Images of Rebirth

Cognitive Poetics and Transformational
Soteriology in the Gospel of Philip
and the Exegesis on the Soul

By Hugo Lundhaug
Images of Rebirth
Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies

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Images of Rebirth

Cognitive Poetics and Transformational Soteriology in the Gospel of Philip and the Exegesis on the Soul

By

Hugo Lundhaug
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Oslo, March 1, 2010
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Apoc. Jas.</td>
<td>The (First) Apocalypse of James</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACW</td>
<td>Ancient Christian Writers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJSR</td>
<td>Association for Jewish Studies Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGHJ</td>
<td>Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANF</td>
<td>Ante-Nicene Fathers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td><em>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Archiv für Papyrysforforschung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apoc. John</td>
<td>The Apocryphon of John</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASNU</td>
<td>Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis</td>
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<td>ATDan</td>
<td>Acta Theologica Danica</td>
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<tr>
<td>AThR</td>
<td>Anglican Theological Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auth. Teach.</td>
<td>Authoritative Teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASP</td>
<td>Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCNH</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEHE</td>
<td>Bibliothèque de l’École Pratique des Hautes Études</td>
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<tr>
<td>BETL</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bib</td>
<td><em>Biblica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>Bulletin de la Société d’archéologie copte</td>
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<tr>
<td>BZNW</td>
<td>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCO</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dial. Sav.</td>
<td>The Dialogue of the Savior</td>
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exeg. Soul</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Exegesis on the Soul</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GCS</strong></td>
<td>Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gos. Phil.</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Gospel of Philip</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gos. Thom.</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Gospel of Thomas</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gos. Truth</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Gospel of Truth</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Great Pow.</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Concept of Our Great Power</em></td>
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<td><strong>HR</strong></td>
<td><em>History of Religions</em></td>
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<td><strong>HTR</strong></td>
<td><em>Harvard Theological Review</em></td>
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<td><strong>Hyp. Arch.</strong></td>
<td>The <em>Hypostasis of the Archons</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ICM</strong></td>
<td>Idealized Cognitive Model</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IFAO</strong></td>
<td>Institut français d’archéologie orientale</td>
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<td><strong>JAC</strong></td>
<td><em>Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum</em></td>
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<td><strong>JBL</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Biblical Literature</em></td>
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<td><strong>JECS</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Early Christian Studies</em></td>
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<td><strong>JRH</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Religious History</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JSJSup</strong></td>
<td>Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods: Supplement Series</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JSNTSup</strong></td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series</td>
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<td><strong>JSPSup</strong></td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series</td>
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<td><strong>JTS</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Theological Studies</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KJV</strong></td>
<td>King James Version</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LCL</strong></td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library</td>
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<td><strong>LXX</strong></td>
<td>The Septuagint</td>
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<td><strong>Mus</strong></td>
<td><em>Le Muséon: Revue d’études orientales</em></td>
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<td><strong>NA&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
<td><em>Novum Testamentum Graece</em>, Nestle-Aland, 27th ed.</td>
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<td><strong>NHC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>NHS</strong></td>
<td>Nag Hammadi Studies/Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies</td>
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<td><strong>NovT</strong></td>
<td><em>Novum Testamentum</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NTS</strong></td>
<td><em>New Testament Studies</em></td>
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ABBREVIATIONS

NTTS  New Testament Tools and Studies
OLA  Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta
OLP  *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica*
OLZ  *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*
OrChr  *Oriens Christianus*
OrChrAn  Orientalia Christiana Analecta
*Orig. World*  *On the Origin of the World*
PapyCast  Papyrologica Castroctaviana
PG  *Patrologia Graeca*
PS  *Patrologia Syriaca*
PTS  Patristische Texte und Studien
*RB*  *Revue Biblique*
ResQ  *Restoration Quarterly*
RSV  Revised Standard Version
*RTP*  *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*
*Re&-T*  *Religion and Theology*
SA  Studia Anselmiana
SAC  Studies in Antiquity and Christianity
SBLDS  Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBELEJL  Society of Biblical Literature Early Judaism and Its Literature
*SBLSP*  *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers*
SBLSymS  Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SBo  *The Bohairic Life of Pachomius*
SBT  Studies in Biblical Theology
SC  Sources Chrétiennes
SD  Studies and Documents
*SecCent*  *Second Century*
SHR  Studies in the History of Religions
SJTOP  *Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers*
SR  Studies in Religion
StOr  Studies in Oriental Religions
StPatr  Studia Patristica
StPB  Studia Post-Biblica
*Teach. Silv.*  *The Teachings of Silvanus*
*Thom. Cont.*  *The Book of Thomas the Contender*
TLZ  *Theologische Literaturzeitung*
*Treat. Res.*  *The Treatise on the Resurrection*
*Treat. Seth*  *Second Treatise of the Great Seth*
*Tri. Trac.*  *The Tripartite Tractate*
ABBREVIATIONS

TU  Texte und Untersuchungen
TUGAL Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
USQR Union Seminary Quarterly Review
VC Vigiliae Christianae
VCSup Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae
WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZKT Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
ZNW Zeitschrift für die neustamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche
Zost. Zostrianos
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen . . ."  

1. Introduction

In both the above quoted excerpts taken from the Nag Hammadi treatises the Gospel of Philip (NHC II.3) and the Exegesis on the Soul (NHC II.6), salvation is presented as attainable only by means of a rebirth. But how are we to understand these references to rebirth? And are the two tractates referring to the same concept, or are they simply using similar terms? And what is the nature of the interpretive processes that come into play when we try to make sense of these statements?

2. Bodily Based Cognitive Models

On a basic level the excerpts quoted above refer to biological procreative processes. At the same time it is quite clear that the imagery is not to be

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understood literally. Rather, the references to rebirth in these texts must be understood, at least in part, as references to ritual processes, and they must be seen in connection with related imagery utilised in these two Nag Hammadi tractates. For these texts not only speak about rebirth, but also refer to a broad range of related concepts relating to procreation and kinship relations, like marriage, fornication and prostitution, fathers, sons, spouses, and siblings. All of these concepts play important roles in discourses that centre around questions of salvation and ritual practice, often in combination with other familiar concepts derived from embodied experience such as eating and seeing.

But how does such imagery function within the specific literary contexts of the two selected texts? Why and to what effect do these texts focus as they do on procreative and often sexually connotative imagery? How is bodily based imagery used to explicate important elements of the religious life, and how are we to know when and to what extent such references are to be understood metaphorically? In short, how are we to understand the vividly changing and allusive use of such concepts in these ancient texts?

3. Allusions and Intertextuality

In addition to the use and function of cognitive models derived from or related to embodied experience, however, there is also another important aspect of these texts that must be taken equally into consideration. Most studies on the Nag Hammadi tractates mention parallels, influences and borrowings from Scripture, but few have actually analysed the patterns and functions of such intertextual connections from a literary perspective. This is especially the case with regard to the use of allusions. As Lowell Edmunds states it, “while philologists postulate lacunae, mark cruxes that defy conjecture, and diagnose anomalies that defy exegesis, with profound calm they pass over undiscerned and undiscernible allusions.” The study of allusions is not without its methodological problems, however, for, as Earl Miner has perceptively put it, “the test for

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2 For a notable exception to this tendency, see Louis Painchaud, “The Use of Scripture in Gnostic Literature,” JECS 4 (1996): 129–146.
3 Lowell Edmunds, Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 43. See chapter 2 for a theoretical discussion of allusions and intertextuality.
allusion is that it is a phenomenon that some reader or readers may fail to observe.”

In the passage from *Exeg. Soul* quoted above, for example, it is perfectly possible to read and make meaningful sense of the sentences without recognising any scriptural allusions, while the interpretive combination of texts that arises from seeing, for instance, an allusion to Titus 3:5 and/or 1 Tim 2:15 may significantly alter the interpretive process and hence the production of meaning prompted by a reading of this passage.

I am therefore convinced that new insights may be gained from our texts by paying closer attention to the patterns of intertextuality on display in them, including the use of allusions.

In both the selected texts, references to Scripture are pervasive, ranging from explicit quotations to the faintest of allusions. The importance of taking such references fully into account in our analysis of the meaning potential of the texts becomes especially clear in light of the practice of memorisation of Scripture in the cultural milieus where we may plausibly situate these tractates’ intended audiences. As Jostein Børtnes rightly stresses with regard to the use of memorised Scripture in the authorial practices of late antiquity, “the emphasis on memorization does not mean that the texts stored in the memory were also to be reproduced *verbatim* in rhetorical or literary practice. On the contrary, in rhetoric the whole point was that memorized texts could be played around with, taken apart, and recombined into new patterns and new discourses.”

Exactly this kind of playful recombination and repatterning of texts in rhetoric is an

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5 See the analysis of this passage in chapter 3 of the present study.

6 As Claes Schaar puts it on a general basis, “The colossal mass of commentaries and annotations dealing with classical, medieval and Renaissance texts covers matter which, transformed to infracontextual patterns, might enrich the appreciation of the surface contexts by being incorporated in a large-scale semiotic system: ‘absent structures’ perhaps on the printed page, but very much present in attentive readers’ minds. By merely providing ‘parallels to’ the edited textual material such stuff has little more than antiquarian interest and remains, unexplored, on display in museums: a great Prince in prison lies” (Claes Schaar, “Linear Sequence, Spatial Structure, Complex Sign, and Vertical Context System,” *Poetics* 7 [1978]: 386–387).


important focus of the present study. *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* both thrive on combining allusions, paraphrases, and citations of different authoritative intertexts in their rhetorically highly ornamental and evocative discourses on central Christian tenets and practices. In the present study the main perspective will, however, be from the point of view of the reader, rather than the author. And as we shall see from the analyses in chapters 3 and 4, readers who had mnemonically internalised considerable portions of Scripture may indeed be regarded as the ideal readers of these two Nag Hammadi texts.

4. A New Approach

In this study we will see how rituals and Scripture are interpreted in reciprocal processes where concepts based on basic embodied experience are central. Methodologically the investigation is built around a two-pronged approach to the selected texts, namely an analysis of the interpretive combination of conceptual structures and of texts.

The way in which the above outlined questions are tackled in the present study constitutes in many ways a new approach to the study of the Nag Hammadi texts. Since my aim is to study the texts from the perspective of the reader, and since the experience of reading is dependent on the functions of the human mind in integrating new information with old, it would seem to be highly relevant to take into account new perspectives on the study of literature and reading developed within the cognitive sciences, that is, theories of reading that do not ignore newer perspectives from fields such as cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, but which base the study of literature and interpretation on recent theories of basic mental processes such as memory, conceptualisation, and creativity. For, as Mary Carruthers has perceptively put it, “in order to create, in order to think at all, human beings require some mental tool or machine, and that ‘machine’ lives in the intricate networks of their own memory.”

All creative thinking, including interpretation of texts, is thus intimately connected with the functions of memory and mental representations. The present study focuses on the process of interpretation from the perspective of how the human mind makes sense of a text by means of the creation and integration of multiple

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mental representations, in a production of meaning that will always be in constant and crucial dependence on context, prior knowledge, individual idiosyncrasies, and social constraints.

The study is thus based on an analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* using recent theories developed within the multidisciplinary field of cognitive poetics.\(^\text{10}\) Instead of trying to get at the minds of the ancient authors and their intentions, the selected texts are here approached from the perspective of the potential patterns of thought prompted in a reading of these texts. In short, the question concerns how the selected texts trigger ways of thinking about important issues relating to the world, the self, reality, and salvation. By adapting to the analysis of allusions and intertextuality a cognitive theoretical perspective developed primarily with a view to the study of metaphor, metonymy and related phenomena, this study also constitutes an attempt to analyse these subjects from a unified methodological perspective grounded in the study of human cognition.

5. The Texts: The Exegesis on the Soul and the Gospel of Philip

Why, among the around fifty tractates that make up the contents of the Nag Hammadi Codices, choose specifically *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as the subjects of the present inquiry? There are several reasons for this choice. For a start, these are two of the Nag Hammadi tractates that most clearly combine the use of scriptural allusions and citations with direct references to ritual actions, and in doing so they employ strikingly similar imagery based on embodied experience. Concepts like procreation and birth/rebirth, together with related concepts like marriage, prostitution, and fornication, are prominent in both texts. Moreover, both texts are among the few Nag Hammadi tractates that contain references to the much debated concept of the “bridal chamber.” Furthermore, both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* eschew the kind of complicated mythological and cosmological systems we find in many of the other Nag Hammadi texts, such as for example the *Apocryphon of John* and the *Tripartite Tractate*, while focussing on the importance of transformation through ritual practice, using concepts taken from basic embodied experience, partly metaphorically and partly metonymically, in soteriologically charged

\(^{10}\) For a discussion and definition of cognitive poetics, see chapter 2.
Chapter One

discourses where familiar everyday concepts are referenced in order both to explicate and to establish realities on an ontologically higher level. Finally, the two texts are also united by the fact that they have come down to us as parts of the same codex, being the third and sixth tractates of Nag Hammadi Codex II. In sum, then, the texts were chosen on the basis of similarities of imagery and for their combination of scriptural exegesis and mystagogy.11

For all their similarities, however, the two texts are also quite different. One of them, *Exeg. Soul*, is quite short and sports a relatively straightforward narrative framework, while the other, *Gos. Phil.*, is both considerably longer, highly complicated, and has no narrative framework. Due to these differences I have chosen to treat *Exeg. Soul* first, in chapter 3, and the more complicated *Gos. Phil.* after it, in chapter 4. In this way the usability of the methodological framework established in chapter 2 can be shown to be fruitfully employed on the shorter and simpler *Exeg. Soul* first, before it is then put to use on the more difficult *Gos. Phil.* Finally, in chapter 5, the two texts are compared from the perspective of the preceding analysis, highlighting similarities and differences between the two in their use of metaphors and Scripture, in their treatment of rituals, and in their overall theologies.

5.1. The Manuscript: Nag Hammadi Codex II

*Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* are two of the seven tractates that make up the contents of Nag Hammadi Codex II, the other texts in this codex being the *Apocryphon of John* (NHC II,1), the *Gospel of Thomas* (NHC II,2), the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (NHC II,4), *On the Origin of the World* (NHC II,5), and the *Book of Thomas the Contender* (NHC II,7).12

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11 None of the other Nag Hammadi texts display all of the features enumerated above.

The most relevant comparative material for Codex II is of course the other Nag Hammadi Codices. The only one of these for which we have a firm *terminus post quem* is Codex VII, which contains a letter in the cartonnage dated to October 348, and hence Codex VII must have been manufactured later than this date. The *terminus ante quem* is more problematic, however, since it is pretty much impossible to know how much later this letter was put to use as cartonnage, and hence how much later the codex was manufactured. It could have been the same year, but it could also very well have been fifty or maybe even one hundred years later. Moreover, while there is datable material in the cartonnage of Codex VII, Codex II is one of the three Nag Hammadi codices that did not have any papyrus fragments at all as cartonnage. This codex must therefore be dated on purely palaeographical grounds and on the grounds of its similarity with the other Nag Hammadi codices, especially Codex VII, and other comparable codices of the period. On such grounds Codex II has been dated by some to the first half of the fourth century, and by others to the late fourth or early fifth century. The most detailed attempt at dating Codex II was made by Søren Giversen in his edition of *Apoc. John*. Giversen there dated the codex to between the years 330 and 340 on codicological and palaeographic grounds. These are, however, highly uncertain criteria when it comes to dating Coptic manuscripts. Moreover, Giversen’s dating is based on a comparison of

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Codex II with a very small number of other manuscripts, many of which are themselves of uncertain date, and on some questionable arguments. These factors combine to make his dating decidedly less than certain. In summary, there does not seem to be any firm evidence that allows us to establish with any certainty either a *terminus post quem* or a *terminus ante quem* for Codex II. On the scant evidence available to us, then, even though the manuscript may conceivably have been manufactured as early as the first half of the fourth century it seems wise to allow for the possibility that the codex may actually have been manufactured as late as the fifth century.

Despite the fact that it has often been assumed that the Nag Hammadi codices were buried as a result of Athanasius’ festal letter of 367 or the anti-Origenist purge that followed the death of Evagrius Ponticus in 399, we actually have no firm indications with regard to the date of their burial. The pottery bowl that was used to seal the jar containing the

Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 133. Wisse urges “great caution” in dating early Coptic biblical papyri (ibid.), and points out that “dates are often assigned by papyrologists whose expertise is Greek rather than Coptic palaeography. It is telling that the late Paul E. Kahle, Jr., one of the few scholars with a broad knowledge of Coptic texts, generally preferred considerably later dates than those assigned by Greek papyrologists” (ibid., n. 10). Wisse states with regard to Greek palaeography that one “can normally only claim to be accurate within about 100 years. Some papyrologists venture to pinpoint dates within 25 years, but this is seldom warranted on palaeographical grounds alone, and would be totally inappropriate for Coptic MSS” (ibid., 131 n. 1). Emmel puts it in even stronger terms, stating that “I shudder to think of what uncertain ground we tread when considering Coptic paleography and codicology” (Emmel, “The Coptic Gnostic Texts,” 38). On Coptic palaeography, cf. also Bentley Layton, “Towards a New Coptic Palaeography,” in *Acts of the Second International Congress of Coptic Studies: Roma, 22–26 September 1980* (ed. Tito Orlandi and Frederik Wisse; Rome: C.I.M., 1985), 149–158.

20 The lack of pagination is for instance taken as “a sign of primitiveness and age” (Giversen, *Apocryphon Johannis*, 37).
23 As Armand Veilleux puts it with regard to Athanasius’ festal letter, “the connection between that letter and the burying of the Nag Hammadi library is one of those scientific hypotheses that are put forward without any real proof, and then are repeated by everyone as if they had been demonstrated” (Veilleux, “Monasticism and Gnosis in Egypt,” 290–291; cf. also Alois Grillmeier, *From the Council of Chalcedon [451] to Gregory the Great [590–604]: The Church of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia After 451* [vol. 2, Part 4 of *Christ in Christian Tradition*; in collaboration with Theresia Hainthaler, trans. O.C. Dean, Jr.; London: Mowbray, 1996], 214. As for the related question of who manufactured, used, or commissioned the Nag Hammadi codices, the jury is still out. I will not discuss this question in the present study, but for the state of the question, see esp.
codices is typical of the fourth and fifth centuries, but it is not possible to determine when the jar and the codices where actually buried. There are indications that a burial shortly after Athanasius’ festal letter of 367 might be too early, however, as it seems clear that such materials were in circulation in Upper Egypt around the middle of the fifth century.

