The Albigensian Crusade was called by Pope Innocent III in 1208 against the Count of Toulouse in response to the murder of the papal legate Pierre des Castelnau. The Pope’s aim was to force the Count and other nobles in Languedoc to take action against the Cathar heretics in their lands, but in the end, the defeat of Catharism in the south of France was achieved through the establishment of the Inquisition and the extension of French royal authority to the area. While some Occitan noble families survived the crusade, others were destroyed and the behaviour of the crusaders towards the local nobility has often been regarded as rather arbitrary, unconnected to how these families related to each other before 1209. This study takes the case of the Trencavel Viscounts of Béziers and Carcassonne, who were the only members of the higher nobility to lose their lands to the crusade, and argues that an understanding of how the Occitan nobility fared in the crusade years must be based in the context of the politics of the noble society of Languedoc, not only in the thirteenth century but also in the twelfth.

ELAINE GRAHAM-LEIGH gained her Ph.D. from the University of London.
The Southern French Nobility
and the
Albigensian Crusade

Elaine Graham-Leigh

THE BOYDELL PRESS
For Martyn Rogers
who lent me a book when I was at an impressionable age
and introduced me to Languedoc
This book is produced with the assistance of a grant from Isobel Thornley’s Bequest to the University of London
Thanks are due to many people, in particular to Brenda Bolton, Tom Asbridge, Alexander Murray, Michael Clanchy, Patricia Skinner, John Gillingham, Tom Cain, Damien Smith, Claire Taylor and the members of the Early Medieval Seminar at the Institute of Historical Research. I am also very grateful to Pilar Jiménez-Sanchez and Charles Peytavie of the Centre d’Études Cathares for their kindness and patience with my French. I would also like to extend my thanks to the family of the late Richard Benjamin for allowing me access to his papers. Last but certainly not least, thanks to Angela Graham-Leigh for proof-reading, to Anne Alexander for preparing the index and to Dominic Alexander, without whose erudition and insights this book could never have been written.
Abbreviations

Abbreviated titles not listed below are to be found in the Bibliography at the back of the book.

ADA Archives départementales de l’Aude
Baluze La Collection Baluze à la Bibliothèque nationale de France
Carcassonne et sa région Carcassonne et sa région: Actes des XLI et XXIV congrès d’études régionales tenus par la Fédération historique du Languedoc méditerranéen et du Roussillon et par la Fédération des Sociétés Académiques et Savantes de Languedoc-Pyrénées-Gascogne (Carcassonne 1970)
CDICAI Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, ed. D. Prósper de Bofarull y Mascaro, 50 vols. (Barcelona 1847–)
Cisterciens de Languedoc Les Cisterciens de Languedoc (XIIIe–XIVe siècles), ed. E. Privat, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 21 (Toulouse 1986)
CT La Cartulaire dit de Trencavel, La Société Archéologique de Montpellier, MS 10
Doat La Collection Doat à la Bibliothèque nationale de France
GC Gallia Christiana in Provincias Ecclesiasticas Distributa, 16 vols. (Paris 1715–1865)
GCB Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium, ed. L. Barru Dihigo and J. Masso Torrents (Barcelona 1923)
Hommage à Pierre Bonnassie Les sociétés méridionales à l’âge féodal (Espagne, Italie et sud de la France Xe–XIIIe siècle): Hommage à Pierre Bonnassie, ed. H. Débax (Toulouse 1999)
LFM  Liber Feudorum Maior: Cartulario Real que se conserva en el Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, ed. F. M. Rosell, 2 vols. (Barcelona 1945)

LIM  Liber Instrumentorum Memorialium: Cartulaire des Guillems de Montpellier, ed. La Société Archéologique de Montpellier (Montpellier 1884–6)

Livre Noir Cartulaire de Béziers (Livre Noir), ed. J. Rouquette (Paris and Montpellier 1918)


Mansilla La documentacion pontifica hasta Inocencio III 965–1216, ed. D. Mansilla (Rome 1955)

MGH SS Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores


Paix de Dieu Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc au XIIIe siècle, ed. E. Privat, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 4 (Toulouse 1969)


Reg. Innocenz III Die Register Innocenz III, ed. O. Hageneder, W. Maleczek and A. A. Strnad, 8 vols. (Graz, Rome and Vienna 1964–2001), édition continues


VII CHCA VII Congreso de la Historia de la Corona de Aragón, 3 vols. (Barcelona 1962)
**Editorial Conventions**

**Names**

I have not attempted to anglicise proper names except where the English form is so well established as to render any other usage inappropriate. In the same way, except where another form has become customary I have attempted to use the form of the name most suitable for its bearer: for instance, William of Newburgh, Guillem de Montpellier but Guillaume de Puylaurens.

**Money**

The Trencavel issued their own silver coinage in both Carcassonne and Béziers during the twelfth century.\(^1\) However, the principal currency of both southern France and northern Spain was the silver coinage issued by the bishops of Maguelonne as counts of Melgueil.\(^2\) The vast majority of Trencavel monetary transactions used Melgorian *sols* rather than their own currency and the Carcassonne coinage seems to have been abandoned by the end of the twelfth century. References to coinage are to the Melgorian unless otherwise stated.

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Map 1. Languedoc and Provence c.1200, the boxed area showing the Trencavel lands.
Map 2. The Trencavel lands.
Genealogies of the Nobility of Languedoc

1. The Tencavel  
2. The counts of Carcassonne  
3. The counts of Foix and the counts of Comminges  
4. The counts-kings of Barcelona and Aragon  
5. The counts of Toulouse  
6. The viscounts of Narbonne  
7. The Guillems de Montpellier  
8. The Roquefeuill  
9. The succession to the county of Provence c.1050–1200  
10. The counts of Foix and Comminges and the viscounts of Narbonne after the Albigensian crusade
### 1. The Trencavel

- **Bernard I Viscount of Albi**
  - d.c. 918
- **Aton I Viscount of Albi**
  - m. Diafronisse
  - d. 942
- **Bernard Viscount of Albi**
  - m. c. 950
  - Gauze de Nîmes
  - Bishop of Cahors
- **Frotaire Bishop of Cahors**
  - m. c. 972-987
- **Diafronisse Bishop of Nîmes**
  - 987-1014
- **Gauze de Nîmes**
- **Bernard II Viscount of Albi**
  - d. c. 918
  - m. Gerberge
- **Frotaire Bishop of Nîmes**
  - 1027-1077
- **Bernard Aton III Viscount of Albi and Nîmes**
  - m. Rangarde
  - d. 1078
  - m. c. 1065 Ermengarde de Carcassonne
- **Guillema**
  - m. Pierre
  - Viscount of Bruniquel
- **Bernard Aton IV Viscount of Albi and Nîmes**
  - d. 1130
  - m. 1083 Cecile de Provence
- **Matheline**
  - m. 1105
  - Guillema de Béziers
d. 1110
  - Guillaume Arnauld
- **Ermengarde d. c. 1147**
  - m. 1110
  - Guillaume Arnauld
- **Guinard**
- **Roger I Viscount of Carcassonne**
  - Albi and Razès d. 1150
  - m. (1) Adelaide de Pons en Saintogne
  - (2) 1139
  - m. 1139
  - Raimond Trencavel
  - Viscount of Albi and Nîmes
  - d. 1072
  - Bishop of Nîmes
  - 1072-1077
- **Guillem Arnauld Viscount of Bruniquel**
  - d. c. 1147
  - m. 1110
  - Guillaume Arnauld
- **Gérard**
  - m. 1151
  - Roger Bernard
- **Matheline de Béziers**
  - d. 1176
  - Sicard de Lautrec
  - Beatrice
d. c. 1211
  - m. 1176
  - Sicard de Lautrec
  - Beatrice
  - Raimond Trencavel
  - Viscount of Carcassonne
  - Béziers, Albi and Razès
  - 1185-1209
  - m. 1203 Agnes de Montpellier
- **Roger II Viscount of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès**
  - d. 1194
  - m. 1171 Adela de Toulouse
  - Raimond Trencavel
  - Viscount of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès
  - d. 1194
  - m. 1171 Adela de Toulouse
  - Raimond Roger
  - d. 1214
  - m. 1203 Agnes de Montpellier
- **Guillaume Arnauld**
  - d. 1139
  - m. 1139
  - Raimond Trencavel
  - Viscount of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès
  - 1185-1209
  - m. 1203 Agnes de Montpellier
- **Roger**
  - m. 1203 Agnes de Montpellier
  - Raimond Roger
  - d. 1214
  - m. 1203 Agnes de Montpellier
  - Raimond Roger
  - d. 1222
  - m. 1222
  - Raimond Roger
  - d. 1222
2. The Counts of Carcassonne

Raimond
Count of Carcassonne
d. c.1012
m. Garsinde de Béziers

Roger the Old
Count of Carcassonne
d.1012
m. Adelaide de Melgueil

Bernard
d.1024
m. Garsinde de Bigorre

Emessinde
d.1056
m. 1001
Ramon Borrell
Count of Barcelona
d.1017

Pierre Raimond
Count of Carcassonne
d. c.1065
m. Rangarde de la Marche

Guillem

Bernard de Bigorre

Roger I
Count of Foix
d.1067

Pierre
Count of Couserans and Foix

Ermessinde de Bigorre
m. Ramirez I de Aragon
d. c.1069

Marjorie
m. Pons, Count of Toulouse
d. c.1069

Stephanie

Garsinde

d. c.1060

Ermengarde
d.1101
m. c.1065
Raimond Bernard Tencavel, Viscount of Albi and Nîmes
d.1078

Adelaide
m. 1067
Guillem
Count of Cerdagne
3. The Counts of Foix and the Counts of Comminges

Pierre of Couserans and Foix

Roger II
Count of Foix
d.1118

Roger III
Count of Foix
d.1149
m. 1117 Chimene de Barcelona

Brandimene
m. 1132
Guillem d’Alona

Roger Bernard
Count of Foix
m. 1151
Cecile de Beziers

Raimond Roger
Count of Foix
d.1223
m. Philippa

Roger
Viscount of Couserans
Count of Pallars

Esclamonde
m. Jouard de l’Isle
d.1201

Rotward

Bernard I
Count of Comminges
d.1144
m. Dias de Muret

Bernard II
Count of Comminges
d.1176
m. Laurent de Toulouse

Bernard III
Count of Comminges
d.1225
m. (1) Marie de Montpellier
(2) Cecile de Foix

Guy de St Foy
and Saves

Fortanier d’Aspet

Roger
Viscount of Couserans
Count of Pallars

Loup

Aimery

Cecile
m. Bernard IV
Count of Comminges

Roger
Viscount of Couserans
Count of Pallars

Ernest de Castelbon d.1229
(2) 1232 Ermengarde de Narbonne

Bernard IV
Count of Comminges
d.1241
m. (1) Marie de Montpellier
(2) Comtes de la Barthe

Roger
Viscount of Couserans
Count of Pallars

Arnauld de Comminges
m. (1) Ericette de Bigorre
(2) Cecile de Foix
4. The Court-kings of Barcelona and Aragon
5. The Counts of Toulouse

Guillem Taillefer
Count of Toulouse
d. 1000
m. (1) ?

Bertrand
Count of Provence
d. 1094
m. (1) ?

Raimond IV
Count of Toulouse
d. 1094
m. (1) daughter of Bertrand of Provence
d. 1066
m. (2) 1040 Almodis de St Gilles
m. (3) Marjone

Almodis
m. Pierre
Count of Melgueil
d. 1094

Guillem IV
Count of Toulouse
d. 1094
m. Phillippe
d. 1068
m. Guillem IX
Count of Toulouse
d. 1127

Bertran
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Cecile
d. c. 1060
m. Bernard Aton
d. 1130

Hugues
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Alphonse Jourdain
Court of Toulouse
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Laurent
m. Bernard II
Count of Comminges
d. 1176
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Guillem X
Duke of Aquitaine
d. 1130
m. Eleanor
d. c. 1080
m. (1) Louis VII
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
m. (4) 1152 Henry II
m. (5) 1152 Louis VII
King of France
King of England

Eleanor
d. 1204
m. (1) Louis VII
King of France
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
King of England
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
King of England

Raimond V
Count of Toulouse
d. 1134
m. Agnes
d. 1187
m. (1) 1154 Constance of France
m. (2) 1166 Richilde de Provence

Agnes
m. 1134
m. Raimond Aton
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Raimond V
Count of Toulouse
d. 1214
m. Baldwin
m. 1203 Guifre de Lautrec

Constance
m. Sancho
King of Navarre

Eleanor
d. 1193
m. Raimond IV
m. (1) daughter of Bertrand of Provence
d. 1066
m. (2) 1066 Richilde de Provence

Raimond VI
Count of Toulouse
d. 1222
m. (1) 1172 Ermessinde de Melgueil
m. (2) 1193 Bourgogne de Cyprus
m. (3) 1196 Joanna Plantagenet

Bertran
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Alphonse Jourdain
Court of Toulouse
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Laurent
m. Bernard II
Count of Comminges
d. 1176
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Guillem IV
Count of Toulouse
d. 1094
m. Phillippe
d. 1068
m. Guillem IX
Count of Toulouse
d. 1127

Bertran
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Cecile
d. c. 1060
m. Bernard Aton
d. 1130

Hugues
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Alphonse Jourdain
Court of Toulouse
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Laurent
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Count of Comminges
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m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Guillem X
Duke of Aquitaine
d. 1130
m. Eleanor
d. c. 1080
m. (1) Louis VII
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
King of France
King of England

Eleanor
d. 1204
m. (1) Louis VII
King of France
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
King of England
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
King of England

Raimond V
Count of Toulouse
d. 1134
m. Agnes
d. 1187
m. (1) 1154 Constance of France
m. (2) 1166 Richilde de Provence

Raimond VI
Count of Toulouse
d. 1214
m. Baldwin
m. 1203 Guifre de Lautrec

Constance
m. Sancho
King of Navarre

Raimond VII
Count of Toulouse
d. 1222
m. (1) 1172 Ermessinde de Melgueil
m. (2) 1193 Bourgogne de Cyprus
m. (3) 1196 Joanna Plantagenet

Bertran
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Alphonse Jourdain
Court of Toulouse
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Laurent
m. Bernard II
Count of Comminges
d. 1176
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Guillem IV
Count of Toulouse
d. 1094
m. Phillippe
d. 1068
m. Guillem IX
Count of Toulouse
d. 1127

Bertran
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Cecile
d. c. 1060
m. Bernard Aton
d. 1130

Hugues
Count of Toulouse
d. 1111
m. Alphonse Jourdain
Court of Toulouse
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Laurent
m. Bernard II
Count of Comminges
d. 1176
m. 1112 Faydide de Provence

Guillem X
Duke of Aquitaine
d. 1130
m. Eleanor
d. c. 1080
m. (1) Louis VII
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
King of France
King of England

Eleanor
d. 1204
m. (1) Louis VII
King of France
m. (2) 1152 Henry II
King of England
m. (3) 1152 Louis VII
King of England

Raimond V
Count of Toulouse
d. 1134
m. Agnes
d. 1187
m. (1) 1154 Constance of France
m. (2) 1166 Richilde de Provence

Raimond VI
Count of Toulouse
d. 1214
m. Baldwin
m. 1203 Guifre de Lautrec

Constance
m. Sancho
King of Navarre

Raimond VII
Count of Toulouse
d. 1214
m. 1213 Sancha d’Aragon
6. The Viscounts of Narbonne

Matfred, Viscount of Narbonne
d.966
m. Adelaide de Carcassonne

Raimond I
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1019
m. Ricarde de Millau

Raimond Bernard
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1066
m. Garsinde de Bezala

Raimond II
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1067
m. Garsinde d’Anduze

Aimery I
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1106
m. 1087 Mathilde Guiscard

Aimery II
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1154
m. (1) Ermengarde
m. (2) c.1126 Ermessinde

Guimer d’Anduze

Aimery III
Viscountess of Narbonne
d.1192
m. (1) 1142 Count Alphonse
(2) 1145 Bernard d’Anduze

Pierre de Millau

Aimery IV
Viscount of Narbonne
d.1239
m. (1) Guillemette de Moncada
d.1217
(2) Marguerite de Marly

Rodrigo
7. The Guillems de Montpellier

Guillem VI
de Montpellier
m. Sibilla

Guillem V
de Montpellier
d.1121
m. Ermengarde

Guillem VI
de Montpellier
m. Sibilla

Guillem d'Omelas
m. Tiburge d'Orange

Bernard

Guillem d'Omelas
m. Tiburge d'Orange

Guillem VII
de Montpellier
d.1172
m. Mathilde
de Bescançon

Guillem VII
de Montpellier
d.1172
m. Mathilde
de Bescançon

Guillem de Tortosa

Guillaume
t.1145
Bernard Aton V
Viscount of Nîmes
d.1163

Adalacia

Emessiode
m.
Stephane de Servian

Guillem VII
de Montpellier
d.1172
m. Mathilde
de Bescançon

Guillem VIII
des Montpellier
d.1202
m. (1) Eudoxia
de Constantinople

Guido Guerjeat

Bergundionis
m. 1183
Adalais de Cognac

Sibilla
m. Raimond
de Roquefeuil

Guillelma
m. Raimond
de Roquefeuil

Adalacia

Marie

Clementia
m. Rostang
de Sabran

Stephan de Servian
m. daughter
of Aynard de Murviel

Stephan de Servian
m. daughter
of Aynard de Murviel

Stephan de Servian

Marie
m. (1) Bernard III
Count of Comminges
(2) 1204 Pere II of Aragon

Guillem IX
de Montpellier
m. 1187
Agnes de Castille

Guillem IX
de Montpellier
m. 1187
Agnes de Castille

Thomas
Tortosa

Agnès
m. 1203
Raimond Roger
Viscount of Carcassonne, Bexiers,
Albi and Razès
d.1209

Adalais

Raimond de Roquefeuil

Raimond de Roquefeuil
8. The Roquefuir

Raimond de Besançon

Marie
m. lord de Roquefuir

daughter

Mathilde
m. Guillem VII de Montpellier
d.1172

Guillelma

Adelaide
m. 1156
Bernard III d’Anduze

Fredol

Agnes

Raimond de Roquefuir

m. c.1190

Guillelma

Guillem VIII de Montpellier
d.1292

Fredol

Bernard IV d’Anduze

Pierre Bermand de Sauve and Anduze
m. Constance de Toulouse

Raimond de Roquefuir m. Delphine de Turenne

m. 1203 Raimond Roger de Béziers
d.1209

Agnes

Raimond Tencavel
1207–c.1263
9. The Succession to the County of Provence c.1050–1200 (rulers of the county appear in bold type)
10. The Counts of Foix and Comminges and the Viscounts of Narbonne after the Albigensian Crusade

Aimery IV of Narbonne
d.1239
m. Marguerite de Marly

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Amalric</th>
<th>Emengarde</th>
<th>Roger Bernard III</th>
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<tr>
<td>Viscount of Narbonne</td>
<td>m. (1)</td>
<td>Count of Foix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.1270</td>
<td></td>
<td>d.1241</td>
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<tr>
<td>m. Philippa of Anduze</td>
<td></td>
<td>m. Ermessinde de Castelbon</td>
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<th>Raimond Roger Count of Foix</th>
<th>Cecile</th>
<th>Bernard IV Count of Comminges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d.1223</td>
<td>m.</td>
<td>d.1241</td>
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<th>Pierre Raimond</th>
<th>Cecile</th>
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<tr>
<td>Count of Comminges</td>
<td>m.</td>
<td>d.1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.1302</td>
<td>m. Brunisende</td>
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<th>Roger IV Count of Foix</th>
<th>Cecile</th>
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<td>d.1241</td>
<td>m. Marguerite de Montcada</td>
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<td>d.1302</td>
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<td>Count of Comminges</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.1295</td>
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<td>m. Therese</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.1271</td>
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<tr>
<td>m. Laurette de Montfort</td>
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<td>Count of Comminges</td>
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<td>d.1348</td>
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<td>m. Agnes de Navarre</td>
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<td>Count of Comminges</td>
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<td>d.1315</td>
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<td>m. Jeanne d'Artois</td>
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<td>Count of Comminges</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.1343</td>
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<td>m. Eleanor</td>
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<td>d.1391</td>
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<td>m. Jeanne de L'Isle Jourdain</td>
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<th>Roger Bernard XI</th>
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<td>Count of Comminges</td>
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The Albigensian Crusade, Past and Present

ON 10 November 1209, Raimond Roger, erstwhile Viscount of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès (1194–1209)¹ and the first member of the higher nobility of Languedoc to fall victim to the Albigensian crusade, died in a dungeon in Carcassonne.² He had been there for two months, since his surrender to the Albigensian crusaders besieging Carcassonne in September, and the speed at which he apparently succumbed to his changed circumstances has given rise to the suspicion in some crusade historiography that he was in fact murdered by the crusaders. The Spanish historian Jordi Ventura, for example, has cast doubt on the likelihood of Raimond Roger having died from natural causes,³ while Sibly and Sibly, in their edition of Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay’s Historia Albigensis, commented on the convenience of his death from the point of view of the crusaders and their new military leader, Simon de Montfort: ‘The death of the young viscount occurred at a time when resistance to de Montfort was beginning to mount, and it was undoubtedly very convenient for him, since the deposed Viscount Trencavel could have provided a rallying point for opposition.’⁴

When the rumour of Raimond Roger’s murder began is not clear, but this historiographical verdict on Raimond Roger’s death clearly echoes the opinions of many of his contemporaries. That the suspicion of foul play was an immediate reaction to the viscount’s death is implied by the complaint from the contemporary chronicler Guillaume de Tudela, written in 1213: ‘ill disposed people and other insignificant ones who know nothing about the affair, whether yes or no, said that he was killed in the night through treason. But never, by Jesus Christ on his throne, would the Count [Simon de Montfort] have ever consented, for anything in the world, to assassinate him.’⁵ In this context, even the elaborate funeral, including an

¹ Raimond Roger’s family are usually referred to as ‘the Trencavel’, from the nickname employed by some of its members, although not by Raimond Roger himself. See pp. 144–146 below.
² ‘Necrology of the Church of Carcassonne’, Bouquet 19, p. 249.
³ J. Ventura, Per l’Catolic i Simó de Montfort (Barcelona 1960), p. 112.
open lying in state, allowed to Raimond Roger by Simon de Montfort looks less a
magnanimous gesture than a desperate attempt to stave off the inevitable.6 Despite
this and Guillaume de Tudela’s emphatic rebuttal, the rumours appear to have
remained common currency into the later thirteenth century. The troubadour
Guillaume Augier’s *sirevêtes* on the death of the viscount, ‘A People Grieving for the
Death of their Lord’, for example, was probably written for an Italian audience
between 1220 and 1230, yet it describes the handsome young viscount as not only
tragically dead before his time, but killed: ‘God . . . you see those who killed him,
who they are, where they come from.’7 Similarly, Guillaume de Puylaurens, writing
in the 1270s, followed Guillaume de Tudela in denouncing those who were evidently
still repeating this persistent rumour: ‘The Viscount himself . . . was put in prison, in
which he died of dysentery not long afterwards, from which many people spread
many lies that he had in fact been killed.’8

The identities of those spreading and listening to this rumour are obscure,
although Guillaume de Tudela’s use of the term ‘garson’,9 that is, youths, servants or
apprentices, and Guillaume de Puylaurens’ formulation ‘many people spread many
lies’10 may be intended to indicate the crowd, the many as opposed to the few. It is
clear, however, that for some at least, Raimond Roger’s death remained the subject
of suspicion and criticism directed at the crusaders. It is also clear that the rumour of
foul play remains virtually the only aspect of Raimond Roger’s dispossession and
death to excite the interest of contemporary and modern writers on the Albigensian
crusade, but this is not the only remarkable aspect of the treatment received by
Raimond Roger and his family. They were the only members of the higher nobility
to suffer such complete and swift dispossession, and this was achieved by the crusad-
ers without protest or positive response from their subjects and neighbours. The
reasons for this exceptional treatment of the Trencavel are worth examining.

The Albigensian crusade was called by Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) on
10 March 1208 in response to the murder of the papal legate Pierre de Castelnau,
supposedly by retainers of Raimond VI de St Gilles, Count of Toulouse (1194–
1222). The crusaders assembled under the leadership of the papal legate Arnauld
Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux (1200–1212) in 1209 and advanced into central
Languedoc in early summer. This was the beginning of a decades-long conflict in
Languedoc, first between much of the nobility and the crusaders, and then between
the southern French nobility and the French crown after the death in 1218 of Simon
de Montfort, the crusade leader chosen in late 1209, and the return of his son Guy to

History of the Albigensian Crusade’, Bouquet 19, p. 128.
pour la mort de son seigneur’, p. 236: ‘Ai dieus . . . ni selhs qui l’an mort, cui ni don’.
68–9: ‘Ipso vicecomite . . . in obstagium remanente. In quo non post multum tempus invasas
disenteria expiravit, unde multi multa mendacia divulgarunt, quod fuisse serio interfactus.’
Aftermath* (Woodbridge 2003).
9 Guillaume de Tudela, ed. and trans. Martin-Chabot, 37, pp. 94–5.
10 Guillaume de Puylaurens, ed. Duvernoy, 14, pp. 68–9.
the family estates in northern France. The hostilities between the crusaders and subsequently the French crown and the counts of Toulouse were concluded in the Treaty of Paris in 1229, but resistance persisted in areas of Languedoc into the 1240s.

The history of the Albigensian crusade has received enthusiastic attention since nineteenth-century antiquarians began to find inspiration in the ruins of the ‘Cathar’ castle of Montségur.11 Beginning in the 1870s with Napoléon Peyrat’s Histoire des Albigeois12 and continuing into the twentieth century with Peyrat disciples like Otto Rahn in the 1930s, a view of the crusade was developed in which the pre-crusade Languedoc was cast as a lost idyll of tolerance and civilisation.13 This remains one of its most influential guises. Continuing popular enthusiasm for the romantic tragedy of the Albigensian crusade has seen the re-branding of the département de l’Aude around Carcassonne in central Languedoc as a ‘pays cathares’ in recognition of a vital part of its tourist industry, while self-proclaimed Catharism returned to Languedoc with the restoration of the Gnostic Church by Réné Gruéhan in 1909.14

The historiography of Catharism and the crusade influenced by this tradition is also immense and varied and includes some of the major modern works on the crusade.15 However, the romantic tradition, and in particular the notion outlined by Peyrat of a secret Cathar treasure, has also given rise to what Réné Nelli has dubbed the ‘secret history’ of Languedoc and the Albigensian crusade, focusing on the mystical secrets of the Cathars. These are often connected in this tradition with common conspiracy theory material: mysterious nocturnal visitors to Montségur are supposed to have left a manuscript describing the castle and the area in Tibetan,16 and a Gnostic mass is said to have been celebrated at Montségur in 1940 by a Templar.17 Scholars of Catharism and the Albigensian crusade have been at pains to stress the separation between the conspiracy theories and scholarship on medieval Languedoc; Réné Nelli, for example, commented that the real mystery was how cultured, educated people could believe in both the real and secret Languedoc at the same time.18

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11 This rediscovery of the romantic nature of the castle was apparently fuelled by inauthentic folk tales told to antiquarians by local villagers, who supposedly claimed that they were afraid to go up to the castle because of the Devils who guarded the treasure there. See R. Nelli, Histoire secrète de Languedoc (Paris 1978), p. 204.


14 Nelli, Histoire secrète de Languedoc, p. 205.

15 Lafort, ‘Une mémoire disputée?’, p. 84.

16 Nelli, Histoire secrète de Languedoc, p. 204.

17 Mystic Templars are omnipresent in all good conspiracy theories, as discussed by M. Barber, The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple (Cambridge 1994), pp. 314–34. Barber concludes his discussion with the most elegant and apt characterisation of the modern conspiracy theorist, from Umberto Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum (Milan 1988): ‘For him, everything proves everything else . . . You can tell him by the liberties he takes with common sense, by his flashes of inspiration, and by the fact that sooner or later he brings up the Templars’, Barber, p. 334.

18 Nelli, Histoire secrète de Languedoc, p. 12.
It is certainly the case that, unlike the ‘secret history’, scholarship on the Albigensian crusade is part of a wider and more varied historiographical tradition than a simple line of descent from Peyrat. Although there was little tradition of historical writing in medieval Languedoc, the sixteenth century saw the beginning of production of regional histories. By the early seventeenth century, this interest in the history of Languedoc had produced a number of works, including Guillaume de Catel on the counts of Toulouse and a general medieval history of Languedoc, Guillaume Besse on Carcassonne and Narbonne, Pierre deMarca on Aragonese and Barcelonese power in medieval Languedoc, Pierre Gabriel on Montpellier and Gérard de Vic on the bishops of Carcassonne.

This development of a historical tradition seems to have come primarily from the urban bourgeoisie. Guillaume de Catel (1560–1626) was a member of one of the most powerful families of Toulouse. A conseiller and the son of a conseiller of the Parlement of Toulouse, he was related by marriage to Chancellor Séguier (1633–1672), one of the most powerful figures in the government of Louis XIII (1610–1643), and to Philippe de Bertier, President of the Parlement of Toulouse. Guillaume Besse, while plainly not from as exalted a family as the de Catels, described himself as a citizen of Carcassonne, and was influential enough to have his work read by the Paris antiquarian Baluze.

The motivation for the production of such histories is presented as simply an educated interest in the past on the part of the literate urban elite. De Catel, for example, was supposed to have been driven to write his Mémoires de l’histoire du Languedoc by a concern that the medieval history of the region was being ‘submerged in fables and romance’. However, from its inception in the sixteenth century, history in Languedoc was produced to serve political, as well as scholarly purposes. Local histories were usually encouraged by towns or by provincial estates; the early histories of Toulouse, for example, responded to a need for municipal unity in a

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19 See pp. 10–14 below.
21 G. de Catel, Histoire des Comtes de Tolouse (Toulouse 1623), and Mémoires de l’histoire de Languedoc (Toulouse 1633).
22 G. Besse, Histoire des comtes de Carcassonne (Béziers 1645) and Histoire des ducs, marquis et comtes de Narbonne, autrement appelez princes des Goths, ducs de Septimanie et marquis de Gotha (Paris 1660).
23 P. de Marca, Marca Hispanica sive Lamos Hispanicus, ed. E. Baluze (Paris 1688).
24 P. Gabriel, Series Praesulum Maguelonensium et Montpel ierum (Toulouse 1665).
25 G. de Vic, Chronicon Historicum Episcoporum et Rerum Memorabilium Ecclesiae Carcassonis (Carcassonne 1667).
26 In the seventeenth century, the Parlement of Toulouse was composed of 4 presidents, 56 conseillers and 116 parlementiers, increased to 150 by Louis XIII. H. Ramet, Le Capitole et le Parlement de Toulouse (Toulouse 1926), p. 129. On the history of the Parlement of Toulouse, see also M. Priari and J. Rocacher, Le Château Narbonnais: Le Parlement et le Palais de Justice de Toulouse (Toulouse 1991), pp. 25–39.
28 Besse, Carcassonne, p. 1.
29 Baluze 7, fol. 87.
30 de Catel, Mémoires, Introduction, p. 3: ‘avoit laissez envelopée de fables et de Romans’.
turbulent political climate. Similar concerns can be seen underlying Besse’s work on the counts of Carcassonne, in which Besse emphasised his identity as a ‘citizen of Carcassonne’ and celebrated the unique history of the town through his use of local myths and traditions alongside documentary evidence. The appearance of this history of Carcassonne’s medieval glory, in a period in which the town was entering a decline in both strategic importance and economic position, is indicative of the factors behind the production of such works and their use in the creation of unity amongst urban elites.

This potential use of the medieval history of Languedoc was not only of local application. Pierre de Marca’s *Marca Hispanica* was composed using documents which he discovered while working as part of a team, headed by himself and Hyacinth, Bishop of Orange, attempting to determine for Louis XIV (1643–1715) the extent of the county of Roussillon through studies of the Catalan and Occitan archives, following the county’s secession to France in the Peace of the Pyrenees of 1659. The work was published posthumously, edited by the antiquarian Baluze and dedicated to Colbert, with a lengthy preamble celebrating the peace between France and Spain, in which the latter was now the grateful follower of its more glorious neighbour.

De Catel’s histories were also produced with political, as well as scholarly, concerns in mind. Guillaume de Catel was a follower of the elite group of aristocratic dissidents gathered in Toulouse around Henri de Montmorency, cousin of Louis XIII and Governor of Languedoc, who was executed for rebellion against the Crown in 1632. These aristocrats ‘saw in ... local culture a means of projecting their political power and social legitimacy’. They also supported their attempts at power through associations with medieval nobility, as demonstrated, for example, by the staging of the chivalric drama *Cléosandre*, written by Balthazar Baro and Guillaume de Catel, by Montmorency in 1624. While the balanced and unemotional language used by de Catel in his historical works appears to bear out the claim, in the introduction to the *Mémoires*, that he was motivated only by scholarship

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31 Schneider, *Public Life*, p. 73.
32 For example the tunnels leading from the Cité of Carcassonne to a cave below the castle of Cabaret, through which the heretics of Carcassonne are supposed to have escaped from the crusaders in 1209. Besse, *Carcassonne*, p. 136, and the poems written by locals describing the behaviour of the bishop of Carcassonne towards the crusade and the terms on which the citizens were allowed to leave after the surrender to the crusaders. Ibid., pp. 137–8.
37 Schneider, *Public Life*, p. 135.
38 Ibid., p. 74.
in his researches,\textsuperscript{39} in the light of his political connections he can be seen to have been working according to a more complex agenda.

There are distinct differences in presentation between de Catel’s first work, on the counts of Toulouse,\textsuperscript{40} and his second, on more general Languedoc history.\textsuperscript{41} The first, published in Toulouse in 1623, was dedicated to Montmorency and appears to proclaim de Catel’s allegiance to the aristocratic group in Toulouse. This allegiance is not apparent from the introduction of the later work, possibly because de Catel was working on the Mémoires when he died in 1626 and it was published posthumously with an introduction by his nephew in 1633. Another significant factor must have been that it was published only a year after Montmorency’s execution for treason. The dedication of Mémoires to Pierre Séguier, Louis XIII’s new chancellor, both stressed the relationship by marriage between Séguier and the de Catels and achieved a respectability for the work through a connection with the chancellor’s reputation as a ‘relentless persecutor of rebels’.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite their different dedications, the contents of both de Catel’s histories reveal the political agendas which they were written to serve. In the introduction to his Histoire des Comtes de Tolouse, de Catel flattered Montmorency through a reminder of his descent from the great St Louis, praising his work against heresy in Languedoc. However, the work itself deals with the rulers of Toulouse only until the county became the possession of the French crown after the death of Raimond VII, the last of the family of St Gilles, in 1249. In similar fashion, in the Mémoires, de Catel recounted the histories of the greatest noble families of Languedoc from their early medieval beginnings until their lands passed to the Crown, whether as a direct result of the Albigensian crusade or in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. De Catel restricted himself to recounting the history of the Occitan, as opposed to northern French, nobility of Languedoc.

This bias can be seen as part of an intellectual culture in Toulouse in which there had been a resurgence of interest in Occitan as a literary language despite increasing official use of langue d’oïl.\textsuperscript{43} It also represented the concerns of Montmorency and his aristocratic followers, who wanted independence and freedom from royal control, and reflects the alliance, also seen in the context of the French Revolution, between the highest ranks of the urban bourgeoisie and the local, as opposed to national, aristocracy.\textsuperscript{44} De Catel’s works create a link between Montmorency and the twelfth-century nobility of Languedoc, who were practically if not nominally independent from the Crown. According to de Catel, the history of the counts of Toulouse had been forgotten in Languedoc as a result of the area’s subjugation to

\textsuperscript{39} de Catel, Mémoires, Introduction, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{40} Idem, Histoire des Comtes de Tolose.
\textsuperscript{41} Idem, Mémoires.
\textsuperscript{42} Moote, Revolt of the Judges, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{43} Schneider, Public Life, pp. 85–6.
the Crown\textsuperscript{45} and he recommended the work to Montmorency as ‘a memoir of what had been lost in the course of three or four centuries’, in which he would have particular interest.\textsuperscript{46} The implicit connection between de Catel’s academic recovery of the counts of Toulouse and Montmorency’s proposed recovery of their political reality is clear. De Catel’s interest in the medieval history of Languedoc lay, not in the past, but in its potential recreation in the present.

The tradition of historical writing glorifying Languedoc, begun in works such as those of de Catel and Besse, was continued in the nineteenth century by authors such as Compayre\textsuperscript{47} and d’Auriac\textsuperscript{48} on Albi, as well as more balanced and scholarly works such as Mahul’s collection of sources on Carcassonne.\textsuperscript{49} The view of the Albigensian crusade generally presented in this historiography is distinctly different from that of the romantics. This was not because it was more sympathetic towards the crusaders than Peyrat, but as a result of the view generally taken in these works towards Catharism. Besse, for example, was adamant in his opposition to the Albigensian crusade, calling Raimond Roger a martyr,\textsuperscript{50} and including an epitaph for Raimond VI of Toulouse which maintained his glorious status despite the loss of his lands.\textsuperscript{51} However, he was unsympathetic to heretics, and plainly had little understanding of Cathar belief.\textsuperscript{52} De Catel was sympathetic to the religious, if not to the political, achievements of the crusade: a member of the resolutely Catholic Parlement of Toulouse, he had no truck with religious dissidence and in 1618 prosecuted and condemned to death the Neapolitan atheist philosopher and magician Vanini.\textsuperscript{53} The focus of the seventeenth-century works was on the orthodox nobility, as opposed to the heretics themselves.

The use of the history of medieval Languedoc for political ends has continued into the twentieth century. The propaganda of the Vichy regime in the South of France, for example, made use of ideas of an independent Midi both through the encouragement of local patois\textsuperscript{54} and through reference to the medieval past. The youth organisation the Compagnons de France, for example, was divided into different regional groups, with the Toulouse region being given as its symbol the coat of arms of the house of St Gilles.\textsuperscript{55} The history of medieval Languedoc appears in fact to have become a battleground between the Vichy Regime, the Germans and the Resistance, who also used the symbolism of resistance to the crusaders, and this perhaps

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\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{47} C. Compayre, \textit{Etudes historiques et documents inédits sur l’Albigeois, le Castrais et l’ancien diocèse de Lavaud} (Albi 1841).
\textsuperscript{50} Besse, \textit{Ducs de Narbonne}, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 354.
\textsuperscript{53} Schneider, \textit{Public Life}, pp. 154–5.
explains why some of the most perplexing and persistent conspiracy rumours centre around events supposed to have taken place in the war years. The best known of these is the mysterious plane, which is supposed to have lowered a cross over the ruins of Montségur on 16 March 1944, the seventh hundredth anniversary of the castle’s surrender to Louis IX (1226–1270). This has been described as the work of the Resistance,56 the work of the Nazis while the Resistance also commemorated the anniversary57 and as a rumour ‘universally recognised as false’.58

While stories such as this would seem to be far from serious scholarship on the Albigensian crusade, it may not be as simple as Nelli suggested to separate modern study of the crusade from the romantic and political historiographical traditions from which it comes. Modern histories of the Albigensian crusade have also been regarded as deliberately furthering political agendas. Belperron’s *La croisade contre les Albigeois et l’union du Languedoc à la France 1209–1249*, for example, first published in Paris in 1942, has been accused of using the history of the Albigensian crusade to argue for support for the Nazi occupation of France, an accusation seemingly based on his general approval of the crusade and his denunciation of the romantic idea of twelfth-century Languedoc promulgated by Otto Rahn as ‘ignorance and bad faith’.59

There are also less immediately obvious effects on the patterns of modern scholarship on the crusade and Languedoc. Some of these may result from a reluctance to study areas particularly colonised by the ‘secret history’. The fact that there has been comparatively little modern work on *Rhédae*, the early medieval Visigothic centre which in the twelfth century was theoretically at least the administrative centre of the county of the Razès, for example, may not be unconnected to the fact that *Rhédae* is now the village of Rennes-le-Château, centre of a popular conspiracy theory concerning Cathars, Templars and the extra-curricular earnings of a nineteenth-century priest called Berengar Saunière.60 This conspiracy theory has made Rennes-le-Château a tourist attraction and has coloured the area’s previous history to the extent that the major nineteenth-century study of the Razès, Fédié’s *Le Comté du Razès et le diocèse d’Alet, Notices Historiques*, was reprinted in an abridged edition by the Association Terre du Rhédae in 1994 with an introduction discussing Saunière.61

It is possible that in the same way, the romantic reputation attaching to the study of Catharism and the crusade in general has aided the creation of a view of it as a discipline apart, and mitigated against the crusade being seen in a wider

57 Lafon, ‘Une mémoire disputée?’, p. 90.
geographical or temporal context in much modern historiography. More impor-
tantly, the different historiographical traditions have been united in portraying the
conflict between the Albigensian crusaders and their opponents in Languedoc as a
dichotomy between good and evil, whether this was between the brutal crusaders
and the lost Eden of twelfth-century Languedoc or, as Belperron had it, the noble
crusaders against the degenerate south. The crusaders and the lords of Languedoc
have not been seen in relational terms, merely as absolutes, and their interaction has
often been assumed to have been conducted in accordance with these absolute char-
acterisations. Just as relatively few studies of the nobility in Languedoc have encom-
passed both the twelfth century and the Albigensian crusade, so the Albigensian
crusade has tended to be portrayed, implicitly if not explicitly, as an outside context
event; a natural disaster whose effects and motivations were nothing to do with the
innocent society it destroyed.

To argue against this view is not to follow the contemporary chronicler Pierre des
Vaux-de-Cernay in arguing that the society of Languedoc brought the crusade on
itself.62 It is to recognise that the crusade operated in relation to Languedoc noble
society and the place of particular lords within it: many crusaders, like their leader
Simon de Montfort, after all became in a sense part of that noble society, as they
benefited from grants of lands confiscated from their defeated opponents. To under-
stand the fate of the lords of Languedoc at the hands of the crusaders, therefore, it is
first necessary to understand their history.

The Trencavel family, the viscounts of Béziers, Carcassonne, Albi and Razès and
their cousins the viscounts of Nîmes, are remarkable because they were the only
members of the higher nobility to be destroyed by the crusade. Through a detailed
examination of the reasons for this particularly harsh treatment, this study takes the
Trencavel as case study of how their dealings with the crusade can be understood in
the context of the complexities of the politics of twelfth-century Languedoc. By so
doing, it aims to elucidate the workings of what was not a battle between good and
evil but a complicated conflict, involving not so much crusaders and Cathars but dif-
ferent groups of religiously orthodox lords whose strategies, tactics and capabilities
were determined not solely by their convictions or lack of them but by their position
in the society in which they lived.

62 Pierre des Vaux, Historia Albigensis, PL 213, xvi, 566. See also the translations, into French:
P. Guébin and H. Maisonneuve, Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay: Histoire Albigeoise (Paris, 1951), and into
English: W. A. Sibly and M. D. Sibly, The History of the Albigensian Crusade: Peter of les
Vaux-de-Cernay’s Historia Albigensis (Woodbridge 1998).
One of the remarkable aspects of the society of twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Languedoc was that it produced very little narrative history. Brief annals and necrologies such as that produced by the church of Carcassonne were known, but the more detailed chronicles and histories being produced in this period in other parts of western Europe are conspicuous by their absence, as are specifically ecclesiastical forms of writing such as hagiography. This dearth of narrative was clearly not the result of a particularly illiterate culture however, as twelfth-century Languedoc left a particularly rich charter record, produced and preserved by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities.

This combination of an abundant documentary record and sparse narrative history has been considered so unusual that it has been suggested that the enthusiastic secular production of charters led to the apparent Occitan disinclination for narrative. Bisson has argued that the abundance of charters created a society in which the written word was something to be used rather than enjoyed: ‘What history most lacked in these southern lands was readers. In written societies oppressed by the accumulation of formulaic fiscal records, many literate men learned how to use the past without learning how to savour it.’ This theory rightly highlights the role of the charter as an instrument in the exercise of power, in contrast to chronicles whose relationship to government was always less direct, but also raises the question of the relationship contained in the charters of eleventh- and twelfth-century Languedoc between the oral and the written.

Despite the development of a more literate society in the twelfth century, it is evident that in the Midi inquiries into land ownership and rights were frequently based on memory; that is, on the oral testimony of reputable witnesses. This can be seen, for example, in the dispute between the Bishop of Béziers, Bernard Gaucelin (1167–1182) and the Abbot of St Aphrodise over the bishop’s claim to the jurisdiction of St Aphrodise when the abbacy was vacant. This dispute was settled in 1175 by Pierre, Archdeacon of Carcassonne, and Stéphane de Poprino, Archdeacon of Carcassonne.

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1 ‘Necrology of the Church of Carcassonne’, Bouquet 19, p. 249.
3 Ibid., p. 307.
4 Doat 60, fols. 254–238v.
St Nazaire, through the testimony of the Archdeacon of Béziers and the sacristan: ‘They testified about those things which they said they knew about, and they gave their statements which are recorded in the charter before everyone, and so from their assertions the aforementioned Archdeacon [of Carcassonne] with fairness and moderation decided that, the church of St Aphrodise being vacant, the Bishop of Béziers ought to hold that Church, and should deal with it for the honour and benefit of the Church.’

Similar inquiries were conducted by the royal vicar in Albi in 1229 and by Roger II, Viscount of Béziers, Carcassonne, Albi and Razès in February 1176 to prove his right of overlordship over the castle of Mèze through the statements of Pierre de Mèze and his family.

In such inquiries, oral testimony was not simply an alternative to written evidence. Roger II could, if he had chosen, have proved his overlordship of Mèze by charter evidence: a charter recording the sale of Mèze to Raimond Trencavel, Roger’s father, by his nephew Gerald de Roussillon in 1152 was copied into the family cartulary in the late 1180s and would presumably have been in Roger’s possession. By the late eleventh century written evidence was beginning to be regarded in some areas as a more accurate record of the past than memory, as demonstrated by Orderic Vitalis: ‘Now, I will turn back and try to relate some things that I have learned not from written sources, but from the tales of old men . . . With the loss of books the deeds of men of old pass into oblivion, and can in no wise be recovered by those of our generation, for the admonitions of the ancients pass away from the memory of modern men in the changing world, as hail or snow melt in the waters of a swift river, swept away by the current, never to return.’ This did not mean that oral evidence was superseded: the possibility of forgery meant that written evidence had often to be regarded with considerable mistrust, only partially overcome by precautions such as the lengthy description of the seal included in the report of the

5 Ibid.: ‘testificati sunt super hiis quae scire se assemebant, et suas attestiones in cartula conscriptas coram omnibus recitaverunt, ex eorum itaque assertionibus, et praescriptorum archidiaconorum mediatione et moderatione cognitum fuit, quod vacantes Ecclesiam tenere, et ad honorem et utilitatem ipsius Ecclesie ibi disponere’.


7 CT, fols. 245v–246; Doat 168, fols. 113–113v.


10 For a discussion of mistrust of the written word, see M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1993), pp. 294–327. The potential problems of written evidence were not confined to forgery: for example, Philip Augustus’s poor command of Latin made Innocent III suspect that his communications to the king were not being relayed accurately by the royal translators: PL 215, p. 1135 ‘minus fideliter exponuntur’. J. N. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley 1986), p. 359.
1229 inquiry at Albi. However, it would not have been such difficulties alone which prompted the preference for oral over written evidence in these inquiries, as oral testimony played a role outside the scope of purely written proceedings. The inquiry into Méze formed its conclusions from the collective memory of the participants openly, before witnesses: through its oral format the inquiry became a dynamic interaction between Roger II and Pierre de Méze which forced Pierre’s public admission of Roger’s claims to overlordship.

The purpose of the written record of these oral proceedings was then to pin down and define what was remembered; as Stock has commented, with the growth of literacy and the increasing importance of documentation, ‘Men began to think of facts not as recorded by texts, but as embodied in texts.’ The care taken to prove that the written record corresponded to the oral process in proceedings like the 1229 inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Albi is an indication of how the written record was regarded as fixing and limiting the oral process. In the first place, the testimonies of the various citizens of Albi on the power of the bishop were written down and sealed with the seal of the royal vicar of Albi. This document was then opened and read out, presumably in Albi, by the vicar’s deputy, to ‘all those present to see and hear this public proceeding.’ The record of the reading out of the document, including the entire text of the original inquiry, was kept in the archives of the Bishop of Albi, where it was found by the compilers of the Doat archive in the seventeenth century.

The way in which charters, as the written records of oral memories, could be used to supply history is most clearly shown by the example of the inquiry commissioned in c.1175 by Alfons II, Count-King of Barcelona and Aragon (1162–1196), into his claims to Carcassonne. The findings of the inquiry claimed that the counts of Barcelona had complete possession of Carcassonne, which they allowed the Trencavel to occupy only as long as they were loyal. The version of history given in the report differs substantially from that which can be gleaned from the contemporary documents recording the Trencavel acquisition of Carcassonne in 1068.
and the inquiry was clearly commissioned to provide Alfons with a means of forcing the viscount, Roger II to renew his allegiance to Aragon through its use of memory and tradition.

The inquiry was essentially a written record of an oral process of investigation. The anonymous authors began by stating that ‘This is what is remembered concerning how the city of Carcassonne, with all the county belonging to it, came to the venerable Count of Barcelona, Ramon-Berenguer [I] the Old, as we heard it from the great men of the court in the presence of the venerable Count of Barcelona, prince of Aragon, your father.’16 It is not entirely clear whether Ramon Berenguer IV had actually instituted his own inquiry into his claim to Carcassonne, or whether this should be simply taken to mean what was generally known by those at his court. However, the important point made by the beginning of the report is that it represented, not what was recorded at the Court of Barcelona, but what was remembered.

Operating within the framework of a legal enquiry, the documented findings used the expected oral forms of evidence. Admitting that the initial inquiry had been incomplete, the authors recommended further information be sought from both written and oral sources: ‘This we heard in the court of the venerable count, your father. But because we were not yet born when these events took place, we do not know whether they are true . . . We therefore counsel you to have read whatever charters there are concerning this matter of Carcassonne. Meanwhile, you should see if you can find older people who have memories of these matters.’17

That Alfons might actively seek out older people who remembered the events about which he wished to know earned a particularly scathing comment from Cheyette, in his article considering the 1068 transactions. In his opinion, as it would have been impossible for there to have been anyone alive in Alfons’s reign who could remember transactions made in 1068, such useless advice demonstrates the deep confusion on the part of the authors of the inquiry over the chronology of the events they were attempting to describe. ‘As the last sentence makes clear, the distant past has collapsed in his mind: he is only dimly aware of the real length of time that separates him from the events that he relates.’18 However, this is to malign the intelligence of the authors. Their advice need not be taken as an indication of their belief that there would still be people alive who remembered the events of 1068. The idea of reliable oral testimony did not exclude the transmission of memory: a memory of being told about an event was as valid as a memory of an event itself. Geographical proximity was more important than temporal: the authors consulted members of the

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16 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, p. 31: ‘Haec est memoria quaeliter civitas Carcassona cum omni comitatu ei pertinente devenit venerabilii comiti Barchinonae, videlicet Raymundo Berengarii vetus, sicut audivimus a magnatibus curiae, in praesentia venerabilis comitis Barchinonae ac principis Aragonensium patris vestri bonae memoriae.’

17 Ibid.: ‘Hae autem in curia venerabilis comitis patris vestri sic audivimus. Sed quia nondum nati eramus quando hae facta sunt, utrum vera sint nescimus. . . Consulimus autem vobis quatuos instrumenta quae ad causam Carcassonae pertinent pergere faciatis. Praeterea exquirere si quos majoris aetatis invenire poteritis qui hujus rei memores existant.’

court at Barcelona because they would be the best authorities for events which had taken place at that court in the past. That they themselves would not be able to remember the acquisition of Carcassonne did not present a problem, as they were part of a transmission of an oral tradition which was as valuable as a memory of an event experienced at first-hand. The overall stress of the report was on memory rather than on written evidence. The charters recording the acquisition of Carcassonne by the Trencavel and the counts of Barcelona in 1068 would have been at the court in Barcelona. Late in Alfonso’s reign, they were copied into the cartulary of the counts of Barcelona, the _Liber Feudorum Maior_. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that they were consulted in this case, and that they were not used in the first place is indicative of the priorities of the authors of the report.

The inquiry into Carcassonne based its findings on the collective memory of all the members of Alfonso’s court, giving it some of the weight of a public process such as that conducted at Mèze by Roger II. The recording of the results in writing was then another step which turned them into a weapon to be used against the Trencavel. Thus, in the c.1175 inquiry, Alfonso II can be seen not only creating a different version of the past but actively recreating the memory of past events. Whether or not the document faithfully recounted what was actually remembered in Barcelona about Carcassonne became irrelevant; by recording a version of that memory, Alfonso was able to recreate that tradition in a form which suited the requirements of Aragonese/Barcelonese policy towards the Trencavel.

The example of the inquiry into Carcassonne demonstrates how charters, as the written records of oral memories and ceremonies, could be used to construct history to the benefit of the lord creating the charter. While the lack of narrative history does not necessitate a view of Languedoc society as one uninterested in its past, this is not an explanation of the particular pattern of sources for twelfth-century Languedoc. The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw a complex and far-reaching change in European society which, among others, created the conditions in large, wealthy religious houses and ambitious noble families with a strong sense of their lineage for the creation of narrative history. The lack of such a narrative history in Languedoc may be both an indication and a consequence of a different pattern of development in the area, creating a society which told its history not in chronicles but in charters and in lyric.

The surviving documentary evidence for the Trencavel viscounts of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès is particularly rich because they compiled their own cartulary. This document, consisting of 248 folios, was compiled in the late 1180s at the direction of Viscount Roger II. The first compilation was written by two different scribes in clear, although highly abbreviated, proto-gothic documentary script, with some decorated initials. In around 1206, a few charters from the 1190s

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20 See in particular R. I. Moore, _The First European Revolution c.970–1215_ (Oxford 2000) for an important recent discussion of this topic.
22 _CT_, fols. 1–221v.
and early thirteenth century were added by a different scribe in a smaller and rounder proto-gothic hand, with a further six from 1176–1185, omitted from the original compilation.23 The cartulary was then not extended until 1214, when another scribe recorded the end of Trencavel power in Languedoc with the surrender of Bernard Aton VI, Viscount of Nîmes, to Simon de Montfort.24 The oldest charters copied into the cartulary can be dated to the early eleventh century, pertaining to the original Trencavel viscounty of Albi,25 but the majority of the charters date from the mid to late twelfth century. Most of these take the form of land transactions, being recognitions by various lords from Carcassonne, Albi, Béziers and Razès that they held their land from the Trencavel. The charters were ordered largely according to the land to which they related, presenting the relationship between the Trencavel and the lords of their lands town by town and castle by castle, an arrangement which is mirrored by the other noble cartulary of central Languedoc in this period, the Liber Instrumentorum Memoralium of the Guillems, lords of Montpellier.26

The motivation for the compilation of the cartulary was probably not a desire to provide a reference book for the Trencavel lands. The infrequent addition of charters after the original compilation meant that the record it could provide was by no means exhaustive and its exclusion of particular types of transactions, such as any dealings with either abbeys or with the secular church, made it incomplete even within the limited period covered. Not all subsequent charters were added to the cartulary as a matter of course, suggesting that the cartulary was not regularly consulted after its compilation and was not functioning as a written resource for the government of the Trencavel lands. If Raimond Roger, Roger II’s son, had made regular use of the charters copied into the cartulary by his father’s administration, he would surely also have appreciated the value of entering his own charters for posterity.

The Trencavel were not the only lords of medieval Europe who did not consult their cartularies. As has been seen, when Alfons II of Aragon wished to examine the nature of his claims to Carcassonne in the 1170s, he showed a marked reluctance to refer to the relevant charters in the Liber Feudorum Maior, the cartulary of the counts of Barcelona. Similarly, Domesday Book, which provided the royal administration of the largest survey of land holding in England, was not consulted regularly until the mid-thirteenth century. As Clanchy has commented, ‘a surprising fact about Domesday Book is that it seems to have been used so rarely in the two centuries after it was made’.27 The regular consultation of documents as a process of government may only have begun during the thirteenth century, and it is the organisation of the cartulary which suggests Roger’s different intentions for the project. Through the

23 CT, fols. 222–46.
24 CT, fols. 247–8.
25 CT, fols. 1v–3v, 7v–9, 19v, 30v–31, 41.
26 Liber Instrumentorum Memoralium: Cartulaire des Guillems de Montpellier, La Société Archéologique de Montpellier (Montpellier 1884–6). This cartulary was probably compiled in the early thirteenth century and arranged the charters by category as well as according to the land with which they dealt, LIM, p. 4.
27 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 33.
arrangement of the charters, the cartulary extended the potential of charters to
determine a particular version of history by setting out a record Trencavel power in
all of their lands. As an argument for Trencavel power, rather than as simply an
inert and unbiased record of their transactions, the greatest value of the cartulary
was in its existence as a composite whole.

The Trencavel cartulary survives in twelfth-century manuscript form, but much
of the charter record of the medieval Languedoc is now preserved only in later
copies. The Doat collection, which comprises 238 volumes, was begun in 1663 by
Jean de Doat, president of the Chambre des Comptes of Navarre, when he brought
to Paris a copy of the inventory of charters pertaining to Bearn for presentation to
Colbert. On his return to the south, Jean de Doat was instructed to obtain copies of
further charters and gradually supplied copies of charters from all the major archives
in the Midi. This was a substantial undertaking, involving a number of copy staff,
for which Doat submitted expense claims totalling more than 60,000 livres and which
was not complete until 1670. The accuracy of the copies is a testament to Colbert’s
careful mind; in 1664 he instructed Doat that the staff hired to copy the charters had
to be able to read Latin, Spanish and the vernacular and to have clear handwriting.
The chief problem with the Doat archive lies in the dates assigned by the copyists to
undated documents, which are often wildly misleading and have the effect of hiding
some important material, since the documents are arranged in chronological order.

The archive became the property of the Bibliothèque Royale in 1732, having
previously been in Colbert’s private collection, and for many of the charters con-
tained therein is the only record of their existence. The French Revolution was a
particular cause of destruction of medieval southern French material: the archives of
the archbishops of Narbonne were burnt on a public bonfire in the town in 1793 and
the archives of the Cistercian abbey of Fontfroide suffered a similar fate in the same
year. The Narbonne records seem to have been particularly unfortunate in the
eighteenth century: the vicecomital archives were destroyed in a fire in 1737 after
they had been removed, for safe-keeping, to Paris. The richness of the docu-
mentary evidence for twelfth-century Languedoc is a result not only of the particular
traditions of the society which created it, but also of the efforts of seventeenth-
century scholars to preserve it.

As discussed above, there are no twelfth-century chronicles or history from central
Languedoc and those produced closest to Languedoc are only of limited value as a
supplement to the charter record. The chronicle of Gaufred de Vigeois appears
well-informed but is brief, and the anonymous author of the Gesta Comitum
Barchinonensium was uninterested in events in Languedoc except where they impinged

28 H. Onriot, La Collection Doat à la Bibliothèque nationale: Documents sur les recherches de Doat dans les
29 Ibid., pp. 29–40.
30 Ibid., p. 41.
31 Ibid., p. 1.
32 On the revolution in Languedoc, see P. McPhie, Revolution and Environment in Southern France
34 Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 421–51.
directly on the interests of the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon. The fullest accounts of individual events affecting the Trencavel in the twelfth century are given by foreign commentators. Both William of Newburgh and Robert de Torigny, for example, describe the murder of Raimond Trencavel in the cathedral of Béziers in 1167, their interest in the viscount stemming from his participation in Henry II’s campaign against Toulouse in 1159, while Roger of Howden gives a long account of Henry of Marcy’s mission to Languedoc and his attack on Roger II in 1178.

