the world, so that we can say that man’s present state proves to be “etwas Nichtseinsollendes”, as expressed by G. Koch.\textsuperscript{80} On the other hand we find passages which claim that Adam was created mortal by God,\textsuperscript{81} and it is to these passages that the fragments of Theodore’s Commentarius in Genesim from the fifth ecumenical synod are most closely attached; thus the comment in the first fragment seems implicitly to exclude an immortal primeval state:

For if from the very beginning He had made us immortal and immutable, we would not have been different from the irrational creatures.\textsuperscript{82}

The problem complex contains for much of the way a close analogy to the question of whether Irenaeus’s teaching on development and recapitulation can be combined, but this does not mean that the solution which is relevant in Irenaeus’s case can be applied to Theodore, where, however, there are also many different proposals.

\textsuperscript{77} Norris 1963, 239–45 (“Appendix I: Anthropology and Christology in Fifth- and Sixth-century Discussion of Theodore”) and 246–62 (“Appendix II: Anthropology and Christology in Modern Discussion of Theodore”).

\textsuperscript{78} As accepted by the majority, e.g. Norris 1963, 173ff.; Koch 1965, 60–72.

\textsuperscript{79} Pregnant examples of such passages are: \textit{In Gal.} 1.3–5, Swete 1880, 7.23–26 and 7.5–10 (cf. Norris 1963, 174; Koch 1965, 60 n. 95); \textit{In Gen.} 3.17–20 (no. 418 in Petit 1991, 273), which calls the immortality that Christ grants a $\delta\nu\nu\tau\varepsilon\rho\alpha\varphi\alpha\varepsilon\varsigma\alpha\iota\varsigma$, implying that man was originally immortal (thus Koch 1965, 65).


\textsuperscript{82} “nam si quidem statim ab initio immortales nos fecerit et inmutabiles, nullam differentiam ad irrationabilia haberemus”, \textit{Concil. Univ. Const.}, Actio quarta, No. LVII,66, Straub 1970, 64.31–65.2; cf. Koch 1965, 69.
as to how the contradictions between the two types of passages can be resolved, or at the least explained. Typical elements in these explanations are, for example, that Theodore’s contradictory views are due to his undergoing a development, or that he felt himself bound by several different traditions without being able to resolve their contradictory character, as was the case, for instance where Slomkowski pointed out that according to Theodore man was originally immortal, but death was simultaneously man’s nature: the first type of statement represents the Church tradition, the second type the philosophical tradition.³³

Slomkowski is also right in his observation that Theophilus’s teaching that man was originally neither mortal nor immortal differs from Theodore’s thinking in the second type of statement, “pour qui l’homme est positivement mortel”⁴. On this point Slomkowski differed from the later, distinctive interpretation of Theodore by Julius Gross. According to Gross, the Church fathers generally held that there were three stages in the salvation plan (the immortal and sin-free primeval state, the epoch of sin and death, and Christ’s restitution of the primeval state), and when Theodore only operates with two Ages, those of mutability and immutability, it does not necessarily mean that Adam’s original state cannot be distinguished from man’s present state.⁵⁵ For Theodore the Fall of Man was a consequence of man’s mortality, because mortality implies mutability and thus an inclination to sin; Adam and Eve were like children, who may have contained desire but did not yet allow it to make itself heard. At the Fall, desire was strengthened, and the natural death also acquired the character of punishment.⁶⁶ Theodore, however, regarded death as a punishment for Adam’s sin, as the natural fate of all people,

³³ Slomkowski 1928, 119–28. The view is cognate with Vööbus’s (1964, 116–17) explanation, which argued partly that being duty-bound to several different layers of tradition Theodore occasionally felt forced into certain compromises, and partly that this fact is particularly at work in his commentaries on Scripture, which is precisely the portion of Theodore’s work that is best preserved in the original language: “Here his hands were not free. We cannot expect him to ignore the interpretation already given by Paul. He had to seek for byways."

⁴ Slomkowski 1928, 129. Slomkowski (1928, 130–31) also accepted that there were similarities between Diodore’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative and Theodore’s, but emphasised that Theodore’s interpretation could not be reconciled with Diodore’s idea of a change in nature from immortality to mortality.

⁵ Gross 1960, 193–94.

and as a punishment for personal sins; “[e]s dürfte schwer fallen, Theodors Aussagen über den Tod miteinander in Einklang zu bringen” remarked Gross, who suggested, however, that one could remove the contradiction between the statements claiming that Adam was created both immortal and mortal, if one assumes that, with Theophilus for example, man was created neither mortal nor immortal, but was receptive to both. This means that Theodore used expressions from the tradition on Adam’s immortality without sharing the view that was generally connected with them. The determining factor is that Theodore did not regard Adam’s disobedience as a “Bruch in der Heilsgeschichte,” but “vielmehr ein Anfang, die erste Episode der gegenwärtigen Weltphase, in welcher Tod und Sünde dominieren.” Finally it must be mentioned that Gross proposed that towards the end of his life (in his work against the supporters of original sin) Theodore unequivocally renounced the traditional interpretation of death as a punishment for Adam’s sin.

The tensions in Theodore’s view of death which Gross noted were developed into one of the most important problems in Norris’ monograph on Theodore, which pointed out two tendencies in Theodore’s authorship: on the one hand Theodore claimed that the weakness of the corporeal nature is the root of moral evil, so that the moral struggle is a struggle between a rational soul and a mortal body, and here Norris believed that Theodore was building in particular on forms of thought of Platonic origin that were circulating at the time. On the other hand Theodore maintained that the root of sin is to be found in the soul’s conscious disobedience, i.e. in the will, which according to Norris is very much a biblical Christian thought inasmuch as this voluntarist view is in conflict with Platonism’s intellectualism. Norris did not believe, though, that the Paradise narrative was the logical starting-point for Theodore’s anthropology or teaching on the two Ages, but because Theodore felt under obligation

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88 Gross 1960, 197.
89 Gross 1960, 199.
91 Norris 1963, passim, e.g. 154.—The weakness and mutability of the corporeal nature are what Theodore also called “mortality”. The problem is in other words that Theodore argued both that sin was a consequence of mortality, and that mortality was a consequence of sin.
to explain his anthropology through this narrative, he was also impelled to seek a solution to the contrary strains of his thought.\footnote{Norris 1963, 173.} The doctrine of death as a punishment for Adam’s sin was of value because it maintained the conscious character of sin, but conversely it could not explain Adam’s sin; as an explanation Platonism’s doctrine of a weakness in relation to the body is better. Theodore also attempted to explain why man was ever equipped with a body, and he argued that for God the struggle with the body’s temptations had educative value.\footnote{Norris 1963, 177.} According to Norris, Theodore achieved a partial reconciliation of his conflicting views through a teaching of God’s foreknowledge of Adam’s sin, which simultaneously made it possible to regard death as God’s punishment for the anticipated sin, His instrument for the extermination of sin and His method of educating man morally.\footnote{Norris 1963, 182–89. Here Norris builds on Cdl. 115 among others.}

The present study does not aim to bring a complete interpretation of Theodore’s theology, and accordingly I do not dismiss Norris’ presentation of the problems and models of explanation. I believe, however, that they require more light and shade when Norris rejects the argument that the roots of Theodore’s anthropology and teaching on the two Ages are to be found in the Paradise narrative. It is clear, to be sure, that it is not this story as such that has been the originator of Theodore’s interpretations, but it is important to maintain that the narrative which Theodore met was already encased in interpretations that served to form fundamental aspects of his own theology. The similarities with Titus of Bostra’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative must not be ignored, for even though the explanation is probably not that Theodore builds on Titus, they mean under all circumstances that Theodore continued a tradition of interpretation in the Syrian-Palestinian region. A historical and genetic model of explanation must be one of the means to explain the tensions in Theodore’s theology.

It is now sufficiently clear that Theodore’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative was influenced by earlier Antiochene commentaries, as they are known from Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus, which in the following I will try to exemplify. However, the
rejection of the teaching on the immortal primeval state could come from the anti-Manichaean literature, as its presence not just in Theodore but also in Titus could suggest. Admittedly Theodore’s texts do not contain open attacks on dualist heretics, as was the case with Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore, even though occasionally there is a trace of a polemic that could be adopted from earlier writers, but that is not the determining point, since my theory is precisely that in Theodore the anti-Manichaean theology becomes loosened from its original context and presented without reference to Manichaeism.

The doctrine of the image of God in man that is partly known from fragments of Theodore’s Commentarius in Genesim, is more complicated than that which we find in Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus insofar as we can say anything at all about these two. Basically Theodore distinguished between εἰκών and ὀμοιόμορφος, but did not employ this distinction to the same extent as Irenaeus and other Early Church fathers. Man, according to Theodore, being comprised of an invisible, rational and immortal soul and a visible and mortal body, was the bond of union (σῶνδεσμος) of the whole of Creation, and in this very function he was God’s εἰκών, i.e. he represented God in the world. As a representative he must also possess a similarity (ὁμοιόμορφος), and Theodore found this in a number of faculties, namely the creative faculty, the rational faculty to intentionally be different places in the world, and the power and authority to pass judgement; finally Theodore saw a similarity between the internal structure of the Trinity and the relation between man’s soul, reason (λόγος) and life (ζωή). These definitions bear no particular resemblance to Titus’s doctrine of the image of God; when Norris interprets them to mean that Theodore would not describe the sanctification as a deiﬁcation or believe in a noetic contemplation of God, one can nevertheless argue that on the general level he shared with Titus an antipathy to contemplation.

95 When Theodore (In Gen.) emphasises that God’s question in Gen. 3.13 was not engendered by ignorance, but was aimed at leading to acknowledgement of sin and correction (Petit 1991, 254–55 no. 381), it resembles a hidden polemic against groups that on the basis of His question believed God to be ignorant. Cf. also In Gen. on Gen. 3.7 below p. 403.
97 Cf. Norris 1963, e.g. 131–32.
When according to Theodore, however, the Creation’s ὀμοιότης with God also included man’s authority to pass judgement, we are dealing with the same teaching that we remarked in Eusebius of Emesa and probably also Diodore of Tarsus, namely that man is created with a faculty to discriminate which is disposed to knowing good and evil. This is seen even more clearly in other passages in Theodore’s authorship. The faculty to discriminate is realised in the meeting with God’s commandment not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, which implies as in Eusebius of Emesa and Titus of Bostra that it must be the commandment which is crucial, not the Tree. In Theodore’s Commentarius in Epistulam ad Romanos on Rom. 7.8, we hear that had Adam not received a law to refrain from the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, it would not have been a sin to eat of it, as of the other trees; according to Theodore the actual content of the order was abstention. It cannot therefore come as a surprise that in Commentarius in Genesim Theodore also claims that the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil acquired its name ἐκ...συμβεβηκότος, since he rejects the possibility of ἐκ φύσεως, and that elsewhere in the same commentary he takes the opportunity to present ideas in the same direction.

Like Eusebius of Caesarea and Titus, for example, Theodore distinguishes fundamentally between the animals which are bound by natural necessity and man who is free, but his view resembles espe-

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98 This is particularly stressed in Wickert (1962, 66, 91–92); the innate faculty of discrimination is aroused by the law of God, by which Theodore means both the Law of Moses and God’s commandment to Adam; Wickert also suggests that Theodore construed the relationship between innate faculty of discrimination and the reason activated by the law on the basis of the pair of Aristotelian concepts potency and act. Cf. also Schelkle 1959, 232–33; Norris 1963, 166; Dewart 1971, 50. A particularly significant example exists in In Rom. 7.8, Staab 1933, 127.26–28: . . . ὅτι ἀναγκαίως μὲν κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον νόμῳς πολιτευόμεθα, ὦρ ἀνὴ ἐξωφυτος ἀνακινεῖται διάκρισις, παιδευομένον ὅν τε ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ τι ποιεῖν προσήκει, ὡστε καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν ἑνεργὸν εἶναι.


100 Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 2.9 (Petit 1991, 173–74 [no. 246]);—in the fragment Theodore also rejects this possibility in connection with a corruptible tree such as the Tree of Life, a view which has no parallel in Titus.

101 In In Gen. on Gen. 3.8–9 (Petit 1986, 99–100 [no. 96]) Theodore argues among other things that the Tree of Knowledge was a fig tree, and in this context he takes the opportunity to emphasise ὅτι μὴ τῇ ποιότητι τοῦ ἕωλου μηδὲ τῇ κατανόησι τῆς βρύσηος τὰ ἀμαρτήματα κρίνεται, ἀλλὰ τῇ δόσει τῆς ἐντολῆς· ἦν ἐφ’ ὅτου δήποτε παραβιάζει ὑπὲρ ἔχει τὴν μέμψιν.
cially that of Titus and Eusebius of Emesa. Titus and Theodore also agree that the unrealised knowledge of good and evil should be put into practice and trained by the commandment, which is understood as a command to abstinence.\textsuperscript{102} However, Theodore does not seem like Titus to believe that observance of the commandment brings about knowledge of God; to be sure, this idea in Titus shares a certain similarity with a remark about Adam in Theodore: “but in order that he may know from the laws that have been given him the One who has made him” (ἄλλα ἵνα ἐκ τῶν τεθέντων αὐτῷ νόμων, τὸν πεποιημένα γνώριζῃ), though this refers not to the commandment not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, but to the cultivation and custody of the garden which Adam was charged with in Gen. 2.15.\textsuperscript{103}—By only regarding man’s knowledge of good and evil as formal and unrealised both Titus and Theodore could maintain that it is not a compulsion of nature, but probably Theodore did not express this circumstance with the help of Titus’s particular distinction between καλός and ἁγαθός, which was based on a reading of Gen. 1.31,\textsuperscript{104} as it appears to be substantiated by another passage in Theodore.\textsuperscript{105}

The idea that man was only distinguished by a faculty to discriminate which was to be trained and that the training began with God’s commandment does not in itself exclude the possibility that Theodore could have claimed obedience and immortality as a real future perspective for Adam and Eve; indeed, the degree to which the same doctrines around this time could be given fine distinctions and combined in different ways should in general be clear from this presentation. As indicated, the presence in Theodore of two different and barely compatible statements on the original state of the first human couple is now a fact that should be taken ad notam. My intention is not to explain this away but partly to illuminate it and partly to demonstrate the similarity between Titus’s position and the type

\textsuperscript{102} See the analysis of Theodore in Wickert 1962, 89ff. (cf. also Norris 1963, 130) and cf. with the presentation of Titus above pp. 323.
\textsuperscript{103} Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 2.15 (Petit 1991, 181–82 [no. 261]; quote lines 1–2) (= Devreesse 1948, 17 n. 4).
\textsuperscript{104} See above pp. 302–5.
\textsuperscript{105} Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 1.29–31 (Petit 1991, 126–27 no. 176; cf. Devreesse 1948, 15 n. 3); the passage also appears in Sachau 1869, 28 (28).14–16 (29).10, translation 17–18.—Cf. Theodore’s use of the pair of concepts κακός—καλός, e.g. In Rom. 13.10, Staab 1933, 163.3.
of statement in Theodore which argues that from the beginning Adam was created for mortality.

The two types of statement must not be oversimplified with the result that we are left merely with the question of whether Adam was originally mortal or immortal? There is very little to suggest that Theodore of Mopsuestia ever believed that Adam simply was created mortal; the problem is rather whether Adam’s preliminary “immortality” was a foretaste of the eschatological salvation and a real future possibility, or was merely a preparation before the pre-destined mortality was set in motion. In Csl. 115, which is either by Diodore or Theodore, one could argue as mentioned both that Adam and Eve’s immortality lacked certainty and could be lost and that they were still not immortal.106 When Theodore occasionally says that Adam and Eve were created mortal, it is probably his opinion that they were created with a view to becoming mortal. This does not resolve the contradiction between the two series of statements, but it does make clear that the contradiction is not quite simply whether Adam was originally immortal or mortal, but whether a lasting stay in Paradise was ever a real possibility for him. In Theodore’s Commentarius in Genesim we very seldom find examples of texts which unequivocally belong to the series in which primeval immortality is a real possibility; the clearest example appears to be the fragment in which Theodore calls the immortality which Christ bestows a δευτέρα ἀθανασία,107 because it is reasonable to argue here that man’s original immortality was of the same kind, at least potentially, as the immortality of the last days. But of course this may just be a case of Theodore perpetuating a traditional terminology to which he is not seriously committed.

On the other hand a fragment on Gen. 3.5 can point in both directions; Theodore states that in the Garden of Paradise God used promise and fear as means of education; the Tree of Life is here a

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106 See above pp. 389–90.—If Csl. 115 does come from Theodore, we should note that these statements may to some degree be thought of as slipping together: on the one hand the fragment states that before sin entered, the flesh had not yet acquired any secure immortality, and on the other hand Theodore precisely associates mutability and mortality and makes them the cause of sin.—Schweizer (1942, 43) also stressed that Theodore’s “Lehre von der Sünde, die durch die Sterblichkeit bedingt ist” is missing in Diodore.

promise which implies that immortality was not yet in Adam’s pos-
session, at least not as a certain, inalienable possession:

Two things, namely promise and fear, lead us away from the wicked
and bring us to the better things. Fear drags us away from evil, but
the promise leads us to the good. As a safeguard against the com-
mandment being violated, God therefore also came with a threat of
punishment, but with the promise of the Tree of Life He urged them
to keep the commandment.\textsuperscript{108}

The promise of reward worked for Adam as a prompting to virtu-
ousness, but in the fragment Theodore does not take up a position
on whether it was ever realistic or God’s intention that Adam should
be given permission to eat of the Tree of Life.

Aside from the doubtful \textit{Csl.} 115, the fragments from \textit{Commentarius
in Genesim} in which Theodore most obviously regards death as man’s
destiny from the beginning are those which are preserved in the acts
of the fifth ecumenical synod. In the first fragment, which I quoted
above, Theodore begins by pointing out that God did not institute
death for men “involuntarily and without premeditation” (“non sponte
et praeter iudicium suum”), and, as is clear from a later fragment,
God’s actions were not determined by his foreknowledge.\textsuperscript{109}
In the same way as Titus, Theodore clearly believes that it is a necessity
to defend God’s freedom in relation to the Paradise narrative.\textsuperscript{110}
Koch is thus quite right to point out that Theodore’s teaching on
man as being mortal from the beginning is not just motivated by a
regard for man’s responsibility, but also by the wish to protect the
sovereignty and omniscience of God.\textsuperscript{111} Corresondingly, Theodore
emphasises in \textit{In Gal.} 2.15–16 that God did not, against His origi-
nal plan, create us mortal out of anger or penitence but with His
ineffable wisdom has made us mortal from the beginning in order to
exercise us in virtue.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{108} Δύο τούτα ἐξάγει τε ἡμᾶς τοῦ χείρονος καὶ προσάγει τοῖς κρείττοσιν, ἐπαγγελία
καὶ φόβος, ὁ μὲν ἀφέλκων τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ δὲ ἁγιόσα τῷ καλῷ. Τούτου γὰρ ἔνεκεν καὶ ὁ
θεός τῇ τε απειλῇ τῆς τιμωρίας ἡσαράσθαι τῆς ἐντολῆς τὴν παράβασιν, καὶ τῇ ἐπαγγελίᾳ
tου ξίλου τῆς ζωῆς ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτῆς προετρέψατο., Theodore, \textit{In Gen.} on Gen.
176–77.

quidem quod peccabunt omnino;” etc.

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. above pp. 327–28.

\textsuperscript{111} Koch 1965, 72. Similarly Wickert 1962, 89.