5.2. Issues of Translation and Transmission

It is generally held that the Nag Hammadi texts are translations, but what is the relationship between the preserved Coptic texts and their hypothetical originals? Based on what we know generally of the development of written Coptic, it is most likely that the translations were made


On the pottery bowl used to seal the jar, see James E. Goehring, “An Early Roman Bowl from the Monastery of Pachomius at Pbow and the Milieu of the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Mélanges offerts à Wolf-Peter Funk (ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier; BCNH, Études 7; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), 357–371. Such bowls were in use between ca. 350–550 CE (see ibid., 362 n. 18; 366 n. 32).


sometime after the mid-to-late third century,” argues Stephen Emmel, but he adds the important caveat that “only for the works in Codices I, VII, and XI can we be relatively confident that they were already translated by the end of the fourth century.” Michael Williams has pointed out that there has been a tendency among scholars of the Nag Hammadi tractates “to equate rather too facilely or thoughtlessly the ‘text’ of a given writing only with what is after all our own modern text-critical ‘guess-timate’ about the ‘original,’ skipping past on our way perfectly real, physical copies of that writing that someone did use.” Emmel notes that scholars mostly “take it for granted that the Nag Hammadi tractates bear some more or less close relationship to a hypothetical original composition, and we move back and forth between the Coptic text we have and the original we would like to have.” He rightly points out that this practice is tantamount to traversing a minefield, for “the Coptic phases of transmission pose nearly insurmountable barriers to recovering the translators’ Vorlagen. It is not yet clear to what extent we can even recover the original texts of the Coptic translations.” Analysing the preserved Coptic texts, translations or not, thus seems to be a much less hypothetical venture than trying to analyse their lost Vorlagen, not to mention the hypothetical originals. Despite this, however, “there is one obvious task that has not yet been carried out thoroughly and consistently,” Emmel points out, “that is, to read the Nag Hammadi Codices as a part of Coptic literature.” Such a task involves reading “the texts exactly as we have

References

30 Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 40–41, Emmel’s emphasis.
32 Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42, Emmel’s emphasis.
them in the Nag Hammadi Codices in an effort to reconstruct the reading experience of whoever owned each of the Codices.”

Now, my aim in this study is not to reconstruct the experience of reading *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* by those who owned Codex II. Such an enterprise would also need to take fully into account the other five tractates of the codex and how all seven of them interact in a reading of the codex as a whole. This kind of approach is outside the scope of the present study, however, due to the expansive nature of such an undertaking. What I have tried to do is more modest, but still not far removed from Emmel’s suggestion, as I do aim to focus on the reading experience of the Coptic texts of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* as we find them in Nag Hammadi Codex II. I have tried to read the two selected tractates as much as possible on their own terms, both independently of each other and independently of the rest of the texts in Codex II and the other Nag Hammadi codices. But although I do not focus strictly on the manuscript as such, neither do I try to get back to any hypothetical originals or Vorlagen.

What are the implications of such an approach? My focus on the texts as we have them in the preserved manuscript means that, although it has been argued that our Coptic versions presuppose Greek originals, I will stick to an analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* from the point of view of how the texts function in their Coptic form. This choice is motivated firstly by the fact that for both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* we have only this one single manuscript witness and we cannot possibly know the extent or nature of the changes that may have been made to the texts, whether in

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33 Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42.
34 As Bentley Layton has noted, “in the case of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts it is crucially important to observe that the original language (Greek) is precisely what we do not have.” I cannot, however, agree with Layton’s rather optimistic conclusion that “if we cannot reconstruct that lost Greek original on paper, still we can hope to approximate the ancient author’s own culture and thought through a recovery of its meaning in a sympathetic English translation keyed to a commentary oriented above all towards Greek usage. Conceivably the ancient Coptic version might be substituted for the English translation: but since ancientness in itself is no virtue, and since Coptic diction is notoriously nonphilosophical, modern ‘classicism’s English’ (provided that it is accurate) will probably be in closer touch with the ancient author’s Hellenistic thought than ancient Coptic, whose nuances of diction, philosophical or otherwise, are largely lost upon us and in any case are certainly not Greek” (Bentley Layton, “The Recovery of Gnosticism: The Philologist’s Task in the Investigation of Nag Hammadi,” SecCent 1 [1981]: 97). Robert McL. Wilson, however, argues for a rather different solution: “Is [the translator] to translate the Coptic as it stands, obscurities and all, or the Greek which he can more
their possible translation from Greek into Coptic or in their later Coptic phases of transmission. Moreover, as Ariel Shisha-Halevy has pointed out,

no argument can be raised for a direct Greek-system influence on the choice of a distinctive form in Coptic, while the motivation for the Coptic translator’s choice must yet stem from, be triggered by the Greek text in some way. The translator “improves” on the Greek, by necessity, since Coptic makes distinctions the Greek does not, and choice in the re-writing by the Coptic writer-translator must be made, by the exigencies of the Coptic system. This then often results in additional or different information being introduced into the text, and trying to comprehend or determine the function-meaning of the Coptic by the Greek as a simple point of reference is fundamentally wrong.

As Chris Reintges rightly notes, “where a Greek source is missing, the distinction between original and translated literature becomes a moot point,” and, as he points out, “the originality of some work can generally not be determined on the basis of linguistic criteria alone.” I have thus deemed it to be the most sound approach to simply stick to the texts as they have actually been preserved, in the language in which they have been preserved, and not to try to analyse them on the basis of the Greek originals we think may lie behind the Coptic texts.

Another reason for this approach is that there are good chances that the texts might have been substantially altered at one or more stages in their transmission. The simple fact that both *Exeg. Soul* and especially *Gos. Phil.* deal with the interpretation of liturgy makes such changes especially likely, since as Paul Bradshaw has persuasively argued, “documents dealing with liturgical matters are particularly prone to editorial corrections so as to give authoritative status to current worship practices.”


This, he stresses, includes all phases of transmission, including the translation of works from one language to another. Bradshaw refers to this as “living literature,” that is, “material which circulates within a community and forms a part of its heritage and tradition but which is constantly subject to revision and rewriting to reflect changing historical and cultural circumstances.” Moreover, we know from the case of the first text of Codex II, *Apoc. John*, which is also known from three additional copies, that texts like the singularly attested *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* may also have existed in very different versions. What Bradshaw terms “living literature” is “characterized by the existence of multiple recensions, sometimes exhibiting quantitative differences (i.e., longer and shorter versions) and sometimes qualitative differences (i.e., various ways of saying the same thing, often with no clear reflection of a single Urtext), and sometimes both.” These characteristics all fit with regard to *Apoc. John*, and there is no reason why *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* should not be equally good examples of such “living literature.”

Unfortunately Nag Hammadi Codex II has come to us somewhat damaged. The codex has been marred by “a systematic worm” which in the case of *Gos. Phil.* “ate a broad path through the lower part of every page of this work,” as Kendrick Grobel puts it, and although the situation is better with regard to *Exeg. Soul*, even here there are many instances of unrestorable damage to the text. I have chosen to adopt a conservative approach with regard to the restoration of the many lacunae in this manuscript. The fact that we do not have additional attestation for either *Gos. Phil.* or *Exeg. Soul* renders proper textual criticism practically impossible. Moreover, in the case of *Gos. Phil.* the unpredictable and

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41 In addition to the version preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II, *Apoc. John* is also found in Codex III (NHC III,1), Codex IV (NHC IV,1), and in Codex Papyrus Berolinensis 8502 (BG 8502,2). All versions are conveniently published in the synoptic critical edition by Michael Waldstein and Frederik Wisse, eds., *The Apocryphon of John: Synopsis of Nag Hammadi Codices II,1; III,1; and IV,1 with BG 8502,2* (NHS 33; Leiden: Brill, 1995).
42 Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 5.
seemingly disjointed nature of the text is such that only the most limited reconstructions may be made with any kind of certainty. Therefore, in order not to distort our actual source material, I will here rely as little as possible on reconstructions of lacunae or emendations of the preserved Coptic text, since such reconstructions are by necessity often of a highly conjectural nature.\(^4^5\) The approach taken in the present study is thus in line with that of Søren Giversen in rejecting the kind of procedure adopted by, e.g., Hans-Martin Schenke, who has tried to reconstruct most of Gos. Phil’s lacunae, and especially in rejecting a tendency among certain scholars to be somewhat too eager to emend parts of the text that have actually been preserved.\(^4^6\)

In summary, my focus is close to the approach Emmel terms a “Coptic reading” of the Nag Hammadi Codices, by being in effect a study of the Coptic texts in the phase of transmission that is as close to the actual manuscript as possible, without specifically reading the texts strictly as parts of that manuscript. While, as Emmel has pointed out, such a reading would tell us little about the hypothetical originals as such, “the results of this Coptic reading would probably contribute insights that would be valuable for the more hypothetical investigation of the composition phase.”\(^4^7\) The “attraction” of such a reading, as Emmel puts it,

is that the codices are our primary data, and presumably they were read by someone—or at least they were laboriously created for that purpose. Hence such a “Coptic reading” takes us (in theory) the shortest distance into

\(^{45}\) In the words of Bentley Layton, “Nag Hammadi editors have approached emendation in widely divergent ways. One extreme pole is occupied by a circle of scholars based in East Berlin,” whose style, according to Layton, “was characterized by severe emendation that sometimes went far beyond the stock-in-trade of homoeoteleuton, dittography, and metathesis,” (Layton, “Recovery of Gnosticism,” 93–94).

\(^{46}\) As Giversen puts it, “Er formålet ... at lade den foreliggende tekst komme til sin ret, således at den ikke siger mere, men heller ikke mindre end den dokumentariske bevindelse i teksten og de slutninger, man med nødvendighed må drage udfra det bevarede, berettiger til, da må der være tale om en ganske anderledes anvendelse af konjekterer ... De bevarede dele af en tekst må være grundlaget ...” (Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 17, and cf. 20–21; cf. also Layton, “Recovery of Gnosticism,” 93: “Speculative restoration and restoration of unpredictable matters of fact have no value”). For Schenke’s approach, see esp. Hans-Martin Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus: Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi,” TLZ 84:1 (1959): 1–26. With regard to Gos. Phil., Schenke’s approach is even more questionable in light of his view of the text as a florilegium (see chapter 4 of the present study), due to the obvious fact that the textual reconstruction of a florilegium must of necessity be fraught with even more uncertainties than the reconstruction of a single coherent composition.

\(^{47}\) Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42.
the minefield of the texts’ complex history of transmission, and therefore should provide us with more certain—albeit quite different—results than other readings.\(^{48}\)

In line with a Coptic reading of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.*, I have chosen throughout this study to quote the possible New Testament intertexts in Coptic rather than, or in addition to, the Greek, since these Coptic translations often show us more clearly the intertextual potential of a Coptic reading of the selected Nag Hammadi texts. Although these Nag Hammadi texts often do not seem to refer to the exact versions of the Coptic New Testament texts as we find them in preserved Coptic New Testament manuscripts,\(^{49}\) neither is it possible to discern any specific underlying Greek text. In any case, I think that in many cases it should better capture the reading experience of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* in their preserved Coptic versions to refer to Coptic versions of the scriptural intertexts.

A few words must also be said concerning the versions of the scriptural texts that are employed. The only (almost) complete edition of the Sahidic New Testament is that of George William Horner, published between 1911 and 1924.\(^{50}\) Unfortunately Horner’s edition of the Sahidic New Testament is, as Wisse puts it, “completely inadequate and out of date.”\(^{51}\) Since the publication of Horner’s edition many better and earlier manuscripts have come to light, and it has also become clear that Horner’s treatment of the manuscripts to which he had access was often both incomplete and inaccurate.\(^{52}\) I have therefore mainly used Hans Quecke’s excellent editions of Mark, Luke, and John from earlier and


better manuscripts in the Palau-Ribes collection in Barcelona,\textsuperscript{53} Gonzalo Aranda Perez’ edition of Matthew from a manuscript in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York,\textsuperscript{54} Herbert Thompson’s edition of Acts and the Pauline epistles from early manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin,\textsuperscript{55} Karlheinz Schüssler’s edition of the Catholic epistles,\textsuperscript{56} and E.A. Wallis Budge’s edition of Revelation.\textsuperscript{57} Where not otherwise stated, these are the editions of the Coptic New Testament texts that are cited throughout this study.\textsuperscript{58}

Although a thorough comparative analysis of \textit{Exeg. Soul} and \textit{Gos. Phil.} in relation to other sources of the period is outside the scope of the present study, some forays into comparative territory are made, in line with the Coptic reading of the texts, focussing primarily on material of a later date than what is usually invoked in studies of these texts, and with a special eye to Coptic material.

6. The Nag Hammadi Library and “Gnosticism”

As is the case with a majority of the Nag Hammadi tractates, \textit{Exeg. Soul} and \textit{Gos. Phil.} have usually been treated in relation to the category of “Gnosticism.” Frederik Wisse argued already in the early eighties, however, that “the individual [Nag Hammadi] tractates can no longer be assumed to be Gnostic,” and pointed out that “it is not enough to be able to claim that a writing can be read in a Gnostic way or that it seems to presuppose Gnostic ideas, for that can be said of many ancient writings


\textsuperscript{58} The quotations from these editions have been orthographically normalised. All translations are my own.
which are clearly not Gnostic in origin.” While Wisse only critiqued the categorisation of Nag Hammadi tractates as “gnostic,” and not the category of “Gnosticism” as such, a direct challenge of the category itself followed a little over a decade later. In his important book *Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category*, Michael Williams mounted the first extended case against the use of the category in the study of the Nag Hammadi texts. He here delineated two main approaches to the definition of “Gnosticism” among modern scholars. The first approach, according to Williams, has been to ground the category in the self-definition, or at least self-designation, of certain figures and groups in antiquity, while the second approach has been to define “Gnosticism” typologically. Williams challenged the validity of the results of both of these approaches. Following partly in the footsteps of Morton Smith, Williams showed self-definition to be an inadequate criterion on the grounds that there is in fact scant evidence in the sources for its actual use among the groups or texts it has customarily been used to label. Moreover, as Morton Smith had already pointed out in an important paper at the Yale conference on “Gnosticism” in 1978, the sources where the use of gnostikos as a self-definition is actually attested are those which are not usually classified as “Gnostic,” but are instead Platonic sources and Christian sources usually considered to belong to the Christian “mainstream,” the writings of Clement of Alexandria being the prime example. As for the typological definition, Williams systematically challenged the various constituent parts of the typological construct

60 Wisse argued that “apart from the Hermetic tractates in Codex VI, none of the tractates fits comfortably into the sect descriptions of the heresiologists. For those which have affinities with the ancient reports of the teachings of the Valentinians one would have to assume that they represent a previously unknown branch or sect” (Wisse, “Prolegomena,” 141).
62 See Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, esp. 29, 31–43.
65 See M. Smith, “History of the Term Gnostikos.”
of “Gnosticism” throughout his Rethinking “Gnosticism”, and showed the net result to be a category which is untenable as a heuristic device with regard to our late antique sources, demonstrating how the frequently contradictory cognitive models embodied in the category of “Gnosticism” have distorted interpretation of the actual texts that have usually been regarded as primary sources of the category, most prominently those of the Nag Hammadi Codices. More recently, Karen King has extended Williams’ critique by showing convincingly how modern scholars in their use of the category have often mistaken the early Christian heresiologists’ rhetoric for facts, and have thus persistently reinscribed the church fathers’ agendas, perpetuating their caricatured descriptions of their opponents and their delineations of orthodoxy and heresy. In summary, the studies of Williams and King supplement each other well and combine to render problematic any further scholarly use of “Gnosticism” as a category, especially in relation to texts like those contained in the Nag Hammadi codices.

In the history of scholarship the use of the category of “Gnosticism” has over the years contributed to the production of an abundance of perceptive and interesting interpretations of the Nag Hammadi texts and other late antique sources. However, the category has also blocked from view a great number of alternative interpretations of the same material, interpretations that may be brought to light by bringing other categories and interpretive frameworks to bear on the sources. Moreover, it is crucial not only to question the way in which “Gnosticism” has been employed

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68 Viewed in this light, it may be argued that it is not so much the “Gnosticism” category as such that is the problem, as its hegemonic position as the category of analysis with regard to a selection of late antique sources, most notably the Nag Hammadi tractates.
as a heuristic device for the purpose of understanding individual texts, but also to question the way in which it has been used to organise our late antique sources. Interpretations of the sources are intimately connected with their classification, and the classification of a majority of Nag Hammadi tractates as “Gnostic” has tended to set these sources apart from other early Christian sources, leading to their being interpreted in opposition to the latter rather than as parts of broadly the same category.

In her book on *Apoc. John*, Karen King summarises the situation well when she states that the Nag Hammadi texts

have challenged and continue to challenge what we thought we knew was the theological nature of Gnosticism. So now that we have pulled back from our preconceptions and begun to ask, what is Gnosticism? It seems clear that the term carries so much intellectual baggage that it must be set aside in order to begin to examine the texts afresh.69

As King argues, rather than generalise concerning the beliefs of “Gnostics” and “Sethians” (and I would here add “Valentinians” as another category that is ripe for deconstruction)70 we should instead “talk about particular texts. The goal is not to create the perfect category (an impossibility in any case), but to make these texts available for critical and constructive work, whether in historical reconstruction or theology.”71 This is exactly the aim of the present study, to read *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as examples of early Christianity in a broad sense, rather than reading them in terms of their “deviance from the posited purity of Christian origins,” as King puts it.72 In order to escape the problems convincingly presented in such detail by Williams and King, I have in the present study chosen to abandon not only the term, but also the category of “Gnosticism” altogether.73 In doing so I hope to show more clearly, on the selected Nag Hammadi tractates’ own terms, how these Christian texts interpret Scripture and ritual practice in conjunction, and how in this process they employ conceptual blends74 based on embodied experience in their reasoning and rhetoric.

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70 Cf. Lundhaug, “Gnostisisme og ‘Valentinianisme’.”
73 This approach has also recently been argued by Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism”. See also Lundhaug, “Gnostisisme og ‘Valentinianisme’.”
74 This term is discussed in chapter 2.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

“Reading entails an immense labor of imaginative construction.”¹

1. Conceptual and Intertextual Blending

While reading texts from the Nag Hammadi corpus, one is frequently confronted with densely allusive and seemingly incoherent passages saturated with opaque symbolism and strange imagery, creating interpretive knots that are notoriously difficult to untie. The problems caused by such passages, and the very complexity of texts like Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul, have prompted me to search for new interpretive tools that may help us confront them.

“The best place to begin analyzing discourses,” Philip Eubanks suggests, “is often with its salient metaphors and metonymies. One important advantage of this approach is that it helps us to locate a discourse’s principal and most rhetorically potent ideas.”² However, as Eubanks emphasises, it is not enough just to identify key metaphors and metonymies. What is needed is a thorough analysis of the function of such devices in discourse.³ This chapter constitutes an attempt to outline a common theoretical framework for analysing the interlinking functions of metaphors, intertextuality and related phenomena in the texts under scrutiny. My aim is to show how such a theoretical framework may prove to be a valuable tool in the interpretation of these and other texts from Antiquity, and how it may also provide the basis for a unified approach to theorising about their broader contexts.

The approach that is outlined in the present chapter is very much inspired by the steadily increasing body of research into metaphor and related subjects within the cognitive sciences. More specifically it may be said to fall within the boundaries of the emerging multi-disciplinary field that may be referred to as cognitive poetics, i.e., the application of the cognitive sciences to the study of literature.\textsuperscript{4} As Keith Oatley defines it,

cognitive science is about knowledge, conscious and unconscious, about how it is represented, how it is used by human and artificial minds, and how it may be organised for particular purposes. It is interdisciplinary and multi-methodological. Cognitive poetics shares the same commitments to be broad rather than narrow. It derives from psychology, linguistics, and literary theory. Its field is literature, including texts that are read, movies and plays that are seen, poetry that is heard.\textsuperscript{5}

Although it is texts from the Nag Hammadi Codices that are the focus of the present study, the methodology that will presently be outlined should be applicable to the study of any text, literary or otherwise.


1.1. Metaphor

The study of metaphor underwent a major shift with the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980. As Gerard Steen humorously puts it, “in the beginning was Aristotle. Then there were the Dark Ages, which lasted until 1980. And then there was Lakoff…” This is of course a gross simplification of the history of metaphor theory, but it is nevertheless an apt illustration of the substantial impact of the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work. Before giving a short overview of the basic tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor as formulated by Lakoff and Johnson and their followers, however, a few words should be said concerning what we may call the “traditional” view of metaphor, the pre-Lakoffian one prevalent in Steen’s metaphorical “Dark Ages.”