Although not produced in Languedoc, these accounts are not necessarily ill-informed about the specific events they describe. Roger of Howden, for example, may have accompanied Henry of Marcy’s legation and therefore been in a position to provide a first hand account, while William’s version of the murder of Raimond Trencavel agrees in essentials with the much briefer accounts given by Gaufred de Vigeois and the later writer Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay. However, neither Roger nor William would have had any general knowledge about either the Trencavel or the political scene in Languedoc and this ignorance inevitably colours their accounts. William of Newburgh showed how little he knew about the Trencavel, apart from the one incident he describes, by calling Raimond Trencavel ‘Guillem’ throughout his account. While the viscount’s name in itself is unimportant to the story of his death, William’s mistake indicates how his account cannot be considered absolutely reliable. William’s information on the murder of the viscount is filtered in the *Historia Rerum Anglicarum* through his own interpretation; an interpretation on which, given his background and lack of connection with either the Trencavel or Languedoc, little reliance can be placed. William is unlikely to have been able to understand the reasons why the citizens of Béziers murdered their viscount and the

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40 Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 440–1.
42 This mistake provides the only clue to the origins of William’s information on the Trencavel. The name Guillem was used by neither the Trencavel nor their predecessors, the counts of Carcassonne, but was attributed to the family in two late twelfth-century sources: William of Newburgh’s account and the c.1175 report compiled for Alfonso II of Aragon on his claim to Carcassonne, which referred to the last count, Roger, as Guillem: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 31–3. It is possible that William’s information on the Trencavel was of Aragonese origin; given the alliances between Aquitaine and Aragon against Toulouse in the later twelfth century, such a transmission is not implausible.
motivations which he attributed to them may be irretrievably garbled.43

The history of twelfth-century Languedoc may be largely reliant on charters, supplemented in places by short accounts from a variety of foreign commentators, but this is not so for Languedoc post 1209. The Albigensian crusaders seem to have brought with them to Languedoc both a tradition of historical writing and something to write about, and the result was a comparative explosion in narrative, firstly from commentators brought to Languedoc by the crusade and later from native writers.44 The two principal contemporary narrative sources for the Albigensian crusade are the Historia Albigensis by Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay and La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise by Guillaume de Tudela. Pierre des Vaux, a Cistercian monk at the abbey of Vaux-de-Cernay in northern France, began his work on the Albigensian crusade in 1213. The first section was finished by 1216, when it was dedicated to Pope Innocent III,45 and a later section, covering the death of Simon de Montfort, was added at a later date and never completed.46 Guillaume de Tudela came from a very different background. A Spanish clerk in minor orders, he began the Chanson in Occitan in 1210 and stopped writing in late 1213.47 The Chanson therefore covers only the earlier years of the crusade, from its inception in 1208 to the eve of the battle of Muret in 1213.

Pierre des Vaux visited Languedoc twice during the period of the crusade, in 1212 and from 1214 to 1218, only departing after the death of Simon de Montfort.48 Guillaume de Tudela was also in Languedoc during many of the events which he described; he had left Spain by 1204 at the latest49 and was living in Montauban in 1211 and later at Bruniquel.50 Both authors were keen to present their accounts as founded on reliable information and personal experience: Pierre des Vaux stated in his introductory dedication to the Pope that ‘everything is true which is written here, as I have set down nothing which I have not either witnessed with my own eyes or heard from persons of the greatest authority’.51 Guillaume de Tudela was also careful to present himself as a reliable informant by admitting various instances when he was not able to speak from personal experience, as for example his comment in his description of Raimond Roger, Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne that he had only met him once.52

43 William’s account reflects his own preoccupations about the secular world and particularly his conception of warfare as a knightly and chivalrous pursuit in which the bourgeoisie should have no involvement: Partner, pp. 110–11.
44 A similar effect can be seen in England, where the Norman conquest gave rise similarly to a thriving tradition of historical writing.
45 Pierre des Vaux, 544.
50 Ibid., 1, pp. 4–5.
51 Pierre des Vaux, 544: ‘vera sunt illa quae scripsi, cum nihil unquam apposuerim, nisi quod viderim oculis meis, vel audierim a magnae auctoritatis personis’.
The credentials of both Pierre des Vaux and Guillaume de Tudela mean that their accounts can be regarded as generally well-informed and together they provide a large part of the information available on the Albigensian crusade. At first glance, the two authors appear to be describing the crusade from different sides. Pierre des Vaux was associated with the crusade leadership. His uncle, Abbot Guy des Vaux-de-Cernay, was not only involved in the Cistercian preaching efforts against heresy both before and during the crusade, but was also a friend of Simon de Montfort, having accompanied him on the Fourth Crusade in 1202. Pierre accompanied his uncle to Languedoc, as he may have likewise done to Zara, and would therefore have been in close contact with both the secular leader of the crusade and the papal legates, especially Arnauld Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux. Pierre des Vaux’s account of the crusade can in fact be regarded as the ‘official history’, presenting the version of events which the crusade leadership wished to disseminate.

Guillaume de Tudela, on the other hand, has been viewed as writing from an entirely different perspective. Although it is clear that he was never a supporter of heresy, the fact that the *Chanson* was written in Occitan, coupled with the author’s obvious connections to the family de St Gilles, have given the impression that Guillaume was presenting the Languedoc version of the crusade. The preface to the recent English translation of the work summed up the prevailing attitude towards both Guillaume de Tudela and his anonymous continuator: ‘[La Chanson] stands as a historical source of great importance, not least because it represents the side that lost’. Guillaume was certainly never afraid to criticise the actions of the crusaders when he felt it appropriate, showing his disgust at the sack of Béziers in 1209, for example, in no uncertain terms: ‘I believe that such savage butchery has neither been planned nor carried out since the time of the Saracens.’

The way in which the accounts of Pierre des Vaux and Guillaume de Tudela appear to lend themselves to a characterisation as opposites can be illustrated by their differing versions of one particular event, the embassy of Raimond VI of Toulouse to the papacy in late 1209. Pierre des Vaux presented Raimond in his usual guise in the *Historia Albigensis* of the cunning man pretending repentance and Innocent as this time undeceived:

He [the Count of Toulouse] went to the Lord Pope, to see if thus he could be returned to his lands which the legates of the Lord Pope were holding for safe-keeping, as it was explained above, and could gain the favour of the Lord Pope. The very cunning man pretended all humility and subjection and promised to carry out exactly everything which the Lord Pope ordered. The Lord Pope lashed him with such reproaches, and covered him with such shame, that, as if placed in desperation, he did not know what to do.

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54 Pierre des Vaux, xvii bis, 570.
56 Guèbin and Maisonneuve, Introduction, p. xiii.
57 Ibid., p. xiv.
58 Shirley, *Song*, Preface, not paginated.
59 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 21, pp. 58–9: ‘C’a anc maus tan fera mort del temps Sarrazinis no cuje que fos faita ni c’om la cossentis.’
do. The Pope accused him that he was an unbeliever, a persecutor of the crusade, and an enemy of the faith, and this was indeed true.\textsuperscript{60}

This is very different from Guillaume de Tudela’s account of the same event:

The Pope and all the Cardinals of Rome received the Count of Toulouse very well, as a baron by birth. The Pope gave him presents of a fine cloak, a fine gold ring of which the stone alone was worth fifty marks of silver, and a horse. Immediately they became very good and cordial friends. The Pope showed him the Veronica of Our Heavenly Father, and he allowed him to touch the surface, which looked like a living man, and he gave him full absolution for all the sins he had committed, because at that time each of them was easily in accord with the other.\textsuperscript{61}

Neither of these accounts should be taken literally. Innocent does seem to have been swayed by Raimond VI’s complaints that he was being unfairly treated: following the Count’s visit to Rome, he ordered his legates to amend their behaviour towards him,\textsuperscript{62} and is unlikely to have received him in quite the manner that Pierre described. However, Innocent is also unlikely to have received the count as an honoured guest in the way that Guillaume relates. To be shown the Veronica, let alone to be allowed to touch it, was a signal honour and one not usually allowed to excommunicate suspected supporters of heretics and murderers of papal legates.\textsuperscript{63}

Evidently, both authors described Raimond VI’s reception at Rome according to their own prejudices.

However, their differences sprang not so much from their attitudes towards the crusade as from a desire to protect Innocent III in the eyes of their audiences. Pierre des Vaux was consistently concerned to show the Pope in a good light, taking care to suppress evidence of disagreements between the Pope and his legates, as for example at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.\textsuperscript{64} Where he could not pretend that the Pope

\textsuperscript{60} Pierre des Vaux, xxxiii, 581: ‘accessit ad dominum papam, tentans si quomodo posset restituti terrae suae, quam legati domini papae pro securitate occupaverant, sicut supra expressum est, et summi pontificis gratiam adipisci; omnem quippe humilitatem et subjectionem praetendebat vir dolosissimus et omnia quaecunque dominus papae praeciperet, promitterat se sollicite adimplere. Quem dominus papa tot vitiis lacessivit, contumelis tot confundit, quod quasi in desperatione positus, quid ageret ignorabat. Ipsum siquidem dicerat incredulum, crucis persecutorum, fidei inimicum, et vera sic erat.’

\textsuperscript{61} Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 43, pp. 106–7: ‘L’apostolis de Roma e tuit li cardenal lo receubro mot be cum baro natural. Lo papa li done un mantel principal e un anel d’or fi, que sol la peira val cinquanta marcs d’argen, e pochas un caval. Ladonc devenagro els mot bo amic coral. Mostre lli la Veronica del Paire espiritual, can ne toque la fassa, que sembla om carnal, tozt sos pecatz li sols que a faitz terminal, ca tals foron d’alloc acordat comunal amdoi cela vegeia.’

\textsuperscript{62} PL 216, 171–3.

\textsuperscript{63} In 1217, for example, Pope Honorius III greatly honoured a group of Frisian pilgrims merely by allowing them to look at the Veronica twice. The Emonis Chronicle 1204–1234, MGH SS 23 (Hanover 1874), p. 482: ‘Que nostris precibus aures sue sanctitatis inclinavit in tantum, ut Veronicae Domini nobis infra paucos dies bis videndum monstraret.’

\textsuperscript{64} Pierre des Vaux, lxxxiii, 700–1: ‘Dominus enim papam, approbante pro majori parte et saniori sacrosancto concilio. This statement should obviously be taken to include figures such as Arnauld Amaury, Archbishop of Narbonne and chief papal legate, and is therefore a denial of the disputes described, for example, by the anonymous continuator of the Chanson: vol. 2, 143–51, pp. 43–83.
and his legates had been in complete agreement, he tended to blame their differences on the malign intervention of outside agencies, as when he attributed the rebukes which Innocent sent to Arnauld Amaury and Simon de Montfort in January 1213 to the influence of the messengers of the King of Aragon. In such instances, Pierre presented the Pope as innocent and naïve: when the Count of Toulouse was attempting to persuade him to send out a new papal legate who would be more sympathetic to him than was Arnauld Amaury:

He [the Count of Toulouse] thought that if the Lord Pope sent one of his cardinals out to him, then, like the cunning and crafty man he was, he would be able to get round him. But Omnipotent God, who is the examiner of hearts and the discoverer of secrets, did not want the purity of the Apostolic See to be abused, nor did he want the evil of the said Count to be defended any more. Therefore the Just Judge, with justice and with mercy, arranged it so that the Pope should satisfy the Count, as if it was a reasonable petition, and that the evil of the said Count should not continue any longer. For the Pope sent out one of his household clerics, Milo by name, to Provence.

It is evident from this passage that Pierre considered the Pope to have been taken in by Raimond VI’s request, as he had to invoke divine intervention to prevent Innocent from being abused. Clearly, saner counsels prevailed, but this passage demonstrates how Pierre used the idea of Innocent’s naïveté to account for those occasions when he seemed to be favouring figures such as the Count of Toulouse over his own legates. Pierre’s first concern was always to present the legatine perspective, but his presentation of Innocent in such instances demonstrates how anxious he was to protect the reputation of the Pope.

The character of the Pope figures far less prominently in the Chanson than in the Historia Albigensis, but Guillaume de Tudela also seems to have been concerned to present Innocent in such a way that his audience would be able to give the Pope their whole-hearted approval. It is this consideration that appears to have shaped the different accounts of Raimond of Toulouse’s embassy. Pierre des Vaux, as a supporter of the crusade against the Count, would not have approved his being well received at Rome and it would have been difficult for him to continue with his favourable presentation of the Pope in such circumstances. That Innocent should have given harsh rebukes to Raimond on his arrival in Rome was necessary for Pierre’s overall presentation of the Pope. Innocent’s subsequent apparently favourable attitude towards the Count is explained by a papal desire to believe the best in

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65 PL 216, 739–40.
66 Ibid., 741.
67 Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 656: ‘rex Aragonum per nuntios suos circumvenire intendebat simplicitatem apostolicam, et per suggestionem falsitatis et veritatis suppresionem impetravit literas . . .’
people and to negotiate a favourable settlement: ‘Indeed the lord Pope, thinking that, if he was driven to desperation, the said Count would attack the church, which was defenceless in the province of Narbonne, more fiercely and openly, told him that he could seek purgation for his two greatest crimes, the crime of heresy and the crime of the death of the legate brother Pierre de Castelnau.’

Pierre des Vaux’s account of Raimond’s visit to Rome seems designed to conceal any dispute between Innocent and his legates over the proper treatment of the Count of Toulouse and to explain Innocent’s apparent championing of the Count of Toulouse over his legates in early 1210. Pierre’s picture of the papal response to Raimond is shaped by his portrayal of the count as an inveterate supporter of heretics whose every approach to the Church was a trick.

Guillaume de Tudela’s audience, on the other hand, might have been expected to have approved of Raimond’s attempts to obtain absolution from his excommunication and be received back into the Church. Guillaume described the embassy which Raimond sent to Rome in early 1209 to negotiate a settlement with the Pope in extremely warm terms and presented the success of this earlier mission as inevitable: ‘These envoys rode to Rome as fast as they could. Why make a long story of it? They said enough and they made gifts enough to reconcile the lord Pope and the Count of Toulouse.’ For Guillaume it was entirely appropriate that the Count of Toulouse should be well received at Rome and this was the only possible way in which Raimond’s reception by the Pope could be described if Guillaume was to be able to continue to show the Pope in a good light.

The unanimity of Pierre and Guillaume in their attitude to the Pope is hidden by the requirements of their different audiences, so that both writers portrayed the Pope as their audiences would have liked him to have been. This agreement in the underlying portrayal, if not in the surface details, of the Pope who called the crusade indicates a more general similarity in attitude between these two writers who are often regarded as completely opposed, and casts doubt on Guillaume de Tudela’s status as an anti-crusade commentator. Notwithstanding the many remaining differences in approach between Pierre and Guillaume, which largely sprang from their different positions vis-à-vis the crusade establishment and the consequent lack of obligation for Guillaume to present the crusaders in an invariably good light, Guillaume cannot be regarded as anything other than a supporter of the crusade. He described its leaders in the most complimentary terms. Arnauld Amaury, for example, is described as a ‘wise and excellent man’ and a ‘friend of God’, while Simon de Montfort was ‘a rich and valiant baron, a tough fighting man, wise and experienced.’

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69 Pierre des Vaux, xxxiii, 581: ‘Veruntamen cogitans dominus papa ne in desperationem versus, Ecclesiam quae in Narbonensi provincia pupilla erat, impugnaret acrius et manifestus dictus comes indixit ei purgationem super duobus quibus maxime impetebatur criminibus, super morte videlicet legati fratri Petri de Castronovo et super crimen haeresos.’


71 Ibid., 11, pp. 30–3: ‘Li mesatage s’en van tost e isnelament, al plus tost qu’ilh pogron, a Roma barbaten. No sai que vos anes recomtan longemen: tant dizon de parausals e tant fan de prezent qu’am le ric apostoli an fait acordament del comte de Tolosa.’

72 Ibid., 3, pp. 12–13: ‘e si i a un bo home’.

a good horseman, generous, honourable and pleasant, kind, frank and courteous, a
man with a good understanding'.

Guillaume’s apparent identification with both the crusaders and the Count of
Toulouse has led to the description of the Chanson as a work containing inherent
contradictions and to the charge that Guillaume would change his support accord-
ing to the victories of either side. The assessment of Guillaume as a writer who was
essentially confused by conflicting loyalties towards both the Count of Toulouse and
the crusaders is somewhat unfair, the result of the persistent assumption that
Guillaume’s work is in some way representative of the Languedoc side in the
Albigensian crusade. In fact, the contradictory nature of the Chanson has been over-
stated; Guillaume’s support for the crusade may have been much more whole-
heARTed than has often been thought.

Guillaume’s connection with the family of the counts of Toulouse, apparent
throughout the poem, was not so much with Count Raimond VI, the opponent of
the crusade, but with his younger brother Baldwin. Guillaume joined Baldwin at his
castle of Bruniquel in 1211 or 1212 and was given a canonry at Bourg St Antonin by
his patron. Guillaume had the highest opinion of Baldwin, describing him as ‘more
valiant than Roland or Oliver’, and his identification with the Count of Toulouse
was plainly for Baldwin’s sake. When the brothers were at odds, Guillaume did not
fail to take Baldwin’s side, arguing that ‘Baldwin would never have wanted to make
violent war on Raimond, if the latter had not so very wrongly had his castle of
Bruniquel sacked.’

Guillaume’s identification with Baldwin was unproblematic as far as his support for the crusade was concerned, since by the time Guillaume was
writing Baldwin had changed sides and surrendered Bruniquel to Simon de
Montfort. The only contradictions in his account originated from the split between
Baldwin and his brother the Count of Toulouse. In 1214, Raimond VI was to have
his brother executed for his support for the crusade and it is possible to suppose
that, had Guillaume been writing after this date, he would have taken a far harsher
attitude towards the count.

74 Ibid., 35, pp. 86–7: ‘A un riche baron, qui fu pros e valent, ardît e combatant, savi e conoisent, 
bos cavalers e larcs e pros e avinent, dous e franc e suau, ab bo entendement.’
76 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 1, pp. 4–5.
77 Ibid., 72, pp. 174–5: ‘sos cors val ben per armas Olivier o Rotlan’.
78 Ibid., 77, pp. 186–7: ‘Ja ab so no l volgra durament garrejar si l castel de Bruniquel ta mal no ihl
fes rauhar.’
80 Guillaume de Puylaurens, 22, pp. 92–5. Raimond and Baldwin had always been at odds:
Baldwin was brought up by their mother, Constance, the sister of Louis VII, after she separated
from their father in 1165, and had difficulty claiming his inheritance from Raimond: Guillaume
de Puylaurens, 12, pp. 64–5. According to Guillaume de Tudela, ‘Raimond had never much
liked him [Baldwin] or been willing to give him a brother’s share nor do him honour at his
court’: Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 77, pp. 184–5: ‘Que anc no l’aime gaire, ni anc re no l vole
dar com om fa a so fraire, ni en sa cort ondtr.’
The *chanson de geste* was a particularly pro-crusade medium\(^{81}\) and the choice of this model, unusual for a work in Occitan,\(^{82}\) by Guillaume de Tudela can be regarded as an indication of where he considered himself to stand. In his introduction, he stated that his work was composed on the model of the *Chanson d’Antioche*,\(^{83}\) a poem which was part of the cycle celebrating the First Crusade, and this statement was undoubtedly intended as a signal to the audience of the stance taken by the *Chanson* towards the Albigensian crusade. Guillaume de Tudela’s work cannot be regarded as anything other than as pro-crusade and, while it was not written from within the crusade establishment, its approach differs less from that of Pierre des Vaux than has been supposed. Guillaume de Tudela did not speak for all Languedoc, only for that part of it which, like Baldwin, actively supported the crusade.

The attitudes of the two major narrative sources for the Albigensian crusade towards the lords of Languedoc are therefore less widely divergent than the different presentation of the accounts might suggest. Guillaume de Tudela was unsympathetic to those lords who were the targets of the crusade, including Raimond Roger, Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne. He emphasised that the viscount was a good Catholic, but still managed to leave the impression that his downfall and death at the hands of the crusade was his own fault, because he had been insufficiently authoritative with his subjects.\(^{84}\) The citizens of Béziers are also presented as culpably foolish in causing their own deaths for refusing to surrender to the crusaders: ‘Their city was so strongly placed, they said, and its walls defended so well that even after a month’s siege it could not be stormed. As Solomon said to the wise queen of the south, a fool’s notions often fall short\(^{85}\) . . . Fools, they [the crusaders] considered them, and madmen, for they knew very well that suffering, pain and death awaited them.’\(^{86}\) The attitude demonstrated by Guillaume de Tudela towards Raimond Roger and the citizens of Béziers demonstrates that, while he deplored the behaviour of the crusaders in dealing with them, he was not generally any more sympathetic towards the victims of the crusade than was Pierre des Vaux. They had, in his opinion, brought all that they suffered on themselves by tolerating heresy and opposing the crusaders.\(^{87}\)

Within the general similarity of their attitudes towards the lords of Languedoc, as with Pope Innocent III, the differences in the way in which Guillaume de Tudela

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\(^{81}\) The *chansons de geste* were not usually set during recent crusades, preferring to depict pro-crusade campaigns against the Saracens. However, Guillaume de Tudela was imitating the premier cycle on the First Crusade, which departed from this pattern. D. A. Trotter, *Medieval French Literature and the Crusades 1100–1300* (Geneva 1988), pp. 71–107.


\(^{83}\) Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 2, pp. 8–9.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 15, pp. 46–7.

\(^{85}\) Proverbs 16:22: ‘*doctrina stultorum fatuitas*’.

\(^{86}\) Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 17, pp. 50–3: ‘Els de la ciptet cujan que fos tant fort fermea e de murs tot entorn enclouza e serrea, que d’u mes tot enteri no l’auguesa forsea. Per so dig Salamos ad Austria la seneia que d’aiio que fols pessa fallh trop a la vega... que ls tenon totz per nescis e per gent forscenea: be sabon que la mortz lor es aparellca e l trebalhs e la pena.’

and Pierre des Vaux deal with these lords can be explained in terms of the differing intentions and audiences for the two contemporary accounts of the crusade. Guillaume de Tudela was writing for a southern audience, if only an audience of southerners who were in favour of the crusade. The lords of Languedoc appearing in his work would therefore have been known, by name if not personally, to his audience, giving Guillaume an interest in portraying them as real people, even while disapproving of their behaviour. The brief portrait of Raimond Roger, for example, which describes him as a friendly young man with whom his subjects would laugh and joke as with any comrade, is an effective piece of characterisation and demonstrates an interest in the lords of Languedoc on the part of both Guillaume and his audience.88

In Pierre des Vaux’s Chronicle, the lords of Languedoc performed a different function. Pierre’s principal concern was to defend the behaviour of the crusaders and to provide an entirely positive picture of their enterprise. The descriptions of the evil characters of lords such as the Count of Toulouse89 and the Count of Foix90 were designed to defend the legates and crusaders against charges that they had victimised them unjustly, with the description of the Count of Toulouse, as the chief enemy of the crusade, being given particular prominence. The element of justification is also apparent in Pierre des Vaux’s approach to the other inhabitants of Languedoc, such as, for example, the citizens of Béziers.91

Pierre was obviously aware that the sack of Béziers by the crusaders was likely to attract considerable criticism even among those who did not oppose the crusade and that he had therefore to defend the leaders of the crusade against the charges of brutality levelled against them, for example, by Guillaume de Tudela.92 It was clearly insufficient for Pierre to defend the behaviour of the crusaders at Béziers by stating that all the citizens had been heretics, as this was manifestly untrue.93 Pierre therefore began his passage on the capture and sack of Béziers by the crusade with a statement of the generally evil character of the citizens, quite apart from their heretical leanings: ‘Béziers was a very noble city, but totally infected with the poison of the heretical perversion: the citizens of Béziers were not only heretics, but were also thieves, lawless men, adulterers, the worst robbers, full of all types of sin.’94

90 Ibid., xliv, 600–2.
93 Pierre des Vaux states that the Bishop of Béziers compiled a list of known heretics in Béziers to give to the crusaders: Pierre, xvi, 566. If this list is the same as the list copied into the Doat archive, then there were 222 heretics in Béziers, hardly a large enough number to justify the massacre of the whole town: Doat 60, fols. 3–6. For a discussion of the list and its possible provenance, see H. Vidal, Episcopatus et pouvoir épiscopal à Béziers à la veille de la Croisade Albigeoise 1152–1209 (Montpellier 1951), pp. 82–4.
94 Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 565: ‘Erat autem Bitteris civitas nobilissimus, sed tota veneno haereticae pravitatis infecta; nec solum haeretici erant cives Biterrensis, sed erant raptores, injusti, adulteri, latrones pestimi, pleni omni genere peccatorum.’
As if concerned that this did not sufficiently establish that the citizens of Béziers richly deserved their fate, he then went on to provide a specific justification for the sack and its most glaring atrocity, the murder of those citizens who had sought refuge in the cathedral of St Mary Magdalene, by creating parallels with an earlier crime committed by the citizens in that same cathedral: ‘The oft mentioned citizens, being the worst of traitors, murdered their lord, Trencavel, Viscount of Béziers, in the church of St Mary Magdalene, which is in that same city, and they broke the teeth of the bishop when he tried to defend the viscount from their hands . . . Deservedly, therefore, was it [the city of Béziers] captured and destroyed . . . In the same church in which, as it has been often said, the citizens of Béziers killed their lord, on the day that the city was captured, almost 7000 of the inhabitants of Béziers were killed.’

The role of the crusaders was not that of brutal or culpable invaders but of the instruments of divine justice for the guilty citizens. This was expressed chiefly through the parallels which he draws between the sack of Béziers and that of Jerusalem. Both of these sacks, Pierre explained, occurred forty-two years after the inhabitants had committed a great crime. That this justified the actions of the crusaders was underlined by the significance of the day on which the sacks took place: ‘It must not be omitted that the oft-mentioned town was sacked many times because of the crime mentioned above, always on the feast day of St Mary Magdalene. The proper revenge for such a crime was taken in the church in which the crime was committed.’

That Pierre des Vaux’s account of the citizens of Béziers had an excusatory function in the Historia Albigensis can be further demonstrated by a comparison with the way in which he deals with the citizens of Carcassonne, the next town to be taken by the crusade. There is no evidence to suggest that the citizens of Carcassonne genuinely had a better reputation than their counterparts in Béziers or that they were particularly disposed to support the crusade. However, in comparison to his long passage on Béziers, Pierre devoted only one line to the citizens of Carcassonne, describing them as ‘very evil heretics, and very great sinners before God’. Pierre’s lack of interest in establishing the evil moral character of the citizens of Carcassonne, in contrast to those of Béziers, seems most likely to relate to the different treatment which they received at the hands of the crusaders: Carcassonne surrendered after a short siege and the citizens were allowed to leave unharmed. In considering the citizens of Carcassonne, Pierre had no crimes committed against them to justify and therefore no motive for spending much time describing their no doubt numerous.

95 Ibid., 566–7: ‘cives saepedicti in ecclesia B Mariae Magdalenae, quae in civitate dicta sita est, dominum suum, vicecomitem Biterrensem Trancavilum, traditores pessimi interfecerunt, episcopo etiam suo, qui vicecomitem ab illorum manibus defendere nitebatur dente confregerunt . . . Merito igitur in illius festivitate capti sunt et destructi . . . in cadem etiam ecclesiam, in qua, ut saepe dictum est, dominium suum occiderant cives Biterrenses, ipsa die capitis suis fuerunt usque ad septem milia de ipsis Biterrensis interfeci.’

96 Ibid., 567: ‘Hoc quoque non est omittendum, quod saepedicta multosies devasta fuerit ob causam superius memoratam, semper in die festi S Mariae Magdalenae; in cuius ecclesia tantum scelus perpetradum fuerat, dignam receptum ejusdem scleris ulteriorum.’

97 Ibid.: ‘cives etiam Carcassonenses pessimi erant haeretici, et peccatores coram Domino nimis’.
faults. Thus, in Pierre des Vaux’s chronicle, the presentation of the inhabitants of Languedoc both explains and justifies their relations with the crusaders.

Pierre des Vaux clearly shared the attitude of the crusaders that opposition to the crusade could be equated with heresy: the presence of one determined the other. For Pierre, this justified the massacre of castle garrisons who had not been given the chance to abjure their supposed heresy, a tactic which, according to Guillaume de Tudela, was assumed as a military strategy. This presentation of opposition to the crusade clearly fulfilled the justificatory function of Pierre’s recitations of the evils of the inhabitants of Languedoc, stressing the righteousness of the crusaders. Pierre’s portrayal of the people of Languedoc attributed degrees of heresy to them according to the treatment which they received from the crusaders, on the principle that the crusaders must be shown to have been always right.

It was possible for Pierre to present his Languedoc subjects in this fashion because his audience was unlikely to have been composed of those with any personal interest in or knowledge of the Languedoc nobility. This was clearly not the case for Guillaume de Tudela, who was prepared to admit the existence of orthodox opponents of the crusade, fighting against the crusaders from foolishness or bad advice rather than heretical sympathies. This difference in the view of the nobility and people of Languedoc taken by Pierre des Vaux and Guillaume de Tudela arose more from the different requirements of their audiences than from any deep disagreement between them about the crusade. Guillaume de Tudela may have recognised the existence of orthodox opponents of the crusade, but he did not approve of them.

If Guillaume de Tudela cannot be regarded as a source providing an opposite viewpoint from that of Pierre des Vaux, certain troubadour poems can provide a genuinely anti-crusade view of noble society in Languedoc and the crusade, and specifically of the Trencavel. While the love lyrics of the troubadours cannot provide a great deal of information on political developments in Languedoc, the sirventes, troubadour poems dealing with subjects other than love, often give contemporary and immediate comment on events. The troubadour genre was rooted in Occitan noble culture and troubadour poems dealing with the crusade and its participants can therefore provide a genuinely different perspective from that of Pierre des Vaux and Guillaume de Tudela. However, the sirventes are not by any means straightforward sources and their use can be problematic.

The works of three troubadours have been considered especially valuable for the study of the Trencavel and the Albigensian crusade. The first of these was the troubadour Cadenet, who wrote at the court of Raimond VI of Toulouse, and who addressed a sirventes addressed to Raimond Roger, Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne in 1204, rebuking him for his bad behaviour on a visit to Toulouse. This sirventes typifies all that is useful for the study of political history in the genre: it

98 See in particular his account of the capture of the castle of Bram, Pierre des Vaux, xxxiv, 583.
100 For example his treatment of Raimond Roger, ibid., 15, pp. 46–7.
provides contemporary comment on events for an audience in the present, rather than for posterity, and it sheds light on the relationship between Raimond Roger and his uncle the Count of Toulouse in a way which sources such as the *Chanson*, written at a greater remove from their subjects, are unable to do. Cadenet was, however, uninterested in Raimond Roger save for when he offended the Count of Toulouse, and the viscount does not appear in any of his further works.

A troubadour who has often been regarded as dealing more consistently with the Tencavel is Raimond de Miraval. According to his *vida* (biography) Raimond was 'a poor knight from near Carcassonne, who owned less than a quarter of the castle of Miraval'. The lords of Miraval were reasonably important in the Carcasses and Raimond's personal plight of owning less than a quarter of the castle is often cited as a reflection of the supposed partible inheritance patterns common to his class in twelfth-century Languedoc. He was probably born around 1160, flourishing as a troubadour from c.1180 until the early thirteenth century. Raimond de Miraval's principal patron was Raimond VI of Toulouse, to whom he addressed many poems under the pseudonym Audiat, but his interest in the Count of Toulouse was not exclusive: he also addressed a number of stanzas to a lord whom he called Pastoret. Pastoret was first identified as Raimond Roger by Andraud in 1902, this identification being based largely on the implications of the pseudonym. According to Andraud, the diminutive form used in the name Pastoret indicates that Miraval was writing about a young noble and the whole name, 'Little Shepherd', must have described a powerful baron, with many subjects under his command. In Andraud's opinion, Raimond Roger was the only possible candidate for the name and this assumption has been followed by authorities such as Topsfield, who repeats Andraud's identification of Pastoret almost word for word.

Such an identification would make the poems of Raimond de Miraval an extremely important source for the study of Raimond Roger, illuminating in particular his relations with Toulouse, but is by no means certain. Raimond de Miraval provided very few specific personal details about Pastoret and none which definitively link the name to Raimond Roger. Andraud's identification of Raimond Roger as Pastoret was based on the fact that he was the most prominent young baron

104 Whether such lords actually practised partible inheritance or maintained an effectively clan-like family structure is debatable.
105 Topsfield, *Miraval*, p. 19. Andraud identifies Raimond with a Raimond de Miraval who appears as a witness to a charter in 1151, but I would agree with Topsfield that Andraud's birth date for Raimond of c.1135 is unfeasible, as he would have been extremely aged at the height of his career: Andraud, *Miraval*, p. 22.
contemporary with Raimond VI and Raimond de Miraval and this should not be taken as conclusive. In addition, those details which Raimond does provide about Pastoret do not agree very well with information from other sources about Raimond Roger and his relations with Raimond of Toulouse.

Pastoret seems to have been a member of Raimond VI’s court.108 Most of the comments addressed to him in Miraval’s poems indicate the kind of jealousies and factions which must have been a feature of court life, as for example where Miraval came to his defence against his enemies, promising that: ‘Pastoret, I want to make it known to your enemies, wherever they are, that I do not love anyone who hates you.’109 In this context, it is clear that Pastoret’s enemies were people with whom Miraval had regular contact and that their enmity manifested itself on a verbal rather than on a military level. Given that Miraval was principally resident at the court of the Count of Toulouse, it does not seem unrealistic in the context of this comment to imagine both Pastoret’s enemies and Pastoret himself there likewise. Pastoret seems in fact to have been a close friend of the Count of Toulouse, as Miraval describes him in another stanza: ‘Pastoret, you who are admitted to his private councils, say to my Audiart . . .’110 It is this characterisation of Pastoret as a resident at the Count of Toulouse’s court and Raimond’s confidant which renders his identification with Raimond Roger so unlikely.

Despite their close kinship,111 there is no evidence to suggest that Raimond Roger and Raimond of Toulouse were ever on anything but the worst of terms. The poem by the troubadour Cadenet indicates that Raimond Roger visited his uncle’s court in 1204, but it also shows that he behaved badly and aroused considerable hostility while he was there.112 Indeed, the violent reaction of the court for which Cadenet was writing suggests that such visits were probably not a frequent occurrence and that Raimond Roger is unlikely to have been a member of the count’s court as Pastoret seems to have been. Raimond Roger and Raimond of Toulouse were certainly enemies in 1201, when Raimond Roger made a treaty against Toulouse with his cousin, Raimond Roger, Count of Foix,113 and their relationship seems to have remained substantially unchanged until the advent of the Albigensian crusaders. In 1209, fearing the approach of the crusade, Raimond of Toulouse approached Raimond Roger with a view to forming an alliance against this new threat. The viscount not only refused this suggestion, but did so with such rudeness that ‘they parted on bad terms, and the Count rode away in anger to Provence’.114

Andraud, in identifying Raimond Roger with Pastoret, was not unaware of the

109 Topsfield, Miraval, p. 196: ‘Pastoret, vos qu’es des conseill privatz, a mon Audiart diguatz . . .’
110 Raimond Roger’s mother, Adelaide, was Raimond of Toulouse’s sister.
112 Doat 169, fols. 94–95v.
113 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 9, pp. 26–7: ‘E son se mal partit, e l coms s’en vai felo, e vai s’en en Provence.’
viscount’s alliance with the Count of Foix of 1201, but argued that Miraval’s apolitical attitudes would have enabled him to ignore such temporary disruptions in the normally good relations between his two favourite nobles. The evidence of Cadenet and Guillaume de Tudela, however, suggests that the situation in 1201 was not an aberration and that, far from being the habitual close friends of Andraud’s imagining, Raimond Roger and Raimond of Toulouse were not only political but also personal enemies. There is no direct evidence for Raimond Roger’s identification with Pastoret and much to argue against it.

If Raimond de Miraval cannot be considered as a troubadour writing directly about Raimond Roger, there remains the *sirentes* by the troubadour Guillem Augier Novella entitled in modern editions ‘A People Grieving for the Death of their Lord’. The work has been described by Nelli as a funeral oration for Raimond Roger, with the implication that the poem represents evidence of a contemporary local reaction to the viscount’s death. It may not, however, be possible to connect Guillem Augier so closely to the viscount: his poem may not be the immediate source for Raimond Roger’s death which it has been taken to be.

In the first place, Guillem Augier himself does not appear to have any connection with Raimond Roger or with Carcassonne. According to his late thirteenth-century *vida*, Augier originated from Vienne in Provence and spent the majority of his working life in Lombardy. There is no evidence to suggest that he travelled west into Languedoc or that he ever visited the Trencavel lands. The precise dating of his works can also be called into question. Guillem Augier’s works are usually dated to the early thirteenth century, but within this broad dating, he seems to have flourished substantially later than the death of Raimond Roger in 1209. The sparse biographical information available about this troubadour associates him with figures such as Guillem Figueira and Aimery de Pégulhan, both of whom wrote at the court of Frederick II towards the middle of the thirteenth century. Aimery de Pégulhan, in fact, lived until around 1270. Guillelm Augier seems to have been writing at Frederick II’s court until around 1230 and this makes the idea that his poem about Raimond Roger was contemporary to the viscount’s death more unlikely. The dating of Guillem Augier to the beginning of the thirteenth century seems in fact to be primarily based on the assumption that he must have written his ode to Raimond Roger in 1209. This assumption is unfounded and somewhat insulting to the imaginative powers of both the troubadours and their audiences; Guillem Augier was probably writing well after the event in this case.

A study of the *sirentes* itself also indicates that Guillem Augier’s work can be regarded neither as a contemporary source for, nor as a mine of information on,

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118 Egan, *Vidas*, p. 46: ‘Augier was a minstrel from Viennois, and he spent a long time in Lombardy, and he composed good descantz and sirentes in the manner of jongleurs, in which he praised some and blamed others.’
Raimond Roger. Nelli has commented on how Guillem Augier provides the only evidence for Raimond Roger’s appearance, when he described him as having blond hair.\textsuperscript{121} However, Guillem Augier is in fact extremely vague about his subject, giving very little information which could not be applied to any idealised lord, and the blond hair itself may simply be another aspect of the topos. Raimond Roger was clearly intended as a perfect knight, indicated by descriptions such as ‘A valiant, courteous and happy knight, the most just, with blond hair, the best in all the world’.\textsuperscript{122} There is nothing in such descriptions which would indicate any personal knowledge of Raimond Roger, either on the part of Guillem Augier or his audience. Beyond the central theme of the poem of the Viscount of Béziers foully murdered, Guillem Augier provided so few other details that there has been some scholarly dispute as to whether the poem’s subject was actually Raimond Roger or his grandfather, Raimond Trencavel, who was murdered in the cathedral at Béziers in 1167.\textsuperscript{123}

The portrayal of Raimond Roger by Guillem Augier seems entirely stereotypical, suggesting that this was not a poem written from any personal involvement with the viscount or his subjects. The description of the viscount’s blond hair, far from being a personal note, may in fact have been part of the stereotype. In troubadour poetry, blond hair was usually synonymous with youth;\textsuperscript{124} in this case the description would have emphasised the tragedy of Raimond Roger’s death. Blond hair was also an essential attribute of the hero in the works of Chrétien de Troyes and seems to have been especially important in a particular type of hero portrait which was intended to be stereotypical.\textsuperscript{125} It is possible that the blond hair of Raimond Roger, far from demonstrating Guillem Augier’s connection to the viscount, was intended to signal to the poem’s audience that this was not a real character but the symbol of the lost culture of Languedoc. The content of the \textit{sirventes} suggests that it was written without any direct connection to either the viscount or his lands, and that it should not be taken as a contemporary local source for the death of Raimond Roger.

Neither the works of Raimond de Miraval nor of Guillem Augier Novella can be used as direct contemporary sources for Raimond Roger, but this does not mean that such troubadour poems are utterly useless for the study of the Trencavel. The argument from their silence itself is interesting: Raimond de Miraval came from the Trencavel lands near Carcassonne and he and his family held their lands from the viscounts. The fact that he appears to address no stanzas to Raimond Roger, almost

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{121} Nelli, ‘Le vicomte de Béziers’, p. 303.
\bibitem{122} Jeanroy, \textit{Troubadours}, p. 235: ‘l’ardit e l cortes, lo gai e l meihs adreg e l blon, lo mellor cavallier del mon.’
\bibitem{123} G. Azais, \textit{Les troubadours de Béziers} (Béziers 1869), p. 120.
\bibitem{125} An example of this stereotyped hero is Cligès, in the romance of the same name: \textit{Chrétien de Troyes, Arthurian Romances}, ed. W. W. Kibler and C. W. Carroll (London 1991), p. 156. Such portraits can be contrasted with descriptions of ‘real’ characters, such as Kay, who have individual characteristics to offset their heroic ones. A. M. Colby, \textit{The Portrait in 12th Century Literature: An Example of the Stylistic Originality of Chrétien de Troyes} (Geneva 1965), p. 3.
\end{thebibliography}
alone among the higher nobility of Languedoc, may therefore be indicative of Trencavel relations with many of their subjects. By ignoring the Trencavel, Raimond de Miraval may have been reflecting the views of the group of lords from which he came. In the same way, the removal of Guillem Augier from the position of chief producer of lamentations on the death of Raimond Roger leaves a silence on the subject from his lands which raises many interesting connections about the nature of Trencavel lordship and their relations with their subjects in the years leading up to the crusade. Such troubadour poems can provide different perspectives on Raimond Roger from those provided by the narrative sources for the Albigensian crusade, but they are not easy to use and their interpretation is never straightforward.

His association with Guillem Figueira and Aimery de Pégulhan shows Guillem Augier’s part in a troubadour culture interested in lamenting the good old days of Languedoc culture before the Albigensian crusade. The sirventes ‘A People Grieving for the Death of their Lord’ should be viewed, not as a contemporary response to the death of Raimond Roger, but in the context of later writing, both troubadour poetry and narrative forms, about the crusade.

As a result of the effects of the crusade in Languedoc, during the first half of the thirteenth century a school of troubadour writing in Occitan and Provençal developed in Italy, centred on the courts of Frederick II and Lombard nobles such as Boniface of Montferrat and Alberto Malaspina. This was founded primarily on troubadour exiles from Languedoc, figures such as Guillem Figueira, Uc de Saint-Circ, Sordello, Arnaut Daniel, Folquet de Romans, Raimbaud de Vacqueiras and Peire Vidal, and was then continued by native Italian troubadours, who continued to write in Occitan. The fashion for Occitan and Provençal literature remained so popular throughout the thirteenth century that Dante was driven to complain about those of his countrymen who used a foreign vernacular and despised their own. The tradition of troubadour works developed by the exiles and their followers looked to twelfth-century Languedoc as a Golden Age and the existence of this troubadour school fostered Italian interest in earlier troubadours. This led to the preservation of the works of twelfth-century troubadours in Italian copies with biographies (vidas) attached to introduce these Languedoc and Provençal figures to an Italian audience.
who would not have been familiar with them. Guillem Augier’s poem on Raimond Roger clearly belongs to this tradition of celebrating pre-crusade Languedoc and also displays the other central feature of this troubadour school: criticism of the crusade and of the church that began it. The most famous of such works is the *sirventes contra Roma* by Guillem Figueria, which berated the papacy for the Albigensian crusade and the sack of Béziers and also for the failure of the Fifth crusade, imperial policy, and the moral failings of the clergy, but he was far from being a lone voice.

The development of the Italian tradition of troubadour works criticising the crusade and the Church was reflected in Languedoc in the growth of a similarly critical attitude in narrative accounts of the crusade. The way in which vernacular accounts of the crusade became more critical during the thirteenth century can be seen from a comparison of Guillaume de Tudela’s account of the capture of Carcassonne and that given by a later anonymous Occitan history of the crusade. This anonymous account, probably written towards the end of the thirteenth century, appears to have been largely based on Guillaume de Tudela’s *Chanson*, sharing similar information and perspective in the descriptions of the crusaders’ attacks on Béziers and Carcassonne. The later writer, however, seems to have embellished and reinterpreted many of Guillaume de Tudela’s comments, so as to present a picture which was far more hostile to the crusade.

In describing the papal legate and crusade leader Arnauld Amaury’s attempts to interest the counts of Nevers and St Pol in becoming Viscount of Carcassonne, before he settled on Simon de Montfort, Guillaume attributed their refusal both to their unwillingness to leave their ancestral lands and to the dishonour inherent in taking lands which belonged to another man: ‘They both said that they had plenty of land in the kingdom of France where their fathers were born, however long their lives might be, and they did not wish to take another man’s inheritance. There was no one present who would not feel himself disgraced if he accepted the fief.’

This passage, while it reflects noble attitudes towards the inheritance and acquisition of land, carefully avoids condemning the crusaders’ actions in dispossessing Raimond Roger: it is only taking the vacant lands which is dishonourable, and even that dishonour can be set aside by the necessities of the crusade. This is not the impression left by the later anonymous history. According to this account, the Duke

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134 Ibid., no. 22, pp. 814–15.

135 Ibid., no. 5, pp. 806–7.


138 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 34, pp. 84–5: ‘Dizon que pro an terra, si cadaus tan vit, el regime de Fransa, on lor paire nasquit, per so no an ilh cura de l’autrui dezerit. No i a sel que no cug del tot estre trait si sela honor prent.’
of Burgundy and the counts of Nevers and St Pol refused the viscounty because of their moral objections to the treatment of Raimond Roger specifically: 'The lords and princes knew very well that a great treachery and treason had been committed against the Viscount.'

The later anonymous account appears to use the passage from the *Chanson* to make a far more condemnatory point against the crusade than the original.

It is possible to see this change in the presentation of this one incident as part of a more general process, in which vernacular writing about the crusade became more extreme, and usually more opposed to the crusade, during the course of the thirteenth century. The best-known, and most useful, account of the crusade written in this tradition is the anonymous continuation of *La Chanson de la Croisade Albigoise*, which picked up Guillaume de Tudela's account at the Battle of Muret in 1215 and continued to relate events until the siege of Toulouse by Louis VIII in 1219.

Nothing is known about the author save what can be deduced from the work itself. The author has been described as a Toulousan: he refers to Bishop Foulques of Toulouse as 'our bishop' and his stress on the battles for Toulouse has been held to indicate a Toulousan perspective. This is not, however, the only possible interpretation of the author’s allegiance, since the focus of the passages on Toulouse is not on the citizens but on the Count of Foix and his sons. This interest in Foix also shaped the earlier passages on the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, some of the most important passages in the continuation of the *Chanson* which give unique details of the debates over Toulouse and Foix and in which the only lord from Languedoc to speak at any length is the Count of Foix.

The complimentary epithets heaped on Roger Bernard, son of Raimond Roger of Foix and himself Count of Foix from 1223, in the later part of the *Chanson* imply a particular connection between him and the author; an implication strengthened by the passage referring to him as 'valiant Roger Bernard, who gave me gold and glory'. It is possible that the continuator of the *Chanson* was a court poet at Foix; since Foix was in the diocese of Toulouse, this presents no contradiction with the reference to Bishop Foulques as 'our bishop'. A connection for the continuator with

139 Bouquet 19, p. 127: ‘losdits senhors et princes connoisian ben que aldit visconte ly era fait ung grand tort et trahison.’


142 *Chanson*, vol. 2, 143–151, pp. 41–83.

143 Ibid., 144–6, pp. 44–57. The author gives the only joke of the Council to a probable member of the Count of Foix’s retinue, Arnauld de Comminges, son of Raimond Roger’s sister, who remarks, after Innocent had withdrawn, ‘we have done well, we have made the Pope go inside, now we can all go home’, ibid., 146, pp. 58–9: ‘Gent avem espleitat; oimais podem anar, car tant es delhiurat qu’intra s’en l’Apostolis.’


145 Ibid., 194, pp. 86–4: ‘E l pros Rotgiers Bernatz, que m daura e esclarzis.’
the counts of Foix provides a context for his wholehearted opposition to the crusade, an opposition which shows a clear difference in approach between his perspective and that of Guillaume de Tudela and places his work squarely within the tradition of later vernacular writing about the crusade.

The continuation of the Chanson was probably begun in around 1228 and may have taken some years to complete.\textsuperscript{146} Although it was therefore written some years after the events which it describes, the author seems to have been well informed about events in Languedoc, and does not appear markedly less reliable than either Guillaume de Tudela or Pierre des Vaux. This is the case even when the author was describing events outside Languedoc, such as the proceedings of the Fourth Lateran Council.

Although the debates over the counts of Toulouse and Foix at the Fourth Lateran Council are presented in a dramatised and dramatic fashion which must have owed much to the imagination of the author, there is no reason to regard the continuation as essentially unreliable about the Council. It is possible that the author had access to first hand sources of information about the proceedings in Rome in 1215, particularly if he had been associated with the court of the Count of Foix. The description in the Chanson of a dispute between Innocent and the churchmen at the Council over the treatment of the Count of Toulouse seems to be borne out by the anonymous eyewitness to the Council, who gives a suggestion of scandal in connection with the debates about Toulouse: ‘Here, I must pass over many other matters whose truth I could not ascertain because I only heard rumours about them .’\textsuperscript{147}

The account given in the continuation of the Chanson of the Fourth Lateran Council is especially notable because of the portrayal of Pope Innocent as essentially opposed to the churchmen and his legates and as supporting the Count of Toulouse in the face of their opposition. In this account, Innocent appears well-intentioned towards Raimond VI, but powerless. In thinking about the way in which the Church was treating the count, Innocent had ‘a heart so oppressed with unhappiness that the tears collected in his two eyes’\textsuperscript{148} and this is an expression both of his awareness of injustice and of his inability to prevent it. As the continuator summed up: ‘The Pope, who was well endowed with ability and wisdom, made it clear to the whole council and in the presence of the barons, both by a written act and by honest speech, that he did not think that the Count of Toulouse was a heretic, and that on the contrary he considered him a good catholic in word and deed. But, afterwards . . . for fear of the clergy who were intimidating him, he confiscated his land.’\textsuperscript{149} This presentation

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., vol. 2, Introduction, p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{148} Chanson, vol. 2, 143, p. 43: ‘de pietat e d’ira n’al cor tant doloiros qu’en sospira en plora de sos olhs ambedos’.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. 42–3: ‘Mas pero l’Apostolis, qu’es savis e guiscos, denant tota la cort e vezen dels baros monstra, per escriptrue e per leials sermos, que el comte de Tholosa no repren ocaizos qu’es deia perder terra ni que mals crezens fos, ans l’a pres per catholic en faiz e en respos mas, per la covinesa s’aviav entr’els dos e per paor de clercia de qu’es temoros li retenc pueih sa terra.’
of papal attitudes is striking, but the inherent unlikelihood of Innocent’s behaviour as described in the continuation of the Chanson presents problems for this source’s acceptance as a reliable and well informed account. These problems are not, however, insoluble: it is possible to accept both the continuation’s reliability and its presentation of the Pope if it is interpreted within the later tradition of anti-crusade writing of which it was undoubtedly a part.

The presence in the south of France of troubadours critical of both the crusade and the Church during the thirteenth century, such as Peire Cardenal and Tomier and Palaizi, has obscured the differences in approach of the French and Italian schools of crusade writing, differences which determine the interpretation of sources like the continuation of the Chanson. This divergence between the schools seems to have arisen in the late 1220s and 1230s, when the royal conquest of Languedoc and the establishment of the Inquisition made criticism of the Church in Languedoc a dangerous pursuit: singing Guillem Figueria’s sirventes, for example, was regarded as an offence by the Inquisition in Toulouse. Peire Cardenal was able to continue writing in a distinctly anti-clerical vein because he enjoyed the protection of Raimond VII of Toulouse and also possibly because his works were infused with an unmistakable and orthodox piety. For those who did not have this protected position, open criticism of the Church and the papacy would have been much more dangerous, and it is possible that this consideration shaped the continuation of the Chanson.

The criticism of Albigensian crusaders, or even of deceased papal legates, was plainly less threatening to the Inquisition than tirades against the papacy itself. The continuator of the Chanson, like the author of the anonymous history of the crusade, was able to take an anti-crusade stance, but was not able to criticise Innocent directly. The scapegoats for the treatment of the Count of Toulouse at the Fourth Lateran Council therefore had to be the churchmen of Languedoc, with a leading role given to Arnauld Amaury, papal legate and Archbishop of Narbonne, who was safely dead by the time the continuation was begun. For the Pope to be portrayed with approval by the author of the continuation, he had to be presented as sympathetic to the author’s concerns. Innocent therefore appears opposed to the crusade, and anxious that the Count of Toulouse should be allowed to retain his lands. This presentation of the Pope does not have to be dismissed as fiction, nor as the result of unreliable information. It is a distortion necessitated by the confines imposed on anti-crusade writing in Languedoc after c.1230: it was possible to criticise the crusade, but criticism of the papacy in the context of anti-crusade writing could only be safely done from Italy.

Writing in Languedoc during the thirteenth century in support of the crusade did not develop into anything approaching a tradition comparable with that of criticising the crusade, but this is not to say that later pro-crusade writing was

152 Anglade, Littérature méridionale, p. 87.
entirely non-existent in Languedoc. The principal pro-crusade account written after the crusade is the chronicle attributed to Guillaume de Puylaurens. In his introduction, the author stated that he was setting out to relate the story of the seventy years' struggle against heresy in Languedoc, beginning with the legation of Pierre de Castelnau in 1203 and ending in 1272.\[153\] The chronicle is, however, especially interesting for the information which it provides about the counts, bishops and citizens of Toulouse in the later twelfth century before the crusade, a period which is not covered by any other narrative source.

The author of the chronicle, who is anonymous in the text, identifies himself as a native of Languedoc, quoting at one point a memory of himself in the streets of Toulouse as a child.\[154\] At some point he was probably associated with the Bishop of Toulouse’s household, as he refers to having spoken personally to both Bishop Foulques of Toulouse\[155\] and Bishop Guillem Peire of Albi.\[156\] The earliest surviving manuscript of the chronicle names its author as Guillaume de Puylaurens\[157\] in an incipit added by either the owner or the copyist of the manuscript and this attribution has been accepted by modern scholars of the work. The only problem has been locating the correct Guillaume de Puylaurens.

The author of the chronicle is usually linked with the master Guillaume who was rector of the church of Puylaurens in the 1230s and 1240s\[158\] and a notary to successive bishops of Toulouse who also worked with the Toulouse Inquisition.\[159\] However, a master Guillaume was also chaplain to Raimond VII of Toulouse around the same time, and there has been considerable debate about whether these two Guillaumes were, in fact, one and the same. Neither Duvernoy nor Sibly and Sibly, the modern editors of the chronicle, have seen any difficulty with viewing Guillaume de Puylaurens as associated with both the bishops and the count of Toulouse; Sibly and Sibly comment that Raimond VII was reconciled to the Church and the French Crown after 1245 and had made some efforts against heresy.\[160\] On the other hand, it is certainly the case that throughout his chronicle Guillaume showed himself firmly in favour of the crusade and entirely unsympathetic to those, including the counts of Toulouse, who opposed it. In this view, Guillaume’s Toulousan origins did not give him any identification with the victims of the crusade. Dossat commented of Guillaume that he was ‘a royalist writer... Guillaume de Puylaurens represents the opinion of those who were easily reconciled to the loss of

153 Guillaume de Puylaurens, prologue, pp. 28–9: ‘Cum inter haec que gesta referuntur ab annis centum citra inter hec nostra maria in Europa, illud valde dignum memoria sit habendum, quod, ceptum pro fide catholica defendenda et pravitate heretica extirpanda in provincia Narbonensi, et Albiensi, Ruthenensi, Caturcensi, Agennensi dioecesis et quibusdam terris ultra Rodanum comitis Tholosani, vix infra LXX annorum spacium finem dinoscitur habuisse.’
154 Ibid., 1, pp. 34–5.
155 Ibid., 7, pp. 50–1.
156 Ibid., 3, pp. 36–7; 4, pp. 40–1.
157 Sibly and Sibly, Guillaume de Puylaurens, Introduction, p. xx.
158 Ibid., p. xxiii.
their independence [to the French Crown], an impression of the author which sits uneasily with the idea that he was chaplain of any count of Toulouse, however chastened and reformed.

The debate about the notary and the chaplain in Toulouse in the 1240s has, however, obscured some problems with the identification of either of these figures as the author of the chronicle. Master Guillaume the notary was probably born in or before c.1200 as, if he was a different person, would master Guillaume the chaplain of the count of Toulouse have been. The chronicle was probably composed in 1275/1276, which would place the author in his late seventies when it was written. It is no wonder that Sibly and Sibly conclude that he ‘probably died about this time’. While it is perfectly possible for master Guillaume to have lived to this age, it is an unlikely age to have begun such an ambitious and complex work.

In the chronicle, the author made great efforts to imply the authority of personal memory for everything which he related; as he said in his introduction, he would only relate ‘those things which I have either seen or heard or have heard from the closest sources or have extrapolated from other writings left for posterity’. This echoed Pierre des Vaux’s similar statement in the prologue to the Historia Albigensis, demonstrating how personal memory was seen, even in the later thirteenth century, as more reliable than the written sources on which the author would otherwise have been dependent. It was therefore important for the author to create the impression that he had a personal connection to all the events he described, and this extended even to the period long before the crusade. Although he cannot possibly have been an eyewitness to either St Bernard’s preaching at Toulouse in 1145 or Henry of Marcy’s attack on Lavaur in 1178, the description of both events is given a personal connection to the author and the implication that these were also based in personal recollection.

It is these connections which have been used to support the idea that the author of the chronicle was born in c.1200. On Bernard of Clairvaux’s preaching, the author related how St Bernard cursed the lords of Verfeil and commented that as a child (infans) he had seen the principal lord of the place, Isarn Neblat, then a centenarian, living in great poverty in Toulouse. Similarly, he described how he remembered people talking as a child about a heretic, Bernard Raimond the Arian, whom Henry of Marcy had converted back to orthodoxy and who had become a canon, and commented how this was ‘a long time before the crusade came to Béziers’. However, it is not necessary to read either of these passages as confirming an early birth date for the author.

162 Sibly and Sibly, Guillaume de Puylaurens, Introduction, p. xxiv.
163 Ibid.
164 Guillaume de Puylaurens, prologue, pp. 28–9: ‘de hiis, que vel ipse vidi, vel audivi e proximo duxi aliqua in scriptis posteris relinquanda’.
165 Ibid., 1, pp. 32–5.
166 Ibid., 2, pp. 34–7.
167 Ibid., 1, pp. 34–5.
168 Ibid., 2, pp. 34–7.
Isarn de Verfeil was still a lord of Verfeil in 1202, when he witnessed an agreement between the counts of Foix and Toulouse\textsuperscript{169} and it is most likely that he lost his lands as a result of the crusade. The author of the chronicle himself attributes the problems of Verfeil under Bernard’s curse not only to weather and barrenness, but also to war.\textsuperscript{170} If Isarn was a young lord of Verfeil in 1145 and was one hundred years old when the author saw him as an \textit{infans}, usually meaning a child under seven, this could have been as late as 1225 and is unlikely to have been earlier than 1215. In the same way, the passage on the 1178 attack on Lavaur attempts to connect the author to the events he describes but does not necessitate his birth in c.1200. Sibly and Sibly have argued that this means that the author heard the gossip about Bernard Raimond the Arian as a child in c.1204,\textsuperscript{171} not a very convincing explanation for the author’s statement that this was a long time before the crusade. This comment is the last sentence of the entire passage and it is more likely that it refers to the events of 1178 and not simply the author’s memory of hearing about them; 1178 being more legitimately regarded than 1204 as a long time before 1209.

Bishop Foulques of Toulouse died in 1231 and Bishop Guillem Peire of Albi in 1230. If the author of the chronicle was born c.1210–1215, it is perfectly possible that he encountered them while attached to the episcopal household as a young man, possibly acquiring the ‘thorough and privileged education in Church circles’ that Sibly and Sibly argue the quality of his Latin indicates he must have received from an early age.\textsuperscript{172} As Duvernoy commented, the level of detail in the passages relating to Foulques in the last years of his episcopate imply that the author was connected to his household in 1228–30.\textsuperscript{173}

The references to master Guillaume the notary, who was hitherto active in episcopal and Inquisition circles, cease in 1254 and the records are then silent for almost twenty years. In 1273, however, a master Guillaume de Puylaurens was named as a witness for Aimery de Rouaix in a case against the royal authorities.\textsuperscript{174} The most likely explanation for his gap is that the master Guillaume who had been the notary to the bishops of Toulouse and possibly chaplain to Raimond VII of Toulouse died in c.1255 and that another Guillaume, who unlike the first used de Puylaurens as his toponymic, was active in Toulouse in the 1270s and wrote the chronicle of the Albigensian crusade. In so doing, Guillaume went to great lengths to imply that he had witnessed the entire seventy years’ war, but it is unlikely that he did so. While the claim to authenticity echoes that of the \textit{Historia Albigensis}, Guillaume de Puylaurens’ chronicle was not a contemporary account of the early years of the crusade. While his focus on Toulouse provides valuable details not contained in other sources, his account is that of a man of the later thirteenth century, looking back on events from before he was even born.