The exercise of virtue is the more anthropological justification for the expediency of death; the fragment of Commentarius in Genesim under treatment also emphasises to an extent the educative value of mortality and mutability, but only as a purely negative experience. The fundamental instability that we experience through evil things such as mutability, death, corruptibility and trouble with the passions, is a precondition for our being able to acquire knowledge of the good things, i.e. immutability, immortality, incorruptibility and impassibility. Here Theodore is clearly taking up the well-known philosophical theme from Plato and Chrysippus that evil is a necessity in order to know the good, or that virtue cannot exist unless vice does too, but he also decisively changes the theme by giving it an eschatological edge: we meet evil in the present age, but this completely negative experience teaches us what is that we lack. Put this way the argument has no parallel in Titus, but in return it parallels the very same idea from Commentarius in Epistulam ad Galatas, where mortality makes possible the struggle for virtue and real progress in the present age; we also find this idea in the synodal fragments, e.g. when Theodore explains that “it is necessity that all rational creatures together... endure the present mutability here so that we can be educated in the best teaching of piety and put in possession of a good will.” It is altogether well-known from Theodore’s works that man’s freedom of choice, his αὐτεξούσιον or προαιρεσία, and the παιδεία-idea of existence as God’s education and training of man in virtue were indispensable concerns for Theodore. Like Diodore therefore, Theodore also appears to subject God’s election and predestination to His foreknowledge of man’s future choices, even though it is possible that on this point too Theodore was on the way to parting company with his teacher’s position.  

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114 See above p. 312.—The same theme is also found in Concil. Univ. Const., Actio quarta, No. LXI,70, Straub 1970, 65–66.

115 Concil. Univ. Const., Actio quarta, No. LVIII,67, Straub 1970, 65: “Necesse est autem omnia simul rationabilia... hic quidem praesentem mutabilitatem pati, ut optimam erudiamur doctrinam religiositatis et ad beniuolentiam constituamur.” Here, however, the reference is to the soul’s mutability.


117 See e.g. Wickert 1962, 89–101 (94–95 on death’s positive significance for the training of virtue); Norris 1963, 160–72, 175, 177.

It is now not surprising that like Titus in *Contra Manichaeos* III.24–25 Theodore finds a useful purpose in the eyes being opened in Gen. 3.7. This is demonstrated by a number of fragments of which the introduction to a *Csl.*-fragment is of particular interest: ‘Ἀνόητας τινές ἔφασαν πεπληρώσθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ διαβόλου πρὸς τὴν γυναίκα ὑπέθεν, “Some have foolishly said that what was spoken by the Devil to the woman has been fulfilled”, because the Devil’s word in Gen. 3.5 is confirmed in Gen. 3.7.119 The reference is clearly to the heretics that Diodore was refuting; he has merely put in “the Devil”, where the heretics would have said “the serpent”. However, Theodore rejects the argument that Gen. 3.5 and 7 express the same idea. In Gen. 3.7 the subject is the knowledge of nakedness, not Divine knowledge which the Devil had promised in Gen. 3.5. Because Adam and Eve had never sinned, they did not know shame, and here Theodore compares them with young children who in the bath realise that they are naked but in their innocence are not ashamed of it. After they had sinned, however, God imbued them with shame to protect them from sin, and it was necessary for shame to be linked first to the sexual organs in order to protect man from inadmissible sexual

Theodore can, for example, also be based on an interpretation of Rom. 8.29, cf. Theodore, *In Rom.* 8.29 in Staab 1933, 141.27–142.11 (cf. here Schelkle 1959, 310; Wickert 1962, 200–1); cf. Wickert 1962, 79ff., incl. 80 n. 22, 88 concerning Diodore–Theodore; on this point Wickert, however, claims a certain distance between Diodore and Theodore. Wickert actually believes (1962, 77–89) that Theodore has undermined the precedence relation between foreknowledge and predestination; he writes (1962, 81–82): “Doch wie Gottes Macht sich nicht nur im gleichsam passiven Vorauswissen, sondern zumal in der aktiven Hervorbringung der künftigen Ereignisse offenbart, so führt die Idee der Präszienz Gottes durch sich selbst notwendig zu derjenigen der Prädestination. . . Gott hat zwar im Blick auf die menschliche Entscheidung seine Wahl getroffen, aber diese bedingt umgekehrt selbst die Entscheidung. Mit diesem Zirkel muß man sich abfinden, und es scheint, als habe Th., soweit es ihm mit den Mitteln seines Denkens möglich war, alles gesagt, was zum Thema zu sagen ist.” (cf. Wickert 1962, 89 n. 1: “Das ‘Wissen’ Gottes schließt aber für Th. stets ein ‘Wollen’ mit ein.”). If Wickert’s interpretation is valid, it is reasonable to assume, however, that Theodore’s circle has its source in the above-mentioned problem that man’s freedom of choice undermines God’s sovereignty (see above p. 338). On the other hand, the old problem of *futura contingenta* and “Tomorrow’s Sea Battle”, doubtless lie outside Theodore’s horizon, not least because, as Wickert also stresses, man’s real freedom is indeed irrenunciable for Theodore.— It is also hardly unreasonable to say that Wickert’s interpretation in the last resort means that Theodore’s standpoint (in the terminology of a later time) is “synergistic” or “semi-Pelagian”; cf. the interpretation of Theodore in Norris 1963, 186–88. Cf. also Koch 1965, 65.

119 Theodore, *In Gen.* on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1986, 115, no. 110.1–7; quote lines 1–2).
intercourse;¹²⁰ these ideas are developed in other fragments.¹²¹ Thus shame made Adam and Eve sew garments for themselves of leaves, which Theodore underlines were fig-leaves from the same tree as the Tree of Knowledge, which was simply a fig tree.¹²²

The fragments emphasise on this point Adam and Eve’s original “undevelopedness”, which as in Irenaeus can of course have been combined with a teaching of an original spiritual endowment, but this is hardly likely when we evaluate these fragments in the light of the others from the acts of the synod. In addition, Theodore’s assessment of the opening of the eyes as beneficial—in the light of sin—to some degree conflicts with Diodore’s view. One can compare Theodore’s remark (“But because they sinned in doing the opposite of God’s laws, the knowledge of shame was put in them by God as a help against sin, in that it is sufficient to destroy the impulse from sin”, Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡμαρτὼν τόναντία τοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ διαπραξάμενοι νόμος, ἐνετέθη μὲν αὐτοῖς ὁ λογισμὸς τῆς σιγής ὑπὸ θεοῦ εἰς τὴν τῆς ἁμαρτίας βοήθειαν, αὐτάρκης δὲν ἐκκόπτειν αὐτῆς τὴν ὀρμήν.)¹²³ with Diodore’s (“that their eyes were opened was in no way for the good”, τὸ διανοιχθῆναι τοὺς φθαρμούς ὑπὸ πάντως ἐπὶ καλὸ γέγονεν.).¹²⁴

As has also been observed by others,¹²⁵ Theodore is clearly constructing a theodicy, and this is the case even though we do not find the φθόνος-motif explicitly in his Commentarius in Genesim, for example.¹²⁶ As we saw from the acts of the synod, however, this theodicy has the character of a doctrine of two Ages or states. Since Gross and Scheffczyk claimed that Theodore acquired this particular doctrine from Titus, a comparison of the two is also important

¹²¹ Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1991, 235–36, no. 348); on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1991, 239, no. 353).
¹²² Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1991, 239, no. 353); on Gen. 3.8–9 (Petit 1986, 99–100, no. 96).
¹²³ Theodore, In Gen. on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1986, 116, no. 110.25–28).
¹²⁴ Diodore, In Oct. on Gen. 3.7 (Petit 1986, 113, no. 109.8–9).
¹²⁶ The φθόνος-charge is not mentioned, since like Eusebius of Emesa Theodore interprets Gen. 3.22 so that the remark is ironical (In Gen. on Gen. 3.22, Petit 1991, 288–89, no. 449 [only lines 4–14]; Tonneau 1953, 52–53; cf. Petit 1991, 289; Romeny 1997a, 209 n. 114).—Elsewhere, however, Theodore can emphasise God’s ἀφθονία, e.g. in In Rom. 3.28, Staab 1933, 141.29–142.2, διὰ πάντων εὕρετεῖν ἑδὸν τῷ θεῷ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας αὐτῶν, ἄφθονον αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν χορηγίαν παρεχόμενος...
on this point. Little effort is required, though, before we discover that despite all the similarities in the interpretation of the Paradise narrative Titus does not know of an actual doctrine of two Ages along the lines of Theodore. This is due to Titus’s extremely individualist point of view: the Paradise narrative is not linked to Christ’s work of salvation or to eschatology; individual people will on their own initiative return to Paradise. This is linked to the fact that even though Titus also believed that from the beginning man was created with a view to mortal life, and even though he of course taught the resurrection of the body on the final day, his interest is not in a future, collective state, but in the soul’s individual salvation after death.127 This interpretation of the Paradise narrative which we know from Titus undoubtedly served to inspire Theodore to formulate his teaching of the two Ages, but there is no doubt that this is his own work. The fact that we find no trace of such a teaching in Diodore of Tarsus points in the same direction.128

127 Titus’s major interests are to do with rest after labour and the crown of victory which the virtuous souls receive after death, see above pp. 343–44. This is otherwise in Theodore; Norris (1963, 162) rightly underlines that “[t]here is no question of Theodore’s identifying in practice the Future Age with an eternally real ontological realm which is future only from the point of view of the individual who has not yet realized his membership in it.” In the fragment of the work Against the Magians, which is found in Dadiño Qatraya’s In Isaiah Sket. XV,16–18 (see above p. 141), Theodore indeed claims very energetically that the soul’s life after death is different from the perfection of the second Age. El-Khoury (1990, 69) actually believes that Theodore taught that the immortal soul sleeps until the last day, when it is reunited with its body, which could fit into this picture, because with the help of this doctrine of the sleeping soul Theodore could effectively maintain the entire eschatology is collective-futurist, but as far as I can see, on the pages in question Dadiño Qatraya is right to say that Theodore did not regard the intermediate state of the soul between human death and reunification with the body as an unconscious torpor.—On this point Titus could better be compared with John Chrysostom, who otherwise for practical reasons is not included at length in this study, and whose ideas on Adam and Eve’s primeval state, on the basis of their presentation in Gross 1960, 182, 184 were also distant from those of Theodore and Titus. In In Rom. Hom. X,3; PG 60, 478 Chrysostom argues that death is a gain for us, if we are continent. We do not sin in an immortal body, and death admonishes us to live a virtuous life; cf. Gross 1960, 185.

128 Schweizer (1942, 42–43) remarks: “Theodor trägt bei jeder möglichen und unmöglichen Gelegenheit seine Lehre von den zwei Katastasen, den παρÓντα und den μÓλλοντα, vor. Seine ganze Erlösungslehre prägt er in diese Begriffe. Bei Diodor findet sich gar nichts davon auch an Stellen, wo es zu erwarten wäre.”; cf. Schweizer 1942, 71.—A fragment from The Book of Memorials, which is preserved in The Book of the Bee LX (Budge 1886, 35, 5–8, translation 139 [cf. Abramowski 1949, 60–61]), distinguishes between the present and the coming world age; the present world age is determined by penance, but the coming world age by retribution. Abramowski
With regard to man’s innate faculty to discriminate, over the Tree of Knowledge and the function of the prohibition, there are several points of contact between Theodore and Titus; as we have seen, these points also exist in the interpretations of the Paradise narrative by both Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus. The problem looks different, however, when we look at the passages in Theodore where man was destined for mortality from the beginning. Here the contact surface with Titus’s presentation is very broad; on the other hand we do not find anything similar in Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore.\textsuperscript{129} Alongside these bold passages we also find passages in Theodore’s texts which reckon more traditionally with an immortal primeval state and a catastrophic Fall. It is clear that the presentations in the two types of passages cannot in all contexts be reconciled with each other, but at the least this is not sufficient cause to claim that the “bold passages” are forgeries;\textsuperscript{130} in the present context therefore it must be reasonable to concentrate our interest solely on them. Here I have emphasised a number of similarities. The most significant difference is that Theodore’s conception, unlike Titus’s, demands that sin is not trivialised; to a far greater degree Theodore is interested in stressing the negative, dark character of sin. Both writers believe it to be God’s intention that man should have negative experiences, but Titus emphasises primarily that these experiences must form the starting-point for our own real progress in virtue, while Theodore emphasises that they should teach us our imperfection with a view to what will be given us in the second Age. Accordingly the comparison implies that Theodore was of a deeper nature with a darker view of life than Titus: in the age of this world the negative experiences dominate. Both through his contrast between this world’s negative experiences, linked to mortality and mutability, and through the positive experiences of the coming age Theodore was able to avoid the easy optimism and banality that could have followed from other aspects of his thought. But this

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{129} If \textit{Csl.} 115 really does stem Diodore, the problem of course shifts to some degree.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{130} See above p. 392.}
difference between Titus and Theodore does not change the fact that there are major and particular similarities between their interpretations of the Paradise narrative that do not exist in Eusebius of Emesa or Diodore of Tarsus.

7. Comparison with Theodore of Mopsuestia’s work: Against those who say that men sin by nature and not by intention

Theodore’s most radical position, and the one that places him closest to Titus is to be found in the tradition that as one of the few Easterns he took part in the Pelagian controversy with a work against the adherents of the doctrine of original sin. The work in question is mentioned first by Photius, who gives as its title, πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φάσει καὶ οὐ γνώμη πταίειν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους, Against those who say that men sin by nature and not by intention, secondly in the Syriac version, and thirdly in the few fragments preserved in a Latin translation. From the summary by Photius it appears that Theodore’s work was directed against a person called “Aram”, who had instigated a new heresy that had infected the western churches. From the description this person can only have been Jerome, and reference is made to his Dialogus contra Pelagianos. The new heresy taught, according to Theodore, that man does not sin by intention but by nature, by which the heretics mean not the good nature with which God originally created Adam but the nature he had after his sin, when he exchanged his originally good and immortal nature for a bad and mortal one. The heretics believe that this sinful nature descends to his successors, even to newborn babies. No man is righteous, nor is even Christ free of sin, because he has taken upon himself the sinful nature; from the heretics’ writings we can see, however, that they do not believe that the incarnation has taken place in truth and

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131 Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 177 (121b) (Henry 1960, 177). The entire cod. 177 (121b–123a) exists in Henry 1960, 177–82.
132 See the account of the background for the work in Barhadbešabba, Hist. eccl. XIX [24], Nau 1913, 512.3–9. The work is also mentioned in Abdišo’s Catal. XIX (Assemani 1725, 34.1; transl. by Badger 1852, 365) and in Chron. Seert. LIII [178], Scher 1910, 290.
133 However, according to Bruckner 1897, 4–5, 84–85, 124 Julian of Eclanum also reveals knowledge of this work.
134 Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 177 (121b) (Henry 1960, 177), cf. n. 2 in Henry 1960, 177–79; Gross 1960, 201.
nature, but only in appearance (σχήματι). Furthermore the new heretics say that marriage and the entire sexual life by which our race is sustained, are the works of the evil nature.\textsuperscript{135}

As several scholars have remarked, however, neither Jerome nor Augustine claimed all the things that Theodore accuses them of here. Gross pointed out, for instance, that Jerome, who did not fully understand Augustine’s “doctrine of sin by nature”, never claimed all the doctrines that Theodore ascribes to him; “[o]ffenbar war der Bischof von Mopsuestia, der schwerlich lateinisch verstand, über die pelagianische Kontroverse nur mangelhaft unterrichtet”, commented Gross.\textsuperscript{136} Beatrice stressed that neither Jerome nor Augustine claimed a docetism and a condemnation of sexual life, and instead he proposed that in reality Theodore is here attacking the Messalians,\textsuperscript{137} whose ostensible “doctrine of original sin” Beatrice nevertheless regarded as essentially the same as Augustine’s.

Beatrice’s views cannot be directly dismissed, because Theodore’s work comes from a time when anti-Messalian activity was particularly strong in Asia Minor, and because Theodore’s picture of the “doctrine of original sin” actually resembles the picture of “Messalianism” that heresiologists and synods tried to draw.\textsuperscript{138} We must be aware, however, that heresiology always distorted the heresies by depicting them with earlier heresies as their model. The heresiologist’s conception of the new heresies’ teaching and character was always a combination of new knowledge and existing prejudices. The “Messalians”, for instance, were accused of supporting a docetic Christology, and whether or not the charge was linked to a misunderstanding of passages in Pseudo-Macarius,\textsuperscript{139} one naturally “misunderstood”, because one read with a previous knowledge gained

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Photius, Bibl., cod. 177 (121b–122a) (Henry 1960, 177–79).
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Gross 1960, 202. Thus also earlier in Amann 1946, 270–77, esp. 271–72.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Beatrice 1978, 242–50.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} See thus Stewart 1991, 35, 89 (here, however, Stewart rejects such interpretations of the “doctrine of original sin” in Pseudo-Macarius which precisely Beatrice represents).
  \item \textsuperscript{139} See Stewart 1991, 65–66 on the accusations of docetism against the “Messalians”.—If Theodore’s polemic against Jerome in reality included a polemic against the Messalians, then according to him they must have been Christological docetists, and Beatrice (1978, 224, 249) actually also referred to the docetism in Julius Cassianus, from where the Encratite-Messalian tradition stemmed, according to Beatrice. But this genealogy seems doubtful, just as on the background of Stewart 1991 it is advisable not to operate with too firm an idea of “Messalianism”.
\end{itemize}
from the anti-Manichaean business.140 Probably Theodore also interpreted “the new heresy”, i.e. Jerome’s battle with Pelagius, in the light of Manichaeism. As we have seen above, it was precisely the Church fathers’ accusation that the Manichaeans taught that man does not sin by will but by nature, and whatever the degree of evidence for this charge in Manichaean texts, it is at least clear that here the Church fathers were also depicting Manichaeism in the light of heresiology’s image of various Gnostic heresies, especially Valentinianism, and that this picture was in turn influenced by earlier philosophical polemic against the Stoics among others.141 Theodore merely continues the old heresiological style by understanding and impugning new heresies by depicting them in the light of earlier heresies that there was already a consensus to condemn. That this is the case here is underlined by the fact that Theodore further accuses “the new heresy” of docetism, which effectively places it alongside Manichaeism. It is quite clear that Theodore has the Manichaean model in mind, since he draws a distinction when stating that “the new heresy” does not claim that man sins by virtue of his original created nature, but by virtue of a nature that was first acquired at the Fall.142 Theodore appears here to underline the specific element in “the new heresy” precisely in contrast to Manichaeism or similar heresies that made evil a part of man’s original constitution.

Among Theodore’s refutations of this new heresy Photius mentions the view, from which he also dissociates himself, that Adam had been mortal from the beginning, and that it was only apparently that God imposed death on us as a punishment for sin, in order, that is, to make us hate sin.143 Theodore’s view here corresponds to the synodal fragments from his Commentarius in Genesim, but is even

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140 Cf. Dörries 1978, 15, 23, 30, 55–56, 59, 77–95, 101, 243, 388, 457 on both the accusations against the “Messalians” of “Manichaeism” and the background for this in Pseudo-Macarius. Dörries accepted that there are similarities between Manichaeism and Pseudo-Macarius, but he underlined that the charge was a “Mißdeutung”.

141 See above p. 173.


143 Photius, Bibl., cod. 177 (122a) (Henry 1960, 179): “Ετι δὲ σωθὲ τὸ λέγειν αὐτῶν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μὲν θητόν πεπλάσθη τὸν Ἀδὰμ, ἐνδείξει δὲ μόνον, ἵνα μισήσωμεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, σχηματίσαι οὕτω τὸν Θεὸν ὡς διὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἀντὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτέθεται ὁ θάνατος…”
closer than them to Titus’s position because according to Photius Theodore actually claimed that the death’s aspect of being a punishment was only apparent. The similarity with Titus raises the question of whether Theodore is not here taking over a doctrine from the Antiochene anti-Manichaeism against “the new heresy” which Theodore precisely conceived of as “a new Manichaeism”?

In addition to Photius’s summary we have a series of Latin fragments handed down in Collectio Palatina, which the compiler of this work believes to be directed against Augustine. The authenticity of the fragments has been the subject of vigorous dispute, because they present a more radical, less “ecclesiastical” picture of Theodore than, for instance, his Homiliae catecheticae.