1.1.1. Traditional Theories of Metaphor

According to the traditional view, metaphor is basically a mode of expression, a linguistic element pertaining merely to style and ornamentation, simply a figure of speech, and is regarded as something fundamentally different from literal language. Indeed, as Seana Coulson and Teenie Matlock have put it using a zoological metaphor, “in traditional linguistic theory, literal and nonliteral meanings are seen as two different beasts, only one of which is well behaved.” In his recent overview of cognitive theories of metaphor, Zoltán Kövecses lists five main features of the

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traditional view: (1) Metaphor is a “linguistic phenomenon,” which is used consciously or deliberately by talented authors or speakers (2) “for some artistic or rhetorical purpose.” (3) It is based on principles of similarity, and (4) requires special talent and conscious use. In sum, (5) metaphor is held to be merely a figure of speech which we can manage very well without.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, from the traditional point of view only new metaphors are regarded as real metaphors, while entrenched, conventional ones are often labelled as “dead metaphors.”\textsuperscript{12}

1.1.2. Cognitive Theories of Metaphor

In 1980, Lakoff and Johnson challenged the traditional view of metaphor on all points in a book which, in their own words, “revealed the need to rethink some of the most fundamental ideas in the study of mind: meaning, truth, the nature of thought, and the role of the body in the shaping of mind.”\textsuperscript{13} Lakoff and Johnson’s self-congratulatory tone aside, \textit{Metaphors We Live By} ushered in a new theory of metaphor, a cognitive linguistic theory whose basic theoretical manifestation is conventionally referred to as Conceptual Metaphor Theory.\textsuperscript{14} This name stems from the fact that, in contrast to the traditional view, the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor asserts that metaphor is primarily a means of conceptualisation.\textsuperscript{15} This means that it is basically a mode of thinking, and metaphorical expressions in language are from this perspective only secondary manifestations of more fundamental conceptual patterns of thought.\textsuperscript{16} It follows from this basic premise that metaphor is


not the sole property of people with a special talent. Metaphor is on the contrary regarded as being essential to the way we think in our everyday lives and does not in principle require any extra mental effort. Furthermore, from the cognitive linguistic perspective, metaphor is not even necessarily based on similarity, but instead on rather different processes of thought. Finally, metaphors that have become conventionalised have, from this perspective, done so because they have proved their worth as important cognitive devices and thus, far from being “dead,” they are often very much alive in everyday thought. Metaphor is thus “one of the main muscles of thought,” as Keith Oatley puts it with a striking metaphor.

It must be emphasised that there is an important distinction in the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor between metaphorical linguistic expressions on the one hand, and the conceptual metaphors of which they are manifestations on the other. For example, the expression “he was at a crossroads in life” is regarded as an expression of the underlying conceptual metaphor life is a journey. From this perspective a single conceptual metaphor may therefore underlie, and motivate, many different metaphorical linguistic expressions. The conceptual metaphor life is a journey can, for example, also engender metaphorical expressions like “her life lacked direction” or “they were heading towards unhappiness.”

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18 For a summary of these points, see, e.g., Kövecses, *Metaphor*, viii.

19 Cf., e.g., Crisp, “Conceptual Metaphor,” 101. As DesCamp and Sweetser point out, the view that some metaphors are “dead” is a fallacy based on the common misconception that ordinary language is literal (Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve E. Sweetser, “Metaphors for God: Why and How Do Our Choices Matter for Humans? The Application of Contemporary Cognitive Linguistics Research to the Debate on God and Metaphor,” *Pastoral Psychology* 53:3 (2005): 224). Raymond Gibbs, Paula Lenz Costa Lima, and Edson Francozo state that conventional metaphorical expressions, which are often labelled as dead metaphors, “reflect enduring conceptual mappings” and are thus far from being dead. They reserve the notion of “dead metaphors” for those metaphors that “express metaphorical relations that are opaque to contemporary speakers” (Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., et al., “Metaphor is Grounded in Embodied Experience,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 36 (2004): 1191).

20 Oatley, “Writing and reading,” 166.
1.1.3. Conceptual Metaphor Theory

At the heart of Conceptual Metaphor Theory lies the concept of mappings between domains. More specifically, Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits the mappings of counterpart relations between conceptual domains in such a way that conceptual structure from a source domain is projected onto the target domain it is being used to understand, according to the formula A IS B. In the case of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY example, elements and structure are projected from the source domain of JOURNEY onto the target domain of LIFE with the intent of conceptualising the latter by means of the former. Thus, in our example of the metaphorical linguistic expression “he was at a crossroads in life,” the image of the crossroads and the structure of travelling on a road is taken from the domain of JOURNEY and projected onto the domain of LIFE in order to conceptualise an important stage within the life of the person in question. We use the domain of JOURNEY in order to better understand LIFE, that is, we use conceptual structure from a more concrete domain (JOURNEY) in order to make sense of a more abstract one (LIFE). In the same way, the concept of FATHER may be used to conceptualise GOD, in the conceptual metaphor GOD IS A FATHER, and DEATH may be conceptualised as SLEEP IN DEATH IS SLEEP. It is indeed an important general principle of Conceptual Metaphor Theory that structure is projected in one direction from a more concrete source domain in order to make sense of a more abstract target domain, and not vice versa. This general rule is known as the principle of unidirectionality, which is an important part of Lakoff and Turner’s Invariance Hypothesis.

It should also be noted that from the perspective of cognitive poetics, phenomena that used to be treated separately from metaphor by the traditional theory can instead be regarded within the framework of

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23 See, e.g., Kövecses, Metaphor, 6, 25.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory as different expressions of the same phenomenon of cross-space mapping, such as, for example, simile (understood as explicit metaphor) and allegory (understood as sustained or extended metaphor). These may now be seen as basically the same kind of beast—well behaved or not—relying on essentially the same cognitive processes.

1.1.4. The Scope of the Source and the Range of the Target

Conceptual metaphors are employed as powerful cognitive tools enabling the readers or listeners to think about abstract and difficult theological concepts in terms of more concrete and familiar concepts and imagery. Since a source domain will always highlight only certain aspects of the target, however, several different source domains are often utilised in order to make sense of a single target. We thus find that different conceptual metaphors, that may even be mutually contradictory, are often used to highlight different aspects of a given target domain. Life may be a journey, but it may also, for instance, be a day, as in the expression “in the evening of life.” Similarly, death may also be conceived of in terms of departure rather than sleep, and God may be, for example, a shepherd, a king, or a fortress. As Raymond Gibbs puts it, “conceptual metaphors may be used to access different knowledge on different occasions as people immediately conceptualise some abstract target domain given a particular task.” A related phenomenon is the use of the same source to illuminate several different targets. Love is a journey, but an argument may also be a journey, and death may be a journey. Zoltán Kövecses refers to these phenomena as the “range of the target” and the

25 Peter Crisp, for example, defines an extended metaphor as a metaphor extending over several clauses, and an allegory as a superextended metaphor, by which he means an extended metaphor with no direct references to the metaphorical target (see Peter Crisp, “Allegory, Blending, and Possible Situations,” Metaphor and Symbol 20:2 [2005]: 115–131).


“scope of the source” respectively, and, as we shall see in the following chapters, both of these phenomena are frequently and effectively utilised as literary devices in the Nag Hammadi texts.

1.2. Metonymy

Having dealt at some length with metaphor, we should also briefly consider how another related phenomenon, that of metonymy, relates to Conceptual Metaphor Theory. What we may refer to as Conceptual Metonymy Theory is, not surprisingly, closely related to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, but while Conceptual Metaphor Theory works on the basis of an $A \rightarrow B$ formula, Conceptual Metonymy Theory works instead according to the formula $A$ FOR $B$. In Kövecses and Radden’s definition, “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM.” One thing, $A$, referred to as the vehicle entity, is thus seen to stand for another, $B$, referred to as the target entity. An example of this is the common AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy as in the expression “he was reading Shakespeare.” Metonymy is distinguished from metaphor mainly by the fact that $A$ and $B$ are associated within a single domain or domain matrix, and by the fact that $A$ and

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29 As with conceptual metaphors it should be remembered that in recent work within cognitive linguistics the term metonymy has a significantly extended meaning in relation to what we may be used to from more traditional theories. Most recent treatments regard, e.g., what has traditionally been referred to as synecdoche simply as one type of metonymic relation among many (for an argument in favor of keeping metonymy and synecdoche as separate concepts within cognitive linguistics, however, see Kenichi Seto, “Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche,” in Metonymy in Language and Thought [ed. Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden; Human Cognitive Processing 4; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999], 91–120).


31 See Kövecses, Metaphor, 145.
b are not blended. 32 However, metaphor and metonymy also interact in interesting ways, as will become clear throughout the present study. 33 In some cases, as when baptism is described in terms of washing, metaphors have a metonymic basis. In other cases there are important metonymic connections to either of the input spaces that are indispensable to the meaning production and rhetoric of the texts under scrutiny.

1.3. Blending Theory

Conceptual Metaphor Theory is a useful theory when it comes to the analysis of simple metaphorical relations. However, there are instances where it fails to account for the complexity of the material. According to the way metaphorical relations are conceptualised within the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, structure is projected from a source domain to a single target domain. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, however, have come up with a new theory that tackles more complex cases of metaphorical and non-metaphorical projection. This is known variously as the theory of Conceptual Integration, Mental Binding, Conceptual Blending, or simply Blending Theory. 34 In a recent paper, Turner

32 William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, *Cognitive Linguistics* (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 216. Croft and Cruse also add the characteristic that “any correspondences (in the Lakoffian sense) between A and B are coincidental and not relevant to the message” (ibid.), but this does not always seem to be the case, as we will see in the analyses in the following chapters. For the notion of blending referred to here, see below.


describes the basic idea of conceptual blending as “the mental operation of combining two mental packets of meaning ... selectively and under constraints to create a third mental packet of meaning that has new, emergent meaning.” The way in which this works is a bit more complicated, however. Blending Theory is in part inspired by Conceptual Metaphor Theory, but it also depends crucially upon Fauconnier’s previous research on mental spaces, and on his theory of cross-space mappings between such mental spaces. These mental spaces are, in Fau-
Fauconnier and Turner’s definition, “small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action.” Such mental spaces are specific short-term cognitive constructs that depend on other more stable longer-term knowledge structures such as domains, and are “structured by frames and cognitive models.” A mental space is thus not the same as a domain, although it is often structured by one or more domains. Mental spaces also include additional contextual, cultural, and other background structure in addition to specifically domain-derived information. In short, the theory of mental spaces is a general model for the description of “interconnections between parts of complex conceptual structures.” “The crucial characteristic of a mental space,” as Eve Sweetser puts it, “is that there can be systematic cognitive mappings between it and other mental spaces, with consequences for (inter alia) reference.”

While Conceptual Metaphor Theory reckons with just two domains, the source and the target, and the mappings between them, Blending Theory operates with a minimum of four mental spaces in a so-called Conceptual Integration Network. In such a network there is a minimum of two Input spaces, plus a so-called Generic space that contains what is common to the two input spaces, and a Blended space made up of elements and structure projected from the two input spaces as well as elements and structure emerging from within the blend itself (see fig. 1). The number of possible input spaces is not limited to just 2.

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40 Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 137; Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 102; see also Fauconnier, Mappings, 39; Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending,” 135.

41 See Hiraga, Metaphor and Iconicity, 37.

42 Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending,” 134–135.

43 Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending,” 135.

44 For a concise description of the Conceptual Integration Network model, see Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 142–144.

45 This figure is based on the one found in Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 46. The four circles represent mental spaces, the black dots represent the elements of the mental spaces, the white dots represent emergent elements, the solid lines represent counterpart mappings, the dotted lines represent cross-space projections, and the square
two, however; they are potentially infinite. Moreover, while Conceptual Metaphor Theory sees the mappings between its two domains as being unidirectional, with transfer of conceptual structure from the source domain to the target, but not the other way around, Blending Theory conceives of its cross-space projections as being able in principle to move in both directions. Blending Theory also covers all kinds of conceptual blending, not just metaphorical relations. In sum, Blending Theory is a theory of considerably greater complexity and scope than Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

The process of blending operates according to certain “structural and dynamic principles.”

46 Take for instance the interpretation of the eucharistic elements as the body and blood of Christ. In this Conceptual Integration Network (see fig. 2) the eucharistic elements constitute one of the input spaces, while the other is constituted by the body and blood of Christ. A conceptual blend depends on cross-space mappings of counterpart relations between the input spaces, and selective projection of elements and structure from these into the blended space. In this example, there are counterpart mappings between the bread and wine in Input space 1 with, respectively, the body and blood of Christ in Input space 2. The common features emerging from the counterpart mappings between these elements in the two input spaces make up the generic space, in this case, for example, the abstract generic feature of “solid” is common to the bread and the body, while “liquid” as well as “red colour” are common to the blood and the wine. Finally, selected elements and structure of both input spaces are projected into the blended space, where the eucharistic elements are identified as the body and blood of Christ. In this particular Conceptual Integration Network it is also of note that the eucharistic bread and wine serve as material anchors for the blend.

46 See Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 133.

47 In the figure (fig. 2) I have included only the elements that are actually projected.


represents a structuring frame. Veale and O’Donoghue add a fifth “constructor space” to this basic four-space model of conceptual blending in order to make it even more useful for computational purposes (Veale and O’Donoghue, “Computation and Blending,” esp. 274–279).

46 See Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 133.

47 In the figure (fig. 2) I have included only the elements that are actually projected.

In addition to dealing with such projections between mental spaces, Blending Theory also accounts for so-called emergent structure, that is, structure and elements emerging in the blend that have no counterparts in the input spaces. According to Fauconnier and Turner, the principle of emergent structure works in the following way.49 First, in what they call “composition,” the blend is created by the elements selectively projected from the input spaces putting elements from each of the input spaces in new relations to each other. This process of composition often, but not always, entails fusion in the blend of some of the elements projected into it. Then, through the process of “completion,” patterns in the blend that have come into being through the process of “composition” evoke information in long-term memory that is used to fill in the blend around the already composed elements. And finally, in the third stage, the stage of “elaboration,” the event in the blended space is simulated mentally (this is often referred to as the “running of the blend”). In this process the blend may be elaborated upon in ways that are in principle limitless.

In the Eucharist example, it is only in the blend that the bread and wine become identified with the body and blood of Christ, and therefore it is only in the blend that the consumption of the bread and the wine is understood as the consumption of the body and blood of Christ. Indeed, consuming the body and blood of Christ is only possible in the blended space, since only here is it possible to regard his body and blood as food and drink, which are the exclusive properties of the first input space and projected to the blend from there. Also, only in the blend does the eating and drinking of the bread and wine come to imply such entailments as the unification with Christ. We may thus say that the ritual of the Eucharist is dependent on the blend depicted here, and that the eucharistic elements are its material anchors.

The blend resulting from a Conceptual Integration Network often contains events and imagery that may be impossible in the real world, but which may still be of great cognitive value. For example, the concept of the Grim Reaper, a hooded skeleton with a scythe representing death, is patently absurd and implausible in the real world, but that does not detract from the usefulness of the blend as a cognitive model.50

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49 For a concise account of this process, see Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks.”
In this blend, specific aspects of death are “brought to life” in a manner that is both vivid and easy to remember, which thus illustrates the common phenomenon that “productive inference … can arise from implausible blends constructed in mental spaces,” as Seana Coulson puts it.51 It should be noted that once a Conceptual Integration Network has been established we do not do our mental work exclusively within the blended space, but we use the network as a whole. In the words of Fauconnier and Turner, “we know the connection of the blend to the input spaces, and the way that structure or inferences developed in the blend translates back to the input spaces. We work over all four spaces simultaneously, but the blend gives us structure, integration, and efficiency not available in the other spaces.”52 It is also important to note that structure and elements from the blend may in turn be projected backwards to the input spaces, which may create yet new inferences and modify the input spaces in the process.53 Depending on the discursive and situational context, the same Conceptual Integration Network may thus give rise to quite different and complex results in the blended space. Moreover, the process of running the blend may also call up new input spaces, recruit new structure, elements, and frames, and contribute to the creation of new blends. Indeed, the blended space itself may become an input space in another Conceptual Integration Network.54

The functions of the fourth space in the network, the generic space, also need to be mentioned. What is common to the input spaces, often abstract structure, constitutes the generic space, which maps onto the counterparts.55 The primary function of the generic space is thus one of cohesion, contributing towards keeping the network together, but, in addition, this space may also facilitate the recruitment of further input spaces to the blend. In the words of Seana Coulson, “the ability to reframe something at a higher level of abstraction (as in a representation evoked in the generic space of a frame network) may serve as a retrieval cue

53 For backward projection, see Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 178, 182.
54 See, e.g., Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 431.
for frames which would have been otherwise unavailable.”

It should be noted, however, that in more complex Conceptual Integration Networks, with more than two input spaces, the latter need not all share the same generic space, but having a shared generic space makes the network as a whole more cohesive.

1.3.1. Vital Relations

Looking more closely at the cross-space mappings of counterpart relations between input spaces, the so-called “outer-space” links, and the “inner-space” links between elements within a single mental space, Fauconnier and Turner enumerate fifteen different types of links, termed “vital relations” between elements mapped in this way. These links range from such properties as Analogy, Representation, and Similarity, to Time and Space. It is a major feature of blending that outer-space vital relations tend to be scaled down, strengthened, and compressed to inner-space relations in the blend. For example, in the Eucharist-blend, described above, there are outer-space vital relations of similarity and representation between, respectively, wine and blood, and bread and body, that are compressed to identity in the blend.

What governs the compression of vital relations is first of all the overarching goal, postulated by Fauconnier and Turner, to “achieve human scale” in the blend. Among the most notable subgoals of this process is to “strengthen vital relations,” “compress what is diffuse,” and to “obtain global insight.”

56 Coulson, “Semantic Leaps,” 298. Coulson is here discussing a so-called frame network, but the principle holds true for any kind of network. As we shall see below, the notion of the generic space plays an important part in conceptualising the functions of a canon in interpretation from the perspective of Blending Theory.

57 See Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 279.

58 For a description and list of the fifteen different vital relations, see Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 93–102. The fifteen vital relations are as follows: Change, Identity, Time, Space, Cause-Effect, Part-Whole, Representation, Role, Analogy, Disanalogy, Property, Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness. Joseph Grady argues convincingly for the addition of Correlation to this list (see Joseph Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Blends,” Journal of Pragmatics 37:10 (2005): 1595–1614).

59 “Blends systematically scale down relations, compress relations into others, and even create new relations” (Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 107).

60 See, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 322–323. Recently Carl Bache and Anders Hougaard have argued convincingly in favour of balancing Fauconnier and Turner’s focus on conceptual integration and compression by also introducing the idea
purpose of blending is to compress and simplify complex mental structures to a scale at which they become more easily manageable to the human mind, making it possible to think in terms of familiar objects, actions, and situations.\textsuperscript{61} Examples of this are when the entire history of evolution is thought of in terms of the time-scale of a single day, making it possible to state that while the dinosaurs appeared on the scene at 10 pm, humans only showed up at the stroke of midnight,\textsuperscript{62} or when we reduce the sun and the planets to the size of melons, oranges, and other fruits in order to enable us to grasp more easily their relative sizes and the vast distances between them in the solar system. Similarly, the concept of GOD is reduced to human scale when conceptualised in terms of the familiar concepts of FATHER or KING.\textsuperscript{63}

1.3.2. A Taxonomy of Blends

We have seen that Conceptual Metaphor Theory accounts only for unidirectional projection between two domains. Blending Theory, which is a much more versatile and dynamic model of meaning production, accounts for the kind of unidirectional metaphorical projection that is handled by Conceptual Metaphor Theory by treating it as one kind of Conceptual Integration Network among many, the type Fauconnier and Turner would call a one-sided shared topology network. This network has two input spaces, corresponding to the source and the target domains, and the usual generic and blended spaces, but the blended space in this kind of network recruits its frame structure exclusively from one of the input spaces—from that which corresponds to the source domain.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{61} See Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 312; Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 418–419.