\textsuperscript{169} de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{170} Guillaume de Puylaurens, 1, pp. 34–5.
\textsuperscript{171} Sibly and Sibly, Guillaume de Puylaurens, Introduction, p. xxi, note 9.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. xxi.
\textsuperscript{173} Guillaume de Puylaurens, Introduction, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{174} Dossat, ‘Guillaume de Puylaurens’, p. 349; Sibly and Sibly, Guillaume de Puylaurens, Introduction, p. xxiii.
Another later writer who plainly supported the crusade was Caesarius of Heisterbach. This Cistercian monk at the abbey of Heisterbach included in his *Dialogus Miraculorum*, begun in around 1221, a short account of the Albigensian crusade, focusing particularly on the sack of Béziers in 1209. This passage is the source of one of the most famous anecdotes arising from the crusade, the instructions given to the crusaders by Arnauld Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux and papal legate, on the capture of Béziers: ‘Realising from their confessions that there were Catholics in amongst the heretics, they said to the Abbot “Lord, what shall we do? We cannot tell the good from the bad.” The Abbot, fearing even more than that the heretics should be spared than that they should pretend, out of their great fear of death, to be Catholics, and then afterwards when they had left return again to their evil, is reputed to have said “Kill them all. The Lord shall know his own.”’

Caesarius appears to have been particularly interested in the capture of Béziers, devoting more attention to it than to the question of heresy generally. Since he had no discernible connection to either Béziers or to Languedoc, it would be easy to dismiss his account, in comparison with more local sources of information, as inaccurate and ill-informed. However, Caesarius’ account of the sack of Béziers can be extremely valuable for the history of the Albigensian crusade, as it represents the Cistercian viewpoint, that of the Cistercian papal legates and, in particular, of Arnauld Amaury.

The originality of Caesarius’ two anecdotes concerning Béziers, Arnauld Amaury’s comment and the casting of the Gospel from the walls of the town by the heretics, suggests that he had different sources of information from the other authors who described the sack, and makes it unlikely that he used a written account, such as that of Pierre des Vaux, as his exemplar. It has been recognised that Caesarius did not use exclusively written sources for the *Dialogus Miraculorum*, but also made use of anecdotes and stories which were told in his monastery. For any Cistercian house, the annual Cistercian General Chapter was a major source of information and gossip, the ‘meeting place for stories from all over Europe’. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Abbot of Heisterbach would have brought back such stories from the Chapter, and, indeed, at various points in the *Dialogus Miraculorum*, he mentions stories heard at the General Chapter.

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174 Ibid., p. 302: ‘Cognoscentes ex confessionibus illorum catholicos cum haereticis esse permixtos, dixerunt Abbat: Quid faciemus, domine? Non possumus discernere inter bonos et malos. Times tam Abbas quam reliqui ne tantum timore mortis se catholicos simularent et post ipsorum abcesum iterum ad perfidiam redirent, fertur dixisse: Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius (2 Tim. 2:19).’
Caesarius refers to the General Chapter as the source of a story.\textsuperscript{181} While he makes no such acknowledgement in his passage about Béziers, it is possible that either the account given by Arnauld to the Chapter of his activities in Languedoc, or general gossip among the Abbots, was the source of Caesarius' unique version of events.\textsuperscript{182}

Caesarius's work, like that of Pierre des Vaux, can be seen as a particularly legatine source, but there is a distinct difference between the approach of the two accounts. Pierre des Vaux, as has been discussed, was presenting the official legatine version of the crusade, designed to show the crusade and the Church in as good a light as possible. His approach to such unfortunate episodes as the sack of Béziers was to both justify and minimise, to ensure the exculpation of the Church. Caesarius's value lies in the fact that his version of the sack of Béziers is the Cistercian legatine version uncorrupted by such considerations. Caesarius was using a peculiarly Cistercian source of information, not intended for those outside the order, and his use of it was also internal. Caesarius was the master of novices at Heisterbach, and the \textit{Dialogus} seems to have been intended for use in educating Cistercian novices, rather than for any circulation outside the order.

Caesarius's account of the sack of Béziers can be used as a companion piece to that given by Pierre des Vaux, as these two sources represent the same viewpoint in two different guises. Pierre des Vaux's account was constructed for external consumption, to justify the Cistercian legatine version of the crusade. Caesarius's was the Cistercian version, unaffected by any justification and intended for purely internal consumption.\textsuperscript{183} Despite its lack of geographical or temporal proximity to the events it describes, Caesarius's account of the sack of Béziers brings the historian the closest, out of all the narrative sources for the Albigensian crusade, to the real thoughts of the initial leader of the crusade.

\textsuperscript{181} For example, Caesarius of Heisterbach, vol. 2, p. 248: ‘Episcopus vero pavens miraculum ubique divulgavit, per quem etiam quibusdam Abbatibus ordinis nostri innotuit, qui anno praeterito illud in Capitulo generali recitaverunt, cunctis Deum glorificantibus.’

\textsuperscript{182} J. C. Moore has argued that the biblical reference in Arnauld Amaury's supposed comment at Béziers suggests this is a literary composition of Caesarius's. However, it is not at all impossible that an educated Cistercian like Arnauld Amaury could produce such quotations in regular speech, or could have been believed to have done so. J. C. Moore, \textit{Pope Innocent III (1160/1–1216). To Root Up and To Plant} (Leiden and Boston 2003), p. 180.

\textsuperscript{183} The sack of Béziers is not the only topic for which Caesarius gives a demonstrably different, internal, Cistercian version from that of better-known sources. His attitude towards Molesme, for example, is much less harsh than that given in the \textit{Exordium Primum}, because of the lack of any concern to justify the order. McGuire, ‘Written Sources’, pp. 230–1.
Victims of the Crusade:
The 1209 Campaign against the Trencavel

Raimond Roger was the last in a line of powerful and largely independent Trencavel viscounts which stretched back to the mid-eleventh century and beyond. The earliest recorded member of the Trencavel family was Bernard, Viscount of Albi under the Count of Toulouse in c.918. Bernard’s grandson, also Bernard, acquired the viscounts of Nîmes through his marriage to the heiress, Gauze, in the mid-tenth century and the family became lords of Carcassonne, Béziers and the Razès in 1068 as a result of the marriage of Raimond Bernard Trencavel, Viscount of Albi and Nîmes (d.1078) to Ermengarde, daughter of Pierre Raimond, Count of Carcassonne (d. c.1065).

Their son, Bernard Aton IV (1078–1130), was Viscount of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi, Razès, Nîmes and Agde and divided these lands between his three sons. Carcassonne, Albi and Razès were held by his eldest son, Roger I (1130–1150), while the second son, Raimond Trencavel I (1130–1167), became Viscount of Béziers and Agde, and the youngest, Bernard Aton V (1130–1163), received the viscounty of Nîmes. Raimond Trencavel became Viscount of Carcassonne, Razès and Albi on Roger I’s death without issue in 1150 and passed these lands undivided to his eldest son, Roger II (1167–94). Raimond Roger succeeded his father, Roger II, in 1194 at the age of nine. He was married in 1203 to Agnes, daughter of Guillem VIII de Montpellier (d.1202), by whom he had one son, Raimond Trencavel II (1207-p. 1263). Nîmes continued to be ruled by the younger branch of the family until it was surrendered to Simon de Montfort in 1214 along with Agde, which had been divided between Raimond Trencavel and Bernard Aton V following disputes between them.

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2. Ibid.
4. CT, fols. 173–173v; Doat 166, fols. 151–152v.
5. CT, fols. 1–1v.
6. Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 271–2. This will was made in 1154, thirteen years before Raimond Trencavel’s death in 1167, but its provisions for the inheritance of all the viscounties by Roger II appear to have remained unchanged.
8. CT, fols. 247–8; Doat 75, fols. 46–48v.
Trencavel power in Languedoc was ended with the death of Raimond Roger at the close of the first campaign of the Albigensian crusade in 1209. The crusaders had mustered at Lyons in June 1209 under the leadership of the papal legate Arnauld Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux, where they were joined by Raimond VI of Toulouse himself, who had made an extensive abjuration of his myriad crimes against the Church to the papal legate Milo. They arrived at Montpellier on 15 July and then advanced westwards into Languedoc, where their first targets were the lands of Raimond Roger.

The viscount was slow to appreciate the danger posed to him by the arrival of the Albigensian crusaders; he rejected the overtures made to him by his uncle Raimond VI in spring 1209 and did not attempt to submit to the crusaders until after Raimond’s submission in June. When Raimond Roger did approach the legates his attempt at surrender was rejected and he returned to his lands to ready their defence. He made a fleeting visit to Béziers before leaving for Carcassonne, where he was to make his stand against the crusaders.

On 22 July 1209, Béziers fell to the crusade army. The horror of the ensuing sack ensured that the crusaders met with little opposition between Béziers and Carcassonne as the inhabitants of castles on their route fled at their approach. Two suburbs of Carcassonne, which lay below the Cité and which were less strongly fortified, were captured on 4 and 8 August 1209 by the crusaders, while the Cité itself was besieged. To avoid financial difficulties like those incurred by the future lord of Béziers it was decided that the Cité should not be taken by assault. The city was plainly ill-equipped for a long siege, and the inhabitants suffered from overcrowding, lack of water and the heat. The crusaders themselves appear to have had plentiful supplies despite the destruction of the corn mills by the fleeing locals, and Arnauld Amaury was supposedly dubbed a wizard in the pay of Satan for this feat of organisation.

Soon after the beginning of the siege, Pere of Aragon arrived at Carcassonne to intercede with the crusaders on behalf of the viscount, but proved unable to obtain

10 Pierre des Vaux, xiv, 565; Guillaume de Tudela, 12–13, pp. 34–9.
11 PL 216, 90–8.
12 Guillaume de Tudela, 15, pp. 44–7.
13 Ibid., 9, pp. 26–7: ‘Lo coms s’en retornè a coita d’esperon, lo vescomte son bot merceia e somon que no guerrei ab lui ni no lh mova tension, e que sian amdui a la defension, qu’ilh ni l pais no caian en mal destruction. El no dig anc d’o, evan li dig de no, e son se mal partit, e l coms s’en avi felo, e vai s’en en Proensa az Arle e az Avinhon.’
14 Ibid., 11, pp. 32–3.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 16, pp. 48–9.
17 Ibid., 22, pp. 60–1; Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 565–7.
18 Pierre des Vaux, xvii, 567.
19 Ibid., 568.
20 Ibid.
22 Pierre des Vaux, xvii, 568: ‘inde et dicabant haeretici, quod abbas Cisterciensis magus erat, daemonusque adduxerat in specie hominum, quia videbatur eis quod nostri non comedehant’.
23 Guillaume de Tudela, 27, pp. 70–1.
terms from the crusaders to which Raimond Roger would agree. Père left for Aragon in frustration and Raimond Roger allowed himself to be enticed out of the Cité of Carcassonne under safe conduct by the promise of negotiations and was taken prisoner.²⁴ The defenders of the Cité and the citizens were then permitted to leave with nothing but the clothes they stood up in, while the crusaders took possession of the town. Raimond Roger himself was detained in the dungeon of his own erstwhile palace.²⁵

Arnauld Amaury then set about finding a new viscount for Carcassonne from among the most powerful crusaders. According to the report which Arnauld sent to Pope Innocent, Simon de Montfort was the natural and obvious choice: ‘The noble man Simon de Montfort, well known, we think, to your Holiness . . . is elected by common counsel to be prince and lord of this land.’²⁶ However, both Guillaume de Tudela and Pierre des Vaux make clear in their accounts of the election that Simon de Montfort was by no means Arnauld’s first, or even second, choice, and that the legate received refusals from the Count of Nevers and either the Duke of Burgundy or the Count of St Pol before offering the position to Simon.²⁷ De Montfort was confirmed as Viscount of Carcassonne by Innocent III in November 1209,²⁸ and as Viscount of Albès in June 1210. Agreements followed with Raimond Roger’s widow Agnes on 25 November 1209, as she surrendered her dower lands of Pézenas and Tourbes to Simon in return for a pension,³⁰ and during the siege of Minerve, on 11 June 1210, with the three-year-old Raimond Trencavel II, who abjured all rights over his father’s lands and titles.³¹ Simon’s possession of the Trencavel lands was finally confirmed in January 1211 at the Council of Narbonne by Père of Aragon’s acceptance of his homage for Carcassonne.³²

Despite initial setbacks in the winter 1209/1210, when the few crusaders remaining in Languedoc lost most of the lands captured in the initial campaign, the crusade was a military success. By 1212, Simon de Montfort was master of almost all the lands of the Count of Toulouse and many of those of the Count of Foix.³³

²⁴ Ibid., 31–2, pp. 76–81.
²⁵ Ibid., 33, pp. 80–3; Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 569; PL 216, 137–41, at 141: ‘vicecomitem Biterrensem haereticorum pessimorum defensorem teneat vinculis compeditum’.
²⁶ PL 216, 140: ‘nobilis vir Simon de Monteforti, sanctitati vestrae sicut credimus bene notus . . . in principem et dominum terrae ipsius de communi consilio est electus’.
²⁷ Pierre des Vaux, xvi b, 569; Guillaume de Tudela, 34, pp. 84–5. Pierre des Vaux does not give any explicit reasons for this refusal, although he refers to the position as both ‘a burden and an honour’, ‘onus pariter et honorem’. According to Guillaume de Tudela, it was the disgrace at taking land that had belonged to another man that dissuaded the counts, and the fact that they had sufficient land already in the north and did not want southern territories.
²⁸ PL 216, 151–2.
²⁹ PL 216, 282–3.
³⁰ Doat 75, fols. 3–8.
³¹ Baluze 81, fol. 25; Doat 75, fols. 16–18. Both copies of the surrender document are dated 1211, but, as the charter specifically says it was enacted during the siege of Minerve, it must be dated to 1210. The surrender was received by Simon de Montfort in the presence of the papal legates Arnauld Amaury and Thedisius, their supporters Fouques, Bishop of Toulouse, Raimond, Bishop of Uzès, and Berenguer, Archbishop of Narbonne.
³² Pierre des Vaux, xlvii, 604.
³³ Ibid., lxiv, 645–6.
September 1213, the death of Pere of Aragon at the Battle of Muret, near Toulouse, ended Aragonese intervention in the crusade and left Simon de Montfort in a particularly strong position. At the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215, Raimond VI was deprived of his county in favour of Simon de Montfort, leaving only his lands in Provence reserved for his son, and while the counts of Foix and Comminges, who had fought with Pere of Aragon at Muret, were reconciled with the Church.

The years following the Fourth Lateran Council saw a resurgence in the fortunes of the counts of Toulouse, beginning in Provence, where the most notable success was the capture of Beaucaire after a long siege in 1216. By September 1217, Raimond VI had regained most of Toulouse, leaving the crusaders in possession only of the Château Narbonnais, the comital castle. A long siege of Toulouse by the crusaders ensued, which was only abandoned in July 1218, following Simon de Montfort's death on 25 June. In 1219, an expedition led by Prince Louis, the future Louis VIII (1223–1226), was unable to halt the decline in the crusaders' fortunes under Simon de Montfort's eldest son Amaury, and recruitment for the crusade suffered especially from the competing attraction of the Fifth Crusade. By the time Raimond VI died in 1222 he was in possession once again of the principal lands of the counts of Toulouse. Carcassonne was retaken by Raimond VII of Toulouse (1222–1249) and Roger Bernard, Count of Foix (1223–1241) in 1224. Raimond Trencavel was reinstalled as viscount and Amaury de Montfort ceded all his lands to the Crown. Raimond Trencavel was viscount for two years, until the town surrendered to Louis VIII in 1226 and the Trencavel were never to hold it again.

The dispossession of the Trencavel was crucial for the early success of the crusade. It was the possession of a secure base which enabled Simon de Montfort and his few remaining crusaders to survive the misfortunes of the winter 1209–10 and provided some newly conquered land to be distributed among the crusaders to reward their participation. As Simon de Montfort pointed out to Pope Innocent following his appointment as Viscount of Carcassonne in September 1209, ‘those who share in the work deserve to receive a portion of that same land’. Carcassonne, in particular, was

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35 The fullest account of the debates on Languedoc is provided by Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 2, 143–51, pp. 40–83. The reconciliations were recognitions of agreements reached with these lords by the papal legate Pietro di Benevento, Cardinal Deacon of S. Maria in Aquiro (1213–16) in 1214.
39 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, p. 574.
40 Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 946–8.
42 PL 216, 141–2, at 142: ‘illis qui laboris participes eundem terrae secundum merita acceperint portionem’.
a strong fortification in a strategic position on the river Aude, suitable both as a refuge and as a starting point for the control of Languedoc.

Based on military considerations, the decision to aim the first crusade campaign against Béziers and Carcassonne appears to support the view of the crusade as unrelated to the politics of Languedoc, selecting targets according not to who owned them but to their strategic importance. However, it is by no means certain that such straightforward military reasoning was paramount in the choice of the targets of the crusade. It can be argued on the contrary that Raimond Roger’s lands were attacked by the crusade because they were held by Raimond Roger and that in making such an attack the crusaders were engaging with the political and social realities of early thirteenth-century Languedoc.

The surrender in June 1209 of the Count of Toulouse to the Church and his subsequent joining of the crusade invalidated the specific goal given to the crusaders in the papal letter Rem credulam audivimus of 10 March 1208. In calling the crusade, Innocent III had aimed it against the Count of Toulouse as the alleged murderer of the papal legate Pierre de Castelnau. ‘He is presumed to be guilty of the holy man’s death’ Innocent wrote in Rem credulam audivimus ‘on account of reliable evidence. Not only did he threaten publicly to kill him and prepare an ambush for him, but also it is said that he received the murderer with great warmth and rewarded him with valuable gifts.’

It has been argued that, since Innocent had decided long before 1208 that military force was needed to deal with heresy in Languedoc, the murder of Pierre de Castelnau was merely the catalyst for an inevitable progression towards a crusade. It is certainly true that the Albigensian crusade marked, not the beginning, but a new phase of Innocent’s efforts against heresy in Languedoc. The Pope’s initial response was the dispatch of legates to the area to both convert the heretics themselves and to galvanise the local church into taking more effective action. The first legates to Languedoc were the papal confessor Brother Rainier (d.1207/9) in 1198 and John di San Paulo, Cardinal Priest of Santa

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45 PL 215, 1355–8; Pierre des Vaux, viii, 556–60: ‘Quia tamen certis indiciis, mortis sancti viri prae suspectur esse reus, non solum ex eo quod publice comminatus est ei mortem et insidias paravit eidem, verum etiam ex eo quod occisorem ipsius in multam familiaritatem admixit, et magnis donis remuneravit eundem.’ While it is often accepted that a retainer of the Count of Toulouse was responsible for the murder, it is most likely that this was without his instructions.
47 Sibly and Sibly, Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay, p. 30, note 48.
49 PL 214, 81–3; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 1, pp. 134–8. In 1198, Rainier was also Innocent’s legate to Leon, Castile and Portugal and was accompanied to Languedoc by Brother Guy.
These efforts were followed by the major legations of Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul, two monks from the Languedoc Cistercian house of Fontfroide, in 1203, and of Arnauld Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux and chief papal legate to Languedoc, in 1204. Milo, a papal notary, was dispatched to Languedoc in 1209 as an additional legate at the request of Raimond VI, Count of Toulouse, followed by Thedisius, a canon of Genoa, who was promoted to fill Milo’s position in 1210. The members of Innocent’s major legations to Languedoc remained in the area until their deaths, either in their original positions or after elevation to the local episcopate. The legates were assisted in their attempts to combat heresy in Languedoc by various preaching missions, particularly by Cistercians, and were frequently accompanied in their missions around
Languedoc by various local bishops, who assisted the legates without ever being given full legatine status. 58

The realisation that these legations alone would be insufficient to extirpate heresy from Languedoc had come long before the murder of Pierre de Castelnau: from the beginning of his pontificate Innocent attempted to secure the involvement of secular lords. In 1198, he alerted the people of the Midi to the danger of heresy in their midst59 and asked Philip Augustus, King of France (1180–1223), to assist the legates in Languedoc and to intervene himself against the heretics in 120460 and in January and February 1205.61 He made similar efforts to obtain the help of Pere II, King of Aragon (1196–1213) in 1205 and 120662 and sent further appeals to the nobles of France63 and Philip Augustus in March 1208,64 but was unable to gain royal support for the crusade despite additional pressure from the legates Arnauld Amaury and Milo.65

It is possible to understand Innocent’s call for a crusade in the light of such failures on the part of the secular authorities to address the problem of heresy in Languedoc. The identity of its initial target is likewise unsurprising. Raimond VI de St Gilles was one of the most powerful lords of Languedoc and had had poor relations with the Church since he inherited the county of Toulouse in 1194. He was excommunicated in 1196 as a result of his persecution of the Abbey of St Gilles66 and again in 1207.67 In 1207 and 1209 Raimond was accused of numerous crimes against the Church in Languedoc and Provence, including persecutions of the abbeys of St Gilles and Candeil, attacks on the bishops of Carpentras and Vaison, charging illegal tolls and breaking the oath which he swore to the Bishop of Orange not to fight on holy days.68 In addition to this evidence of anti-clericalism, Raimond VI was also accused

63 PL 215, 1359–60.
64 PL 215, 1358–9.
65 Pierre des Vaux, x, 562. Innocent further encouraged participation in the crusade by the lords of France and Philip Augustus himself in October 1208 (PL 215, 1469–71), and February 1209 (PL 215, 1545–6).
67 PL 215, 1166–8; Pierre des Vaux, iii, 551.
68 PL 216, 90–8; PL 215, 1166–8.
of defending and supporting heretics, to the extent of tolerating important heretics in his court. It was Raimond’s previous behaviour towards the Church which made the accusation of his involvement in the murder of Pierre de Castelnau so readily credible.

Despite this context, however, Innocent’s anger at the death of his legate was clearly a factor in his call for the crusade. According to Guillaume de Tudela: ‘When the Pope heard the news that his legate had been killed, you may be sure he was displeased: in his rage, he grasped his chin in his hands and called on St James of Compostella and St Peter of Rome, who lies there in the chapel. Then, he pronounced the formula of anathema and dashed out the candle.’ The decision to respond to the murder with military force does not seem to have been the result of long consideration. A messenger from Languedoc would have been unlikely to have reached Rome before late February 1208 and the violence of the Pope’s reaction may have led him to a more extreme position than he would otherwise have taken; even to a position which he would later regret. The evidence for Raimond VI’s involvement in the murder did not always appear as clear to the Pope as it did in 1208: by 1212 Innocent was reminding his legates that Raimond’s guilt was only suspected, not proved.

However, although Innocent’s anger at the news of the murder of his legate Pierre de Castelnau led him into some vituperative rhetoric against the Count of Toulouse in the letter, such as the summary of his character as ‘a changeable and crafty, shifty and inconstant man’, the launch of the Albigensian crusade did not mark a change in the papal opinion that local secular involvement was vital for the extirpation of heresy. As Innocent described to Philip Augustus in 1208 the secular authorities also

69 Ibid., 1167: ‘Impie, crudelis, et dire tyranne, non es confusus in pravitate haereticam usque adeo declarare, ut ei qui te corripuit super haereticorum defensione responderis quod talen haeresiarham, quemdam scilicet haereticorum episcopum, invenires qui fidem eorum meliorem quem Catholicorum esse probaret?’

70 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 5, pp. 16–17: ‘Cant l’apostolis saub, cui hom ditz la novela, que sos legatz fo mortz, sapchatz que no lh fo bela, de mal talent que ac, se tenc a la maichela; e reclamat sant Jacme, aisel de Compostela e sant Peyre de Roma qui jatz en la capeta. Cant ac sa orazo faita, excantit la candela.’

71 The impression of haste in the decision to call the crusade is also given by Guillaume de Tudela, who described Arnauld Amaury encouraging the Pope to further speed: ‘Sire, by St Martin! This is too much talking and delay in this business; come on and write your letters in good Latin, those as you please, then I can set off!’, Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 6, pp. 20–1: ‘Senher, per sant Martin! Trop fam longa paraula d’aiso e lond train; car faiz far vostras cartas e escriure en latin aitals cum vos plaia, qu’iau me met’ en camin.’

72 The identity of the messengers to Rome is unclear. Pierre des Vaux refers to the mission comprising Fouques, Bishop of Toulouse, and Navarrus, Bishop of Couserans, dispatched to Rome by the remaining legates in response to the death of Diego, Bishop of Osma and Raoul, in 1207 and Pierre de Castelnau in 1208, but the chronology of this passage is unclear and the mission may be more properly dated to 1209: Pierre des Vaux, ix, 560–1; Guillaume de Puylaurens, trans. Sibly and Sibly, p. 39, note 49. Guillaume de Tudela mentions Arnauld Amaury’s presence at Rome and it may have been he who brought the news to the Pope: Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 5, pp. 16–19.

73 PL 216, 613–14.

74 Pierre des Vaux, iii, 558: ‘homo versipellis et callidus, lubricus et inconstans’.
had a duty in an area afflicted by heresy to aid the Church in its extirpation. His vision for anti-heresy efforts in Languedoc thus, he said, followed the biblical example of Melchisedec, who was both priest and king and who represented the ideal that ‘the material and spiritual swords assisting each other mutually, each shall help the other’.75

The importance to Innocent of local secular involvement against heresy in Languedoc can be seen, not only in his correspondence with Philip Augustus, but also in his efforts to gain the co-operation of the Count of Toulouse, beginning in 1198.76 The Albigensian crusade was a continuation of these efforts; Innocent intended the crusade to be the vehicle, rather than the replacement, for local secular effort against heresy. Local participation was therefore of the utmost importance.77 This did not exclude the Count of Toulouse himself: the first objective of the crusade was not merely to punish the count for his suspected involvement in the murder, nor to replace him with a crusader, but to force him to fulfil his duty and take action himself against the heretics: ‘If he is not brought to his senses by this sort of harassment we will make it our business to take more serious action against him and when he promised that he will indeed make amends he must give these sure signs of his repentance: that he disassociates himself from the followers of the heretical depravity as completely as he possibly can.’78 Although Innocent recognised that the persuasion would probably involve at least the temporary confiscation of the count’s lands,79 this was not in itself the crusade’s objective, which was rather to compel the involvement of the Count of Toulouse against heresy.

The question of the selection of another suitable target for the crusade following the surrender of the Count of Toulouse is one addressed by the contemporary accounts. Pierre des Vaux seems to have been of the opinion that the attack on Béziers by the crusaders required no explanation whatsoever, remarking merely that the crusaders ‘set out together, and directed their righteous steps towards the town of Béziers’,80 and displays no awareness that this represented a departure from the original aim of the crusade as laid down by Innocent in March 1208.81 Guillaume de Tudela’s account differs slightly from that of Pierre des Vaux, but although he recognised that the attack on Béziers was a result of a decision process initiated by the surrender of the Count of Toulouse to the crusaders in June 1209, Guillaume did

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75 PL 215, 1358–9, at 1359: ‘ad quod signandum rex regum et Dominus dominantium Jesus Christus secundum ordinem Melchisedec sacerdotis et regis de utraque voluit stirpe nasci, sacerdotali videlicet et regali. Et principes apostolorum: Ecce gladii duo hic, id est simul, dicente demum Domino: satis est, legitur respondisse, ut materiali et spirituali gladiis sibi invicem assistentibus, alter per alterum adjuvetur.’
77 On Innocent’s efforts to increase local participation in the crusade, particularly in the winter 1209/1210, see Dutton, ‘Aspects’, p. 36.
78 Pierre des Vaux, viii, 559: ‘Quod si nec sic vexatio dederit intellectum, manus nostras in eos curabilium aggravare. Si quo modo vero satisfactionem promiserit exhibere, ipsum poenituidinis suae hanc signa praemittere oportet, ut sic tot posse suo depellat harvictae sectatores.’
79 Pierre des Vaux, viii, 560.
80 Pierre des Vaux, xv, 565: ‘pergunt pariter, rectoque gressu perveniunt ad Biterrensem civitatem’.
81 Pierre des Vaux, viii, 556–60.
not attach any particular importance to the selection of Béziers as the first target of the crusade, regarding it merely as the first step in a general aim to conquer Languedoc: "They thought that they would not meet with anyone to resist them in the whole of the Carcasses, and that they would take Toulouse, but it had made its peace. They would take Carcassonne, they said, and the Albigeois."\(^{82}\) The contemporary chroniclers of the crusade therefore portray the decision to attack Béziers as merely part of a more general campaign against heresy in Languedoc, in which Béziers was the first target simply as a result of its proximity to Montpellier.\(^{83}\) However, despite the impression given by Pierre des Vaux and Guillaume de Tudela, the attacks by the crusaders on first Béziers and then Carcassonne in the summer of 1209 may have had more immediate aims than the general extirpation of heresy from Languedoc.

That the crusaders’ campaign against Béziers and Carcassonne was specifically directed at Raimond Roger himself, and not simply at two desirable towns affected by heresy, is indicated by the crusaders’ attitudes to Narbonne. Narbonne was a large and important town, the seat of the Metropolitan and a wealthy commercial centre, situated east of Carcassonne and south-west of Béziers.\(^{84}\) It does not figure in the contemporary accounts of the 1209 campaign: both Guillaume de Tudela and Pierre des Vaux describe the crusaders proceeding directly from Béziers to Carcassonne: ‘And so, Béziers having been taken and destroyed, we decided to direct our righteous steps towards Carcassonne.’\(^{85}\) ‘Three days they stayed in the green meadows [in Béziers] and on the fourth day the knights and sergeants set off and rode across the plains with their banners borne high and blowing in the wind. On a Tuesday evening, just as Vespers were sounding, they came to Carcassonne.’\(^{86}\) This is also the impression given by the report made to Innocent by Arnauld Amaury in September 1209, which also depicts the crusaders proceeding straight from the capture of Béziers to Carcassonne: ‘Therefore, when the news of such a miraculous and terrifying event [the sack of Béziers] was universal, the people, making for the mountains and inaccessible places, left between Béziers and Carcassonne more than one hundred noble castles, stuffed with food and things left...

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82 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 13, pp. 38–9: ‘No cujon trobar ome en trastot Carcasses, Tholoza cujan pendre, mas acordada s’es, Carcassona pendran, so dizon, e Albigeos.’
83 This is also the interpretation followed in much of the historiography of the crusade; see for example Thouzellier, *Catharisme*, p. 230; Dutton, ‘Aspects’ p. 34.
85 Pierre des Vaux, xvii, 567: ‘Capta itaque et destructa civitate Biterrensi, proposuerunt nostri recto gressu tendere Carcassonam.’
86 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 23, pp. 62–3: ‘Tres jorns an sojornat en les pratz verdejans, al quart jorn son mogutz cavalier e sirjans per la terra qu’es plana, que no i a disturbans, lors estendartz dressatz contra l vent banoians, a un dimartz al ser a las vespras sonans vengro a Carcassona.’
behind which those fleeing could not take with them . . . and so, on the feast of St Peter in Chains, the whole Christian army came to Carcassonne.”

These contemporary accounts have been followed in modern historiography, perpetuating the assumption that the crusaders did not pass anywhere near Narbonne in 1209, but would have followed the route of the modern D11/D610, which leaves Béziers heading almost due west, and which passes well north of Narbonne. However, this road was not the principal route between the towns in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The sales by Roger II of the *guidagia*, the road toll which formed an important part of vicecomital income, for parts of the road to Narbonne from Béziers indicate that this was the major route out of Béziers, as the one on which it was profitable to charge tolls. The fact that there are no sales of *guidagia* for the more northern route, which avoids Narbonne, on the other hand, is suggestive of its relative unimportance. On leaving Béziers, it would have been most natural for the crusaders to take the Narbonne road.

The crusaders appear to have received the submission of Narbonne in 1209: Guillaume de Catel included in his 1633 history of Languedoc a copy of a document recording the surrender of Viscount Aimery of Narbonne and Archbishop Berenguer to the crusaders in 1209, with details of the measures which they promised to make against heresy. The document is dated 1209 and de Catel placed it in late July, after the fall of Béziers but before the crusaders reached Carcassonne, allowing him to attribute the immediate surrender of Narbonne to the fear engendered by the sack of Béziers. Although there is no extant copy of the document apart from de Catel’s version, given his usual accuracy there is no particular reason to doubt the veracity of his account and the dating is consistent with their most likely route.

The crusaders, however, do not seem to have bothered to take control of the town themselves. Following his surrender, Viscount Aimery gave some rather unenthusiastic support to the crusaders, but they themselves do not appear to have maintained any presence in the town. In 1210, for example, Pierre des Vaux describes a siege conducted by Simon de Montfort of the castle of Puisserguier. This castle was in the viscounty of Narbonne, and Aimery’s co-operation was therefore required. However, although the situation of Puisserguier would have made Narbonne an

87 *PL* 216, 137–41, at 139: ‘Disseminato ergo rumore tanti miraculi usque adeo territi sunt universi, ut montana petentes et invia, inter Biterrensem et Carcassonam reliquerunt castra nobilia plusquam centum, referta tamen ciboriis et reliqua supellectili quam fugientes secum nequiverunt asportare . . . in festo sancti Petri ad vincula totus Christi exercitus Carcassonam pervenit.’
89 October 1179: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 337–8, June 1184: ibid., pp. 377–9. The road in all these transactions is termed a ‘caminum’, a high road. The *guidagia* was a toll levied, sometimes illegally, by many lords in Languedoc. It paid for an armed guard to accompany travellers through certain lands or along a particular stretch of road.
91 Pierre des Vaux, xxvii, 577.
ideal base from which to mount this expedition, it is clear from Pierre des Vaux’s account that Simon de Montfort led his troops to the castle from his more distant base at Carcassonne. In this period, Narbonne seems to have been functioning almost as a neutral town, suitable for meetings between the leaders of the crusade and their antagonists: when Pere of Aragon finally agreed to receive the homage of Simon de Montfort for Carcassonne in January 1211, he did so at Narbonne.92 Even in 1212, when the people of Narbonne rioted at the presence of Guy and Amaury de Montfort in the town,93 there is no suggestion that there were any significant numbers of crusade troops there.

In their acceptance of Aimery’s surrender and their subsequent departure from Narbonne, the crusaders demonstrated a different attitude towards the town than towards Béziers and Carcassonne, one which cannot be readily accounted for. If it is assumed that the crusaders were embarking on a war of conquest in Languedoc, Narbonne should have been rich and important enough to attract their attention, while, if they are credited with more religious motives, there is no evidence to suggest that Narbonne was notably free from heresy in comparison to its neighbours. De Catel attempted to explain the way in which the crusaders appear to have ignored Narbonne in terms of the measures which Aimery and Berenguer instituted against heresy on the crusade’s arrival.94 Such last minute measures are unlikely to have swayed Arnauld Amaury and the other crusaders had they decided to attack the town, especially as they were neither stringent nor far reaching, laying down merely that heretics should be handed over to the justices for punishment and that no public officials should work for heretics on pain of excommunication.95 That such basic steps against heresy were only introduced in Narbonne in 1209 certainly does not bear out de Catel’s claim that there was nothing for the crusaders to do there and suggests that there was no qualitative difference between the situation at Narbonne and that at Béziers or Carcassonne which could explain the differing attitude of the crusaders.

There is also no obvious reason why Viscount Aimery of Narbonne should have received so much more lenient treatment than Raimond Roger at the hands of the crusaders. The significant political relationship of the viscounts of Narbonne, in common with the Trencavel, had been with the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon throughout the twelfth century.96 If Pere of Aragon’s protection was not

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92 Pierre des Vaux, xliii, 599.
94 de Catel, Mémores, p. 792: ‘mais ils trouvèrent que l’Archévêque et la Vicomte avoient si bien réglé les affaires par les susdits établissemens, qu’il ne s’y trouva rien à redire, et fuèrent contraints de passer outre après avoir attesté ces articles’.
95 Ibid.
96 The viscounts of Narbonne had been closely connected with the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon since the early twelfth century. Viscount Aimery II (d.1134) was the half brother of Ramon Berenguer III, Count of Barcelona (d.1130): their mother was Matilda, the daughter of Robert Guiscard. Aimery’s heiress, Ermengarde (1134–92) maintained the connection to Barcelona-Aragon throughout her long rule and Narbonne was firmly within Pere of Aragon’s sphere of influence by the early thirteenth century. Under Aimery IV (1205–39), Narbonne also had connections to Castile, as he was related to the powerful Castilian de Lara family, being the

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sufficient to save Raimond Roger, there is no obvious reason why Aimery’s connections with Aragon should have dissuaded the crusaders from attacking him. In the same way, it is unlikely that the presence of Archbishop Berenguer in Narbonne would have saved it from the crusaders had they been determined to attack. The archbishop’s connections were also with Pere of Aragon97 and he had a particularly bad relationship with Arnauld Amaury.98 It should also be noted that the crusaders rarely felt themselves hampered by the clergy in the towns they attacked. Although the crusaders had no quarrel with the Bishop of Béziers, whom Pierre des Vaux described in glowing terms99 and on whose behalf Simon de Montfort made considerable efforts during his rule of Béziers,100 the bishop was still expected to leave Béziers and to watch the crusaders sack a town of which he owned half of the secular jurisdiction.101 It seems unlikely that the presence of Berenguer could have influenced the behaviour of the crusaders towards Narbonne.

While Narbonne’s surrender sets the town apart from the attempted resistance of both Béziers and Carcassonne, the crusaders were not simply responding to aggression in their 1209 campaign. According to Guillaume de Tudela, Raimond Roger tried to conciliate the crusaders in much the same way as did Aimery: ‘When the Viscount of Béziers saw that the news which was going around was true, that the Count [of Toulouse] had made peace with the Church, his regrets were great. He was disposed to come to a similar accord, if he could. But the legate despised him, and refused his request.’102 Like Aimery of Narbonne, Raimond Roger attempted to surrender to the crusaders, doing so even before they were directly threatening his lands. Raimond Roger’s attempted surrender to the legate indicates that the difference

97 Berenguer was Pere’s half-uncle, the illegitimate son of Pere’s grandfather Ramon Berenguer IV.
98 This dated back to 1204, when Berenguer appealed to Pope Innocent III about the way he was treated by the legates: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 11, pp. 509–11. On Berenguer’s relations with the Pope and his legates, see E. Graham-Leigh, ‘Hirelings and Shepherds: Archbishop Berenguer of Narbonne (1191–1211) and the Ideal Bishop’, English Historical Review 116 (2001), pp. 1083–102.
99 Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 566: ‘magistrum videlecit Reginaldum de Montepesulano, virum aetate, vita, scientia venerandum’.
100 For example, in 1211 and 1212 he compelled many minor Béziers lords to make extensive restorations to the Bishop of Béziers of lands seized from the Church: Doat 61, fols. 37–62v.
101 Vidal, Episcopatus et pouvoir à Béziers, pp. 41–3.
102 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 11, pp. 92–3: ‘E cant le vescoms saub que hom ditz verament que l coms a fait patz, on plus pot se repent: Be s volgra acordar, si pogues ichament, mas el non o vole prendre, tan l’agro e nient.’ The legate here is Milo, despatched at the beginning of the year at the request of the Count of Toulouse as assistant to Arnauld Amaury: PL 216, 100; Pierre des Vaux, ix, 562.
in the treatment received by Narbonne from that meted out to Béziers and Carcassonne by the crusaders cannot be explained simply in terms of the apparent difference in responses which the crusaders encountered from these towns. It suggests that the significant difference between Narbonne, Béziers and Carcassonne was that the latter were towns belonging to Raimond Roger, and the former was not.

The fate of Nîmes, whose viscount Bernard Aton was Raimond Roger’s cousin, is also interesting in this context. The viscounty of Nîmes was taken by Simon de Montfort in 1214 and Bernard Aton dispossessed.103 This has not been found worthy of remark in either contemporary or modern accounts of the crusade, yet the viscount was not accused of any connection with heresy, Nîmes, situated in the east of Languedoc, was not in the area particularly associated with a prevalence of heresy and the town had not opposed the crusade. The seeming naturalness of Bernard Aton’s dispossession may spring from his family background more than from anything he did or did not do, an indication that it was the Trencavel and not their towns that were targeted. In their 1209 campaign, the crusaders appear to have been targeting Raimond Roger specifically, rather than simply attacking known centres of heresy. Milo’s refusal to accept Raimond Roger’s surrender while the crusaders were at Montpellier indicates that he had already been selected as their initial target and suggests that the dispossession of Raimond Roger was a specific goal of the crusaders before they began their campaigns in Languedoc.

The responsibility for the change of crusade target from the Count of Toulouse to Raimond Roger has been attributed to many different factors. Those modern accounts that see the Trencavel lands as a specific goal of the crusade suggest that this change was a result of the influence of the Count of Toulouse himself over the crusaders, arguing that Raimond VI may have seen in the crusade an opportunity to punish Raimond Roger for his former unhelpful attitude.104 That Raimond VI would have been allowed such extensive influence over crusade policy seems unlikely, given his history of unfortunate relations with the Church, but this idea demonstrates the general assumption that it was the crusaders themselves who had sole responsibility for their tactics. This follows the impression given by Guillaume de Tudela’s description of the crusaders’ advance into Languedoc.105 It is possible, however, that there was also some papal and legatine influence over the decision to target Raimond Roger.

In setting the reform of the Count of Toulouse as the principal goal of the crusade, Innocent gave some indication of how he thought this could be achieved: ‘But if perhaps harassment shall bring to his senses the aforementioned Count, who does not consider his own death as if he had entered into a league with it, and if he begins to seek with his face full of shame the name of God, you must not fail to bring to bear on him the full weight of persuasion so that he may make satisfaction to us and to the Church, and most importantly of all to God, by expelling him and his followers from

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103 CT, fols. 247–8; Doat 75, fols. 46–48v.
the castles under his lordship and taking their lands.\textsuperscript{106} Beyond this suggestion of the
general strategy which the crusaders could employ, Innocent did not deal with tacti-
cal considerations in this letter, giving the impression that tactical decisions would be
left to the crusaders themselves. He may, however, have interested himself in the
tactics employed by the crusaders, as suggested by a letter written by the Pope to his
legate Arnauld Amaury and to the bishops of Riez and Couserans in February
1209.\textsuperscript{107}

In this letter, Innocent informed Arnauld that he had decided not to accede to the
Count of Toulouse’s request over the county of Melgueil. He agreed with Arnauld
Amaury that, if the Count of Toulouse continued in his evil deeds, the business of
the Church would be expedited if he were not in possession of the county,\textsuperscript{108} and
advised his legate that the best way to deal with the count was through cunning and
caution, following the example of the Apostle, who said ‘As I was clever, I took you
by a trick.’\textsuperscript{109} Innocent seems here to have been considering the treatment of the
Count of Toulouse in a military context and assessing the strategic implications for
the crusaders if the count was in possession of Melgueil, and his closing advice
should also be seen in this light. He counselled Arnauld that the Count of Toulouse
could be separated from his allies, so that, ‘if he continues in evil, he can be pro-
ceeded against more easily, being alone and forsaken’.\textsuperscript{110} In this letter, Innocent
showed that he did not see any separation between political and religious issues in his
dealings with lords such as the Count of Toulouse and military issues for the good of
the crusade. The letter also indicates that, although Innocent was prepared to take
advice from Arnauld Amaury, he did not consider that any one else should have the
final say in military matters. It suggests Innocent’s opinion that tactical, as well as
policy and strategic decisions concerning the crusade, should be a papal preserve.

The assumption that the initial tactics of the crusade were the responsibility of the
Pope may also be reflected by the behaviour of Arnauld Amaury during the 1209
campaign against Raimond Roger. Until the selection of Simon de Montfort as
Viscount of Carcassonne in September 1209,\textsuperscript{111} Arnauld appears to have main-
tained a position of actual, as well as titular, leader of the crusade. The famous role
in the sack of Béziers attributed to him by Caesarius of Heisterbach may have had its
roots in rumour and gossip, but its presentation of Arnauld as the unquestioned
leader of the crusade, with ultimate responsibility for tactical decisions, is nevertheless

\textsuperscript{106} Pierre des Vaux, viii, 560: ‘Praenominatum etiam comitem, qui quasi foedus percussisset cum
cadem morte propria non recogitat si forte vexatio sibi tribuat intellectum, et impleta facies ejus
ignominia incipiat inquirere nomen Dei ad satisfaciendum nobis et Ecclesiae, imo deo, pondere
non desinatis inductae super eum oppressionis urgere ipsum et fautores ejusdem de castris
Domini depellendo, et auferendo terras eorum in quibus relegatis haereticis.’

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{PL}, 215, 1546–7.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{PL}, 215, 1546: ‘considerantes hoc ipsum quod tu, fili abbas, per tuas nobis litteras suggestisti, ut
videlicet si fortassis in incoepta malitia pertinaciter perduraret, ipso demum eo juxta meritum
spoliato, statueremus de ipso quod Ecclesiae negotio expeditiret’.

\textsuperscript{109} 2 Corinthians 12:16: ‘Cum essem astutus, dolo vos cepi.’

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{PL}, 215, 1546: ‘vel si perseveraverit in malitia, tandem contra ipsum et solum et destitutum
levius procedatur.’

\textsuperscript{111} Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 34, pp. 84–5; Pierre des Vaux, xvii bis, 569–70.
indicative.\textsuperscript{112} It is possible that Arnauld Amaury, and through him Innocent III, had more involvement in the decision to make Raimond Roger the first target of the crusade than they are accorded by Guillaume de Tudela.\textsuperscript{113} The dispossession of Raimond Roger may have been as much a part of an ecclesiastical policy for the crusade as it was simply a response by the crusaders themselves to the altered position of Raimond of Toulouse.

\textsuperscript{112} Caesarius of Heisterbach, vol. 1, p. 300.

\textsuperscript{113} It has been suggested that Innocent III was powerless to influence decisions taken by Arnauld Amaury and other papal legates, but this can be overstated. See E. Graham-Leigh, ‘Evil and the Appearance of Evil: Pope Innocent III, Arnauld Amaury and the Albigensian Crusade’, in \textit{Innocenzo III Urbis et Orbis}, vol. 2, pp. 1031–48.
The Wrong Side in the Patronage War: 
Heretics, Cistercians and Abducted Bishops

Whatever the degree of papal involvement in the decision to attack the Trencavel lands, there are various possible motivations behind the selection of Raimond Roger as the first target of the crusade. Notwithstanding the general description of the Albigensian crusade as an effort against heresy,\(^1\) the treatment of the nobility of Languedoc by the crusaders was not always closely linked to the degree of their heretical sympathies. Pope Innocent rebuked Arnauld Amaury and Simon de Montfort for the behaviour of the crusaders in January 1213: ‘You also, brother Archbishop, and the noble man Simon de Monfort, leading the crusaders into the lands of the Count of Toulouse, have not only occupied lands where heretics were living, but you have stretched out your greedy hands into those lands which have no reputation for heresy.’\(^2\) Innocent’s complaint demonstrates his view of Languedoc as a land divided into heretical and orthodox areas, which reflected in the secondary importance thus given to the beliefs of individuals within those areas the attitude of the crusaders themselves.

Heresy is generally equated in accounts of the crusade with opposition to the crusade. According to Guillaume de Tudela, the crusaders adopted a policy of massacring the garrisons of captured castles as a military strategy aimed at discouraging resistance: ‘They decided together that in each fortified town before which the army presented itself, and which refused to surrender, all the inhabitants would be put to the sword when it was taken by storm. They would then find no one who dared to resist them, because the fear would be so great after such demonstrations.’\(^3\)

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\(^1\) From the vast literature on Catharism in Languedoc, for recent English studies, see M. Barber, *The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages* (London 2000); M. Lambert, *The Cathars* (Oxford 1998).

\(^2\) PL 216, 739–40, at 739: ‘Tu autem, frater archiepiscopus, ac nobilis vir Simon de Monteforti, crucisignatos in terram Tolosani Comitis inducentes, non solum loca in quibus habitabant haeretici occupastis, sed ad illas nihilominus terras quae super haeresi nulla notabantur infamia, manus avidas extendistis.’ Innocent made a similar complaint to Simon de Monfort, *PL* 216, 741: ‘licet in eis nec haeretici aliqui habitarent, nec habitatores eorum super haeretricae pestis errore infamia compersisset’.

\(^3\) Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 21, pp. 56–9: ‘E li un e li autre an autre lor empris que a calque castel en que la ost venguis, que no s volguessan redre, tro que l’ost les prezis, qu’aneson a la espaza e qu’om les aucezis e pois no trobarian qui vas tor se tenguis per paor que aurian e per so c’auran vist.’
Pierre des Vaux, in justifying such massacres, defended this policy in terms more military than religious. In his account of the capture of the castle of Bram, to the north west of Carcassonne, in 1210, for example, he set out the argument that the crusaders meted out only their just deserts to the inhabitants of Languedoc by describing how Simon de Montfort had the defenders mutilated as a reaction to the atrocities perpetrated by the defenders on his men: ‘They put out the eyes of the defenders, over a hundred in number, and cut off their noses . . . The Count had this punishment carried out not because such mutilation gave him any pleasure but because his opponents had been the first to indulge in atrocities . . . it was right that they should fall into the pit which they had dug themselves and drink from time to time of the cup they so often administered to others.’ The opportunities offered by the crusaders to the defenders of castles like Minerve in 1210 and Les Casses in 1211 to abjure their heresy as an alternative to mass slaughter suggests that Pierre des Vaux’s view reflected that of the crusaders themselves: that for the crusaders there was an equation of military and spiritual resistance, which allowed them to treat all their opponents as deserving the sort of harsh treatment given to the defenders of Bram.

The principle that, within those areas reputed to be heretical, all opponents of the crusade could be considered as proven heretics would have been a convenient one for the crusaders, especially since, according to Guillaume de Tudela, a particularly brutal style of warfare was part of their strategy. However, it was not one which could be applied to the highest nobility of Languedoc. The Pope was clearly aware of the importance of public support, and therefore of the reputation of the Church, to the success of his campaigns against heresy in Languedoc, as he wrote to his legates in March 1208: ‘Therefore we encourage and exhort you so that your modesty, when it is seen, shall everywhere change the ignorant imprudence of men, and nothing shall appear from your words or your actions which could give ammunition to the heretics.’ Innocent was concerned that the reputation of the Church should not be damaged during its pursuit of heresy in Languedoc and he laid particular stress on behaviour which could lead to accusations that lords of Languedoc were being dispossessed, not as a result of their connections with heresy, but from the greed and veniality of the Church.

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4 Pierre des Vaux, passim, but especially the inhabitants of castles near Limoux in autumn 1209 (xxxv, 576), the defenders of Termes 1210 (xxii, 598, at 300–400), inhabitants of Lavaur in 1211 (li, 607–9), and also see Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 68, pp. 164–5.
5 Pierre des Vaux, xxxiv, 585: ‘hominibus autem castri illius plusquam centum oculos eruerunt, nasos amputaverunt . . . hoc autem fieri fecit comes, non quia placeret ei talis detruncatio membrorum hominibus illata, sed quia adversarii sui hoc incooperunt . . . justum enim erat ut, in foveam incidentes quam foderant aliquando calicem quem alius saepissime propinarent.’ Psalms 7:15: ‘He is made a pit, and digged it, and is fallen into the ditch which he made’, ‘lacum aperuit et effodit cum et incidet in foveam quam fecit’.
6 Pierre des Vaux, xxxvii, 587.
7 Pierre des Vaux, lii, 611.
In early 1210, Innocent wrote to his legate Thedisius that ‘It is not suitable for the Church to be enriched by the losses of others’, and implicit in this statement is the concern that the Church might seem to be seeking the dispossession of lords like the Count of Toulouse for financial gain. It was this concern which lay behind his insistence that great lords such as the Count of Toulouse should be treated in accordance with the strictest legal principles, as he stressed to Arnauld Amaury and the Bishop of Uzès in 1212: ‘Since he [Raimond of Toulouse] has not been found guilty of heresy nor of the murder of Pierre de Castelnau of blessed memory, although he is strongly suspected of them . . . we do not see by what justification we can give his land to others, which has not been lawfully taken from him or from his heirs.’

Innocent’s correspondence with his legates on Raimond VI shows a rigour regarding proof of heresy absent from the crusaders’ dealings with less prominent members of the Occitan nobility. In this context, the most obvious reason for the selection of Raimond Roger as the first target of the crusade would have been that he was guilty of heresy, as confiscation of goods had been a recognised penalty for heresy throughout the medieval period. However, there is no evidence that Raimond Roger was a heretic. His orthodoxy was asserted explicitly by Guillaume de Tudela, who stated that ‘He was a good Catholic, and I call on a number of clerics and canons living in their cloisters to support this.’ While Guillaume’s favourable attitude towards Raimond Roger in this passage, in which he also stated that ‘there was no better knight in all the world, nor braver, nor more courteous, nor more gracious’, could be held to cast doubt on this claim and his emphasis on Raimond Roger’s Catholicism to indicate, conversely, an accusation of heresy, the hostile chronicler Pierre des Vaux was also unable to describe Raimond Roger as a heretic. Pierre contented himself with commenting that Raimond Roger, ‘following the depravity of his uncle [Raimond VI of Toulouse] did not suppress heresy in any way’, and this indicates that Guillaume’s statement of the viscount’s orthodoxy was probably well-founded.

While defending Raimond Roger’s personal orthodoxy, however, Guillaume de Tudela accounted for his dispossession by the crusaders with the heresy of his subjects: ‘All his knights and other subjects maintained the heretics in their towers and...

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10. PL 216, 614: ‘Quia tamen nondum est damnatus de heresi vel de necie sanctae memoriae Petri de Castronovo eti de illis sit validus suspectus . . . non intelligimus quia ratione possemus adhuc alicui concedere terram eius, qui sibi vel haereditibus suis abjudicata non est.’
13. Ibid.: ‘En tant cant lo mons dura n’a cavalier milhor, ni plus pros ni plus larg, plus cortes ni gensor.’
castles and so they caused their own ruin and their shameful deaths. The viscount himself died in great anguish, a sad and sorry loss, because of this grievous error.\footnote{Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 11, pp. 46–7: ‘E tuit se cavalier e l autre valvassor tenian los eretges, qui en castel, qui en tor, per que foron destruit e mort a desonor, el meteis ne morig, a mot granda dolor, dont fo pecatz e dans, per cela fort error.’}

The intention of this passage was not to indicate that the Trencavel subjects were somehow particularly heretical and that they therefore made the viscount more vulnerable to the crusaders than other lords who had been similarly unenthusiastic in the extirpation of heresy, merely that the crusaders attacked any lands with a heretical reputation. However, this idea seems to underlie many modern accounts of Raimond Roger’s dispossession. Some historians have represented the particularly heretical character of the Trencavel lands as simply a question of numbers: Raimond Roger’s lands contained more heretics than elsewhere in Languedoc, therefore Raimond Roger was the first target of the crusaders. This was the explanation offered, for example, by Strayer: ‘Raimond Roger of Béziers had at least as bad a reputation for tolerating heretics as Raimond of Toulouse, and his strongholds dominated the region where the Cathars were most numerous. He was the logical man to attack.’\footnote{J. R. Strayer, \textit{The Albigensian Crusades} (New York 1971), p. 60.}

There have also been some attempts to connect the viscount and his administration with known heretics, to argue that Raimond Roger’s dispossession is explained by his particularly close relations with heretics and that he was therefore more culpable than his contemporaries.\footnote{E. Griffe, \textit{Le Languedoc cathare au temps de la croisade 1209–1229} (Paris 1973), pp. 14–15; Thouzellier, \textit{Catharisme}, p. 134; Roquebert, \textit{L’épopée cathare}, vol. 1, pp. 142–3.}


This decretal was a landmark in anti-heresy legislation, as it equated heresy with the secular crime of lèse-majesté, and laid down especially ferocious penalties, in particular the disinheritance of the Catholic heirs of heretics. It also conflated the defenders and supporters of heretics with the heretics themselves; Innocent referred to the ‘defenders, harbourers, supporters and believers in heretics’ as if they were all to receive the same treatment.\footnote{\textit{PL}, 214, 537–9; \textit{Reg. Innocenz III}, vol. 2, p. 4: ‘defensores, receptatores, fautores et credentes haereticorum’.}

Raimond Roger’s reputation as an especially blatant defender of heretics is based on the central role played in his
administration by three figures: Bertrand de Saissac (d. 1200), Pierre Roger de Cabaret (d. c. 1211) and Stéphane de Servian, all of whom were accused at some time of heresy. Since this would have gone beyond the mere negligence towards heresy exhibited by Raimond Roger’s neighbours, it is worth examining the heretical reputations of these three men in some detail.21

It has been argued that Catharism in the twelfth century was not seen by many of its sympathisers as a discrete sect, but as a way of pursuing holiness which was not antithetical to their orthodox beliefs. Mark Pegg has presented a convincing picture of this fluid relationship to the heretics among largely peasant communities in the Lauragais in the twelfth century, in which the heretics were part of the communities and support for them was not a barrier to a positive view of the established Church.22 However, it is clear that the demotic spirituality which revered the heretics as the holy good men and good women would not have applied in a similar way to members of the nobility. While it was possible before the crusade for peasants to resist definitions of heretic and orthodox, this would not have been a likely strategy for members of aristocratic families, whose relationship to the Church is unlikely to have resembled that of peasants in lacking an awareness of the ecclesiastical establishment. Expressions of piety towards the Church from nobles in Languedoc can be assumed to have been made with an awareness of the Church as a discrete institution which would have prevented the sort of merging of the heretical and orthodox identified by Pegg in the Lauragais. If a particular lord was an avowed heretic, unlike the peasants Pegg describes he would be unlikely to exhibit behaviour associated with an orthodox attitude towards the Church. A consideration of the records of Bertrand de Saissac, Pierre Roger de Cabaret and Stéphane de Servian with the Church can therefore shed light on the question of their heresy or orthodoxy.

Bertrand de Saissac, one of the most powerful lords of the Montagne Noire region of the county of Carcassonne, was a prominent member of the court of Raimond Roger’s father, Roger II, from 117923 and was appointed guardian to the young Raimond Roger in Roger’s will of 1194.24 In the historiography of the Languedoc and the Albigensian crusade, Bertrand has a strong reputation as an enthusiastic Cathar believer,25 but the fact of his heresy may not be as certain as it has appeared. Bertrand’s reputation as a heretic is based on a deposition made by Bernard d’Oth de Niort to the Carcassonne Inquisition in 1242.26 According to the Inquisition records, Bernard described to the inquisitors the heretical circle which had been identified by Pegg in the Lauragais. If a particular lord was an avowed heretic, unlike the peasants Pegg describes he would be unlikely to exhibit behaviour associated with an orthodox attitude towards the Church. A consideration of the records of Bertrand de Saissac, Pierre Roger de Cabaret and Stéphane de Servian with the Church can therefore shed light on the question of their heresy or orthodoxy.

21 Other lords, such as Raimond VI of Toulouse, are accused by Pierre des Vaux of consorting with heretics, but not of having known heretics occupy the principal positions in their administration: Pierre des Vaux, iv, 551–4.
23 See p. 153 below.
centred around his grandmother, Blanche de Laurac, in the years before the advent of the crusaders in 1209. He named a large number of Languedoc nobles as members of Blanche’s group, including no less a person than Raimond Roger, Count of Foix, and stated that, in around 1200, Bertrand de Saissac was present during preaching by a Cathar *perfectus*.27

This is the only evidence for Bertrand’s heresy, and the reliability of this source should not be regarded as unimpeachable. In the first place, Bernard d’Oth’s deposition constitutes a posthumous accusation of heresy against Bertrand, made forty years after his death by one who is unlikely to have known this supposed associate of his grandmother in life. The presence of the names of other powerful lords who are not elsewhere linked with heresy, such as that of the Count of Foix,28 also indicates that Bernard’s deposition may be less an accurate account of those whom he knew to have associated with his grandmother than a list of the most important lords whom he could think to accuse. Bernard’s deposition to the Inquisition should not be regarded as anything more than hearsay on the question of Bertrand de Saissac’s heresy and it is further cast into question by the contemporary evidence concerning Bertrand’s attitude towards the Church.