Amann admittedly accepted that the fragments were genuine, but he pointed out that as excerpts they could give a false impression of the work against the adherents of the doctrine of original sin; read in its entirety the writing would perhaps have proved to be more “Augustinian”, more like the Homiliae catecheticae; Amann also, however, considered the possibility of a development in Theodore’s views in relation to his previous writings.

It was Devreesse in particular who regarded as forgeries the fragments from Theodore’s writing against the adherents of sin as nature; nothing of what these and similar fragments contain is to be found “dans l’œuvre authentique de Théodore, absolument rien”, he claimed. DeVreesse accepted that such fragments contiennent, sans conteste, quelques-unes des expressions favorites de notre auteur et, à leur lecture, on retrouve le mouvement général de son style. Mais ils contredisent sa pensée authentique, les accorder avec elle est une entreprise vaine; il n’y a pas de place ici pour un concordisme.

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144 Collectio Palatina in Schwartz 1924–26; the five relevant fragments Schwartz 1924–26, 173.15–176.33, and they are introduced (173.15–17) with: “Theodori Mampsuestini episcopi de secundo codice libro quarto, folio decimo contra sanctum Augustinum defendentem originale peccatum et Adam per transgressionem mortalem factum catholice disserentem.” Earlier it was thought that the five fragments were compiled by Marius Mercator, but Schwartz (1924–26, VIII ff.) has shown that the fragments were more likely collected in the 6th cent.—The five fragments are also available in Swete 1882, 332–37.

145 Amann 1946, 275–76.

146 Devreesse 1948, 102, cf. 196. According to Devreesse, this was also true of the text to which Photius refers.

147 Devreesse 1948, 103.
Gross disagreed with Devreesse on this point, arguing for the authenticity of the fragments partly by showing that their teaching on Adam’s original mortality is also found in the writings of Theodore which Devreesse acknowledges as genuine, and partly by demonstrating that Theodore’s fundamental teaching on the two Ages only makes sense if Adam belonged to the first Age from the beginning.148 While especially Wickert followed Gross,149 Koch in particular has found it difficult to accept that the fragments were authentic, without it being possible to say his arguments are strong.150

Gross is without doubt right that precisely because the ideas in these fragments are also found in the other vestiges of Theodore’s oeuvre, they must be accepted as authentic. Naturally this does not exclude the possibility of imprecise translations into Latin,151 and the compiler’s interest renders it likely that Amann is correct in arguing that the fragments give a wrong general impression of the work. I should like to underline, however, that an interpretation of many of the ideas in the fragments as being a perpetuation of an anti-Manichaean tradition can form a supplementary argument in favour of their authenticity, because the interpretation shows that it is not so remarkable or improbable that a writer in the 5th century presented the views that it contains.

The main concern of the fragments is to refute those who are so demented as to believe that God was unaware that Adam would sin, and therefore only made Adam immortal for six hours in order

150 Koch (1965, 19 n. 52, 59 n. 92, 70–71) accepted that the fragments contain ideas from Theodore and can be said to develop the thoughts that also exist in the fragments from the fifth ecumenical synod and in Cdl. 115, but he was nevertheless inclined to regard them as forgeries, since Theodore’s ideas have become “ins Extrem überspitzt” (70), and because he considered their transmission as dubious. Koch also suggested, however, that it might be a question of “jene polemischen Übertreibungen und Vereinseitigungen ... zu denen unser Autor neigt” (70–71), which could also be understood in the context of the bitter nature of the Pelagian controversy. Precisely on this point Koch was doubtless right, for Theodore’s ideas must almost certainly have been sharply honed in a polemical treatise. Collectio Palatina also presumably quotes only the passages from Theodore in which he expresses himself most vehemently and, from the compiler’s viewpoint, most heretically. Unless they are forged, the fragments can therefore give a false overall impression of the work.—Devreesse’s views are followed also in e.g. Kelly 1977, 373.—Clark (1992, 204–6) omitted to take a position on the question of authenticity.
to make him mortal after he had sinned. If God had wanted Adam to be immortal, the Fall of Man could not change His mind; for God did not make the Devil mortal, when he sinned. Theodore’s opponents say that in anger and fury God made Adam mortal, and that he punished all mankind for one man’s transgression.

Against this Theodore claims that God knew that Adam would sin and without doubt die because of this. In line with Wickert’s view, this must mean that also in this work Theodore to some degree reckoned death to be the punishment or consequence of sin. As a prominent point, however, Theodore also claims the naturalness of death: just as Adam initiated the first status (i.e. κατάστασις), that of mortality, so has Christ initiated the second immortal status, and that is why Christ also had to traverse all the stages of human life in order to be able to lead men from the first to the second status. As Wickert has pointed out, in this context Theodore employs 1 Cor. 15.48–49, where Paul actually establishes the order earthly–heavenly as an argument that mortal status always goes before immortal. Here there is a striking similarity with Titus’s corresponding argument on the basis of 1 Cor. 15.53 in Contra Manichaeos IV.100.

Thus, according to Theodore, death belongs to nature, in contrast to sin:

And he [i.e. Christ] has therefore taken death upon him, but in no way sin; he remained completely untouched by this, however. For he has without doubt taken upon himself that which was natural, i.e. death, but he has in no way taken upon himself sin, which was not natural but of the (free) will. For if there had been sin in nature, as that extremely wise (writer) claims, then he would of necessity have taken upon himself sin, which (in that case) was present in nature.

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152 Coll. Pal. 51.8, Schwartz 1924–26, 176.13–23 (Fr.1, Swete 1882, 332–33).
154 Coll. Pal. 51.7, Schwartz 1924–26, 175.30ff. (Fr. 1, Swete 1882, 333.1–2).
155 Wickert 1962, 103.
156 Coll. Pal. 51.7, Schwartz 1924–26, 176.15–16 (Fr. 3, Swete 1882, 335.13ff.).
157 Coll. Pal. 51.7, Schwartz 1924–26, 175.25–176.3 (Fr. 3, Swete 1882, 335.25–30); Wickert has also pointed out that Theodore argues in similar fashion in In Cor. I 15.45–47 (Staab 1933, 195.6–20; cf. also In Cor. I 15.48–49, Staab 1933, 195.21–29); Wickert 1962, 104.
158 See above p. 351 and → Ch. XI.51.
159 "et mortem quidem propter ea suscepit, peccatum uero nequaquam, sed ab hoc inunmis omnino permanisti, quod enim erat naturae, id est mortem, indubitanter assumpit; peccatum uero, quod non erat naturae, sed voluntatis, nullo pacto suscepit. quod si fuisse in natura peccatum iuxta sapientissimis huius eloquium, pec-
As Wickert in particular has pointed out, Theodore is also essaying an explanation as to how death can be both nature and a punishment for Adam’s sin. Adam and Eve were mortal from the beginning, but not until and by virtue of their transgression did they become worthy (“digni essent”) to be imparted with “the experience of death” (“mortis experientiam”) or the sentence of death (“mortis sententiam”). Wickert interpreted this argument as follows,

daß eine Möglichkeit, die der Mensch seit seiner Erschaffung besaß, infolge seiner Sünde, durch Gottes Urteil, für ihn zur Wirklichkeit wurde. Man kann fragen, inwieweit das aristotelische Begrißpaar δόναμις—ἐνέργεια im Hintergrund steht.

To a considerable degree this form of thought resembles Titus’s considerations, which are that man is indeed created mortal, but that God has allowed him to procure for himself the cause of his death.

In both the information on and the fragments of Theodore’s work Against those who say that men sin by nature and not by intention we thus meet some of the same examples of Theodore’s closeness to Titus of Bostra’s position that we found in his Commentarius in Genesim as well as new examples of this closeness. The similarity precisely with Titus and the Manichaeanising distortions of Jerome’s teaching suggest that Theodore’s understanding of the Paradise narrative is determined by the earlier Antiochene anti-Manichaean literature. This does not necessarily mean that Theodore was influenced by Titus—at any rate there is no basis for claiming such influence through considerable terminological similarities and suchlike—but rather it raises the question of Theodore and Titus’s common dependence on the lost Antiochene anti-Manichaean texts.

catum in natura prorsus existens necessario suscepisset.”, Coll. Pal. 51.7, Schwartz 1924–26, 176.7–12 (Fr. 3, Swete 1882, 335.35–336.3). Cf. Gross 1960, 203.—The passage shows which deduction formed the basis of the charge referred to by Photius against “Aram” for teaching that Christ took sin upon himself.

Wickert 1962, 105.—Clark’s (1992, 206, cf. 204) presentation of Theodore’s reasoning is wrong on the other hand (“Theodore, like Rufinus, believes that Adam and Eve were created mortal in body and would have received immortality only later, had they remained obedient”): according to Theodore there was no real possibility of immortality in the Garden of Eden.

See above p. 352.
8. Comparison with the Constitutiones Apostolorum

Yet another piece in the puzzle may well be found in the similarity between Theodore’s position and the Constitutiones Apostolorum which, as mentioned, was emphasised by Turmel, Slomkowski, Gross and Beatrice. In a comparison, however, we must note that the Constitutiones Apostolorum hardly contains a coherent interpretation of the Paradise narrative, but only scattered passages that must be interpreted separately.

At one point, for example, the Constitutiones Apostolorum can speak of God’s Providence, which included Adam when he received the commandment in Paradise, but also included him after he had sinned and was justly banished, in that the education of Adam and his successors continued through the goodness of God. This statement in such a passage perhaps suggests a continuity between the education of Adam before and after the disobedience, but also sets the stage for an understanding of disobedience as sin and banishment as punishment. A passage in the Constitutiones Apostolorum V points in a different direction, claiming that God could have made all men immortal if He had wanted to, as we can see in relation to Enoch and Elijah. The passage can be read in several ways, but that it points in the direction of Titus’s teaching on death is made likely by a second passage soon after which emphasises that death is not a punishing payment (μὴ μισθὸν τιμωρίας εἶναι τὸν θάνατον), since both the saints and their lord, Jesus Christ, also suffered death.

With regard to Constitutiones Apostolorum VIII.XII,16–20 there are doubtless aspects that could also be compared with the texts that we are examining; thus Adam was given an innate law, so that by himself and from himself he has the germ of the cognition of God. The human body is soluble and from the four elements, but immortality is presented apparently as a real goal that could have been

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163 See above pp. 98–99.
165 Constitutiones Apostolorum V.VII,8, Funk 1905, 253.9–11.
168 καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν νόμον δέδωκας αὐτῷ ἐμφυτόν, ὅπως οἴκοθεν καὶ παρ’ ἐαυτοῦ ἔχοι τὰ σπέρματα τῆς θεογνοσίας (Constitutiones Apostolorum VIII.XII,18), Funk 1905, 500.33–502.2.—Cf. Constitutiones Apostolorum VIII.IX,8 (Funk 1905, 486.20–21).
169 Constitutiones Apostolorum VIII.XII,17, Funk 1905, 500.25–27.
reached if Adam had kept the commandment in Paradise. Similarly we read later that God made man mortal by virtue of his constitution and promised him resurrection (θνητὸν ἐκ κατασκευῆς ποιήσας καὶ ἀνάστασιν ἐπαγγελμένος...).

The scattered passages are unsystematic, but at least in the Constitutiones Apostolorum V.VII there are particular considerations that resemble Titus’s and Theodore’s. As a minimum we can say that Titus, Theodore and the Constitutiones Apostolorum constitute a common testimony to a specific interpretation of the Paradise narrative in the Syrian region. Any explanation demanding a little more must bear in mind that the compiler was an Arian. This has been convincingly argued by C.H. Turner, who suggested that the compiler was an Antiochene writer from somewhat before 400, e.g. c. 360–380, because around 400 there would hardly any longer have been any movement that attempted to Arianise Catholic literature.

Among the theologians that we have dwelt on, Eusebius of Caesarea demonstrated at least periodically some sympathy for Arius, and even though his pupil Eusebius of Emesa was not an Arian, his friendship with George of Laodicea is testimony to an environment in which there could be close ties with full-blood Arians. Diodore and Theodore on the other hand were unambiguous Nicenes. It seems most likely that similarities between the Constitutiones Apostolorum and Theodore are due to their common access to texts from the first half and the middle of the 4th century, where contact between Arians and the burgeoning Antiochene tradition was not an impossibility.

9. Hypotheses to explain similarities between interpretations of the Paradise narrative

The above examinations show that although there are striking similarities between on the one hand Titus of Bostra’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative and on the other hand the interpretations in Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore of Tarsus, when it comes to the decisive point, the disobedience, the differences

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170 Constitutiones Apostolorum VIII.XII,19, Funk 1905, 502.2–5.
172 Turner 1915.
are deep: what according to Titus is useful, necessity and man’s destiny, is for the others a fall and a catastrophe. This result of course requires some modification if Csl. 115 proves to be by Diodore, but this fragment can just as well come from Theodore.

But as for the crucial point, the disobedience, there is in contrast a broad similarity between Titus and most of Theodore’s presentations; also passages in the Constitutiones Apostolorum appear to express the same as these two writers. In this way the examinations have confirmed and underpinned earlier assumptions that Theodore’s radical interpretation of the Paradise narrative was not only his own work, but also continued a tradition in the Syrian region. I also assume that this tradition comes from vanished anti-Manichaean works, and that it was in the early or middle of the 4th century when Titus was also writing it influenced the compiler of the Constitutiones Apostolorum

Even though further uncertainty creeps in when we try to develop this argument with further clarifications, the attempt will still be of value, since evaluating the different possibilities that the weak source material provides gives rise to historical models of explanation that offer more context in the results and thus sets up certain fundamental points of orientation for our understanding. I have attempted to draw up three good explanatory models which are all worthy of consideration; I myself prefer the third of these.

The first is really Gross and Scheffczyk’s model, that Theodore was dependent on Titus. The simplicity is of course its strength, while its weakness has to do with the fact that the similarities between Titus and Theodore are more related to content than terminology, so that perhaps it is preferable to explain them through a common dependence on another writer, which presumably could better allow for the possibility for different formulations of the same basic ideas.

The second model of explanation is that both Theodore and Titus built on Diodore’s vanished anti-Manichaean treatise. It is easy to imagine that Theodore used a Diodore-text. If Titus used Diodore, it may be for this reason that Theodoret wove Titus and Diodore together in Haereticarum fabularum compendium I.26. The theory fits in to some degree with the statement by Heraclianus that both Titus and Diodore used Adda-texts; for Diodore’s part it was only Μμβιμε, while Titus used several Adda-texts which can also have included Μμβιμε. Titus may have become interested in Diodore’s treatise, because it related to one of the same texts that he himself was con-
cerned with. The theory also receives slight support from the fact that not until the final eighteen books does Diodore deal with the Manichaeans’ use of biblical quotations, which is reminiscent of the fact that Titus only concerns himself with the Bible in the last two books; but here we must remember that Μόδιος, which was Diodore’s subject in the first seven books, can also have concerned itself with the Bible, if indeed it was a kind of commentary on Mani’s Living Gospel.

The objections to this explanation must have to do among other things with the chronology. We do not know when Titus and Diodore were born, but since Titus was already Bishop in 362 and died at the latest in 378, while Diodore did not become Bishop until 378 and died some time before 394, Diodore was doubtless considerably younger than Titus. Of course Titus can have used a younger man’s work, but another problem is that Diodore’s Commentarius in Octateuchum precisely did not, as far as we can see, contain the decisive point of similarity between Titus and Theodore, where God’s foreknowledge and plan of salvation mean that the disobedience in the Garden of Eden has lost its catastrophic character. If Commentarius in Octateuchum is the work of Diodore’s youth, while the anti-Manichaean writing was composed later, Diodore can of course have changed his view, but in that case Titus, who at the most can have had access to the works of Diodore’s youth, can hardly have been dependent on Diodore.

I would therefore prefer the third model of explanation, which builds on my suggestion above that Heraclianus’s information that George of Laodicea’s refutations of Manichaeism were almost the same as Titus’s refutations can be explained by Titus drawing on George’s work. The particular interpretation of the Paradise narrative which Titus and Theodore share comes in reality from George. To be sure Theodore can have had direct access to George’s work, but because the antagonism between Theodore and the Arians was so acute, it is perhaps more probable that also Diodore’s anti-Manichaean writing was based on George’s, so that it was Diodore’s work that was Theodore’s immediate source. Although Diodore too was a strict Nicene, his relationship as pupil to his teacher Eusebius of Emesa can have made him more open to a use of texts that stemmed from his teacher’s friend. These contexts may even have been clear to Theodoret, who therefore in Haereticarum fabularum compendium I.26 first mentioned Titus and Diodore in an interlinked way
and immediately after George and Eusebius of Emesa. Finally it was natural for the Arian compiler behind the *Constitutiones Apostolorum* to use ideas that came from his fellow-believer George.

This model of explanation is extremely uncertain because firstly it only deals with theological similarities and cannot be developed further through a demonstration of common passages, quotations and suchlike, and secondly because it refers to no fewer than two vanished texts (George’s and Diodore’s), but it has at least the advantage that it gives a coherent and not improbable explanation of the theological similarities that we elaborated above. What remains now is the question of whether there is anything in our otherwise slender knowledge of George of Laodicea’s life and works which renders the theory impossible.

Assuming that all the references to “George of Laodicea” really are to the same person, we hear that George was originally a presbyter in Alexandria who already in 322 was living in Antioch and occupying a sharply Arian position. In Antioch he was one of those who opposed the city’s Nicene Bishop, Eustathius, who banished him from the city in c. 326. Later George became Bishop of Laodicea and a leading Church politician; he now modified his previously sharply Arian views and became a supporter of the ισομορφή-formula and an opponent of Aetius and his Neo-Arians. In the 340’s he helped Eusebius back to Emesa, from where he had earlier been banished by the local inhabitants, and he composed a eulogy to Eusebius on his death in 359 which was used as a source by the Church historians, Socrates and Sozomen.173 Brief letters and fragments of letters by George are preserved, as well as a long letter in Epiphanius from 359 or 358, where George’s authorship is not completely certain; but all this material deals with the Son’s relationship to the Father and not with the Paradise narrative.174 Since there is otherwise no clear or necessary link between the interpretation of the Paradise narrative which we hypothetically ascribed to George and an Arian teaching on Christ (for the particular interpretation of the Paradise narrative was also used by Titus and Theodore, who were not Arians), the only support for my theory is the fact that at

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174 Hanson 1988, 44, 365–71.—The long letter is in Epiphanius’s *Haer.* 73.12,1–73.22,8 (Holl 1933, 284.11–295.32).
least there is nothing in our fragile knowledge of George’s environment and education that could gainsay it.

George’s Alexandrian background, his career in Antioch and the Syrian region and his friendship with Eusebius of Emesa thus make it probable that he too, like Titus, was a writer who found himself midway between Alexandria and Antioch. As I pointed out, the particular interpretation of the Paradise narrative contains a considerable Platonising element, namely an interest in emphasising God’s transcendence and immutability—that His plans are as eternal as His foreknowledge. It is natural to meet this Platonising element in a writer with an Alexandrian background. In this context we must note that Theodoret stressed George’s philosophical education in *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* I.26 precisely in connection with George’s anti-Manichaean writing.

Fundamentally I do not at any rate believe that it would in any way be likely that the similarities between Titus and Theodore could be explained by the two writers, independently of one another, developing similar conceptions. Their interpretation of the Paradise narrative was an innovation and was not an expression of the same ideas that the other writers had asserted. Retrospectively we can see how all the elements in their interpretation were present in the tradition, but also how these elements were welded into other structures. Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative came into being through a clash with the main trend in Greek patristics, and it is for this reason that in *Contra Manichaeos* III.17,7 he must underline: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπειθήσας ἀνθρωπος τὸ τηνικάδε ἀπώλετο ἢ ἀνήκεστα διέθηκεν έαυτόν.
In conclusion the results of this comprehensive examination will be briefly summarised and possible perspectives outlined. The subject has been Bishop Titus of Bostra’s lengthy work *Contra Manichaeos*, and the unifying point of interpretation has been the idea that the work is best understood on the background of the contemporary situation, namely, a two-pronged Manichaean mission to particular pagan and Catholic groups in the province of Arabia which presented Manichaeism as the rational, philosophical and moral Christianity with the best solution to the theodicy question. The pagans who could be attracted by this mission were precisely those who were also open to the Catholic Church, and a particularly dangerous situation had therefore arisen since the relationship between Catholics and pagans was already very poor as a result of the conflicts under the Emperors Constantius II and Julian the Apostate. The Manichaean mission might also make inroads into Titus’s own flock, where there were similar groups with an open attitude to alternative questions and messages.