\textsuperscript{62} For this example, see Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 418–419.

\textsuperscript{63} For an analysis of these and other metaphors for God using Blending Theory, see DesCamp and Sweetser, “Metaphors for God”.

\textsuperscript{64} See Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 165–166. For an in-depth treatment of metaphorical blends, see Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs”.
Blending operations may be simple or complex, but the type of network that Turner has especially emphasised is the so-called “double-scope” network. Such networks have “inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames and an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those organizing frames and has emergent structure of its own.” The central feature of such blends is the fact that the differences in the projected organizing frames, both of which contribute to the blend, “offer the possibility of rich clashes,” as Turner puts it. “Far from blocking the construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination and the resulting blends can turn out to be highly creative.” Blends of the kind I will be analysing in the following chapters fall more often than not into the category of double-scope, or even multiple-scope.

1.3.3. Blending Theory vs. Conceptual Metaphor Theory

We have seen here that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory are quite different. However, the two theoretical approaches may be regarded as complementary, rather than contradictory. While Conceptual Metaphor Theory deals mostly with stable knowledge structures in long-term memory, and is useful when dealing with relatively stable and simple conceptual structures, it is on-line meaning production that is the focus of Blending Theory, which is also considerably more helpful when it comes to the analysis of more complex and creative conceptual blends, not to mention the analysis of emergent structure. As we have seen, one of the central motivations for Blending Theory is that it accounts for so-called “emergent structure” resulting from cross-space mappings, i.e., structure that does not derive from either input space, but nevertheless emerges in the conceptual blend. However, it should be noted that

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65 For the complete typology of blends, see Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think.
emergent structure is not a precondition for the application of Blending Theory. The basic mechanisms of the theory apply regardless of whether new structure emerges from the blending or not.\textsuperscript{71} Another strength of Blending Theory is that it accounts for the kinds of phenomena that the Invariance Hypothesis excludes by default, most notably cross-space projection of elements and structure in more than one direction.\textsuperscript{72} Blending Theory’s ability to handle the interanimation of mental spaces, and ultimately of the cognitive models or texts they derive from, is a precondition for the usefulness of the theory in handling the majority of the conceptual blends that are analysed in the following chapters, and also for its applicability to the analysis of allusions and other intertextual relations.

1.3.4. Blending, Cognitive Architecture, and Memory

In terms of cognitive architecture, Fauconnier and Turner claim that “mental spaces operate in working memory,” and that “elements in mental spaces correspond to activated neuronal assemblies and linking between elements corresponds to some kind of neurobiological binding, such as co-activation.”\textsuperscript{73} This means that Blending Theory finds itself somewhere between a connectionist and a representationalist cognitive architecture while the connection to either of them is kept rather vague.\textsuperscript{74} Since it stays on a level of abstraction that, as Patrick Colm Hogan has pointed out, is neutral with regard to cognitive architecture,\textsuperscript{75} Blending


\textsuperscript{72} See Peter Stockwell’s devastating critique of the Invariance Hypothesis in Stockwell, “The Inflexibility of Invariance”. In the words of Stockwell, “The Invariance Hypothesis curtails the perception of metaphor as creative. It limits our understanding, condemning us to see things only in the way that we have always seen them. It would prevent us from seeing how we could possibly genuinely perceive anything new or challenging. It cannot explain the capacity of language for reference to a new sense beyond source and target” (ibid., 140). Blending Theory, on the other hand, is inherently a far more dynamic model and steers well clear of the problems described by Stockwell.

\textsuperscript{73} Fauconnier and Turner, \textit{The Way We Think}, 102.


\textsuperscript{75} See Hogan, \textit{Cognitive Science}, 109. Hogan argues that Blending Theory would benefit from being more specified in terms of representationalist architecture (see ibid., 109–113), while David Ritchie has argued for a reformulation in terms of connectionist architecture (see L. David Ritchie, “Lost in ‘Conceptual Space’,” \textit{Metaphor and Symbol} 19:1 [2004]: 31–50).
Theory provides analytical tools for modelling processes of thought without being married to any specific theory of how the mind works on the level of architecture.

An important notion of memory research that may supplement Blending Theory, however, is that of “priming.” Bob Snyder defines priming as “a process whereby the recall of a particular memory causes the low-level activation of other associated memories (a context), without this process necessarily becoming conscious.”

Another way of putting this is that priming is about preparing pieces of long-term memory for activation by making them more easily available. As Hogan puts it, “primed items are, in effect, brought out of long-term memory, though they are not accessed directly in consciousness.” Such items thus come to be “in a different mental state from either the conscious/rehearsal material or the material stored in long-term memory.” We may think of the status of primed memories as having been “placed temporarily in a sort of buffer between long-term memory and consciousness.”

For my purposes here, the most important feature of the notion of priming is the insight that the activation of one memory primes related memories, which consequently “makes it more likely that some of those semiactivated memories will also be recalled.” In this sense, priming helps us to understand the way in which mental spaces are called up to processes of blending in working memory. This is highly relevant with regard to allusions. If, for instance, we have detected an allusion to First Corinthians at one point in our

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reading of *Exeg. Soul*, we are consequently more likely to detect further allusions to the same text in subsequent parts, or subsequent readings, of *Exeg. Soul*.

1.4. Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs)

Another important concept that will be used in the present work is George Lakoff’s notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs). An ICM is, in the clear formulation of Raymond Gibbs,

> a prototypical “folk” theory or cultural model that people create to organize their knowledge. . . . ICMs are idealized and don’t fit actual situations in a one-to-one correspondence but relate many concepts that are inferentially connected to one another in a single conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole.

The elements of an ICM are very often structured by conceptual metaphors, since metaphors help organize the elements of the ICM by means of their entailments. As Zoltán Kövecses puts it, “metaphor is primarily used to understand a whole system of entities in terms of another system.” Take for instance the ICM for *society*. Here the conceptual metaphor *society is a family* is especially productive, leading to the conceptualisation of society in terms of the concept of family. Often, however, cognitive models are defined by a set of metaphors, each highlighting different aspects of the ICM. The cognitive model for society is for instance also structured by the metaphors *society is a person* and *society is a machine*. At the same time, *family* and *machine* are themselves ICMs. Still, even though a concept is defined by a cluster of cognitive models, it is psychologically easier to grasp as a single concept, rather than as the sum of its constituents.

The elements and structure that make up an ICM become closely linked in experience, and thus in people’s memory, and this facilitates the priming and activation of related elements of the ICM once one element

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81 For the theory of Idealized Cognitive Models, see Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*.
83 See, e.g., Gibbs, *Poetics of Mind*, 203.
85 Lakoff refers to this as ICM clustering (Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 74–76, 203).
86 For these conceptual metaphors, see Kövecses, *Metaphor*.
has been activated. However, the level of priming and activation follows from the prototype effects pertaining to ICMs. In most cases, not all of the constituents of an ICM are of equal importance. ICMs are usually radial or graded in one or more ways, and this causes prototype effects. When, for example, an ICM is brought to mind in a general sense, one is likely to think of it differently than when it is activated in a specific context. One might say that the features that are central to the ICM are more easily activated in a general activation of the cognitive model than the less central ones, while the latter may be more easily brought to mind in specific contexts.

In terms of Blending Theory, ICMs may be encountered as providers of input spaces to Conceptual Integration Networks. In this sense they are equivalent to domains, but the element of structure is to a greater degree inherent in the concept of an ICM than in that of a domain, thus making the former term more useful for our purposes than the latter. At times, an ICM may also be regarded as the cognitive model that provides the category structure for the whole blending network as well as for the individual spaces in the network. Blending Theory may in turn be used to model the internal workings of an ICM, the combination of ICMs or expansion of ICMs.

Following Raymond Gibbs, I would like to stress the inherently dynamic nature of ICMs and their functions in metaphorical meaning construction. As Gibbs has argued,

understanding literary texts, similar to any act of meaning construal, is not a matter of accessing highly structured knowledge, in the form of abstract prototypes, from long-term memory. Instead, text understanding is a dynamic activity that relies on concrete, often embodied information, which people creatively compose in the moment of reading.

This means that when the reader encounters in a text, for example, the metaphorical source ICM of machine in the conceptual metaphor the mind is a machine, he or she draws on concrete knowledge of

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specific parts of that ICM, depending on the context and depending on the reader’s prior “real-world” and textual knowledge and experience. As Gibbs has pointed out, concepts and categories are highly flexible,\(^{92}\) and a cognitive model, such as the MACHINE ICM is not an abstraction based on concrete instances, but rather a cluster of information and structure that may be activated in various ways in different contexts. “Instead of assuming that language activates fixed prototypical conceptual representations, language serves,” claims Gibbs, “as an immediate pointer to encyclopaedic knowledge from which conceptual meanings are created ‘on the fly’, or as an *ad-hoc* comprehension process.”\(^{93}\) ICMs, then, that are made up of different, sometimes contradictory, elements, should be viewed “not as fixed, static structures, but as temporary representations that are dynamic and context-dependent.”\(^{94}\) They should be regarded as “temporary constructions in working memory constructed on the spot from generic and episodic information in long-term memory, rather than as stable structures stored in long-term memory.”\(^{95}\)

1.5. *Intertextuality*

Let us now turn from the interpretation of metaphors and other conceptual blends for a moment to consider the related phenomenon of the interpretation of allusions and citations, and the broader phenomenon of intertextuality. Traditionally, intertextuality and metaphor have been viewed as separate phenomena and treated within different theoretical frameworks and largely within different scholarly fields and traditions. However, there are important points of contact between them which suggest the possibility that they might fruitfully be treated within a unified theoretical framework. Such an overarching framework, I want to suggest, may be found in an adaptation of Blending Theory. Peter Stockwell has recently pointed out that

taking “the cognitive turn” seriously ... means a thorough re-evaluation of all of the categories with which we understand literary reading and analysis. In doing this, however, we do not have to throw away all of the insights from literary criticism and linguistic analysis that have been drawn out in the past. Many of those patterns of understanding form very useful

\(^{92}\) Gibbs, “Prototypes,” 31–32.
\(^{93}\) Gibbs, “Prototypes,” 38.
\(^{94}\) Gibbs, “Prototypes,” 33.
\(^{95}\) Gibbs, “Prototypes,” 32.
starting points for cognitive poetic investigation. Some of them require only a little reorientation to offer a new way of looking at literary reading. Occasionally, this might seem to be no more than recasting old ideas with new labels. I would argue (along cognitive linguistic lines) that new labels force us to conceptualise things differently.\footnote{Stockwell, \textit{Cognitive Poetics}, 6.}

I fully share Stockwell’s sentiment and would argue that one field of literary theoretical investigation that needs only a little reorientation in order to be adapted for a cognitive poetic methodology is that of the study of intertextuality.\footnote{For a recent overview of the theoretical concept of intertextuality, see Graham Allen, \textit{Intertextuality} (The New Critical Idiom; London: Routledge, 2000). For a comprehensive bibliography of studies on or within the framework of intertextuality up until the late eighties, see Udo J. Hebel, comp., \textit{Intertextuality, Allusion, and Quotation: An International Bibliography of Critical Studies} (Bibliographies and Indexes in World Literature 18; New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); and see also Hans-Peter Mai, “Intertextual Theory—A Bibliography,” in \textit{Intertextuality} (ed. Heinrich F. Plett; Research in Text Theory 15; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 237–250. For an excellent treatment of intertextuality in relation to the analysis of texts from antiquity, see Edmunds, \textit{Intertextuality}. See also Ulrich Luz, “Intertexts in the Gospel of Matthew,” \textit{HTR} 97:2 (2004): 119–137 for a brief and informative overview of theories of intertextuality and a subsequent application to the Gospel of Matthew. Note, however, that “there does not exist anything like a coherent theory of intertextuality” (Mai, “Intertextual Theory,” 237).}

Similarities between the phenomena of metaphor and allusion have indeed been noted by several scholars of classics and literature. Gian Biagio Conte, for instance, has treated allusion as a rhetorical trope on the same level as metaphor. According to Conte, “allusion works in just the same way, and in the same semantic area, as a rhetorical figure.”\footnote{Gian Biagio Conte, \textit{The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets} (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 44; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 38 Cf. also Joseph Pucci, \textit{The Full-Knowing Reader: Allusion and the Power of the Reader in the Western Literary Tradition} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), xv, 9.} Although Conte here presupposes the traditional view of metaphor as a rhetorical figure, his observation of the similarities between metaphor and allusion is useful when seen within the cognitive poetic framework, outlined above. From this perspective, Conte’s description of the similarities between allusions and tropes is highly suggestive. “In both allusion and the trope,” writes Conte, “the poetic dimension is created by the simultaneous presence of two different realities whose competition with one another produces a single more complex reality. Such literary allusion produces the simultaneous coexistence of both a denotative and
a connotative semiotic.”99 By reformulating Conte’s “different realities” into different mental spaces, it is apparent how adaptable such a view is to the theoretical framework of Blending Theory.

Other literary theorists have also come close to the current positions within cognitive poetics outlined above. Indeed, Ziva Ben-Porat’s highly evocative theory of the poetics of allusion, outlined in her important 1976 article “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,”100 may now serve as a useful link between traditional literary approaches to allusion and current views within cognitive poetics. Ben-Porat’s definition of allusion provides an apt illustration:

The literary allusion is a device for the simultaneous activation of two texts. The activation is achieved through the manipulation of a special signal: a sign (simple or complex) in a given text characterized by an additional larger “referent.” This referent is always an independent text. The simultaneous activation of the two texts thus connected results in the formation of intertextual patterns whose nature cannot be predetermined.101

In a similar vein, Ellen van Wolde stated in 1989 that intertextual relations are “a part of the reader’s general semiotic actualization process,” a process focussed on the reader, “because the reader achieves intertextual semiosis through logical and analogical reasoning in interaction with the text.”102 She claimed further that these intertextual relationships “do not concern the similarity between text and referent but the ability of the reader to conceive of the worlds of the text as possible or to reconstruct them, or, in other words, to give them contents by relating them to his own living- and reading-experiences.”103 According to van Wolde, the reader thus “turns the possible worlds of the text into realities.”104

The notion that the intertextual connections between sign-systems amount to the creation of entirely new systems of signification has also been emphasised by the scholar who coined the term intertextuality in

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99 Conte, Rhetoric of Imitation, 24. Note, however, that within cognitive linguistics the differences between denotation and connotation have been all but erased (see Tomasz P. Krzeszowski, “Connotation and Denotation,” in Reference in Multidisciplinary Perspective: Philosophical Object, Cognitive Subject, Intersubjective Process [ed. Richard A. Geiger; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1995], 363–373).
101 Ben-Porat, “Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 108.
the first place, namely Julia Kristeva. It is not her original definition of the term that is of most interest in the present context, however, but her later reformulation of it at a time when she herself expressed the need to abandon the term “intertextuality” in favour of “transposition,” because she felt that the former term had “often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources’.” According to her reformulation of the concept in *Revolution in Poetic Language*, intertextuality should rather be understood as the “transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another,” in a way that “implies the abandonment of a former sign system, the passage to a second via an instinctual intermediary common to the two systems, and the articulation of the new system with its new representability.”

However, while Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality sticks to the level of the “sign-systems” and does not allow for the importance of either authorial or readerly interpretation, those theories of intertextuality that come closest to the concerns of current cognitive theory are those which focus on the reader. As Joseph Pucci points out, a theory like that of Ben-Porat amounts to “a strong claim for an empowered reader.” In such approaches, the process of intertextuality is located in readers’

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106 Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (trans. Margaret Waller; New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 60. Despite Kristeva’s change of term, however, the term intertextuality “remains, nearly a quarter of a century later, an important part of the fabric of contemporary terminology, used indiscriminately by students of allusion of every stripe and critical inclination,” as Joseph Pucci puts it (Pucci, *Full-Knowing Reader*, 15).


108 Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 60. The number of different terms that have been employed to describe similar notions of transfer between and combination of textual and extra-textual sign systems is quite bewildering. Claes Schaar, for instance, launched a highly complicated theory of vertical context systems (Schaar, “Linear Sequence,” 377–388), while Udo Hebel has preferred the metaphor of text archaeology in order to describe his notion of the scholarly interpretation of allusions (Udo J. Hebel, “Towards a Descriptive Poetics of Allusion,” in *Intertextuality* [ed. Heinrich F. Plett; Research in Text Theory 15; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991], 135–164). Among the multitude of other terms are hypertextuality, metatextuality, paratextuality and transtextuality. A convenient glossary can be found in Allen, *Intertextuality*, 210–221.

109 Cf. the critique in Bortnes, “Rhetoric and Mental Images,” 46–47.

110 Pucci, *Full-Knowing Reader*, 17.
minds, where production of meaning is regarded as a result of a dialogical interplay between two or more texts. “Meaning arises when two or more texts are brought together in the understanding of a reader,” as George Aichele puts it, and meaning produced in this way can never be predetermined and will always be subject to change. Pucci himself comes particularly close to the perspective of the present study in his own study of allusion. In Pucci’s words, “It is at the point of mental connection that the allusion is created—and only at this point. To claim otherwise is, in my view, to replace an essentially autonomous creative act on the part of the reader with a paradigm in which that act is distorted, hidden, or subsumed.”

1.5.1. Intertextual Blending

By now it should be apparent that the abovementioned notions of intertextuality lend themselves easily to be rephrased and restated within a cognitive poetics framework. We have seen how Ziva Ben-Porat in the mid-seventies conceived of the intertextual patterns created by means of literary allusions, and also how van Wolde’s concept of the actualisation of intertextual relationships comes very close to Blending Theory’s notion of the blending of mental spaces. Van Wolde’s view of intertextuality in the late eighties thus seems especially close to contemporary views within cognitive poetics. The same may also be said of Conte’s


112 Pucci, Full-Knowing Reader, 36. Pucci even refers to an “allusive space,” which he describes as a “mental place where the allusion is made to mean,” a concept that turns out to be rather similar to Blending Theory’s notion of the blended space. As Pucci describes it, the “allusive space” “exists apart from the referential and significative control of the language that gives rise to it. So, too, are the meanings that arise in it unique, because they result from an interpretive free-play on the part of the reader, as the dissonances of two discrete works are mediated in the give and take of a mental, interpretive dialogue. As it turns out, that dialogue may extend to places and topics that have nothing at all to do with the two works that constitute the allusion, whose language nonetheless occasions their articulation, if only momentarily. This dialogue ensures that the reader assumes complete interpretive power over the allusive moment—and at the expense of the author, whose power evanesces” (ibid., 43).