Bertrand de Saissac’s notorious attack on the abbey of Alet on behalf of Raimond Roger in 119729 seems to have given Bertrand a largely undeserved reputation for anti-clericalism and to have obscured the generally orthodox approach by him and his family towards the Church. The lords of Saissac were enthusiastic benefactors of the Cistercian abbey of Villelongue, founded near Saissac in 114930 and the major Cistercian house of Fontfroide also received support from the family.31 Bertrand does not seem to have differed from his family in this orthodox and supportive attitude towards the Church; he began his regency government of Béziers in 1194 not only by agreeing to rule in co-operation with the bishop, Gausfred (1184–99),32 but also by confirming a generous settlement over the secular jurisdiction of Béziers which Roger II had negotiated with the bishop some time earlier.33 These are not the actions of a man inspired by either heretical or anti-clerical beliefs and it is worth

27 Doat 24, fol. 100.
28 Raimond Roger’s wife Philippa and his sister Esclarmonde are described as heretics in other depositions, but this is the only accusation against Raimond Roger of Foix himself. Raimond Roger was never accused of heresy in life, and was cleared of charges associated with his sister’s support of heretics at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215: Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 2, 145–6, pp. 50–5.
29 GC, vol. 6, p. 271.
32 Doat 61, fols. 316–321v.
33 Doat 61, fols. 322–325v: The settlement was negotiated when Roger II ‘wished to give all he had in Béziers to Alfonso of Aragon’, a probable reference to an agreement between Alfonso and Roger at some time after 1179, when Roger recognised Alfonso as his overlord for Carcasonne. Aragon had never previously had any claim on Béziers, which was held from the counts of Toulouse, but Alfonso seems to have regarded it as part of his lands in Languedoc by 1184. See Chapter 5 below.
considering whether, had Bertrand been an acknowledged heretic, the Bishop of Béziers would have been prepared to co-operate with him in the regency government, not to mention the question of whether he could have done so without censure from his own superiors. The contemporary evidence for Bertrand’s attitude towards the Church does not support the suggestion that he was a heretic, an accusation which only appears in the statement recorded by the Inquisition some forty years after his death. If Bertrand de Saissac was not considered to be a heretic by his contemporaries, then the idea that Raimond Roger’s fate was determined by his position in his government must be called into question.

Pierre Roger de Cabaret was, like Bertrand de Saissac, a prominent member of Raimond Roger’s government, and was vicar of Carcassonne from 1204. He was mentioned in a number of depositions made to the Carcassonne Inquisition in 1240–2; included in the list which Bernard d’Oth de Niort gave of Blanche de Laurac’s associates, he was specifically mentioned as having listened to the preaching of the perfectus Guiraud. A deposition made by Raimond Carabasse also identified Pierre Roger as part of the heretical group centred around Blanche, as Raimond described him as having taken part in heretical preaching at the castle of Bram in company with Pierre de Laurac. In contrast to Bertrand de Saissac, there also appears to be contemporary evidence of Pierre Roger’s heresy, as Pierre des Vaux described him as ‘long set in evil ways, a heretic and a manifest enemy of the Church’. However, as with Bertrand de Saissac, Pierre Roger de Cabaret may not have been as clear a heretic as his reputation, particularly his posthumous reputation, suggests.

Although Cabaret has been regarded by historians as a centre for heretics in the years before the crusade, the lords of Cabaret seem to have been reasonably active in their patronage of orthodox religious foundations. This is demonstrated for example by the generous grant made by Roger de Cabaret, his brothers and other lords of Cabaret, and the brothers Pierre and Raimond de Lauran, of all the pastureage of Cabaret with complete exemption to Fontfroide in 1166 and the donation in 1183 by Pierre Roger himself and Jourdain de Cabaret to Rieunette of all their lands in the vicinity of the abbey. Pierre Roger’s attitude to heresy is also illuminated by the trial of heretics conducted by Pere of Aragon at Carcassonne in 1204, while

35 Doat 24, fols. 88v–109v.
36 Doat 24, fol. 108.
37 Doat 24, fols. 210v–223v.
39 For the reputation of Cabaret as a heretical centre, based on later statements to the Inquisition, see M. Barber, ‘Catharism and the Occitan Nobility: The Lordships of Cabaret, Minerve and Termes’ in *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood, 3: Papers from the Fourth Strawberry Hill Conference 1988*, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge 1990), pp. 1–19, at p. 15.
40 It is possible that this individual was Pierre Roger, who, if he was an old man in 1209, may well have been flourishing by 1166, but it is not possible to make a firm identification.
41 Doat 59, fols. 50–52v.
42 Mahul, vol. 5, p. 23.
Pierre Roger was vicar. In this trial, a group of heretics were brought before a panel consisting of Berengar, Bishop of Carcassonne (1202–1209) and the papal legates Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul, so that their arguments could be refuted and themselves condemned. Pere’s original intention seems to have been for short proceedings lasting only a single day, but the trial was extended to take in another group of heretics ‘at the prayers of the vicar of the Viscount of Carcassonne’. It is possible to interpret this comment as indicative of Pierre Roger’s support for the heretics, assuming that he was anxious that the panel should hear the arguments of more heretics in the hope that they might be convinced by them. However, much as this interpretation might suit Pierre Roger’s reputation, it does not seem to be the most likely reading of this comment.

To appreciate Pierre Roger’s likely role in the trial of heretics at Carcassonne, it is necessary to understand Pere of Aragon’s intentions, both in convening and in publicising the tribunal. In 1204, the year in which he travelled to Rome to become a papal vassal, Pere was particularly anxious to appear as a good son of the Church. Whether he intended the trial at Carcassonne to be the beginning of a more extensive campaign against heresy in the Trencavel lands is unclear, but it is evident that Pere intended to get as much credit as possible for making even this rather limited effort against heresy. The presence of the papal legates was probably not coincidental and the way in which the trial was publicised, with descriptions of the proceedings being sent to all Trencavel towns, shows how Pere intended to present himself as committed to the fight against heresy. In this context, while it is not impossible that a very naive Pierre Roger might still have hoped that the panel could be won over by the arguments of the heretics, after he had demonstrated his allegiance in this manner, it is unlikely that Pere would have left him in his position of authority in Carcassonne, still less revealed in his account of the trial that the vicar of Carcassonne had supported the condemned heretics. That Pierre Roger’s involvement in the trial was mentioned in the account which Pere had sent out, and that he was allowed to remain vicar of Carcassonne following it, indicates that his intervention was not in support of the heretics. In 1204 therefore, Pierre Roger appears, not as a heretic, but as a zealous opponent of heresy, encouraging Pere of Aragon to make greater efforts against it than he had planned.

Pierre Roger’s reputation for heresy is most likely to have arisen from his opposition to the Albigensian crusade, opposition which was equated with heresy in all but the highest nobility, both by the crusaders themselves and by Pierre des Vaux. The castle of Cabaret was certainly an important centre and refuge for opponents of the crusade after the fall of Carcassonne in August 1209. It survived two attempts at

44 Ibid.: ‘Altera vero die ad preces vicarii viccomitis Carcassonensis alis hereticis audientiam dehisce.’
45 The report of the tribunal was to be sent to all the viscounties of the Trencavel, as indicated in the preamble.
capture by the crusaders in 1209\textsuperscript{47} and 1210\textsuperscript{48} before its eventual fall\textsuperscript{49} and troops from Cabaret assisted those opposing the crusaders elsewhere, such as at the siege of Termes in 1210.\textsuperscript{50} The castle’s role in opposition to the crusade is demonstrated by Pierre des Vaux’s comment that it was ‘the fount of heresy’\textsuperscript{51} and its status as the chief stronghold of the enemies of the crusade seems to have been preserved in the later thirteenth century\textsuperscript{52} and entered local folklore, which by the seventeenth century, told of secret tunnels, leading for three leagues from the Cité of Carcassonne to a cave below Cabaret, used by heretics to escape from the crusade.\textsuperscript{53} However, the reputation of the castle of Cabaret does not necessarily determine the extent of Pierre Roger’s religious orthodoxy, in the same way as his opposition to the crusade does not mean he was necessarily recognised as a heretic before the fall of Carcassonne. The evidence for his behaviour before the crusade indicates that Pierre Roger was not a heretic or a supporter of heretics and this should be set against the decidedly more dubious evidence of much later Inquisition records.

The equation of heresy with opposition to the crusade may also account for modern declarations of Stéphane de Servian’s heresy. Stéphane was the most powerful secular lord, after and possibly even including the viscount, in Béziers in the early thirteenth century, the only lord whose agreement was sought for the co-operative rule between Bishop Gausfred of Béziers and Bertrand de Saissac during Raimond Roger’s minority.\textsuperscript{54} Stéphane’s reputation as a heretic is based on the submission that he made to the crusaders in February 1210, in which he renounced heresy and recognised his grave errors against the Catholic faith and the Church.\textsuperscript{55} This appears to be a clear statement of heresy on Stéphane’s part, but it need not actually be taken as such. Stéphane’s previous relations with the Church seem to have been entirely orthodox and there is nothing before this submission which indicates his heresy.

In April 1204, for example, a dispute between Stéphane and the abbey of Villelongue over the castle of Cassan was referred to arbitration by Ermengard, Bishop of Béziers (1205–1208) and the Abbot of St Aphrodise.\textsuperscript{56} The Abbot of Villelongue had apparently seized the castle of Cassan, which he alleged Stéphane had built on his land illegally, and Stéphane was demanding its return. The case was decided broadly in Stéphane’s favour; he was to recognise that he held the castle from the abbey and in return Villelongue’s ability to sell the castle was strictly limited, with the Count of Toulouse, the viscounts of Béziers and Narbonne and

\textsuperscript{47} Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 577.
\textsuperscript{48} Pierre des Vaux, xlviii, 605.
\textsuperscript{49} Pierre des Vaux, lvi, 619.
\textsuperscript{50} Pierre des Vaux, xl, 591.
\textsuperscript{51} Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 577: ‘ibi siquidem erat fons haeresis’.
\textsuperscript{52} Maurina de Bosquet demonstrated the formation of the reputation in the 1240s when she recounted to the Inquisition how she had seen heretics ‘openly coming and going’ in the streets at Cabaret in 1210: Pegg, Corruption of Angels, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{53} Besse, Comtes de Carcassonne, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{54} Doat 61, fols. 316–19.
\textsuperscript{55} Doat 75, fols. 9–13: ‘Ego Stephanus de Cerviano confiteor errasse et contra fidem catholicam et sanctam Romanam ecclesiam multum graviter adiquisse.’
\textsuperscript{56} Doat 60, fols. 352–7.
Guillem de Montpellier being expressly excluded as potential buyers. This agreement seems designed to preserve Stéphane’s independence from the major secular lords of the area by ensuring that none of them could gain possession of his castle and constitutes a much more favourable settlement for him than for the abbey. It seems unlikely that the Bishop of Béziers and the Abbot of St Aphrodise would have designed such a settlement for a lord whom they knew to be a heretic, suggesting that Stéphane was recognised as orthodox by his local church. The language of Stéphane’s 1210 submission to the crusaders should be understood in the context of the equation of opposition to the crusade with heresy, which makes it entirely possible that harm done to the Church through military opposition to the crusaders could be expressed as harm done through support for heresy and a promise to end resistance to the crusade could be couched in the terms of a return to religious orthodoxy. Cathar perfects had probably passed through Servian in the years before the crusade – a debate was held there between heretics and orthodox in 1206 – but Stéphane’s submission need not be read as an irrefutable admission of his heresy. Like many other lords of Languedoc he may have failed to persecute heresy, but his relations with the Church before 1209 indicate that he had a reputation neither for heresy nor for anti-clericalism.

It is possible that neither Bertrand de Saissac, Pierre Roger de Cabaret nor Stéphane de Servian should be regarded as heretics, their posthumous reputations for heresy notwithstanding. This does not exclude the possibility of connections with heretics; it is quite possible that heretics passed through both Saissac and Cabaret in the years before the crusade, and Stéphane de Servian was connected to the circle of Blanche of Lautrec through his wife, Blanche’s daughter Navarre, who may have become a perfecta, and who died at Montségur in 1234. However, such second-hand connections would not have set Raimond Roger apart from the rest of the higher nobility of Languedoc; his treatment by the crusaders cannot be explained on such grounds alone.

In common with much of the higher nobility of Languedoc, while having no particular connection with heresy himself, Raimond Roger made no effort to extirpate it from his lands. He did not undertake any trials of heretics of his own at Carcassonne or elsewhere and appears to have been absent during Pere of Aragon’s lone effort in 1204. Through this negligence, Raimond Roger clearly contributed to the problems faced by the Church in Languedoc, but the existing canon law against heresy did not provide the Church with an easy way of dealing with this behaviour. In 1179, Raimond Roger’s father, Roger II, had been excommunicated, along with his cousin, Bernard Aton VI, Viscount of Nîmes and Raimond V of Toulouse, by Pons, Archbishop of Narbonne (1162–1181) for just such conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for the extirpation of heresy under canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council.
Council (1179). Excommunication was also laid down as a penalty for those who refused to assist the Church against heresy by the decretal *Ad abolendam* in 1184, but the application of further penalties was problematic.

*Vergentis*, written as it was to deal with heresy in an urban context, was not well designed to meet the problems faced by the Church in Languedoc; while its ferocity may have laid the ground for the Albigensian crusade, it did not provide for the dispossession of lords as determinedly unhelpful as the Count of Toulouse simply for their neglect of their duty against heresy. That *Vergentis* was not easily applied to Languedoc may well have been recognised by Innocent himself, as the version of the decretal sent to Languedoc in 1200 with the legate Cardinal John di Santa Prisca did not contain the clause calling for the dispossession of the Catholic heirs of heretics. However, it is probable that in 1200 Innocent had not yet appreciated the particular difficulties by orthodox lords who would not extirpate heresy, and so, while *Vergentis* was altered, it was not altered enough.

The way in which *Vergentis* approached supporters and defenders of heretics may not have been particularly successful. Its position was modified in Innocent’s subsequent decretal *Ad eliminandum*, written to Viterbo in September 1207, in which supporters of heretics were treated separately from the heretics themselves, and stood to lose only a quarter of their possessions, and also in canon *Excommunicamus* of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which again treated them separately. *Vergentis* was regarded by many as an invalid basis for attacking the lords of Languedoc, as stated to Innocent III by Philip Augustus in 1208 in defence of Raimond VI of Toulouse, as, commenting on Innocent’s call for a crusade to take Raimond’s lands, Philip protested that: ‘You should know that we have been told by learned and erudite men that you cannot do this by law unless he has been found guilty of the heretical perversion.’ It could be suspected that the negligence in dealing with heresy exhibited by lords like Raimond Roger and Raimond of Toulouse amounted to a support of heretics, but this, as Innocent reminded his legates in the case of the Count of Toulouse, was difficult to prove. The problems inherent in the application of the existing heresy legislation to the lords of Languedoc were addressed at the Fourth

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62 *PL*, 201, 1299.
63 Pennington, ‘Pro Peccatis’, p. 2.
64 P. Gabriel, *Series Praesulum Maguelonensem et Monspeliensem* (Toulouse 1665), pp. 267–8. This version of *Vergentis* is substantially different from that sent to Viterbo and so the omission of the clause dealing with provision for the catholic heirs of heretics is more likely to reflect a genuine change in Innocent’s policy than an copying error. Clarke also views *Vergentis* as a decretal aimed specifically at the papal states, but was unaware of the differences between the Viterbo and Languedoc versions: Clarke, ‘Punishment of the Guiltless’, p. 277.
66 Alberigo, pp. 235–5; Pennington, ‘Pro Peccatis’, p. 3. The problem was probably more with the ferocity of the penalties laid down by *Vergentis*, as *Ad abolendam* also imposed similar penalties for the supporters of heretics as for the heretics themselves and was not criticized for it: *PL*, 201, 1298.
67 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 558: ‘sciatis quod a viris litteratis et illustratis didicimus quod id de jure facere non potestis, quoque idem de heretica pravitate fuerit condempnatus’.
Lateran Council, at which the canon Excommunicamus dealt with the case of the secular lord who neglected to prosecute heresy in his lands, by making him subject to dispossession after a year of obstinacy.\textsuperscript{69} It is probable that this canon was inspired by the problems faced by Innocent in dealing with the lords of Languedoc, but, while it may have legalised the partial dispossession of the Count of Toulouse at the Council, it could provide only retrospective justification for the treatment meted out to Raimond Roger by the crusaders.

The selection of Raimond Roger as the first target of the crusade was not in accordance with previous canon law and Innocent’s own decretals on the treatment of those who neglected to tackle heresy. Seen simply as the beginning of a campaign against heresy in Languedoc it appears misguided: if this had been its aim then Raimond Roger’s attempt to submit to the legates in June 1209 should have protected him from dispossession\textsuperscript{70} just as Aimery of Narbonne protected himself through a similar proceeding. There was little in Raimond Roger’s previous conduct concerning heresy which either laid him open to legal dispossession or which made him ‘the logical man to attack’.\textsuperscript{71} This does not, however, necessitate the assumption that in his case papal considerations were abandoned wholesale in favour of military practicality. The approach of the Pope and his legates to the nobility of Languedoc was not restricted to questions of Catharism; nor was negligence concerning heresy the only subject on which lords like Raimond Roger could be tried and found wanting.

In their dealings with the lords of Languedoc, the papal legates did not restrict themselves to evaluating attitudes to and toleration of heresy, but considered all aspects of noble behaviour towards the Church in Languedoc. Lords could find themselves condemned by the legates as much for their mistreatment of bishops as for their failure to extirpate heresy. That the legates considered lordly behaviour towards the Church in its entirety is demonstrated by the surrender made by Raimond VI, Count of Toulouse, to the legate Milo in June 1209, in which his persecutions of the bishops of Carpentras and Vaison were listed together with his support of heresy and involvement in the murder of the legate Pierre de Castelnau,\textsuperscript{72} and in which his promises to amend his behaviour towards the secular church were

\textsuperscript{69} Alberigo, p. 234, ‘Si vero dominus temporalis, requisitus et monitus ab ecclesia, terram suam purgare neglexerit ab hac haeretica foeditate, per metropolitanum et ceteros comprovinciales episcopos excommunicationis vinculo inmodetur, et si satisfacere contempsert infra annum, significetur hoc summo pontifici, ut extunc ipse vassallos ab ejus fidelitate denunciet absolutos et terram exponat catholicis occupandam.’ See Arnold, \textit{Inquisition and Power}, p. 24 on the importance of the Fourth Lateran Council legislation on the development of canon law against heresy.

\textsuperscript{70} Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 11, pp. 32–3.

\textsuperscript{71} Strayer, \textit{Albigensian Crusades}, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{72} PL 216, 90–8, at 90: ‘item quod juramenta quae feci super expulsione haereticorum vel eis credentium non servasse dico, item quod haereticos dico semper fovisse esse favisse, item quod de fide suspectus habetur, item quod dies Quadragesimae festorum, et Temporum qui securitate gaudere debant, dico violasse, item quod adversariis meis, qui se justitiae offerebant pacemque juraverant, dico noluisse justitiam exhibere, item quod Judaeis publica commissi officia, item quod monastrii Sancti Willelmi et aliarum ecclesiaster possessiones et ecclesias injuste detineo, item quod incastelavi ecclesias et incastelatas injuste detineo, item quod indebita pedagia vel guidagia colligo vel colligi facio, item quod Carpentoractensem episcopum a propria sede depuli, item quod de interfectione sancte memoriae Petri de Castronovo
clearly as important as those to abjure further contact with heretics. This consideration by the legates of the behaviour of the lords of Languedoc towards the Church was not simply a matter of amassing the maximum number of crimes, but, rather, a seamless assessment of their worthiness – an assessment which did not necessarily correlate with the cumulative gravity of their previous offences, but which determined the way in which they would be treated by the legates and the crusaders.

Pierre des Vaux demonstrates how the crimes committed by lords such as the Count of Toulouse against the local church could be held to typify their evil character and could therefore call for more stringent punishment than the individual offences might warrant by themselves. Pierre did not make a distinction between actual abuses of churches and prelates and demonstrations of anti-clerical attitudes on the part of the Count of Toulouse, such as the occasion when he supposedly had his jester caper and pull faces in the door of a church in which mass was being said. For Pierre, all such behaviour sprang from the same root, the count’s heresy and hatred of the Church: ‘Meanwhile the Count, amazing to say, held his mercenaries in affection, and with them he robbed churches, destroyed monasteries, and took everything that he could from their property. Thus he was always an instrument of the Devil, a son of evil, the first born of Satan, the enemy of the crusade and the persecutor of the Church, the defender of heretics and the oppressor of Catholics, the minister of evil and abjurer of the faith, full of evils, the storehouse of all sins.’ In his presentation of the behaviour towards the Church of such lords as the Count of Toulouse, Pierre des Vaux seems to reflect the attitude of both the Pope and his legates. The crimes of the lords of Languedoc towards their local churches were most important for the
The principle that the lords of Languedoc should be assessed by the legates in terms, not of guilty or not guilty, but as worthy or unworthy, is demonstrated most clearly in the decisions of the Council of Lavaur of February 1213. This council was convened by Arnauld Amaury to consider the petitions which Pere of Aragon had made on behalf of the counts of Toulouse, Foix and Comminges and for Gaston de Béarn, in which he had stressed that none of these lords were heretics and therefore should not be attacked by the crusaders.\(^7_6\) In rejecting Pere’s pleas for the counts, the Council did not attempt to convince the king that the counts were heretics but justified their continued persecution of these lords through their behaviour to the church in general. The Count of Toulouse, they said, had lied to them too many times for his repentance to be believed this time, and had ‘attacked and damaged the Church of God and Christianity, faith and peace with heretics and routiers’;\(^7_7\) the Count of Comminges had likewise attacked the Church with heretics and routiers;\(^7_8\) the Count of Foix had laid violent hands on clerics and cast them into prison,\(^7_9\) while Gaston de Béarn had attacked and desecrated the cathedral of Oloron.\(^8_0\)

The crimes committed by these lords against the Church should not be taken as genuine evidence of anti-clericalism or of support for heresy, being largely politically motivated.\(^8_1\) The counts of Toulouse were mainly active against the Church in Provence, where their attacks on the bishops of Carpentras,\(^8_2\) Vieux,\(^8_3\) Vaison\(^8_4\)

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\(^7_6\) Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 648–59.
\(^7_7\) Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 650: ‘Ecclesiam Dei et Christianitatem, fidem et pacem cum haereticis et ruptariis impugnavit et damnificavit.’
\(^7_8\) Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 651: ‘ipsam Ecclesiam, licet nunquam in aliquo laesus esset, cum eisdem pestilentibus impugnasset’. This probably refers to disputes between the counts of Comminges and the bishops of Couserans over the town of St Lizier: see note 88 below.
\(^7_9\) Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 651: ‘post injectionem manuum in clericos et detrussionem corum in carcerem’. This is probably a reference to Raimond Roger of Foix’s behaviour towards the abbey of Pamiers, at which, according to Pierre des Vaux, he had imprisoned the abbot and the canons for three days while he held wild parties in the canons’ quarters, finally expelling the abbot and canons and demolishing many of the buildings to build a castle: Pierre, xlv-xlvi, 600–4.
\(^8_0\) Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 652: ‘ruptarios in cathedralem ecclesiam Oleronis induxit, ubi amputato fune de quo pendebat pixis continens corpus Jesu Christi in terram cecidit, et quod nefas est dicere, ipsum corpus Dominicum est per terram expensum, transgressus juramenta manus in clericos violentes injecti’. This seems to have been an isolated incident, unrecorded elsewhere.
\(^8_2\) Expelled from his see by Raimond VI: *PL* 216, 90.
\(^8_3\) Long-running dispute involving both Raimond V and Raimond VI: *GC*, vol. 16, instrumenta, pp. 226–7 and 233–7.
\(^8_4\) The Bishop of Vaison was expelled three times from his palace between 1170 and 1193 by Raimond V, and Raimond VI had thrown Bishop Rainbaut (1193–c.1227) into prison and destroyed the episcopal palace: *GC*, vol. 16, instrumenta, pp. 926–928; de Vic and Vaissète, vol 6, p. 147.
and St-Paul-Trois-Châteaux\(^{85}\) should be seen as attempts to gain control of the area in the context of their wars over it with the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon.\(^{86}\) The long running dispute with the abbey of St Gilles should also be viewed in terms of secular politics,\(^{85}\) as should the attacks by the counts of Comminges on the town of St Lizier, which belonged to the bishops of Couserans, to which the Council of Lavaur probably referred.\(^{88}\) They were, however, presented at the Council as evidence of anti-clericalism and the general depravity of these lords. The counts were not, strictly speaking, being punished for their persecutions of the Church by the Council, but their previous relations with ecclesiastical institutions on their lands meant that they were unworthy of anything but the harshest treatment.

In contrast to many of their contemporaries, the Trencavel seem to have had few problems with the secular church in their lands. The relations in the later twelfth century between the Trencavel and the bishops of Béziers and Carcassonne appear to have been generally cordial.\(^{89}\) In both towns the viscount and the bishop ruled largely in co-operation,\(^{90}\) as laid down, for example, in the provisions made in the

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\(^{85}\) Raimond V is said to have ‘crossed the Rhône with a great army of heretics’ to attack Bishop Bertrand (1193–1205): GC, vol. 1, p. 713.

\(^{86}\) The counts were also involved in a dispute with the Emperor over the county of Viviers: GC, vol. 16, p. 558. See A. Dufont, ‘Les comtes de Toulouse et le Vivaraïs Xme – fin XIIme siècle’, *Ecole Antiques de Nîmes* (1971), pp. 75–94.

\(^{87}\) Raimond VI was excommunicated for building a castle to dominate the abbey in 1196: PL 206, c.1120 and forcibly removed the inhabitants to his town of St Girons, imprisoning the bishop there until he agreed to give St Lizier over to the count’s jurisdiction. Bernard IV of Comminges was censured for his behaviour over St Lizier by Simon de Montfort in 1216: GC, vol. 1, instrumenta, pp. 185–7.

\(^{88}\) These began when Bernard I, Count of Comminges, burnt the town of St Lizier to the ground in 1120 and forcibly removed the inhabitants to his town of St Girons, imprisoning the bishop there until he agreed to give St Lizier over to the count’s jurisdiction. Bernard IV of Comminges was censured for his behaviour over St Lizier by Simon de Montfort in 1216: GC, vol. 1, instrumenta, pp. 185–7. Navarrus, Bishop of Couserans (1208–16) worked very closely with the papal legates in Languedoc and may well have been one of the churchmen participating in the Council of Lavaur.

\(^{89}\) Relations between the Trencavel and both bishoprics seem to have been steadily improving throughout the twelfth century. In Carcassonne, the only evidence of dispute is from 1113, when Bernard Aton promised to return goods which he had taken unjustly from the bishop: GC, vol. 6, p. 873. In Béziers, a dispute between Bishop Bernard (1128–52) and Viscount Raymond over jurisdiction was settled in 1132 by Alsou Jourdain, Count of Toulouse: GC, vol. 6, p. 315. Ill feeling between Bishop Bernard and Raimond Trencavel continued until the bishop’s death; in 1150, Raymond apparently appealed to Pope Eugenius III after the bishop denied his request for a chapel in his palace: Doat 61, fols. 186–9. However, relations between the viscount and the bishops improved after Bernard’s death; the letter written in 1153 by Raimond V of Toulouse warning Bishop Guillaume against Raymond Trencavel says more about the Count of Toulouse’s relations with the Trencavel than it does about their behaviour towards the bishops: Doat 61, fols. 186–7; *Livre Noir*, pp. 238–9. For the details of the relationship between the Trencavel and the bishops, see Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, pp. 46–56, and Vidal, *Episcopatus et pouvoir à Béziers*, esp. pp. 48–52.

\(^{90}\) The bishops of Béziers held the secular jurisdiction of five bourgs, la Madeleine, la Campenau, la Salvetat, le Maureilhan and le bourg voisin le cathédrale, about half the town. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the viscounts of Béziers had ruled chiefly through control over episcopal appointments, but there is no evidence that the Trencavel viscounts were able to influence elections in the twelfth century. The co-operation between viscount and bishop in the twelfth century was probably a result of the weakness of vicecomital authority; particularly after the 1167 rebellion, the bishops were the chief allies of the viscounts against the citizens. In
1194 will of Roger II for the minority government of his son, Raimond Roger. The bishops of Béziers, in particular, also benefited from vicecomital generosity in the early thirteenth century, receiving a number of grants and concessions from Raimond Roger. The cordial nature of the relationship between the Trencavel and the bishops of Béziers and Carcassonne in the later twelfth century was reflected in their relations with the major Benedictine abbeys in their lands: La Grasse in Carcassonne, Caunes in the diocese of Narbonne and St Aphrodise in Béziers.

This generally rosy picture of Trencavel relations with the church in their lands should not entirely conceal the existence of disputes and Trencavel abuses against their local church. One of the major problems was between the Trencavel and the bishops of Albi, demonstrated most dramatically by the excommunication of Roger II in 1178 for his imprisonment of Bishop Gerardus (1174–83), but Trencavel disputes with the church were not restricted to this diocese alone. In 1171, Roger made an attack on the abbey of St Pons de Thomiers, and, in 1197, Carcassonne, the bishops had very little secular authority, minimising the potential for conflict, and it is possible that the Trencavel had some influence over episcopal appointments, as some twelfth-century bishops came from families identified with Trencavel support. An example of this was Pons de Tresmals, Bishop of Carcassonne (1142–59), whose family were frequent witnesses to Trencavel charters and the recipients of donations from Bernard Aton following the 1120–4 Carcassonne rebellion. A Bernard de Tresmals was also vicarius of Carcassonne from 1141 to 1143.

92 For example, the bishop and canons were given permission to fortify any of the churches in Béziers as required in 1203 (Doat 62, fols. 5–8; Livre Noir, pp. 513–14), and in 1204, Raimond Roger sold to the bishop all the albergues which he had in the bishopric, along with all secular jurisdiction over clerks, their households, and the inhabitants of the towns of Lignan and Aspiran (Doat 62, fols. 9–14v; GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, pp. 148–9).
93 The Trencavel were most enthusiastic in their patronage of La Grasse in the early twelfth century, when Bernard Aton made a number of generous grants to the abbey (ADA, H28; de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1634–7) but there is no evidence of disputes later in the century.
94 The Trencavel were the principal overlords of the abbey, and had substantial property there throughout the twelfth century: Doat 168, 292–293v. However, they do not seem to have abused their power over the abbey and appear to have been regarded by the monks as their best protectors: Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, p. 75.
95 There is only one indication of Trencavel misbehaviour towards St Aphrodise, when Roger II restored in his will of 1194 ‘the mill of Balendino, which he had unjustly possessed’: Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 283–4. The generally good relations between the Trencavel and the abbey are demonstrated by the way in which they were able to mediate in the long-running dispute between St Aphrodise and the bishops of Béziers: GC, vol. 6, pp. 384–6.
96 Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, p. 165. The bishops of Albi were the chief secular lords of the town, over which the Trencavel had very little power after losing control of episcopal appointments in the mid-eleventh century. However, the Trencavel were not prepared to tolerate this situation as they did in Béziers, and Roger II made various efforts in the 1170s to assert himself over the bishop, of which this imprisonment was undoubtedly one. Roger may have had some short term success: there was a vicecomital vicar in Albi for the first and only time in the twelfth century, between 1175 and 1177, but the 1193 settlement with Bishop Guillaume (1185–1230) returned him to his habitual powerless position: Doat 105, fols. 117–19; Compayre, Études historiques, pp. 141–3.
Bertrand de Saissac, regent for Raimond Roger, intervened violently in the election of the Abbot of Alet. Bertrand imprisoned the newly elected Abbot Bernard, disinterred the body of the previous abbot, Pons Amelius (1167–97) and sat it in the abbatial chair to preside over an election more congenial to Trencavel interests: GC, vol. 6, p. 271. There are no surviving primary records for the abbey for the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. It has been argued that the attack on Alet was inspired by concern that it was becoming the major fortified centre of the Razès, replacing the Trencavel capital of Rhedae: Fédié, Razès, p. 61; Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, pp. 167–8. However, the situation of the abbey, in a narrow valley overlooked by substantial hills, is such that it would not have been a suitable site for a major fortification, although defensive walls were built by Pons Amelius. The rejected candidate, Bernard, had been Abbot of St Polycarpe, a house to which the Trencavel seem to have been opposed since its dispute with La Grasse in the early twelfth century (Mahul, vol. 2, pp. 243–7), and this may have been the root of Bertrand de Saissac’s objection to the election. There is no evidence that the Trencavel customarily expected to control abbatial elections at Alet, and it is therefore more likely that Bertrand’s intervention was inspired by objection to the candidate chosen, rather than to the election procedure itself.

Raimond Roger was certainly not the worst offender against the church in his lands and his relations with the secular church, especially the bishops of Béziers and Carcassonne, were far better than those of many of his contemporaries, most notably the counts of Toulouse and Comminges. However, while it is not possible to explain the dispossession of Raimond Roger by referring to his abuse of the Church, the pattern of his and his family’s relations with the Languedoc church may still have led to his condemnation in the minds of the papal legates as a lord unworthy of fair or legal treatment.

If the lords of Languedoc were treated according to legatine assessments of their deserts, it is reasonable to assume that previous Trencavel relations with the papal legates would have had some influence on the decision to target Raimond Roger. The legates Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul began their legation to Languedoc in Béziers, where they brought about the suspension of the bishop, Guillaume de Rocozels (1199–1205), in February 1203. They remained in and around the Trencavel lands at least until 1205, when they and Arnauild Amaury were involved in investigating the bishop of the neighbouring diocese of Agde. There is little evidence for the relationship between the legates and Raimond Roger, but the viscount seems at least to have recognised their presence in Béziers and both Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul witnessed a charter of October 1203 in which Raimond Roger allowed the canons of the cathedral to fortify various churches in the town. This participation by the legates in the viscount’s charter indicates that relations between them were at least not hostile and suggests a certain degree of co-operation between the legates and the secular authorities while they were in Béziers.

If relations between Raimond Roger and Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul were...
unexceptional, this was decidedly not the case for relations between those sent to Languedoc to deal with heresy and Raimond Roger’s father. Roger II was excommunicated by Henry of Marcy for imprisoning the Bishop of Albi in 1178\textsuperscript{102} and his town of Lavaur was attacked by Henry in 1181.\textsuperscript{103} In addition to his first excommunication, in 1179, Roger was named on the return of Archbishop Pons of Narbonne from the Third Lateran Council as one of those excommunicated for hiring routiers and neglecting the problem of heresy.\textsuperscript{104} He seems to have gained the worst possible reputation through his dealings with Henry de Marcy, and it is possible that his memory was sufficiently unsavoury to taint the opinion which subsequent papallegates had of his son.

Roger’s poor relations with Henry de Marcy may have proved particularly significant for Raimond Roger’s dealings with the crusade because Henry de Marcy was not only a papal legate, but a Cistercian. Cistercian involvement in efforts against heresy in Languedoc dated back to St Bernard’s preaching mission to Toulouse in 1145, with the idea that the order was the Church’s best weapon against heresy.\textsuperscript{105} Pope Innocent was an admirer of the Cistercian order who showed his intention to use Cistercians in many areas during his pontificate by adopting the rota circle device and motto of the Cistercian Pope Eugenius III, ‘fac mecum signum in bonum’, as his own on his accession,\textsuperscript{106} and papal legations to Languedoc under Innocent became increasingly Cistercian in character. That Innocent intended the extirpation of heresy from Languedoc to be the task of the Cistercian order is demonstrated by his choice of Arnauld Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux, as chief papal legate to Languedoc in 1204,\textsuperscript{107} an appointment which would have facilitated and encouraged the involvement of other Cistercians, such as Abbot Guy des Vaux-de-Cernay and Abbot Foulques of Thoronet, against heresy and efforts such as the preaching campaign of twelve Cistercian abbots in 1207.\textsuperscript{108}

Arnauld remained active as head of the order even when absent in Languedoc and his frequent communications with his abbey meant that there were usually a number of Cistercians from Cîteaux with the legates.\textsuperscript{109} Arnauld brought to his legation not only his position as head of the Cistercian order but also particular connections with the Cistercians of Languedoc through his previous position as Abbot of

\textsuperscript{102} PL 204, 235. The only chronicle account of the legation is that of Roger of Howden (Chronica, vol. 2, pp. 150–66), who may have been a member of the legation, and who includes Henry’s letter describing the results of his mission.

\textsuperscript{103} Gautier of Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 448–9.

\textsuperscript{104} de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 341–4.


\textsuperscript{107} PL 215, 275; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 6, p. 407.

\textsuperscript{108} Pierre des Vaux, v, 554.

\textsuperscript{109} Dutton, ‘Aspects’, p. 95.
Grandselve. Grandselve was one of the major southern French houses and mother house of Fontfroide, itself one of the most important Cistercian foundations in Languedoc.\textsuperscript{110} Arnauld would therefore have had particular influence over the Cistercians in Languedoc, making him an ideal choice as legate for a pope who wished to involve them in the fight against heresy.

Innocent's selection of papal legates for Languedoc before the appointment of Arnauld Amaury also shows his intention to make dealing with heresy a Cistercian preserve.\textsuperscript{111} The first legate sent to Languedoc, brother Rainier, had been a Cistercian monk at Casamari in south Italy and was to go on to be involved with the Cistercian house of Fossanova.\textsuperscript{112} Rainier may have been chosen as a legate more for his close connections with Innocent himself than for his Cistercian affiliations,\textsuperscript{113} but subsequent papal legates to Languedoc were more clearly selected for their Cistercian connections. The appointment of Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul as papal legates to Languedoc in 1203\textsuperscript{114} marked a different sort of legation from those which Innocent had previously dispatched, as they were not given a finite mission of short duration but were to remain in Languedoc for a number of years, in the event until both of their deaths.\textsuperscript{115} Both Pierre and Raoul were of unusually low rank for such a crucial appointment, for which a more usual appointee would have been a cardinal or at least a responsible figure attached to the papal household.

Pierre de Castelnau was previously known to Innocent, having come to papal attention through the disputes over his election as Archdeacon of Maguelonne in 1198 or 1199,\textsuperscript{116} and Innocent had used him to investigate accusations of abuses at the abbey of St-Guillem-le-Desert in 1199.\textsuperscript{117} This suggests that Innocent thought well of Pierre, but such a small task does not compare to a major papal legation. The factor which made Pierre so suitable for his 1203 appointment is unlikely to have been his previous experience in investigating an abbey, rather, it was most probably his membership of the Cistercian order. Pierre had entered the Cistercian house of Fontfroide at some time between 1200 and 1203 and thus his selection as papal legate involved one of the largest houses in Languedoc directly in the fight against heresy. It was probably Pierre’s status as only a recent entrant to the order which...

\textsuperscript{110} For the clearest description of the foundation and filiation of the Cistercian houses of the Midi, see B. Wildhaber, 'Catalogue des établissements cisterciens de Languedoc aux XIIe et XIVe siècles', in \textit{Les Cisterciens de Languedoc}, pp. 21–47.

\textsuperscript{111} On Cistercian legations to Languedoc, see Kienzle, \textit{Cistercians}, pp. 135–73. Kienzle points out that the major figures in the preaching campaigns, Arnauld Amaury, Guy des Vaux-de-Cernay and Fouques of Toulouse had ties to Peter the Chanter and therefore also to Innocent III through his time as a student at Paris. See Kienzle pp. 171–3 and J. W. Baldwin, \textit{Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle}, 2 vols. (Princeton NJ 1970), p. 6.


\textsuperscript{113} He went on to become the papal confessor. F. Robb, 'Joachinist Exegesis in the Theology of Innocent III and Rainier of Ponza', \textit{Florensia} 11 (1997), pp. 137–52, p. at 139.

\textsuperscript{114} PL 215, 272; \textit{Reg. Innocenz III}, vol. 6, pp. 403–5; Pierre des Vaux, i, p. 543–6.

\textsuperscript{115} Raoul died in late 1207 and Pierre de Castelnau was murdered in January 1208.


\textsuperscript{117} PL 214, 1053–7; \textit{Reg. Innocenz III}, vol. 5, pp. 142–6.
determined the selection of his companion Raoul, another monk of Fontfroide, as this would have helped maintain the ties between the legates and their order while they were away from their house.

The essentially Cistercian character of the papal legations to Languedoc seems to have been preserved, largely through the influence of Arnauld Amaury, even when the later legatine appointees were not themselves Cistercian.118 This character may have exacerbated conflict between the legates and the secular church in Languedoc and, in particular, antagonism between them and the local episcopacy. This antagonism was to have important effects on the way in which the relations between secular lords and the local Church were viewed by the legates. In sending his legates to Languedoc, Innocent intended that they should not only attack heresy itself, but should also deal with the wider causes of the problem. He considered in particular that the behaviour of some of the bishops of Languedoc had created a climate in which heresy could flourish. As he wrote concerning Otho, Bishop of Carcassonne (1170–1198), in 1198: ‘The Church having been committed to his care has fallen into such a state, along with other dioceses, that the enemy of mankind has almost speared the hearts of everyone with the sword of evil, to drag them back with him into the eternal fires of Gehenna, and the contagion of the heretical perversion has penetrated the diocese to such an extent that ministers find many and unheard of sects of diabolical lies everywhere and they preach publicly and the people hold to what they believe.’119

The legates were made responsible for the reform of the Church in the Midi so that it could play its proper part in the eradication of heresy and in so doing shaped noble relations with the Cistercians and the secular Church in a way which may have had substantial influence on the legatine view of the Trencavel. The reformation of the Church in Languedoc led to a number of episcopal depositions: the bishops of Fréjus120 and Carcassonne121 were deposed in 1198, the Bishop of Béziers was suspended in 1203,122 the Bishop of Vence was deposed in 1204,123 the bishops of Toulouse124 and Viviers in 1205,125 the bishops of Rodez126 and Carcassonne in

118 Milo, a papal notary, appointed in 1209 (PL 216, 100; Pierre des Vaux, ix, 561) and Theodius, a canon of Genoa, appointed in 1210 (PL 216.173; Pierre, x, 562).
120 PL 214, 374; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 1, pp. 595–7, Guillaume de Pont (1193–8).
123 PL 215, 366; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 7, pp. 133–7. The name of this bishop is unknown. In the episcopal records reproduced in Gallia Christiana, Bishop Pierre Grimaldi (1185–1202) was the last named occupant of the episcopal see until Guillaume Ribot (1229–39); GC, vol. 3, p. 1215.
124 PL 215, 682, Raimond de Rabastens (1202–5).
125 GC, vol. 16, pp. 558–9, Nicholas (1177–1205).
126 PL 216, 409, Hugo de Rodez (1161–1211).
1211 and the Archbishop of Auch in 1213. This process also, unsurprisingly, led to a considerable degree of bad feeling between the legates and the local bishops.

This antagonism was probably not a significant problem between the legates and the bishops in Provence. Nicholas, Bishop of Viviers, for example, appears to have adopted a reasonable attitude towards his deposition, confessing to the ‘very grave crimes’ of which he was accused by the canons of the cathedral and agreeing to resign at the request of his superior the Archbishop of Vienne to avoid a long drawn out deposition process. The church in Provence, between misbehaving bishops and the attacks of the Count of Toulouse, seems to have been in at least as a bad a state as that in Languedoc, but the way in which the legates approached its problems was distinctly different. Legatine assessments of episcopal behaviour in Provence were largely uncomplicated by the question of heresy, as the area was very little affected by this problem. Consequently, episcopal depositions in Provence appear to have been both less complicated and more closely related to obvious abuses than those in Languedoc.

In correspondence concerning the problem of heresy in both the south of France and the papal states, Innocent III made clear his opinion that the prevalence of heresy in a diocese was the direct result of negligence on the part of the bishop, writing for example to Archbishop Berenguer of Narbonne in 1203: ‘Rapacious wolves attack the flocks under your care... because, like a dumb dog refusing to bark, you do not deter them with barking, nor do you follow the example of the Good Shepherd and lay down your life for your flock, but rather you flee, leaving them to the jaws of the wolves.’ Quite apart from this general principle, Innocent plainly felt that the prelates of Languedoc were making insufficient efforts against heresy. In the first year of his pontificate, he found it necessary to write to Archbishop Bernard of Auch (1192–1199) that ‘we wish such a serious disease to be tackled more efficiently by the industry of you and your fellow bishops’. It is likely

\[ \text{PL 216, 490–10, Berengar Raimond (1209–11).} \]

\[ \text{PL 216, 408–9; GC vol. 1, pp. 989–90, Bernard de Montaut (1201–13), previously Bishop of Lectore (1197–1201).} \]

\[ \text{GC vol. 16, p. 559.} \]

\[ \text{It was feared that Bishop Nicholas was well-connected enough to cause considerable problems for the Church if he was forced out of his see unwillingly. GC vol. 16, p. 559: ‘considerans quod hoc utilitate Vivariensis ecclesiae potius expediret, cum dictus episcopus potens et nobilis, et episcopatus totus periclitari sub ipsius potestate’.} \]

\[ \text{PL 215, 83; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 6, p. 128: ‘Invaserunt enim iam gregem tibi commissum lupi rapaces... quod, velut canis mutus latraro non valens, nec eos latratu deterres, nec, boni pastoris exemplo, animam tuam pro ovibus tuis ponis, sed fugis potius, eius luporum morsibus derelictis.’ Also see Innocent’s letter of 1207 to Bishop Rainier of Viterbo in which he rebuked him in very similar terms for allowing heresy to invade his diocese: PL 215, 673–4; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 8, pp. 188–90. The usual meaning of ‘valeo’ is ‘to be strong’ or ‘to be able’, but in this context it seems more likely that Innocent was employing it in its more obscure classical sense as expressing dismissal, refusal or scorn, cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ed. H. Rackham (London 1933), 1, 44, 124, pp. 120–1; ‘talis est deus ut nulla gratia nulla hominum caritate tenuatur, valeat’, ‘If god is of such a nature that he feels no benevolence or affection towards men, dismiss him.’} \]

\[ \text{PL 214, 71; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 1, p. 120: ‘per tuam et aliorum coepiscoporum tuorum industriam luic morbo tanto efficacius volumus obviari’.} \]
that the papal opinion of the Languedoc episcopacy soured the secular church’s relations with the legates in a way which was avoided in Provence.

The legates appear to have approached the bishops of Languedoc with the assumption that they were already guilty of the gravest negligence, as demonstrated by the prevalence of heresy in their sees, and could therefore not expect the same degree of consideration as innocent prelates, including those in Provence, could expect. From the beginning of Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul’s legation in 1203, episcopal deposits in Languedoc were as much to do with the prelates’ attitude towards the legates as they were with individual misdeeds. Guillelm de Rocozels, Bishop of Béziers, was suspended by the legates in 1203 for his refusal to accompany them on their mission against the Count of Toulouse and his failure to carry out their instructions to excommunicate consuls of Béziers whom they considered heretical. Neglecting to excommunicate heretics was undoubtedly a serious offence, but Guillelm’s suspension was less to do with his attitude towards heretics than his attitude towards the legates themselves: he was suspended for disobedience, not negligence.

Guillelm was not alone in his disobedient and hostile attitude towards the legates. In 1203 his metropolitan, Archbishop Berenguer of Narbonne, was accused by the Pope of having ‘denied...help and support’ to Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul and of refusing to help them persuade the Count of Toulouse to take action against the heretics. The rancorous nature of Berenguer’s relations with the legates is revealed by his appeal to Innocent against them of 1204:

When you [Pierre de Castelnau] and Raoul came to the province of Narbonne, when you should have sent polite letters announcing your arrival to me, you came in improbably, so that you brought me to want to go to the Apostolic see to cast out that which was falsely told to the Pope about me in the hope of favour, you and brother Raoul, without consulting your colleague the Abbot, seized my offices and benefices on pain of anathema as if I was a very lowly clerk, and ordered that I should not leave the diocese...In the execution of these things you have exceeded the limits of your orders in four or five points.

It appears that the Pope had anticipated such problems between his legates to Languedoc and the local episcopate. In 1198, announcing the first legation of Rainier to the prelates of the Midi, Innocent instructed that they should accept any measures which he prescribed against heresy without quibble, orders which the

135 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 509: ‘Cum ingressurus provinciam Narbonensem litteras ad nos benevolas tuumque adventum significantes praemittere debueras, inopinatus advertem me falso atque adulatricie summo pontifici subjectum fuerat, tu et frater Rainieri, inconsulto collega vestro abbaie, sub poena anathematis, officii atque beneficii mei tanquam cuilibet vilissimo clerico mandasti, me a mea diocesi ullo modo discederem...In quo quoad executionem in quattuor aut quinque capitulis mandati suscepti fines transgressus es.’
Pope found it necessary to repeat and enlarge upon to the same prelates in 1204: ‘You are to receive them [the legates] humbly, and take care to obey them absolutely, admitting their correction without argument.’\footnote{PL 215, 360; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 7, pp. 122–6: ‘Recipiatis humiliter, et inviolabiliter observare procurates, correctionem eorum sine contradicione qualibet admitentes.’} Innocent’s repetition and amplification of his instructions to the prelates on obedience to the legates is indicative of the problematic relations which had developed between the legates and many Languedoc bishops by 1204. The situation is likely to have been worsened by the Cistercian character of the legations to Languedoc. Relations between the order and the secular church in France were extremely poor in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, to the extent that in c.1200 Innocent was obliged to send a general letter to the prelates of France remonstrating with their tacit support for secular attacks on Cistercian houses.

The legatine response to the unhelpful attitude of the local bishops was often their removal from office and replacement with more congenial prelates; in particular, the replacement of prelates of local origin with candidates from the ranks of the legates themselves and their associates. Raimond de Rabastens, Bishop of Toulouse, was replaced in 1205 by Foulques, Abbot of Thoronet,\footnote{Doat 55, fols. 286–7; GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, p. 52.} Berenger Raimond, Bishop of Carcassonne in 1212 by Guy, Abbot of Vaux-de-Cernay.\footnote{GC, vol. 6, p. 879.} The occupation of Languedoc sees by papal legates was further extended by Arnauld Amaury’s election as Archbishop of Narbonne in 1212\footnote{PL 216, 613–14; Besse, Ducs de Narbonne, p. 466. This followed Berenguer of Narbonne’s death in August 1211 (J. Font y Bayell, ‘Alfons el Cast i el Monastir de Sant Cugat de Valles’, VII CHCA, vol. 2, pp. 181–94, at p. 191), not his deposition as is often stated (for example, B. M. Bolton, ‘Tradition and Temerity: Papal Attitudes to Deviants 1159–1216’, Studies in Church History 9 (Cambridge 1972), pp. 79–91, at p. 81, note 3). The idea that Berenguer was deposed is based on the papal letter of June 1210, In tantum clamor, to Arnauld Amaury and Hugh Raimond, Bishop of Riez, which refers to a rumour that Berenguer was ‘not only negligent but pestilent’, PL 216, 283–4: ‘cum non solum negligentes sint, ut asseritur, sed etiam pestilentes’. The letter calls for an investigation of Berenguer, but there is no evidence to suggest that its result was his deposition: Graham-Leigh, ‘Hirelings’, pp. 1087–8.} and Thedisius’ elevation to the bishopric of Agde in 1213.\footnote{GC, vol. 6, p. 325.}

The one notable exception out of the sees in Languedoc is Béziers, where Bishop Guillem de Rocozels, suspended by Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul in 1203,\footnote{PL 215, 272–3; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 6, pp. 403–5.} was not succeeded by a Cistercian or legatine candidate, but by Bishop Ermengard (1205–1208) from the local abbey of St Pons de Thomiers. This difference may be explained by the fact that Guillem was not deposed in 1203, but merely suspended, and was therefore not replaced as bishop until after his death in 1205.\footnote{Despetis, Agde, p. 77.} It is possible that the legates were not involved in the appointment of Ermengard, leaving the chapter free to elect a local candidate. The legates also had little cause for complaint against the bishop of Béziers following the suspension of Guillem de Rocozels, as both Ermengard and his successor Reginald de Montpellier (1208–1212) seem to
have been enthusiastic supporters of both the legates and the crusaders. Reginald, in particular, was praised by Pierre des Vaux for his conduct during the siege of Béziers and was described as ‘a man respected in life, age and wisdom’.  

By the advent of the crusade in 1209, the legates may well have thought that representatives of the secular church in Languedoc were essentially opposed to the work of their legation and to have regarded the local connections of such prelates as anathema. This is suggested by their treatment of Berengar Raimond de Roquefort, Bishop of Carcassonne (1209–1211). Berengar was a prelate who had the highest opinion of both the legates and the crusaders, of whom he was an enthusiastic supporter. He joined the crusaders after their capture of Carcassonne in August 1209 and was particularly helpful to them at the siege of Termes in late 1210. However, in early 1211 he was forced to resign from his bishopric, for reasons which the Pope expressed as the many ‘impediments and defects’ which prevented him from carrying out his pastoral duties. The nature of the ‘impediments and defects’ was never specified further. As a result of his support for the crusade, Berengar Raimond can have spent little of his short episcopacy in his diocese, with probably a concomitant decline in the standards of pastoral care in Carcassonne, but this is a failing for which he is unlikely to have been deposed, since even prolonged absences on the part of bishops engaged on the business of the legates and the crusade were tolerated and even encouraged. Foulques of Toulouse, for example, was away from Toulouse between 1211 and 1214, and between 1217 and 1229, without censure. The enforced resignation of this bishop whose behaviour should have brought him nothing but legatine approval seems strange, and may have been brought about more by revelations about Berengar Raimond’s connections, than by his own actions.

Although Berengar Raimond seems to have been entirely orthodox and genuine in his support for the crusade, this could not necessarily be said for the rest of his family. His mother was described by Pierre des Vaux as ‘a very evil heretic’, which, although it should not be taken as definitive proof of her Cathar beliefs, at least indicates that she was opposed to the crusade. His brother, Guillem de Roquefort, expressed his opposition to the crusade in active and unambiguous terms and in 1210 was guilty of an attack on a Cistercian abbot and his companions. Berengar Raimond’s relationship with such enemies of the crusade was brought forcefully to the attention of the legates at the siege of Termes in 1210, when he attempted to use his relation to defenders of the castle to negotiate its surrender. It seems possible that it was this reminder of Berengar Raimond’s connections to local opponents of the crusade which necessitated his deposition in the eyes of the legates. Pope Innocent had long been concerned about the possibility that clerics could be unduly influenced by their

144 Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 566: ‘virum acetate, vita, scientia venerandum’.
145 Pierre des Vaux, xlii, 596.
146 PL 216, 409: ‘supportare nequiens sarcinam sollicitudinis pastoralis, multis incommodis et defectibus praepeditus’.
147 Cabau, ‘Foulque’, p. 159.
149 Pierre des Vaux, xxx, 579.
150 Pierre des Vaux, xlii, 596.
families to the detriment of their churches. This was particularly a matter of concern in the case of bishops recruited from the ranks of the local aristocracy and would have had special force in Languedoc, where the legates were deeply distrustful of the local nobility. Long before 1211, the legates showed that, in their opinion, the dioceses of Languedoc were better presided over by external, Cistercian, bishops, than by candidates from local noble families. These considerations meant that a bishop with local connections could be regarded as unsuitable for his position, regardless of his own behaviour and attitude to the crusade. Berengar Raimond may have been forced out of his see because of his connections to the local nobility, a victim of legatine distrust of the local representatives of the secular church in Languedoc.

The result of the legatine attitude towards those bishops of local origin in the dioceses of Languedoc appears to have been the development of a division within the secular church between the legatine, Cistercian, prelates, and the remaining prelates from the local aristocracy. The occupation by the legates and their confederates of many of the sees in Languedoc appears to have been regarded with resentment by the other prelates. Berenguer of Narbonne, for example, complained that the election of Foulques to Toulouse in 1205 was uncanonical and infringed his authority as metropolitan as a result of the involvement of the legates Pierre de Castelnau and Raoul. The division in the secular church in Languedoc between the Cistercian and the local bishops seems to have affected the relations between the bishops and the nobility in the area. The local prelates, particularly those who were deposed and replaced by legatine appointees, may have come to represent orthodox opponents of the crusade against the crusaders and the legates.

This may have been the case with Berengar Raimond de Roquefort after his resignation from Carcassonne in 1211. He appears to have been regarded as an alternative bishop of Carcassonne during Guy des Vaux-de-Cernay’s episcopate by many of the local nobles, being referred to as ‘Bishop of Carcassonne’ for example in a charter in which Guillem Armiger de Caunes swore to support him in 1215. This view of his status seems to have been so widespread by 1217 that the abbots of St Jacob and Caunes found it necessary to oversee a formal agreement between Berengar Raimond and Guy, in which Berengar made a formal recognition that he was no longer Bishop of Carcassonne. The way in which the two possible bishops of Carcassonne represented two different sides was demonstrated when Raimond Tencavel, with the help of Raimond VII of Toulouse and Roger of Foix, retook the town in 1224, and reinstated Berengar Raimond as Bishop.

152 The military orders appear to have fallen onto the side of the non-Cistercian secular church, although this applies more to the Hospitalers than to the Templars. See D. Selwood, Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitalers in Central-Southern Occitania c.1100–c.1300 (Woodbridge 1999), pp. 43–6.
154 Doat 55, fols. 75–76v.
155 Besse, Carcassonne, p. 85.
156 de Vic and Vainsête, vol. 6, p. 614.
the interim, Berengar was replaced when Carcassonne was retaken in 1226 by Charin, who had been chancellor to Simon de Montfort.157

Raimond de Rabastens, deposed as Bishop of Toulouse in 1205, seems also to have been regarded as an alternative bishop of Toulouse to his replacement, Foulques of Thoronet. This is indicated by the dating clause in a charter issued by Raimond VI to the Bourg of Toulouse in 1207, a year after Foulques had been officially elected to the see, which refers, not to Bishop Foulques, but to Bishop Raimond.158 Raimond de Rabastens does not seem to have been disgraced by his deposition and appears in fact to have become a valued supporter of the Count of Toulouse, forming part of the embassy which the count sent to Rome in early 1209.159 Raimond VI had particularly poor relations with Bishop Foulques, so much so that the count expelled the bishop from the city in 1211: ‘That tyrant, having been thrown into a rage, sent one of his soldiers to the Bishop, commanding and ordering him strictly that he should leave the city of Toulouse and all the lands of the Count swiftly in peril of his neck.’160 In the light of the antagonism between Raimond VI and Foulques, it is easy to appreciate how Raimond de Rabastens would have been welcomed as an alternative bishop, better disposed to orthodox opponents of the crusade.161

The examples of Raimond de Rabastens of Toulouse and Berengar Raimond de Roquefort of Carcassonne demonstrate the way in which the secular church in Languedoc was divided by the activities of the legates and the crusaders. The replacement of many local prelates with Cistercian or legatine candidates appears to have created a climate in which those bishops who were dismissed or attacked by the legates were identified with the orthodox nobility who opposed the crusade, which in turn meant that any locally connected members of the secular church were regarded with suspicion by the crusaders. This process may not have been entirely confined to the episcopacy. Boson, the Abbot of Alet installed as a result of Bertrand de Saissac’s violent attack on the abbey in 1197, was deposed by the legate Conrad of Montferrat in 1222,162 but was probably restored to his position by Raimond Trencavel during his short occupation of Carcassonne between 1224 and 1227, as he appears as a

157 Ibid.
158 R. Limouzin-Lamothe, La Commune de Toulouse et les sources de son histoire 1120–1249 (Toulouse 1932), pp. 403–4. Limouzin-Lamothe dismisses this as a dating error on the basis of Raimond’s deposition in 1205, but there is no internal evidence which argues for an earlier dating for the charter. Raimond seems to have been left some sort of episcopal status by Innocent III on his deposition, as Innocent stated that he was only required to surrender the administration of the see, and could keep his episcopal dignity: PL 215, 682.
159 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 10, pp. 30–1. The other members of the embassy were the Abbot of Condom and Bernard de Montaut, Archbishop of Auch (1201–13).
161 Raimond de Rabastens was related to two of the most stalwart supporters of Raimond VI and Raimond VII: Pierre Raimond and Pelfort de Rabastens (Chanson, vol. 2, p. 39, note 2).
162 GC, vol. 6, p. 271.
witness with the title ‘Abbot’ in two of Raimond’s charters from 1227. Boson does not appear to have been an effective incumbent of his abbacy. Not only was he elected in the most dubious circumstances, he was said to have so depleted the finances of the abbey that it could hardly support one monk. He was also specifically identified with opposition to the crusade and on his deposition was accused of giving active support to the heretics. Given the common equation of opposition to the crusade with heresy, it is not necessary to interpret this as evidence that Boson was a Cathar sympathiser, but it demonstrates clearly that lack of sympathy for the crusade which was probably a significant factor in his deposition. Boson appears to have been another member of the non-Cistercian church who became identified with the opposition to the crusade, creating the divide in the church in Languedoc between the Cistercians, other houses, and the secular church.