On this background Titus of Bostra composed his refutation. As its basis he drew on some of the Manichaean’s own texts and on previous Christian heresiology, including earlier anti-Manichaean literature, as well as perhaps pagan philosophical works. In relation to the pagan readers who were attracted by Manichaeism, it was his primary intention to warn them and prevent their conversion to Manichaeism; secondarily, however, he also hoped that he could interest them in his positive message and his Church; in relation to Catholic readers his aim was quite simply to hold them firm in the Church context where they already found themselves. These aims required both that the correctness of the Manichaean’s view of themselves be denied, and that the questions and interests that had put wind in the Manichaean sails received a different response and were met in a different way.

The attack on the Manichaean’s presentation of themselves set
out to show that this was in no way a rational and moral movement. On the contrary, Manichaeism was an irrational—and therefore ridiculous—asocial and barbarian movement, which with a totally deterministic world-view rendered moral appeals impossible and was actually itself engaged in lawless actions. Although Titus’s polemic on the one hand thus wrote off any claim of Manichaeism to serious interest, he also on the other hand took its claim to have solved the theodicy problem seriously, because it was in this that he judged the Manichaeans’ real strength to lie. According to Titus, Manichaeism’s doctrine of eternal matter was an attempt to release God from the responsibility for evil, i.e. for men’s sins and for the evil works of Creation, but in this area Titus knew better ways to defend God: the responsibility for sin lay in man, not in any matter, and the works of Creation were not evil but contributed to the education of mankind.

Titus’s defence of God was based on man’s innate reason, which expressed itself in common, universal concepts, and this defence was advanced almost without reference to the Bible, because it was also intended to be read by the pagans who were attracted to Manichaeism. The defence also bore the hallmarks of ideas originating from Greek schools of philosophy. Titus’s concept of God contains in particular Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, the idea of the common concepts comes from Stoicism, while Titus’s doctrine of the soul and ethical action is compounded of ideas from all three philosophical branches. Even though there was a concrete cause for him to present this philosophical theology, we must note that philosophical ideas had already long been employed by the Early Catholic theologians; in this sense there was nothing new in Titus’s theological profile. Nevertheless, his dispute with one of the philosophy-oriented Manichaean texts resulted in parts of the traditional interpretation of Scripture—namely the interpretation of the Paradise narrative—having to be revised in new ways in relation to the philosophical objections that the Manichaean text raised.

While the earlier tradition had always interpreted Adam and Eve’s disobedience in the Garden of Paradise as a catastrophic Fall, Titus accepted the objection in the Manichaean texts that by virtue of His foreknowledge God must have anticipated man’s transgression; this foreknowledge must also imply, according to Titus, that from the very beginning the future transgression had been included in God’s plans, for otherwise the consequence would be unacceptable for the
concept of God, namely that God lost His freedom and was ruled by man’s disobedience. If the disobedience was a step in God’s plans for man, it could not then be understood as a fall, but must instead be a good, useful step in man’s moral development. From the beginning it was God’s intention both that man should struggle for virtue, learn from his initial transgression and end his earthly life with death, which was similarly beneficial for man and not a punishment, since death either put an end to man’s sins or procured for the virtuous man rest after his efforts. Titus thus made God’s immutable Providence and man’s free moral progress converge in a presentation in which the incarnation apparently disappears off the face of the earth.

Titus’s revision of the Paradise narrative is one of many examples of the fact that the philosophical theology in the first two books of Contra Manichaeos continues in the last two books, which are concerned with the proper understanding of the Bible and ostensibly are directed only to Catholic Christians. When Titus here too engages in demonstrating the rationality of the Church’s teaching, the inference is that, just like the pagan groups, the people within Titus’s church who were attracted by Manichaeism, had been influenced by the Manichaean claim to be on the side of reason. Moreover, it was probably also Titus’s intention that the pagans affected should proceed further after the first two books and be influenced by the presentation in the last two books of Catholic Christianity as rational and philosophical.

It is of importance that with Contra Manichaeos we have an example of an Early Catholic text in which the inclusion of philosophical ideas and forms of thought in the theology is so clearly being linked to real strategies in relation to concrete groups inside and outside the Catholic Church. Even though on the one hand it is a particular feature that Titus rejects the understanding of Adam and Eve’s transgression as a fall, it is clear on the other hand that his emphasis on man’s innate reason, ethical freedom of choice and moral progress is a continuation of important themes in the theology of the Eastern Church. Contra Manichaeos can—as an extreme example—be said to underpin the suggestions that have been to the fore that the prominent position of these themes was in the context of a bias against Gnostic and Manichaean “heresies”, because the theology of these groups was regarded as deterministic systems that denied the possibility of ethical choice and development.

This context between a moralist-rationalist theology and the bat-
tle against heresies must be particularly relevant for theologians from the Antiochene School, to whom Titus possibly had a particular affiliation, since a number of them wrote several works against the Manichaean and similar heresies. In addition the special features of Titus’s interpretation of the Paradise narrative are not unique; similar interpretations are to be found in fragments of Theodore of Mopsuestia’s writings. Even though Theodore did not himself devote any particular attention to the battle against Manichaeism, I suggest that his interpretations on this point derive from earlier Antiochene anti-Manichaeism, just as I make the case that ultimately there must be a common source behind these interpretations and that of Titus; this source could be George of Laodicea’s lost anti-Manichaean work.

As can be seen, these studies have centred around a clear historical interest, namely to knit the theological and philosophical material together with a particular situation in the province of Arabia in the second half of the 4th century. At first sight this interest ties the material to limited and special circumstances, but on closer inspection ‘limited’ and ‘special’ contain features of something that is in fact typical of early Christianity. A concern with Contra Manichaeos thus contributes to sharpening the attention to a circumstance that may never have been forgotten, but at times has been under-emphasised, namely that the history of Early Catholic theology should not merely be studied and explained as an internal development of the tradition, but should also be understood as being defined by the increasingly external relations to the surrounding pagan society and divergent Christian groups who were regarded as heretical. This study thus points towards a more comprehensive historical perspective for interpretation that can contribute to further knowledge in the field.

The present work examines in a historical context the content of the discussion in which Titus participated, i.e. the questions as to what evil, the soul, ethical action and God actually are. To be sure, this discussion may lay claim to contain universal statements, but it is nevertheless the historian’s task to place it in a past context. However, considering the distance of modern culture to Antiquity, the contextualisation of texts that lay claim to universality is in reality a precondition for all further engagement with them. The wider importance of this study is, I hope, as a stimulus to further discussions across the disciplines.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE TEXT

Sigla

Bibl. = Photius, Bibliothèque, ed. Henry 1967
C = Sacra Parallela, Codex Coislinianus 276. I have used the edition in Pitra 1888 together with the corrections in Casey 1928

corr = emendations without direct support in a manuscript
ed.L and ed.L (H) = De Lagarde 1859, i.e. De Lagarde’s edition of H
ed.L59a = De Lagarde 1859a, i.e. De Lagarde’s edition of Sy
ed.N = Nagel 1973, i.e. Nagel’s edition of Contra Manichaeos III.7–30 transmitted in V
G = Congregazione della Missione urbana di S. Carlo, Genoa, cod. 27. I have used copies of the manuscript
H = Hamburg, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. phil. 306 (olim Stadtbibliothek, Philosophi gr. in fol. XVI). I have not used the actual manuscript
R = Sacra Parallela, the recension in Codex Rupefucaldinus. I have used the edition in Lequien 1712, as found in PG 18
Sy = British Museum add. 12,150. I have used copies of the manuscript. The references, however, are to page and line numbers in De Lagarde 1859a
Torres = Franciscus Turrianus’s translation of Titus into Latin in Canisius 1604, here following PG 18
V = Athos Vatopaedi No. 236. I have used copies of the manuscript, together with ed.N and ed.N67

Number 1
I.1, Gr. 1.1–16

Πᾶσι μὲν οὖς γέγονε διὰ σπουδής τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμαρτανομένων τὰς αἰτίας ἐξελείν θεοῦ, οὐ γὰρ τε καὶ ἀληθῆς γέγονε κατὰ τοῦτο τῶν τοιούτων ὁ σκοπός, εἰγε μὴ διαφυγόντες τὸ προνοεῖν τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς τὸν θεὸν εὐλόγως καὶ φιλαλήθως ἀνθρώποις ἀνέθηκαν τά σφόν αὐτῶν ἀμαρτήματα, ἐπεῖτογε μικρὸν ἱάσθαι τι βουληθέντες μείζονι καὶ χαλεπῶ νοσήματι τῆς ἀσθείας περιέπεσον, εἰς ἀρνήσιν τῆς ἐν παντὶ φαινομένης τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίας ἐμπεσόντες—ὁ δὲ Μάνης, ἐκ βαρβάρων <ὡν> καὶ τῆς μανίας αὐτῆς
As for all those who are eager to remove the causes of men’s sins from God, their aim in this regard is both holy and truthful, if they do not flee from the (reality) that God takes care of things among us, and with reason and openness ascribes to men their own sins.

Since it was indeed something insignificant that they wished to heal, they plunged into the greater and heavy sickness of impiety, ending up by denying that God’s Providence reveals itself in everything.
Manes, who was from the barbarians and was rightly named after “madness” (μανία), used a yet more harmful medicament against impiety: because he wanted to show God to be innocent of the evil, he set up evil against God, making it almost equal to Him, uncreated—so he says—against uncreated, and living against living, as one who has always on the one hand rebelled against God and fought with God—but has never at any time caused God trouble—yet on the other hand has been completely unable to take anything from God, because the substance, being uncreated, is both eternal and perfected. And, as the saying goes, “he who flees the smoke has fallen into the fire”.

a) Titus maintains that it is a legitimate concern to release God from the responsibility for human sin and instead lay the entire blame on mankind, provided that this does not lead to the denial of Providence.

b) Titus means that attributing the blame for mankind’s sin to God is an insignificant impiety compared to the denial of Providence.

c) i.e. against the impiety of holding God responsible for evil.

d) A well-known proverb: see Pseudo-Diogenianus, Par. VIII,45: Τὸν καπνὸν φεύγων, εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέκεισαν· ἐπὶ τὸν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν δεινῶν φευγόντων, καὶ εἰς μείζονα δεινὰ ἐμπιτόντων (Von Leutsch and Schneidewin 1839, 314.1–3), also Macarius Chrysocephalus, Rhod. VIII,42 (Von Leutsch 1851, 220.1); Michael Apostolius, Coll. par. IX,59a (Von Leutsch 1851, 474.15) and XVI,93 (Von Leutsch 1851, 684.21–22), cf. Poirier and Sensal 1990, 3 n. 15; Lieu 1994, 128 with n. 441, 192–93 with n. 159.

Number 2
I.1, Gr. 1.22–30

ὁτι μὴν γὰρ1 εὐσέβες τῶν2 παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων ἀναίτιον παντὶ σθένει τὸν θεὸν ὁμολογεῖν, πρῶτος προσβεβέμεθεν ἐσποῦδακε τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας ὁ λόγος· ζητουμένου δὲ τίνα τρόπον πλημμελοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ βουλομένου, οὐ3 περὶ μειζόνων κατηγοροῦμεν θεοῦ, περὶ μικρότερων ὃσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἀπολογείθαι βουλόμενοι, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν ἕκ τέ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἔχοντες ἀσφαλῶς οὐδεμοῦμεν4 πρὸς τὴν τουαύτην ζήτησιν, τῷ γε ἐκατοτεῖς φιλαλήθως προσεγκαλεῖν εὐσέβη τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν ὑπὲρ θεοῦ ποιούμενοι.

1 γὰρ ed.L(H) cf. עִּשׁ “for” in Sy 2.22; omitted in V G.
2 τῶν V ed.L(H); omitted in G.
3 οὐ ed.L(H) cf. עָמַל in Sy 2.25; omitted in V G, perhaps lost through haplography (βουλομένουν βουλομένου).
4 οὐδεμοῦμεν V ed.L(H); οὐδεμοῦμεν G.
For the teaching of the Catholic Church endeavours to give priority to (the point) that it is pious to confess with full vigour that God is innocent of the injustices that exist among men. When we examine in what way we sin, since God does not wish us to do so, we do not accuse God of great things, since like him(a) we wish to defend Him with regard to minor things. On the contrary: since we possess the very way of truth both from the Holy Scriptures and from the common concepts, we are walking assuredly towards the examination that is thus constituted, and by sincerely directing the charges against ourselves, we make the demonstrative proof in defence of God a pious one.

(a) ‘him’: i.e Mani.

**Number 3**
I.5, Gr. 4.11–14

toigaro⏰n loip何度 tην ἀρχὴν tής μυθώδους ἁσβείας αὐτῶν ἐλθομεν, ἐξετάζοντες, εἰ παραδέχονται γοῦν αἳ κατὰ φύσιν ἐννοιαι δύο ἐναντίας ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων.¹ εἰ² γὰρ μηδὲ συμφωνοῦσας δέξαιτ’ ἄν, ἢπου γε μαχομένας;

1 τῶν ὄντων V G ed.L(H); omitted in Sy 5.31.
2 εἰ V ed.L(H); ἢ G.

Hereafter therefore let us come to their fabulous principle of impiety, in that we shall examine whether the natural concepts at least allow for two opposite principles in the existing things. For if the natural concepts will not even allow for two concordant principles, how will they then be able to allow for two conflicting principles?

**Number 4**
I.12, Gr. 6.25–32

<ἄρα εἰ>¹ ἐκάτερον τῶν παρὰ τῷ μανέντι νομιζόμενοι ἐναντίων οὐσία ξώσα τε καὶ ἀγένητος² οἰνομάζεται, <οὐ δῆλον>³ ὡς, έκ βαρβάρων την ἀρχὴν τῆς τοιαύτης λαβούσης πλάνης, διέφθαρται <παρ’ αὐτῷ>⁴ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν⁵ ἢ ἀκολουθία; ὁλόκληρος γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὕτη ἐπ’ ἵσης τυχάνει ἐκατέροις ὑπογραφή, οὗ μόνον ἐναντιότητος πάσαν ὑπογίαν ἕξοριζος, ἀλλ’ οὕτε διαφοράν τινα συγχωροῦσα ἐν τοῖς οἴνομαζομένοις ὑπάρχειν.
If each of the two which are regarded by the madman(a) as opposites is called “a living and uncreated substance”, is it not then clear that since the origin of such a misconception is taken from the barbarians, the consequence from the common concepts is destroyed for him? For the description of both of them is also to the same extent completely the same, in that it not only removes the entire suspicion of an opposition but also does not allow any difference to be present in the mentioned (substances).

a) ‘the madman’: i.e. Mani.

Number 5
I.13, Gr. 7.4–36

If each of the two which are regarded by the madman(a) as opposites is called “a living and uncreated substance”, is it not then clear that since the origin of such a misconception is taken from the barbarians, the consequence from the common concepts is destroyed for him? For the description of both of them is also to the same extent completely the same, in that it not only removes the entire suspicion of an opposition but also does not allow any difference to be present in the mentioned (substances).

a) ‘the madman’: i.e. Mani.
One can admittedly find a contrariety in the qualities of the existing things, but in no way in the substance. For white is contrary to black, but both are in the body of the same substance. For they are precisely on the one hand contrary to one another and on the other hand not contrary to one another: in the first place they belong to a single genus in that both are colours; and if they then seem to be contraries, they still provide pleasure for the eye through the variety of colour. For neither of them causes harms to pleasure by their lack of symmetry. Moreover, there is both virtue and vice in the soul, and although these are also contraries, they are not only in the same substance, but are also designated in a single genus, for they are both a state, and they are also present in the soul as something accidental, for which reason it is also possible that they are accidentally absent, since the soul that they are in finds itself first in one mood, then in the other. Thus it is clear that one thing is the account of the substance, another is the account of the things that come into being in this(a) by accident.
And indeed, white and black are sometimes in a way inseparable from the things they are in, but nevertheless no one has ever given the things they are in a name after them. For no one who has wished to signify “milk” has used the name of whiteness instead of the name that in accordance with its species is given to its substance—in order not to seem to signify the many things to which the name of whiteness is attached instead of a single thing. Of course we do not signify the raven by the name of blackness either, but we signify it by the name of the animal and the species. These and similar qualities are inseparable, but virtue and vice in a soul are qualities that have come into being by accident, so that it is more appropriate that man’s substance in no way seems to be predicated from these things, but that it should be signified in a particular way. At least no one has signified what man is from the evil that is present in this or that man, but first one has stated the species of the substance, and then named who it is, and only finally predicated the quality.

Now one could then, as I anticipated before, find a contrariety of qualities in the subordinate things, partly in the separable qualities, partly in the inseparable qualities. But in respect of God every quality is rejected, because none of the things that He is called is something else beside Him, for He is simple and uncompounded, but nevertheless, as I mentioned previously, “being” takes precedence from the perspective of thinking over “being such as this”.

Number 6
I.15, Gr. 8.27–35

ἐπείτα εἰ καλοὶεν τάγαθον ἀφθαρσίαν, φθορὰν ὄνομάσουσιν τὸ κακόν. τίνος δ’ ἂν εἰῇ φθορὰ ἡ φθορά; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἄγαθοι ἀδύνατον· εἰ δ’ ἑαυτῆς¹ εἰῃ φθορά, ἐν πολλοῖς τοῖς αἰώσι διέφθαρκεν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μάτην αὐτὴν εἶναι φαντάζονται. πῶς δ’ ἂν εἰῃ φθορὰ ἑαυτῆς ἡ φθορά;² πάντως γὰρ ἔτερόν τι φθείρει, οὐχ ἑαυτὴν. εἰ δὲ ἑαυτὴν ἐφθείρειν,³ οὐδ’ ἂν τὴν ἄρχην ὑπέστη.⁴ ὀφθήσεται⁵ γὰρ ἑαυτὴν φθειρόωσα μᾶλλον⁶ ἢ οὕσα· φθορὰ γὰρ ἀφθαρτος⁷ ἀδύνατον κατὰ γε τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας⁸ ἐπινοηθήναι.⁹

a) ‘this’: i.e. substance.

1 ἑαυτῆς G ed.L(H); αὐτῆς V.
2 πῶς δ’ ἂν εἰῇ φθορὰ ἑαυτῆς ἡ φθορά: πῶς δ’ ἂν εἰῇ φθορά V G ed.L(H); πῶς
Furthermore: If they call the good “incorruption” they will doubtless give evil the name “corruption”. But what is it that the corruption corrupts? It is impossible that it is the good. But if it is corruption itself that is corrupted, it has been corrupted for many eternities, and they fantasise to no purpose that it (still) exists. But how can corruption be corruption of itself? For it is at any rate something other that is corrupted by it, and not itself. But if it was itself it corrupted, it would not have existed to begin with, either, for it should be noted that (in that case) it would rather have been corrupted than have existed: for it is impossible that corruption is incorruptible according to what the common concepts intend.

Number 7
I.16, Gr. 9.1–4

οταν μέντοι τουιούτον ἀκούωσι λόγων οἱ ἐκ τοῦ μανέντος ὁρμόμενοι, ἀπορούντες Πόθεν οὖν (φασὶ) τὰ κακὰ; πόθεν δὲ (λέγουσιν) ἢ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμφανισμένη ἀταξία;

1 οὖν G cd.L(H); εἰσὶν V.
But when those who issue from the madman hear such words, they ask the questions: “From where,” they say, “do evil things come?” “From where,” they say, “does the disorder come that reveals itself in the things?”