113 For the relationship between possible worlds theory and mental space theory, see Semino, “Possible Worlds”.

114 It is worthy of note that she has recently edited a book on the use of cognitive perspectives in scriptural exegesis, Ellen van Wolde, ed., Job 28: Cognition in Context (Biblical Interpretation 64; Leiden: Brill, 2003).
emphasis on the centrality of the evocation of thoughts for the function of both allusions and metaphors.\footnote{See Conte, \emph{Rhetoric of Imitation}, 38.}

Ziva Ben-Porat conceived of the interplay that is established between texts through the use of allusions in terms of the dialogical relationship between two independent spaces. Using terminology borrowed from Conceptual Metaphor Theory we may refer to each of the texts in this relationship as the source and the target texts respectively, each representing its own domain. However, since, as Ben-Porat noted in her article, the intertextual relationship works both ways,\footnote{Ben-Porat, “Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 114 n. 9.} causing a reinterpretation of both the alluding (target) text and the evoked (source) text, Conceptual Metaphor Theory is structurally too simple to be suited to conceptualise this kind of relationship. Blending Theory, on the other hand, is ideally suited to model what Ben-Porat described in terms of intertextual patterning, and the unpredictable production of meaning that arises from it.\footnote{In addition, it also fits well with the fact that, in her theory as well, although she uses different terms, the blended space may recruit structure from the intertextual input spaces that lie outside of the actual allusive device or signal used to activate them.} Conte’s assertion that in both metaphor and allusion, “the poetry lies in the simultaneous presence of two different realities that try to indicate a single reality,”\footnote{Conte, \emph{Rhetoric of Imitation}, 38.} is clearly in line with the focus and interests of Blending Theory.

We have seen that Blending Theory may prove to be a powerful tool in the interpretation of conceptual blends, whether they be metaphorical, counterfactual, or otherwise. It is thus all the more surprising that Blending Theory has so far hardly been applied to the analysis of allusions or other kinds of intertextual relations. Peter Stockwell and Eve Sweetser have indeed suggested the possibility of doing so, but few have so far answered the call.\footnote{See Stockwell, \emph{Cognitive Poetics}, 126–127; Eve Sweetser, “Whose Rhyme is Whose Reason? Sound and Sense in \emph{Cyrano de Bergerac},” \emph{Language and Literature} 15:1 (2006): 29–54. A notable step in this direction is constituted by Michael Burke, “Literature as Parable,” in \emph{Cognitive Poetics in Practice} (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 115–128. Building mainly on M. Turner, \emph{The Literary Mind}, Burke prefers the term “parabolic projection” and does not operationalise his notion of intertextuality in terms of a fully developed Blending Theory.}

Where Blending Theory usually operates with mental spaces that arise on the basis of domains or ICMs, which may thus aptly be termed \emph{conceptual} blending, I suggest that we may also regard memories of texts
that are brought to the mind of a reader as mental spaces and that we may use the methodological framework of Blending Theory to model the mental connections and integration that takes place between such mental spaces in the act of interpretation. I will refer to such interpretive processes involving the combination and connection between memories of texts as *intertextual* blending. With both conceptual and intertextual blending what we are modelling are the mental interpretive processes of combining and creating connections between mental spaces that become active in working memory, cued by sensory input derived from reading or hearing the texts under scrutiny. In both cases we may have integration networks that are single-, double-, or multiple-scope, with a potentially infinite number of input spaces. Moreover, since they are all mental spaces, we may also have hybrid integration networks that include both conceptual and intertextual input spaces. Intertextuality, then, will here be modelled as the recollection, construction,120 and combination of memories of large and small pieces of texts and discourses—memories that when called upon constitute mental input spaces that are recruited to integration networks and blended in the process of interpretation. Complex intertextual relations, such as those represented by the phenomenon of composite allusions, seem to be especially suited to be subjected to a blending analysis, given Blending Theory’s provision for analyses of complex blends with multiple input spaces. These intertextual input spaces may, as I conceive it, be cued by literary and non-literary texts alike121—the latter including actions and performances such as rituals and ritual processes. Allusions and metaphorical expressions may then be regarded as triggers that facilitate the recruitment of mental spaces based on memories and knowledge of texts and concepts alike to an integration network and a process of blending.

As I have tried to show here, Blending Theory seems ideally suited to be used as an analytical tool with regard to intertextual relations as well as to metaphors and other instances of conceptual blending. The kind of wide-ranging and detailed application of Blending Theory to the analysis of intertextuality proposed here, which I will refer to as *intertextual blending*, has, to my knowledge, not previously been attempted.


121 Cf. Ben-Porat, “Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 108 n. 5.
An important advantage of a Blending Theory approach to intertextuality over many traditional approaches is its synchronous rather than diachronous focus. This means that it places itself far from the kind of “source criticism approach” that compelled Kristeva to abandon the term “intertextuality” in favour of “transposition.” Approached from the perspective of Blending Theory, inferences are not unidirectional, from an earlier text to a later one, but they are rather synchronous in the interpretation of a reader.

1.6. Conclusion

In the Nag Hammadi texts we often encounter highly complex conceptual blends, and we frequently witness how such blends are shifted and turned on their heads, so to speak, as similar Conceptual Integration Networks, with shifting contextual frames or different emphases, are juxtaposed or integrated with one another. At other times, new input spaces are added to existing networks while others fade into the background, often to reappear and become foregrounded again at a later stage in the text. ¹²²

Such complex interpretive problems seem to justify the need for a flexible and comprehensive overarching theory of interpretation in order to tackle the challenges posed by such complex literary creations. Blending Theory promises to provide us with such a framework. ¹²³ Not only may theories of allusion and intertextuality, and cognitive theories of metaphor be incorporated rather smoothly within the framework of Blending Theory, but the latter may also contribute substantially to the former theories with its added flexibility and theoretical sophistication. In my view, Blending Theory clearly has much to offer in terms of greater theoretical specificity and clarity in cases of complex metaphors and composite intertextual allusions, features that are so common in the literary works from the Nag Hammadi Codices.


¹²³ In the words of Todd Oakley, “what makes conceptual blending so promising as a general model of cognitive framing is its ability to handle metadiscourse structures as well as discourse, sentential, lexical, and referential structures” (Todd V. Oakley, “Conceptual Blending, Narrative Discourse, and Rhetoric,” Cognitive Linguistics 9:4 [1998]: 334).
The problems of knowing the extent to which different mental spaces are utilised in any one (person’s) interpretation of a text stem from the impossibility of knowing the mental constitution of other people, and especially those far removed from ourselves in time, space, language, and culture. We therefore have to deal with probabilities at best, and often with mere possibilities. I suggest, however, that we may use Blending Theory as an analytical tool with which we may experiment with different input spaces in modelling possible interpretations of the texts in question. The results may then be evaluated according to the degree to which they provide us with overall interpretations that seem plausible on the basis of relevant criteria. So, while it may be necessary to abandon any hopes of reaching definitive answers, we have at least an analytical tool that enables us to outline interpretive possibilities. It is the mapping of such potential interpretations in the two selected tractates from the Nag Hammadi Codices that is the focus of the following chapters.

With regard to the integration network diagrams that are used throughout this study it is important to keep in mind what they are and what they are not. The diagrams should be seen as analytical tools and as a supplement to the verbal exposition of the texts. They are definitely not to be regarded as self-sufficient, or as providing a complete picture of any process of blending. Rather, they must be regarded as being akin to snapshots of mental processes of blending that focus on certain aspects and disregard others. Such a diagram can never capture such a process in its entirety and is not to be understood on its own apart from the verbal exposition. The necessity of using such diagrams as analytical tools, and of showing explicitly the Conceptual Integration Networks in the analyses of Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil., stems from the fact that we as modern scholars do not have the same frames of reference, the same concepts or intertexts present in our heads (in memory) when reading these Nag Hammadi texts as those who read them in antiquity did. It therefore proves helpful in our analysis and exposition of the texts to make explicit the possible blends that may have been automatically triggered when the texts were read by various ancient readers.

2. Interpretive Contexts and Communities

“It is a commonplace of literary criticism,” Margaret Freeman points out, “that one of the defining characteristics of literature is its ability
to generate multiple meanings and interpretations.”\textsuperscript{124} Although literary critics, and, I might add, interpreters of the Nag Hammadi texts, “are adept at producing such readings, readings which are often insightful and illuminating,” Freeman rightly notes that they “tend to assume rather than explore the principles and the processes by which such multiplicity occurs.”\textsuperscript{125} Blending Theory, however, not only shows us that a multiplicity of possible meanings is an inevitable outcome of interpretive processes, but it also shows us how and why this is the case. The fact that it goes unnoticed most of the time is “a function of the availability of certain frames through defaults, contexts, or culture,” as Fauconnier and Turner put it.\textsuperscript{126} Now, what are the constraints and influences that guide such interpretive processes?

2.1. 

Authorial Intention and the Role of the Reader

In the words of Margaret Freeman, “literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and sociocultural worlds in which they have been created and read.”\textsuperscript{127} It should not be necessary to point out that there are differences between these various minds and their respective contexts. Surprisingly, however, Fauconnier and Turner do not address the question of where the process of blending is actually considered to occur. Is it in the author, the reader, or in the text itself? In Fauconnier and Turner’s work this is kept rather vague, but most often they seem to assume that the blends simply exist in the texts or artworks that they analyse. However, as literary theorists have repeatedly stressed, questions regarding the relationship between author, text, and reader are neither easy nor trivial.

For one thing, there is the old thorny question of authorial intention. Are the Conceptual Integration Networks we identify to be regarded as the intended products of empirical authors, or do we regard them as arising from the “texts themselves,” or as products of the reader(s), and if so, which reader(s)?

\textsuperscript{124} Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.
\textsuperscript{125} Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.
\textsuperscript{126} Fauconnier and Turner, “Polysemy and Conceptual Blending,” 83.
\textsuperscript{127} Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.
Recognising this shortcoming in the theories of Fauconnier & Turner and others, Tim Rohrer addresses the question in a recent article. Rohrer suggests that we ought to operate with different Conceptual Integration Networks for the author and the reader. Arguing convincingly for the need among blending theorists to “make explicit the contents of precisely whose head or heads they are claiming to model,” Rohrer presents a model of “space-swapping” between the authorial and the interpretive networks. Basically, what he suggests is that what counts as a blended space from the author’s perspective should be regarded as an input space from the perspective of the reader. It follows from this approach that, although we may speculate as much as we want, as interpreters we will never be able to ascertain the extent and nature of the authorial blending process, but will only ever have access to the interpretive side of things. The only authorial intention we can speak of, the only intentionality that is reachable to any reader, will be the one created in a reader’s mind in order to make sense of the text as it is read, which may or may not correspond to the intentions of the empirical author.

The notion of authorial intentionality still has an important role to play, however. Not only may we speculate as to the possible nature of the authorial blending network, but the hypothetical authorial intention that is constructed in the mind of the reader should also be regarded as a powerful cognitive model that is used in the interpretation of the text. Raymond Gibbs points out the centrality of this, stating that the meaning of a text is generated by hypothesizing intentions authors might have had, given the context of creation, rather than relying on or trying to seek out the author’s subjective intentions. Readers’ interpretations of texts depend on their inferences about a hypothetical author founded in the linguistic conventions and artistic practices at the time the author wrote the work, as well as in publicly available knowledge of how the text was created. A work might display a multiplicity of meanings given the large set of intentions readers can hypothesize about an author and the conditions under which a work was written. This multiplicity of meanings is perfectly appropriate to propose, even if the actual author intended only a single interpretation for a text.

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Thus, some kind of intentionality—whether we refer to it as that of the author, real or implied, or as that of the “text itself” in one version or another—will always be constructed by the reader of a text in order to make sense of it. This readerly constructed intentionality is, of course, subject to change in the course of the process of reading and re-reading the text, for no interpretation will ever be stable, as contexts may change and new input spaces may always be introduced, causing our mental blended spaces to shift in ways that will always to some extent be less than predictable.

2.2. The Function and Effects of Context

How do we recognise a metaphor when we see one? Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory are powerful theories of metaphor interpretation, but they do not explain how metaphorical expressions, or other kinds of figurative language, may actually be identified as such. Indeed, several scholars have challenged the notion that we should, or even can, distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements or utterances at all. The “commonsense dichotomy between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ is a psychological illusion,”130 states Mark Turner. Patrick Colm Hogan has recently argued in favour of the dismissal of the dichotomy, stating that

cognitive principles indicate that this is a misguided question. In a cognitive framework, there is nothing about a sentence, divorced from human minds, that would make it literal or metaphorical, or meaningful in any way. Meaning is just a function of cognitive processing, whether that of a speaker, a listener, a writer, or a reader. Put differently, there is no such thing as a metaphorical—or, for that matter, literal—statement per se. Rather, there are only literal and metaphorical intents and literal and metaphorical interpretations or, more technically, literal and metaphorical generative processes and literal and metaphorical interpretive processes.131

Hogan distinguishes between what he calls a demarcation criterion and a decision criterion when it comes to metaphor identification. The former of these two is a criterion for distinguishing between literal and metaphorical statements, and the latter is a criterion for determining

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131 Hogan, Cognitive Science, 91.
when to interpret an expression metaphorically or literally. He concludes that what distinguishes literal from metaphorical interpretation is “not a matter of the terms themselves, nor of any specific part of their lexical structure or properties, nor of the relations between these structures or properties. Rather, it is a matter of our presumption regarding the transfer of source properties to the target.”

From this demarcation criterion Hogan deduces that a “decision criterion” does not exist. He notes that many theorists have mistaken their demarcation criteria for decision criteria, and points out that his own proposed demarcation criterion “cannot serve as a decision criterion, because it concerns interpretive assumptions, not objective properties of or objective relations between the source and the target.”

So, if we grant that the decision on whether to understand a statement metaphorically or literally depends on the reader, we need to take a look at what guides the reader’s interpretation. According to Hogan, “you can’t tell a metaphor by looking at it.” Instead, “we choose a metaphorical or literal interpretation on the basis of a wide range of empirical factors—knowledge of the speaker, of the situation, of common usage, et cetera—in connection with general concerns for logical consistency and explanatory simplicity.”

This is true even with regard to statements that seem to be obviously metaphorical, since even these “may be intended literally in a relevant context.” Context is thus of primary importance. According to Seana Coulson,

context-free expression meaning is an illusion based on the use of defaults. Instead, understanding language utterances involves integrating linguistic, contextual, and background knowledge to yield cognitive models with which to incorporate the content of expressions and their implications for the interpretation of the larger speech activity.

So, context is of central importance in any decision on whether language should be regarded as metaphorical or not. Often, however, it is not a case of an either/or situation. Put in terms of Blending Theory, “the

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133 Hogan, Cognitive Science, 92.
134 Hogan, Cognitive Science, 92.
135 Hogan, Cognitive Science, 92.
136 Hogan, Cognitive Science, 92.
unpacking possibilities offered by the blended space will depend on what is already active in the context of communication.” 138 A linguistic expression, according to Fauconnier,

does not have a meaning in itself; rather, it has a meaning potential, and it is only within a complete discourse and in context that meaning will actually be produced. The unfolding of discourse brings into play complex cognitive constructions. They include the setting up of internally structured domains linked to each other by connectors; this is effected on the basis of linguistic, contextual, and situational clues. Grammatical clues, although crucial to the building process, are in themselves insufficient to determine it. 139

One of the main obstacles facing us in the interpretation of historical documents like those of the Nag Hammadi Codices, however, lies in the fact that we have no certain knowledge of their historical context(s). For us, the Nag Hammadi tractates must be regarded as utterances that have been removed from their original contexts. However, no interpretation is ever context-free. Coulson, as we saw, calls it an illusion, and as Eve Sweetser points out, “we can only actually interpret complex linguistic forms by constructing some possible use or uses of those forms to convey meaning.” 140 This observation holds true not only with regard to small-scale lexical units, but with regard to any kind of interpretation. When context is lacking, we, as readers, automatically provide it, consciously and subconsciously, in the process of interpretation, for “in reading, we assimilate what we read to the schemata of what we already know. The more we know the more we understand, and we project what we know to construct a world suggested by the text,” 141 in Keith Oatley’s apt formulation.

2.2.1. The Identification and Interpretation of Allusions

As already mentioned, an allusion is “a phenomenon that some reader or readers may fail to observe.” 142 In terms of cognitive theory this means that, in the same way as a metaphor may also be interpreted strictly literally, by interpreting the source input without blending it with a target, a potential intertextual trigger in a text may or may not be activated and

138 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 333.
139 Fauconnier, Mappings, 37–38.
140 Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending,” 137.
141 Oatley, “Writing and Reading,” 166.
call up the intertextual input space of an evoked text to an integration network where it is blended with the alluding text in a reading and understanding of the latter.\textsuperscript{143}

Another issue that concerns the interpretation of both metaphors and allusions is the question of “how far the meaning of a text goes,” to quote Leo Noordman.\textsuperscript{144} “How minimalistic or maximalistic does one conceive the linguistic meaning to be; how much inferences are part of the meaning of a text …?”\textsuperscript{145} How do we evaluate the existence and relevance of allusions, and the extent to which we should utilise the intertext in our interpretation of the alluding text? And how do we know whether to understand a potentially metaphorical expression metaphorically or not, and on what levels to interpret it?

From the perspective of the model proposed here, it seems evident that no clear-cut answers to these questions may ever be given. Meaning is produced in the mind of the reader, who draws on his or her own knowledge and memories in a production of meaning that relies fundamentally upon the reader’s own, often subconscious, recruitment of mental spaces. “The writer offers a kit of parts, or a set of cues. The reader does the construction,” as Keith Oatley puts it.\textsuperscript{146}

2.3. Canon and Interpretation

In Early Christian controversies over orthodoxy and heresy, disagreement over interpretation was a central point of contention, as proper belief and practice were intimately connected with correct interpretation of Scripture. Although there was no agreement on the exact delineation of the corpus of texts to be regarded as authoritative, more often than not controversy revolved around different meanings produced by different readers reading the same texts. Manlio Simonetti argues that “the study of Holy Scripture was the real foundation of Christian culture in the Church of the earliest centuries.”\textsuperscript{147} However, Scripture is, as Simon-
etti points out, “a complex of writings diverse in subject matter, form, and date, and sometimes inaccessible for various reasons, so that the effective knowledge and use of them by Christians was not obvious, but required a notably complex effort of interpretation.”

In these interpretive processes the function of the concept of canon was crucial. I here understand canon, with George Aichele, as “a collection or list of authoritative writings, as accepted by some group of readers.” A canon, Aichele argues, “arises from the need to control the understanding of written texts,” Scripture being an especially pertinent example. Once established, a canon tends to obscure the individual canonical texts’ aspects of incoherence and open-endedness, thus mutually strengthening their apparent completeness. According to Lee Martin McDonald, an important feature of writings that were regarded as authoritative Scripture in early Christianity was that they were “believed to be internally self-consistent and not self-contradictory,” a point that is illustrated well by Justin Martyr, stating in his debate with Trypho the Jew that if someone showed him a Scripture that seemed to contradict another,

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\text{since I am entirely convinced that no scripture contradicts another, I shall admit rather that I do not understand what is recorded, and shall strive to persuade those who imagine that the scriptures are contradictory to be rather of the same opinion as myself.} \quad (\text{Justin, Dial. 65, ANF 1:230})
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This passage says a great deal about the presuppositions guiding Justin’s interpretation of Scripture. In Justin’s mind, Scripture, by its very nature,

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149 George Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture: Semiotics and the Bible* (Interventions 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 127. However much some texts try to present themselves as being self-evidently authoritative (see, e.g., Rev 22:6–10, 18–19), canonical status is not an intrinsic quality of a text, but a status bestowed upon it by a community of interpreters (see Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 128; Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 2, 7–9, 15). For the concept of interpretive communities, see Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) and the discussion below.
151 See Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 129.
cannot be self-contradictory, and therefore can, and must, be brought into harmony through exegesis. What consequences does such a view of Scripture have for the exegesis of Scriptural texts?