That the Cistercian order was especially associated with the crusade, and much more so than the secular church, is suggested by the attack made by Guillem de Roquefort, the brother of Berengar Raimond, Bishop of Carcassonne, on a Cistercian abbot from Elne outside Carcassonne in 1210. This abbot, far from being a member of the crusade leadership, had been sent by Raimond Roger, Count of Foix, to negotiate on his behalf with the legates at St Gilles. However, according to Pierre des Vaux, his membership of the order was enough for Guillem de Roquefort, who attacked and killed the abbot and his party ‘for no other reason than that they were Cistercian’. Pierre des Vaux, unsurprisingly, refers to Guillem as ‘that most ferocious persecutor of the Church’ but does not offer any examples of more general persecution. Guillem’s attack on the abbot is indicative of hatred of Cistercians specifically, rather than simply of Cistercians as representatives of the Church in general. This demonstrates the effect of the opposition in the church between the Cistercian legates and the local bishops and shows that the meaningful division in Languedoc society during the crusade was not so much between heretics and orthodox, but between the supporters of the Cistercians and the supporters of the secular church.

The identification of the secular church in Languedoc with noble opponents of the crusade also meant that support for the Cistercians became the principal determinant of orthodoxy for the Languedoc nobility. When Stéphane de Servian, for example, surrendered to Simon de Montfort and abjured his supposed heresy in 1210, he was to demonstrate his sincerity and continued orthodoxy through the donation of thirty silver marks to Cîteaux. His surrender was followed by that of

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164 GC, vol. 6, p. 271.
165 Ibid.
166 Pierre des Vaux, xxx, 579.
167 Ibid: ‘Exeuntes a Carcassona abbas et socii ejus, cum per unum fere milliarium, ille immansissimus hostis Christi, ille ferocissimus Ecclesiae persecutor, Guillemus videlicet de Rupeforti, frater Carcassonensis episcopi, qui tune erat, adversus eos subito insurrexit, armatus videlicet in inermes, crudelis in miles, saevus in innocentes. Qui, ob per nullam aliam causam nisi quia Cistercianus erant, abbatii xxxvi, converso vero ejus xxvi plagas infligens, eos in loco illo hominum crudelissimus interfecit.’
168 Ibid.: ‘ille ferocissimus Ecclesiae persecutor’.
169 Doat 75, fol. 11.
fourteen other lords from Béziers, who also promised money to Cîteaux. The selection of Cîteaux as the beneficiary of these lords’ surrenders bore little relation to their pre-crusade behaviour. If Simon’s concern had been that these lords should be compelled to benefit the church which they had damaged by opposition to the crusade, the obvious donation for them to make would have been to the bishop of Béziers, who appears to have suffered from the depredations of secular lords in the early thirteenth century. Similarly, under the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1229 Raimond VII undertook to make payments ‘in reparation for the harm he had caused them and for the good of his soul’, not to the Church in Languedoc in general, or to a selection of bishoprics and monasteries, but solely to the Cistercian houses of Cîteaux, Grandseilve, Bellepeche and Candeil. These conditions demonstrate the special place which support for the Cistercians occupied in the opinion of the legates and the crusaders, so that it became the best indicator and guarantor of the orthodoxy of secular lords.

This attitude towards support for the Cistercians on the part of the papal legates would clearly have had an important effect on the way in which they assessed those members of the nobility with whom they were dealing. The lords’ relations with the Cistercians is likely to have been given more weight than any other consideration in the legates’ assessment of their deserts and therefore to have determined how they were treated by the Church. The importance of support for the Cistercians for a lord of Languedoc seeking to reach a rapprochement with the crusade is demonstrated by the speech attributed to the Count of Foix in the description of the Fourth Lateran Council given by the anonymous continuator of the Chanson. According to this source, Bishop Foulques of Toulouse made a comprehensive accusation against the count at the Council, citing not only his opposition to the crusade, but also his support for heresy:

“My lords” he said “you have all heard the Count of Foix declare that he is free of this heresy and untainted by it. But I say to you that his land is the very fount of it, that has loved, favoured and helped the heretics, that all his county is full and infested with them, that he has fortified the mountain of Montségur specifically to be used in their defence and that he allows them to stay there. And that his sister, after the death of her husband, became a heretic and stayed for three years at Pamiers, where she corrupted many people to her false belief.”

170 Doat 75, fols. 11v–13.
171 In 1211, Simon forced a number of lords from Béziers to return tithes which they had abrogated from the Bishop: Doat 62, fols. 37–62v.
172 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, pp. 632–7, at p. 633: ‘en reparation des dommages qu’il leur avoit causés que pour le salut de son âme’.
174 Esclarmonde of Foix was married to Jourdain de l’Isle Jourdain (d. c.1201).
175 Chanson, vol. 2, 145, pp. 48–9: “Senhors” so ditz l’avesques “tug auzetz que l coms ditz qu’el s’es de la eretgia delhiuratz e partitiz, en dic que sa terra fo la mager razitz, e el les amatz e volutz e gratzitz, e totz lo seus contatz n’era ples e farsitz; e l pog de Montségur fo per aital bastitz qu’el les pogues defendre, els hi a cosenitz, e sa sor fo eretja, cant moric sos maritz, es estec poih a Pamias plus de tres ans complitz ab sa mala doctrina ni mans convertitz.”
Raimond Roger of Foix stated that he could not be expected to control his sister and that he had never had friendly relations with heretics. The author of the Chanson had him cite only one proof of his orthodoxy, which was obviously supposed to be sufficiently telling on its own: ‘I have never had any friendship with heretics, neither believers nor perfecti. On the contrary, I have offered, given and made legal donation of myself to Boulbonne, where I have been very well received and where all my ancestors offered themselves and are buried.’

The counts of Foix had a tradition of generosity to the Cistercian abbey of Boulbonne, but this passage is more complex than a simple statement of fact. The juxtaposition of support for heretics or Cistercians as the two possible alternatives for a lord of Languedoc is a demonstration of the view of the Cistercians as the determinants of orthodoxy for the nobility and this is further indicated by the comment on Raimond Roger’s ancestors. If Raimond Roger had indeed donated himself to an abbey, this could have been cited at the Council in his defence whether or not that abbey was a Cistercian house. However, the insistence on the traditional support of the counts of Foix for Boulbonne indicates a specific attempt to stress a connection with Cistercians. There would be no reason to mention the burial place of his ancestors unless to emphasise his good relations with that particular house: even heretical lords would have had ancestors buried in churches.

The continuation of the Chanson is not, of course, an exactly contemporary source and it is important not to take the speeches in it as precise repetitions of those actually made at the Council. However, there is no reason to suppose a marked change in the role of Cistercians between 1215 and c.1230, especially since the treatment of Stéphane de Servian in 1210 indicates a view of role of the order in the early days of the crusade similar to that suggested by the Treaty of Paris in 1229. In the light of this, it is possible to argue that the passage in the continuation on the Count of Foix at the Fourth Lateran Council demonstrates an awareness on the part of the author of the special status of Cistercians in the minds of the legates and the churchmen connected with the crusade and that a connection with the order was the surest way for any of the higher nobility of Languedoc to obtain favourable treatment from the Church.

It is apparent that the legates’ assessment of Raimond Roger would have placed particular emphasis on his and his family’s relations with the Cistercians and the character of these relations would not have argued in Raimond Roger’s favour. The Trencavel ‘displayed no special enthusiasm for the Cistercians’. No Cistercian house within the counties ruled by the Trencavel received consistent or enthusiastic patronage from them, nor does the family appear to have been any more generous

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176 Ibid., pp. 50–3: ‘Qu’anc no amei eretges, ni crezens ni vestitz, enans me soi rendutz e donatz e ufritz dretamens a Bolbona, on ieu fui ben aizitz, on trastotz mos lihatges es datz e sebellitz.’
177 Boulbonne, near Mazères, was founded in 1129 and affiliated to the order in 1150 as a daughter of Bonnefont: Wildhaber, ‘Etablissements cisterciens’, p. 27.
179 After the filiation of Valmagne in the diocese of Agde to the order in 1153–5, it received minimal attention from the Trencavel, with their involvement restricted to the grant of tolls levied on their lands by Raimond Trencavel in 1161 and 1165: GC, vol. 6, p. 721. The Trencavel seem
The extent of Trencavel support for Silvanes reveals their greater enthusiasm for this abbey than for any other in the Midi, and the selection of this particular house as the recipient of Trencavel patronage is itself indicative of their attitude towards the Cistercians in general. It has been noted that Silvanes was especially associated with the counts of Barcelona and, while receiving patronage from a range of lords from Languedoc, was ignored by the counts of Toulouse. It is quite possible that this was a consideration in Trencavel support of the abbey, but it is also important to note that Silvanes was not a major house and was situated at a long distance from any Trencavel lands. In supporting this one house, the Trencavel inverted the usual patterns of noble patronage for monastic foundations and this may be to have been no more enthusiastic in support of Fontfroide, in Narbonne, as their only involvement was the confirmation by Roger II of a donation made by Pierre Mercier to the abbey and its possession of land in the suburb of St Michael in Carcassonne: GC, vol. 6, p. 202. Various Trencavel made occasional donations to smaller houses in and around Trencavel lands: Roger I and his wife Bernarde made a substantial donation to the new house of Villelongue in 1150 (Mahul, vol. 1, p. 223); Roger II gave all his property at Ricemnet to the nunnery there, affiliated to Villelongue, in 1172 (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 22). Raimond Trencavel and his wife Saure granted land to Candeil in Albi in 1164 and Roger II and Raimond Roger both confirmed the abbey’s possessions and took it under their protection, in 1191 and 1201 respectively.

The Trencavel seem to have had good relations with Grandseve before its Cistercian affiliation in 1145: in 1144, Roger I granted exemption from all dues to Grandseve, in return for which he was to be received as a brother of the abbey, as his father, Bernard Aton, had also been: Doat 76, fol. 14. However, their involvement after this date was restricted to Roger II’s grant of exemption from tolls in 1170, confirmed by Raimond Roger in 1203: Doat 77, fol. 29 and Doat 78, fol. 169. The Trencavel do not appear to have had any involvement with Cîteaux, although other members of the higher nobility of Languedoc did: J. Marillier, Chartes et documents concernant l’Abbaye de Cîteaux 1098–1182 (Rome 1961).

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183 1151: donation of land at Calm Raimond by Raimond Trencavel (Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Silvanes, ed. Verlaquet, p. 333); 1151: confirmation by Raimond Trencavel of the donation of land at Marnes by Roger I (ibid., p. 334); 1156: exemption from the salt tax at Béziers granted by Raimond Trencavel (ibid., p. 357); 1165: exemption from the salt tax for all the lands of Silvanes granted by Raimond Trencavel (ibid., p. 358); 1173: Roger II’s confirmation of all grants made by his ancestors (ibid., pp. 396–401); 1180: Roger II’s donation of various rights to Silvanes (ibid., pp. 405–7), confirmed September 1180 by Adelaide (ibid., pp. 407–8).


indicative of their unfavourable attitude towards the more local Cistercian houses.

It is possible that the Trencavel felt threatened by the Cistercian presence in and around their lands, conceivably as a result of the patterns of support for houses of the order among the lesser nobility. While large Cistercian foundations such as Valmagne and Fontfroide, both on or near Trencavel lands, may have proved uncomfortable neighbours, smaller houses could appear no more friendly to the viscounts. The Abbey of Villelongue, founded as a daughter of Morimond near Saissac in 1149, is an example.\(^{186}\) The foundation of Villelongue seems to have had a detrimental effect on the nearby Benedictine house of Montolieu, whose fortunes had declined so much by 1182 that Pope Lucius III was forced to place it under the jurisdiction of St Pons de Thomières to prevent the dispersal of the monks.\(^{187}\) This effort proved insufficient, and in 1209 Simon de Montfort was forced to give the remaining monks shelter in Carcassonne.\(^{188}\) Mahul offered ‘the persecutions of the Albigensian heretics’ as an explanation for the parlous state of the abbey in 1182.\(^{189}\) However, it seems more reasonable to connect the lack of secular support and patronage for Montolieu in the later twelfth century with the foundation of Villelongue a few miles away, especially since the re-founded abbey failed to thrive in the thirteenth century, when the threat of heretical attack would presumably have been removed.\(^{190}\)

The Trencavel had been patrons of Montolieu in the earlier twelfth century and the abbey remained particularly associated with the lords of Aragon, themselves consistently loyal supporters of the viscounts.\(^{191}\) In contrast, its rival at Villelongue had been founded with donations from Isarn Jourdain and Guillelma de Saissac\(^{192}\) and the lords of Saissac remained among its most enthusiastic supporters throughout the twelfth century.\(^{193}\) The lords of Saissac dominated the western Montagne Noire and, despite Roger II’s efforts to involve Bertrand de Saissac in his government in the 1180s and 1190s,\(^{194}\) remained effectively independent of their supposed Trencavel overlords. Villelongue’s strong connection with these lords could have been enough to discourage Trencavel patronage, with the effect on Montolieu as an

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\(^{186}\) GC, vol. 6, pp. 1017–19; Mahul, vol. 1, pp. 221–30; Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, pp. 96–7. The abbey was known as Compagnes when first founded, but will be referred to here as Villelongue, its later name, for the sake of clarity.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 86.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., p. 86.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., p. 86.


\(^{191}\) Aragon was the nearest village to Montolieu and the lords of Aragon were particularly associated with the abbey even in the early thirteenth century, when the abbot was Isarn II d’Aragon: Mahul, vol. 1, p. 88.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., p. 221.

\(^{193}\) 1152: sale of a vineyard in Saissac to Villelongue by Bernard Maixine, with the permission of the lords of Saissac; 1158: donation of a vineyard by Guillaume Bernard, Isarn Jourdain and Jourdain, the sons of Jourdain de Saissac; 1165: donation by Isarn Jourdain and Bernard de Saissac of all their rights at St Jean de Villelongue: Mahul, vol. 1, pp. 223–8.

\(^{194}\) See pp. 153–4 below.
added disincentive. The lords of Saissac were not unusual amongst the lesser nobility for their enthusiasm for the Cistercians and the problems experienced by the Trencavel in establishing their authority over such lords may have presented the Cistercians as, like their patrons, a threat to Trencavel power.

The Trencavel should not be viewed as essentially anti-Cistercian; there are no examples of Trencavel abuses against Cistercian foundations and various Trencavel demonstrate some level of approval for the order. Roger I, for example, made donations to both Silvanes and Villelongue near the end of his life and it seems reasonable to see these as motivated, at least in part, by personal piety.195 Trencavel support for Silvanes can similarly be seen as an expression of personal approval for the Cistercians, but as one which allowed the viscounts their reservations about the Cistercian role in the politics of twelfth-century Languedoc. These reservations meant, however, that Raimond Roger had no ties with any of the major Cistercian houses in and around his lands and they created a tradition of visible expression of Trencavel piety through particular association with the secular church and Benedictine houses like La Grasse.

In comparison with lords like the counts of Toulouse and Foix, the Trencavel had had good relations with their bishops, but, far from presenting Raimond Roger to the papal legates in a good light, his particular identification with prelates like Berengar Raimond, Bishop of Carcassonne, who were themselves suspect, would merely have worsened his position in their eyes. By 1209, the secular church in Languedoc was seen as opposed to Cistercians and to Cistercian efforts against heresy, while support for the order was necessary for those who wished to show that they were not enemies of the crusade. The Trencavel ambivalence concerning Cistercian houses in Languedoc could have implied to the legates that Raimond Roger was likely to be opposed to their efforts against heresy. Just as his attacks on Provençal bishops were to present Raimond VI as unworthy of forgiveness in 1213, so lack of Trencavel generosity to Fontfroide could have demonstrated that Raimond Roger was potentially inimical to the crusade.

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Ambitious, Brave and Lacking in Political Sense:  
The Political Background to the Crusade

If the treatment of the Trencavel by the crusade was based on a consideration by the papal legates of all aspects of their relations with the Church, this was no less true of the way the secular politics of Languedoc influenced the behaviour of the crusaders. The assumption that the course of the crusade was not uninfluenced by the relationships of the Occitan nobility is present in much of the modern historiography of the crusade, for example in the frequently advanced argument that the crusade’s attack on Béziers and Carcassonne was inspired by the Count of Toulouse. However, the efficacy of this argument also illustrates how the interactions of the crusaders and the Trencavel must be understood in terms of the entire complex spectrum of noble politics in Languedoc before the crusade.

The immediate justification for the argument that Raimond of Toulouse brought the crusaders to Béziers is Guillaume de Tudela’s description of how Raimond Roger snubbed his attempts to make an alliance against the crusade which led to the Count’s submission to the crusade armies. For Guillaume this was also a family drama; he pointed out in his first passage on the Count of Toulouse’s approach to the viscount that Raimond Roger was Raimond VI’s nephew and repeated this information in subsequent mentions of the hostility between the two lords. In much of the modern historiography of the crusade, Guillaume’s moral that kin should stick together is less prominent, but the argument that the Count of Toulouse was the cause of the crusaders’ attacks on Béziers and Carcassonne fits into the usual picture of the position of the Trencavel in the secular politics of Languedoc, which characterises their primary relationship as being with Toulouse.

While it is generally admitted that the counts of Toulouse were not the only, or even the principal, power in Languedoc, the idea that the Trencavel were vassals only of the counts of Toulouse has however proved both persistent and pervasive and the position of Raimond Roger and his family has been evaluated solely in terms

1 Sumption, Albigensian Crusade, p. 84; Wakefield, Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition, p. 100; Roquebert, L’épopée cathare, vol. 1, pp. 245–6.
3 Ibid., 10, pp. 30–1; 14, pp. 44–5.
of how it related to that of the counts of Toulouse. Wakefield, for example, in the same passage in which he recognised the influence of the King of Aragon on the politics of twelfth-century Languedoc, summed up the Trencavel position on the eve of the crusade purely in terms of how it affected Toulouse: ‘The big families were able to manoeuvre profitably during the wars of the counts of Toulouse with Aragon. Notable in this respect were the Trencavels . . . who had succeeded by the end of the twelfth century in creating a feudal enclave that cut the county of Toulouse in two.’

The majority of other historians of the Albigensian crusade have shared this view of the position of the Trencavel. Belperron, for example, while he described the Trencavel as ‘infeodated’ to the kings of Aragon by 1179, nevertheless persisted in regarding them primarily as vassals of the Count of Toulouse. In a list of the vassals of Toulouse who rebelled against Raimond V in 1181, for example, Belperron stated that: ‘The most powerful of these perpetually rebellious barons were the Trencavel.’ Belperron was followed in his view of the relative importance of the counts of Toulouse and the kings of Aragon for the Trencavel by Roquebert, who was also determined to regard the Trencavel as ‘the most important vassal house of Toulouse’. Roquebert was also aware of the power of the kings of Aragon over the Trencavel, stating that ‘Trencavel, vassal of the Count of Toulouse, did homage to Aragon for the town of Carcassonne.’

Both Belperron and Roquebert appear to have been uncomfortable with the idea that the influence of the kings of Aragon may have been as important for the Trencavel as that of the counts of Toulouse. Belperron’s use of quasi feudal terminology such as ‘infeodated’ may have been intended to disguise or disqualify the very real power which the kings of Aragon had over the Trencavel by the thirteenth century, giving the impression that this power was somehow less valid than that of Toulouse. Roquebert, on the other hand, while admitting in one chapter that the Trencavel held their most important town from Aragon, was able to ignore this statement when summarising their political position in another. The most definite exception to this prevailing attitude towards the Trencavel is Madaule, who accepted that the counts of Toulouse had ‘no genuine feudal authority’ over the Trencavel lands, which were ‘held in a general way’ from Aragon. However, even Madaule seems to have been unwilling to credit the kings of Aragon with authority over the Trencavel to equal that of the counts of Toulouse, an unwillingness expressed by the weakness of the phrase ‘held in a general way’.

The general opinion of the position of the Trencavel on the eve of the Albigensian crusade is best summarised by Strayer: ‘Squarely in the midst of the Count’s [of Toulouse] domains lay the holdings of the Trencavel family, stretching from

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5 Wakefield, *Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition*, p. 52.
6 Belperron, *Croisade*, p. 15.
8 Ibid., p. 22.
9 Belperron, *Croisade*, p. 15.
Carcassonne and Béziers in the south to Albi in the north, and including a number of powerful castles. The Trencavel were ambitious, aggressive, brave and (for the most part) utterly lacking in political sense. They could not be controlled and they would not let themselves be ignored. No other vassals of the Count of Toulouse were quite as unruly...12 This view of the Trencavel as the archetypal ‘over-mighty barons’ is also a result of the consideration of the Trencavel in relation only to Toulouse. When Sumption, for example, stated that ‘real authority belonged to their [the counts of Toulouse’s] vassals... more ambitious and more powerful than either of these princes [the counts of Foix and the viscounts of Narbonne] were the Trencavel viscounts of Béziers... from the death of Bernard Aton IV in 1130, the Trencavels were undoubtedly more powerful than the counts of Toulouse’,13 his argument rested on the assumption that, if the Trencavel were not controlled by the house of St Gilles, they must have been effectively independent. This is, however, to impose a structured hierarchy on a political situation in Languedoc which was far more complex and far more chaotic.

The century and a half in which the Trencavel held Béziers and Carcassonne were a period of disruption and instability in Languedoc, resulting apparently from almost constant warfare between the counts of Toulouse on the one side and the counts of Barcelona and dukes of Aquitaine on the other.14 The wars between the counts of Toulouse and the dukes of Aquitaine began at the end of the eleventh century, as a dispute over the inheritance to the county of Toulouse. In around 1094, Guillem IV, Count of Toulouse (c.1060–1094), left Toulouse on pilgrimage to the Holy Land and never returned.15 He left a daughter, Philippa, already married to Guillem IX of Aquitaine (1071–1127), and a brother, Raimond IV de St Gilles (1042–1104), who took possession of the county of Toulouse. In 1079 the two brothers had made a formal division of the lands of their father, Pons, Count of Toulouse (d. c.1060), which gave Toulouse and the western Languedoc to Guillem and left Raimond with the eastern lands, including Béziers, Narbonne, Uzès and Provence,16 but they may have remained co-rulers of Toulouse up until Guillem’s departure.17

Raimond IV’s succession to Toulouse was undisputed until after he himself had departed for the First Crusade in 1096, leaving his eldest, possibly illegitimate, son, Bertran (d.1111), as Count of Toulouse in his stead.18 This provided the opportunity

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13 Sumption, Albigensian Crusade, p. 20.
15 J.-L. Déjean, Quand chevauchaient les Comtes de Toulouse (Fayard 1979), 2nd ed. as Les Comtes du Toulouse 1050–1250 (Fayard 1988), pp. 25–6. For a family tree of the counts of Toulouse, see Genealogy 5, above.
16 de Vic and Vaisète, vol. 3, p. 419.
18 Ibid., p. 109. Déjean comments, concerning the question of Bertran’s legitimacy, that he was probably the son of Raimond’s first wife, the daughter of the Count of Provence, but, as Raimond was twice excommunicated for consanguinity involved in this union, his son was not strictly legitimate.
for Guillaume IX of Aquitaine to attack Toulouse, where he remained in possession until he also left on crusade in 1101. Bertran was then able to reinstall himself as count, retaining the title until 1108, when he himself departed for the Holy Land, leaving Toulouse to his younger half-brother, Alfons, then a small child. In 1113, Guillaume IX captured the town again and Alfons spent the next six years in exile in Castile. He was only able to retake Toulouse after Guillaume had left to fight against the Muslims in Spain in 1119.

Although de Vic and Vaissète were at pains to deny that successive counts of Toulouse in the early twelfth century had more pressing interests elsewhere, pointing to Guillaume of Aquitaine’s attempt to recapture Toulouse in 1120 as evidence of his concern for the town, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the dispute over Toulouse originated, not so much from confusion over rights of succession, but because members of the family, on both sides, were more interested in crusading than they were in their lands in Languedoc. Raimond IV and Bertran seem to have been happy to leave Toulouse in the barely adequate keeping of a minor while they pursued richer holdings in the Holy Land: Bertran became Count of Tripoli and he also inherited substantial holdings in Provence through his wife, Helene of Burgundy. This was to change with Alfons Jourdain: although he maintained his family’s crusading tradition by participating in the Second Crusade in 1147, he did not put his interests abroad above his possession of the county of Toulouse. His interests in Languedoc were Alfons Jourdain’s first priority and the effects of this increased interest in Toulouse were twofold: Alfons Jourdain and his successors were more secure as counts of Toulouse than their predecessors had been, and the warfare in Languedoc broadened and intensified.

War over the disputed succession to Toulouse continued intermittently throughout the twelfth century: in 1142, Louis VII (1137–1180) mounted an unsuccessful expedition to Toulouse in defence of his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine’s (d.1204) claims to the county, and Henry II of England (1154–1189) followed his example in 1159. The war between Toulouse and the Plantagenets continued in the 1180s: Raimond V supported the rebellion of Henry the Young King against Henry II in 1183 and was also at war with Richard, Duke of Aquitaine (d.1199) in 1188. In the opinion of Benjamin, a treaty made in 1186 between Alfons of Aragon and Richard indicates that the disputes between Aquitaine and Toulouse in the 1180s were directly connected to the disputed succession of a century before: ‘we are

19 Ibid., p. 110.
20 Ibid., p. 112.
21 Alfons Jourdain’s mother, Raimond IV’s third wife, Elvire, was the illegitimate daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile.
25 Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, p. 436.
28 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, pp. 102–3.
dealing here, not with a mere case of border warfare, but with a revival of the Poitevin claim to the entire county of Toulouse.  

Alfons Jourdain and his successors were not only involved in hostilities with the rival claimants to Toulouse but, throughout the twelfth century, were also embroiled in a long-lasting conflict with the counts of Barcelona which began in another disputed succession, this time to Provence. The succession to Provence had been in dispute since the death without issue of Bernard, Count of Provence, in 1094, upon which both Raimond IV de St Gilles and Gilbert de Millau claimed the county. Gilbert seems to have been largely successful in his claim, but the situation was exacerbated by his failure to produce any children except daughters: Douce, who was married in 1112 to Ramon Berenguer III, Count of Barcelona (1096–1131), Stephanie, married to Raimond de Baux, and Faydide, who was married to Alfons Jourdain of Toulouse, also in around 1112. Due to the occupation of Toulouse by Guillaume of Aquitaine, the war over Provence did not begin until 1119, by which time Ramon Berenguer had established a capital at Arles. The initial hostilities were concluded in 1125, when Provence was divided between the combatants: Ramon Berenguer was to have the county of Provence, and Alfons Jourdain the Marquisate, on the eastern bank of the Rhône, but this settlement proved to be only temporary.

By 1132, Berenguer Ramon, the younger brother of Ramon Berenguer III and Count of Provence (d.1144), was at war with Alfons Jourdain over the succession to the neighbouring county of Melgueil, a war which also involved Guillaume VI de Montpellier in support of the Count of Provence. In this conflict Alfons Jourdain was defeated, and peace was made in 1135, when Berenguer Ramon married Beatrice, the heiress of Melgueil. The war over the succession to Provence broke out again in 1142 as a result of the involvement of Raimond de Baux, who was married to the youngest daughter of Gilbert de Millau, and dragged on after the death of Berenguer Ramon in 1144 until finally ended by Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona (1131–1162), acting for his young nephew, Ramon Berenguer I of Provence, in 1156.

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30 Benjamin, ‘Forty Years’ War’, p. 278. This conclusion is based on the clause in the treaty in which Richard surrendered any claims to lands held by Roger II to Alfons of Aragon. Benjamin suggests the possibility that these claims related to a submission which Raymond Tencavel may have made to Henry II in 1159. However, there is no evidence for any submission which would have given Henry any rights of overlordship over the Tencavel. It seems more likely that these claims relate to the claims of the counts of Toulouse over Béziers, as Alfons was in the process of extending his own influence over that county. This clause only makes sense if seen in the context of Richard’s claims to Toulouse and must be taken as evidence that he intended a major campaign.

31 The genealogical details of the different claims to Provence are given most clearly by d’Aladai i de Vinyals, ‘Domination’, p. 357, and Higounet, ‘Grand chapitre’, p. 315, and see the genealogies at the front of this book.

32 Busquet, Histoire de Provence, p. 139.


34 Busquet, Histoire de Provence, p. 140.


The unexpected death of Ramon Berenguer I without male heirs in 1166 sparked a new round of the conflict over Provence, although the Count of Toulouse now faced a more powerful enemy in Alfons II of Aragon, the son of Ramon Berenguer IV and Petronilla, the heiress of Aragon. Raimond V of Toulouse acted quickly, first to betroth his son, Raimond, to Ramon Berenguer’s daughter, Douce, and then to marry the widow, Richildis, himself.37 The resulting conflict lasted until 1176, renewed in 1172 by the marriage of Ermessinde, the heiress of Melgueil, to Raimond V’s son.38 Hostilities broke out again in 1180,39 exacerbated by the death of Ramon Berenguer II of Provence, possibly murdered by Raimond V, in 1181,40 and the war was only ended by the deaths of its protagonists in the 1190s: Raimond V in 1194, and Alfons of Aragon in 1196.

Although the wars between Toulouse and Aquitaine and Toulouse and Barcelona had their origins in disputes over the succession to specific lands – Toulouse and Provence – the effects of these conflicts were felt throughout the Midi. The counts of Barcelona showed themselves willing to participate in any league against the counts of Toulouse, whether it directly involved the county of Provence or not. In 1159 Ramon Berenguer IV took part in Henry II’s campaign against Toulouse,41 presum-ably on the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and the continued willingness of the counts of Barcelona to support the Plantagenets against the counts of Toulouse can be seen in Alfons II’s 1186 treaty with Richard of Aquitaine.42

The violence of Languedoc in the twelfth century is clearly apparent. The records of the viscounts of Béziers and Carcassonne contain requests for fortification of various villages and small towns throughout the two viscounties from 1138 on43 and there was a similar process occurring in the churches of the region: the cathedrals of Béziers and Agde and the major Benedictine abbey of La Grasse, near Narbonne, had all received permission to fortify themselves by the early thirteenth century.44 To outsiders, Languedoc by the late twelfth century was a terrible, lawless place. In
1181, for example, Stephen de Tournai, Abbot of St Genevieve de Paris (d.1203), wrote of his journey through Languedoc as ‘A journey undertaken, because of the danger from rivers, from bandits and from Coterills, Basculs and Aragonese, more with dread than with joy’. For ‘dread’ Stephen used the Latin word *lethalis*, a pun on Lethe, the river of the underworld, stressing the impression that Languedoc was as fearful as Hell itself. He went on to describe the horrors which he had seen in the deserted country through which he travelled, referring to ‘the burning of towns and the ruin of homes, where there was nothing safe, nothing relaxing, nothing which did not endanger health and threaten our lives’.

The ‘burning of towns and the ruin of homes’ is usually interpreted as a reference to the ongoing warfare between the counts of Toulouse and Barcelona, but in his list of the special dangers of the journey, however, Stephen left the merely descriptive to give a clue as to what he considered to be the real source of the endemic disorder. According to Stephen, the party in which he was travelling had to deal not only with usual risks to the medieval traveller such as rivers and bandits, but also with ‘Coterills, Basculs and Aragonese’; that is, mercenaries. Mercenaries were employed by most if not all of the major lords of Languedoc and were regarded as causing a significant social problem. In 1179, for example, the Count of Toulouse, the Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne and the Viscount of Nîmes were all excommunicated by the Archbishop of Narbonne for this and other crimes, following the decree of the Third Lateran Council of the Church in the same year, which had laid down excommunication as the penalty for employing them.

Mercenaries are an external cause of disorder, even when employed by Languedoc lords; the terms used to describe them by contemporaries stress their essential foreignness. However, it is possible to see twelfth-century Languedoc society as inherently disordered, the effects described by Stephen de Tournai created by the exercise of noble authority which was not so much accepted by the people as legitimate as imposed on them by force. It is clear from related sources that the ‘bad customs’ of the nobility denounced by the Peace of God movement in the early eleventh century were still common in the middle of the twelfth around the Mediterranean. In 1149, for example, a Catalonian lord called Bertrand de Castellet left his brothers in his will ‘all the loot from my four bad boxes’ and in 1202 Catalan lords resisting the imposition of a more effective form of royal power over

45 Stephen began his career as Abbot of St Euvertius d’Orléans before becoming Abbot of St Genevieve. He was elected Bishop of Tournai in 1192, having been proposed for the position by Guillaume, Archbishop of Rheims: *GC*, vol. 3, pp. 213–14.

46 Bouquet 19, p. 283: ‘periculis flaminium, periculis latronum, periculis ex Coterillis, Basculis, Aragonensibus, via suspecta magis sit lethalis quam laeta’.

47 Ibid.: ‘Sequor Albanum episcopum [Henry of Marcy, Cardinal Bishop of Albano] . . . per incendia villarum et ruinas domorum, ubi nihil tutum, nihil quietum, nihil quod non minuetur saluti et non insidietur vitae.’


the nobility, maintained their rights to ‘maltreat their peasants and take things away from them’. In Languedoc, the operation of the guidagia and pedagia tolls by the nobility demonstrates a similarly lawless attitude. These tolls, frowned on by the Church, appear to have been charges for the provision of armed guards along particular stretches of road and were frequently sold off by the higher nobility to castellans living along the route. They seem to have operated much like a protection racket, suggesting that some of the Languedoc nobility gained what was probably a substantial part of their income through what was essentially banditry.

Some of the twelfth-century fortification may well have been intended to resist this behaviour, particularly when it was carried out by the residents of the new fortification themselves and not their putative overlord. The deputation from the village of Moussoulens to Roger II in 1175 is an example. The men of Moussoulens who came to Carcassonne to request permission to move their village to a nearby hill and fortify it appear to have been the representatives of the villages as opposed to their aristocratic overlords; there are seventeen named participants listed in the charter before ‘other good men of Moussoulens’ and nine of those are referred to only by their first name, a mark of low status. The fortification does not appear to have been carried out at Roger’s instigation, although it is possible to interpret the fact that the Moussoulens villagers sought his permission as a sign that they wanted to enlist his support against the local nobles who would resent the peasants taking steps to protect themselves. Moussoulens would not have been the only settlement in Languedoc to enjoy a peripatetic existence, as Limoux appears also to have done in the early thirteenth century, again apparently at the instigation of the citizens themselves.

The conflict between the counts of Toulouse and Barcelona should not be viewed so much as a destabilising influence on Languedoc society as an intensification of the endemic violence on which much Occitan lordship was based. While in this sense it was probably less important for the development of Languedoc society in this period than it has been portrayed, it nevertheless provided many of the noble families with unrivalled opportunities for asserting their independence from comital dominance. By playing one off against the other, they could ensure that they were dominated by neither and that they would always have a ready and powerful ally to defend them against the claims of the other. It was a game played with particular skill by powerful lords of the western Languedoc such as the counts of Foix and the counts of Comminges, both of whom were able to remain independent into the thirteenth century, and with lesser degrees of success by the viscounts of Narbonne, the Guillems de Montpellier and the Tencavel.

51 Ibid., p. 33.
52 Raimond VI of Toulouse, for example, confessed to charging ‘unowed’ guidagia and pedagia in his surrender to the papal legate Milo in June 1209, the implication of the concentration on these particular tolls being that all guidagia was unowed: PL 216, 92.
53 CT, fols. 156–156v, and Doat 168, fols. 107–8.
Throughout the twelfth century, the Trencavel held lands from both the counts of Toulouse and the counts of Barcelona. Their earliest viscounties of Albi and Nîmes were both part of the lands of the counts of Toulouse; shortly before his death in c.1060, Pons, Count of Toulouse, donated Albi and half of Nîmes to his third wife, Marjorie.57 Following the death of Roger, Count of Carcassonne, in 1067, Raimond Bernard Trencavel acquired Béziers and Carcassonne in right of his wife, Ermengarde, the count’s sister.58 Of these, Béziers was also part of the lands of the counts of Toulouse: when Guillem IV and Raimond de St Gilles divided the lands of their father, Pons of Toulouse, between them in 1079, Béziers was included as one of the counties to be held by Raimond.59 Bernard Aton IV therefore held the majority of his lands from the Count of Toulouse and his sons, Raimond Trencavel, Viscount of Béziers, and Bernard Aton, Viscount of Nîmes, had no other overlord, while the eldest son, Roger, Viscount of Carcassonne and Albi, also held half his lands from Toulouse.60

In the first half of the twelfth century, the Trencavel were more inclined to support the counts of Toulouse than the counts of Barcelona, being involved in an alliance against Toulouse on only two occasions. In 1114, Bernard Aton supported Guillem of Aquitaine as Count of Toulouse,61 but was allied again with Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse by 1120.62 This alliance was continued in 1125, when Bernard Aton swore to help Alfons Jourdain against both the Duke of Aquitaine and the Count of Barcelona,63 and was renewed with Bernard Aton’s sons after the former’s death in 1130.64 In 1142, Roger I was involved in a league with Guillem de Montpellier to expel the Count of Toulouse from Narbonne, but the hostilities were ended by the settlement made at the end of that year, when Alfons Jourdain agreed to withdraw from Narbonne.65 Raimond Trencavel appears to have enjoyed particularly good relations with Alfons Jourdain while Viscount of Béziers; not only is there no evidence of disputes between the two, but Raimond accompanied Alfons Jourdain to the Holy Land on the Second Crusade in 1147, remaining there with him until Alfons died.66

These largely cordial relations between the counts of Toulouse and the Trencavel, with the Trencavel generally supporting the St Gilles against both Barcelona and Aquitaine, were to undergo a profound change in the second half of the twelfth century, with distinct hostility between the Trencavel and Toulouse dating from Raimond V of Toulouse’s imprisonment of Raimond Trencavel in 1153.67
precise reasons for Raimond’s imprisonment are unclear, but the memory of this experience plainly rankled. According to William of Newburgh, Raimond Trencavel joined Henry II’s 1159 campaign against Toulouse ‘remembering with hatred the Count, into whose hands, they say, he had previously fallen’.68

This set the pattern for relations between the Trencavel and the counts of Toulouse for the rest of the twelfth century: the only significant alliance between the two was in 1171, when Roger II agreed to support Raimond V and received Raimond’s daughter Adelaide for his wife as a reward.69 Roger also received the castle of Minerve, to be held directly from Louis VII,70 but, despite these inducements, the alliance was not long-lasting. In 1177 Roger joined an alliance with Guilm VIII de Montpellier to keep the Count of Toulouse out of Narbonne71 and in 1179 was again allied with Alfonso II, King of Aragon and Count of Barcelona.72

Raimond Roger certainly seems to have regarded Raimond VI of Toulouse as his enemy. Despite the cessation of hostilities between Barcelona and Toulouse at the end of the twelfth century and the fact that Raimond VI was Raimond Roger’s uncle, the two appear to have been on bad terms throughout Raimond Roger’s rule as Viscount of Carcassonne and Béziers. Allied against Raimond VI with the Count of Foix in 1201,73 Raimond Roger was discourteous in 120474 and refused his uncle’s offer of co-operation against the crusade in 1209.75

The enmity between the counts of Toulouse and the Trencavel developed at a period when the influence of the counts of Barcelona over the Trencavel was increasing. Relations between the Trencavel and the counts of Barcelona in the first half of the twelfth century had been largely hostile, as demonstrated for example by Ramon Berenguer’s attack on Carcassonne in 1112,76 but in 1150 an agreement between Ramon Berenguer IV and Raimond Trencavel signalled a profound change.77 In the same year, Raimond Trencavel, Viscount of Béziers since 1130, had inherited the viscounties of Carcassonne, Albi and the Razès from his brother Roger I, who had died without issue.78 Raimond’s accession gave Ramon Berenguer an opportunity to extend his influence over Carcassonne; in November, Raimond Trencavel swore to be faithful to him and to hold Carcassonne, Laurac and the Razès from Barcelona.79

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69 CT, fols. 199v–200; Doat 168, fols. 21–2. Raimond V and Raimond Trencavel had had a brief alliance in 1163, when Raimond V returned the ransom paid in 1154, and had made a treaty of mutual assistance: Doat 167, fols. 241–4 and 245–246v.
70 de Vic and Vaisseté, vol. 8, p. 279.
71 CT, fols. 242–242v.
73 Doat 169, fols. 94–95v.
75 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 9, pp. 26–7.
78 CT, fols. 1–1v. Raimond inherited Béziers under the terms of his father’s will (CT, fols. 173–173v; Doat 166, fols. 151–152v), and his succession to Carcassonne had been agreed as early as 1132 (see CT, fols. 140v–141; Doat 166, fols. 165–166v and 168–169v).
This was repeated between Alfons II of Aragon and Raimond Trencavel’s son, Roger II, in 1179, when Roger admitted that, when he was young and could not tell right from wrong, he had been led astray by evil counsel, had allied himself with Alfons’s enemies, and had gone to war against his lord and friend. He was now prepared to honour the agreement made by their fathers (in 1150) and would forfeit Carcassonne and Limoux if he reneged on it again. At the same time, Roger agreed that Minerve, which he had been given to hold from Louis VII in 1171, at the time of his marriage to Adelaide de Toulouse, Louis’ niece, would now be held from Aragon.

The terms of the 1179 alliance indicate that the influence of the counts of Barcelona had extended over the Trencavel in the years since the original agreement in 1150. Although the 1179 agreement repeated the terms of the 1150 treaty, the provisions for forfeiture of the lands if Roger reneged and the lengthy apology which Roger had to make for his previous alliance with Toulouse, suggest that Alfons II now expected a greater degree of loyalty from, and influence over, the Trencavel than had been enjoyed by his predecessors. No Trencavel had previously been expected to apologise for changing sides and the terms of the 1179 agreement meant that Roger would now have far less scope for independent action and involvement in the politics of the Languedoc than he had had hitherto.

This trend continued in the 1180s with Alfons of Aragon extending his influence, not merely over Carcassonne, but over all the Trencavel lands. That Alfons aspired to control Béziers and Albi, as well as Carcassonne and the Razès, through his domination of Roger II, is indicated by the treaty, dated 1186 by Benjamin, which he made with Richard, Duke of Aquitaine. This treaty appears to have been made on account of a new campaign being planned by Richard against Toulouse and reveals that Alfons was prepared to lend his support, but was also concerned to protect his own interests in Languedoc. According to a clause in this treaty, Richard waived all claims which he might have to the Trencavel lands: 'I, Richard Count of Poitou, give, concede, confirm, surrender and waive all claim on behalf of me and my successors, freely and absolutely without any retention or exaction, all the land... which Roger of Béziers and Trencavel his brother have and hold at any time in any way, either by them or by their predecessors to you, Alfons King of Aragon and your successors.'

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80 Ibid., pp. 329–30: ‘Cum puer essem nec valens inter bonum et malum, utile et inutile decernere, consilio quorundam meorum pravorum hominum seductus, annui et concessi Raimundo, comiti Tolose, Carcassonam et alias terras quas de volvis teneo et tenere debeo et omnes mei antecessores de vestris tenuerunt: et insuper, guerra et aliis iniuriis vos, dominum et amicum meum, irritavi. Praeterea, prudenciorum usus concilio, me deliquesse recognoscens, veni in potestate vestra, et placuit simplici pietati vestre hoc totum et tantum nefas michi condonare.’
82 de Vic and Vaissèe, vol. 8, p. 279.
84 Benjamin, ‘Forty Years’ War’, pp. 283–5.
85 Ibid., p. 283: ‘Ego Ricardus comes Pictavie dono concedo et confirmo, diffinio et evacuo per me et per successores meos, libere et absolute et sine retencione et exactione, volvis domino Ildefonso regi Aragonum et vestris hereditibus totam illam terram. . .quam et que omnia Rotgerius de Biterris et Trencavel frater eius quocumque modo aliquo tempore habuerunt et tenuerunt per se ipsos et per antecessores suos.’
As Benjamin comments, ‘the problem lies in deciding what claims Richard might have had in this area’.86 As discussed, Benjamin concludes that this treaty should be taken as evidence of Richard’s resumption of the Aquitainian claim to Toulouse and that the claims over the Trencavel lands referred to in the treaty were those of the counts of Toulouse. It is unlikely that these included any claim to Carcassonne. While Carcassonne was included in Guillem IV of Toulouse’s portion when he and his brother Raimond de St Gilles divided their father’s lands between them in 1079,87 there is no later indication that the counts of Toulouse regarded Carcassonne as their property in the same way that they did Béziers or Albi. Given that Richard is unlikely to have been reviving a forgotten and nebulous eleventh-century claim to Carcassonne, there are two possible occasions in the twelfth century when the Trencavel could have provided the counts of Toulouse with a claim to be overlords of Carcassonne.

The first of these would have been in 1154, when Raimond Trencavel was released from his imprisonment by Raimond V of Toulouse.88 The imprisonment was probably related to the alliance which Raimond Trencavel had made with Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona, in 1150;89 the spell in prison may well have been intended to convince Raimond that a continued alliance with Toulouse was, after all, in his best interests. It would have been natural for Raimond V to require Raimond Trencavel’s full submission as a condition of his release, but he does not appear to have done so. William of Newburgh, commenting on the conditions of Raimond’s release, stated that he was ‘robbed of the greater part of his lands’,90 but transactions made by Raimond Trencavel involving lands in all the counties which came under his lordship between 1155 and 1157 indicate that he had not, in fact, been deprived of any major possessions.91 It is more probable that William of Newburgh was guilty of hyperbole than that Raimond V had gained Carcassonne through his imprisonment of Raimond Trencavel. This conclusion is supported by the agreement made in 1158 between Raimond Trencavel and Ramon Berenguer IV, which does not give any indication that Raimond V had been recognised as overlord of Carcassonne in 1154.92

If the Count of Toulouse did not acquire a claim to Carcassonne in 1154, the only other likely opportunity for him to have done so before 1186 was in 1171. The 1171 agreement between Roger II and Raimond V of Toulouse,93 rescinded by Roger’s surrender to Alfons in 1179,94 clearly represented an important change in Roger’s policy towards the counts of Toulouse and counts of Barcelona, but it did not confer any of Roger’s lands on Raimond. The 1171 agreement was a treaty of mutual

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86 Benjamin, ‘Forty Years’ War’, p. 278.
88 CT, fols. 214–15.
92 CT, fols. 189v–190; Doat 167, fols. 191–193v.
93 CT, fols. 199v–200.
assistance, not a land transaction; Raimond V gained the valuable support of the Trencavel but he did not gain a claim to Carcassonne. The clause dealing with the Trencavel in the 1186 treaty between Alfonso of Aragon and Richard of Aquitaine must therefore have been dealing, not with Carcassonne and the Razès, those parts of the Trencavel lands for which the counts of Barcelona had been recognised as overlords at least as far back as 1150, but with Béziers and Albi, the lands which the Trencavel held from the counts of Toulouse. This treaty is indicative, not only of Richard’s ambitions over Toulouse, but also of Alfonso’s increasing influence over the Trencavel. The extent to which Alfonso had been able to increase his dominance over Roger II is also indicated by Alfonso’s will, made shortly before his death in 1196, in which he left to his eldest son, Pere, not only the kingdom of Aragon and the county of Barcelona, but also lands in Languedoc ‘from the city of Béziers to the bridge of Aspe [probably near Perpignan]’.

By the time of Raimond Roger’s inheritance of the viscounties of Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and the Razès in 1194, his lands, with the possible exception of Albi, in which the viscount had in any case little actual power, were all held under the influence of the King of Aragon. In the past, his ancestors had been able to choose between the combatants in the ongoing wars between the counts of Toulouse and the counts of Barcelona. For Raimond Roger, an alliance with the Count of Toulouse against the King of Aragon would not have been a possibility: Pere’s influence on occasions such as the arrangement of Raimond Roger’s marriage to Agnes, the daughter of Guillem VIII de Montpellier, in 1203 suggests his personal dominance over the viscount, probably resulting from both Raimond Roger’s youth and the extensions of Aragonese power over the Trencavel of the 1180s.

This personal influence over the behaviour and decisions of Raimond Roger was not the limit of Pere’s authority over the Trencavel lands. The extent of Pere of Aragon’s involvement in Trencavel administration, particularly at Carcassonne, is indicated by the tribunal which he established in Carcassonne in February 1204 to deal with heresy. In so doing, Pere was acting as the sole ruler of Carcassonne, and Raimond Roger appears to have been absent from town at the time of the tribunal. This may have been the period of his 1204 visit to the Count of Toulouse. The extent to which his authority was replaced by that of Pere of Aragon in this case is striking; rather than the distant overlord whom the Trencavel were obliged to support in war, Pere seems to have been actively ruling in Carcassonne, at least in 1204. The 1204 tribunal reveals how far Raimond Roger was subject to Pere of

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95 Ibid., pp. 328–9.
97 This was not a very prestigious match for Raimond Roger, despite his family’s long-standing connections with the Guillens de Montpellier, because of Guillem’s failure to have the children of his second union legitimised: PL 214, 1130; Reg. Innocenz III, vol. 5, pp. 249–55. The match arranged for his eldest son, Guillem IX, with Tiburge de Murviel had been abandoned as a result of this and it therefore speaks much for Pere’s influence over Raimond Roger that he could be persuaded to go ahead with a match disdained by less important families than the Trencavel: Duhamel-Amado, ‘Les Guillens de Montpellier’, pp. 13–28.
98 Compane, Études historiques, p. 227.
Aragon, even over the internal rule of his lands. He was a long way from the independence which had been possible for his predecessors.

There has been considerable debate over whether the increased influence in Languedoc enjoyed by Pere of Aragon should be seen as a result of Aragonese imperialism in the Midi or as merely fortuitous. The latter view was stated particularly strongly by d’Abadal i de Vinyals, who was of the opinion that the Pyrenees formed not only a geographical but also a natural political barrier, which prevented the counts of Barcelona from taking anything other than a secondary interest in the Midi.100 This view has been echoed by Bisson, who, although he was prepared to credit Alfons II in particular with an interest in northern expansion, maintained the view that this expansion was merely the result of Alfons’s concern about, and desire to protect himself from, the alliance of the Capetians and the counts of Toulouse.101 Bisson did not see Alfons as harbouring any major ambitions towards the Trencavel lands.102

However, there is by no means a consensus on this issue among historians. Higounet, for example, in his work on the counts of Toulouse and the counts of Barcelona, viewed the extensions of Alfons’s power into Béarn, Bigorre and Roussillon in the 1170s as part of his campaign to extend his dominion in the Midi and described him as ‘the emperor of the Pyrenees’.103 This opinion on Alfons’s foreign policy is supported by Cabestany, who, whilst acknowledging the difficulties which the geography of the area presented for the establishment of a kingdom spanning the Pyrenees, was nevertheless able to state that Alfons’s son, Pere II, shaped his policies to achieve ‘the intention of his father, Alfons II, to create a Pyrenean kingdom’.104 Ventura also emphasised the importance of the French Mediterranean coast to the rulers of Catalonia and commented that the Pyrenees were not a boundary, but a spinal column, uniting rather than dividing Occitania and Catalonia.105 Shideler, who did not go so far as to ascribe explicitly imperial ambitions to Alfons, also agreed with Higounet and Cabestany in viewing the interests of the house of Barcelona in Languedoc, Provence and the Pyrenees as of paramount importance for Ramon Berenguer IV, Alfons II and Pere II. The focus of attention did not, according to Shideler, shift away from the north-east until after the defeat of Pere II at Muret in 1213.106

The debate over the ambitions, or otherwise, of Barcelona and Aragon in the later twelfth century in the Midi is of particular importance for an understanding of the history of the Trencavel because it is chiefly the attitude of Ramon Berenguer and Alfons towards their lands which is in dispute. That Alfons wished to expand his

100 d’Abadal i de Vinyals, ‘Domination’, p. 315.
101 This interest in northern expansion is demonstrated by Alfons’s attempts to absorb Urgel, Roussillon and lower Pallars into the administration of Catalonia, and the extension of Aragonese influence into Béarn, Bigorre and Foix: Bisson, ‘Prelude to Power’, pp. 23–40, at p. 25; idem, Medieval Crown, p. 37.
102 Bisson, Medieval Crown, p. 38.
104 Cabestany, ‘Alfons el Cast’, in Els Primers Comtes-Reis, ed, Schramm et al., p. 73.
105 Ventura, Alfons el Cast, p. 269.
106 Shideler, Medieval Catalan Noble Family, p. 115.
influence into the counties bordering Catalonia in the Pyrenees, such as Bigorre, Béarn and Roussillon is not in doubt: any ruler of Catalonia would want to create buffers for his northern borders. The question of whether Alfons was interested in adding lands in Languedoc to his kingdom is, in essence, the question of his attitude towards the Trencavel.

In considering the Occitanian policy of the counts of Barcelona, it is useful to compare the attitudes of Ramon Berenguer IV and Alfons towards the Trencavel lands with their views on Aragonese holdings in Provence. This comparison reveals that their attitudes to these lands were very different, despite their geographical proximity. The county of Provence seems always to have been considered as a suitable holding for a younger son, and successive count-kings went to some lengths to ensure that it was held separately from their lands in Catalonia. This can be contrasted with the arrangements made for Carcassonne, as this was almost always regarded as part of the lands of the elder son, to be held in conjunction with Barcelona and Aragon. That Alfons II, for example, did not separate Carcassonne from Aragon and Barcelona as he did Provence, and, indeed, went to some lengths to prevent Carcassonne and Provence from being held together, indicates that his attitudes towards these two counties were very different. Carcassonne may well have formed the basis for his ambitions in Languedoc.

In his attitude towards the Midi, Alfons is presented by Bisson as the passive recipient of allies, rather than as the aggressor. This is particularly apparent in the discussion of Alfons’s policies in the 1170s, in which Bisson stated that Alfons countered the defection of ‘most of the magnates of lower Occitania, including the Viscount of Béziers’ by 1176, by cultivating alliances along the Pyrenees. The implication is that the identities of his Occitan allies were unimportant to Alfons as long as he had some to protect his borders from the Capetians and the counts of Toulouse. This was also implied by d’Abadal i de Vinyals, who reasoned that Carcassonne and the Razès were not mentioned in the peace agreement made

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107 Provence was left by Ramon Berenguer III to his younger son, Berenguer Ramon: *LFM*, vol. 1, pp. 527–32. After the county returned to the older branch of the family on the death of Berenguer Ramon’s son, Ramon Berenguer, in 1166, Alfons II made repeated attempts to separate its rule from that of Aragon. It was held until 1181 by Alfons’s younger brother Ramon Berenguer, and then by another brother, Sancho, and was left in Alfons’s will to his younger son, Alfons: *CDLIAC*, vol. 4, pp. 395–411, at p. 408.

108 See for example the wills of Ramon Berenguer III (*LFM*, vol. 1, pp. 527–32) and Alfons II (*CDLIAC*, vol. 4, pp. 395–411). Bisson has stated that Alfons left the county of the Razès to his younger son Alfons, but this statement seems to have been based on a misreading of the Latin name *Rodonensi*. This is unlikely to refer to the Razès, which are usually given as *Redeni* in Latin: Bisson, *Medieval Crown*, p. 38.

109 Carcassonne was left to the second son, Ramon Berenguer, in the will of Ramon Berenguer IV of 1162: *LFM*, vol. 2, pp. 333–4. However, after Alfons had made Ramon Berenguer Count of Provence, he required the return of Carcassonne to be ruled by himself alone: Mahul, vol. 5, p. 275.


111 Ibid., p. 37.
between Alfons and Raimond V of Toulouse in 1176 because Alfons was content to allow Raimond to enjoy them in exchange for security in Provence.

The corollary of this view is that the alliances made between the Trencavel and Aragon in the second half of the twelfth century must have been made at the Trencavel’s behest; in particular, it has been suggested that Roger II initiated his surrender to Aragon in 1179. The arguments put forward for this, however, are unconvincing. Both Bisson and d’Abadal i de Vinyals have suggested that Roger sought this alliance because he was alarmed by recent efforts being made against heresy in Languedoc. In Bisson’s opinion, this alarm was due to the proclamations of the Third Lateran Council of 1179; according to d’Abadal i de Vinyals, it was the embassy of Henry de Marcy, Abbot of Clairvaux (1177–79), to Languedoc in 1178 which necessitated Roger’s return to the Aragonese fold.

It is indeed probable that the 1178 legation greatly exacerbated the hostility between Roger and Raimond of Toulouse, but this is not necessarily an argument for Roger’s seeking an Aragonese alliance in 1179. Henry de Marcy was sent to the Midi in response to the appeal made by Raimond V of Toulouse to the Cistercian General Chapter of September 1177. In this appeal, Raimond described evocatively the havoc which heresy was wreaking in Languedoc, where it was so widespread that ‘it has divided husband and wife, father and son, mother and daughter in law’. He stated that he was not strong enough to deal with the heretics on his own and that his efforts to do so were hampered, chiefly, by ‘the most notable of my subjects, [who] have been seduced and have dragged with them a large proportion of the people’. This may have been a veiled reference to Roger II and, when Roger was excommunicated by Henry de Marcy in 1178 for imprisoning the

112 de Vic and Vaissède, vol. 6, p. 68.
116 PL 204, 235–40; PL 190, 1119–24; Roger of Howden, vol. 2, pp. 150–66. Roger’s account, based on the letters sent by Henry de Marcy and Cardinal Pietro of St Chrysogono, is the only chronicle account for this legation; the local chronicler Gaufred de Vigeois mentions Henry de Marcy’s return to Languedoc in 1181, but omits the 1178 legation: Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 448–9. The 1181 legation is also recounted in the Chronicon Clarevallensis, PL 185, 1250. On the mission, see Kienzle, ‘Henry of Clairvaux’, pp. 63–87.
118 de Vic and Vaissède, vol. 6, pp. 77–8.
119 Ibid., p. 77: ‘qu’elle a mis la division entre le mari et la femme, le père et le fils, la belle-mère et la belle-fille’. This may be a reference to Matthew 10:35: ‘For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law’, ‘Veni enim separare hominem adversus patrem suum, et filiam adversus matrem suam, et nurum adversus socrum suam.’ This description of the heretics’ activities in terms of Christ’s is an emphasis of their reversal of the natural order.
120 de Vic and Vaissède, vol. 6, p. 78: ‘les plus notables des mes sujets ont été séduits et ont entraîné avec eux une grande partie de peuple’.
Bishop of Albi,\textsuperscript{121} it is possible that he laid the blame at Raimond of Toulouse’s door.