Number 8
I.17, Gr. 9.25–38

gέγονε τοῖνυν μίξις καὶ κράσις τοῦτον (φησὶ) τὸν τρόπον τῆς τε καταποθείσης δυνάμεως τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς καταπιούσης ὠλής, καὶ οὕτως ἔξ ἀμφότερον ἐδημιουργήθη τόδε τοῦ πάν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ δηλαδὴ, οὗ γὰρ ἀν προϊνόσκει τῇ κακίᾳ κόσμου γενέσεως ἐντεύθεν δὴ (φασὶ) τὰ μὲν ἁγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακά τῆς κράσεως ἐκείνης καὶ τῆς συνόδου τοῖν κατὰ τὴν ἕναντιτήτιζος τῶν τῆς προχμάτων ἐμφαινομένης ὀρίζεται δὲ ψυχή μὲν ἀπεσαν εἰναι τῆς μερίδος τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ σῶμα δὲ καὶ τὴν σάρκα τῆς ὠλής πη μὲν κατέχουσιν ὡς ἐν εἰρκτῇ τὴν ψυχήν πη δὲ κατεχομένην ὡς θηρὶον πρὸς τῆς ἐπωθής οὕτω μὲν δὴ σοφισάμενος τὴν ὠλὴν ὁ ἁγαθὸς κόσμου φησὶ γέγονε δημιουργός οὐκ ἀντιποιθεῖς καὶ τοῦ δημιουργήσεαι αὐτόν ἀνθισταται γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπανάστασιν τῆς κακίας ἢ σοφρονίσσαι διενοθή.

1 τόδε τὸ ed.L(H); τόδε G; τὸ δὲ V.
2 δὲ G ed.L(H); omitted in V.
3 κατέχουσιν ed.L(H); κατέχον G; κατέχων V. Since the two πη are parallel, it is reasonable to assume that the participles also are, hence the text of H is preferred here.
4 πρὸς G ed.L(H)—supported by ἔπος, “by”, in Sy 13.11; πρὸ V.
5 σοφρονίσσαι V G; σοφρονήσαι ed.L(H).

So in this way a mixture and a mingling have arisen,—he says,(a)—of the power of the good one, which has been devoured, and by the matter that has devoured it, and thus this universe was created out of both, manifestly(b) by the good one, for the evil does not concern itself with the genesis of the world. It is precisely for this reason, they say, that both good things and bad things exist, since the mentioned mingling and fusion of the two forces in question shows itself here through the opposition between things. But he declares that the entire soul is part of the good, and that the entire body and the flesh are part of matter; matter holds the soul as in a prison, but itself held like an animal by an incantation. Then since the good one has fooled matter in this way, he is, he says,(a) the Creator of the world; true he did not strive to create (the world), for he
stands against it, but he did so because of the rebellion of evil, which he had in mind to quell.

a) ‘he’: i.e. Mani.

b) ‘manifestly’ is probably intended ironically; cf. δηλαδή in Liddell, Scott and Jones 1968, 384b.

**Number 9**

*I.17, Sy 13.32–34*

This passage is omitted in Gr. 10.17—also in G+V

It is probably best to regard this passage as part of Titus’s original text, which by mistake has slipped out of the Greek text transmission. Sy has no particular interest in adding it independently.

For he has concealed his books and has placed them in darkness because he feared the refutation which would be (made) against them on the basis of(a) them.

a) ‘of’: lit. ‘from’.

**Number 10**

*I.21, Gr. 13.2*

ός γε ὁ τὰ τοῦ μανέντος συγγράφων φησινὶ “ἐπιθυμοῦντες”

1 ὁ τὰ τοῦ μανέντος συγγράφων φησινὶ V G ed.L[H]: otherwise in Sy 17.8 ὁ τὰ τοῦ μανέντος συγγράφων φησινὶ, “the mad Mani says in his book”. The difference is probably best explained by Sy simplifying the original.

... as he, who writes down the madman’s teachings, says, “they desired”...

**Number 11**

*I.24, Gr. 15.19–37*

αὐτίκα οὐχ ἡμεῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων αἱ ἀναβεβηκαί δυνάμεις, ὅτι μὲν ἔστι τάγαθον γινώσκομεν, τῇ γνώσει καὶ μόνῃ πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν
For example, not only we but also the angels’ superior powers know that the good exists, in that through knowledge and through that alone we are brought up to piety, since with regard to knowledge the angels are clearly just as superior as they are with regard to their nature. But neither we nor they have a part in seeing God in substance. Nor are we therefore able to see the angels themselves, as long as we are clad in the natural body. For it is clear and a recognised fact that he who sees, sees what resembles himself. But if anyone should unwisely believe that what has been said is untenable—because we see the sun, moon and stars, and beneath us rocks and gold and silver and altogether the earth and the sea and all the animals, and yet we surely do not resemble them—he shall know
that even if the species of the enumerated things are different, the body is nevertheless the superior genus for all these species. For the substance is divided into the invisible, insofar as it is incorporeal, and the visible, insofar as it is a body. The first division thus determines all this as a genus, which is the body. So a body then sees a body, and as a body it both resembles and is kin to what is seen, even if their(a) species are different because of the diversity of colours and good order in everything.

a) ‘their’: i.e. ‘he who sees’ and ‘what is seen’.

Number 12
I.29, Gr. 17.36–18.6

καὶ τολμὸν ἑπάγει ὦτι δὴ κατεκοιμήσει τὴν ὑλὴν ἡ ἀποσταλείσα τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις ὡς τὸ θηρίον ἔπονη, ὥς τοῦ μόνον ἀπθάνως τὰ ἀκρῶς ἐναντία τῷ λόγῳ κρίνει καὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς κατὰ φύσις ἐνδεχόμενα τῷ ἰδίῳ πλάσματι χαριζόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον ἢ βούλεται καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατασκευάζον. εἷς ὁμοφών μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἑτούθθων φησὶ θεὸν δημιουργήσαι τὸ τὸ πάν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἐννοεῖ μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῆς κακίας, ἐννοεῖ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, ἔτει μονοειδῆ εἶτε συγκειμένην ἕκ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ταύτην, ὡς ἕκατερον μικρὸν ὑστερον δείξομεν, σύστασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον.

1 κατεκοιμήσει VG; κατεκοιμήσει ed.L(H).
2 τούτων ed.L(H)—supported by ψηφ...σόμε...ιδέ, “both of these two” in Sy 23.17; τούτων VG (should then belong to θεόν and not to ὁμοφών).
3 συγκειμένην ed.L(H); συγκειμένων G.
4 The punctuation and parenthesis εἷς ὁμοφών...τῶν ἐναντίων are changed as compared to ed.L(H), based on another analysis and translation of the text.
5 ταύτην VG; ταύτη ed.L(H).

And he dares to add that the power sent out by God has indeed lulled matter to sleep like an animal with an incantation, in that in his speech he not only improbably mixes together the greatest contradictions and with his own fabrication generously grants (much) to those things which by nature are in no way possible, but he also contrives the opposite of what he (actually) intends—also here. For he says that it is from these two(a) that God created this universe, and that man’s body came from evil, but that his soul came from the good, whether it is homogeneous or it is also composed of
contraries. Below we will thus show that both (possibilities) have no proof at all.(b)

a) ‘these two’: i.e. evil and good.
b) cf. Contra Manichaeos I.32.

Number 13
I.32, Gr. 20.10–21.20

φέρε δή τά πραττόμενα κακά πρὸς ἄνθρωπον¹ κατίδωμεν τίνι προσήκε²
φιλολόγως. ἐπιχειρήσει μὲν γὰρ ᾤσως καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κράσιν εἰσηγήσασθαι
tῶν ἄνω ὑπείληφεν ἐναντίον· εἶτε δὲ αὐτὴ μονοειδῆς ὑπάρχοι³ ἐκ τάγαθοῦ
παρ’ αὐτῷ εἶτε καὶ ἐκ συνθέσεως τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐκ τῆς μερίδος τοῦναντίου⁴
τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ῥαδίου ἀποδειχθῆσεται κατὰ τὴν ἀσέβη ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν τὰ
cακὰ γνῶμενα· ἦστι μὲν οὖν ἀδώματος ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ μηδαμῶς σύνθεσιν κατ’
ὕσιάν καὶ μάλλον ἐναντίων ἐπιδειχμένη⁵· οἱ γὰρ ἐκ διαφόρων συντιθέναι
δόξαντες αὐτὴν ὥς τὴν ὑσίαν ποικιλὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὴν διαφερομένην
eἰσηγήσαντο, ἀλλά τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν ὄρωμένων ὑπέγραψαν, ἐνα
λόγων ἀπλών καὶ περιληπτικῶν αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι μὴ δυνηθέντες. εἶ γὰρ
καὶ ταῖς διαφόραις ποιήσισιν, ὡς ἐπιδείχται, ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις διαφέρεται
πρὸς ἐαυτὴν, ὡς κατ’ ὑσίαν ἔργον ὑπάρχουσα τοῦ θεοῦ ἠμεταβλητός
tε ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐκ διαφόρων σύγκειται, ἐναντίων μὲντὸν κράσεων τοσοῦτον
ἄφεστηκεν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ καθ’ ἐαυτὴν σῶμα εἶναι δοκεῖν. θῶμεν δὲ κατὰ
tὴν ἐκείνουν νευδολογίαν (εἶγε καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν εἰπεχειρήσῃ), ὡς καὶ ἡ
ψυχή τοῦ ἄνθρωπου συνεστήκεν ἐξ ἄγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ· οὐχὶ τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν
αὐτῆς κατ’ ἐκείνουν ἀναθέτευν τῷ ἁγαθῷ, τὸ δ’ ἀλόγιστον εἰ γε εἰ ἐπὶ τῇ κακίᾳ⁶
δήλων ὡς οὐδέν ἄν έτερον εἶπεν ἤξοι. τῆς τοιοῦτος ἐπιθυμίας κινουμένης
σφαλέως εἶτε ἐκ μόνου τοῦ σώματος εἶτε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσήκοντος τῇ κακίᾳ
μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥς ἠμνήστηκεν ὡς τῇ κακίᾳ ἐπιθυμίας, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιδειχθῇ τῇ
πράξει· ἦστιν ἑνώς οὐδεὶς εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν προσέρεται; ἐγκλήματα⁷ δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῆς πρά-
ξεως, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας γίγνεται, ὡς ἐς μείνειν ἐπὶ χάρας ἡ ἐνθύμησισ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, εἰς ἔργον τῇ αἰρέσει τοῦ λογισμοῦ μὴ προφέμεθαι, πρῶτον μὲν
ἄν παυθείνθητον, ἐξπομενήν τε ἄμα καὶ σβεννυμένην, ἐπείτα οὐδάμας
ὁγκλήματα¹⁰ νομισθῆναι οὐ μόνον κοινὸν, ἀλλὰ οὔδ’ εἰς τῷ ἐκείνουν τῷ
ἀνατιθήματα καὶ οὔτε τῷ σώματι οὔτε ἄλλῳ μέρει τινὶ
tαύτης, ὡς τὴν μὲν ἀλόγιστον κακίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι τῇ αἰτίᾳ¹¹ τῶν παρ’
ἡμῖν κακῶν ἄκε μὴ ὑπάρχουσαν, κινουμένειν δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνουν λόγον
ἐκ τῆς μερίδος τάγαθοῦ ταύτη προφέρεσθαι, εἰ γε μὴ ἔτερῳ χρησιμεθα
CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE TEXT

1 ἀνθρώπων G ed.L(H)—supported by Sy 26.7 (καὶ ἔνθρον Μ); ἀνθρώπων V.
2 προσίκε G ed.L(H)—supported by Sy 26.7 (καὶ ἔλθησαν ἐκαυτοῖς, “and let us consider for whom they are fitting”); προσίκει V.
3 ὑπάρχω V; ὑπάρχει ed.L(H).
4 τούναντίον ed.L(H); τούναντίον V G. Presumably Beck (1978, 122 n. 33) is nevertheless right that the word is a gloss from an ignorant scribe: “Im Text (Lag. 20,15) ist das störende τούναντίον zu streichen. Beweis: S. 21,7: ἐκ τῆς μερίδος τοσοῦτο (sic!)”. Beck thinks that for Titus κακά are the sins; if the Manichaeans believe that the soul consists of a good and an evil part, the good part, in Titus’s eyes, must be the part with reason, and since sin requires deliberation, it must stem from the good part. One might object to Beck that the word still makes sense if one translates as “from the contrariety which is the good”, but the fact that there is no equivalent in Sy 26.11–12 favours Beck’s view; the word is therefore also omitted in the present translation.
5 ἐπιδειχμένη V G; ἀποδειχμένη ed.L(H).
6 τὸ δ’ ἀλλόγιστον εἰ γε εἰπὶ τῇ κακίᾳ V,—supported by ἐνόησεν ζῆλος ed. τὴν μετὰ τὸν κακόν καταλήψας εἰς, “but its ignorance, if it exists, he supposes (to be) from evil”, in Sy 26.25–26; τὸ δ’ ἀλλόγιστον εἰπὶ τῇ κακίᾳ G ed.L(H).
7 ἐγκλημα V G; ἔγκλημα ἐνόησεν ed.L(H).
8 δὲ G ed.L(H)—supported by ξύπνῳ in Sy 26.32; omitted in V.
10 ἐγκληματα G ed.L(H)—supported by Sy 27.1–2; ἐγκληματα V.
11 αἰτίαις G ed.L(H)—supported by ἐνόησεν, “cause” in Sy 27.6; κακίας V.
12 φέρεσθαι V G; φέρεται ed.L(H).
13 αὐτός G ed.L(H); αὐτός μὲν V.
14 οἶκεν V G; οἶκεν V corr.G ed.L(H).
15 ἦ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ G ed.L(H); ἦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ μοίρᾳ V.
Let us regard the evil things that are committed by men, and let us openly perceive to whom they belong. For he(a) will perhaps dare(b) also to introduce a mingling of contraries in the soul, as he supposes. But whether it be homogeneous from what is good according to him, or it be also from the composition of contraries, it is easily demonstrated that according to this ungodly assumption evil things have come into being from the part of the good.

The soul is incorporeal, however, in that it in no way permits a composition with regard to substance, and particularly not a composition of contraries. For those who believe that it is composed from differences have not introduced a substance that is diversified and different in relation to itself, but on the basis of visible things they have written about its activities, in that they could not make one simple and comprehensible account about it. For even if it(c) is different—first in this way and then in that way—in relation to itself through the different qualities that it assumes, nevertheless it is according to its substance God’s work and immutable, and it is not composed of differences, but on the contrary it is just as much removed from a mingling of contraries as it is from seeming to be a body in itself.

However, let us assume, following his false talk—in case he should also dare to say this—that man’s soul too has been put together from good and evil. Must one not then, according to him, ascribe the soul’s reasoning faculty to the good, but ascribe that which is irrational, if it really exists, to evil? It is obvious that he would not be able to say otherwise. Hence, when desire is dangerously stirred either from the body alone or also from the part of the soul that belongs to evil, is the action then performed of its own accord? Do not consideration and deliberation come first in man, and thereafter come the decision and the choice of action, and desire then moves to (realise) the deed? But this fault(d) (which is linked to) evil, comes into being from the action, not from the desire, so that if the reflection of the desire remained in its place and did not through the choice of the reasoning faculty move to (realise) the deed, then firstly it could be brought to an end more quickly, since it would blaze up and go out at one and the same time, and secondly it would in no way be regarded as a fault, not only in general, but not even if it was judged according to the highest virtue.

Hence it is clear that the sins are attributed to the soul’s reason on good grounds and not to the body or any other part of this(e)
so that the irrational evil has got rid of being the cause of the evils that are among us, because this evil does not exist either, and that these evils, according to his argument, seem likely to emanate from the part of the good, unless we use another argument out of regard for the love of truth. For if the soul, through not knowing the quality of the desire,(f) had moved on to act irrationally, one could definitely claim that the things which are done irrationally are brought about as though they were from the irrational part (of the soul). However, if the reasoning faculty on the one hand often chooses desire, in that it has voluntarily subjugated itself to a bad way of life, and then once more rejects desire, when a fear, of whatever kind, or at least a desire for virtue that draws towards itself, restrains it,(g) it is clear that it is the reasoning faculty alone that as its own actions both perform those that are done beautifully and those that are done differently. And here the examination of what is to be demonstrated turns out badly against the madman(a) and in favour of the opposite. For none of our sins comes from matter, as they (otherwise) say, but from the soul or from its reasoning faculty, which according to him belongs to the good part.

a) i.e. Mani.
c) ‘it’: i.e. the soul.
d) ‘fault’: the translation of ἔκκλημα as “reproach” could also make sense here, but not, as far as I can see, in what follows.
e) ‘of this’: i.e. of the soul.
f) ‘the quality of the desire’: i.e. ‘which kind of desire it is about’.
g) ‘it’: i.e. the reasoning faculty.
δίκην ταύτην ἐπαχόμενος οὐ μόνον μετὰ τελείας ἐπιστήμης τὸν βίον ὀδεύῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοῦργος τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς κατορθωμάτων ὑπάρχῃ.

1 κατεσκεύασεν V G; κατεσκεύασεν ed.L(H).
2 πέρι το τρόπου V G; ἀλλὰ γε πέρι το τρόπου ed.L(H).
3 The text in Sy 34.4–6 is different: οὐκ ἔσται ἑνὶ ἥδι  ἤς ἐν ἀλλάξειν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς κατορθώματος ὑπάρχη, “For even if they are blamed by (saying) this (word) that ‘the world is without order’, and they are in doubt over the manner and the cause of its coming into being, nevertheless they acknowledge this: that it came into being from God.”
4 τούτῳ ed.L(H); τούτῳ G; τούτον V.
5 δὴ μέρος μὲν G ed.L(H); μὲν δὴ μέρος V.
6 τετῆρηκεν οἰκονομεῖν ed.L(H)—supported by Sy 34.8–9; τετῆρηκε τούτον οἰκονομεῖν V G.

So God has made the world, and those against whom the treatise is directed are not raging about this point. For even if they manifestly change the world that is ordered into disorder, they agree on its character and the cause of its coming into being. So over this(a) God has set man as a rational citizen, even though he is only part of the whole. Everything else, which can neither look towards virtue nor vice, God has kept to Himself to control, but He has brought it about that virtue alone or vice should depend on himself(b), in that He has beforehand placed knowledge of both (qualities) in his nature, in order that while being driven on in accordance with this insight, he can not only go through life with complete knowledge, but can also be the author of the accomplishments of virtue.

a) ‘over this’: H’s text (τούτῳ) appears to be an intelligent correction and is followed here, since it presumably refers to κόσμος, ἐφίστημι is often construed with the dative for that over which something is placed; cf. also τυφλὸν... ἤνιοχον ἐφιστάν ἀρματί ὀξυτάτῳ, Gr. 29.23 (= Number 16).

b) “on himself”: i.e. on man.

Number 15
II.3, Gr. 27.6–16

καὶ καλῶς γε λόγῳ ἐγκλήματος ἡ ἀμαρτία1 καλεῖται παρὰ λόγον (ὁ γε δυνατὸν ἐστὶ χρησάσθω τονταχοῦ) πραττομένη, ὡς εἶναι ἀμαρτίαν πᾶν τὸ παρὰ λόγον πραττόμενον, εἰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν λαμβάνει τὴν ἀφορμήν. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀλόγιστος χρήσις ποιεῖ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν,
And with a word of reproach sin is well named as being committed “against reason”—which as a matter of fact can be applied everywhere—so that all that is committed “against reason” is sin, even if it takes its origin in those things that are in accordance with nature. For the irrational use of the things that are in accordance with nature brings about sin, whereas the reason within us examines the things that are in accordance with nature, and therefore the sin that is committed is not unnoticed. So if we train our immanent reason hard like a body for the exercise of virtue, we make it healthy and strong through a well-measured movement. But if we do not regard it as worthy of training and care, it becomes weaker from illnesses and in the end, because it is neglected, it becomes lame.