If it is held that no canonical text contradicts another, then it follows that each constituent text in the canon can legitimately be drawn upon in the reading of any of the others, to fill in gaps and to resolve apparent contradictions. The canonisation of a group of texts thus not only defines a corpus of authoritative texts, but in so doing also delineates a group of legitimate intertexts that are sanctioned to mutually reinforce each other and through which any of its constituent texts are supposed to be understood.\textsuperscript{153} Since the canonised texts are believed to contain basically the same message, readers are consequently encouraged to play the canonical texts against each other, and in this way canon limits interpretive creativity and stimulates it at the same time.\textsuperscript{154} However, considering the great diversity of scope, style, and content, even among the texts that were accepted as authoritative by a majority of early Christian communities, each individual text could not carry equal weight. We therefore find that interpreters operated, at least implicitly, with a concept of a “canon within the canon,” facilitating the use of more authoritative texts as hermeneutical keys for the explication of less authoritative ones within the canonical corpus.\textsuperscript{155}

A canon thus controls which texts are legitimately to be considered as authoritative Scripture, sanctioning authoritative intertexts to the reading and interpretation of each of the texts incorporated within it, estab-

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Aichele, \textit{The Control of Biblical Meaning}, 2.
\textsuperscript{154} See Aichele, \textit{Sign, Text, Scripture}, 132; Aichele, \textit{The Control of Biblical Meaning}, 12.
lishing “an intertextual network that provides a reading context through which any of its component texts can be understood correctly.”\footnote{Aichele, The Control of Biblical Meaning, 2.} It is important to note, however, that this effect does not rely on a fixed canon. All that is required is an at least implicit understanding within a given interpretive community of a group of texts being individually and collectively authoritative.

It should thus be evident that we may describe the functions of the concept of a canon in processes of interpretation in terms of how it influences the mechanics of intertextual blending. A good example of this is constituted by how very different narratives of the nativity of Christ in Matthew and Luke have been commonly interpreted in Christian tradition. As Raymond Brown has remarked, “commentators of times past have harmonized these different details into a consecutive narrative, so that the ordinary Christian is often not even aware of a difficulty when Lucan shepherds and Matthean magi fraternize in the Christmas crib scene.”\footnote{Raymond E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in Matthew and Luke (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 35. See Matt 2:1–12; Luke 2:1–20.} Since both accounts are part of the biblical canon, and thus share the generic property of canonicity, they are regarded by default as equally true, and there is consequently a certain pressure upon the reader to harmonise or integrate the two accounts with each other. Rather than interpreting the differences between them as contradictions, the two stories are understood together, being blended in readers’ minds, and the resulting blend eventually becomes entrenched in the collective memory of the community.\footnote{See fig. 3 for this intertextual integration network. For a complete Blending Theory analysis of the traditional harmonised reading of the nativity accounts of Matthew and Luke, see Hugo Lundhaug, “Canon and Interpretation: A Cognitive Perspective,” in Canon and Canonicity: The Formation and Use of Scripture (ed. Einar Thomassen; Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2010), 67–90.}

The description of the basic mechanics of this intertextual blend is valid with regard to the analysis of any interpretation within a canonical framework, where elements of two or more texts are brought together and blended in the act of interpretation. This means anything from isolated elements of one canonical text being brought to bear on elements of another, to more wide-ranging megablends. We will see this amply illustrated when we turn to the analysis of Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. in chapters 3 and 4.
In light of Blending Theory, the function of the concept of a canon in the interpretation of a given text can be conceived of as one of restricting the number of available intertexts as sources for the projection of input spaces to an interpretive blend, shutting out those texts that are explicitly rejected as heretical, while at the same time rendering the canonical texts salient. One might say that the canonical texts will be predisposed for priming and subsequent activation in any reading of a canonical text, since any two canonical texts will share this generic category structure.\(^{159}\)  

The fact that the elements and structure that make up the canon become closely linked in experience, and thus in people’s memory, facilitates the priming and activation of related elements of the canon once one has been activated. References to the nativity story in Matthew, for example, thus give easy mental access to the one in Luke. The Christian canon of Scripture is without doubt a graded and in many ways radial concept (albeit with complex internal links and structures). As we have seen, not all of its constituent texts are of equal importance, and some texts are more closely linked than others. The level of priming and activation displays certain prototype effects. When the canon is brought to mind in a general sense, one is not likely to think first and foremost of a text like Jude or Second Peter, but rather of the Gospels or central Pauline texts like Romans or First Corinthians, and of Genesis and Isaiah rather than the minor prophets. In this sense, canon functions as an ICM. Thus, the texts that are most central to the canon are more easily primed by a general activation of the cognitive model than the less central ones. There are, as we have seen, canons within the canon.

2.4. The Function of Creeds and Rules of Faith in Interpretation

The reader who accepts the canonical status of a text and reads it within the canonical framework will inevitably regard all the texts belonging to the canon as intentional expressions of the same overall meaning. As mentioned above, no interpretation will ever be stable, however, as new input spaces may always be introduced and the cross-space projections altered, with often less than predictable results. The process is inherently dynamic and, in a broad sense, context dependent.

\(^{159}\) As mentioned above, canonicity is an important component of the generic space in such an integration network, and this feature of the generic space facilitates the recruitment of further texts having the same generic structure, i.e., other canonical texts, as input spaces in the network.
Aichele argues that a “community’s desire for a canon is desire for a text that conveys truly an essential, authoritative message and that controls the interpretation of that message.” 160 This, however, is a desire that will never be satisfied. No matter how firm the canonical delineation of authoritative texts becomes, interpretation will never be guided solely by the texts on the inside of the canon, or solely by the canon as meta-text, for it is clear that the canonical texts can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways by people who share the same, or broadly the same, canon. Thus, in order to control the interpretation of Scripture, additional measures are needed, and it is evident that Christian communities felt the need from a very early stage, long before the eventual closure of the canon, to establish certain extra-canonical checks and balances in order to safeguard acceptable interpretation. Doctrinal statements of varying complexity were accordingly codified in increasingly important creeds and rules of faith. 161 In terms of Blending Theory, such doctrinal checks and balances may be conceived of as additional interpretive frames that exclude certain readings and facilitate others, but, importantly, they may also be regarded as authoritative input spaces in their own right, that increasingly projected major elements of their own to the interpretive blends arising from the reading of Scriptural texts. Thus we also see how rules of faith or creeds cannot any more than the canon, or its individual constituent texts, interpret themselves, that is, control their own interpretation, since interpretation will always be a dynamic practice performed by human beings in particular contexts. And accordingly we may observe that the creeds themselves increasingly became subjects of commentary and interpretation. 162 Viewed as new authoritative input spaces, then, it becomes clear that the establishment of such authoritative doctrinal formulations can only limit interpretation to a certain extent. Interpreters will be able to interpret Scripture in an infinite variety of ways, even while being in accordance with authoritative credal formulations.

2.5. Interpretive Communities

How can one then ultimately distinguish between right and wrong, or rather acceptable and unacceptable, readings? As Stanley Fish has pointed out, “while there are always mechanisms for ruling out readings, their source is not the text but the presently recognized interpretive strategies for producing the text.”163 Fish’s focus on the function of interpretive communities as the locus of a text’s meaning thus provides us with an important corrective to a focus on the individual autonomous reader, and a promising point of departure for further inquiries into the social constraints upon interpretation, the function of institutional power structures, and the impact of struggles between various interpretive communities over the acceptable range of scriptural interpretation in early Christianity. As Fish has argued, “the fact of agreement, rather than being a proof of the stability of objects, is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community to constitute the objects upon which its members … can then agree.”164 From this it follows, argues Fish, that “disagreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which the facts are settled. Of course, no such settling is final, and in the (almost certain) event that the dispute is opened again, the category of the facts ‘as they really are’ will be reconstituted in still another shape.”165

Early Christian interpreters of Scripture were no exceptions to this rule. The understanding of texts were shaped by the needs and constraints of the individual interpreter’s social context. So, although there were mechanisms for ruling out readings, such as canons, creeds, and rules of faith, discussed above, these mechanisms were not grounded in the texts themselves, but in “the presently recognized interpretive strategies” for producing them.166 As Bart Ehrman formulates it, following Fish,

to be sure, few readers realize that they are generating meanings from a text, that is, that they are employing culturally conditioned interpretive strategies to make sense of the words on a page. Interpretive strategies, according to the common assumption, are necessary only for ideologically slanted (i.e., biased) interpretations, not for understanding a text’s “common-sensical” or “obvious” meaning. But in point of fact, even com-

mon sense requires (by definition) a community of like-minded readers, a group of interpreters who share basic assumptions both about the world and about the process of understanding.  

And in early Christianity there was, of course, not just a single interpretive community, but rather a great number of such communities and sub-communities, and from one or more of these communities stem the texts that are the focus of the present study, *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil*.

### 2.6. Embodiment and Culture

A central idea of cognitive linguistics is the assumption that “conceptual organisation within the human mind is a function of the way our species-specific bodies interact with the environment we inhabit,” as Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green put it. The dominating perspective within the field is that human cognition is embodied, which means that there is a fundamental awareness of the fact that the way we perceive, think, and communicate is fundamentally grounded in embodied experience. For, as Evans and Green point out, “we can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience.” But what about the cultural side of things? Although the human body may be said to be basically universal in its constitution across cultures, this, of course, does not mean that the way the body and its processes are interpreted, or the way it is used, are universal. While “it is our embodied interaction with the world

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168 Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 50.


171 See Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 285. Kövecses argues that “it is simplistic to suggest that universal aspects of the body necessarily lead to universal conceptualization, and it is equally simplistic to suggest that variation in culture excludes the possibility of universal conceptualization” (ibid., 294; Kövecses’ emphasis).
that provides the basic shape of experiences, and our cognitive abilities that further abstract and schematize those basic shapes,” as Michele Emanatian puts it, these are, “of course, filtered through the culture we are part of.”172 By extension we may say that while the basic cognitive processes are universal, their applications are not.173 That is to say that while the mechanics of thought are fundamentally human and embodied and the same across cultures, this does not mean that people think the same regardless of culture and context—far from it. Acknowledging the universal underlying mechanics of thought may, however, enable us to analyse the intellectual products and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with an adequate degree of methodological clarity.

2.7. Conclusion

Cognitive poetics provides us with a means of analysis that, in the words of Margaret Freeman, “opens up the cognitive layers upon which a literary text is built and, in doing so, provides a reading that reveals the frame and structure of meaning that is endemic and central to the text itself. It makes explicit the cognitive skills we apply implicitly when we analyze literary texts.”174 It is thus hoped that the use of the methodology outlined in this chapter will facilitate the exposition of the interpretive possibilities that are opened in a reading of the texts under scrutiny, and help illustrate the ways in which readers may produce meaning in their encounters with them. My intention in this study is not so much to find answers, as to highlight interpretive possibilities that may enable us to pose new questions. I would also like to stress the hypothetical nature of the quest to grasp the ways in which these texts were actually understood at the time when they were produced and read in antiquity, not to mention the intentions behind them, for as Stanley Fish has pointed out, “we are never not in the act of interpreting.”175

173 See Kövecses, Metaphor in Culture, 286.
174 Freeman, “Poetry,” 277.
175 Fish, “Normal Circumstances,” 276.
CHAPTER THREE

"IN HER NATURE SHE IS A WOMAN":
THE FEMINISATION OF THE SOUL IN
THE EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL

(2 Pet 1:4)¹

1. Introduction

With a confidence now rarely found among scholars of Antiquity, Robert McL. Wilson could state in 1975 that “we today have no doubt of the original intention of Hosea, and of the meaning of his prophesies. Coming to the Exegesis on the Soul with that knowledge we are bound to regard it as something of an exegetical curiosity.”² It is this “exegetical curiosity,” the sixth tractate of Nag Hammadi Codex II, entitled the Exegesis on the Soul (Ἑκάσ ̀γιτῆς ἐτεθέωρηκεν ὑκοιμιόνος
Ἦθεφυς ετούδλων ετετήνωτ ἐβολ
Ἦτεσοίμη ἥππακο ετρύπκοςονος
(2 Pet 1:4)¹

¹ Horner, Sahidic New Testament.
³ Exeg. Soul is located between the tractates Orig. World and Thom. Cont. on pages 127.18–137.28 in Nag Hammadi Codex II. It is one of eight Nag Hammadi tractates to have a title at both its beginning and its end (see Jean-Daniel Dubois, “Les titres du Codex I [Jung] de Nag Hammadi,” in La formation des canons scripturares [ed. Michel Tardieu; Patrimoines; Paris: Cerf, 1993], 221).
1.1. Outline of the Narrative

*Exeg. Soul* is in several ways a unique text among the Nag Hammadi tractates, especially with regard to its literary structure and composition, but also when it comes to its contents. It is a self-proclaimed exegesis, but one which is not presented in a straightforward manner. Instead we are treated to an allegorical exposition presented in the form of a mythical narrative interspersed with commentary, quotations, and more or less oblique allusions. The story focuses on the fallen soul, personified as a woman, and her repentance and redemption. In summary, the storyline

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5 Allegory is here understood as an extended metaphor (i.e., a metaphor extending over several clauses), akin to Peter Crisp's notion of allegory as a "superextended metaphor," i.e., an extended metaphor with no direct references to the metaphorical target. *Exeg. Soul* does have some direct references to the metaphorical target, but still largely functions in the way described by Crisp (see Crisp, "Allegory," 115–131).
describes the soul's life of prostitution (πορνεία)\(^6\) after her fall from heaven into a material body, and her repentance once she realises her predicament. Regretting a life of prostitution, the soul weeps and prays to her Father in heaven, with whom, it turns out, she lived in her original existence. Now, upon hearing the soul's repenting cries for help and pleas for forgiveness, the Father takes pity on her and provides her with salvation in the form of a husband. Exeg. Soul informs us early on that the soul's original existence was “male-female,” and we later learn that the union between the soul and her saviour-husband re-establishes this original pair and leads to the soul's ascent back into heaven. Such is the main structure of the mythical narrative. It should be mentioned, however, that the text becomes increasingly homiletic as it progresses, with the mythical narrative proper ending three manuscript pages before the end of the tractate.\(^7\)

1.2. Purpose and Problems

While, on the face of it, the narrative is rather simple, the way it is presented is not. It is especially the text's intricate and often implicit prompting of conceptual and intertextual blends that creates interpretive problems. The tractate contains interpretive twists and turns that may indeed baffle the modern reader, often making it difficult to discern the principles at work in its scriptural exegesis. It should be noted at the outset, however, that Exeg. Soul is not merely concerned with exegeting the explicitly quoted scriptural passages, but also ones that are only alluded to, and not only written sources, but ritual practice as well. In the present chapter I will delve into the poetics of Exeg. Soul and investigate the methods of exegesis employed and the materials they are applied to. In particular I will investigate the function of metaphor, metonymy and intertextuality in the tractate's understanding of ritual, a theme that plays a crucial role throughout.

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\(^6\) The term πορνεία may be taken to refer to any kind of illicit sexual intercourse, including adultery and fornication as well as prostitution (cf. Joseph Jensen, “Does Porneia Mean Fornication? A Critique of Bruce Malina,” NovT 20:3 [1978]: 161–184). I have translated the term throughout as prostitution, but it should be noted that since the underlying term is πορνεία it also carries the aforementioned connotations and not simply what we would strictly regard as prostitution. It should also be noted that the way πορνεία is used in Exeg. Soul is dependent on its use in the New Testament and in the Septuagint.

\(^7\) For a convenient overview of the structure of the text, see the tables in Kasser, “L’Ekségésis,” 76, 79.
As argued by Raymond Gibbs, and discussed in chapter 2, the nature of human conceptualisation facilitates the use of multiple metaphors to access different aspects of one’s knowledge of a concept so that it may be conceptualised differently at different instances and in different contexts. In *Exeg. Soul*, we will see that the scope of the source and the range of the target in metaphorical relations are exploited rhetorically in diverse and interesting ways. In what follows we will take a closer look at some of the most important metaphorical blends that function throughout this tractate and how they interrelate with each other and with the tractate’s many scriptural quotations and allusions. In other words, we will be looking at the way in which the tractate prompts for the construction of metaphorical and intertextual blends and how they interact.

### 2. Textual and Redactional Issues

Despite its unique features, scholars have shown only moderate interest in *Exeg. Soul*. Apart from Maddalena Scopello’s study, the critical editions by Jean-Marie Sevrin and Cornelia Kulawik are the only book-length treatments of it. The main focus so far has been a philological one, and there have appeared several critical editions of the Coptic text with accompanying translations and commentary. In addition to Sevrin’s French and Kulawik’s German critical editions there is also the important English edition by Bentley Layton, with introduction and translation by William C. Robinson, Jr., as well as the early German edition by Martin Krause. In addition, several important articles dealing

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8 Gibbs, “Prototypes,” 33.


primarily with issues of the reconstruction and translation of the Coptic text have been published.\textsuperscript{11}

### 2.1. Scriptural Intertextuality

One of the most conspicuous features of \textit{Exeg. Soul} is its use of scriptural quotations. But how do they function in the text’s overall rhetoric? The exegetical method of \textit{Exeg. Soul} was described in 1975 as “proof-text method” by Wilson, who did not hold it in high regard:

> From the point of view of the modern scholar, the document reveals the weaknesses of the proof-text method, and of allegory. The quotations are simply lifted out of context, without regard for their original setting or their original meaning. For us of course this involves an exegetical misdemeanour, but our principles and methods are different.\textsuperscript{12}

As will be shown in what follows, however, this is hardly an adequate description of the way in which Scripture is used in this tractate.\textsuperscript{13} The scriptural references in \textit{Exeg. Soul} range from direct quotations and paraphrases to allusions. With regard to the first two categories, the texts are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 223.
\item My use of the term Scripture does not presuppose a closed canon. The term is used here to refer to a corpus of texts that was considered by early Christian communities to be authoritative. The evidence of \textit{Exeg. Soul} indicates that for the individual or community behind this tractate such a corpus of texts seems to have corresponded broadly to the texts which eventually came to be included in the Old and New Testament canons. However, the way in which \textit{Exeg. Soul} refers to Homer may indicate that a rather open and loosely defined concept of Scripture is operative. For the relationship between Scripture and
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
either explicitly identified or employed anonymously. Indeed, one of the features that make *Exeg. Soul* unique among the Nag Hammadi texts is its extensive use of direct scriptural quotations. 14 The tractate quotes directly from Jeremiah, Hosea, Ezekiel, Psalms, and First Corinthians, and even identifies these texts with introductory phrases. The quotation of 1 Cor 5:9–10, for instance, is introduced by the phrase, “therefore Paul, writing to the Corinthians, said:” (Διὰ τοῦτο παύεις εορτασμὸν ἔγκορισσός πεθανεῖ). 15 In addition, passages from Ephesians, Genesis, Isaiah, and John are also quoted directly, but anonymously. The introductory statements are in these cases more vague. 16 The quotation of John 6:44 is for example introduced with the statement “therefore the Saviour cries out:” (Διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Χριστός ἖κφερε ἑπι μὴν χεῖ). 17 *Exeg. Soul* also introduces as quotations what seem to be paraphrases of passages from Genesis, Matthew, Luke, Acts, First Thessalonians, First Corinthians, Second Corinthians, and Ephesians. In these cases, introductory phrases like “as it is written” (κατὰ τὸ γράμμα τῆς χεῖ) 18 belie the fact that they, as far as we know given the current manuscript evidence, do not introduce exact quotations. Nevertheless, the fact that they are presented as such underscores the scriptural basis, and thereby also the implicit scriptural authority, of these paraphrases.