However, Roger’s alliance with Toulouse had been broken in 1177, when he had allied himself against the count with Guillem de Montpellier.\textsuperscript{122} This suggests Roger’s confidence in his ability to survive independent of both Toulouse and Aragon and it is unlikely that Henry of Marcy’s legation, damaging as it was for him, would have changed his opinion. It is all too easy for historians to apply the lessons of the Albigensian crusade to the politics of twelfth-century Languedoc, but the idea that Roger’s response to the 1178 legation, or even to the Third Lateran Council, would have been to seek military protection through an alliance with Aragon is anachronistic. Until the advent of the Albigensian crusade, no lord in Languedoc would have dreamed that his indifference to heresy would have elicited such a strong military response. In any case, had Roger viewed the 1178 legation as posing a substantial political and military threat, the alliance to seek would not have been with Aragon, but with Toulouse: it was the Count of Toulouse, after all, who was so in favour with the Cistercians. Alfons of Aragon proved no help to Roger when Henry de Marcy returned in 1181 to attack Lavaur, a town nominally under Trencavel rule, nor did Roger contemplate a military response: his wife, Adelaide, immediately handed the town over to the legate.\textsuperscript{123} Roger’s problems with heresy in the 1170s and 1180s cannot be regarded as credible motivation for him to volunteer to surrender to Aragon in 1179.

The Trencavel submission to Aragonese dominance in 1179 seems in fact to have been a response to sophisticated pressure exerted on them by Alfons. In c.1175, Alfons II commissioned an inquiry into the claim of the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon to the counties of both Carcassonne and the Razès.\textsuperscript{124} The report of the results of the inquiry traced the origins of the claim to the eleventh century, to the events of 1067 and 1068.\textsuperscript{125} The death without issue of Count Roger of Carcassonne in 1067 began a dispute between his mother, Rangarde, and his sisters and their husbands,\textsuperscript{126} over the possession of his lands, a dispute which was not ended until the surrender of Rangarde in 1070.\textsuperscript{127} Raimond Bernard Trencavel and Ermengarde were able to secure their possession of Carcassonne and the entire lands of the

\textsuperscript{121} Roger of Howden, vol. 2, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{122} CT, fols. 242–242v.
\textsuperscript{123} Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 448–9.
\textsuperscript{124} de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 31–3.
\textsuperscript{125} On the Trencavel and the counts of Barcelona in the eleventh century, see Cheyette, ‘Sale’, pp. 826–64; Duhamel-Amado, \textit{Gene\`se des lignages}, pp. 190–1; Débax, \textit{Féodalité languedocienne}, pp. 58–71.
\textsuperscript{126} Ermengarde was married to Raimond Bernard Trencavel, and Adelaide to Guillem, Count of Cerdaigne. Guillem was the particular ally of Rangarde against Raimond Bernard. His marriage to Adelaide in 1067 was probably arranged by Rangarde to gain his support; de Vic and Vaïssète, vol. 5, pp. 554–6. Garsinde is usually thought to have been married to Raimond, Viscount of Narbonne, who seems to have played no part in the inheritance dispute. The lack of involvement in the dispute by Garsinde and Raimond may be explained by the theory that Garsinde was in fact dead before 1068 and that the Garsinde married to Raimond of Narbonne was a member of the family of the lords of Anduze: Stasser, ‘La maison vicecomtale de Narbonne’, pp. 502–3.
\textsuperscript{127} de Vic and Vaïssète, vol. 5, p. 576.
counts by entering into an agreement with Ramon Berenguer I, Count of Barcelona (1035–1076), by which they obtained his assistance in retaining the county against the rival claimants.128

According to the compilers of the report for Alfons II, the death of the last count gave Ramon Berenguer I complete possession of both Carcassonne and the Razès, which he then passed to his heirs. The Trencavel involvement in Carcassonne was the result of opportunism by Bernard Aton IV during the minority of Ramon Berenguer III, as the disorder in all the lands of the counts of Barcelona provided Bernard Aton with the means to weasel his way into Carcassonne through an offer of protection to the citizens. Despite his original promise to cede Carcassonne to Ramon Berenguer on his majority, Bernard Aton remained in the town until expelled by force and then attempted to retake it with the assistance of the Count of Toulouse. The matter was finally settled with an agreement that Bernard Aton should hold Carcassonne from the counts of Barcelona.129

The account given in the report of the Barcelonese acquisition of Carcassonne differs widely from that which can be gleaned from the charters recording the 1068 transaction, not least because it ignores the involvement of the Trencavel until the early twelfth century.130 However, its conclusion that the counts of Barcelona acquired rights of overlordship to Carcassonne in 1068 and that the Trencavel held it as their subordinates appears on the surface to correspond with the agreement set out by the 1068 charters. The charters seem to record a transaction in which Ramon Berenguer I agreed to help Ermengarde and Raimond Bernard acquire Carcassonne and the Razès in return for their undertaking that they would hold both counties Ambitious, Brave and Lacking in Political Sense

128 This transaction was recorded over five different charters. (1) 1 March 1068: Ramon Berenguer and Almodis gave Raimond Bernard and Ermengarde Carcassonne and Razès: CT fols. 82v–83; Doat 165, fols. 177–178v, printed in de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 557–8. (2) 2 March 1068: Raimond Bernard and Ermengarde gave Carcassonne to Ramon Berenguer and Almodis and received 1100 ounces of gold: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, perg. Ramon Berenguer I, no. 393, printed in de Vic and Vaissète, pp. 548–9, and LFM, vol. 2, pp. 301–2. (3) 2 March 1068: a similar sale of the Razès for 1000 ounces of gold: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, perg. Alfonso I, no. 275, doc. 1, printed in de Vic and Vaissète, pp. 549–51, and LFM, vol. 2, pp. 300–1. (4) 2 March 1068: Ramon Berenguer and Almodis gave to Raimond Bernard and Ermengarde all the lands in Carcassonne which were held from the Count of Toulouse, to be held from the Count of Barcelona: CT, fols. 188v–189v, printed in de Vic and Vaissète, pp. 551–4, and LFM, vol. 2, pp. 322–4. (5) 2 March 1068: the parties agreed that one side would succeed the other should they die without issue: no manuscript copy survives, but printed in de Vic and Vaissète, pp. 558–60, and LFM, vol. 2, pp. 299–300. Two charters, nos. 1 and 5, are dated 1068 and the others 1067. 1068 is the most probable date for this transaction, as Count Roger of Carcassonne was still alive in March 1067. The most likely explanation for the difference in dating between the charters is a confusion amongst the scribes as to which dating system should be used. Since the Catalan year began on 25 March, this would explain the difference in dates between the charters: Cheyette, ‘Sale’, p. 836, note 27. Débax, however, argues that the transaction did take place over two years: Féodalité languedociene, pp. 59–63.


130 The campaign of Ramon Berenguer III against Carcassonne described in the report is probably a reference to Barcelonese attempts to take Carcassonne in the early twelfth century: in 1107, 150 citizens of Carcassonne promised to make war on Bernard Aton on behalf of the Count of Barcelona (Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 251–2), and Ramon Berenguer III made his own attack on Carcassonne in 1112 (CT, fols. 210v–211).
from him. It is possible, however, that the rights thus acquired were less comprehen-
sive and more nebulous than a cursory examination of the charters might suggest.

That the charters recording this transaction should not be taken at face value is
suggested by the treatment and the subsequent fates of Couffolens and Cazilhac, two
strategic castles situated to the south-west of Carcassonne. Both of these castles were
specifically included in the donation by Raimond Bernard of the county of
Carcassonne to Ramon Berenguer, in return for 1100 ounces of gold,131 and were
just as specifically excluded from the charter in which Ramon Berenguer gave
Carcassonne and its surrounding county back to Raimond Bernard, to be held from
Barcelona.132 Couffolens and Cazilhac were the only lands to be excepted from the
return of Carcassonne to Raimond Bernard and this move to keep them in his own
hands indicates a genuine desire to control Carcassonne on the part of Ramon
Berenguer. Their strategic positions and their retention solely in the hands of the
Count of Barcelona would have facilitated the extension of comital power over the
Trencavel.

Couffolens and Cazilhac did not, however, become the property of the counts of
Barcelona. Both were in the hands of Ermengarde, wife of Raimond Bernard and
regent for her son Bernard Aton, in 1085 when she made a donation to the church
of S. Maria and S. Saviour in Carcassonne which included all the tithes which she
held in both Couffolens133 and Cazilhac.134 In 1101, Ermengarde and Bernard Aton
made a further donation involving Cazilhac, this time to the abbey of La Grasse135
and in 1110 Bernard Aton recognised that he held Cazilhac and Couffolens from the
abbey.136 Cazilhac then passed to Guillem Comes, one of the most prominent
members of Bernard Aton’s court, as in 1150 his sons recognised that they held it
jointly from the Trencavel and La Grasse.137 Couffolens also remained in the posses-
sion of the Trencavel throughout the twelfth century; Roger II is referred to as the
lord of the castle as late as 1175.138

The grants of Cazilhac made by Ermengarde to La Grasse suggest that, not only
had Couffolens and Cazilhac remained in Trencavel hands, but that there was no
awareness that they should not have done so. Ermengarde seems to have regarded
Cazilhac as entirely her possession and it was certainly presented as such to La

131 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 548–9: ‘Item evacuamus et diffinimus et guiiriimus vo-
bis praescriptis comiti et comitissae ipsum castrum de Confolent et ipsum villam cum suo terminio,
et ipsum villam de Casiliag cum suo terminio et cum suis pertinentiis’.
infantes nostri guiiriimus et diffinimus et evacuamus ad Raymundum Bernardi vicecomitam, et
ad uxorem eius Ermengardem, et ad infantes eorum, totos ipsos castros, et totas ipsas villas cum
suis totis terminis et ecclesiis et totos ipsos alodes, quos Petrus Raymundus comes et Rogarius
filius eius habuerunt et tenuerunt et homines per illos in comitatu Carcassensi aut Redensi et in
comitatu Tolosano, et in comitatu Narbonensi et Menerbensi, excepto ipso Castro de Confolent
cum suo terminio et excepta ipsa villa de Casiliag cum suo terminio.’
133 Mahul, vol. 5, p. 175.
134 Ibid., p. 155.
137 Mahul, vol. 1, p. 252; Doat 167, fols. 50–1.
138 CT, fols. 197–197v.
Grasse: ‘[I give] the whole town of Cazilhac, which is in the county of Carcassonne . . . I give it thus as a free alod and without any reservation.’139 This donation reveals absolutely no awareness of the terms of the 1068 agreements, a remarkable omission since Ermengarde herself had been one of the signatories to them. Ermengarde must have been aware of past and rival claims to Carcassonne and of their potential effect on the present.

Her donation of Cazilhac to La Grasse was accompanied by the confirmation of her younger sister Adelaide, Countess of Cerdagne, who gave up everything in Cazilhac which their father ‘the aforementioned Count Pierre Raimond had, either as a free alod, or which any man or woman held from him’.140 Adelaide had surrendered all her rights to the county of Carcassonne to Ramon Berenguer in 1070141 and her confirmation of Ermengarde’s grant may have been part of a peace-making process between the two sisters through a joint connection to La Grasse.142 In looking back to the 1068 agreements for her donation of Cazilhac, however, Ermengarde might be expected to have either involved the Count of Barcelona in her donation or to have given some recognition of comital claims to the town. The most likely explanation for this omission seems to be that she was aware of no such claim.

That the apparently explicit provisions for the transfer of Couffolens and Cazilhac from the Trencavel to the Count of Barcelona were not carried out raises questions over whether Carcassonne and Razès similarly were perceived to have changed hands. Ramon Berenguer I employed the title ‘Count of Carcassonne’ in 1071, in a treaty with Guillem, Count of Toulouse,143 but not subsequently: it was not a title generally adopted by Ramon Berenguer and his successors. The 1068 agreements may not have transmitted to the counts of Barcelona any permanent claim to authority in Carcassonne. Cheyette has highlighted how a wide range of transactions apparently exclusively concerned with land actually had a more important social function,144 and it is possible that this was the case in 1068. The agreements clearly formed an alliance between Ramon Berenguer and Raimond Bernard, but the lands listed in the charters may have functioned as guarantees of good faith without any transfer of property actually taking place.

Whatever the extent of the claim to Carcassonne given to the counts of Barcelona in 1068, it does not appear to have figured prominently in the minds of Ramon Berenguer’s descendants before the 1170s. There is no suggestion in any subsequent agreements with the Trencavel before 1179 that the count-kings considered that they had any claim to Carcassonne which dated back to the last Count of Carcassonne. The strength of Barcelonese rights to Carcassonne was considerably

142 On the potential social role of such donations, see Rosenwein, *To be the Neighbour of St Peter*, esp. pp. 120–2.
143 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 588–90.
144 Cheyette, ‘Sale’, p. 848.
overstated in the c.1175 report and it is possible that it recorded, not so much an unbiased inquiry into recent history, but an attempt to pressurise the Trencavel into returning to their alliance with Barcelona-Aragon.

The differences between the report’s account of the 1068 transactions and contemporary records have been described as mistakes, attributable to the sheer length of time elapsed between the inquiry and the events it attempted to describe. However, the version given by the authors of the report seems too favourable to Aragon to be accidental. The report appears to have reconstructed the past in Alfonso’s favour and contains passages which could be read as implicit threats to Roger. This is particularly true of the passages dealing with the attitude of the citizens of Carcassonne to the Trencavel’s defiance of the Count of Barcelona: ‘The men of Carcassonne refused to put up with such wrongdoing and injustice, and by common agreement they handed over themselves and their city to your grandfather, as they ought to have done.’ The point, of course, was that the Trencavel had been expelled once from Carcassonne with the connivance of the Count of Barcelona and that what had happened once could most certainly happen again.

The compilation of the report and the way in which it altered and adapted the past to argue that the Trencavel had no claim to Carcassonne beyond what was allowed them by the generosity of the count-kings demonstrates Alfonso’s determination to limit the chances of any continuing alliance between Roger and Toulouse in the 1170s and hence his eagerness to achieve domination over the Trencavel. Far from being the willing participants in their alliances with Barcelona and Aragon, the Trencavel appear to have been as resistant to domination by the count-kings as the count-kings were insistent. It has been suggested that Raimond Trencavel’s submission to Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona, in 1150 was made under duress. According to the seventeenth-century Spanish writer Geronimo Zurita, Ramon Berenguer went to Narbonne with an army to intimidate Raimond Trencavel into submission, although there is no surviving contemporary confirmation for this incident. Raimond Trencavel does, however, appear to have

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145 Ibid., p. 832: ‘This anonymous memory of events long past is questionable on its face. Its author’s partisanship is obvious . . . he does not remember correctly the name of the last Count of Carcassonne . . . He does not know the terms of Ramon-Berenguer’s testament or of the events that followed the assassination of Cap d’Estopes [Ramon Berenguer II – the nickname means ‘towhead’]. And he ignores completely Ermengard and Raimond Bernard, the parents of Viscount Bernard Ato, though they and not their son were the people most deeply involved with Ramon Berenguer.’

146 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, p. 32: ‘Homines vero Carcassonae videntes tantam injuriam et injustiam, noluerunt diu sustinere, et communicato consilio reddiderunt se et civitatem domino suo avo vestro, sicut facere debuerunt.’


149 However, it is likely that Ramon Berenguer did have a number of troops in the Midi in the autumn of 1150, as in September 1150 he was at Arles, completing the treaty with Raimond de Baux which ended a phase of the ongoing succession dispute over Provence, a mission on which it would have been appropriate for him to be accompanied by a sizeable entourage: Busquet, Histoire de Provence, p. 141.
been unwilling to relinquish his alliance with Toulouse, as a clause agreeing non-aggression towards Toulouse was included in the mutual assistance treaty which he made with Ermengarde of Narbonne in 1151. This lack of enmity towards Raimond Trencavel in 1151 suggests that he may not have been the instigator of his switch to alliance with Barcelona in the previous year and lends credence to the idea that he may have been coerced. Roger II seems to have continued his father’s resistance to alliance with Aragon: far from seeking the 1179 alliance, Roger appears to have been consistently opposed to the possibility of increased Aragonese dominance, even as a price for protection from Toulouse. He may also have sought to limit the extent of Aragonese control over the Trencavel.

In 1185, Roger proposed the adoption of Alfons, the younger son of Alfons of Aragon, to be his heir and to inherit all his lands. As Roger stated in the adoption charter, addressed to Alfons II: ‘I give to your son Alfons . . . all my lands, and I take him in good faith as my adoptive son, and I give to him all my lands . . . for the possession and use of your son and mine.’ The record of the adoption is dated to June 1185, which makes Roger’s motivation particularly incomprehensible, placing it after the conception, if not the birth, of his own son and eventual heir, Raimond Roger.

It is possible that Roger’s primary aim was not to provide himself with an heir in default of a son of his own, but to extricate the Trencavel lands from Aragonese dominance. The only condition which Roger imposed in the document was that the son adopted by Roger should inherit the Aragonese lands in Provence: ‘However, in such a way that your son shall have all that you have . . . in the whole of Provence . . . and so, as it is written, I, the said Roger . . . give all my aforesaid lands and holdings to your son Alfons.’

Given that the Provençal lands belonging to the family of the counts of Barcelona were almost invariably held separately from Barcelona and Aragon, this condition amounted to the requirement that the Trencavel lands would become part of the county of Provence, rather than part of the lands of the King of Aragon in the Midi. The effect of this adoption would therefore have been to place the Trencavel at one remove from the kings of Aragon, at the price of holding their lands from the far less powerful counts of Provence.

Roger made considerable preparations for the adoption of Alfons’s son as his heir, including his presentation of guarantees to the church of Béziers that the bishop would retain secular jurisdiction over his lands under the new administration. This grant was remembered by the church of Béziers on Roger’s death in 1194, when Bertrand de Saissac confirmed the arrangement, referring to the occasion when Roger ‘wanted to give everything he owned in Béziers to Alfons, King of

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152 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 384: ‘dono filio tuo nomine Ildefonso . . . scilicet omnes meas terras, et bono animo illam per meum filium adoptivum suscipio. Et dono illi omnes meos terras . . . ad bonum et utilitatem vestri filii, atque nostri.’
154 Doat 62, fols. 322–325v.
The implication of this comment is that, although the bishop was not prepared to relinquish his claims to the secular jurisdiction that Roger had promised him in 1185, Roger had not in fact given all he had in Béziers to Alfons and that the adoption had not gone ahead. The inheritance of Aragon and the Trencavel lands on the deaths of Roger II and Alfons II were also unaffected by any adoption arrangement. Raimond Roger succeeded from his father, Roger, in 1194 without any mention of the rights of Alfons and in 1196 Alfons the Younger received Provence, Millau, Gevaudan but not Carcassonne under the terms of his father’s will.

The adoption of Alfons by Roger II was not to Aragonese advantage. Alfons’s influence over the Trencavel by the 1180s was such that he would have exercised more control over Carcassonne by leaving it in Trencavel hands than by making it part of Provence. The adoption is most likely to have originated from Roger, whose awareness that the proposal was much more in his interests than it was in Alfons’s is suggested by the lengthy preamble to the document, in which he outlined all the help which he had received from Alfons and acknowledged that, if it had not been for Alfons, he would have lost his lands completely. The abortive adoption of Alfons the Younger by Roger II seems to indicate the Trencavel reluctance to become further dominated by the count-kings, while its abandonment suggests Aragonese interest in retaining the Trencavel lands as part of an Aragonese empire in the Midi.

Despite such resistance from the Trencavel, by Roger’s death in 1194 Aragonese control over Carcassonne was greater than at any other time in the twelfth century. The view of the Trencavel as principally connected to Toulouse has enabled historians to conclude that the Trencavel were isolated by the peace between Toulouse and Aragon in the early thirteenth century. However, for Raimond Roger, it was the influence of Pere II that determined his role in the politics of Languedoc. Far from an over-mighty dependant of Toulouse, when the crusaders attacked Béziers and Carcassonne in the summer of 1209, they faced a subject of the King of Aragon.

155 Ibid., fol. 322.
157 CDICA, vol. 4, p. 408.
158 de Vic and Vaissete, vol. 8, p. 384: ‘bona fide confiteor et recognosco quod vos dominus meus Ildefonsus Dei gratia rex Aragonisium, comes Barchinonensis, marchio Provinciae, me protegasti et defendisti a meis inimicis. Et reveracognosco quod ab omni terra mea excine datus esse, nisi mihi subveniretis, cum vestris hominibus, cum vestris magnis donis, quae mihi et meis, in magnis necessitatibus donastis, et omnes guerras meas fecistis, quibus terram meam restituui.’ This probably refers to the rebellion in Béziers in 1167, in which Roger’s father, Raimond Trencavel, was killed, and following which Roger only regained possession of the town with Aragonese assistance.
159 Duhamel-Amado, Genèse des lignages, p. 203.
The dominance that Pere of Aragon had achieved over the Trencavel by the early thirteenth century made his response to the crusaders’ attack on Béziers and Carcassonne particularly crucial. Pere might have been expected to save Raimond Roger from his fate; in the event, the king’s reaction to the crusaders allowed them to seize the Trencavel lands. The ambivalence of Pere’s position when it came to the crusade’s treatment of the Trencavel reflects his general attitude towards the crusade. On the one hand, he fully supported its aims,1 having been an enthusiastic prosecutor of heresy in Aragon itself2 and a somewhat more circumspect one in Languedoc.3 He showed himself to have a keen appreciation of the merits of crusading against enemies of the faith in Europe, as demonstrated by his participation in the campaign against the Muslims in Spain in 1212, which culminated in the victory of Las Navas de Tolosa,4 and also enjoyed cordial relations with the leader of the crusade, Arnauld Amaury, which dated back to the latter’s abbacy at Poblet.

On the other hand, however, he was clearly concerned that the crusaders could threaten his own lands in Languedoc. In September 1209 Innocent III wrote to Berenguer, Archbishop of Narbonne and Pere, Bishop of Barcelona, giving them permission to excommunicate anyone who took any lands belonging to the King of Aragon.5 The timing of this letter, written at the time of the first campaign undertaken by the crusaders against Pere’s towns of Béziers and Carcassonne, indicates that it was sent in response to Pere’s concerns that his property in Languedoc would not be safe from the depredations of the crusaders. It suggests that Pere was not a

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1 Bisson, Medieval Crown, p. 49; Ventura, Pere el Catolic, pp. 193–6, Bagué, ‘Pere el Catolic’; Schramm et al., Els Primers Comtes-Reis, pp. 103–145, p. at 123.


3 For example the trial of heretics at Carcassonne in 1204: Compayre, Études historiques, p. 227.


5 Mansilla, p. 429.
wholehearted supporter of the crusade even at its inception; although he approved of its aims, he was inevitably concerned that those very laudable goals might be to the detriment of his power in Languedoc.

Pere’s concerns about the incursions of the crusade into his own lands in Languedoc were to lead eventually to his military support for the counts of Toulouse, Foix and Comminges and to his defeat and death at the Battle of Muret in 1213. He was prepared to intervene on behalf of lords of Languedoc against the crusade when it was in his own interests to do so and he also attempted to assist Raimond Roger. According to Guillaume de Tudela, the King of Aragon arrived at Carcassonne shortly after the commencement of the siege and attempted to mediate acceptable terms of surrender for Raimond Roger and the defenders: ‘He [Pere] spoke with the French and with the Abbot of Cîteaux, who was called to them there, as nothing could be done without his agreement. The King told them the conversation which he had had in the town with the Viscount and spoke as forcefully as he could on his behalf, and on behalf of the lords who were found with him.’

Pere’s efforts at Carcassonne were unsuccessful because of the intransigence of the crusaders, who were only prepared to concede that Raimond Roger and eleven companions could leave the town with only the possessions they had on them, conditions to which the viscount would never agree. Guillaume de Tudela, as a supporter of both the crusade and the King of Aragon, was careful in this passage not to imply any opposition to the crusade on Pere’s part and indicated that when his efforts at mediation had failed, he abandoned Raimond Roger to his fate: ‘Struck with a great grief at the turn which events had taken, the King mounted his horse. The King Pere of Aragon returned grieved and with a heavy heart because he had not been able to save them. He went home to Aragon, angry and sorrowful.’

Guillaume remained unwilling to suggest that Pere was anything but a supporter of the crusade, offering extensive justifications for his military opposition in 1213, including that the crusaders were devastating the entire Toulousan and that Pere’s obligations were to assist his brother-in-law: ‘“And because he is my brother in law”’

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7 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 29, pp. 74–5: ‘am los Frances parla e al l’abat de Cistel, que hom i apela, que senes son cossell ja re fait no i aura. lo reis lor a retrait aiso que parlat a lai dins ab lo vescomte, e fort los ne preia de lui, aitant co pot, e dels baros que i a’.
8 Ibid. Pere commented that the Viscount’s agreement to these conditions would be as likely as a donkey flying in the sky: ‘Aiso s’acabara aisi tot co us azes sus el cel volara.’ Raimond Roger’s response was that he would rather his men were skinned alive: ‘E el, cant o auzi, ditz c’ans les laichara trastotz vius escorgar e el eis s’auchira.’
9 Guillaume was particularly attached to Pere of Aragon’s sister Eleanor, who was married to Count Raimond VI of Toulouse, calling her ‘the best and fairest Queen in Christian or heathen lands or anywhere in the whole wide world’, Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 15, pp. 46–7: ‘La plus bona reina, tota la belazor que sia en crestias ni en la paianor, ni tant can lo mons dura tro en Terra Major.’
10 Ibid., 29–30, pp. 74–5: ‘Lo reis monta el caval, ab gran dolor que n’a car aisi s’es camjatz. Lo reis Peyr d’Arago felos s’en es tornatz, e pesa l’en son cor car no ls a deliuratz. En Aragon s’en torna, corrosos e iratz.’
he said “because he married my sister, and because I have married my other sister to his son, I have to help them against the evil men who wish to disinherit them.”

Inevitably, the picture presented by Pierre des Vaux is rather different. Pierre suggests that Pere of Aragon remained interested in the fortunes of Raimond Trencavel after the dispossession and death of Raimond Roger in November 1209, reporting a rumour apparently circulating in the ex-Trencavel lands, that the king was encouraging resistance to the crusade and to Simon de Montfort: ‘The King . . . ordered, in addition, as it was said, secretly to the nobles throughout all the Viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne who were resisting the Holy Church and our Count, that they should not co-operate with the Count, promising that he would attack the Count with them.’ This is connected by Pierre des Vaux to Pere’s unwillingness to accept Simon de Montfort as his vassal for Carcassonne, as the same passage also related how, in late 1209, the king had spent two weeks with Simon de Montfort on route to Montpellier, but remained adamant that he would not receive his homage. In late 1209, therefore, Pere was evidently prepared to maintain the rights of the Trencavel against the crusaders and he appears to have continued in his support for the Trencavel after the death of Raimond Roger in November 1209, refusing to accept Simon de Montfort as Viscount of Carcassonne until the Council of Narbonne in January 1211. This delay suggests his hope that he would not have to accept him at all.

Pere’s interest in the fate of Raimond Trencavel did not end with his acceptance of Simon de Montfort’s homage for Carcassonne: in 1213 his envoys were repeating to Innocent III the rumour that Raimond Roger had been murdered. In his passage dealing with the siege of Carcassonne, Guillaume de Tudela stressed the close and cordial relationship between Pere and Raimond Roger and had Pere state that there was nothing he would not do to help the Trencavel: ‘I am very distressed and very sorry for you, because of the affection in which I hold you, and I know of nothing, save for the risk of great dishonour, which I would not do to help

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11 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 131, pp. 290–1: ‘E car es mos cunhatzeam as o respozea, e eu ai a so filh l’autra sor maridea irai lor ajudar d’esta gent malaurea que ls vol dezeretar.’ This is also given as Pere’s motivation by the Gesta Comitum Barchinonensium, which was similarly concerned to present the King in as good a light as possible, GCB, p. 53: ‘Verum cum comus praedictus insurrisisset contra comitem Tolosanum et sorores dicti domini Petri et eos excheredaret . . . cessare nollet a dammo et inuria dicti comitis Tolosani ista solum et non alia ratione venit in auxilium dicti comitis Tolosani et sororum suarum apud castrum de Murel . . . Dominus rex Petrus venerat ad partes illas cause praestandi auxilium tantum suis sororibus, ut praedicitur, et comiti Tolosano, non ut daret auxilium alciui infidelii seu christianae fidei inimico.’
12 Pierre, xxvi, 576: ‘rex . . . mandavit insuper, sicut dictum fuit secreto nobilibus per totum vicecomitatum Bitierrense et Carcassonensem, qui adhuc resistebant sanctae Ecclesiae et comiti nostro, ne vicerentur comite, promittens eis quod ipse cum eis comitem impugnaret.’
13 Ibid.: ‘Cum autem die quodam vellet ire ad Montempessulanum, et non auderet, misit ad comitem et mandavit ei ut obviaret ei apud Narbonam. Quo facto, ad Montempessulanum rex et comes noster pariter devenerunt: ubi cum dies quindecim fecissent, non potuit inclinari rex ad hoc, ut recipideret hominum comitem saepdictum.’
15 PL 216, 739–40, at 739: ‘unde vicecomes praedictus terram perdedit auxilio destitutus, ad ultimum miserabiliter interfectus’.
Despite this sentiment, however, the help which Pere was prepared to give to the Trencavel was clearly limited, in a way in which his later support, crucially, for the Count of Toulouse was not.

Pere’s first tactic for both Raimond Roger and the Count of Toulouse was to attempt to negotiate on their behalf with the crusaders. His response to the incursions made by the crusaders into the lands of Raimond VI of Toulouse in 1212 was an appeal to the papacy, leading to the convention of the Council of Lavaur in January 1213 to which Pere appealed at length on behalf of the counts of Toulouse, Foix and Comminges and for Gaston de Béarn. He also attempted to secure the intercession of Philip Augustus through the dispatch of the Bishop of Barcelona to Paris in early 1213, in the hope that he would bring pressure to bear on Simon de Montfort. These tactics were similar to those which he employed in 1209 on behalf of Raimond Roger, with their emphasis on negotiation with the crusaders to benefit the lords of Languedoc whom they were attacking. However, in 1213 Pere was prepared to respond with military force to the failure of his efforts to resolve the situation peacefully, as he was not in 1209.

It is a feature of Pere of Aragon’s efforts on behalf of Raimond Roger and Raimond Trencavel II between 1209 and 1211 that he did not go beyond the bounds of negotiation, even when the negotiations were unsuccessful. This is true even of the attempts by Pere recounted by Pierre des Vaux to incite rebellion by the lords of Carcassonne and Béziers. Although the rumour recounted by Pierre des Vaux said that the king would assist any rebellious lords against Simon de Montfort, it seems likely that any Aragonese help would have been limited. Pere’s attempt to encourage the lords of Carcassonne to resist Simon on behalf of Raimond Roger appears rather to have been a way of securing military help for the Trencavel without having to commit his own forces; a provision of military resistance at one remove.

Pere’s unwillingness to be involved in military opposition to the crusade is entirely understandable in the context of his policies towards both heresy and the papacy. Throughout his reign, Pere demonstrated the importance which he placed on papal support, most clearly through his journey to Rome in November 1204. On this occasion, he became a papal vassal, receiving the crown of Aragon from the Pope and agreeing to hold his kingdoms from him. This was not an unprecedented step for a King of Aragon. Sancho Ramirez I (1063–1094) had submitted to the Pope in 1068, agreeing to pay yearly tribute to him, a step which was repeated in 1095 by his son.

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16 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 28, pp. 72–3: ‘Tant soi per vos iratz e m’en pren gran pitansa, per l’amor qu’ieu vos port ni per la conoisansa, non es res qu’ieu vos fes senes gran malestansa.’
17 PL 216, 739–40.
18 Pierre des Vaux, lxxvi, 648–53.
19 Smith, ‘Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia’, p. 158.
20 Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 576.
Pere I (1094–1104). However, it was a step which was taken by Pere II in the face of considerable opposition from his Aragonese subjects and demonstrates the extent to which he valued good relations with the papacy.

Pere’s attempts to negotiate in favour of the lords of Languedoc did not initially endanger these good relations, particularly as Innocent appears to have shared some of his concerns about the behaviour of his legates and the crusaders by 1213. However, it was made very clear to Pere by the legates following the Council of Lavaur that he was dangerously close to declaring himself an enemy of the crusade and putting himself beyond the pale of the Church. As Arnauld Amaury wrote to the king in February 1213: ‘We have understood, not without great perturbation and disturbance of mind, that you have decided to take under your protection the city of Toulouse [and the lands of the counts of Toulouse, Foix, Comminges and Gaston de Béarn] . . . if this is true, not only your spiritual safety but the honour of your kingdom and your reputation could fall into disrepute . . . We hope that you will take care . . . lest you should, by associating with excommunicates and evil heretics and their supporters, incur the stigma of excommunication yourself.’

Pere’s behaviour in 1213 following this warning was very different from his actions in 1211. In 1213, the king was prepared to put the interests of the counts before his relations with the papacy, while in 1211, the interests of the Trencavel were subordinated to them. Pere’s resistance to accepting Simon de Montfort as Viscount of Carcassonne appears to have been ended by a papal command, as, according to the Gesta Comitum Barchinonensium, ‘The lord King, on the orders of the Lord Pope, to whom he was always obedient, handed Carcassonne and other castles with their appurtenances to Simon de Montfort, receiving homage and fidelity for them.’ Pere’s response to the dispossession of Raimond Roger therefore appears to have been that he would do everything in his power to help the Trencavel and uphold their rights against the crusaders, except endanger his good relations with the papacy by contravening papal wishes. This difference between Pere’s attitude to his relations with the papacy in 1211 and in 1213 can therefore account for the different

23 Colección Diplomática de Pedro I de Aragon y Navarra, ed. A. Ubieto Arleta (Zaragoza 1951), 21, p. 235.
25 Luchaire commented of Pere of Aragon from his submission to the Pope in 1204 that ‘he showed himself to be absolutely devoted to the interests of the head of the Church, his lord’: Luchaire, Royales vassal, p. 52. Pere undoubtedly hoped to increase his own prestige through his submission to the papacy; Linehan has suggested that he may have wanted to ‘steal a ceremonial march on the Kings of Castile and Léon’: P. Linehan, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford 1993), p. 570.
26 As demonstrated by his letter of January 1213 to Arnauld Amaury: PL 216, 739–40.
27 Pierre des Vaux, lxvi, 655: ‘Intelleximus non sine turbatione multa ac amaritudine animi quod civitatem Tolosae . . . dispositis in protectione ac custodia vestra recipere . . . Cum igitur haec, si vera sint non solum in salutis vestrae dispendium, sed in honoris regii ac opinionis vestrae et famae possint cedere detrimentum . . . Optamus autem quatenus tam vobis . . . dignemini providere, ne communicando excommunicatis et maledictis haereticis et fautoribus eorumdam, labem excommunicationis incurrere vse contingat.’
28 GCB, p. 53: ‘Dominus Rex, mandato Domini Papae, cui obediens fuit semper, tradidit Carcassonam et alia castra cum eorum domino Simoni comiti Montis-fortis, recepto homago et fidelitate ipsius.’
responses made by the King of Aragon to the Trencavel and to the Count of Toulouse.

It has been suggested that the essential difference for Pere of Aragon between the situation in 1209–1211 and in 1213 was the success of the crusade; that the crusaders in 1213 posed a threat to Aragonese power in Languedoc to an extent which was previously unforeseen.\textsuperscript{29} The crusaders were certainly in a much better and more threatening position in 1213 and it is possible that Simon de Montfort had been a less than satisfactory subordinate in Carcassonne.\textsuperscript{30} However, the letter in which Innocent attempted to protect Pere’s lands from the incursions of the crusaders in 1209 demonstrates that the King was not so naive as to suppose that they would not pose a threat to him even during their first campaign.\textsuperscript{31} It is not credible to suggest that the position of early 1213, when the crusade held all the lands of the Count of Toulouse save for Montauban and Toulouse itself, could not have been foreseen in 1211, when Pere accepted Simon de Montfort as Viscount of Carcassonne.\textsuperscript{32} If the king had been simply reacting to the threat posed by the crusaders to his own power in Languedoc, he would have turned to military intervention when his attempts at negotiation failed for the Trencavel.

Pere’s response to the crusade appears to have been governed by considerations other than the successes of the crusaders themselves. It has also been suggested that before 1213 the situation in Languedoc was not Pere’s first priority and that he did not have the leisure to deal with the threats to his lands in the Midi until after the resounding victory of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212.\textsuperscript{33} Given the importance that Pere and his predecessors placed on their trans-Pyrenean empire it seems unlikely that he would have looked on its dissolution with equanimity, even while preoccupied with Spanish concerns, but his acceptance of Simon de Montfort as Viscount of Carcassonne in 1211\textsuperscript{34} may have been impelled by his desire to settle matters in Languedoc to enable his participation in the Las Navas campaign.

Pere’s attitude towards the importance of his relations with the papacy may also have undergone a change between 1211 and 1213, which would have enabled him to consider military intervention on behalf of the Count of Toulouse as he would not do for the Trencavel. In January 1211, Pere still hoped that the Pope would agree to the dissolution of his marriage to Marie de Montpellier, but in June 1212 Innocent had ordered him to surrender Montpellier to his (Pere’s) brother-in-law, Guillem and judged in January 1213 that the marriage between Marie and Pere was legitimate and that they should be reconciled to each other.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{29} Sumption, \textit{Albigensian Crusade}, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{30} As indicated by Innocent’s letter of January 1213 to Simon, in which he rebuked him for his apparent refusal to give Pere his dues as overlord of Carcassonne: \textit{PL} 216, 743–4.
\textsuperscript{31} Mansilla, p. 429.
\textsuperscript{32} Pierre des Vaux, xlvii, 603–4.
\textsuperscript{33} Smith, ‘Peter II’, pp. 1059–64.
\textsuperscript{34} Pierre des Vaux, xlvii, 603–4.
\textsuperscript{35} Mansilla, pp. 533–7. On the marriage case of Pere and Marie, see J. Vincke, ‘Der Eheprozeß Peters II von Aragon’, pp. 108–89; Smith, ‘Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia’, pp. 166–94. Pere had married Marie in 1204, claiming Montpellier on her behalf from her half brother Guillem, and had one son, Jaime, born in 1208, and a daughter, Sancha, born in 1205. Pere
The end of the marriage case meant that Pere did not have to place such a high value on papal support as hitherto. This should not, however, be regarded as the entire reason for his military intervention in favour of the counts in 1213; rather, it was a factor which enabled Pere to take advantage of the possibility that, through his assistance of the counts, he could become the overlord of the entire Languedoc. The prospect of increased power for Aragon in the Midi as a result of military intervention against the crusade is raised by the anonymous troubadour poem addressed to Pere and written in 1212 or early 1213: ‘Say to him [Pere] that his strength, already so great, will be tripled if we see him gathering his rents in Carcassonne like a good king.’\(^{36}\) The writer of this poem plainly did not regard Pere as the ruler or overlord of Carcassonne under Simon de Montfort and Aragonese influence there was certainly negligible in comparison to the control which the king had exercised over Raimond Roger. However, the opportunities for Aragonese expansion in the Midi in 1213 lay not in the recapture of Carcassonne, but in the increased dominance which Pere could achieve over the lords of Languedoc to whom he gave his assistance: the counts of Toulouse, Comminges and Foix and Gaston de Béarn.\(^{36}\)

The lords of Béarn and Foix, while inheriting a considerable tradition of independence, were by the end of the twelfth century largely under the control of the kings of Aragon.\(^{37}\) However, the counts of Comminges appear to have retained some independence from the kings of Aragon into the early thirteenth century. Bernard IV, Count of Comminges, had made a recognition of Aragonese overlordship of Comminges in 1201,\(^{38}\) but does not appear to have been regarded as a full subject of Aragon even in 1213, as is suggested by the wording of Pere of Aragon’s petition to the Council of Lavaur on his behalf: ‘The King seeks and asks for him [the Count of Comminges], as if for a vassal of his [my italics], that he should be restored to his land.’\(^{39}\) This can be contrasted with the reference to Gaston de Béarn in the same petition: ‘In the same way the aforementioned King seeks on behalf of his vassal Gaston de Béarn . . .’\(^{40}\)

The counts of Comminges were clearly still independent from the kings of Aragon in early 1213,\(^{41}\) in a way that the lords of Béarn or the counts of Foix were not and the same was true for the position of the counts of Toulouse. Relations between Toulouse and Aragon had remained relatively cordial following the conclusion of hostilities in 1196, demonstrated for example by the marriage of Raimond VI of

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\(^{37}\) Bisson, *Medieval Crown*, pp. 33–4; de Mony, *Relations politiques des comtes de Foix*, vol. 1, p. 40. Gaston de Béarn was also Count of Bigorre through his marriage to the heiress Petronilla in 1196.

\(^{38}\) Higounet, *Comminges*, p. 84.

\(^{39}\) Pierre des Vaux, levii, 649: ‘petit idem rex et rogat pro eo, sicut vassallo suo, ut restituatur ad terram suam’.

\(^{40}\) Ibid.: ‘Item pro Gastone de Béarno vassallo suo petit saepedictus rex . . .’

\(^{41}\) Although the count-kings had successfully gained increased influence over them compared to the beginning of the twelfth century: see Smith, ‘Peter II’, p. 1055.
Toulouse and Eleanor of Aragon in 1204,\(^{42}\) and the betrothal of Raimond (later VII) to Pere of Aragon’s daughter Sancha in 1205.\(^{43}\) However, the counts of Toulouse remained independent from Aragon and were still the chief opponents to Aragonese expansion in the Midi until the advent of the crusaders. Pere’s intervention for the counts against the crusaders offered the opportunity for the king to change this situation to his advantage.

In January 1213 Pere of Aragon was at Toulouse with the counts of Toulouse, Foix, Comminges and Gaston de Béarn. Presumably in exchange for his forthcoming intervention against the crusaders at the Council of Lavaur, Raimond VI of Toulouse and his son Raimond (later VII) made a complete submission of themselves and their remaining lands to the king: ‘We personally hand over ourselves and the city and suburbs of Toulouse and the castle of Montauban with all their appurtenances . . . into the hands and control of you lord Pere by the Grace of God King of Aragon and Count of Barcelona.’\(^{44}\) This was followed on 27 January 1212 by similar pledges of fidelity sworn by Raimond Roger of Foix and his son Roger Bernard,\(^{45}\) Bernard of Comminges and his son Bernard\(^{46}\) and Gaston de Béarn.\(^{47}\) That these agreements effectively made Pere the overlord of Toulouse is demonstrated by a donation which he made to the Templars at Toulouse in February 1213, in which he was clearly acting as the lord of the town.\(^{48}\)

It is probable that Pere arrived at this position of potential unprecedented dominance over Languedoc through the promise of peaceful support of the counts in the negotiations with the legates, as there is no reason to suppose that Pere was anxious to attack the crusaders except as a last resort. However, acceptance of the failure of the negotiations with the papal legates in 1213 would have meant relinquishing control of both Toulouse and Comminges to Simon de Montfort. Pere was not anxious to oppose the crusade and to set himself outside the bounds of papal support, but a victory at Muret would have seen the completion of Aragonese imperial ambitions in the Midi with control of the entire Languedoc.\(^{49}\) It is not difficult to appreciate that this would have seemed a risk worth taking.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{120}\) The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade

42 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 15, pp. 46–7; Guillaume de Puylaurens, 5, pp. 46–7. Guillaume de Puylaurens dates the marriage to 1200; it is possible that the couple were betrothed then and that the marriage was not solemnised until 1204.

43 Vincke, ‘Peters II von Aragon’, p. 119. This Sancha died before she could be married to Raimond VII, who married Pere’s sister Sancha in 1213.

44 Mansilla, p. 492: ‘mittimus personaliter nos ippos et Tholosam civitatem et suburbium et villam Montisalbani cum omnibus eorum pertinentibus . . . in manu et posse vobis domino Petro Dei gratia regi Aragonum et comiti Barchinonae’.

45 Mansilla, pp. 494–5.

46 Mansilla, pp. 495–6.

47 Mansilla, pp. 496–7.


49 Higoumet, in particular, comments that Pere of Aragon in 1212/1213 was at the zenith of Aragonese power in the Midi (‘Un grand chapitre’, p. 322), and Smith also concedes that Pere could be seen as ‘Emperor of the Pyrenees’ following the submission of the Count of Toulouse to him in early 1213 (Smith, ‘Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia’, pp. 143–4).

50 This is also the reason given for Pere’s intervention against the crusade in the Chronicle of
If it is accepted that Pere of Aragon’s willingness to intervene militarily against the crusade on behalf of the Count of Toulouse was a result of the enticing possibility of the fulfilment of his imperial ambitions in the Midi, his reasons for not taking military steps on behalf of the Trencavel are made clear. Guillaume de Tudela attempted to explain the limits on the help which Pere was prepared to give Raimond Roger through the viscount’s own shortcomings as a persecutor of heretics: “Baron” he [Pere] said to him [Raimond Roger] when he had listened well, “by Jesus our Saviour, you can’t blame me for this, because I told you to banish the heretics and I advised you because there were so many in this town who held many meetings of that mad error.” Pierre des Vaux seems to approach more closely to Pere’s motivation in accepting Simon de Montfort as Viscount of Carcassonne and abandoning any support for the Trencavel. Despite the fact that Simon was likely to be a much more difficult subject than Raimond Roger had been, Pere had far too little to gain, and in 1211 far too much to lose, through continued support for the Trencavel. “The King Pere of Aragon, in whose dominions the city of Carcassonne lay, did not wish to accept the Count [Simon de Montfort] as his man, but he wanted to have Carcassonne.”

If the King of Aragon was not prepared to risk his relations with the papacy to support the Trencavel, it could be supposed that there would still have been the Trencavel’s allies and lesser lords from their viscounties to fight for them against the crusaders. The counts of Toulouse and Foix, after all, lost much of their land for periods during the crusade, but were able to regain them and apparently retain the support of many of the lords of their lands. That the Trencavel were not able to do so may not have been purely the result of Pere of Aragon’s attitude and the inconvenient fact of Raimond Roger’s imprisonment and untimely death. The lack of an effective resistance on behalf of Raimond Roger’s son may also indicate a problem with the quality of support for the Trencavel from the lords of their lands and their neighbours. For the crusade to succeed, the crusaders had not only to capture Carcassonne, but to keep it, so that it could serve as their secure base. They would not have been able to do so had there been serious opposition, and this lack suggests the presence of a weakness that they were able to exploit.

In his passage describing Raimond Roger’s death in prison, Guillaume de Tudela provides a moving account of the grief of his subjects:

The Viscount fell ill, as I believe, with dysentery, and so he had to die. But first he wished to receive communion. The Bishop of Carcassonne therefore decently gave him

Jaime I, which alleged that the people of Toulouse had come to Pere and promised him that he would become lord of the county if he would help them against the crusaders: The Chronicle of James I King of Aragon, surnamed the Conqueror (written by himself), ed. and trans. J. Forster, 2 vols. (London 1883), vol. 1, pp. 15–16. The early parts of this chronicle are notoriously unreliable, but this appears a reasonable summary of Pere’s most likely motivation.

51 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 27, pp. 70–1: ‘“Baro” so ditz lo reis, “per lo Senhor Jesus, no m’en devetz blasmar, qu’ieu vos ai defendut que casessatz eretges, e vos ai somonutz si que en esta vila en so mans plaitz tenutz d’aiesta folia erransa.”’

52 Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 576: ‘Rex Aragonensis Petrus, de cujus dominio erat civitas Carcassonae, nullo modo volebat habere accipere hominum comitis, sed volebat habere Carcassonam.’
the last rites, and he died that evening as night fell. The Count of Montfort then conducted himself in a manner befitting a courteous knight and a great lord; he displayed the body to the sight of the people of his land, so that they could come to weep and honour him. Oh, you would have heard such stirring grief from the people. The Count had him buried with a great cortege. Let God, if he has pity, care for his soul, because it was a great tragedy.53

Through his passage Guillaume de Tudela creates an impression of widespread distress and anger which seems borne out by a variety of other sources. The rumour, mentioned contemporaneously by Guillaume de Tudela54 and Innocent III55 as well as by the later chronicler Guillaume de Puylaurens,56 that the viscount was murdered is suggestive of a similar reaction and Nelli has argued that Guillem Augier’s poem, ‘A People Grieving for the Death of their Lord’ should be viewed as part of the same response to Raimond Roger’s death.57

The picture presented by these sources on the reaction to the dispossession and death of Raimond Roger is an engaging one, but may have been more literary than actual. Guillem Augier’s poem does not represent any local reaction to Raimond Roger’s death, being most likely written some years later for an Italian audience. While the rumour that the viscount was poisoned seems to have been widespread, it does not appear particularly connected with the Trencavel lands. Pope Innocent, as he made clear in his letter to Arnauld Amaury of January 1213, received his information on the rumour from the messengers of the King of Aragon58 and Guillaume de Tudela’s loyalties lay with Baldwin, the younger brother of the Count of Toulouse. It is possible that the reaction to Raimond Roger’s death described in these sources is overstatement, and cannot be taken as reflecting political support for the Trencavel against the crusade.

Following the fall of Carcassonne, the crusaders continued to meet with considerable resistance from the lords and towns of the Trencavel lands, as shown by the defiance of the lords of fortifications such as Minerve, Termes, Cabaret and Lavaur.59 Those lands conquered in the initial campaign against the Trencavel lands

53 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 40, pp. 100–1: ‘Le mals de menazo le pres adoncs, so m par, per que l covenc morir, mas anc volc cumenjar: l’avesque de Carcassona lo fe gent aordenar, e morit en apres la noit a l’avescapr. E lo coms de Montfort fe que cortes e bar, a la gent de terra lo fe el pla mostrar e que l anesso planher trastuit e honorar. Ladonzes viratz lo poble en aura voitz criadir. A gran professio fetz lo cros sosterrar. Dieus pesse de la arma, si el s’en vol pregar, car mot fo grans pechetz.’ The elaborate funeral arrangements made by Simon de Montfort for Raimond Roger are also described by the later anonymous account of the Albigensian crusade: Bouquet 19, p. 128.
54 Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 37, pp. 94–5.
55 PL 216, 739–40.
56 Guillaume de Puylaurens, vol. 1, 14, pp. 68–9.
57 Nelli, ‘Le vicomte de Béziers’, p. 303.
58 PL 216, 739.
59 Minerve fell to the crusaders in July 1210: Pierre des Vaux, xxxvii, 585–7; Guillaume de Tudela, vol. 1, 48–9, pp. 114–19. Guillem de Minerve was initially given lands in Béziers in compensation, but later reneged on his agreement with Simon de Montfort and fought for Raimond de St Gilles: Chanson, vol. 2, 167, pp. 176–7; 169, pp. 190–1. Termes surrendered after a long siege in
also proved rebellious; by Christmas 1209, out of Raimond Roger’s possessions Simon de Montfort was left with only Carcassonne itself, Fanjeaux, Saissac and Limoux under his control after ‘almost all the people of those parts, affected with the same ill will, deserted our Count’. These included the citizens of Castres and Lombers, who reneged on their submissions to Simon de Montfort in late 1209 – in Castres’ case at considerable risk to a large number of the citizens, who were being held hostage at Carcassonne. This opposition to the crusade was devoid neither of organisation nor of co-operation between different lords; as Gordon commented, ‘the events of 1209 revealed the deep solidarity among the castellans of the Carcasses, Razés and Montagne Noire.’ In one of the major attempts to co-ordinate resistance, in May 1210 some of the most powerful and independent lords of the Trencavel lands – Pierre Roger de Cabaret, Raimond de Termes, Aimery de Montréal and unnamed others – made an approach to Pere of Aragon, in which they attempted to secure royal assistance against the crusaders.

It is debatable, however, how far these efforts involved support for the Trencavel. Neither the citizens of Castres nor Lombers made any move to reinstate the Trencavel as their overlords, although at this point Raimond Trencavel II had not surrendered his claim to the Trencavel lands and his guardians were presumably still countenancing opposition to the crusade. This apparent separation between enmity for the crusade and support for the Trencavel on the part of their erstwhile subjects was also exhibited by the people of Carcassonne, following Raimond Trencavel II’s rule there between 1224 and 1226. Raimond Trencavel was made Viscount of Carcassonne by the counts of Toulouse and Foix, not by the support of his father’s subjects. Carcassonne was retaken by Raimond VII of Toulouse and Roger Bernard, Count of Foix, and Raimond Trencavel was reinstalled as viscount as Amaury de Montfort ceded all his lands to the Crown. The extent of their enthusiasm for Trencavel rule is suggested by Raimond Trencavel’s complete absence from the charter recording the surrender of the citizens of Carcassonne to


60 Pierre des Vaux, xxxii, 581: ‘Ita pari malignitatis affectu similiter omnes fere indigenae recesserunt a comite nostro.’

61 Ibid., xxxi, 580: ‘quidam de potentioribus de Castris tenebantur obsides Carcassonae’.

62 Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, p. 169. Lords from Cabaret, for example, assisted the defenders of Termes: Pierre des Vaux, xl, 590; Guillaume de Tudela, ed. and trans. Martin-Chabot, vol. 1, 54, pp. 126–9. The expectation of this sort of co-operation is demonstrated by Pierre des Vaux’s account of the siege of Hautpoul, during which a knight from Cabaret in the crusade army was shot at as a traitor by the defenders: Pierre des Vaux, li, 630–1. The traitor, Jourdain de Cabaret, eventually died in Raimond VII’s prison at Toulouse in 1228, after he had been captured by Olivier de Termes: Peal, ‘Olivier de Termes’, pp. 109–29, at p. 112.

63 Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 384.

64 Raimond Trencavel II surrendered to Simon de Montfort on 11 June 1210: Baluze 81, fol. 25; Doat 75, fols. 16–18.

65 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, p. 574.

66 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, p. 574.
Louis VIII in June 1226. The charter states that the castle of Carcassonne was being held by Roger Bernard, Count of Foix and formerly Raimond Trencavel’s guardian, an occupation which the citizens plainly regarded with disfavour, but no mention was made of the viscount and the citizens were not required to abjure future Trencavel support.67

The attitude of Pierre Roger de Cabaret and his companions appears to have been similar. Although not explicitly recognised as such in modern studies of the crusade,68 the approach of the lords of Cabaret, Termes and Montréal to Pere of Aragon was most likely a response to the king’s earlier call for a rebellion by the lords of Carcassonne against Simon de Montfort,69 a call which can be viewed as an attempt to uphold the rights of Raimond Trencavel. The failure of the parties to reach agreement, according to Pierre des Vaux because the lords would not undertake to hand their castles over to royal control,70 did not prevent their opposition to the crusade. It only prevented a rebellion against Simon de Montfort in favour of the Trencavel, behind which Pere of Aragon and not the lords of Cabaret, Termes and Montréal would have been the driving force.

The literary accounts of the response to the death of the viscount focus on the grief and anger of the Trencavel’s subjects, but do not exclude the existence of particular Trencavel supporters. Raimond Roger was survived by two adult male relations: Raimond, the younger brother of Raimond Trencavel II’s grandfather Roger II, and Bernard Aton VI, Roger II’s first cousin who was Viscount of Nîmes and Albi. Neither of these appears to have given any support to the claims of Raimond Trencavel II; Raimond died some time after 1211, and Bernard Aton surrendered Nîmes and Agde to Simon de Montfort in 1214.71 Raimond Trencavel II was in fact most closely associated in his youth with the counts of Foix: Raimond Roger72 and Roger Bernard, who was his guardian in 1224.73 It is unlikely that Raimond Roger of Foix accompanied Raimond Trencavel to Minerve in June 1210, as the witness list for the surrender includes only crusaders and clerics, which suggests that Raimond Trencavel’s entourage was not high status,74 but it is reasonable,

68 See for example the comments on the meeting of these lords with Pere of Aragon by Sibly and Sibly: Guillaume de Puylaurens, trans. Sibly and Sibly, p. 81, note 21.
69 Pierre des Vaux, xxvi, 576.
70 Pierre des Vaux, xxxvi, 584: ‘Rex autem statim ut sic accesserunt ad eum, voluit ut traderent ei munitionem castri Cabareti . . . Consilio igitur inter se habito, praecliti milites rogarunt iterum regem ut intraret Montem-regalem, et ipsi facerent ei sicut promiserant, quia rex nullo modo voluit intrare, nisi prins facerent ei quod volebat: quod cum facere nohissent, unusquisque ipsorum cum confusione a loco colloqui recessit.’
72 Raimond Roger of Foix’s mother was Cecile, the elder half-sister of Roger II, Raimond Trencavel’s grandfather. She married Roger Bernard, Count of Foix, in 1151.
73 For example in various acts which Roger Bernard enacted on Raimond’s behalf in 1224: Doat 169, fol. 255; de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 808–9; ‘ego Rogerius Bernardi, comes Fuxi, custos Trencavelli vicecomitis et terre sue’, He is also called the guardian of Raimond Trencavel by Guillaume de Puylaurens: ed. and trans. Martin-Chabot, vol. 1, 32, pp. 120–1.
74 Baluze 81, fol. 25; Doat 75, fols. 16–18.
despite the dearth of information before 1224, to suppose that Raimond Trencavel was brought up by his Foix kinsmen.

Raimond Roger of Foix had been a particularly close ally of the Viscount of Carcassonne before the crusade, being made his heir in 1201 in default of a son of his own as part of a new alliance against the Count of Toulouse. The connection with Raimond Trencavel could also have proved profitable for the counts. The counts of Foix had harboured ambitions for Carcassonne since the late eleventh century and were able to gain substantial influence over Carcassonne during Raimond Trencavel’s minority following the capture of the town by Roger Bernard and Raimond VII de St Gilles in 1224. Support for Raimond Trencavel related to the particular preoccupations of the counts of Foix, although its significance before 1224 can be overstated in view of their inaction on his behalf before that date.

Despite Raimond Trencavel’s connections with Foix, however, the figure to emerge from the literary sources as a Trencavel supporter was not from Foix at all, but a connection from a completely different side of the family. The account of the Fourth Lateran Council given by the anonymous continuator of the Chanson gives Raimond de Roquefeuil, the nephew of Guillem VIII de Montpellier and hence first cousin to Agnes, Raimond Trencavel II’s mother, a prominent position in support of the Trencavel:

Raimond de Roquefeuil cried out in a great voice: “Oh true Lord Pope, have mercy and pity on an orphan child, driven very young into exile, son of the honoured Viscount who was killed by the crusaders and by Simon de Montfort, who had taken charge of him. He was martyred wrongfully and shamefully . . . yet you do not have in your court a cardinal abbot who can profess a better Christian faith than that which he had. Since you have killed the father and dispossessed the son of his inheritance, lord, give him back his land, out of regard for your own honour. If you refuse to give it to him, may God pay you by adding the weight of his sins to your own soul! If you have not returned the land quickly and in short order, I myself will take back from you the

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75 Doat 169, fols. 94–95v.
76 The counts of Foix had frequently been allied with the Trencavel during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, demonstrated for example by the mutual defence treaties made between Roger III, Count of Foix (d.1149) and Roger I and Raimond Trencavel in c.1135 (Doat 166, fols. 218–21), and the similar agreement ensuring mutual protection against the Count of Toulouse concluded between Raimond Roger, Count of Foix, and Raimond Roger in 1201 (Doat 169, fols. 94–95v). However, the ambitions of the counts of Foix in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries over the lands of the Trencavel are indicated by the attack on Carcassonne by Roger II of Foix in 1095 (CT, fols. 116v–117), and Roger III of Foix’s involvement in the rebellion of Carcassonne of 1120–1124 (CT, fols. 117–117v). Their continuing interest in Carcassonne throughout the twelfth century is demonstrated by the events of 1167, when, following the murder of Raimond Trencavel in the cathedral of Béziers, Raimond V of Toulouse attempted to give Carcassonne to Roger Bernard III of Foix, on the grounds that Roger Bernard’s wife, Cecile, was Raimond Trencavel’s eldest daughter (Doat 167, fols. 299–301v). On the counts of Foix in the twelfth century, see de Mony, Relations politiques des comtes de Foix, vol. 1; Castillon d’Aspet, Histoire du Comté de Foix, vol. 1.
77 Roger Bernard seems to have been effectively ruling Carcassonne for Raimond Trencavel in 1224 (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 808–11), and continued to benefit from his influence over Raimond even after the latter had attained his majority, as demonstrated by Raimond’s donations of Limoux and Chericorb to him in 1227 (Doat 169, fols. 261–64, 277–278v).
land, the right and the inheritance, on the day of Judgement when we shall all be judged!”

This speech was greeted by applause from the other lords from Languedoc, an enthusiastic reception which so discomfited the Pope that he withdrew into the Lateran palace. The *Chanson* account does not, however, provide a context for this impassioned defence of the Trencavel and does not immediately indicate whether Raimond de Roquefeuil should be regarded as representing a group of Trencavel supporters, or even as active in support of Raimond Trencavel II at all.