Number 16

II.7, Gr. 29.9–28

οὔτω δὲ κατεσκεύασε τὸν ἄνθρωπον φύσει μὲν οὐτ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, ἐπιτρέψας δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ τοῦ κρείττονος τὴν αὔρεσιν. εἰ δὲ τοι μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν μὴτε κακόν, τί ἂν εἰ ὑλοῦν ζητεῖται. σκοπητέον τὸ βραχύ παιδίον τῇ τῶν ἄκρων ἀναρέσει γνωριζόμενον, λέγω δὴ οὐτ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν.1 ἦ μὲν γὰρ οὕσια τοῦτοῦ καλῆ, τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἁρετὴν ἀγαθὸν οὔπω προσείλθησεν. οὔτω δὴ καὶ χρυσῷς φύσει καλὸς, λόγῳ δὲ ἁρετῆς οὐκ ἀγαθὸς, ἀμυνοχὸς ἄν. καὶ λίθοις τίμιοι παραπλησίως καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα,2 ἔκαστον κατὰ τὸ ἱδιὸν ἐν ὑψεῖ κάλλος. κατὰ δὴ τούτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καλὸς μὲν καὶ λίαν καλὸς οὕσια τε καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ διὰ μόνης ἁρετῆς προσγνῶμενον πόνον κτάται: δι’ ὃ θέος ἐπ’ αὐτῷ εἶναι τοῦτο πεποίηκεν. εἰ δὲν3 ἑσθηκέ μὲν τὴν ἐξουσίαν, οὐ προενθετείκε δὲ τῇ φύσει τὴν γνῶσιν ἁρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας, τυφλὸν ἄν εἶδοξεν ἡνίοξον ἐφιστάται ἀρματὶ ὅζυτάτῳ. εἰ δὲ
God has thus indeed constructed man so that he is neither good nor bad by nature, but He has transferred the choice of what is better to his reasoning faculty. Now, if he is neither good nor bad, it must be asked what he may then be. One must then look at the infant child, which is characterised by a negation of extremes, i.e. it is neither good nor bad. For even though its substance is beautiful, it has nevertheless not yet acquired the good in relation to virtue. Similarly, gold is also beautiful by nature, but not good with regard to the reasoning of virtue, since it is inanimated. And likewise precious stones and all that exists, each of them with regard to its own beauty in appearance. In fact according to this explanation man is on the one hand beautiful, indeed “very beautiful”(a), both in substance and in his very essence(b), but the good that is added through virtue alone is acquired through toil. That is why God has brought it about that it depends on man alone. So if He had given him the power but had not placed the knowledge of virtue and vice in his nature beforehand, it would have looked as if a blind charioteer was in charge of a very swift team of horses. But if at the same time He has mixed the two—the power to acquire what is more beautiful and the knowledge to distinguish and to choose surely—then He
has beforehand demonstrated the guiding mind as an expert, but
this mind will drive nature’s team of horses safely on if, having fallen
asleep on the racecourse, he really is not to crash because of his
lusts.

a) λίγων καλὸς alludes to Gen. 1.31aLXX; cf. above p. 303.
b) αὐτῷ τῷ ἐίσαι is, as Torres also realised (“essentia ipsa”), the Aristotelian
technical term, which is rendered in Latin as essentia; see Liddell, Scott
and Jones 1968, 489a.

II.11, Gr. 31.3–7

οὖτω μὲν δὴ1 τὸν ἀνθρωπον τετίμηκεν ὁ θεὸς, κατ’ εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ
δημιουργήσας2 αὐτόν, ἵνα ὠσπερ αὐτὸς ἐλευθερότητι φύσεως ἁγαθός, οὖτω
δὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐλευθερότητι προαιρέσεως3 ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχῃ θεοῦ, οὐκ
ὁδυναμία φύσεως τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν ἀπεχόμενος, ἐλευθερότητι4 δὲ τὴν ἁρετὴν
τιμῶν.

1 δὴ G cd.L(H); οὖν V.
3 προαιρέσεως V; προθέσεως G cd.L(H).
4 ἐλευθερότητι V G; ἐλευθερότητι cd.L(H).

In this way God then has honoured man by creating him in His
own image, in order that he can be an emulator of God through
the freedom of his will just as He Himself is good through the free-
dom of His nature,(a) in that man does not keep away from sinning
because of his weakness of nature, but honours virtue through his
freedom(a).

a) ἐλευθερότης is the substantive for ἐλευθέριος, which acc. to Liddell, Scott
and Jones 1968, 532a means ‘acting like a freeman’, ‘fit for a freeman’
etc., while ἐλευθερότης means ‘the character of an ἐλευθερίος’, especially
‘freeness in giving, liberality’, ‘generosity’. Lampe 1961, 449b, however,
reckons on a change of meaning to ‘free will’, and although the only
references are to this passage in Contra Manichaeos, the meaning ‘fre-
dom’ is supported by Sy, which in 39.19 renders ἐλευθερότητι προαιρέσεως
with μᾶλις κράτος and the two other ἐλευθερότης with ἐκλογὴ in
39.18.21. But whether or not ἐλευθερότης in the manuscripts instead of
ἐλευθερότης should also be regarded as a new formation must be left
open.
But if anyone against this treatise should bring forward the one who sometimes wants to restrain himself from bad deeds, but nevertheless claims to be unable to do so, let him learn that it is not the nature of a lengthy bodily suffering to change at once either. Nor, in similar fashion, is it easy for the bad state of the soul, which has been stiffening for a long time, to release itself from the things that are part of a long custom, unless some greater passion enters and drives out the passion that had previously been received.

1 \(\text{µν} G\) ed.L\(H\); omitted in \(\text{V}\).
2 \(\text{εικολον}\) ed.L\(H\)—supported by \(\text{Nm Qwr}\) [\(\text{theod.}\) h ol tya tyalyld al Nynho, “it is not easy for her [i.e. the soul] to flee from those things” in \(\text{Sy}\) 40.2–3; \(\text{εικολον}\) \(\text{V G}\).
ἀλλὰ γνώσει φυσικῆ ἐπιβάλλουσα τούτοις. αὐτίκα ἁμα μέν, ἐὰν θέλωμεν,
τάναντία ενθυμομέθη, ἁμα δὲ τάναντία πράττειν οὐ δυνάμεθα. οὕτως ἦ
μὲν πράξις ἀφώρισται τῇ αἰρέσει τῆς προθέσεως, ἡ δὲ ἐνθύμησις τὴν
φυσικὴν γνώσιν ἀρέτης τε καὶ κακίας μαρτυρεῖται. εἰ γάρ μὴ τούτα προε-
γινόμενοι, οὐτ' ἂν ἐνθυμήσημεν οὔτ' ἂν τὸ κρείττον εἰλόμεθα στερόμενοι ἃ
τὸ πάντως προαιρείσθαι τὸ χεῖρον ἁγγαίας φαύλαις προειλημμένοι· δι' ὁ
δὴ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώποις σπουδαστέοι περὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἀνατροφὴν ἢ
γεωργίας περὶ τὴν τῶν φυτῶν αὐξησιν.10 τὸ τούτων τὴν ἐνθύμησιν ἡμῶν εἰς
tεκμήριον λαμβάνειν δύο φύσεων ἐναντίον παραπλήγησιν ἢ εἰς ὁσπερ εἰ
tις φαίη τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπάντων κρᾶσιν εἴναι τὴν ὑπν. ἑπειδὴ τούτοις
ἀπασιν ἐπιβάλλει.

1 ἐκατέρων, ἀναγκαίως G ed.L/H; ἀναγκαίως ἐκατέρων V.
2 οὔδ' V G ed.L/H; after οὔδ' there is an addition above the line in G,
    perhaps v (incorrect emendation into οὐν?)
3 κίνησι G ed.L/H; omitted in V.
4 ἐνθύμησις V G ed.L/H; ἐπιθυμία in Sy 40.25.
5 οὕτω ed.L/H—appears to be supported by Sy, "just as our eye has the
    natural ability to see the actions of others" etc., in Sy 40.28–29; οὔ V G.
7 διαδεχεται G ed.L/H; διακαδεχεται V (sic).
8 <τὰ> corr.ed.L—supported by τὰ in Sy 40.32; omitted in V G
    H(acc.to ed.L).
9 εἰλόμεθα στερόμενοι: ed.L assumes that there is a lacuna between εἰλόμεθα
    and στερόμενοι, apparently because it is not very easy to see how the
    participles στερόμενοι and προειλημμένοι relate to one another, but
    the view is not supported by Sy. When Lieu (1994, 184 with n. 128)
    nevertheless seeks to improve the text with the aid of Sy ("If we do not
    have this foresight, we shall not be able to re
    fl
    ect nor to choose
    what is better. [. . .,<Syriac: It happens that most people . . .] when they
    are deprived of complete choice, will prefer the worst through bad
    upbringing.")
    his emendation is untenable: cf. Sy 41.2–6 ἤλθαν οἱ ἑπερατοὶ πρὸς τὸν
    βασιλέα Λευκάρδην, ἐπέστησαν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῆς Λαμπρινῆς καὶ ἐφίλησαν
    τὸν βασιλέα Λευκάρδην, ἐπέστησαν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῆς Λαμπρινῆς καὶ ἐφίλησαν
    τὸν βασιλέα Λευκάρδην, ἐπέστησαν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῆς Λαμπρινῆς καὶ ἐφίλησαν
    τὸν βασιλέα Λευκάρδην. "For if we had not known these
    things beforehand, we would not have considered them, nor would we
    have chosen virtue, and (thus) we would have been deprived of every-
    thing. But it happens that many prefer evil, because they have been
    caught (in evil) beforehand through a detestable way of life."
10 περὶ τὴν τῶν φυτῶν αὐξησιν V G; in G, however, τὴν is added in tiny
    letters above the line (whether or not by the same hand I cannot judge);
    περὶ τῶν φυτῶν αὐξησιν ed.L/H.
But because those who come from the madman\(^a\) also try besides to prove that two opposing natures exist in us, namely through us thinking first bad things, then good things, one must declare that knowledge of both is naturally present in us, and we are therefore inevitably drawn towards the thought of the things that we know\(^b\), in that we are not deprived of (knowledge of) anything at all, but (simultaneously) we gain everything by preferring what is better.

For how should one have extolled people’s voluntary movement towards what is better unless the thought had by nature submitted itself to both sides, both injustice and justice? For knowledge (of injustice and justice) is necessary to be able to distinguish (between them); the thought examines the things that are (thus) known, and the intention inclines towards what it wants. But these things are not different parts of the soul, but in a way its activities. Precisely in this manner it is by nature characteristic of our eye to see (something) else, if it\(^c\) by chance meets evil or good actions, and yet it will not be the cause of either of them\(^d\)—for the mind receives the visual impression and distinguishes what it has seen—thus after the manner of the eye the thought is also inevitably moved towards the things that can happen, in that the thought does not force the soul towards them\(^e\) but through natural knowledge submits itself to them. For example, we think of contrary things at the same time, if we wish to, but we cannot do contrary things at the same time. Similarly, the action is determined by the choice of the intention, but the thought testifies to the natural knowledge of virtue and vice.

For if we had not known these things\(^f\) beforehand, we would have not been able to think or choose the better, since we completely lacked (the ability) to choose beforehand and preferred the worse through bad ways of living. That is precisely the reason why people should be more concerned for the education of children than the farmers are for the growth of their plants.

So taking our thought as proof of the two opposing natures (in us) could be like saying that sight is a mingling of all colours, because it is devoted to all of them.

\(^{a}\) ‘the madman’: i.e. Mani.

\(^{b}\) i.e. ‘the bad and the good’.

\(^{c}\) ‘it’: presumably ‘the eye’.

\(^{d}\) ‘them’: i.e. the ‘evil or good actions’.

\(^{e}\) ‘them’: i.e. ‘the things that can happen’.

\(^{f}\) ‘these things’: i.e. ‘virtue and vice’.
But in general it is neither happy to be rich nor piteous to be poor, because he alone is happy to whom belongs the soul’s steadfast good deed in relation to virtue, whether this one be rich or poor. God has also made man for the sake of this good deed, in order that on the one hand he should receive existence from God, but on the other hand receive from himself the good in addition, through God’s assistance. For God also wants man to have the rationality from himself, since he has it by virtue of his well-known frankness.

Number 21
II.17, Gr. 35.34–38

For natural death would also come without punishment, so that the unavoidable punishment is another one for offenders (than death),
whereas the greater number escape the punishment prevailing among us, so that the possibility of hiding oneself shall become a test of the human reasoning power.

**Number 22**

**II.19, Gr. 36.15–28**

εἰ δὲ καὶ κολάζεσθαι τινα συμβαίνοι οὐκ ἀναίτιον μόνον ἄλλα καὶ θαυμάσιον ἄνδρα, καὶ δίκην ἁρτῆς ἀπαιτεῖσθαι τοῦτον, τί ἂν βλάβος προσαγάγοι τῷ πάσχοντι; διελέγχει μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ποιοῦντας, οὐ βλάπτει δὲ τὸν ύπομένοντα, κἂν ἔως θανάτου φέρηται τὰ τῆς ἀλλόγου τιμωρίας. φθάσας γὰρ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος νεκρότιτι τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον μεμελέτηκαν. ὃ γὰρ μηδὲν μὲν ἡδονὸς τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ἁμηδέσ, πῶς οὐχὶ νεκρὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ πρὸ θανάτου ὁ γε τοιοῦτος καθέστηκεν; εἰς χάριν τὴν γε νομίζομεν ἐπιβουλήν δεχόμενος, ἣ μετὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον προσδοκή μεῖζον ἁγαθοῖς ἐντεῦξεν ὃν ἀπολλειπέν δοκεῖ, ἐφ’ ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐχθρὸν ταχέως παραπέμπομενος ὡς εὐεργέτας τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἔχει. καὶ ἄλλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαίᾳ τῆς βασάνου ἡ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συγχώρησις, ὡς ἂν δοκιμωτέρα τυχάνοι ἡ άιρεσις τῆς ἁρτῆς, εἰ μηδὲν θάνατον εὐλαβοῖτο.

1 τῆς βασάνου V G ed.L(H); μᾶλλον = τοῦ βασικάνου in Sy 46.19.
2 μηδὲ G ed.L(H); δὲ μὴ V.

But even if it should happen that someone is punished who is not only an innocent but also an admirable man, and he is thus punished for his virtue, what harm should it inflict on him who suffers this? For although it may be true that this is a charge against those who do (such a thing against him), yet it does not harm him, since he endures, even if he had to bear the consequences of the groundless punishment till death. For such a man has already beforehand because of his mortality taken care of what concerns life. For when nothing of what is pleasant or unpleasant for the majority is so for him, there is no reason why he who is like this has not become dead to life also even before death. He receives that which is considered an injury as a sign of grace, by which he hopes to obtain greater blessings after the present life than those which he seems to leave behind, and when he is about to be swiftly sent by his enemies towards (these greater blessings), then he has as his benefactors those who plot against him. And otherwise God’s allowance of painful
έπειδή δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους τῇ κακϊᾳ προσνόμουσι, τῖνα τρόπον εἰμαρμέναι διάφοροι κατ’ αὐτοὺς πολλῶν ἔστιν ὅτε χιλιάδαν ὕφ᾽ ἕνα καὶ Ῥοῶν, μάλλον δὲ ὑπὸ μίαν ὁράν πιστουσῶν; ἄρα μία1 τις εἰμαρμένη συνάπτει τούτους ὕφ᾽ ἐαυτῆ;2 καὶ πῶς οὐ πάντη τοῦτο γε3 ὑπολαμβάνειν γελοιότατον; οὕνεκ τὸ μὲν ἄνισον τῆς εἰμαρμένης (τὸ χαλεπὸν τῶν πεπλανημένων νόσημα)4 χόραν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐκ ἔχει, πόλεμοι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄρχῃν ἐκ πλεονεξίας λαμβάνουσι, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν πρὸς θεοῦ συγχωρομένην ἔχουσι. κακὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἡ ἀφορμή (λέγω δὴ τῆς πλεονεξίας ἡ ἐπιθυμία), ὀπερ ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλ᾽ οὐχὶ θεοῦ πλημμέλημα τοῖς ἐμπροσθὲν δἐδεῖται, θάνατος δὲ τῆς φύσεως οὐ κακός. γένεσις γὰρ καὶ θάνατος πρὸς θεοῦ φύσει νενομοθετηται, οὐ τῶν γε τελευτῶντων ἀπολλυμένων, ἄλλα τῶν γινομένων τοῖς οὕσι προστιθημένων· ἁγαθοῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἄν εἶθ τὸ μόνον τοῖς οὕσιν ἀνθρώπως τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ γεγονέναι δωρεῖται, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὄντας προκατασκευάζειν τοῖς οὕσιν, ὡς ἂν οἱ5 τε γενόμενοι διαδραμόντες αὐτάρκες τοῦ βίου τὸ στάδιον, ἀντὶ ἀναπάύσεις τοῦ δρόμου τὸν θάνατον λάβωσιν (οὕσι εἰς ἀπώλειαν αὐτοὺς ἄχοντα, ἄλλ᾽ ἐτέρωσε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστους6 μετάγοντα) οἳ τε μὴ οὕντες πάροδον εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι λάβωσιν. οὕκουν θάνατος ὁ τῇ φύσει νενομοθετημένος οὐ πονηρός, κἂν ὁποσοῦν8 ἐπίοι. οὔδε γὰρ τὸ διάφορον τῶν περιστάσεων δὴ ἄν ἐπεισιν ἐξεταστέον, ἕνα δὲ τρόπων9 κοινὸν τοῖς πάσιν οὖσα γνώστεον, λέγω δὴ τὸ μὴ δίχα περιστάσεως τίνος καὶ ἀνάγκης ἀναχορεῖν ψυχήν ἀπὸ σῶματος, ἄλλα παραμένειν ἔσος ἂν τὸ φυσικὸν αὐτῆς καταγώγων ἀκαθαρσῶν διαμένος. τοῦτο μέντοι τῷ φυσικῶ καὶ κοινῷ συνυπάρχει τι δέος, ὅπερ εἰς τιμωρίας ὑποσίαν ἀναγκαίους περείληπται, οὐ μέντοι ἐν τοῖς πάσιν, ἄλλ᾽ οἷς γε ἡ διάνοια πρόχειρος εἰς ἀμαρτίαν, πρὸς ἀνατριπτήν ταύτης,10 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμφρον11 κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἀρὰ γε12 τοῦ πλημμελεῖν καὶ τοῦ οὕσει θεοῦ μοχθόρων εἶναι τὸν θάνατον ἀπήλλακτα, ὁ δὲ φιλαμαρτήμον ἀπὸ μὲν13 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀνοίας ἀφ᾽ ἥσπερ καὶ πλημμελεῖ, τὸν θάνατον εὐλοβεῖται. ἀναγκαῖον μέντοι τῆς ἀνοίας ἔχει τὸ τοιοῦτον14 παρακολούθημα, ἱνα τὸ15 ἄδειξες δεδιώκ.16 προσήκειν ἄληθῶς δεδιέναι (λέγω δὴ τῆς ἀμαρτίας) διαφύγῃ τὴν βλάβην. ἐπείδη οὖν πλεονάσῃ παρ᾽ ἐθνεῖς τὰς τῆς ἀμαρτίας, ἢς γε τυχάνει ἐν εἴδος τὸ τῆς ἀπληστίας, ἀειτοῖς17 παραίτητα γίγνεται τῆς κατὰ τὸ φαίνομενον τιμωρίας, ἢτις κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄληθὲς ὡς οὐκ ἄν εἰη τιμωρία

**Number 23**

Π.22, Gr. 38.30–40.5

testing is necessary among men, so that the choice of virtue can be more genuine, if anyone should not even fear death.
λέλεκται, φύσει κοινῆ κατὰ πάντων ὀρισμένη, εὐεργετεῖ δὲ τοὺς τε πίπτοντας ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοὺς διασωζόμενους, τοῖς μὲν ἄμαρτίας τέλος παρέχουσα, τοῖς δὲ ὑπόδειγμα δέους ἐμποιοῦσα· εὐεργετεῖ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀδίκους τέλος τῆς ἀδικίας ὁ θάνατος, οὕτω δὴ καὶ δικαίως ὡς νικηταῖς τρόπον τινα στεφάνων ἀρχή· ὡστε θαυμάσιον διὰ τῆς πανσέφρου προνοίας τοῦ θεοῦ συμβαίνει· τὸ γὰρ δοκοῦν ἐκλάζειν εὐεργετεῖ καὶ οὐδὲ δὲ, ἢν αὐτὸς ἀντικρὺς κατασκευάζει ἀνιαρῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντον, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἢν ἀνθρώπους αὐτομολοῦσι συγχωρεῖ· ὡστε πόλεμος ὡκ ἔρχον θεῷ ἀλλὰ συγχώρησις ἀνογχαία, εἰς μὲν ὑποψίαι τιμωρίας κατὰ τῆς ἄμαρτίας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀλληθὲς εἰς τέλος αὐτῆς, ἐνθα κἂν δίκαιος πέσῃ (δίκαιον δὲ πολεμεῖν ἀπεικός) μειζόνος εὐεργετεῖται. μειζόνι γὰρ τοῦ παυθῆναι κακίας τὸ καρπῶν ἀπολαύσαι τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς πόνων, ὀπερ ἐνεσβέσει μετά θάνατον ὑπάρξει.