The majority of *Exeg. Soul*’s direct quotations are taken from the Old Testament, namely Genesis, Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and

canon, see e.g. Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 133. For thorough discussions of questions regarding Scripture and canon, see e.g., Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders, eds., *The Canon Debate* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002) and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.


15 *Exeg. Soul* 131.2–3.

16 As Ulrich Luz points out, “The difference between allusion and quotation is fluid. The absence of an introductory quotation formula should not be a factor in evaluating a putative quotation; many quotations, particularly in Hellenistic literature, are not introduced by such a formula” (Luz, “Intertexts,” 135).

17 *Exeg. Soul* 134.34–135.1.

18 *Exeg. Soul* 133.9, introducing a paraphrase based on Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.
Hosea, while only three New Testament texts, John, First Corinthians, and Ephesians, are quoted directly. Of the latter, First Corinthians is the only one explicitly identified by the text, while for instance, as we have seen, John 6:44 is referred to simply as the words of the Saviour. In addition to the outright New Testament quotations, however, there are several close paraphrases and an abundance of allusions.

A seemingly curious feature of *Exeg. Soul* is the fact that it also quotes Homer’s *Odyssey* three times, in much the same manner as it quotes Scripture,20 introduced the first time with the statement “therefore it is written in the poet” (Διὰ τοῦτο σημαίνεται ἡ λέξις).21 Moreover, in addition to quotations from texts that eventually became part of the biblical canon, *Exeg. Soul* also quotes at least one extra-canonical text besides the abovementioned quotations from the *Odyssey*. Introduced as the words of the Father, speaking through the Prophet (Διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ὁ θεός ἐν τῷ προφήτῃ “Therefore he said through the Spirit in the Prophet”),22 *Exeg. Soul* follows closely what First Clement presents as a scriptural quotation,23 but which may be from a hypothetical text known as *Apocryphal Ezekiel*.24 Here it is difficult to decide whether *Exeg. Soul* quotes the same text as First Clement or whether it is simply quoting


23 1 Clem. 8.3.

1 Clem. 8.3. 25 The fact that both texts end their quotations at the same place and both go on in a similar fashion to quote from Isaiah, 26 indicates that the latter may well be the case. 27 It should be noted, however, that Clement of Alexandria also quotes part of the same passage, presenting it simply as a quotation from Ezekiel, 28 and agrees with Exeg. Soul in using the word ψυχή (“soul”) rather than καρδία (“heart”) as the oldest manuscripts of First Clement would have it. 29 Antoine Guillaumont has concluded that Exeg. Soul “sans aucun doute” quotes Apocryphal Ezekiel directly and not through First Clement, 30 while Scopello and Sevrin have both argued that Exeg. Soul quotes the apocryphon from an anthology, that is, from a thematic collection of excerpts from different sources. 31 Boudewijn Dehandschutter, on the other hand, argues that the very existence of Apocryphal Ezekiel itself is not well enough attested to sustain such a conclusion. In his view First Clement, Clement of Alexandria, and

27 Frederik Wisse argues, on the basis of how the quotation from Isa 1:16–20 follows the possible Apocryphal Ezekiel quotation in First Clement, that in quoting 1 Clem. 8.3, the author of Exeg. Soul believed that he was in fact quoting Isaiah. Wisse argues that this is indicated by the fact that Exeg. Soul introduces its own following quotations of Isaiah with the phrases πάλιν κενά (“again, in another place”) and πάλιν περί πέχου (“again he said in another place”) (see Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 77). However, the latter argument overlooks the fact that Exeg. Soul introduces the quotation of 1 Clem. 8.3 / Apocryphal Ezekiel as the words of the Father speaking through the spirit in the prophet (see Exeg. Soul 135.26–31), and thus the introductory phrases πάλιν κενά and πάλιν περί πέχου may simply signify that these are to be understood as further words of the Father, rather than further words of the same prophet.
28 Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.91.2.
29 Here the manuscripts of First Clement differ, however. While the fifth-century Greek Codex Alexandrinus and two Coptic codices, one from the fourth century and the other possibly from the fifth, agree in having καρδίας, the eleventh-century Greek Codex Hierosolymitanus, an eleventh-century Latin manuscript, and a twelfth-century Syriac manuscript have ψυχης or its equivalent (see Bart D. Ehrman, ed. and trans., The Apostolic Fathers [2 vols.; LCL 24–25; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003], 1:48–49).
30 See Antoine Guillaumont, “Une citation de l’Apocryphe d’Ézéchiel dans l’Exégèse au sujet de l’âme (Nag Hammadi II,6),” in Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts: In Honour of Pahor Labib (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 6; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 35–39, esp. 38. This assessment has been supported by Birger Pearson (see Pearson, ”Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 642).
Exeg. Soul might well all be quoting a variant of canonical Ezekiel. In any case, whether Exeg. Soul quotes Apocryphal Ezekiel, First Clement, a variant of canonical Ezekiel, or some other source, what is relevant to the present study is that Exeg. Soul presents this quotation as a quotation from one of the prophetic writings, on par with its other quotations of Old Testament Scripture, and that it functions on an equal footing with them within this text.

Although Exeg. Soul quotes texts from the Old Testament to a much greater extent than it does New Testament ones, which may give the impression that the former texts are more important to Exeg. Soul than the latter, the picture is significantly altered when we also consider allusions. The tractate does not limit itself to allusions to texts that are also quoted, but utilises a broad spectrum of Old and, especially, New Testament texts. In the following analysis, we will see that there is no reason to privilege the texts or passages that are explicitly quoted over those that are “only” alluded to. In fact, we will see that some of the most interesting intertextual connections in this text, as in many others, are made by way of allusions. Since the Old Testament quotations in Exeg. Soul have already been studied extensively, here I will focus primarily on the New Testament quotations and allusions.

2.2. The Question of Redaction

Given Exeg. Soul’s liberal use of quotations it should come as no surprise that this feature of the text has been one of the main areas of scholarly interest. The presence and function of the quotations have been given varying interpretations, but a primary focus has been on what they may or may not tell us concerning the tractate’s redaction history. Some have suggested that the quotations are mere additions to what was already a
self-contained mythological narrative of the fall of the soul into the material world and its subsequent salvation and ascent. Characterising the quotations as “eclectic glosses and references,” Jean Doresse was the first to advance such a theory, suggesting that the quotations were inserted into the narrative at the latest possible stage, by the compiler of Nag Hammadi Codex II.35 Some years later, William C. Robinson presented a more moderate articulation of this theory, arguing that it was the redactor of the hypothetical Greek original who inserted the scriptural quotations and references as proof-texts into an already existing mythological narrative, and argued that the latter did not itself depend upon the quotations.36 Robinson’s main argument was that the quotations may be removed from the text without significant loss of meaning, leaving the mythological narrative fundamentally intact. According to Robinson, the quotations “were added to the story and so are not the narrative’s source,” they just “sanction its interpretation.”37 Other scholars have argued in favour of the integrity of the text as it stands, however, and held that not only are the quotations essential ingredients of the tractate as a whole, but they are in fact crucial components of the mythological narrative itself.38 Finally, Sevrin and Scopello have both argued that the tractate is the coherent work of an author using several sources, with the mythological narrative being one of these sources, and that the majority of the Old Testament quotations were taken from an anthology, rather than directly from the various Old Testament texts.39

39 See Sevrin, “La rédaction”; Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 2–26; Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 17–44. Against the conclusion that Exeg. Soul used a florilegium of Old Testament excerpts, see Robinson, “Introduction,” 138; Kulawik, Die Erzählung, 125. With regard to the New Testament, however, Scopello concludes that the author had a good and direct knowledge of these texts (see Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 44).
The approach taken in the present study is in line with the view that *Exeg. Soul* as it is preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II should be regarded as a coherent and consistent whole,\(^{40}\) and for the purposes of the following analysis I will refrain from entering into speculations regarding the tractate’s possible redaction history.

3. Analysis of Major Blends

Throughout *Exeg. Soul* there are certain key conceptual blends that underlie and guide the rhetoric of the tractate. An analysis of these blends is the focus of the present section.

3.1. The Soul is a Woman

Perhaps the single most important premise for the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul* is the fact that the soul is presented as a woman. This is referred to in various ways throughout the tractate and is introduced in its very first lines in etymological and anatomical terms:

\[ \text{ⲁⲛⲥⲟⲫⲟⲥ ⲉⲧϣⲟⲟⲡ ϩⲓⲧ̄ⲛⲛⲉϩⲏ ⲁⲩϯⲟⲛⲟⲙⲁⲥⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲯⲩⲭⲏ ̄ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲣⲁⲛ ̄ⲥϩⲓⲙⲉ ⲟⲧⲱⲥ ̄ⲛⲧⲉⲥⲫⲩⲥⲓⲥ ⲟⲩⲥϩⲓⲙⲉ ⲧⲉ ⲟⲩ̄ⲛⲧⲁⲥ ̄ⲙⲁⲩ ϩⲱⲥ ̄ⲛⲧⲉⲥⲙⲏⲧⲣⲁ} \]

The wise who lived before us named the soul with a feminine name. Indeed, in her nature she is a woman. She even has her womb.

\( (Exeg. Soul 127.19–22) \)

In identifying the soul as a woman, *Exeg. Soul* creates a metaphorical blend of the concept of soul with the concept of woman. In terms of Blending Theory we may speak of this as a single-scope network where a framing (source) input taken from the Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM)\(^ {41}\) of woman provides organising structure to the focus (target) input of the soul (see fig. 4). The structure of the framing input (woman) becomes the structure of the blend (soul-as-woman) which in turn creates inferences that are projected back onto the focus input (soul), altering our understanding of the latter, inducing a “feeling of global insight,” as Fauconnier and Turner would put it.\(^ {42}\)

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\(^{41}\) See chapter 2 for an introduction to the concept of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) as it is used in the present study.

\(^{42}\) See, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 129.
This opening statement is thus the first expression in *Exeg. Soul* of arguably the most significant blend that runs through the entire text, namely the soul is a woman. As we shall see, this metaphor serves as the rhetorical backbone of the text, helping its readers to conceptualise the rather abstract topic of the internal life and struggles of the soul in terms of more concrete biological and cultural knowledge of women. One of the possible entailments that follow from this particular conceptual integration network is specifically highlighted in the passage quoted above, namely the detail that the soul has a womb. The highlighting of this particular metaphorical entailment serves a dual purpose. It is used as a description of the soul’s femaleness and thus supplements the etymological argument, but more importantly it also sets the stage for the further rhetorical exploitation of this very aspect of the metaphorical blend at a later stage in the narrative.43

The ICM woman is a cluster model, which means that it consists of a cluster of cognitive models.44 Throughout the tractate the basic metaphorical blend the soul is a woman draws on different aspects of this source ICM to create a number of lower-level metaphorical blends like the soul is a prostitute, the soul is a bride, the soul is a wife, the soul is a sister, the soul is a mother and the soul is a daughter, as the woman ICM is drawn upon to supply different mental framing inputs, at different points in the narrative, corresponding to these different stereotypical female roles. Elements and structure from each of these inputs are thus at different times blended with elements from the focus input the soul. Of course, like most ICMs the contents of the “woman” ICM is culturally contingent, which means that the exact composition of this ICM in its late antique *Sitz im Leben* is impossible for us to retrieve, and, consequently, so are also many of the metaphorical entailments of the blends involving this ICM. However, since not only common embodied experience, but also intra- and intertextual connections point us in certain directions, this does not leave us totally in the dark. As we shall see, a good number of metaphorical entailments may be discerned from the texts cited or alluded to by *Exeg. Soul*.45

The attribution of different female roles to the soul at different stages of the narrative functions as a major plot development device in *Exeg. Soul*. As we now take a closer look at the function of the various blends that

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45 For the cultural contingency of ICMs, see chapter 2.
are related to the overarching conceptual blend the soul is a woman, we will consider them in the order in which they appear in the narrative development of Exeg. Soul, starting with the soul’s original state.

3.1.1. The Soul Is a Daughter and a Virgin

Exeg. Soul describes the original unfallen state of the soul using the two female ICMs of virgin and daughter:

\[ \text{Exeg. Soul 127.22–24} \]

The soul is a virgin (παρθένος), and since she is “with the father” she is of course ipso facto his daughter. The ICMs of virgin and daughter both supply important metaphorical entailments for the interpretation of the soul’s original state. An important entailment of the latter is that as a daughter, it is proper for the soul to be obedient to her father. The Soul is a daughter metaphor thus serves to introduce the theme of hierarchy and power relations relative to the soul, as well as Exeg. Soul’s persistent rhetoric of obedience and submission.

It is a major point in Exeg. Soul that as long as the soul obeys her father, she exists in a pure state of virginity. This equation of obedience with purity is significant. As soon as the daughter-soul is disobedient and leaves her place, however, she falls into prostitution and loses her virginity. There is no middle ground. The soul’s original state of being, as an obedient daughter and virgin, thus serves as an important contrast to the soul’s subsequent tribulations in the material body. The description of this original state becomes all the more significant by the fact that this state is also that to which the soul should ideally return, since whichever way we interpret the original state of the soul, it will have profound implications for how we view the nature of the soul’s plight in her fallen state and the nature of her salvation.

3.1.2. The Soul as Male-Female

In its original state the soul is not only a daughter and a virgin, but is also described as “a male-female”:

\[ \text{Exeg. Soul 127.22–24} \]

The most common translation of the Coptic term ṣⲟⲩⲧⲥⲟⲩืⲉ is “androgyne.” In order to show more clearly the rhetorical function of the term in Exeg. Soul, however, I have here...
... and she was male-female in her likeness.\(^{47}\) (Exeg. Soul 127.24–25)

The latter characteristic serves not only as a contrast to her later existence in the world, on par with the two former characteristics in importance, but it is also a more complex one. In order to understand the rhetorical function of the term “male-female” (ⲣⲟⲩⲧⲥϩⲓⲙⲉ) in Exeg. Soul we have to look into the scriptural basis for the way it is used here. This means that in order to understand the conceptual blend, we need to consider the implications of the intertextual blending that is operative here involving the account of the creation of man in Gen 1:26–27 and that of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24.

There was a widespread interpretive tradition in antiquity, based on the peculiar juxtaposition of these two passages in Genesis, which held that the “man” (ἄνθρωπος) which is described in Gen 1:26–27 as being created according to the image (κατ’ εἰκόνα) of God, was an androgynous, male-female, being.\(^{48}\) Not only is the wording in Gen 1:26–27 ambiguous with regard to grammatical number, but in Gen 2:21–24 Eve is described as being created from Adam, thus indicating to several exegetes that Eve had to have been originally contained within the original “man” (ἄνθρωπος) referred to in 1:26–27. From this perspective, the first creation was that of a male-female entity, an Adam that also included Eve. This interpretation is supported by the Alexandrian text of the Septuagint which at Gen 5:2, after having referred to Adam as the man created “according to the image” (κατ’ εἰκόνα) at 5:1, states that God made them male and female and that he called their name, Adam (καὶ ἐπωνόμασεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῶν Αδαμ).

\(^{47}\) Robinson’s translation of ἐως as “form,” in “she was virgin and in form androgynous,” (Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 145) is too restrictive and obscures the intertextual connection to Genesis, where the word ἐως, translating the Greek ὀμοίως, is crucial.

In *Exeg. Soul* the identity of the male part of the original male-female pair is also made clear later on, where he is identified as the soul’s brother and husband:

\[ \text{ⲛⲉⲩϩⲟⲧ ̄ⲣ ⲅⲁⲣ ⲉⲛⲟⲩⲉⲣⲏⲩ ̄ⲛϣⲟⲣⲡ ϩⲁϩⲧ ̄ⲙⲡⲉⲓⲱⲧ ⲉⲙⲡⲧⲧⲥⲓⲙⲉ ⲥⲱⲣⲙ ̄ⲙⲫⲟⲟⲩⲧ ωⲧⲡⲉⲥⲥⲟⲛ ⲡⲉ} \]

For they were at first united with each other beside the Father, before the woman lost\(^{49}\) the husband who is her brother. \(\text{(Exeg. Soul 133.3–6)}\)

A reading of *Exeg. Soul* 127.22–25 and 133.3–6 with Gen 1:26–27 in mind may thus produce the intertextual blend shown in fig. 5. *Exeg. Soul* 127.22–25 should on its own be enough to evoke Gen 1:26–27, but together with *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6, at a point where Genesis 1 has already been quoted and alluded to several times, and thus very likely to be primed in the reader’s mind, it is readily evoked.\(^{50}\) As we can see, there are counterpart relations between the descriptions of the original state of the soul and the original ἀνθρωπός of Genesis 1, with vital identity relations between Adam in the Genesis input and the male part of the soul’s male-female pair in the *Exeg. Soul* inputs. And as Adam and Eve in the Genesis account may be said to be both spouses and siblings, the Genesis passage easily blends with the description of the soul’s partner as her husband and brother in *Exeg. Soul*. Consequently the same applies to the identity relations between the soul and Eve. Furthermore, the generic male-female relation and the proximity of this pair to the Father are features that are projected to the generic space. In the blend, there is a compression to uniqueness of vital identity relations which results in an equation of the original state of the soul with the relationship between Adam and Eve in Genesis.\(^{51}\)

With this blend in mind we may now consider the blend related to the soul’s fall. The separation of the soul from her consort is, in addition to the passage at *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6, quoted above, also referred to in 127.25–26 and 132.20–21:

\[^{49}\] I have chosen to understand the Coptic σωρή as “lost” (cf. Crum 355a), but the term may also be translated as “led astray” (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157). See below for discussion.

\[^{50}\] On subsequent readings of the tractate this is of course even more the case.

but when she fell down to a body and came to this life  
(Exeg. Soul 127.25–26)

since the time she fell from the house of her Father  
(Exeg. Soul 132.20–21)

The latter two passages state that the soul falls from the house of her Father and into a body. The nature of the separation from her partner is described only in 133.3–6, however, where the ambiguous Coptic word σωρη is used. The phrase τωρα σωρη υφουτ may be understood in conflicting ways. The woman either lost her husband or led him astray. The latter does not really fit into the overall narrative of Exeg. Soul, however, where the soul’s tribulations are shown to be caused by the fact that she left her husband and “the house of her father” and “fell” (ρε/γαε) into a body. Her husband does not seem to do anything wrong, however. On the contrary, he comes to save her later on. On these grounds, the rendering “lost” seems more correct, retaining the culpability of the soul while keeping her husband and Saviour suitably spotless.52 This is also more in line with Exeg. Soul’s commentary on its quotations of the Odyssey towards the end of the tractate, where it refers to the soul leaving (κω υκ) her true husband.53 The separation of the soul from her partner also recalls the splitting of the original ἄνθρωπος, which in Genesis happens with the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24. Exeg. Soul evokes both that account and the fall from grace and banishment from paradise in Gen 3, which produces an interesting interpretive blend, where the separation of the soul from her partner is equated with the account of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24, while the fall of the soul from heaven is equated with the fall from grace in Gen 3. There is here a common generic space for the three inputs as well as one for inputs 1 and 2, and for 2 and 3 respectively. Note also that

52 This is also the solution chosen by Kulawik, who translates “bevor die Frau den Mann verlor” (Kulawik, Die Erzählung, 47). The translation “led astray,” which is the one chosen by Robinson (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157), may be supported by seeing here an allusion to Eve making Adam eat the forbidden fruit (cf. Rose Horman Arthur, The Wisdom Goddess: Feminine Motifs in Eight Nag Hammadi Documents [Lanham: University Press of America, 1984], 42), but such an allusion does not fit well within the overall rhetoric of Exeg. Soul.
53 Exeg. Soul 137.6–7.
there is only a partial projection of the two Genesis input spaces into the blended space. Only select features of these inputs are utilised, as shown in fig. 6.