The Roquefeuil were lords from the Nîmes area in eastern Languedoc, with particular connections to the lords of Anduze and the Guillems de Montpellier. A man named Johannes de Roquefeuil was a member of Guillem VIII de Montpellier’s court in the late twelfth century, appearing as a witness to a charter of 1184, in which the Bishop of Maguelonne swore to be faithful to Guillem, and as the first named witness to a charter of 1194, in which Raimond VI of Toulouse gave the castle of Frontignon to Montpellier. In 1211, three members of the Roquefeuil family gave evidence to the tribunal examining the case for the dissolution of the marriage between Pere II of Aragon and Marie de Montpellier: ‘the lady Marquissa de Roquefeuil’, Arnauld de Roquefeuil and Raimond de Roquefeuil. The family were closely involved in the investigations into the validity of the marriage, probably because they themselves were connected to the Guillems de Montpellier, and could therefore give evidence on the degree of consanguinity between Marie de Montpellier and her first husband, Bernard, Count of Comminges. In addition to

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78 Guillaume de Tudela, *Chanson*, vol. 2, 146, pp. 56–9: ‘Ramons de Rocafoils a en aut escridat: “Senher dreitz apostolis, merce e peitat aias d’un effan orfe, jovenet ichilat, filh del onrat vescomte, que an mort li crozat e n Simos de Montfort, cant hom II ac llhivrat . . . E cant el pren mariri a tort e a pecat, e no as en ta cort cardenal ni abat agues milhor crezensa a la crestandat. E pro an mort lo paire e l filh dezeretat, Senher, ret li la terra, garda ta dignitat! E si no la lh vols rendre, Deus t’en do aital grad que sus la tua arma aias lo seu pecat. E si no la li lluiras en breu jorn assignat, eu te clami la terra e l dreg e la eretat al dia del judici on tuit serem jutjat!” ’

79 Ibid.: ‘“Baros” ditz l’autre, “mot l’a gent encolpat.” ’

80 Inspiring the sarcastic comment from Arnauld, Count of Comminges, that ‘we have done good work, and now we can go home, because we have made the Pope go inside’, ibid.: ‘Ditz Arnautz de Cumenge “Gent avem espleitat, oimais podem anar, car tant es delhiurat qu’intra s’en l’Apostolis.” ’

81 There is no study of the Roquefeuil themselves, but see Bousquet, ‘Le traité d’alliance’, pp. 25–42, at p. 29, note 9. Their connection with Anduze was argued in particular by E. Martin-Chabot in his translation of Guillaume de Tudela (vol. 2, pp. 57–8, note 4): their chief connection was the marriage of Adelaide de Roquefeuil to Bernard d’Anduze in 1156. Some genealogical information about the family can also be gleaned from the *Liber Instrumentorum Memoralium*, the cartulary of the Guillems de Montpellier, and from Vincke, ‘Peters II von Aragon’, pp. 108–89.

82 *LLM*, p. 87.

83 *LLM*, pp. 163–5.


85 Ibid., p. 181.

86 Ibid. This is probably the same Raimond de Roquefeuil who spoke at the Fourth Lateran Council, but it is not possible to make a positive identification on the basis of his name alone.
the depositions made by the three Roquefeuil, the report on the case sent to the Pope by Arnauld Amaury and the Bishop of Uzès in December 1211 was witnessed by a ‘lord Marquis de Roquefeuil’, presumably the husband of the Marquisa who gave evidence.87

The Roquefeuil do not appear to have been particularly influential or powerful members of the Languedoc aristocracy, but they had numerous connections to many higher status families. Raimond de Roquefeuil’s mother was Guillelma, the daughter of Guillem VII de Montpellier, who married a Raimond de Roquefeuil at some time before 1200.88 Guillelma can probably be identified with the ‘lady Marquisa’ who gave evidence to the tribunal at Narbonne in 1211,89 as she used this title in a charter of 1200 dealing with her dispute with her brother over her dowry.90 The title ‘marquis’ was not used consistently by the lords of Roquefeuil and it may have been regarded more as a nickname, as indicated by the wording of the 1200 charter: ‘Guillelma . . . who is called Marquisa’.91 However, its use by Raimond de Roquefeuil’s parents indicates that his father was the head of the family and the principal lord of Roquefeuil, a conclusion supported by the fact that Raimond himself was in control of the castle of Roquefeuil by 1225.92

Despite his family connections to Montpellier, Raimond de Roquefeuil’s personal allegiance was given to Toulouse. He appears to have been high in Raimond VII of Toulouse’s favour, receiving from him, for example, the castles of Aquantico, Roque and Sabras, along with half of the castle of Brissac, in 121693 and the castle of Ganges in 1217.94 Raimond de Roquefeuil’s attendance at the Fourth Lateran Council was probably as part of the Toulousan contingent and his speech should not necessarily be regarded as evidence of a group of Trencavel supporters in Rome in 1215.

Raimond himself continued to be identified as a Trencavel supporter in the years following the Council. In March 1226, Raimond de Roquefeuil submitted to the authority of Louis VIII and forswore his former allegiance to all the rebel lords in Languedoc, promising to obey the king concerning ‘the support I had for and the help I gave to Raimond, Count of Toulouse and Raimond his son, or T whom they call Viscount, or the Count of Foix, and others who attack the Church or the Count of Montfort’.95 This was a common formula in the large numbers of submissions

88 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 461.
89 Vincke, ‘Peters II von Aragon’, pp. 163–5. The evidence that the lady Marquisa gave to the tribunal seems to have been particularly pro-Marie, as she agreed completely with the evidence given by Clemencia, described as the friend of Marie de Montpellier.
90 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 461.
91 Ibid.: ‘ego Guillelma uxor ejus, quae vocor Marchesia’.
92 GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, p. 201. He also controlled the castles of Pausis and Valarange in the diocese of Nîmes, Blanchfort in the diocese of Mende and Casteleucum in the diocese of Rodez.
93 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 695–6. The other half of the castle of Brissac was already held by the Roquefeuil from the counts of Toulouse.
94 Ibid., p. 696.
95 GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, p. 201: ‘super eo quod favi et auxilium praestiti Raimundo quondam comiti Tholozano, aut Raimundo filio eius, vel T quem vocant vicecomitem, et comiti Fuxi, et aliis qui ecclesiam impugnabant, seu comitis Montis-fortis’.
made by various lords and towns in Languedoc to Louis in 1226, but the reference to ‘Thom they call Viscount’, which clearly means Raimond Trencavel, at this time Viscount of Carcassonne and Béziers, may have been created specifically for Raimond de Roquefeuil, appearing in no other surrender.

It is dubious, however, whether Raimond de Roquefeuil actually gave any active support to Raimond Trencavel; his behaviour at the Fourth Lateran Council may be sufficient to explain his identification as a Trencavel supporter in 1226. While much of the Chanson account of the Fourth Lateran Council should not be taken literally, it is possible that Raimond de Roquefeuil’s fictional speech reflects a real event. The author shows no interest in the Trencavel or in Raimond de Roquefeuil outside this passage, which makes an uneasy interruption of the debates on the Count of Foix and which plays no clear purpose in the narrative. The most likely explanation for the inclusion of this awkward passage in the Chanson is that Raimond de Roquefeuil’s speech in support of Raimond Trencavel II had become notorious, one of the best-known events of the Council which an Occitan audience would expect to be included in any account.

If Raimond de Roquefeuil’s vocal support for the Trencavel in 1215 had become well-known, this in itself could account for the requirement that he abjure Trencavel support ten years later, without him having been active in defence of Trencavel rights. That Raimond de Roquefeuil did not continue in active support for the Trencavel is suggested in the Chanson: in his speech at the Fourth Lateran Council, Raimond does not suggest any action if the Pope did not see justice done for Trencavel, claiming instead that he would be brought to account on the Day of Judgement. Since the continuation of the Chanson was written some years after Raimond de Roquefeuil surrendered to the Crown, it is possible to interpret his speech as an encapsulation of all his dealings with the Trencavel, from his famous protest in Rome to his subsequent disinterest. Raimond de Roquefeuil seems to have been a lord in the retinue of the Count of Toulouse, who spoke in Raimond Trencavel’s favour possibly for the opportunity to criticise the Pope and possibly from indignation at the injustice with which the Trencavel were treated. His speech does not indicate the existence of wider support in Languedoc for the Trencavel and his identification in 1226 as a Trencavel supporter does precisely the opposite: that Raimond de Roquefeuil was the only lord required to abjure fighting for Raimond Trencavel II suggests that there was no one else interested in so doing.

The dispossession of Raimond Roger and his son seems to have been achieved with remarkably little protest from the lords of the Trencavel lands, and Raimond Trencavel does not appear to have been particularly successful in attracting supporters for regaining his rightful inheritance until well after Béziers and Carcassonne had come under French royal control. Much of this lack of interest in the Trencavel cause would, of course, have been pragmatic: many of the lords to whom the Trencavel might have looked for help were busy fighting the crusade themselves. However, it is possible that the pattern of Trencavel relations with the lords of their

lands made them particularly unable to maintain support after their initial defeat by
the crusade; that the crusade’s choice of the Trencavel as their first targets related
not only to their position with the King of Aragon, but with the castellans of
Carcassonne and Béziers as well.
Guillaume de Tudela attributed Trencavel problems in dealing with the lords of their lands in the early thirteenth century to Raimond Roger’s youth:

‘Because he was young he was friendly with all of those in the lands in which he was lord, and they had neither awe nor fear of him; on the contrary, they laughed and joked with him as if he were their equal,’ demonstrating an attitude towards young rulers common throughout the medieval period and beyond. In 1200, Innocent III used the same grounds to dismiss the succession of Frederick, the young son of Henry VI, to the Empire: ‘It is obvious to all that it is not seemly for [the boy] to rule. For how could he rule others, being in need of others to rule him? How could he guard the Christian people, being himself committed to the guardianship of another person . . . that is clear from the word of Scripture, which says “Woe to thee, O land, whose King is a child”, and again “whose princes eat in the morning”.’

Innocent himself, though hardly a child when he was elected Pope in 1198, was criticised by Walther von der Vogelweide for being inappropriately youthful for his position: ‘Oh the Pope is too young, God save your Christendom.’

Guillaume’s portrayal of the young ruler more interested in informality than in enforcing his authority is also reflected later in the medieval period, by writers such as Froissart, who regarded the youthful Richard II as prone to desert his responsibilities and dangerously frivolous as a result of his age: ‘Vae terrae cujus rex puer est’, rursus, “Cujus principes mane comedunt.” Ecclesiastes, x, 16.

1 Born in 1185, Raimond Roger was nine when he succeeded his father, Roger II, in 1194. By the terms of Roger’s will, Raimond Roger’s guardian was Bertrand de Saissac, one of the principal members of Roger’s court, who ruled for the young viscount until his death in c.1200: Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 283–4.

2 Guillaume de Tudela, ed. and trans. Martin-Chabot, vol. 1, 15, pp. 44–7: ‘Mans, car era trop joves, avia ab totz amor, e sels de son pais, de cui era senhor, no avian de lui ni regart ni temor, enans jogan am lui co li fos companhor.’


Guillaume de Tudela used his argument about the consequences of Raimond Roger’s youth to partly excuse his dereliction of his duty to remove the heretics from his lands, explaining the apparent paradox between his own orthodoxy and the statement that all his subjects protected heretics. This explanation does not remove the conclusion, implicit in the *Chanson* passages dealing with the fall of Béziers and Carcassonne to the crusade, that Raimond Roger’s fate was his own fault, but it allowed Guillaume to present the viscount as a positive character by attributing any active malevolence to his subjects: ‘All his knights and vassals maintained the heretics in their castles and in their towers, and so they caused their own ruin and their shameful deaths. The Viscount himself died in great anguish, because of this grievous error.’ By reflecting common prejudices about the characters and habits of youthful rulers, this argument drew conclusions which the *Chanson’s* audience would have already been drawing for themselves: it was an interpretation of vicecomital conduct designed for those who had not known Raimond Roger in life. However, Guillaume may also have been repeating a general impression about the relations between Raimond Roger and his subjects, and it is possible that this represented, not the temporary result of the viscount’s minority, but a deep-seated malaise.

The location and extent of the Trencavel demesne lands are unknown. In the eleventh century it is probable that the majority of these were in Albi, but it is equally likely, for reasons outlined below, that by the end of the twelfth century the bulk of Trencavel demesne holdings had shifted to Carcassonne. In addition to their landed wealth, the Trencavel collected a variety of different dues from the lands under their control, of which the *albergue*, based on the cost of providing a night’s lodging for the vicecomital retinue, and the *leude*, a tax levied on markets, appear most often in the documentary record. It is also probable that the *guidagia*, a charge which paid for protection from an armed guard, was charged on major roads through the Trencavel lands, despite the fact that this particular toll had been outlawed by the Church. How much profit the viscounts made from such dues is debatable. The lack of evidence on the Trencavel demesne lands makes it difficult to assess how great a contribution such charges could have made to vicecomital income and the extent to which the viscounts benefited personally from the money collected is by no means certain. Almost without exception, the tolls and charges levied in the Trencavel lands appear in the historical record because they were granted away by the viscounts: a donation of various rights, including the *leude*, in Béziers to Berengar de Béziers by Raimond Trencavel in 1155 and the sales of *guidagia* on the Béziers–Narbonne road by Roger II in 1179 and 1184 are a few out of numerous examples. The distribution of taxation rights to local lords may call into question not

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6 Ibid.: ‘E tuit sei cavalier e l’autre valvassor tenian los eretges, qui en castel, qui en tor. Per que foron destruít e mort a desnor. El meteis ne morig, a mot gran dolor, dont fo pecatz e dans, per cela fort error.’
8 See pp. 137–44 and 146–51 below.
only the extent to which such charges formed a significant part of Trencavel income, but also vicecomital power to enforce their collection and delivery to their court. The donations and sales mentioned above may have been more recognitions of a status quo than they were signs of Trencavel generosity, and it is possible that the nature of the records gives tolls and other charges a greater prominence than they in fact possessed in vicecomital finances.

Whatever the principal sources of Trencavel income, it has been suggested that the late twelfth century was a period of increasing poverty for the viscounts. Gordon wrote of the later years of Roger II’s rule that ‘we have just a few, isolated hints that all was not well in the Trencavel lands, enough to be sure of the existence of tensions without understanding their precise nature’.11 He went on to connect this malaise with his earlier suggestion that Raimond Roger had suffered financial problems, based on his grant in 1204 of a ten-year lease on the albergue of Béziers to the canons of the cathedral for 6000 sols.12 6000 sols appears a considerable sum and it has been argued that the canons were able to prosper at the expense of the viscounts by taking advantage of their economic problems in agreements like this.13 Since they gained in addition the secular jurisdiction over all clerks and clerical households in Béziers and its suburbs of Lignan and Aspiran, it is difficult to view them as the exploited party, but, although it is also true that 6000 sols would have been a welcome, if short-term, solution to Trencavel financial difficulties, the motivations behind this agreement may not have been as straightforward as they appear at first glance.

Similar leases or sales were not unknown in Béziers, and the 1204 agreement was not the first time that the Bishop of Béziers had bought rights or property in the area. While rare in the early twelfth century, for the period 1150–1209 sales to the bishop and canons outnumber the donations recorded in the episcopal records by more than 2:1.14 These sales came from a wide selection of the Béziers nobility and the frequency with which these sort of arrangements were used renders an automatic connection with economic hardship more problematic. Such an interpretation would cast the bishop by the early thirteenth century as single point of wealth in a poverty-stricken see, but it was not unknown for the bishops themselves to arrange sales of their property with members of the local nobility. In 1174, for example, the bishop sold the tabellionat, a tax levied on money changing, to Bernard de Caussinopolis for 1000 sols and an annual rent of six pounds of pepper.15 In this context, Raimond Roger’s 1204 lease appears less of an urgent response to a problematic situation than part of the normal relations between the secular and ecclesiastical lords of Béziers. While the lease involved the largest amount of any single agreement recorded in the episcopal records, the difference between this sum and the value of the lease may not have been substantial. The expenditure of similar sums was not unknown: between 1176 and 1206, for example, the bishop spent a total of more than 6000 sols in acquiring

12 Ibid., p. 57; Vidal, Episcopatus et pouvoir épiscopal à Béziers, p. 52; GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, pp. 148–9.
13 Vidal, Episcopatus et pouvoir épiscopal à Béziers, p. 52.
14 Livre Noir, pp. 231–531.
portions of the bourg of Maureilhan. As has been argued by Rosenwein, it is by no means certain that economic gain was the only or primary motivation in eleventh- and twelfth-century donations to ecclesiastical institutions. Conceivably, the later twelfth-century sales involving the church of Béziers represented not so much a response to economic difficulties as the introduction of a mutual exchange in transactions designed to create lasting relationships between giver and receiver. Thus the Trencavel’s financial difficulties at the end of the twelfth century may be more the product of a change in the way that transactions were expressed than of economic hardship: the evidence for the Trencavel economic position is inconclusive at best.

If the Trencavel financial situation is difficult to assess, the question of the extent of their control over their viscounties is also problematic. Débax has argued that Trencavel power over their subjects increased throughout the twelfth century, as they extended to the lords of their counties a feudal system of homage and fidelity. Against this picture of solidifying Trencavel authority, an alternative interpretation by Cheyette points out the lack of extant charters for the majority of castles in the heart of the Trencavel lands, in comparison to those on the edge of their viscounties and particularly in the Montagne Noire on the northern border of Carcassonne. In this hypothesis, diametrically opposed to the picture of Trencavel power painted by Débax, vicecomital authority was consistently challenged by the castles and especially the fortified villages of the most densely populated parts of the Trencavel lands, which appear infrequently in the charter record.

These two constructions of Trencavel authority result from different approaches to lordly power and carry with them differing problems. Débax’s interpretation is a strictly feudal one, and in the light of the considerable debate on the validity of the idea of the feudal system, cannot necessarily be accepted without further examination. Cheyette’s interpretation is less reliant on the theory of noble power for its conclusions, but shares with Débax’s one important assumption concerning the nature of the documentary evidence: that the surviving Trencavel charters delineate the limits of Trencavel authority. Both these arguments are based on the use of charters to indicate Trencavel power over either castles or lords in their lands and suggest that those not mentioned in the charter record were outside or at least on the margins of vicecomital control. It is possible, however, to dispute this assumption. The peace agreements, oaths of faithfulness and promises of non-aggression for castles at the fringes of Trencavel territory found in the Trencavel cartulary may be

17 Rosenwein, To be the Neighbour of St Peter, esp. pp. 120–42.
20 Ibid., p. 272. A rare appearance of such villages in the charter record was made by the village of Moussoulens, near Sainte on the fringe of the Montagne Noire, when Roger II granted the chief men of the village permission to move the settlement to a more easily fortified site in 1175: CT, fols. 156–156v; Doat 168, fols. 107–8.
less confirmations of authority than suggestions of its lack. The idea that the Trencavel regularly collected a variety of different agreements from the castles under their control as a matter of course puts a unlikely bureaucratic slant to a vicecomital administration which more probably acted in response to crises. Thus, the castles in the centre of their domains would appear less often in the charters than those on the margins if vicecomital authority in the former was less frequently in dispute. The example of the castle of Cabaret, discussed in detail below, demonstrates that the existence of charters cannot be equated with Trencavel control.

The effect of these interpretations is to ignore the potentially wide gap between the nominal and actual power wielded by the Trencavel over their subjects. It is not possible to credit the Trencavel with substantial coercive power over the lords of their viscounts; Cheyette’s conclusion that they used castles for the collection of tolls rather than for direct control of the populace, although based on problematic charter evidence, is probably a correct one. Trencavel government must have been carried out through the consent of a significant proportion of the lesser nobility; a consent which would have been encouraged through their active participation in vicecomital administration. While the evidence of oaths and agreements can be ambiguous, an examination of Trencavel relations with the lords of their lands, through a study of the composition of their government, can provide an alternative picture of the extent of their power.

A study of the personnel of Trencavel government reveals that the most frequent witnesses to their charters made up a small core vicecomital court. There appears to have been a certain amount of continuity in the membership of this court over the administrations of different Trencavel, so that a number of families can be identified with a tradition of participation in vicecomital government. Among the lords who were the most frequent witnesses to charters for Bernard Aton IV, Bernard de Canet and the members of the families of Tresmals, Comes and Pelapol figure highly. Bernard de Canet and lords from the Tresmals and Pelapol families continued to participate in Trencavel government under Roger I and members of Roger’s court also included lords from Hautpoul, Barbairan, and Aragon, and Guillem de St Felix, who witnessed the largest number of charters for Roger. The families of

22 See pp. 152–3 below.
24 For a comparable study on the court of the viscounts of Narbonne, see Gramain, ‘Composition de la cour vicomtale’, pp. 121–59, and on the counts of Toulouse see Macé, Comtes de Toulouse, pp. 147–286.
25 Guillem Calvet de Tresmals between 1115 and 1118, Bernard de Tresmals in 1125 and 1126, Amorose de Tresmals and his son Guillem Bernard in 1125.
26 This does not appear to have functioned as a title, but appears to have been used as a surname both by this Guillem Comes and by his sons Guillem and Bernard: CT, fol. 110; Doat 167, fols. 50–1. Guillem Comes senior witnessed charters for Bernard Aton in 1125 and 1126.
27 Arnould de Pelapol, his son Bernard and his father Bernard in 1125 and 1126.
28 Chieffly Bernard de Tresmals between 1130 and 1143.
29 Arnould de Pelapol 1130–8, Bernard de Pelapol 1130–4.
30 Guillem Pierre d’Hautpoul 1130–50.
31 Aimery de Barbairan 1149–50.
32 Guillem Roger d’Aragon 1136–50.
Canet, St Felix, Pelapol, Hautpoul and Barbairan continued to participate in Trencavel government under Raimond Trencavel, and lords of Hautpoul, St Felix and Canet also appear as members of the court of Roger II.

The chief instrument of Trencavel government over their different viscounties, and hence a particularly important indication of support for their rule among the different noble families in their viscounties, was the office of vicar. The vicar was a vicecomital deputy in a particular town or viscounty, differing from the earlier comital deputies, the viscounts, in that the office did not become a hereditary position and was not usually held for life. The first Trencavel vicar to be mentioned in a charter was Bernard de Tresmals, who is referred to as vicar of Carcassonne in 1141 and 1143. A vicar for the Razès was first mentioned in 1146 and Albi had a vicar in 1175. Bernard Aton may have appointed a vicar in Béziers in c.1100, but there are no subsequent mentions of this post in the town until 1176.

Both Roger I and Raimond Trencavel appointed vicars from those who were already members of their courts and both also appear to have chosen lords who came from the counties in which they were to work. On his inheritance of Carcassonne and the Razès from his brother in 1150, Raimond Trencavel retained both Guillem de St Felix and Pierre de Villars in their positions and they remained vicars of Carcassonne and the Razès respectively until Raimond’s death in 1167.

34 Guillem de St Felix 1150–70.
35 Guillem and Amblard de Pelapol 1150–65.
36 Pierre Raimond d’Hautpoul 1150–64.
37 Guillem Chatbert and Aimery de Barbairan 1150–65.
39 Guillem de St Felix 1171, Jordan de St Felix 1194.
40 Bernard de Canet, presumably the grandson of the first Bernard, was the notary for Roger II.
44 Ibid., p. 1088.
46 Livre Noir, p. 146.
47 Doat 168, fols. 113–113v.
48 Roger I’s first vicar for Carcassonne was Bernard de Tresmals in 1141 and 1143, followed in 1146 by Guillem de St Felix, from the county of Carcassonne. His vicar for the Razès, also first appointed in 1146, was Pierre de Villars, whose probable origins were in the town of Vilarzel-du-Razès.
49 It has been suggested that Arnauld de Lauran was vicar of Carcassonne in 1150 (Allabert, ‘Une seigneurie alliée: Lauré’, pp. 83–107, p. 87), based on the reference in the agreement of that year between Roger I and the lords of Saisac over Valsègère to ‘Arnauld who was vicar of Carcassonne’. Since, however, the charter goes on to name Guillem de St Felix as vicar of Carcassonne in the witness list, Arnauld’s occupation of the position must have been at an earlier date (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1106–7). An Arnauld de Lauran witnessed a donation made by the lords of Termes to Viscountess Cecile in 1118: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, p. 869. He and his brother Pierre were involved in the 1120–4 Carcassonne rebellion (de Vic and
Guillem and Pierre were also among the most frequent witnesses to Raimond Trencavel’s charters, raising the question of how far they actually functioned as deputies in vicecomital absence and how far the office of vicar may have been simply a way of rewarding loyal service at court, which did not necessarily carry onerous responsibilities with it.\(^{50}\) The character of the office of vicar changed with Roger II, who ushered in a more professional conception of the role of the vicariate in his government. Apparently not favouring the idea of retaining the same vicars throughout his rule, Roger dismissed both Guillem de St Felix and Pierre de Villars,\(^{51}\) and in the seventeen years of his rule appointed six vicars of Carcassonne,\(^{52}\) three vicars of the Razès\(^{53}\) two vicars of Béziers\(^{54}\) and one vicar of Albi.\(^{55}\) Roger also does not seem to have chosen his vicars for their local connections, rotating vicars from one position to the other.\(^{56}\) The appearance of the office of sub-vicar in Carcassonne and Limoux in 1193\(^ {57}\) is another indication of the greater complexity and professionalism of Trencavel government under Roger, which was also reflected in the emergence of a vicecomital notary in the person of Bernard de Canet in the late 1180s\(^ {58}\) and with the creation of other offices such as that of seneschal.\(^ {59}\)

Vaisètè, vol. 5, pp. 917–19), and received their castles back from Viscount Bernard Aton in 1126 (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 925). It is not clear when Arnauld held the position of vicar of Carcassonne and the lack of any witness list giving him this title suggests that he held it only for a short time.

Guillem de St Felix seems to have accompanied Raimond Trencavel on occasions when he left Carcassonne, being present, for example, when Raimond made an agreement with Roger de Cabaret at the castle of Aragon in the Montagne Noire in 1153: de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, pp. 1138–40. The frequency with which Pierre de Villars appears as a witness to Raimond’s charters also indicates that he spent a large amount of time away from the Razès himself, as the Trencavel did not have a metropolitan centre in the Razès and appear to have visited the county seldom. For details of Trencavel charters dealing with the Razès, see Débax, Féodalité languedocienne, pp. 283–5.

The last appearance of Pierre de Villars as vicar was as witness to Raimond’s sale of lands at Chericorb in July 1167 (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, pp. 271–2), while Guillem de St Felix’s was in 1170, as witness to a donation to the Church of Carcassonne (Doat 65, fols. 92–3). The frequency with which Pierre de Villars appears as a witness to Raimond’s charters also indicates that he spent a large amount of time away from the Razès himself, as the Trencavel did not have a metropolitan centre in the Razès and appear to have visited the county seldom. For details of Trencavel charters dealing with the Razès, see Débax, Féodalité languedocienne, pp. 283–5.


Isarn Bernard 1181–2, Hughes de Romegoux 1189, Raimond Ermengaud 1193.

Bertrand de Capestang 1176, Arnauld Raimond 1190.

Pierre Raimond d'Hautpoul 1175.

So that Isarn Bernard began as vicar of the Razès in 1181 and became vicar of Carcassonne in 1184, while Hughes de Romegoux was vicar of Carcassonne in 1174–5, and vicar of the Razès in 1189.

Guillem Ugo, witness to a donation by Roger to the Jews of Carcassonne, December 1193 (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, pp. 426–7), Alsonus, witness to permission given by Roger to the lords of Flacian to build a fortress, October 1193 (Doat 168, fols. 43–4, 47–48v). The sub-vicar of Limoux indicates that these were not just deputies to the vicars, but would sometimes have their own areas, which were not deemed important enough to merit a full vicar.

First mentioned as the notary of Roger II in Roger’s agreement with Sicard de Lautrec in 1188: de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, pp. 383–6. He had been joined by a colleague, Pierre Robert, by January 1194: ibid., pp. 421–2.

On the development of lesser offices like seneschal in twelfth-century Languedoc, see Mundy, Society and Government at Toulouse, pp. 240–6.
Roger’s use of these officials was substantially different from that of his father. Although the vicar of Carcassonne is still occasionally found witnessing charters for Roger outside Carcassonne, suggesting that the title continued to be viewed as at least partly honorific, by the thirteenth century the position was operating more consistently as a deputy in vicecomital absence and not simply as a chief member of the court. Roger II’s changes to the nature of the vicariate in his lands can be seen both as part of social changes taking place in the twelfth century and as a natural desire to rule his lands and his deputies with greater efficiency. However, even under Roger, the choice of vicar appears to have been largely limited to those who were either themselves members of the court, or who came from families with traditions of loyalty to the Trencavel. The twelfth-century vicars can therefore provide a good indication of the principal supporters of Trencavel government.

Any assessment of Trencavel power must recognise how their authority over their subjects was prone to both temporal and geographical differences, necessitating a county-by-county assessment beginning with Carcassonne, the seat of Trencavel power and their most valuable possession. In the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, Trencavel control of Carcassonne appears to have been severely limited. Although they were nominally lords of Carcassonne from 1068, it is possible that they did not actually gain possession of the town until after the death of Raimond Bernard Trencavel in 1078 and they remained unpopular there into the twelfth century. In 1107, for example, the men of Carcassonne swore to Ramon Berenguer III, Count of Barcelona, that they would make war on Bernard Aton on his behalf ‘either with you or without you’. The formula is indicative of the enthusiasm in Carcassonne for rebellion against their viscount and indeed the agreement with Ramon Berenguer was signed by 150 of the citizens. Witness lists indicate that very few lords from either the town or county of Carcassonne were involved in Trencavel government in this period, and Trencavel insecurity in the early twelfth century was also encouraged by various of their neighbours, including the Count of Barcelona and the Count of Foix.

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60 Isarn Bernard, for example, seems to have been at Béziers with Roger in 1184 while he was vicar of Carcassonne: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 379–80.
61 This would explain its use by Bernard de Canet, who referred to himself as the vicar of the viscount while acting as scribe in 1191: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 412–14.
62 Pierre Roger de Cabaret, vicar of Carcassonne, worked with Pere of Aragon over the trial of heretics in 1204 in Raimond Roger’s absence: for example, Compayre, Etudes historiques, p. 227.
63 See for example the close parallels between Roger’s changes to the vicars and the development of professional deputies among the English nobility in the early fourteenth century: Saul, Knights and Esquires, pp. 69–89.
64 Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 251–2: ‘erimus tibi fideles adjutores et defensores contra vicecomitem Biterrensem et uxorem eius et filios . . . et faciemus gueram illis cum vobis et sine vobis’.
65 Of the thirty-four lords from the county of Carcassonne who submitted to Bernard Aton in 1124, only three had previously appeared as witnesses to Trencavel charters. The lords appear to represent a reasonable cross-section of the Carcassonne nobility, suggesting that Bernard Aton had not been able to attract very many nobles to his court: Doat 166, fols. 123–125v.
66 Roger, Count of Foix, is implicated in the 1120–4 Carcassonne rebellion: CT, fols. 117–117v.
In 1120, Carcassonne rebelled against Bernard Aton, who was expelled from the town and unable to re-enter for four years. In 1124, however, the end of the rebellion of Carcassonne provided him with an opportunity to create his own constituency in Carcassonne by rewarding Trencavel supporters with lands taken from the rebels. Bernard Aton’s donations of land following the rebellion went to, among others, Guillem Comes, Bernard de Canet, and members of the Tresmals and Pelapol families. Most of the property donated was in or very close to the Cité of Carcassonne, suggesting that it was taken not from the nobles from the county of Carcassonne who submitted to Bernard Aton in 1124, but from citizens who were not given a similar chance to submit and avoid dispossession. By this redistribution of urban property, Bernard Aton was able to both take control of the town and encourage participation in Trencavel government by those whom he benefited, as this was largely based at Carcassonne. In 1124 Bernard Aton created the inner circle of families who would remain the mainstay of Trencavel government into the late twelfth century, under the administrations of his sons and his grandson. While Bernard Aton was able to build a new security for himself and his successors on lords such as the Tresmals and the Pelapol, however, it is possible that Trencavel power outside this select group was never anything more than shaky.

The Trencavel position in Carcassonne was very different from that in their original viscounty of Albi. Débax has commented on the oaths of fidelity recorded from various lords of Albi to the viscounts in the twelfth century preserved in the Trencavel cartulary and on vicecomital relations with the most powerful lords of the county. However, the numbers of oaths of fidelity from Albi in the cartulary are not in themselves indicative of any particular Trencavel control and cannot be taken as evidence of a perpetual and unchanging relationship. When the lords of Bruniquel swore to be faithful to Roger I in 1141, this may have given Roger some influence over Bruniquel in that year, but not necessarily beyond. Similarly, Trencavel relations with the lords of the county of Albi may also have been more problematic than this hypothesis suggests. The most powerful lords in Albi were the
lords of Lautrec,\textsuperscript{78} who expressed this reality through use of the title ‘viscount’.\textsuperscript{79} The Trencavel appear superficially to have had reasonable relations with the lords of Lautrec: Sicard de Lautrec swore oaths of fidelity to Roger I in 1141\textsuperscript{80} and to Raimond Trencavel in 1152\textsuperscript{81} and another Sicard de Lautrec gave up the castle of Montronde to Roger II in 1181,\textsuperscript{82} but far from having significant power over them, they appear to have felt themselves threatened. In 1162, an oath of faithfulness from the lords of Montréal to Raimond Trencavel and to his son Roger included the stipulation that they would protect the castle against Sicard de Lautrec,\textsuperscript{83} suggesting not only difficult relations, but also a Trencavel respect for the power of the lords of Lautrec as equals rather than as subjects. The same impression of relations between the Trencavel and Lautrec is given by the marriage in 1176 of Roger II’s sister, Adelaide, to Sicard de Lautrec,\textsuperscript{84} appearing again as more an alliance by Roger with a powerful neighbour than with a subject under his control. The lords of Lautrec occasionally acted as witnesses to Trencavel charters, but usually in company with great lords such as the Count of Toulouse.\textsuperscript{85} They do not appear to have been members of the Trencavel court and cannot be considered to have been substantially under vicecomital control. Trencavel dealings with many of the other most powerful lords of Albi seem largely restricted to oaths of fidelity, which cannot be taken as evidence of any particularly good relations nor of vicecomital control of the county.\textsuperscript{86} The Trencavel do appear to have had genuinely close relations with the lords of Hautpoul,\textsuperscript{87} various of whom were frequent witnesses to charters for

\textsuperscript{78} The lords of Lautrec were descended from the Trencavel: a Sicard de Lautrec was the son of Bernard, Viscount of Albi (d. c.918).

\textsuperscript{79} c.1072: agreement with the Bishop of Albi (GC, vol. 1, instrumenta, pp. 5–6); 1141: agreement between Roger I and Sicard de Lautrec (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, pp. 1049–50); 1142: agreement between Roger I and Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse (CT, fols. 138–9; Doat 167, fols. 65–6); 1152: agreement between Raimond Trencavel and Sicard (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 1050); 1157: agreement between Raimond V, Count of Toulouse and Raimond Trencavel (ibid., pp. 1206–1207); 1160: confirmation of a donation to Candeil (ibid., pp. 1223–4); 1176: marriage between Sicard and Adelaide, daughter of Raimond Trencavel (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, p. 312).

\textsuperscript{80} CT, fols. 139–139v.

\textsuperscript{81} de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 1050.

\textsuperscript{82} de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, pp. 353–4.

\textsuperscript{83} de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 1252–3.

\textsuperscript{84} de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 8, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{85} Sicard de Lautrec witnessed the peace between Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse, and Roger I in 1142 (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 1050), and the agreement between Roger I and Raimond V of Toulouse in 1149 (ibid., pp. 1103–4). Sicard de Lautrec also participated, along with Raimond V of Toulouse, in the settlement of a dispute between Raimond Trencavel and Ugo Escarfed in 1153 (ibid., pp. 1134–7). Ugo Escarfed was one of the lords of Roquefort (Doat 167, fols. 111–112v).

\textsuperscript{86} For example for Curvale in the mid-eleventh century (CT, fols. 7–7v), although a Guillem Aton de Curvale was mentioned in Raimond Trencavel’s will of 1154 as one of a group to whom the government of Albi should belong in Roger’s minority (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 271), for Bruniquel in 1141 and 1152 (de Vic and Vaisètè, vol. 5, p. 1133), and for Roquefort in 1139 (Doat 166, fols. 269–170v). The lord of Bruniquel in 1141 was Raimond de Roquefort.

\textsuperscript{87} Pierre Raimond and Arnauld Raimond d’Hautpoul recognised that they held Hautpoul from Raimond Trencavel in 1162: CT, fols. 29v–30.
Roger I, Raimond Tencavel and Roger II, but these lords are the only members of the Albi nobility who can be positively identified as court members. Given the distinct dearth of Albi lords witnessing charters for the Tencavel, it does not seem safe to conclude that their control of the county was based on their relationship with the rural nobility.

There is no evidence to suggest significant problems for the Tencavel with the most important towns of the county of Albi such as Castres and Lavaur. Although in 1174 Roger referred to ‘quarrels and disagreements’ with the lords of Castres in making a new settlement with them, these do not seem to have been long-standing or serious and Roger also appears to have been in complete control of Lavaur when dealing with Henry de Marcy in 1178 and 1181. The situation in Albi itself was very different. In 1229, an inquiry was instituted by Louis IX’s regency government into the extent of the Bishop of Albi’s jurisdiction over the secular affairs of the town. This was described briefly by Pierre de Colommedo, the royal vicar in Albi, in a report sent back to Paris: ‘By the order of the lord King, we have made a diligent inquiry into the church of Albi and through inquiry we have found that the greatest civil jurisdiction . . . belongs to the Bishop and church of Albi.’ A more detailed account shows Gualhardus Golferii, acting on behalf of the vicar of Albi, carrying out the inquiry into the bishop’s rights by asking the bishop himself and a large number of citizens what they knew about the jurisdiction of Albi and the extent to which it belonged to the bishop. The citizens were required to swear as to the truth of what they were saying and all gave broadly the same evidence: that the bishop was the chief secular ruler of Albi. The balance of power between the bishop and the viscount in Albi was summed up most succinctly by Bernard d’Avisat de Lescure: ‘He said that he had heard it said that the Viscount of Béziers and the canons of St Cecilia along with the good men of Albi elected the Bishop, and that the Viscount was the man of the Bishop of Albi.’

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88 Guillem Pierre d’Hautpoul.
89 Pierre Raimond d’Hautpoul.
90 Pierre Raimond d’Hautpoul.
91 CT, fols. 36v–37: ‘querimonias et querelas’.
92 PL 204, 235; PL 190, 1119; Roger of Howden, Gesta regum, vol. 2, pp. 150–66; Gaufrid de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 448–9; Chronicon Clarevallense, 1230. Roger I received the submissions of various lords from Lavaur in 1139: CT, fols. 19–23v.
93 The timing of this inquiry clearly relates to the Treaty of Paris, which was concluded between Raimond VII of Toulouse and the Crown on Good Friday 1229, following the informal agreement between the two parties made at Meaux early in the same year, in which Albi was ceded to Louis IX: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 6, pp. 632–7.
95 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 909–16. The testimonies of thirty-three citizens are recorded, in addition to that of the bishop.
96 Ibid.: ‘Item dixit quod audivit dici, quod viccomes Biterrii et canonici Sancte Cecilei cum probis hominibus de Albia eliebant episcopum, et vicecomes erat homo episcopi Albiensis.’
The base of vicecomital power in the town was Châteauvieux, the old fortified area next to the Cité and near to the cathedral, situated to the east of the Bourg, which grew up chiefly in the twelfth century. The importance of its possession for the viscounts was emphasised in 1177: in giving it to be held from him by Guillem Frotard and Paganus Berengar, Roger II laid particular emphasis on the requirements that they should defend it for him against all comers. Aside from control over Châteauvieux, the twelfth century had seen a steady erosion in vicecomital powers compared to those of the bishop. From the surrender of the right to take the goods of the bishop after his death by Roger I in 1144 to the settlement arranged by Sicard de Lautrec, Frotard Pierre de Berencs, Bernard de Boisso esto and Doat Alaman Roger II and Bishop Guillem Peire (1185–1230) in 1193, the viscount was the loser. After 1193, while Châteauvieux remained in Trencavel possession, the rest of Albi had passed in effect to episcopal control. This trend was taken still further by Raimond Roger when in 1201 he allowed the churches of Albi to build whatever fortifications they saw fit. The right of election of the bishop was clearly important to both the viscounts and the counts of Toulouse: in 1132, it was the subject of an agreement between Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse, and Roger I which stated that it was to be held by Roger from Toulouse, but it was not sufficient to prevent the erosion of vicecomital power. In 1191, Raimond V secured his possession of Albi through negotiation with the bishop, with Roger II simply acting as a witness, and, in his description of the delivery of Albi to the crusaders in 1210, Pierre des Vaux wrote: ‘The city of Albi had been held by the Viscount of Béziers, but Guillem the Bishop was the principal lord of the city, and he gratefully received his lordship and handed the city over to him.’

This trend was briefly reversed in the mid 1170s by Roger II, who appears to have made a concerted effort to increase his power in Albi, directed both at the most important lords of the county and at the bishop. In 1176, Roger attempted to improve relations with Castres through the sale of the toll of the road from Béziers to

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97 Chateauvieux was the holding of a younger branch of the Trencavel family in the eleventh century, descended from Frotaire, the younger brother of Raimond Bernard Trencavel: de Vic and Vaissete, vol. 3, p. 128. However, it was in the possession of the elder branch of the family by 1143, when Roger I swore to hold it from Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse: CT, fol. 201. Raimond V made a grant of all his possessions in Chateauvieux to Raimond Trencavel and Roger in 1163: CT, fols. 28–28v. It was eventually given to the Bishop of Albi by Simon de Monfort: Doat 62, fols. 33–6.

98 For a clear map of medieval Albi, see Higounet et al., Atlas Historiques des Villes de France.

99 Doat 105, fols. 128–9.

100 de Vic and Vaissete, vol. 5, pp. 980–1.

101 Doat 105, fols. 113–16.

Montpellier to Elisarius de Castres, and enlisted the support of Sicard de Lautrec by giving him his sister Adelaide in marriage. His efforts to increase his control of the town of Albi included the abduction of Bishop Gerardus (1174–1183), probably in around 1175, and resulted in the appointment of Pierre Raimond d’Hautpoul as vicar of Albi, the only time in the twelfth century that the Trencavel were able to appoint such an official in the town. However, these successes were but short-lived and proved insufficient to halt the progressive decline in Trencavel power over Albi.

The decline in Trencavel power in Albi probably related to their loss of control of the episcopal see. In the tenth and early eleventh centuries, the Trencavel viscounts ruled Albi largely through their control of the bishopric; in every tenth-century generation of the family, a younger son became Bishop of Albi. This system of control was extended to incorporate Nîmes when it was acquired by Viscount Bernard of Albi through his marriage to the heiress, Gauze, in c.950. Bernard’s son, Frotaire, already Bishop of Albi (972–987) was transferred to Nîmes in 987, and his nephew, also Frotaire, became Bishop of Nîmes in 1027. The Trencavel viscounts also exercised considerable control over appointments to the bishopric of Albi even when there was no suitable younger son to occupy the see. In c.1040, Bernard Aton III and his brother, Bishop Frotaire of Nîmes (1027–1077), made an arrangement with a certain Bernard Aimard that his son Guillem would become Bishop of Albi on the death of the present incumbent, Amelius II (1028–1052), in return for substantial payments to both the Trencavel and to Pons, Count of Toulouse. In 1066, Bishop Frotaire of Albi (c.1065–1066) was excommunicated for simony, having received his episcopal appointment on payment of a valuable horse to Bishop Frotaire of Nîmes and his brother Bernard Aton III, who ‘was accustomed to receive not a little money for appointments to the Bishopric of

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107 Ibid., p. 312.
108 The bishop was released in 1178 on the orders of Henry de Marcy, and Roger was excommunicated: Roger of Howden, vol. 2, p. 165.
110 This was not an uncommon noble strategy in Languedoc in this period, being also used, for example, by the lords of Melgueil, who owed their wealth to their control of the bishopric of Maguelonne (Dunbabin, France in the Making, p. 121), and the viscounts of Narbonne, who also attempted to keep the archbishopric of Narbonne within their family (Caille, ‘Origine et développement’, pp. 9–36).
111 With the exception of Frotaire, son of Aton I (d.942), who was Bishop of Cahors. For a list of bishops of Albi from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, see GC, vol. 1, pp. 8–15.
112 Ibid., p. 436.
113 GC, vol. 6, p. 435.
114 Ibid., p. 436.
115 GC, vol. 1, instrumenta, p. 4: ‘Donamus ergo Froterius et Bernardus ad Guillermum filium Bernardi Ameli suum episcopatum subscriptum post mortem Ameli episcopi . . . in tali ratione ut teneat Froterius episcopus et Bernardus frater eius, in pignore et mediateate, de ipsa dominicatura, de ipso episcopatu.’ The successor to Amelius II was called Guillem, and therefore may well have been the son of Bernard Aimard, acquiring the see in fulfilment of this by then old arrangement.
116 Despite the name, probably not a member of the elder branch of the Trencavel family.
'Grave oppression of the citizens'  

Albi'. This excommunication marked the end of Trencavel dominance of the bishopric of Albi. After this date, the see was not occupied by any further members of the Trencavel family and, while the Trencavel retained some control over episcopal elections into the twelfth century, they were never again in a position, as they were in the early eleventh century, to insist on the subjugation of episcopal interests to those of the viccomital family. From 1066, the chief secular power in Albi was the bishop, and by the advent of the crusade Trencavel control in both the town and the county appears to have been minimal.

The situation in Albi was mirrored by that in Agde, in which Trencavel control was likewise limited by episcopal power. In the division of the Trencavel lands by Bernard Aton IV's will of 1129, Agde was left, along with Béziers, to his second son, Raimond Trencavel. In 1150, following some disagreements, it was divided between Raimond and his younger brother Bernard Aton V, Viscount of Nîmes, in a settlement which gave Bernard Aton the city of Agde and the title of viscount, but all the land west of the river Hérault to Raimond. This amounted to about half of the county and should have given Raimond Trencavel considerable authority in Agde, had it not been for the increasing control exercised by the bishop. In 1173, Louis VII granted extensive privileges to Guillem, Bishop of Agde, including the lordship of one third of the town, the right to fortify both churches in Agde and the town itself and jurisdiction over all the fortifications already in existence. The implication of the grant is that the power given here to the bishop was not being exercised by either Bernard Aton or Roger II: Louis' statement that he allowed the bishop to construct fortifications 'because of fear of the Saracens and the frequent incursions of evil men' suggests that the secular lords of Agde had neither the ability nor the interest necessary to defend the town. When Bernard Aton VI donated the whole viscounty of Agde to the Church to signify his intention to enter religious life in 1187, this may not have meant a great change to a

117 GC, vol. 1, instrumenta, p. 4: 'qui pro inductione episcopi Albiensis pecuniam non parvum accipere erant soliti'.

118 The origins of most of the twelfth-century bishops of Albi are obscure, but the see does not appear to have been dominated by any one family following the end of Trencavel domination in 1066.

119 See the agreement over the right of election between Raimond V of Toulouse and Roger I in 1132: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 980–1.


122 Ibid., pp. 1122–4.

123 Ibid.: 'Quod Trencavellus donet fratris suo Bernardo-Atuni civitatem Agathem cum omni suo territorio . . . et donet ei totum Agathe nem sicut Eraudi dividit versus Orientem.'

124 GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, pp. 328–9. Bonde argues that the Bishop of Agde was the chief secular authority in Agde in 1173: Bonde, Fortress-Churches, p. 122.

125 GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, p. 329: 'Damus etiam licentiam in ipsa ecclesia et civitate ob timorem Saracenorum et propter frequentiam incursus iniquorum hominum faciendi turris, munitiones muros, posternulos et portarum tuitiones et valles et quaecunque ecclesiae et ipsi civitatis novis expedire.'

126 Ibid., pp. 329–30. The extent to which any property changed hands in 1187 is unclear: Bernard Aton was regarded as Viscount of Agde by Simon de Montfort, who required him to surrender both Nîmes and Agde to his control in 1214: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 651–3.
situation in which the bishop was already the most effective secular authority in his see.

The Trencavel may also have experienced problems with Béziers, where the bishops held the secular jurisdiction of about half the town.\(^{127}\) Trencavel relations with the Béziers episcopate do not appear to have been marred by the same power struggle which took place in Albi, but it is possible that there were other problems which diminished Trencavel influence in, and control over, the town and county of Béziers and which restricted the response by the lords of Béziers to the dispossession and death of Raimond Roger in 1209. In the years after 1068, Trencavel influence in Béziers may have been greater than it was in Carcassonne and the viscounts identified themselves more strongly with this town than they did with Carcassonne or even Albi, their original seat. To historians, the family identity was expressed by the name ‘Trencavel’, which was first taken by Raimond Bernard, Viscount of Albi (d.1078) and then by various of his descendants. It was described as a *cognomen*\(^ {128}\) and has been regarded as a surname,\(^ {129}\) since this is the classical Latin meaning of the term. However, this was not how the name was used. While the use of Trencavel was more complex than that of a simple nickname,\(^ {130}\) it remained specifically connected with Raimond Bernard and his commemoration, being reserved for those members of the family who had been given the name Raimond.\(^ {131}\) That ‘Trencavel’ remained the possession of only those named for Raimond Bernard, and not those with other given names, indicates that it was not perceived by members of the family as the principal means of asserting their family identity.

This contrasts with the attitude towards ‘Trencavel’ displayed by those outside the core of the male descendants of Raimond Bernard. The name ‘Trencavel’ seems to have been used by others to identify members of the family, and to signal their own relationship to it. Bernard Aton IV’s daughter, Ermengarde, married to Gausfred de Bouillon, Count of Roussillon, was twice referred to as ‘Trencavella’ by her son Gerard, once when making a donation to La Grasse in 1139,\(^ {132}\) and once in 1150, when he agreed to sell part of her dower lands to Raimond Trencavel.\(^ {133}\) In both cases, the charters dealt with lands which Ermengarde held as a result of her

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128 It was first called a *cognomen* in 1080 by Raimond Bernard’s widow, Ermengarde (CT, fols. 27–27v) and subsequently by Raimond Trencavel I in 1142 (Doat 72, fols. 25–26v: ‘Raymundus qui cognominor Trencavelli’).
129 Dauzat, *Noms de famille de France*, p. 36.
130 Nicknames were comparatively rare among the higher nobility of Languedoc and Catalonia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries: two other examples are Ramon Berenguer II, Count of Barcelona (1076–82), who was called ‘Cap d’Estopes’ (Towhead), and Alfons, Count of Toulouse (1112–48), who was called Jourdain because he had been born in the Holy Land in 1103 while his father was on crusade and had been baptised in the Jordan. In neither case were these nicknames subsequently assumed by other family members, although Jourdain became an accepted given name in Languedoc.
131 It was used by Bernard Aton IV’s second son, Raimond (d.1167), Raimond’s second son, Raimond (d. post 1211), and Raimond Roger’s only son, Raimond (d. post 1263).
133 Doat 166, fols. 104–105v.
Trencavel descent and the use of the name ‘Trencavella’ on the part of her son can be seen as a way of stressing her Trencavel origins and hence his own connection to the family. In a similar fashion Cecile, daughter of Raimond Trencavel, referred to herself as ‘the daughter of the late Trencavel’ in 1167, in the transaction in which Raimond V de St Gilles, Count of Toulouse (1148–1194) attempted to remove Béziers from Roger II and give it to Cecile’s husband, Roger Bernard, Count of Foix. The transfer of Béziers to the Count of Foix would have benefited from the implication of legitimacy supplied by Cecile’s Trencavel descent and that this was expressed through the name ‘Trencavel implies an external perception of a family identity centred on it. In the same way, male members of the family who did not use the name could have it applied to them by others, as it was, for example, to Roger II by Bertrand de Saissac, one of the most powerful lords of the county of Carcassonne, in 1173.

This external pattern of use for the name ‘Trencavel’ seems to have been adopted by Raimond Trencavel II, who took the name ‘Trencavel’ in a much more consistent fashion than any of his predecessors and used it to the exclusion of his given name, Raimond. This is in contrast to the way that ‘Trencavel’ was used by his predecessors, as Raimond I, for example, called himself simply ‘Trencavel’ very rarely, and is more usually referred to as ‘Raimond Trencavel’. Given that Raimond Trencavel II spent his life in unsuccessful attempts to regain his father’s lands, it is unsurprising that his use of names appears to have been tailored to an internal as opposed to an external appreciation of the family identity: his insistence on the name Trencavel would have been a reminder to others of his lost heritage.

For the members of the Trencavel family themselves, however, the name which most expressed their identity was not their nickname but the toponym ‘of Béziers’. That the twelfth-century Trencavel had a particular fondness for the title ‘Viscount of Béziers’ is suggested by its greater use in comparison to the other vicecomital titles to which they could lay claim. Raimond Trencavel, for example, only once used the title ‘Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne’, and that was directly after his inheritance of Carcassonne from his brother in 1150. His son, Roger II, made greater use of multiple titles than his predecessors, calling himself ‘Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne’ in 1179 and ‘Viscount of Béziers, Carcassonne, Albi and Razès’ in 1179 and ‘Viscount of Béziers, Carcassonne, Albi and Razès’ in 1184.

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134 Doat 167, fols. 299–301v: ‘filiam quoniam Trencavelli’.
135 Ibid., fols. 57–58.
136 Raimond Trencavel was referred to by both names in his surrender to Simon de Montfort and the Albigensian crusaders in 1210 (Baluze 81, fol. 25; Doat 75, fols. 16–18), but subsequently was consistently called simply ‘Trencavel’ (GC, vol. 6, instrumenta, p. 201; Doat 169, fols. 279–80; de Catel, Mémoires, p. 647).
137 For example de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1069–72, 1106; LFM, vol. 1, pp. 332–4; CT, fol. 201.
138 Treaty with Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona: LFM, vol. 2, pp. 328–9. Bernard Aton IV also made occasional use of the title ‘Viscount of Carcassonne’, as for example in his will of 1118 (Doat 166, fols. 1–2v), but had a marked preference for the Béziers title.
139 In his surrender to Alfons II of Aragon (1162–1196) (LFM, vol. 2, pp. 328–9), and his will (Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 283–4).
1185, but he also showed a marked preference for the title ‘Viscount of Béziers’, which he used more frequently than any other vicecomital title and which he usually cited first in any list of titles.

In addition to this preference for the vicecomital title, members of the Trencavel family also used Béziers as a toponym. Roger II, for example, described himself as ‘Roger of Béziers’ in charters dating from 1177 and 1191, neither of which actually related to Béziers itself, the first being a sale of lands in Carcassonne and the second an agreement over the secular jurisdiction of Albi. This use of Béziers to express family identity was particularly marked in the case of Roger I, who was never ruler of Béziers, but who consistently referred to himself as ‘Roger of Béziers’. In similar fashion, the name continued in use long after Béziers had been lost to the French Crown: in 1263, Roger, son of Raimond Trencavel, participated in his father’s charter under the name ‘Roger of Béziers’. In contrast to their identification by others as the Trencavel family, the Trencavel identified themselves principally through the Béziers toponym, creating a family identity which persisted when their rule of the town was only a memory.

Despite the continuing identification of themselves as the lords of Béziers, by 1209 Béziers had become less important than Carcassonne to its viscounts. At the approach of the crusaders in June 1209, although Raimond Roger ‘worked night and day to defend his lands’, his efforts were almost entirely devoted to Carcassonne, leaving the inhabitants of Béziers in ‘great distress and anxiety’ to see to the defence of Carcassonne even though it was evident that the crusaders, advancing westwards from Montpellier, would reach Béziers first. The absence from Béziers of any members of the vicecomital court when it was taken by the crusaders and, in contrast, the presence of such central figures in Trencavel government as Pierre Roger de Cabaret at Carcassonne, shows how Béziers was effectively abandoned by Raimond Roger to face the crusaders on its own, and demonstrates the comparative value placed by the Trencavel on their two major towns.

In Béziers, the authority of the viscount was challenged by that of the citizens.
themselves. Béziers had a consulate from 1131 and the power of this urban oligarchy must have had the effect of diminishing the control which could be exercised by the Trencavel over the town. Conflicts between the viscounts and the citizens are indeed the most obvious cause of the Béziers rebellion in 1167, in which Raimond Trencavel was murdered. The most detailed account of the rebellion, that given by William of Newburgh, attributes the death of the viscount to Raimond’s failure to uphold the rights of the citizens of Béziers over those of his knights. According to William, the incident which provoked the rebellion occurred while Raimond Trencavel was on campaign, assisting his nephew, Bernard Aton VI, Viscount of Nîmes, against the Count of Toulouse. While his troops were on the march, there was an argument between a knight and a citizen arising from the use of the former’s horse as a beast of burden: ‘It happened that a certain citizen of Béziers, along with certain of his fellow citizens, caused an injury petulantly to a not ignoble knight, who was proceeding along the road at the same time, having taken the horse of the knight away and set it to bearing burdens along the road.’

The knight complained to Raimond Trencavel and his fellow knights stated that they would leave the army if their colleague did not receive satisfaction. Raimond Trencavel was therefore forced to support the knight; the citizen was punished, although not harshly, and the others who were with him were dismissed from the army. This in turn enraged the citizens and the viscount arranged a meeting in Béziers cathedral to deal with their complaints once and for all. The citizens, however, thinking either that they had been insulted beyond the possibility of remedy, or that Raimond did not actually intend to do anything for them, came to the cathedral with weapons hidden under their clothes and, on a given signal, attacked and murdered the viscount. Roger II, Raimond Trencavel’s son and heir, was unable to regain control of Béziers until 1168, despite the efforts which Alfonso of Aragon made in besieging the town on his behalf. Once Roger had been reinstalled as the ruler of Béziers, he took revenge on the citizens by introducing

147 The consulate, an office which emerged in many southern French towns in the twelfth century, was an urban magistracy. Sometimes a member of the lord’s court, but more usually a prominent citizen, the consul often represented the increasing power of the citizens against the nobility. On the consulate in Béziers, the most informative account remains Julia, Histoire de Béziers, pp. 295–8. On consuls generally see Patterson, World of the Troubadours, pp. 165–70; Mundy and Riesenbarg, Medieval Town, pp. 48–53; Lewis, ‘Development of Town Government’, pp. 51–67, and idem, ‘Seigneurial Administration’, pp. 562–7, especially pp. 567–8. For consuls in the thirteenth century, see Given, State and Society, pp. 57–8; Bousquet, ‘Traité d’alliance’, pp. 25–42; and in Catalonia, see Daileader, ‘Vanishing Consulates of Catalonia’, pp. 65–94. The most notable conflict between consuls and lords in the twelfth century was in Toulouse, see Limouzin-Lamothe, Commune de Toulouse, pp. 106–135; Mundy, Liberty, pp. 53–89.

148 Trencavel relations with the citizens of Béziers are discussed by Débax, Féodalité languedocienne, pp. 276–9, and Duhamel-Amado, ‘De la Cité Visigothique à la ville médiévale’, pp. 71–94.

149 But this is not to exclude the possibility of some noble involvement in the revolt, see note 160 below.


151 Ibid., pp. 126–7: ‘Contigit autem ut quidam Bederensis, numero fretus concivium, equiti cuidam non ignobili simul procedenti petulanter injuriam faceret, equo ejus militari . . . ablato, et ferendis in via sarcinis deputato.’