1 μία G ed.L(H)—supported by ἰαμαυμα, “one destiny” in Sy 49.6–7; μή V.
2 έαυτή ed.L(H); έαυτών V G.
3 καὶ πῶς οὐ πάντη τούτῳ γε G ed.L(H); καὶ πῶς καὶ οὐ πάντη γε τούτῳ V.
4 ὁθὲν τὸ μὲν ἄνισον τῆς εἰμαρμένης (τὸ χαλεπὸν τῶν πεπλανμένων νόσμα) V G ed.L(H); otherwise in Sy 49.8–9: ἰαμαυμα σκαναί ταῦτα γε διὰς σκαναί ταῦτα γε ἰαμαυμα χαρά μανταται. “From this inequality of fate there is not place in the affairs (of men) for the severe illness of those erring ones.”
5 τελευτάντων V G corr.ed.L; τελευτάντων H(acc.to ed.L)
6 οἱ G ed.L(H); οἱ V.
7 ἐκάστους V G; ἐκάστου ed.L(H).
9 τρόπον ed.L(H); τῶν τρόπων V G.
10 ταύτης G ed.L(H); αὐτῆς V.
11 ἐμφραν ed.L(H)—supported by ἰαμαυμα παρακαταδίκησαν αὐτὸν ταῦτα διὰ, “for he who is wise and is in (a state of) virtue”, in Sy 49.33–34; ἐμφραν V G.
12 ἄρα γε G (concluding); ἄρα γε V ed.L(H).
13 μὲν G ed.L(H); omitted in V.
14 τοιοῦτον G ed.L(H); τοιοῦτο V.
15 ἰνα τὸ G ed.L(H); ἰνα δὲ τὸ V.
17 έαυτοῖς G ed.L(H); έαυτοῦ V.
18 δὲ G ed.L(H); καὶ V.
19 δοκοῦν G ed.L(H); δοκεῖν V.

But because they also assign wars to evil, (the question arises) how is it according to them in the case of the different destinies, when sometimes many thousands fall at one and the same time, or rather,
indeed, in one and the same hour? Surely one destiny or another unites them under itself? It really is in every way the most ridiculous thing to suppose this. In such circumstances there is no room for the inequality of destiny in things, (and the argument on this basis is otherwise) the errant men’s heavy sickness, and (furthermore it is a fact) that wars have their beginnings in covetousness, but are realised (in practice) because God allows it. For their occasion, i.e. the desire of covetousness, is admittedly an evil that is due to the sin of men—not of God—as has been shown previously, but death in nature is not evil.

For birth and death are ordained by God in nature, in that those who die are in no way lost, while those who are born are added to those who (already) exist. For it would not be characteristic of a good being to give existence and birth only to the men who (already) exist, but on the contrary to prepare those who do not exist to be, so that both those who have been born receive death—which should be regarded as a rest after the race when they have run through life’s arena sufficiently, since death does not lead them to destruction, but leads each of them away to the other side according to their deserts—and those who do not exist receive the entrance to birth. Surely then, death, which is ordained by nature, is not evil, whichever way they should come upon it. For the difference between the circumstances by which they come upon it should not be examined either, but one must know that there is one common manner for all, i.e. that the soul does not withdraw from the body without some distress and pain, but that it holds out for as long as its natural lodging may persist unimpaired. In this natural and common (death) there is admittedly a certain fear present, namely the fear one has of necessity with regard to the suspicion of punishment; it is true that it is not present in them all, but it is at least (present) in those whose intention is ready to sin, with a view to disturbing this intention. For while it is true that he who is wise with regard to virtue, is released from sinning and from thinking that death is evil, yet he who loves sin fears death out of the same ignorance through which he also sins. Precisely the same consequence follows inevitably from ignorance, in order that he who fears what is not to be feared will escape being harmed by that which it is in truth fitting to fear, namely sin.

When the sinful (desires) then swell up in the peoples(a), among which one kind is indeed (the desire of) greediness, they become
guilty of the visible punishment, which admittedly cannot in truth be called a punishment, since it is destined for all through their common nature, but on the contrary is a benefaction both for those who fall in war and for those who come through it safely: for the fallen by putting an end to their sin, and for the survivors by instilling in them an example of what there is to fear. But also if some of the righteous have joined the crowd (in war), death is similarly a benefaction. For just as death puts an end to the injustice of the unjust, so it is also for the righteous—as it is for the victors—in a manner the beginning of the crowns of victory. Therefore death occurs wonderfully through God’s all-wise Providence. For what seems to punish is a benefaction, nor is it a case of punishment through those things that He Himself openly brings about, which are (otherwise) considered to be unpleasant things, but (only) through those things that He simply allows men themselves to be involved in.

Thus war is not the work of God, but His permission is necessary. With regard to sin, war is to be sure (appointed) for the (fearful) suspicion of punishment, but with regard to the truth (it is appointed) in order to put an end to sin, and even if a righteous man should then fall—but it is unlikely that a righteous man prosecutes war—a major benefaction has been performed. For greater than the abstaining from evil is it to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour for virtue which is prepared for the pious after death.

\(\textit{a)}\) ἔθνεσι could also be translated here as ‘gentiles’.

Number 24
II.23, Gr. 40.10–14

πῶς δὲ ἂν τὸν θάνατον κακίσσαι δυνηθέειν, ἀπολύοντά γε τῆς ύλης (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἀπατεώνος) τὴν ψυχήν; ὅπερ κατὰ μὲν τὴν κοινήν δόξαν ἤκιστά γε θάνατος κακὸν. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος τοὺς πᾶσι συμβαίνον οὐ κακόν\(^1\).

1 κακὸν G ed.L(H); κακός V.

But how could they scold death, when it indeed releases the soul from matter, according to the deceiver’s teaching? That is why death is in no way an evil according to common opinion. For that which of necessity befalls everyone is not evil.
But that death is in no way evil may especially be shown in the following way: for if it were not destined for everyone, the righteous man would forever have laboured for virtue without reaping anything beyond the pearls of sweat, while the unrighteous man would have spent the time as an immortal in sinful lusts. And both facts would have been quite improper. But death ends both the unrighteous lust in the sinner and stops the righteous labour of him who acts rightly. For since being able to sin is necessary for men, because it is the cause of them (also) being able to act virtuously, while the power to acquire the beautiful and the good, which is given by God in the majority of men, tends towards a readiness to sin, so that virtue can be more admirable when it involves difficulty, death is beneficial for them both, the righteous as well as the unrighteous:
for the righteous as rest after his efforts, but for the unrighteous it puts an end to his sins.

Since death is now found to be good—and not merely not evil—not in the way according to the madman’s teaching, where it releases the soul from the—non-existent—matter, but in the way described, for what reason should we imagine a principle of evil behind wars, and not just blame the unrighteous intention among those who make use of it?

Number 26
II.28, Lag Gr. 44.6–9

οὐτε θάνατος (κἂν πολὺς ἁθρόους ἐπενεχθεῖσθα) πονηρός, ὡς ἐπὶ ζημία κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ θεοῦ κείμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ὑφελεῖσι τῇ ἀνωτάτῳ δικαιοῖς τε καὶ ἄδικοις ὄρισμένος.

1 πολύς G ed.L(H); πολλ (abbreviated) V.
2 πονηρός G ed.L(H); πονηρός ὡς V.

Nor is death evil, even if it should occur in a great number suddenly, since it is not laid down by God in respect of men for punishment, but is determined in the highest degree for the benefit of both righteous and unrighteous.

Number 27
II.39, Gr. 49.35–37

ἐλεγχὸς γὰρ πᾶν ἐναντίον ἐναντίον, γνώσει μέντοι καὶ κρίσει, ἄνευ δὲ γνώσεως οὐδέτερον θεατέρῳ δήλον.

1 θεατέρῳ ed.L(H); θατέρου G; διὰ θατέρου V.

For every proof is the contrary of its contrary, (the proof that) precisely (takes place) through cognition and judgement, but it is clear that without cognition neither of them exists for the other.
Thus, since man is cognisant of both, virtue and vice, whichever (of them) he may choose—for knowledge comes before choice—he is designated by that, but before he has knowledge, as long as he is a child, he is not designated by either of the two extremes.(a)

a) ‘extremes’: i.e., ‘good and evil’, cf. Number 16 above.

For the same happens for different reasons to the righteous and the unrighteous, and neither to the damage of the righteous nor as punishment for the unrighteous. For what is natural cannot be a punishment, but serves as an example or for the prevention of incurable evils.
For it seems as though it was at the least not appropriate that the signs of God’s wisdom were accessible to all, and that the ineffable and incomprehensible mind was everywhere laid bare to men, since most of the resolutions of a man who is a king and a ruler are occasionally also covert, so that it is unclear for what reason that which is done is being done.

**Number 31**

II.48, Gr. 56.36–37

tí δ’ ἀν εἴποιμεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἀπανταὶ νοῦν σοφίας τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢν ἐποιήκε νοοῦντας καὶ μὴ νοοῦντας ἐκπλήττεσθαι τε καὶ τιμᾶν;

1 εἴποιμεν V G corr.ed.L C; ἔποιμεν H(acc.to ed.L); εἴποιμι R.
2 ἀπανταὶ V G ed.L(H); πάντα R C.
3 ἢν G ed.L(H); R C—supported by Sy 70.26; omitted in V.
4 ἐποιήκε V G ed.L(H); ἐποιήκε καὶ R C.
5 νοοῦντας V G ed.L(H); νοοῦντας τε R C.
6 ἐκπλήττεσθαι τε G ed.L(H) R C; ἐκπλήττεσθαι V.

But what can we then say about God’s wisdom—being beyond every intellect—which it is fitting that we both stand in awe of and honour both when we understand it and when we do not?

**Number 32**

III.1, Gr. 66.28–67.9

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐμπροσθεν ἐκ τε τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν εἰρημένα πάντων ἄν ίσως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐκκλεσίας τῶν νοῶν ἀσφαλίσαιτο μηδαμῶς προσίεσθαι τοῦ μανέντος τὴν κατὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ὄλων.
blasphēmian, ἐπειδὴ δὲ θήραν ἔτεραν κατὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας μεμελέτηκε δεινήν τε καὶ χαλεπήν, ῥήσεις τινὰς τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν ἐκβιαζόμενος πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ ψευδολογίαν, ὧρα ἤ ἄν καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν ἐλέχχουσα κατ’ αὐτοῦ κινήσα τρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῶν πεπι- στευκότων, ταῖς ἄλλοκοτοι καὶ λίαν ἀπιθάνοντος ἐρμηνεύεισθαι ἐστὶν ὅτε πρὸς τῶν ἐκείνων πλανομένων. ποικίλος γὰρ μεθοδεύων ἦν ἐπενόησε συνεργεία τοῦ διαβόλου πλάνην, ἵσχυεν ἑπιχειρεῖ. Ἐλλῆσαι μὲν οὖ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀνατρέπων, τὰ ἐλάττω κακὰ πρὸς μείζονα ἀσβεσίας ὤγκον ἐξαίρων, κακοπάθεστερον ἐλληνισμὸς ὑφηγεῖται, οἷς σχεδὸν πρὸς ἀπασαν συμπεριγράμμενος φάσιν ὁμοδοξίᾳ κακῶν καὶ σφάλερον μαθημάτων τὴν προσθήκην τῶν ἐαυτοῦ πλασμάτων παρεμβάλλει—παρὰ δὲ χριστιανοὶ τὰ χριστιανὸν δῆθεν μετικῶς καὶ πιθανότητα ὁμόματις τῷ χριστῷ καὶ ἰμάτων τῆς γραφῆς καὶ ἐπιεικείας ἐμφάσει τὸν μὲν λύκον (ὄπερ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἐνδοθὲν κεσὼν, τὸ δὲ κώδιον ἐξωθὲν περιτθέμενος, ὀπάτη ἀστέρος τῷ ποιμνίῳ γίγνεται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τοὺς ἢττον ἐμφρόνας καταβλάπτει.

1 τῶν ὕλων V G ed.L(H); omitted in Sy 82.8.
2 δὲ G ed.L(H)—supported by Sy 82.8; omitted in V.
3 τινὰς G ed.L(H); τὸν V (meaningless); omitted in Sy.
5 ἐλέχχους V G ed.L(H); singular in Sy 82.10 (καταβλάπτει, “refutation”—perhaps καταβλάπτει is merely forgotten.
6 πεπιστευκότων V, although the reduplicatory πε is added above the line; πιστεύουν G ed.L(H).
7 ταῖς ed.L(H); αὐταῖς V G.
8 πρὸς τῶν ἐκείνων πλανομένων V G ed.L(H); otherwise in Sy 82.12–13: τοῖς ἢττον ἐμφρόνας καταβλάπτει, “to those who are led into error by his disciples”.
9 ἦν G ed.L(H); omitted in V.
10 ποικίλος γὰρ μεθοδεύων ἦν ἐπενόησε συνεργεία τοῦ διαβόλου πλάνην, ἵσχυεν ἑπιχειρεῖ. V G ed.L(H); Sy 82.13–14 is rather different: ὡς ἐνὶ καταβλάπτει τοῖς ἢττοις ἐμφρόνας, “By all sorts of means he is made crafty by the wealth (= abundance) of his error, with Satan’s assistance, and . . .”.—Also in the following lines there are wide differences between Sy and the Greek text.
11 ὑφηγεῖται G; ἐφηγεῖται ed.L(H); ἔφηγεῖται V.
12 ἀπασαν ed.L(H); ἀπαντά V G.
13 καὶ V G—supported by Sy 82.21; omitted in ed.L(H).
14 κεσὼν ed.L(H)—the structure with the following peripthéménes could favour this as a correct emendation; κεσώ G; omitted in V (error, for it is found in Sy 82.22).
15 ἀστέρος V G ed.L(H); omitted in Sy 82.23.
16 τοὺς ἢττον ἐμφρόνας G ed.L(H); τοὺς ἢμφρονάς ἢττον V.
What has now been said above—both from their actions(a) and from the common concepts—may perhaps strengthen the mind, also in all those outside the Church, so that it in no way sanctions the madman’s blasphemy against the Creator of all things; but because he has set another trap(b) for those who are from the Church, both fearful and dangerous, by violating certain words from the Holy Scriptures for his own false narrative, the time is now also ripe to set in motion refutations from the Divine Scriptures against him to strengthen those who believe (and) in defence of those who are occasionally led astray by him through outlandish and highly improbable interpretations. For while he artfully deceives with frauds, which he has invented in collaboration with the Devil, he strives to become strong. Among the Greeks he does not overthrow their teachings, but he raises the lesser evils to the greater standing of impiety and (thus) he instructs a worse kind of Greekness; in them(c) he has inserted an addition of his own inventions, in that he carries his claim round to nearly everyone with a similar tenet on evil and unreliable doctrines, but with the Christians the deception of a star comes into being for the flock,(d) in that he forsooth(e) follows the things that are the Christians’ and with both the persuasiveness that lies in the name of Christ and with a presentation that builds on the words of Scripture and reasonableness he partly hides the wolf—which is himself—on the inside and has partly donned sheep’s clothing on the outside, and in this way he destroys the less intelligent.

a) ‘from their actions’: πράγματα must summarise one of the bases of the argument in Books I–II, in which Titus has been concerned with the actions of the Manichaeans to only a limited degree, however. Sy 82.5 translates with τοιαύτα τὰ πρᾶγματα τούτα, “both from their affairs”, and Torres “tum ex rebus ipsis”.

b) ‘trap’: θήρα, lit. ‘hunt’, see Liddell, Scott and Jones 1968, 799a; Lampe 1961, 651a. Torres’ “aliam venationem” is a direct translation. However, the meaning here must be that mentioned in Arndt and Gingrich 1960, 361a: “net, trap”. The meaningless καβύς in Sy 82.8 must of course be corrected to καβύς = θήρα.

c) ‘in them’ refers either to ‘the lesser evils’ or to ‘teachings’.

d) perhaps an allusion to Jude 13.

e) ‘forsooth’ (δῆθεν) is probably ironical here.
And shortly after he writes, “Because of this each of the very archons of matter formed,” he says, “after they had in consternation sent down their immanent power involuntarily in the way we said before, itself into a trap for the soul because of the performed movement and because of him who had firstly revealed himself for the redemption of the soul, once the door had been opened, and they moulded a copy of him on earth which they forced the bewitched souls to be separable from only with difficulty.”

The passage was a cardinal example for Baumstark (1931, 36–39) that the text of $\text{Sy}$ is more original than the Greek one. So I also include $\text{Sy}$ with a translation:

$\text{Sy}$ 83.35–84.7

...
And soon after he says again: “Because of this each one of them, that is the archons of matter,—in that way as we say beforehand,—because of that trembling which had come to pass, and because of that one who first showed himself for the redemption of the soul, and when the doors first were opened by their consternation which was not by their will, each one of them dismissed the power which was in them, and each depicted itself as a snare for the soul and formed his likeness on earth so that by it(a) souls might, with difficulty, be snatched away because of the coercion of the enticement of error.

a) ‘it’: i.e. the snare.

*Number 34*

**III.7, Gr. 69.5–25 (= ed.N 296.1–298.6)**

<᾽Επαπορῶν>¹ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, τοῦ χάριν ἐγένετο, περὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπον δεικνύειν ἐπιχειρῶν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πλάσμα θεοῦ, κινεῖ μὲν ἀνοίητος καὶ ἐπέρα, πῶς δὲ καὶ ² ἐντολὴν ἐδίδου (φησὶν) ὁ θεὸς τῷ Ἁδάμ; δυοῦν γὰρ θάτερον ἡ ἐγίνοσκεν ὡς παραβῆσεται καὶ οὐ μᾶτην μόνον ἐδίδου, ἀλλὰ καὶ άιττος αὐτοῦ, ³ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντα λέγειν ἀνάγκη ἅ τὸν θεὸν ἁγνοίοι περιβλήσθαι, ὡς τὴν ἐντολὴν δεδόθησαν μὲν, ⁴ εἰς ἐπιβουλὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον πρὸς τῆς κακίας (ὡς οἴεται) καὶ οὐδὲνος ἐτέρου, ὑφελήσθαι ⁵ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἡλευθερώσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, πεισθέντας ⁶ συμβουλὴ τοῦ ὦφεως, ὃν ἀγγέλον εἶναι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διορίζεται. τυφλὸς μὲν γὰρ ἦν, φησί, γευσάμενος δὲ τοῦ ἀπηγορευμένου εἶδεν ἑαυτὸν ὃτι γυμνὸς ἦν καὶ σκέπη τῇ εὐρεθείσῃ κατεχρήσατο καὶ ἔγνω τὰ γαθοῦν τε καὶ κακὸν. ⁹ οὕτως μάλιστα ὑφέληται, ¹⁰ παραβεβηκὼς τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ ἐπιβουλῶς πλάσαντος. πῶς δὲ (φησὶ) πρέποι ἀν ¹¹ θεῷ λέγειν „ἰδοὺ Ἁδάμ γέγονεν ὡς εἰς ἔκαθον τοῦ γινόσκειν καλὸν καὶ πονηρὸν· καὶ νῦν, μήποτε ἐκτείνας τὴν χείρα λάβῃ τὸν ἕνωλυ τῆς ζωῆς καὶ ἀφή καὶ ζησάτως εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα·“; εἰ γὰρ <oriously> ἦν ἄθανασιαν ἀπολαβέναι, ¹³ φθονερὸς δὴ ὁ ἐξελαύνων τοῦ παραδείσου τὸν ἄνδρα ¹⁴ καὶ ἀποκλείων αὐτῷ τὴν μετοικίαν τοῦ ἔνωλυ τῆς ζωῆς, οὗ μετέχοιν εἰς οἷς ἐαὶ τὴν ἄθανασίαν ἔχειν οἷς τε ἦν.

² δὲ καὶ V G ed.L(H); omitted in Sy 84.28.
3 αὐτὸ G ed.L(H); αὐτῷ V; the text in Sy 84.31 is οὖν ἀνέκτη τῆς ἀπειθείας, “but he was also the cause of the disobedience”, which ed.N suggest could render αἰτία τῆς ἀπειθείας.

4 λέγειν ἄνεργη V G ed.L(H); ἄλλα ἄλλα, “and it is not likely”, in Sy 84.32, which ed.N (with a question mark) suggests could render ἀλλά ὅσιον ὁκλῶμ. The difference, however, is more likely one of perspective, and is due to the Catholic view of Sy, see above pp. 196–97.

5 μὲν V ed.L(H); μὲν ὅν (for ὅν?) G (meaningless).

6 ὄφελέσθη G ed.L(H); ὄφελέσθη V.


8 πειθήσαντα G ed.L(H); πειθήσαντα V; ἀλλά ἄλλα τὸ οἷον τιμῶθαι ἰησοῦν ἀλήθεια ἀλήθεια ἰησοῦν ἀλήθεια, “and man was (thus) liberated through his disobedience at the serpent’s advice”, in Sy 84.34–35 can acc.to ed.N be explained by an original ἀπειθήσαντα, a suggestion supported to an extent by V’s πειθήσαντα, which is only used poetically when it is not negative.

9 κακόν V G; τὸ κακόν ed.L(H).

10 ὄφεληται G ed.L(H); ὄφελητο V.

11 πρέποι ὅν V G; πρέποι ed.L(H).

12 <(άς φησι)> corr. from τὸ τὴν άνδρα in Sy 85.8 (cf. ed.N); omitted in V G ed.L(H).

13 ἀθανασίαν ἀπολοβείν V G ed.L(H); ἀθανασίαν ἀπολοβείν ed.L, “not to lose his immortality”, in Sy 85.8–9, which ed.N suggests could render μὴ ἀπολέσαι.

14 τοῦ παραδείσου τὸν ἄνδρα G ed.L(H); τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦ παραδείσου V.

(1) He(a) thus also doubts why the whole world came into being, but as for man, he strives to demonstrate that he is not God’s creature. (2) He(a) examines also other things foolishly: “In what way,” he says “has God given Adam a commandment?” (3) For one of two reasons: Either He knew that he would transgress, (and in that case) He not only gave the commandment in vain but was also responsible for it,(b) (4) or one must say that God was ignorant and was endowed with ignorance, so that the commandment was indeed given, but by (the principle of) evil as a plot against man, as he(a) believes, and by none other. (5) But it has been of the greatest benefit and has set man free when he followed the serpent’s advice, which he(a) claims was the angel of the good. (6) “For man was blind,” he says, “but when he had tasted the forbidden, he saw that he was naked, and he made use of the clothing that he found, and he learned to know good and evil.” (7) Thus he(c) has above all benefit from transgressing the order from the one who created him with guile. (8) “But how”, he says, “can it be fitting for God to say, ‘See,
Adam has become like one of us knowing good and evil, and now, lest he ever stretch out his hand to take from the Tree of Life and eat and live forever!?” (9) “For,” he says, “if it is possible to take away immortality, then He is jealous (φθονερός) who expels the man from Paradise and excludes him from sharing the Tree of Life, from which the participant could forever possess immortality.”

a) he: i.e. Mani.
b) ‘responsible for it’ (αἴτιος αὐτοῦ), i.e., ‘responsible for him transgressing’.
   The text of Sy is possibly just a free translation to render the same. αἴτιος αὐτό in V, however, must be the dative of interest.
c) he: i.e., man.

*Number 35*

III.8.2, ed.N 300.12–13

συνηγορήσει δὲ ἐκατόρ ὡς οὐ μάτην ἐτόλμησε καὶ τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης τὰ πλείστα περιγράψασθαι.

1 ὡς V; omitted in ed.N.

But he(a) says in his defence that he has not undertaken to excise most of the new covenant in vain.

a) ‘he’: i.e., Mani.

*Number 36*

III.11.3, ed.N 304.18–20

ὁς δὲ σοφὸς πάσης ἐννοίας ἐπέκεινα τῶν γενομένων ἢρμοσεν ἕκαστον καὶ <ποικίλας> τὸ κόσμιον ἡμών συγκατεσκεύασεν αὐτοῖς.

1 <ποικίλας> corr.; ποικύλλας V ed.N.
2 τὸ κόσμιον V; cf. άπαξλεπ., “their ornament” (= τὸ κόσμιον . . . αὐτοῖς), in Sy 87.9; τὸν κόσμον ed.N.

But as wise beyond all conception He has joined together every single created thing, and having made them varied He has established the order for them.
Number 37
III.15,7–9, ed.N 314.7–10

To be sure, God, who gave the order, knew what would happen, (8) but He did not remove freedom from the creature, nor is He silent about the commandment so that freedom becomes inactive, (9) since from the beginning He had in this way intended that man should be in God’s image, worthy of the Creator.

Number 38
III.17,5, ed.N 318.6–10

For he who by his activity experienced that he is capable of both things learns from himself through this experience to choose what is better, since the almost necessary task showed him the freedom and the power of (his) nature.
Above all the difference between the two texts appears to be theological; they disagree over whether evil is necessary (cf. above p. 329).

For he(a) who through the act knew by experience how he is able to do both things(b) of his own accord, learnt to choose that which is preferable, for the experience in front of him, which indeed had inevitably happened, had shown him his freedom and also the authority that his (human) nature had.

a) ‘he’: i.e. man
b) ‘both things’: i.e. virtue and vice.

Number 39
III.18,4–5, ed.N 320.12–14

(4) However, He(a) has wanted him(b) to be mortal. (5) He has in truth not laid down the limit of death for him without a pretext, but He fixed it on the grounds of the disobedience, which He clearly knew of beforehand.

a) ‘He’: i.e. God.
b) ‘him’: i.e. man.

Number 40
III.18,11, ed.N 322.1–6

τὸ μὴ ἀεὶ μήτε τὸν παραλαμβανόμενον εἰς ἁγιοτίν ἀμαρτημάτων ὀθανάτως ζῆν ἐν κακία προθέσεως, καὶ πολλῷ γε πλέον, εἰ μηδενὸς τοῦ μετὰ Θάνατον ἔξης ἀπειλούμενον, <μήτε>¹ τὸν γυμναζόμενον εἰς ἁγώνα ἁρετῆς
Death is a benefit in that) neither he who is controlled by a sinful way of life always lives immortally in deliberate wickedness—and that would be much more (harmful), if (it meant that) nothing of what followed after death threatened him—nor that he who exercises himself in the struggle for virtue has to abide patiently the incessant sweat (of effort), but that they both, through the greatest benefaction and most inconceivable profit receive the conclusion of life.

Number 41

III.21.3–4, ed.N 326.6–14

(3) But this saying: “See, I have given you every seed-bearing corn there is on earth that sows a herb, and every tree that has in itself the fruit of (its own) seed-bearing germ; to you it shall be for food”—surely these words clearly show that from the beginning we were formed for the very condition in which we find ourselves. (4) And (the acts of) disobedience did not alter the (human) creature, as if there was the one dispensation from the beginning, but another when the disobedience was known in God’s foreknowledge.
God was therefore not forced by man’s disobedience to prescribe death for him and remove him from Paradise, but on the contrary it pleased Him to take the starting-points in Himself, in the divine dispensation. Thus He has actually willed it. (2) But if God was not forced, and man did not suffer harm, when he came to this (kind of) condition, which was also prepared for him from God the Creator’s side, then the experience of an (originally) better way of life must have been necessary for the one who set out from that place in order through the labours of virtue and piety and for himself to procure the path back with an even greater reputation.

1 <θεός> corr.ed.N on the basis of Sy 93.21.
3 πρὸς τὸ διὰ πόνων ἀρετῆς τε καὶ εὐσεβείας ἐαυτῷ πραγματεύσασθαι V cf. also ed.N67; omitted in ed.N.

The critical apparatus in ed.N also points out other variants in Sy.

(1) God was therefore not forced by man’s disobedience to prescribe death for him and remove him from Paradise, but on the contrary it pleased Him to take the starting-points in Himself, in the divine dispensation. Thus He has actually willed it. (2) But if God was not forced, and man did not suffer harm, when he came to this (kind of) condition, which was also prepared for him from God the Creator’s side, then the experience of an (originally) better way of life must have been necessary for the one who set out from that place in order through the labours of virtue and piety and for himself to procure the path back with an even greater reputation.
beβλημένην, ἀλλ’ ἐντολή τὸ εξείναι κοιλύουσα ἁγώνα παρασκευάζει τῷ δεχομένῳ.

1 ἐπαγγελίαν V; ἐπαγγελίαν ed.N (printing error).
2 <ἲλλην> corr.ed.N on the basis of ἔλθωτοι in Ἱερ 95.17; ἄλλα τὴν V.

The critical apparatus in ed.N also points out other variants in Ἱερ.

(7) One would thus see that the same actions both must be performed and are being forbidden according to their different purposes with regard to the intention of each one’s vow. (8) For if anyone who has adopted abstinence vows not to do those things which it is possible to do, he has for the future excluded himself from doing what is (otherwise) possible (for him). (9) And the question is not asked about how the action is in itself, but about the promiser’s intention, since with the particular aim of the vow he also introduces another quality through the action. (10) Thus it is too with relation to Adam: (11) It was not the tasting of the tree that had the blameworthy quality of an action, but the commandment that hindered what was possible and prepared the struggle for its recipient.

Number 44
III.27.8–9, ed.N 340.13–19

οὐ διὰ βασκανίαν ἕποκλειόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν χρήσιν τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐπαπορήσειν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ μανέντος, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ζῆν ἀθανάτως τὸν πολλὴν ἔχοντα προχειρότητα πρὸς ἀμαρτίαν διὰ τὸ ἐλευθέροιν τῆς φύσεως ἀσύμφορον ἦν, ἵνα μὴ συναπαθανατισθῇ τούτῳ παρὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας, ἀνείργηεθε θεὸς λυσιτελῶς τὴν χρήσιν τοῦ τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἐμποιοῦντος δόξαν καλὸς θνητῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπων.

1 βασκανίαν V; βασκανίας ed.N.
2 δόξαν V; δόξας ed.N.
ed.N also points out other variants in Ἱερ.

(8) It was not because of jealousy that God excluded them from the use of the Tree of Life (which it otherwise would be) according to the doubt (adduced) by supporters of the madman, but because by reason of the freedom of nature it was harmful that anyone who has a great predisposition for sin, lives immortally. (9) In order for what issues from sin not to be made immortal in the same way,
God withholds for beneficial purpose the use of what conveys immortality, inasmuch as He regarded it as good that man was mortal.

*Number 45*

**IV.12, Sy 134.28–29**

1 ἐκπλήθειν is passive and makes no sense; Sebastian Brock (in a letter dated 20th October 2001) suggests that it is a corruption of ἐκπληθεῖν.

“For I have come and been sent out to restore and <cleanse> the gospels because in them—even in those(a)—is also (some) of the intermingling”, as he says, “of evil.”

a) Sebastian Brock (in a letter dated 20th October 2001) explains that ἐστὶ “must be in apposition to ἔστι ... ἐστὶ in this text quite often must be masc. pl. demonstrative”.

*Number 46*

**IV.19, Sy 138.4–14**

1 ed.L59a copies the manuscript slavishly by not reproducing the dot in the introductory τ, despite the fact that the edition does not usually note this writing error.

2 The punctuation mark omitted in ed.L59a.

3 ἀλλὰ ὢν Sy; ἀλλὰ ὢν ed.L59a.

4 It is puzzling why ἀλλὰ is plural; Sebastian Brock (in a letter dated 20th October 2001) suggests that it could be ditto by from what follows.
But Xenophon writes that “the sages of the Persians of old believed in two opposing principles”, so that it was from there that this man(a) had a closeness to barbarism. Aristotle, however, spoke about “matter”, but he did not give this name to some living principle as (it is the case with) this “matter” of his(b), (he) who uses and introduces an alien name which does not belong to himself. But, corresponding to the likeness of the name, he(c) called that which is not alive nor has any movement of its own accord “matter”. This man,(a) however, altered the use of the false name (so that it designated) “evil”, and he is not only ungrateful in (the matter of) his theft, but he is also a miserable knave who alters something which is not his own into a fraud. But Plato <taught>, more and more in error, with a clear term the transmigration of souls(d).

a) ‘this man’: i.e., Mani.
b) ‘of his’: i.e., of Mani.
c) ‘he’: i.e., Aristotle.
d) The present translation of the last lines about Plato seems better than the one to be found in Jackson 1925, 256: “But Plato erroneously taught in terms more clear [than Mānī] the transfusion of souls (taśp kā dnapšātā).”

Paul said that he (only) knows a little out of much, and he (only) prophesies a little out of much, but when perfection comes, (then) that which was a little comes to an end. Now because he speaks through me, perfection has been introduced precisely through me, and also that which was a little is being repaired and cleansed.
Faith in God is a knowledge of God through the visible Creation and the natural concepts, together with the affection for and love of Him according to the cognition of virtue and vice—which is pleasing to God.

“Who”, then, “will deliver me from this body of death”, for—unless a strong goodness will shine forth in me—the body through the bodily passions <in my limbs> gathers for me natural death of condemnation.(a) And he is calling it “body of death”,—not because of this general death, but (because of) the kind of death which is from condemnation through the threat, if those (conditions) of sin will remain.

a) ‘natural death of condemnation’: i.e. a natural death resulting in condemnation.
And then, because it is rightly said in opposition to this statement: “will those who rise (at the resurrection) be caught up in the very same bodily passions, in lusts and diseases, and in pleasures and in griefs, if they receive the same body?”—he therefore in an excellent and admirable fashion heals and restores the contrary statement, using the truth, by means of what follows this statement, for this is what he says: “I say, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor is corruption heir to that which is not corrupted.”

II, C R, corresponding to Sy 178.13ff.

1 φής C R; τωντικ, “says he”, in Sy 178.13, i.e. φησίν.
2 Καί οὕτε C; Οὕτε R.
3 τῶν νοῦν C; τῶν νοῶν οὐ R.
4 προσέχουσιν C; παρέχουσιν R.
5 οὕτε τοῖς ἐξής ἐπιλεγμένοις παρακολουθοῦσιν C; omitted in R.
6 <ἀδικωτατοῖ>; ἀδικωτατοί C; ἀδικωτατῶν R.
7 The sentences Οὐ τοίνυν ἐστίν... οὐ τὸ δίκαιον αἰροῦνται are omitted in Sy 178.15.
8 Ὁ ὅκιτι C—supported by οὐδὲ C in Sy 178.15; Οὐδὲ οὐσί C R.
9 πολιτεύεται C R; perhaps <πολιτεύσεται> (corr.PG 18, 1260A3–4, n. 66).
How would you say that the body rises, if flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God?—“Therefore,” they say, “the resurrection of the dead does not exist”. And they neither direct their attention to the (scriptural passages) that are mentioned above in abundance, nor do they understand the (passages) added subsequently, but like people who are extremely unrighteous when circumstances persist, they choose the (proposition) which they presume to be pleasant for them in relation to their own impiety, and (so) they do not choose what is righteous—“No longer (is) the risen flesh (endowed with) passion,” says the apostle, “nor does a heavy body live again in fellowship with the passions.”

Number 51
IV.100 (last half), IV.101 (last part)
I, C R, corresponding to Sy 179.1–11 and 179.17–19

Ei μὲν γὰρ τις τούτῳ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σάρξ ἀμα τοῖς εἰμίφιτοις πάθεσιν αὕθις ἀναστάσας ζήσεται, τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχουσα τε καὶ δρῶσα, ἢ ἕν ἄλογος οὐκ ἔχουσα ἀγαθὴν ἐλπίδα. Ei δὲ μεταβολὴν αὐτὸ δὴ τούτῳ λαμβάνει κρείττονος καὶ μακαρίας ἐξες, ὑπὲρ δεικτικῶς σημαίνει φάύσκων. δει γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τούτῳ ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τούτῳ ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν. Δικαία μὲν τοῦ συγκαμόντος ἐργαλείου τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ ἀπόδοσις οὐκ ἐπιζήμιος δὲ καὶ αὕθις ἐπίπονος ταύτῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ μακαρίῳ ταύτας ἐσεθαί τῶν σωζομένων τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπειληφθείας μὲν τὸ σύμφων τοῖς αὐτάς σώμα, οὐ μέντοι βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες, καὶ σαρκικῆς ἐπιθυμίας γέμον, καθάπερ τὴν ἀρχήν, ὑπὲρ δὴ προσήκον ἦν τῷ ἀγώνι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑνευδοκιμήσαι ταύτας.

The following conclusion to the fragment is rediscovered in Sy 179.17–19, where it is part of IV.101:

Ἀδικία γὰρ, εἰ μὴ τὸ συμπονήσαν τῇ ψυχῇ σώμα, κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδόθη συναπολαύσοντα αὕτη τῶν ἐπάθλων.
What follows in Sy 179.11–13 is the ending of Ch. 100, which is placed in the following as Number 51,II.

For if anyone said that the risen flesh will again live together with its innate passions, since the same passions both suffer and act together with the soul, it(a) would be without reason, since it did not have a good hope. In the opposite case this very (body) receives a change to a better and blessed condition which he (also) demonstrably indicates, saying: “For this corruptible must put on incorruptibility and this mortal put on immortality.”(b) It is just that the instrument that has toiled together with the soul is given back to it, and it is not harmful and on the other hand laborious for it, but these souls of the saved will exist in blessedness(c) after having regained the body that was united with them. However, it is no longer heavy and earthy and full of fleshly desire as it was in the beginning, when it was fitting that (the souls) won renown in the struggle for virtue.

In conclusion an extract from IV.101:

For it is an injustice if the body that toiled together with the soul in this (earthly) citizenship is not to be returned to it, so that together they can enjoy the prizes for battle.

a) ‘it’: i.e. the risen flesh.
b) 1 Cor. 15.53.
c) ‘in blessedness’; βῆος is not implied or has been omitted, as the editors of C R believed: cf. θαυμάζω, “in blessedness”, in Sy 179.8.

II, Sy 179.11–13 (conclusion of IV.100)

In this way, then, the apostle elucidates by means of many words the doctrine about the resurrection, and he introduces the statement about the beatitude which is (based) on it.
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