152 Ibid., p. 129.
Aragonese troops into the city, ostensibly to protect it against the Count of Toulouse, but actually to murder the citizens with whom they were quartered.\footnote{Ibid., p. 130.}

This is by far the most detailed version of the revolt of Béziers and the murder of Raimond Trencavel, but it is borne out in essentials by other accounts. William’s description of the murder itself is similar to that given by Pierre des Vaux,\footnote{Pierre des Vaux, xvi, 565–7.} with both authors mentioning details such as the attempt by the bishop to protect Raimond Trencavel.\footnote{Ibid, 566: ‘episcopo etiam suo, qui vicecomitem ab illorum manibus defendere nitebatur dentes confregere’; William of Newburgh, vol. 1, p. 128: ‘frustra se paene usque ad periculum proprium objectante episcopo’.} Pierre des Vaux is unlikely to have used William of Newburgh as his source: although writing forty years after the event, he spent much time in the Languedoc and would presumably have had many local sources of information. Gaufred de Vigeois, a local and near contemporary writer dealing with the revolt, also bears out William of Newburgh’s account, although with much greater brevity and with more emphasis on Roger’s revenge on the town, not mentioned by Pierre des Vaux.\footnote{Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, pp. 440–1.} None of the accounts of the revolt identify the leader or any of the participants, but Sigal has recently suggested that the leader, who may have been both the citizen who provoked the original incident and the murderer of Raimond Trencavel, was a certain Bernard, who ended his days as a recluse attached to the abbey of St Bertain, and who was rapidly accorded saintly status following his death in 1182. According to his Vita, he had been condemned to seven years’ penitence for crimes committed as the leader of a revolt in Languedoc by the Bishop of Maguelonne in 1170, and the Béziers rebellion is the only urban revolt of the right date.\footnote{Acta Sanctorum (Antwerp 1675), April II, pp. 676–97; Sigal, ‘Bernard le Penitent’, pp. 275–7.}

The citizens of Béziers probably had long-standing grievances underlying the incident described by William of Newburgh. That Raimond Trencavel’s rule was generally disliked in Béziers before this incident is suggested by Gaufred de Vigeois, who attributed the rebellion to its tyrannical character: ‘They swore that they would return him alive to Toulouse, because he gravely oppressed the citizens.’\footnote{Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, p. 441: ‘Juraverunt enim Tolosano vivum illum reddere ipsi, eo quod graviter opprimere cives.’} Raimond Trencavel was allied with Alfons of Aragon in 1167, and so this was essentially a threat to turn him over to his enemies. This use by the citizens of Béziers of a Trencavel overlord to help diminish the power of the Trencavel is a reflection of similar tactics used by the citizens of Carcassonne with the Count of Barcelona in 1107 and 1120.\footnote{In particular with the Nairat family, who held most of the bourg of Maureilhan from the bishops of Béziers. Pierre Nairat was still in exile in 1180, probably for his role in the 1167 rebellion, and was referred to by Roger as ‘the traitor Pierre Nairat’: Doat 61, fols. 290–291v. On the Nairat and the Trencavel, see Duhamel-Amado, ‘De la Cité Visigothique à la ville médiévales’;}

\footnote{148 The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade}
demonstrated, for example, by the existence of a vicar of Béziers in 1176 and 1190–1204. It is equally probable however that relations between the Trencavel and the citizens did not become notably more cordial and that the same problems which sparked the 1167 rebellion also limited the cooperation between the viscount and the citizens of Béziers in the face of the crusade. William of Newburgh’s version of the 1167 Béziers rebellion presents it as a class conflict, in which the knights of Béziers supported the viscount against the citizens, but this reflects his own prejudices and it should not be assumed that the Béziers nobility were represented only among Raimond Trencavel’s supporters. It is possible that Trencavel authority over the lords of Béziers was hampered by as many problems as that over the citizens and that the viscounts could count on as little support from the county as they could from the town. In the early twelfth century, the Trencavel enjoyed good relations with many powerful lords from the county of Béziers and members of important Béziers families such as the lords of Servian and Murviel appear as witnesses to Trencavel charters. Considerable effort was put into maintaining this favourable situation, the marriage of Bernard Aton IV’s eldest daughter Matheline to Guillaume Arnauld de Béziers in 1105 being only one example. Following the establishment of Trencavel power in Carcassonne after the end of the 1120

161 1176: Bertrand de Capestang (Doat 168, fols. 113–113v).
163 It has been argued that the citizens of Béziers attempted to hold out against the crusaders out of loyalty to the Trencavel: Barrain, ‘Le massacre de 1209’, pp. 95–114, at pp. 101–2. However, it is not necessary to invoke Trencavel loyalties to explain why the citizens resisted foreign troops demanding that they hand over 200 of their number, suspected of heresy, to be executed. Raimond Roger’s desertion of Béziers on the approach of the crusade makes it more unlikely that the citizens would have held out for his sake.
164 Both William of Newburgh and Gaufred de Vigeois describe Raimond Trencavel as having supporters who died with him in the cathedral at Béziers: William of Newburgh, p. 128; Gaufred de Vigeois, Bouquet 12, p. 441. These were presumably representatives of the knights whose rights Raimond upheld over those of the citizens.
165 Raimond Stéphane de Servian and Sicard de Murviel, 1130, agreement between Roger I and Raimond Trencavel (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 960–2; 1130, protection from Alfons Jourdain, Count of Toulouse (ibid., pp. 962–3; CT, fols. 199–199v; Doat 165, fols. 163–163v, 166, 134–135v).
166 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 3, p. 567. A Guillaume Arnauld de Béziers, presumably the son of Matheline and Guillaume Arnauld, appears as a witness to charters for Raimond Trencavel between 1130 and 1150, and was named in Raimond Trencavel’s will of 1154 as one of those who was to care for Béziers in Roger’s minority: Mahul, vol. 5, pp. 271–2; Doat 167, fols. 143–6.
rebellion, however, lords from the county of Béziers were to play an ever-diminishing role in Trencavel government.

After the 1120s, very few lords from Béziers appear as witnesses to Trencavel charters dealing with matters pertaining to Carcassonne or its county. This could be explained as a demonstration of the separation made between the administrations of the two counties, a natural arrangement considering their rule by different viscounts for the twenty years between 1130 and 1150, but there is no evidence for such a distinction after 1150: members of the Trencavel court who can be identified as coming from Carcassonne frequently appear as witnesses to charters dealing with Béziers. Thus the comparatively small proportion of lords from Béziers appearing as witnesses to Trencavel charters in the later twelfth century implies their exclusion from a Trencavel government largely conducted from Carcassonne, an impression heightened by the identities of the vicars of Béziers. The post was held in 1176 by a lord from Capestang in Narbonne and from 1199 by Bernard Pelapol, a family particularly connected with Carcassonne. In the later twelfth century, the Trencavel government of Béziers also did not include representatives of the most powerful family of the county, that of the lords of Servian. Raimond Roger, in particular, seems to have made efforts to maintain good relations with Stéphane de Servian, as demonstrated for example by his donation of land for the building of a fortress in August 1199. However, the non-appearance of the lords of Servian as witnesses to Trencavel charters after the early twelfth century suggests that they were not so much vicecomital subjects as rivals in Béziers for vicecomital power and that Stéphane de Servian’s influence is more likely to have diminished than enhanced that of Raimond Roger.

The lack of inclusion of lords from Béziers in Trencavel rule over the county would have had the effect of both making that rule less secure and of precluding any particular loyalty from Béziers to the Trencavel. Very few lords of Béziers would have had vested interests in maintaining the Trencavel, and they, like the citizens of Béziers, may have resisted the crusaders on their own account rather than for Raimond Roger. Despite the wide lands which the Trencavel could claim to rule, by the second half of the twelfth century their real influence appears to have been centred on and largely restricted to Carcassonne. In 1154, Raimond Trencavel made a will while imprisoned by the Count of Toulouse. In this document,

167 Roger I, Viscount of Carcassonne, Albi and Razès, and his brother, Raimond Trencavel, Viscount of Béziers.
168 For example, Roger II’s permission for a market to be held in the castle of Gabian in Béziers in 1180 was witnessed by, among others, Pierre de St Michel, then vicar of Carcassonne (Le Livre Noir, pp. 390–1), and Bertrand de Saisac’s confirmation of privileges granted by Roger II to the Bishop of Béziers in 1194 was witnessed by lords from Fanjeaux and Montréal, and the vicars of both Carcassonne and the Razès (Doat 61, fols. 322–325v).
169 Bertrand de Capestang: Doat 168, fols. 113–113v.
170 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 468–9, and 483–5.
171 The power of the lords of Servian is indicated by Stéphane de Servian being the only lord of Béziers whose assent was necessary to the agreement between Bertrand de Saisac and Bishop Gausfred of Béziers over the regency government of Raimond Roger: Doat 61, fols. 316–19.
172 CT, fol. 243; Doat 169, fols. 75–8.
presumably because he had no access to members of his family or court with whom he could make arrangements in person, he recorded those on whom his son could rely in his minority in each part of the Trencavel lands. The lords who were to administer Béziers and Albi were from families among the most powerful in their respective viscounties: for Béziers, Guillem Arnauld and Berengar de Béziers and Adémari de Murviel, and for Albi Isarn de Dornan, Ugo de Cenceon and Guillem Aton de Curvale. None of these lords had appeared previously as a frequent witness to Trencavel charters and by contrast, the lords who were to administer Carcassonne were those at the centre of viccomital government: Bernard de Canet senior and junior, Guillem de St Felix and Bernard Pelapol. Envisaging his son’s minority in the event of his own early death, Raimond Trencavel provided for the administration of each of his viscounties by members of the local elite. It was only in Carcassonne that this intersected with the group of leading figures of Trencavel government. The suggestion of the will is that Trencavel rule was centred on the group of Carcassonne families created after the 1120–1124 rebellion, outside which their influence was substantially weaker.

Trencavel influence over many lords of Carcassonne, however, appears to have been similarly limited. While Trencavel viscounts of Carcassonne from 1124 onwards were reasonably successful in establishing their authority over lords from much of the county of Carcassonne, they were relatively powerless in outlying areas of the county, in particular in the Montagne Noire. The Montagne Noire, to the north of Carcassonne, was inhabited in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by various powerful families connected by a network of marriages and alliances which also spread to lords in the Montagnes d’Alaric to the south. For most of the

174 Among the most powerful of the lords of the Montagne Noire were the lords of Saisac, the lords of Cabaret and the lords of Minerve, while the most influential in the Pyrenees were the lords of Termes. The lords of Saisac held a number of castles in the western Montagne Noire and also Montréal, whose lord, Aimery, was related to the lords of Laurac and of Niort in the Razés: Roquebert, *L’épopée cathare*, vol. 1, p. 114, and see Gordon, ‘Laity and the Catholic Church’, pp. 147–174 on the twelfth-century lords of Saisac. In 1195, a member of the Saisac family married the heiress of Fenouilledes in the Razés. They were also connected to the lords of Hautpoul in the northern Montagne Noire. The lords of Cabaret were linked by marriage to the lords of Hautpoul: a Guillem Peire, named as a lord of Cabaret in 1137, referred to himself as the son of Azalais d’Hautpoul (CT, fols. 90v–91), and had particular connections with the lords of Miraval in the Montagne Noire and Puylaurens in the south-west. Their lands in the early twelfth century had spread as far as Castres, but this was ceded to Bernard Aton IV after the rebellion of Carcassonne in 1120–4 (Mahul, vol. 3, p. 29). They remained the overlords of Aragon and of Vilarzel in the Razés, which was held from them by the lords of Fanjeaux, and also had substantial holdings at Lauran in the Minervois (Allabert, ‘Une seigneurie alliée: Lauré’, pp. 85–7; de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1271–3; Mahul, vol. 3, p. 29). For the most recent study of the lords of Cabaret, see Gardel, ‘La seigneurie de Cabaret’, pp. 65–82. The lords of Cabaret had marriage connections with the lords of Niort and Peyrepertuse. On the lords of Peyrepertuse, see Ovehan, *La seigneurie de Peyrepertuse*. The lords of Minerve also had connections with the Razés: in 1191, Guillem de Minerve contracted an advantageous marriage with Rixovende de Termes: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 412–14. The extent to which the lords of the Montagne Noire functioned as a cohesive group can be overstated as there are many examples of disagreements such as the murderous feud between Miraval and Hautpoul in
twelfth century, the infrequent appearance of lords from the Montagne Noire in
Trencavel charters suggests that the viscounts could attract few of the most powerful
lords to their court175 and they were similarly unable to exert over them any coercive
power. As the crusaders discovered, many of the castles were almost impregnable
and the lords would certainly have been able to resist any Trencavel attempts to take
them. According to Pierre des Vaux, the castle of Cabaret was ‘an extremely strong
and almost impregnable castle near Carcassonne, fortified with many men’,176 the
castle of Minerve was very difficult to take: ‘The castle was unbelievably strong, sur-
rrounded by very deep natural ravines, so that, if an army wished to attack it, it could
not approach it without undergoing the greatest danger’,177 and the castle of Hautpoul was in an even better position: ‘The castle of Hautpoul was sited in an
inaccessible situation, on the peak of a very high and steep mountain, on top of huge
boulders; it was so strong that . . . even if the doors of the castle were open, and there
was no one resisting, no one could walk up to the castle and reach the tower without
great difficulty.’178

The realities of the power relationship between the Trencavel and the most
powerful lords of the Montagne Noire are demonstrated by the construction of the

castle of Surdespine by the lords of Cabaret, at some time between 1137 and
1143.179 The site of the castle of Cabaret, above the village of Lastours in the
Montagne Noire about twenty miles north of Carcassonne, was already heavily forti-
fied prior to the construction of the castle of Surdespine. In addition to the main
castle of Cabaret, another, Quertinoux, was probably in existence by the early
twelfth century on an adjoining peak.180 It cannot have been in Roger I’s interests to
allow the building of a third castle at this already formidable position and his accep-
tance of its construction, apparently retrospectively, in 1145 was probably a way of
maintaining the fiction of his authority over the lords of Cabaret by not inviting

the early thirteenth century, which resulted from the murder of a retainer of Pierre Raimond
d’Hautpoul by Gaucelin de Miraval: Peal, ‘Spread and Maintenance of Catharism in
Languedoc’, p. 74. However, the extent to which these lords co-operated with each other
against the crusade implies the existence of a group identity which predates it: Pierre des Vaux,
iii, 630–631; xxxvi, 584, and see pp. 123–4 above.
175 The exceptions to this are the lords of Hautpoul, from the northern edge of the Montagne Noire
in the county of Albi, and the lords of Aragon, near Carcassonne, who were dominated by the
lords of Cabaret.
176 Pierre des Vaux, xxxvi, 577: ‘castrum quodam prope Carcassonam fortissimum, et quasi
inexpugnabile et multis milibus munitum’.
177 Pierre des Vaux, xxxvi, 585: ‘Castrum autem illud incredibilis erat fortitudinis, profundissimis
quippe et natvis vallibus cingebatur; itaque si necessitas ingrueret, non poterat exercitus
exercitii sine maximo discrimine subvenire.’
178 Pierre des Vaux, iii, 630: ‘Castrum autem Altipulli, in altissimi et archissimi montis arquitate,
super rupes maximas et quasi inaccessibiles situm erat; tantae siquidem erat fortitudinis . . .
quod si aperae essent ianuae castris, et nullus peditus resisteret, non posset quis sine gravi
difficultate ipsum castrum perambulare et ad turrim ipsum pertingere.’
179 The lords of Cabaret recognized that they held Cabaret from Roger I in 1137 without any
mention of the existence of Surdespine: CT, fols. 90–1. Barber discusses the case of Surdespine:
‘Catharism and the Occitan Nobility’, pp. 9–12.
180 Doat 166, fols. 233–236v. A further castle, La Tour Regina, was built at the same site at some
time in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.
defiance.\textsuperscript{181} Both Roger and his successor Raimond Trencavel appear to have felt threatened by Surdespine castle. Roger received another submission from the lords of Cabaret for Surdespine just before his death in 1150, in which they swore not to hold the castle against him (a likely indication that this was precisely what they had been doing)\textsuperscript{182} and in 1153, Raimond Trencavel also accepted the existence of the third castle at Cabaret, referring as he did so to the disputes and quarrels which he and Roger had had with the lords of Cabaret over the matter.\textsuperscript{183} The dealings of the Trencavel over the castle of Surdespine demonstrate their lack of influence over the lords of the Montagne Noire. Although the lords of Cabaret plainly had enough interest in the Trencavel to want to preserve the appearance of Trencavel lordship over them, that both Roger and Raimond Trencavel were brought to accept the existence of the new castle which they resented indicates that the lords of Cabaret could have considerable independence when they chose to exercise it. The Trencavel were not in a position in which they could coerce the lords of Cabaret and this seems an accurate portrayal of their relations with most of the lords of the Montagne Noire.

The degree to which the lords of the Montagne Noire showed interest in participation in Trencavel government fluctuated throughout the twelfth century. Raimond Trencavel was more successful than his predecessors in attracting lords from families such as those of Saisssac, Minerve, Miraval and Les Ilhes to his court and this process was revived during the last years of Roger II’s rule. Bertrand de Saisssac became a frequent witness to Trencavel charters from 1179\textsuperscript{184} and Roger’s attempts to involve lords from the Montagne Noire in his government reached their peak in 1191, when Roger gathered a number of lords, principally from Carcassonne and including Bertrand de Saisssac and the lords of Cabaret and Aragon, to Saisssac to swear an oath of loyalty to his six-year-old son, Raimond Roger.\textsuperscript{185} These efforts appear to have been largely successful, as Raimond Roger’s rule saw an increase in the involvement of Montagne Noire lords in his government. Not only was his guardian during his minority Bertrand de Saisssac, but the vicar of Carcassonne in 1204 was Pierre Roger de Cabaret.\textsuperscript{186} However, while Raimond Roger’s court may have owed its composition to the efforts made by his father to involve the lords of the Montagne Noire in his government, it is possible that this had an alienating effect on those lords who were more traditionally associated with support for the Trencavel. During Raimond Roger’s rule, the lords of Canet, St Felix and many others either became less frequent witnesses to charters or stopped appearing altogether. This meant not only a change in the personnel of Trencavel government, but also a potential change in the degree of loyalty felt towards the Trencavel by the principal supporters of their government. The interest of the Montagne Noire lords in

\textsuperscript{181} de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, p. 1066.
\textsuperscript{182} Doat 167, fols. 58–9.
\textsuperscript{183} Mahul, vol. 3, p. 30: ‘clamis et querimoniis’.
\textsuperscript{184} He witnessed the agreement between Roger II and Ramon Berenguer, Count of Provence in 1179: CT, fols. 193v–194.
\textsuperscript{185} Mahul, vol. 5, p. 283: ‘omnes praedicti milites, congregati ad colloquium apud Sauxcenx, de mandato Rogeris vicecomitis Biterrensis’.
\textsuperscript{186} Doat 62, fols. 9–14v.
vicecomital government was more usually directed at avoiding than supporting it
and they had no tradition of loyalty to the Trencavel to compare to that of the
families who had ruled with the Trencavel since 1124. The result of Roger’s
policies towards the Montagne Noire in the last fifteen years of his rule may have
been to leave his son reliant on these most unreliable of subjects and isolated against
the crusade.

The Trencavel, in common with many of the higher nobility of Languedoc, had
pretensions to power which far exceeded the limits of their authority and a nominal
claim to many lands over which they were unable to rule. They coupled this with a
willingness to assume a style more appropriate for their nominal than actual power.
The acquisition of Béziers, Carcassonne and Razès by Raimond Bernard Trencavel
in 1068 has been said to mark ‘the Trencavel family’s leap from obscurity to major
temporal power’. Raimond Bernard not only gained far more extensive lands
than had ever been held by the family before, but also potentially increased the
status, in the sense of their standing among the nobility as distinct from their power
or actual legal authority, of his family. From their previous position as the viscounts
of Albi and Nîmes, the Trencavel, by virtue of their new lands, were effectively
counts of Carcassonne, among the highest nobility of Languedoc. Although the
Trencavel were never able to rival the counts of Foix or Toulouse in power, their
desire to present themselves as similarly powerful and independent is apparent
throughout the twelfth century.

The apogee of Trencavel status was in 1171, when Roger II was granted Minerve
by Louis VII as a reward for his new allegiance to Raimond V, Count of
Toulouse. Minerve was already part of the Trencavel domains, as it lay in the
county of Béziers, and the Trencavel had established nominal authority over the
lords of Minerve, who made a number of submissions to them relating to their
possession of the town of Lauran in the Minervois during the twelfth century.
Louis VII’s grant seems less concerned with conferring property in return for
Roger’s allegiance than in conferring status. Although Minerve was given to Roger
by both Louis and Raimond V, the letter of donation makes clear that Roger was to
hold the castle directly from the King: ‘And so we . . . freely give and concede . . . the

187 An indication of the attitude of the lords of the Montagne Noire to the Trencavel may be pro-
vided by the troubadour Raimond de Miraval, who, although based at Toulouse, appears to
have maintained his connections to and his identity as a lord from the Montagne Noire.
Raimond de Miraval did not, as has been supposed, write for or about Raimond Roger, which
is unusual considering that he was nominally a Trencavel subject. His decision to ignore the
troubadour court of Raimond Roger’s mother, Adelaide, in favour of Toulouse, and to excise
all mentions of the Trencavel from his poems, may well be indicative of the way in which the
Trencavel were usually regarded by lords of the Montagne Noire.
189 For the early history of the counts of Carcassonne in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the most
complete narrative account remains de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 3, pp. 70, 115, 308–26, but also
190 de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, p. 279. Roger II also received Adelaide de Toulouse, Raimond V’s
daughter, as his wife: Doat 168, fols. 21–2.
191 Undated submission to Bernard Aton (CT, fols. 99–99v); undated submission to Roger (CT,
fols. 97v–98); 1161: submission to Raimond Trencavel (CT, fol. 106v).
castle of Minerve, so that the aforementioned lords of the castle shall hold it from you and shall become your men, and that you similarly shall hold the same castle from us and when we come into those parts, by divine grace, you shall become our man.\footnote{de Vic and Vaissèête, vol. 8, p. 279: ‘Etenim . . . liberaliter concedimus et donamus . . . castrum Minerbae, eo modo quod domini praedicti castrum illud de vos teneant et vos hominium inde faciant, et vos similiter idem castrum de nobis teneatis et cum ad partes vestras divina providente gratia, veniremus, nobis hominium faciatis.’} This donation, coupled with Roger’s advantageous marriage, therefore elevated him to a theoretical position similar to that of the counts of Toulouse themselves, as lords holding land in Languedoc directly from the King. The maintenance of the idea that the Trencavel were indeed among the most notable in Languedoc was, however, more difficult.

As a result of the acquisition of Carcassonne and Razès in 1068, following the surrender by Rangarde, mother of the last Count of Carcassonne, to the Count of Barcelona in 1070,\footnote{de Vic and Vaissèête, vol. 5, p. 576; Cheyette, ‘The “Sale” of Carcassonne’, pp. 839–43.} Raimond Bernard Trencavel was, to all intents and purposes, Count of Carcassonne. He ruled all the lands which had been held by the counts and his wife, Ermengarde, was the last count’s sister. That he did not assume the title of count in charters himself should not be particularly surprising, as the assumption of such titles held in right of a wife was by no means universal in Languedoc in this period, but there is no apparent reason why his son, Bernard Aton, should not have done so.\footnote{It has been suggested that the counts of Carcassonne did not apply the comital title to the place names of any of their counties: Cheyette, ‘The “Sale” of Carcassonne’, p. 828. This could be presented as an explanation for why the comital title was not transferred to the Trencavel, if not for the fact that the last counts of Carcassonne had begun the occasional use of place names in their titles by 1067 and were described in that manner by others: in 1059, for example, Pierre Raimond, Count of Carcassonne, was described as ‘Comes Biterrensem’ by Bernard Berengar, Viscound of Narbonne: Doat 48, fols. 8–8v. The use of titles by the counts of Carcassonne does not appear unusual by the mid eleventh century and cannot explain subsequent Trencavel use of titles.} Even more striking is the fact that Ermengarde herself did not use the title ‘countess’ in charters during the twenty years in which she ruled Carcassonne as regent for her son between 1078 and 1100, preferring instead to refer to herself solely as ‘viscountess’.\footnote{As for example in receiving a swearing of faith for Mirepoix, 1080: CT, fol. 50.} Ermengarde was also known as ‘viscountess’ by others, as for example in a peace treaty between Aimery II, Viscound of Narbonne, and a certain Roger, son of Gila, in 1111.\footnote{Doat 47, fols. 3–4v.} This is particularly unusual because Ermengarde, as the daughter of a count, could have used the title countess for herself regardless of the status of her husband, just as Adelaide, the daughter of the Count of Toulouse who married Roger II in 1171, described herself as viscountess when acting with Roger and as Countess when acting independently.\footnote{As for example when confirming a grant to Silvanes in 1180: Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Silvanes, pp. 407–8.}

It could be argued that the Trencavel simply saw themselves as viscounts, but the use of the title of ‘count’ in the coinage issued for Carcassonne by Bernard Aton, Roger I and Roger II demonstrates that they were interested, in certain conditions,
in their potential comital title. This raises the question of why their use of it was so limited.\textsuperscript{198} The use of titles in twelfth-century Languedoc did not always represent an objective reality and could relate less to the lands which any given noble held than to the status which they desired to claim. This can be seen most clearly in the case of the lords of Minerve. The lords of Minerve were under nominal Trencavel lordship throughout the twelfth century and appear in a number of Trencavel charters using their toponymic.\textsuperscript{199} In the mid-twelfth century, however, the lords of Minerve began an occasional assumption of their own vicecomital title: Guillem de Minerve used the title ‘Viscount of Minerve’ when making a donation to his son in 1161\textsuperscript{200} and Pierre de Minerve did the same when witnessing a charter for Ermengarde, Viscountess of Narbonne in 1163.\textsuperscript{201} Minerve had not had a viscount in the Carolingian period, nor were the lords of Minerve descended from families associated with viscounties elsewhere.\textsuperscript{202} For these lords, the vicecomital title was more an expression of their ambition than something conferred by the possession of certain lands.\textsuperscript{203}

It is clear that the nobles of twelfth-century Languedoc could not assume at will in their charters whatever titles they fancied. If these titles were essentially subjective, they represented consent between the lord assuming the title and those for whom it was assumed, and are indicative both of the images the lord assuming of them wished to project and a perception among the other parties about which charters were appropriate for his use. The use of the comital title in the Carcassonne coinage was possible because of its narrow circulation; as the coinage was virtually restricted to the town itself, the comital title was only assumed over those subjects over whom, after 1124, the Trencavel had established the most control.\textsuperscript{204} It can be supposed that the Trencavel did not assume the title of Count in their charters because they

\textsuperscript{198} Poey d’Avant, \textit{Monnais féodales de France}, vol. 1, pp. 275–8.
\textsuperscript{199} c.1120: submission to Bernard Aton for Lauran (CT, fols. 99–99v); 1143: agreement between Alfonso Jourdain, Count of Toulouse, and Roger I (de Vic and Vaisseté, vol. 5, pp. 1069–71); 1145: submission for Lauran to Roger I (ibid., p. 1066); 1149: donation by Roger I to Pierre de Minerve (ibid., pp. 1105–1107); 1163: submission by the lords of Termes to Raimond Trencavel (ibid., pp. 1274–5).
\textsuperscript{200} CT, fol. 106v; Doat 167, fols. 214–215v.
\textsuperscript{201} de Vic and Vaisseté, vol. 5, pp. 1273–4.
\textsuperscript{202} A discussion of the origins and development of the vicecomital title in France in purely feudal terms is provided by Duby, \textit{The Three Orders}, pp. 152–3, and is analysed in more detail in Werner, ‘Kingdom and Principality’, pp. 243–90.
\textsuperscript{203} Comital titles also seem to be used in a manner indicating their relation to status rather than to simple land holding, as for example Pierre de Lara, Viscount of Narbonne (1192–1202): ‘Comitem Petrum Vicecomitem Narbonae’ (Doat 48, fols. 34–35v). Pierre was also Count of Molina (Caille, ‘Seigneurs’, p. 242), but his use of the comital title as part of his name rather than with his other title indicates that this should be seen as a reference to status, and not as a list of possessions. This usage of comital titles, including their use by members of comital families who were not themselves counts, was a feature of twelfth century Castile, see Reilly, \textit{Kingdom of Léon-Castile}, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{204} Spufford, \textit{Money}, p. 191. The Trencavel tended not to use Carcassonne money in transactions with their subjects, preferring instead the Melgorian coinage.
were unable to do so and that this may have been the result of the way in which their acquisition and possession of Carcassonne were perceived.205

The Trencavel do not appear to have been regarded as the legitimate successors of the counts of Carcassonne, with rights over the title. This is suggested by an agreement recorded between Ermengarde and a certain Raimond son of Garsende in the late eleventh century.206 In this agreement, Raimond swore to support Ermengarde against anyone except for a number of lords who were specifically excluded. This list contained the majority of the most powerful lords of Languedoc and appears to have virtually nullified the value of the treaty by excluding from it all Ermengarde’s possible enemies. However, the list also included an unnamed ‘Count of Carcassonne’. The only lord aside from the Trencavel who could conceivably have been described as the Count of Carcassonne was the Count of Barcelona, but this is not a reference to him, as the Count of Barcelona is listed separately among those excluded from the requirements of the agreement. The inclusion of the name of the Count of Carcassonne in this treaty with Ermengarde therefore indicates that Ermengarde and the Trencavel were not regarded as the counts: the county of Carcassonne was vacant, and the Trencavel were merely lords who ruled their lands on sufferance. If it was considered necessary for this agreement to provide for the existence of a Count of Carcassonne, it seems reasonable to suppose that Ermengarde did not fill the position of that count.

There appears to have been no sense of continuity between Trencavel rule and that of the counts and the problems of status remained. Even in the late twelfth century, the Trencavel do not appear to have been regarded as the legitimate successors of the counts of Carcassonne. This is indicated by the composition of the Trencavel cartulary, compiled under Roger II in the late 1180s. The cartulary displays a sense of continuity between the twelfth-century Trencavel and their tenth- and eleventh-century ancestors who were viscounts of Albi, containing a number of charters recording recognitions by various lords that they held lands from Trencavel viscounts of Albi, dating back to the early eleventh century.207 The inclusion of these charters in the cartulary demonstrates that the twelfth-century Trencavel were regarded as the legitimate successors of their eleventh-century predecessors in Albi. The only charter relating to Lombers, a fair sized town near Albi, for example, dated from the early eleventh century and was a submission by the lords of Lombers to Aton II.208 This was worth its inclusion in the cartulary compiled by Roger because there was continuity between Aton and Roger: if previous lords of Lombers had accepted that they held the town under the Trencavel Viscount of Albi in the eleventh century, then this was a demonstration that the twelfth-century lords of Lombers should do so from Roger, as Aton’s successor.

205 Cheyette appears to have been aware, albeit almost unconsciously, of the problems associated with the comital title for the Trencavel, as he commented that ‘The Trencavel ... kept carefully to viscount and viscountess.’ This statement is not elaborated upon, but the phrase ‘kept carefully’ implies a sense that the Trencavel were not allowed to assume the comital title: Cheyette, ‘The “Sale” of Carcassonne’, p. 860.
206 CT, fols. 34–34v.
207 CT, fols. 1v–3v, 7v–9, 12, 16–16v, 18v, 30v–31, 41.
208 CT, fols. 16–16v.
Roger did not, however, use any charters of the counts of Carcassonne in his cartulary. This could be attributed to simple unavailability of the documents, but, given that the cartulary is most likely to have been compiled at Carcassonne, it seems odd that Roger should have had greater access to eleventh-century charters of his forebears, presumably transported from Albi, than to documents of a similar age which would have been kept at Carcassonne. In addition, it cannot be assumed that Roger possessed an original for every charter entered into the cartulary: it would have been an easy enough matter to recompose charters which had or should have existed, but which did not survive. The complete absence of charters pertaining to the counts of Carcassonne in the Trencavel cartulary indicates that they were not considered relevant to Roger’s argument for domination of the lords living on his lands. This can only be because there was no perceived continuity between Trencavel rule and that of the counts. If the fact that a previous lord of any given castle in Carcassonne had recognised that he held it from the counts of Carcassonne was not an argument that the twelfth-century lords of the same castle held it from Roger, then this is an indication that the Trencavel were still, in the late twelfth century, not regarded as the legitimate successors of the counts of Carcassonne.

This perception about the Trencavel acquisition of the lands of the counts of Carcassonne had profound implications both for their relations with their neighbours and overlords and for their internal rule over their lands. It is possible that Trencavel unpopularity in Carcassonne in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, as demonstrated by the rebellions of 1107 and 1120–1124, was rooted in the perceived illegitimacy of their succession from the counts and that this also contributed to their later difficulties in Béziers. The Trencavel acquisition of Béziers differed from that of Carcassonne and the Razés in it was not covered by the 1068 agreements. It has been argued that Béziers formed part of Ermengarde’s dowry when she married Raimond Bernard in c.1065, but there is no direct evidence for this contention and it is just as likely that Béziers was Ermengarde’s portion of a division of Count Roger’s lands between his sisters, a partible inheritance arrangement which would not have been unusual practice even among the highest nobility of Languedoc in the eleventh century.

The difference in acquisition does not appear to have created any greater legitimacy for the Trencavel in Béziers. While they were more secure in Béziers than in Carcassonne in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, they were not the successors of the counts. There are no charters pertaining to Béziers under the counts of Carcassonne in the Trencavel cartulary and the perception that the Trencavel were not entitled to the comital title also seems to have existed in Béziers in the twelfth century. On his coinage issued for Béziers, Bernard Aton described himself as ‘count’. However, his son, Raimond Trencavel, used no title at all on his coinage for Béziers and his son and grandson Roger II and Raimond Roger both described themselves as ‘viscount’ on their Béziers coins. This change from ‘count’ to 'viscount' on their coinage is significant.

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‘viscount’ on the Béziers coinage during the twelfth century mirrors the growth in problematic relations between the viscounts and the citizens and suggests that, not only was the Trencavel use of the comital title an issue in Béziers, it was a use which they were not able to enforce against a hostile citizen body.

The way in which the Trencavel continued, throughout the twelfth century, to be perceived as the usurpers, rather than the successors, of the counts of Carcassonne, created problems not only for their internal rule of their lands, but also for their attempts to assert status and independence to rival the counts of Toulouse and Barcelona. Throughout the twelfth century, the Trencavel appear to have made efforts to rectify this situation by connecting themselves more closely with the counts. It is probable, for example, that Bernard Aton IV named his eldest son Roger, a name previously unknown in the Trencavel family, but which had been the name, not only of the last Count of Carcassonne, but also of the counts’ most important ancestor, Count Roger the Old (d.1012), to connect him with his comital predecessors.212 Roger II also seems to have made an attempt to create a continuity between the Trencavel and the previous counts of Carcassonne through a written version of the past in the Trencavel cartulary, by including a document purporting to be the will of Count Roger the Old.213 As this posthumous nickname suggests, Count Roger was regarded by his descendants as the ancestor from whom all legitimate claims to the county sprung; both Rangarde and her daughter Adelaide traced their claims to Carcassonne back to Roger the Old in surrendering them to the Count of Barcelona.214 The continuity with Roger the Old was thus the determinant of legitimacy for the counts of Carcassonne and it was this legitimacy which Roger II was attempting to claim through the inclusion of Roger the Old’s will in his cartulary. The presence of the will created a mythical continuity with the counts and attempted to claim that Roger, like all good rulers of Carcassonne, was in direct succession from Roger the Old.

The efforts of the Trencavel in the twelfth century to create a continuity between themselves and the counts of Carcassonne suggest that their perception of their lack of legitimacy had not been eradicated and was still posing problems. The Trencavel do not appear to have continued to experience problems with the internal rule of Carcassonne in the later twelfth century. However, they remained vulnerable to attack on their method of acquisition of the town: in the 1170s, for example, Alfonso II of Aragon commissioned a report into his rights over Carcassonne which attacked the Trencavel by casting the Trencavel’s means of gaining possession in a very dubious light.215 That no Trencavel assumed the title of count, even during the period of their greatest power and independence from c.1160–1179, indicates that

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213 CT, fols. 34v–35.
215 Ibid., pp. 31–3.
the factors limiting their status in the eleventh century continued to do so in the twelfth.

The Trencavel’s inability to use the comital title did not prevent them from seeking other means of titular self-aggrandisement. One such was the use of the title ‘proconsul’. This title was first assumed by a twelfth-century Trencavel in 1146, by Raimond Trencavel. It was subsequently used in a number of charters by him and his son, Roger II, and was sufficiently accepted by at least some Trencavel subjects for Raimond Trencavel to be occasionally described as proconsul even in his absence. Proconsul was originally a Roman title. Under the Roman Empire, the proconsul was an ex-magistrate who was appointed by the Senate to a consular position as governor of a province and exercised a wide variety of powers including the right of command of troops stationed in the province and full judicial control. It reappeared in Languedoc in the eleventh century as an alternative title employed by both Viscount Bernard Aton III of Albi and Nîmes, and Viscount Bernard Berengar of Narbonne. Bernard Aton described himself as ‘proconsul of Nîmes and prince of Albi’ in a charter assenting to the building of a new bridge in Albi in c.1040 and Bernard Berengar used the title ‘proconsul of the city of Narbonne’ in his appeal against excommunication to the Pope in 1059. No eleventh-century lord demonstrated a degree of attachment to the title comparable to that of the Trencavel, whose adoption of it has attracted various different explanations.

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216 Ibid., p. 1088.

217 1154: swearing of faith by Pierre Isarn (CT, fols. 108v–109); 1157: donation to Pierre de Villars (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, p. 1182); 1158: donation of the foires of Carcassonne and the Razès to his son Roger (ibid., p. 1215); 1161: Guillem de Minerve swearing to hold Lauran from Raimond (CT, fol. 106v); 1163: settlement of a dispute between Raimond and Guillem de Termes (ibid., pp. 1277–9); 1163: settlement of a dispute between the lords of Saisac (Doat 167, fols. 257–259v); 1165: Guillelma de Valsègere swearing to hold Valsègere from Raimond (CT and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1286–7); 1165: Arnauld de Claremont swearing to hold Claremont from Raimond (ibid., pp. 1288–9); 1165: instructions to Guillem de St Felix on the process for dealing with debtors in Carcassonne (Doat 167, fols. 288–289v); 1166: agreement with his son Roger (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1298–9); 1167: sale of land at Chericoir (Doat 167, fols. 296–298; de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 271–2).

218 Used only between 1167 and 1177. 1170: donation to the church of Carcassonne (Doat 65, fols. 92–3); 1172: donation to Rieunette (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 22); 1173: permission to the chapter of Carcassonne to build in the town (Doat 65, fols. 54–55v); 1174: Bertrand and Isarn de Saisac swearing to hold Montrevel from Roger (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 8, pp. 307–9); 1175: donation to Hughes de Romegoux (CT, fol. 120–120v); 1175: permission to the men of Moussoulens to fortify the village (CT, fol. 156–156v; Doat 168, fol. 177–177v); 1177: sale to Roger de Durfort (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 278); 1177: sale of Conflent to Hughes de Romegoux (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 276).

219 Donation by Guillem de Minerve of Lauran to his son in 1161: CT, fol. 106v; Doat 167, fols. 214–215v.

220 Wells, The Roman Empire, pp. 6, and 141; Homo, Roman Political Institutions, p. 254; Millar, Emperor in the Roman World, pp. 16–17.

221 GC, vol. 1, p. 4.

222 Doat 48, fols. 3–12.

223 GC, vol. 1, p. 4: ‘proconsul Nemaunensem et principis Albiensem’.

As suggested by the stress in Bernard Berengar’s appeal on ‘proconsul of the city of Narbonne’, both Bernard Berengar and Bernard Aton used the title in a specifically civic or urban context. Bernard Berengar was co-Viscount of Narbonne with his brothers Raimond and Pierre and he may have been using the proconsul title to indicate a position over the city of Narbonne which he alone held. However, his use of the vicecomital title in other dealings with the archbishop suggests that the most probable interpretation of the proconsul title in his appeal is that it was simply an attempt to translate ‘viscount’ into a Roman form, possibly because of the appeal’s Roman destination. The appearance of the proconsul title in this document may even have been the result of a decision by the scribe rather than the viscount himself.

This is also a possible explanation for the use of the proconsul title by Bernard Aton III in c.1040. The use of two Latin titles in conjunction, ‘proconsul of Nîmes and principis of Albi’ indicates that proconsul here represented a Romanisation of an existing title, rather than a new title altogether. However, in contrast to the Narbonne proconsul title, the appearance of the proconsul title in this charter is unlikely to have been a mere scribal conceit. The differentiation between the two titles for Nîmes and Albi suggests that the adoption of these Latin titles in this charter was the result of careful thought by the viscount of how he wished to characterise his authority in his two viscounties. Nîmes had been acquired through the marriage of Gauze, Viscountess of Nîmes, to Bernard II, Viscount of Albi, in c.950 and remained a secondary possession of the viscounts, who maintained the majority of their power in Albi. The use of the title proconsul in respect of Nîmes in this charter should probably be regarded as a Roman version of viscount, which may have been adopted by Bernard to conform with his use of the Latin title principis to describe his rule over Albi, a title which implied far more power and independence than did ‘viscount’.

It has been suggested that the Trencavel use of the title proconsul in the twelfth century represented, similarly, a simple Romanisation of the title ‘viscount’, impelled generally by the growth of enthusiasm for the Roman past in the twelfth century, and specifically by the use of the title ‘consul’ by the counts of Toulouse. There are, however, several problems with this interpretation. While the adoption of this Roman title by the Trencavel was undoubtedly inspired by general twelfth-century enthusiasm for the Roman past, the greater frequency with which Raimond Trencavel and Roger II employed the title and the range of different charters in

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225 Doat 48, fols. 3–12: ‘proconsul de civitate Narbonae’.
226 Caille, ‘Seigneurs’, p. 32.
227 For example his peace agreement with Archbishop Guifred in 1066: de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 540–1.
228 GC, vol. 1, p. 4.
230 I am grateful to the late Professor Timothy Reuter for this suggestion.
which it was used, compared to the eleventh-century examples, indicates that their adoption of the title proconsul should not be so easily dismissed.

A decision to represent the title ‘viscount’ by a Roman title would more probably have been taken by the scribe of the charters than by the participants, but the Trencavel viscounts cannot be thus divorced from the assumption of the title. To do so assumes a degree of education and autonomy in the scribes of twelfth-century Trencavel charters which may be exaggerated, and necessitates the assumption that the Trencavel themselves were entirely uninterested in the written form of their charters after the enactment of the transactions which they recorded. This was demonstrably not the case, as Roger’s compilation of the Trencavel cartulary in the late 1180s indicates. Roger appreciated the ways in which written charters could contribute to both his power and his prestige and it seems unlikely that he would not have noticed that he was called viscount in some of his charters and proconsul in others. It is more probable that the decision to use the title proconsul lay with the viscounts themselves and it is therefore legitimate to suppose there to have been more meaning behind this decision than ephemeral scribal fashion.

It is also unlikely that the adoption of proconsul by Raimond Trencavel and Roger was in response to a use of consul as a title by the counts of Toulouse. In the first place, the title of consul does not appear to have been widely used by the counts of Toulouse at any period during the twelfth century. It was not used by the counts in any charters with the Trencavel and does not appear to have been adopted at all during the period, between 1146 and 1177, in which the Trencavel were calling themselves proconsuls. It is therefore unlikely that the Trencavel would have adopted their title in response to a title which the counts of Toulouse had abandoned some years before. In addition, the idea that the Trencavel called themselves proconsuls in reference to the consuls of the counts of Toulouse is reliant on a static and structured view of noble hierarchies in Languedoc, in which the Trencavel knew and were happy with their place as comital subjects and dependants. The history of the relations between the Trencavel and Toulouse in the twelfth century suggests that this was not the case and that the Trencavel would have been unlikely to sabotage their struggles for independence from comital domination by stressing their subservient position through their nomenclature.

The use of the title proconsul by the Trencavel seems to have been much more deliberate than the hypothesis discussed above would allow and can be supposed to have been tailored to increase or respond to a problem with their status. It has been suggested that this problem was their authority over the citizens of Béziers, presenting the use of proconsul as a reaction to a consular title, this time used by

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232 Such enthusiasm has been regarded as the creation of the increased study of Roman law in the twelfth century: see for example Benson, ‘Political Renovatio’, pp. 339–86, esp. p. 339. However, the use of the proconsul title by the Trencavel does not appear to have only legal relevance and should be considered in a wider context than that offered by this interpretation of the rediscovery of the Roman past in the twelfth century.


urban magistracies. In this hypothesis, the title proconsul would have meant ‘acting for the consuls’ and would have been a way of stressing that Trencavel power was complementary and not inimical to consular authority. This argument appears at first glance to be supported by the form of the proconsul title commonly used by both Raimond Trencavel and Roger, as it was usually given as ‘proconsul of Béziers’, but this apparent application of the proconsular title to Béziers is deceptive, as the Trencavel commonly assumed the toponymic ‘of Béziers’ as their principal family identity, incorporating it in their vicecomital titles even when they did not rule the town.

The title proconsul does not appear to have been used in charters in any particular pattern and certainly does not seem to have had any particular application to Béziers. For the assumption of the title proconsul to have been directed at the consuls of Béziers, it would have had to have been used in charters in which they would have had some interest. There would have been little point in using the title in land transactions with minor lords from the county of Carcassonne, as both Raimond Trencavel and Roger did, if its relevance was restricted to Béziers. The use of proconsul in charters not relating to Béziers indicates that it was probably not used by the Trencavel to indicate their relationship with urban consulates. Béziers was the only town ruled by either Raimond Trencavel or Roger to develop consuls until the late twelfth century. There seems to have been very little threat to Trencavel power from urban oligarchies in Carcassonne, the chief seat of the Trencavel, after the early part of the century and it did not develop a consulate until 1192. If the title proconsul was understood to relate to urban consulates, it would have had very little relevance throughout most of the lands of the Trencavel.

The title of proconsul seems most likely to have been adopted to increase and reflect growing Trencavel power and independence in the mid-twelfth century and the abandonment of the title after 1177 is suggestive, coinciding as it does with the end of independent Trencavel power after the surrender made by Roger II to Alfonso II of Aragon in 1179. The Trencavel were certainly interested in reflecting their position in these years through the names and titles applied to them in their charters: in one charter, Roger described his father, Raimond Trencavel, in these years as ‘fortissimi Trencavelli’. They may also used references to their matrilineal connections in the same way; this is the most likely explanation for Roger’s references in 1158 to himself as the son of Saure ‘comitissa’, a title which would have related to her own, unfortunately unknown, familial position, rather than to her husband’s title, as she was more normally referred to as ‘viscountess’. The use of

235 There were consuls in Béziers from 1131.
236 For example, 1163: Raimond Trencavel’s arbitration of a dispute between Raimond and Guillaume de Termes (de Vic and Vaissète, vol. 5, pp. 1277–9); 1157: donation to Pierre de Villars, vicar of Razès (ibid., p. 1182); 1175: Roger giving permission to the men of Moussoulens to fortify their village (CT, fol. 156–156v; Doat 168, fol. 107); 1177: sale of Couffolens to Hughes de Romegoux (Mahul, vol. 5, p. 276).
239 1180: donation to the abbey of Silvanes (Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Silvanes, pp. 405–7).
‘comitissa’ solely to refer to Saure in the third person as Roger’s mother indicates that this was a way for Roger to associate himself with comital status. Roger II was also interested in the greater authority which the use of the full list of vicecomital titles could confer, adopting the formula ‘Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne’ and ‘Viscount of Béziers, Carcassonne, Razès and Albi’ for transactions with his most important adversaries, most notably the King of Aragon.241

In its eleventh-century incarnation as a Romanisation of viscount, the use of the title proconsul would have conferred some increase of status on the Trencavel through the creation of a connection to both the Roman Empire and the latest fashion.242 However, under the Roman Empire, the proconsul was a figure of considerable power and authority in a province and the use of the title by Raimond Trencavel and Roger could therefore represent a claim to greater status than was accorded them by their vicecomital titles. Information about the proconsul under the Roman Empire is unlikely to have reached Raimond Trencavel from literary sources, as proconsuls do not figure highly in the Roman and late antique texts in the twelfth century,243 and, if an obscure passage had been brought to Raimond Trencavel’s attention, there would have been little point in using the proconsul title in a way which would not have been widely understood. However, Languedoc was a proconsular province until the end of the third century and it is possible that the use of the title proconsul by the Trencavel was a reference to an oral tradition which remembered the Roman rulers of the province.244 Languedoc was certainly a region particularly rich in reminders of the Empire and the preservation of the names of the proconsuls on inscriptions, some of which would have remained visible in the twelfth century,245 would also have helped create a climate in which the memory of the proconsul as the ruler of Languedoc could have been preserved in the province.

The pattern of Trencavel use of the title also implies an understanding of the title based in an oral, rather than a literary, tradition since it was not restricted to charters with members of the elite, but was also directed at lower levels of society. In 1175, for example, Roger II termed himself ‘proconsul of Béziers’ in a charter giving permission to the men of the village of Moussoulens to move their village to a more defensible position, and to build fortifications.246 As Roger did not use the proconsul title in every charter as a matter of course, it seems probable that it would have been adopted in this case with the expectation that the men of Moussoulens would have been able to interpret it in the desired fashion. This argues for a survival of the proconsul title in oral culture as the Trencavel’s adoption of the title was only worthwhile if it was generally understood. In their use of the title proconsul, the Trencavel may have been tapping into a specific tradition concerning the history of Languedoc,

242 Interest in the twelfth century in emphasising real or spurious links to the Roman past was widespread in Europe. For a detailed discussion with particular reference to the celebration of Roman colonial policy by writers from Roman foundations on the Rhine, see Sanford, ‘Study of Ancient History’, esp. pp. 37–8.
244 Rivet, Gallia Narbonensis, pp. 87 and 97–8.
245 Ibid., p. 86.
246 CT, fol. 156–156v; Doat 168, fol. 107.
rather than into a general knowledge about the Roman Empire in the west. It would have been this specific connection which would have given their use of the title a greater significance than it would have had as simply the Roman form of viscount. It is not possible to claim for the survival of any specific knowledge of Roman proconsuls in twelfth-century Languedoc, but it seems reasonable to interpret Trencavel adoption of the title as an attempt to increase their status. In this context, it would have referred to the independent ruler of Languedoc, rather than to a dependent vicecomital status.

The adoption of the title proconsul by the Trencavel represented a claim to status rivalling that of the counts, compensating for the lack of their own comital title. It provided a way in which the Trencavel could assert their power while avoiding the necessity of confronting the problem posed for their status by their dubious acquisition of Carcassonne, the perceived illegitimacy of which was still influencing their position among the higher nobility of Languedoc in the late twelfth century. The proconsul title also provided Raimond Trencavel and Roger with a method of isolating their rule over Carcassonne from the question of their succession from the counts of Carcassonne. In dealing with Carcassonne, both Raimond Trencavel and Roger used the formula ‘the proconsul ruling the city which is called Carcassonne’. This formula detached Trencavel status from their possession of Carcassonne, by describing them as proconsuls in a general sense, applied to their general status and not to their rule over any one town. It also attempted to cut through the problem of the legitimacy of their succession to the counts of Carcassonne through the implication that the fact of their rule in Carcassonne was the only justification required for it.

The Trencavel’s imaginative use of titles such as proconsul can be seen as a result of their insecure status and position within the higher nobility of Languedoc. Because they were not accepted as the successors of the counts of Carcassonne and hence were not able to adopt the title of count, the Trencavel occupied a somewhat anomalous social position, in which they fought constantly to assert their status as the independent equals of lords such as the counts of Toulouse and Foix, but in which they remained vulnerable to attack on the very basis of their power. Raimond Roger has been regarded as one of the most powerful lords of Languedoc, no more assailable than any of his neighbours, but this appearance is deceptive. In their relations with the count-kings of Barcelona and Aragon, their power over their subjects and the authority with which they could lay claim to the status of their comital predecessors, the Trencavel were far weaker than their possession of wide lands might imply – and isolated.

IN the version of the Albigensian crusade prominent from the later thirteenth century on, Raimond Roger, if he was remembered at all, usually became an archetype. Guillem Augier used his blond hair to signal that his representation in the *sirentes* ‘A people grieving for the death of their lord’\(^1\) was as a stock character and not a real person: the young, proud, reckless lord, whose personal history and family background were equally unimportant. For the Italian audience for whom Guillem Augier was writing, the lack of such details allowed the viscount to stand for the then popular idea of pre-crusade Languedoc as a place of chivalry and culture destroyed by the indiscriminate crusaders. However, it is clear that the crusaders treated Raimond Roger and his family in the way they did because of who they were; far from random or unfortunate, the crusaders’ approaches to the Trencavel were bound up with the Trencavel past.

It is clear that the crusaders attacked Béziers and Carcassonne in their first campaign because they were Trencavel towns, not the other way around. Carcassonne in particular was evidently a prize and its value to the crusade should not be underestimated. However, the crusaders had to balance their need for a base from which to conduct further operations with an equal need to win as many of the Occitan nobility as possible to their cause. In his approaches to heresy, Pope Innocent had been consistent in his desire to encourage the local laity to deal with the problem. The aim he gave to the crusaders was not to destroy the noble families of Languedoc but to persuade them to fight with them. If the crusaders had simply taken one town away from the Trencavel, or any other lord, this would scarcely have disposed that lord and his family and connections to become their allies, but rather would have created another enemy for the crusade near at hand. The wholesale removal of the Trencavel, compared to the treatment of other members of the higher nobility, was not so much victimisation as a way for the crusade to minimise antagonism from the higher nobility while obtaining the strong fortress they required.

The Trencavel did not have the cordial relations with the Cistercians that could have spoken for them as a family whom it would pay the crusaders to treat well. Nor did they have the sort of secure position either within their lands or among their

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neighbours that could have served as the basis for a pro-Trencavel resistance. In the
century and a half in which they held Carcassonne and Béziers, the Trencavel seem
best characterised by their ambition and a faint persistent air of the parvenu: the rulers
of Carcassonne who should have been, but somehow were not, the counts. They
may have made themselves powerful but they did not make themselves popular, and
in the end the former was not enough to outweigh the lack of the latter. Guillem
Augier notwithstanding, no one seems to have been very distressed that the
Trencavel were gone.

They did not quite disappear. After Raimond Trencavel II’s two-year rule of
Carcassonne came to an end when the town surrendered to Louis VIII in 1226,2 he
appears to have remained for some time in possession of Limoux under the protec-
tion of the Count of Foix.3 However, under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, con-
cluded between Raimond VII of Toulouse and the French crown on 12 April 1229,
the Trencavel lands passed in their entirety to the king.4 Raimond’s movements for
the following decade are unclear. It is possible that he continued his apparent attach-
ment to the Count of Foix, or he may have been in exile, possibly in Catalonia. In
1240, he staged an attempt to regain Carcassonne with the assistance of such local
figures as Olivier de Termes, but was unable to capture the town. After a further
period of probable exile, he finally surrendered to the French Crown in 1247.5

His guardian and protector, Roger Bernard of Foix, had died in 1241, and there is
no further suggestion of a particular connection with the counts. Even without
exalted assistance, however, Raimond Trencavel managed to retain Limoux,
appearing in a charter for that town in 1263 with his wife and two sons, Roger and
Raimond Roger.6 The duration of Trencavel connections with Limoux is unclear
and after 1263 the few mentions of them are scanty and obscure. Clearly, the family
never again obtained the status enjoyed by the twelfth-century viscounts of
Carcassonne, Béziers, Albi and Razès, but they did survive, and may even have
spread once again throughout central Languedoc. A fourteenth-century troubadour,
for example, apparently returning to his tenth-century roots, was named Peire
Trencavel d’Albi.7

Despite this evidence of tenacity, the crusade was a tragedy for the Trencavel, and
their fate and that of others like them has come to stand in many modern interpreta-
tions for the destruction of an entire Occitan society. Just as the royal castle, Tour
Regina, was built to dominate the ruins of the three pre-crusade towers at Cabaret,
so in this view the crusaders ensured that the pre-lapsarian golden age of Occitan
culture could be ground under the deadening heel of northern French royal author-
ity. However, underneath this gloomy picture is the fact that many of the lords of
Languedoc prospered in the crusade years, and the list of those who ultimately

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5 de Catel, Mémoires, p. 647.
7 Zufferey, Bibliographie des poètes Provencaux, p. 47.
profited from the new thirteenth-century Languedoc included not only southern French supporters of the crusade, but some of its bitterest foes.

Olivier de Termes, for example, forfeited his lands in 1247 as a result of his participation in Raimond Trencavel II’s rebellion in 1240. However, they were restored to him in July 1250 as a result of his participation and conspicuous gallantry in Louis IX’s crusade in 1248. By demonstrating his willingness to serve the French king, Olivier de Termes was able to earn the 1250 peace agreement between himself and the Crown, and retain his position as one of the more powerful lords of the Razès and Narbonne. Other lords, such as the counts of Foix and the viscounts of Narbonne, were able not only to maintain their previous standing but to improve on it. Many of the major noble families improved their administrative procedures during the course of the thirteenth century, and this enabled them to exert more comprehensive control over lands which, in the twelfth century, had often been more theoretical than actual parts of their domains. Raimond VII of Toulouse was able to consolidate his rule over the county and gain judicial authority over Toulouse itself. Both the viscounts of Narbonne and the counts of Comminges developed complex systems of administration, and those employed by the counts of Foix were so sophisticated that, by the early fourteenth century, they were able to undertake a survey of all hearths and taxes due from the entire county.

These administrative improvements were often accompanied by increased standing among the French nobility, as a result of their dealings with the French Crown. The viscounts of Narbonne frequently served in royal armies, as did the lords of L’Isle Jourdain. Jourdain IV fought for Charles d’Anjou in Sicily and became one of his counsellors. The counts of Foix also developed a tradition of military service, for which they were well rewarded: Roger Bernard IV (d.1302) was governor of various lands in Gascony in the late thirteenth century and Gaston Fébus (d.1391) was lieutenant general in Languedoc in the late fourteenth century. By the late fourteenth century, the counts of Foix had gone from the independent but obscure border lords of the twelfth century to ‘major figures in the French political scene’, two of whom, Gaston I (d.1315) and Gaston Fébus, had married members of the French royal family.

Many of the lords of Languedoc retained the rebellious attitudes of their forebears despite these successes. Following their inheritance of Béarn in 1290, the counts of Foix expended much energy in an attempt to build up an effective state stretching from the Pyrenees to Béarn and Foix, and in 1276 Aimery V of Narbonne (d.1293) conspired with the King of Castile to support him in a forthcoming invasion. However, despite these signs of continuing resistance to royal authority, it is clear

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9 Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe*, p. 59.
10 Ibid., p. 61.
11 Ibid., p. 168.
12 Ibid., p. 167.
13 Gaston I married Jeanne d’Artois and Gaston Fébus Agnes de Navarre in 1348.
14 Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe*, p. 168.
15 Ibid., p. 228.
that lords like the viscounts of Narbonne and the counts of Foix prospered in the post-crusade years.

That they were able to do so indicates that the nature of noble politics in thirteenth-century Languedoc was not determined by the attitude of any particular noble family to the Albigensian crusade. While it can be argued that the events of the crusade laid the foundation for the prosperity of some of the higher nobility – the removal of the Trencavel as a rival cannot have hindered the development of the power of the viscounts of Narbonne, for example – how far the crusade was directly responsible for the changing nature of noble power in the thirteenth century is debatable. The advances in the mechanisms of power demonstrated by lords such as the counts of Comminges and Foix in the thirteenth century can be viewed as developments from administrative practices employed in the twelfth-century by lords such as the Guillems de Montpellier or the Trencavel, both of whom had sufficiently developed systems of administration to be able to have cartularies compiled. The tighter control which their increasing administrative sophistication gave lords like the counts of Foix over their lands allowed them to rival in wealth and power their contemporaries in northern France; however, this came about not from the destruction of Occitan society by the crusaders but by its development: a development that would be difficult to argue would not have occurred if the crusade had not taken place.

The Trencavel were destroyed by the Albigensian crusade, but they were ultimately rather marginal figures among the nobility of Languedoc, if temporarily powerful ones. The counts of Foix had been prominent in Languedoc when the Trencavel were merely viscounts of Albi and they remained so long after the Trencavel had been forgotten, maintaining their power in continuity over those periods of Languedoc history that are supposed to be so different: before the crusade, and after.
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