Whether this means that the soul herself constitutes the entire male-female entity in her original state, i.e., the entire original ἄνθρωπος, or just the female part of it, is left ambiguous in the passage from Exeg. Soul quoted above, but, as we shall see, the latter interpretation seems the most probable in light of the overall rhetoric of the text. It is clear that the motif of the ideal male-female pair is rhetorically highly important in Exeg. Soul and represents the ideal paradisal state and salvation’s ultimate goal, as well as the means of bringing it about. It is consequently also the ideal with which the undesirable conduct and fallen states of the soul are contrasted. A literal rendering of the term ροιγτς εις makes clear the important contrast between the soul’s original existence in a male-female pair, and her subsequent existence as a lone female (εις) without her male partner, her true husband, in her fallen state. Leaving her true male (ροιγτ) partner, the female (εις) ends up consorting with false ones. Salvation, as we shall see, consequently entails reunification with her natural and true male (ροιγτ) partner.

Some modern commentators have taken the account of the soul’s original state in Exeg. Soul to imply a state of negated sexuality, that is, a state of being neither male nor female. William C. Robinson, for example, characterises the original state of the soul as an “asexual state (virginity and androgyny),” in contrast to a fallen state, “characterized by sexual identity (female or male).”54 This interpretation misses a highly important aspect of Exeg. Soul’s overall rhetoric, however, namely the contrast between the soul as a lone female vs. the soul as the female part of a male-female pair, together with the important contrast between her one true spouse and her many untrue husbands or adulterers. Importantly, in both cases the soul is female. Robinson even claims that “the narrative revels in condemning sex.”55 He argues that asexuality is the salient characteristic of the soul’s original state, and that it is “sexuality in itself” that is “the soul’s plight.”56 He draws from this the conclusion that “deliverance would entail restoration of the original state of

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54 Robinson, “Introduction,” 137.
asexuality.” But should we, as Robinson does, take the actions of the soul to refer directly to human actions in the “real” world? And is it sexuality as such that Exeg. Soul takes issue with? We will take a closer look at these questions when we now turn to investigate Exeg. Soul’s description of the sexual escapades of the soul in her fallen state.

3.1.3. The Soul Is a Prostitute

Exeg. Soul combines two separate but related themes in its account of the soul’s fallen state, namely, on the one hand the story of the lost daughter, and on the other that of the unfaithful wife. As just mentioned, the soul’s status as an obedient daughter and virgin changes dramatically with her fall:

But when she fell down to a body and came to this life, then she fell into the hands of many robbers, and the wanton men tossed her into each other’s hands, and they [...]. Some used her [by force], while others persuaded her by deception with a gift. In short, they defiled her, and she [... her] virgin[ity], and she prostituted herself in her body, and she gave herself to everyone, and whomever she would embrace she considered to be her husband. (Exeg. Soul 127.25–128.4)

The soul’s fallen state is in this account contrasted in important ways with her original state, and the contrasts could hardly have been greater. At this stage the soul is no longer described as a virgin, but instead as a prostitute and a victim of abuse. The soul is defiled against her will by “robbers” (Ἀχθής) and “wanton men” (Ῥαβδόρρης) who abuse her, but she also prostitutes herself willingly, considering anyone she might come across to be her husband. The earthly adulterers are described as both

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57 Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 137. Robinson qualifies this statement, however, by limiting it to “the second part of the narrative.” In the first part he sees “sexual violation” as the plight of the soul (ibid.); See also ibid., 138. Cf. also Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 111, 114.

seducing and forcing her, and making her be a slave for them as if it were they who were her faithful husbands and true masters:

Again, when she turns her face from these adulterers she runs to others and they force her to sleep with them and to slave for them upon their bed as if they are the masters, but out of shame she no longer dares to leave them. And as for them, they deceive her for a long time as if they are true trustworthy husbands, as if valuing her greatly. And at the end of all these things they leave her behind and go. (Exeg. Soul 128.7–17)

Both aspects are important for the further development of the narrative and for the soteriological points that are made. First, her many false husbands at this stage of the narrative stand in direct opposition to the one who is later referred to as “her perfect husband” (πεσχαϊ ἤτεραυος) and “the true bridegroom” (πρίγωκετεί ὃινη). Secondly, the victimisation of the soul at the hands of “robbers” (Χητις) and “wanton men” (γυψριςς) shows her vulnerability apart from the safety provided by her father and her brother/husband. The description of the “robbers” and “wanton men” as pretending to be trustworthy true husbands is significant, and it is worth noting that the soul serves them as if they were her masters. The terms “husband” (ραξει) and “master” (χοεις) are here intimately linked and thus strengthen the aspect of power and submission inherent in the marriage ICM, which, as we shall see, is made even more explicit when Exeg. Soul later alludes to Gen 3:16 / 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3 / Eph 5:23 stating that “the master of the woman is her husband” (πχοεις γαρ ἤτεραυος πε πεσχαϊ). While the adulterers are “masters”—albeit not rightfully so—the soul, for her part, is correspondingly a “servant” or “slave” (σεβαλλα). Significantly, the term χοεις, (“lord/master”), is also, alongside σωτήρ (“saviour”), the main christological title used in Exeg. Soul.

What, then, are the metaphorical entailments of the tractate’s description of the soul as fornicating and prostituting herself? And how are we to understand Exeg. Soul’s sexual references? When answering these
questions, we should keep in mind that the soul is explicitly stated to be female. Robinson’s description of the earthly state of the soul as being “characterized by sexual identity (female or male)” underestimates the significance of this fact, making the actual gender of the soul irrelevant. However, the soul’s specifically female identity is in fact essential to the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*, since this is the only gendering that fits the narrative, and since the metaphorical entailments of describing the soul as male would be quite different, and certainly not compatible with *Exeg. Soul’s* narrative and general rhetorical structure.

So, what are the entailments of describing the soul in terms of the conceptual metaphor THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, and how does this metaphor function within the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*? We should keep in mind that although the actions of the soul are described in terms of the actions of a woman, it is not to be regarded as a complete human being. Before we start looking into the possibility of a significant metonymic relationship between the soul and the complete human being of which it is a part, we need to consider the metaphorical entailments. More often than not these analytical dimensions have been mixed, however, so that the descriptions of the prostitution and sexual abuse of the soul have been taken to indicate that sexuality is the main problem not only of the soul’s life in the body, but also, by way of an implicit PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, of the complete human being. Moreover, when the soul is described in terms of sexually connotative imagery, we need to analyse in each case how the relevant framing input functions in relation to its possible focus input(s), and consider the potential implications of the resulting blends.

It should be noted that even on its surface, i.e., on the level of the metaphorical source, *Exeg. Soul* does not directly condemn sexuality per se, but only illicit sexuality—that which amounts to πορνεία. The important question is thus whether πορνεία is used as a metonymy for sexuality in general, or whether it should rather be interpreted as a metaphor for something else. Much of what *Exeg. Soul* has to say concerning the infidelity and repentance of the soul is based upon Old

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63 This aspect is overlooked by Rose Horman Arthur, who claims that “the soul could have been allegorized as a male who fell from his feminine counterpart had not the normative hermeneutic of Genesis made Eve the cause of Adam’s sinning” (Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 42).
Testament quotations taken from texts that deal first and foremost with Israel's infidelity in relation to God. The way these Old Testament intertexts are understood within the context of *Exeg. Soul*, however, is substantially shaped by the New Testament. In making the point that its πορνεία imagery does not refer primarily to bodily prostitution or fornication, but rather, by way of metaphor, to the soul's relationship to the material world, actual sexual immorality being one of its bodily manifestations, *Exeg. Soul* refers to texts from the New Testament:

> But concerning this prostitution the apostles of the Saviour commanded: “Guard yourselves against it! Cleanse yourselves of it!” speaking not only of the prostitution of the body, but especially that of the soul. Therefore the apostles [write to the churches] of God, so that [things] like this may not happen among us, but the great [struggle] concerns the prostitution of the soul. From it comes the prostitution of the body too.

(*Exeg. Soul* 130.28–131.2)

The πορνεία of the body is thus explicitly contrasted with the πορνεία of the soul. The two are indeed linked, the one being presented as the cause of the other, but they are also clearly distinguished. It should also be noted that it is specifically the πορνεία of the body that is linked to the πορνεία of the soul. Nowhere does *Exeg. Soul* equate πορνεία with sexuality in general. Whatever its underlying views concerning bodily sexuality may be, *Exeg. Soul* emphasises that it is making an argument that relates specifically to the soul, and supports its case by arguing that the apostles...
in fact also made such a distinction, as evidenced in Scripture. The point is further strengthened when *Exeg. Soul* proceeds to quote 1 Cor 5:9–10 together with Eph 6:12, explaining that “Paul” is “speaking spiritually”:

Therefore Paul, writing to the Corinthians, said: “I wrote to you in the letter: ‘Do not mix with prostitutes,’ by no means (meaning) the prostitutes of this world or the greedy or the robbers or the idolators, since then you would have to leave the world.”

Thus he is speaking *spiritually*, “for our struggle is for us not against flesh and blood,” 70 as he said, “but against the world rulers of this darkness and the spirits of wickedness.”

(Exeg. Soul 131.2–13)

According to *Exeg. Soul*, then, “Paul” should not be taken to refer primarily to bodily prostitution in 1 Cor 5:9–10, but rather to the prostitution of the soul. 72 We are thus specifically invited to read the imagery metaphorically. 73 This gives us the metaphor associating with worldly things is an illicit sexual relationship. But the soul can choose to associate either with worldly matters, understood as πορνεία, or with the Saviour.

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69 1 Cor 5:9–10.
70 Eph 6:12. This inversion of the sequence of “flesh” and “blood” is quite common (see Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 37).
71 Eph 6:12.
72 Similarly, Origen states in his *Commentarius in Canticum*, “We must realize also that, just as an illicit and unlawful love may happen to the outer man—as that, for instance, he should love a harlot or adulteress instead of his bride or his wife; so also may the inner man, that is to say, the soul, come to attach its love not to its lawful Bridegroom, who is the Word of God, but to some seducer or adulterer” (*Comm. Cant.*, Prologue, 2; R.P. Lawson, trans., *Origen: The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies* [ACW 26; London: Longmans, 1957], 30). In the same vein, Gregory of Nyssa, in his *Sixth Homily on the Song of Songs*, explicitly interprets the marriage bed of Cant 3:7–8 as representing the union between the soul and Christ (see Verna E.F. Harrison, “Gender, Generation, and Virginity in Cappadocian Theology,” *JTS* 47 [1996]: 65).
73 Frederik Wisse has rightly noted that these quotations of First Corinthians and Ephesians are essential to the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. As Wisse puts it, “this passage is crucial to the whole tractate. It gives apostolic sanction to the whole exegetical enterprise of ExSoul. It legitimates taking the references to πορνεία in Scripture to refer to the spiritual pollution of the soul. Without 1 Cor 5:9 f. and Eph 6:12, the pneumatic-allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament passages on fornication would lose its basis” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 72).
In contrast to the former, the latter is understood by means of the related conceptual blend associating with Christ is a legitimate sexual relationship. The latter is, as we shall see, connected to the overarching blend Christian life is a marriage with Christ, which is fundamental to the theology of the tractate.

A feature of some significance for the interpretation of Exeg. Soul’s metaphorical account of both the infidelity and marriage of the soul, especially with regard to the evocation of Scripture and ritual, is the use of the term κοινωνία and its cognates. In the literature of antiquity κοινωνία generally denotes close fellowship, participation, or union between persons or entities, as well as the marital relationship between human beings, including but not limited to its sexual aspect. In early Christian literature, the term is frequently used to denote the communion with God and/or Christ, above all in the Eucharist. It is worth bearing in mind this inherent polysemy in our interpretation of the use of this term in Exeg. Soul, for it may be somewhat misleading to render κοινωνεῖν and κοινωνία in Exeg. Soul simply as sexual intercourse, since such a translation obscures a range of other relevant connotations. In order to preserve the ambiguity and range of the Greek term, which has an important rhetorical function in this text, I have thus chosen to translate it consistently as “communion.” It is significant that Exeg. Soul uses the term κοινωνία rather than other more direct terms related to sexual activity. The use of κοινωνία in the specific sense of “sexual intercourse” is relatively rare in our late antique sources, indicating that, depending on context, its non-sexual connotations should be easily activated alongside the possible sexual ones. Due to the narrative context in which it

74 LSJ, 970a. Interestingly the neoplatonist Iamblichus also uses the term κοινωνεῖν to describe the soul’s (harmful) relationship with the body, see e.g. Iamblichus, De mysteriis 200,7–8; Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (Hermeneutics: Studies in the History of Religions; University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 39. The verb κοινωνεῖν was also used to describe participation or initiation in the mysteries (See LSJ, 969b–970a).


76 This is what Robinson does (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise”). See also Krause, who uses the corresponding German term “geschlechtlichen Umgang” (Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 53).
appears, the sexual connotations of the term as it is used in *Exeg. Soul* are nevertheless highly significant. The way κοινωνία is used here within a discourse that is heavily reliant on imagery related to marriage and adultery, with an important focus on the womb of the soul and other procreative imagery, clearly evokes sexual connotations and thus causes the activation in readers’ minds of metaphorical relations where sexual intercourse is an important aspect of the framing input space. Nevertheless, due to the common, and important, Christian usage of the term to denote communion with Christ in a general sense and especially in connection with the Eucharist, and considering the Christian subject matter of this text, such non-sexual connotations are also primed and easily called upon as input spaces in these interpretive blends. In any case, the communion with Christ is a central concern in *Exeg. Soul* and is, at least partly, expressed metaphorically in terms of a sexual relationship.

Let us now consider the interaction between some of the mental spaces that may be primed and activated by the use of the term κοινωνία and its cognates in *Exeg. Soul*. The biblical intertext most likely to be brought to mind is First Corinthians, a text that *Exeg. Soul* also quotes directly. First Corinthians 10:16 and 20 are here especially relevant: “The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion (κοινωνία) in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a communion (κοινωνία) in the body of Christ?” (1 Cor 10:16)\(^{77}\) and: “I do not want you to be partners (κοινωνούς) with demons” (1 Cor 10:20).\(^{78}\) Of course, the context in which these passages, and by extension the rest of 1 Cor 10, is brought to mind in a reading of *Exeg. Soul* is quite different from their context within First Corinthians. Yet at the same time, once the input spaces have been called up and connections have been made between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians, new entailments may materialise and elaborations be made that put both texts in a new light. We will presently take a look at some of the inference-patterns that are created once we pay attention to the interaction between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians.

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\(^{78}\) οὐ δὲ ἔλεος κοινωνίας τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι /νῆλεγω χε λα ἐτρεπτήρκονονος ἡπέσειον.
With First Corinthians already primed through direct reference and quotation elsewhere in *Exeg. Soul*, the use of the term κοινωνία easily calls to mind 1 Cor 10, where Paul juxtaposes idolatry and the eating of food offered to idols with the Eucharist using the terms κοινωνία and κοινωνός. Blending 1 Cor 10 with the *Exeg. Soul* input creates counterpart mappings between the Pauline juxtaposition of the communion in the flesh and blood of Christ and the communion with demons made in 1 Cor 10 and the corresponding dichotomy between the soul’s communion with the Saviour and her communion with the adulterers in *Exeg. Soul*. Counterpart connections are thus created between the communion of the soul with the Saviour-Christ in *Exeg. Soul* and the communion in the flesh and blood of Christ in 1 Cor 10:16, while the soul’s infidelity with the adulterers is mapped onto the partnership with demons mentioned in 1 Cor 10:20 (see fig. 7).79

In the resulting integration network we also notice several other interesting correspondences of terminology and structure between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians. In these blends, references to prostitutes and fornication in First Corinthians easily merge with descriptions of the prostitution of the soul in *Exeg. Soul*. As a result, Paul’s comments on prostitution and prostitutes in 1 Cor 10 may be taken as references to the prostitution of the soul. Further, the admonition to flee from πορνεία (πως ἐβολ ἱπτορια / Φεύγετε τήν πορνείαν) in 1 Cor 6:18 together with the juxtaposition of joining with Christ and joining with a prostitute in 1 Cor 6:16–17 also blend well with *Exeg. Soul*. Moreover, the use of the word μοιχός to denote the adulterers with which the soul prostitutes herself throughout *Exeg. Soul* also contributes to the recall of this part of First Corinthians at this point,80 and the way this word is used in 1 Cor 6:9 fits well with its use in *Exeg. Soul* and serves to strengthen the priming of

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79 As we can see from fig. 8, 1 Cor 10 is already the product of a complicated blend. This figure only shows some of the most central counterpart relations, and I have left the blended space open since the possible relevant blends are too numerous to fit into the available graphic space of a single figure.

80 Aside from 1 Cor 6:9, this term is only used once in Luke (Luke 18:11) and once in Hebrews (Heb 13:4) in the whole of the New Testament. Reading it as an allusion to the latter text also creates interesting and enlightening intertextual patterns, especially taken together with a reading in relation to First Corinthians. In the LXX the term is found in Job 24:15, Ps 49:18 LXX Pro 6:32, and Isa 57:3, the passages in Psalms and Isaiah being especially relevant with regard to *Exeg. Soul*. In the Sahidic New Testament the Coptic equivalent нοεκ is used instead of the Greek μοιχός (see Michel Wilmet, *Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique: II. Les mots autochtones* [3 vols. CSCO 173, 183, 185, Subsidia 11, 13, 15; Leuven: Peeters, 1957–1959], 1:484).
First Corinthians as a supplier of intertextual input spaces in the reading of *Exeg. Soul*. Later, as we shall see, the quotation of Gen 2:24 at 1 Cor 6:16 also contributes to direct attention to this passage when the former is quoted by *Exeg. Soul*.\(^{81}\)

As we shall see, the restoration of the soul to its original state is described in terms of a return to a state of perpetual union with “her perfect husband” (περαι ἱπτερειος).\(^{82}\) On the level of the metaphorical source, at least, that is, on the level of the narrative, this does not seem to entail a restoration to asexuality. The claim that *Exeg. Soul* is primarily concerned with condemning sexuality requires the identification (based on an unstated metonymy) of illicit sex, i.e., πυροντεια and μυρχεια, with sex in general in the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. But there does not seem to be any compelling reasons for doing so.\(^{83}\) To take what the tractate says about the prostitution and adultery of the soul to signify simply the sinfulness of sex seems, on the contrary, to go against the gist of the passages quoted above, which seem to speak against precisely such a reading.

This brings us to the importance of analysing the role of the Saviour in *Exeg. Soul*. But first we need to look closer at the soul’s necessary preparations for her marriage with him, and the way in which these preparations are connected to the soul’s metaphorical femininity.

### 3.1.4. The Womb of the Soul

Perhaps the single most curious feature of *Exeg. Soul* is the way it describes important aspects of the soul’s fallen state and the nature of redemption by way of the imagery of the womb of the soul. The notion that the soul has a womb is in itself not unique to this tractate. In the *Legum allegoriae* of Philo of Alexandria we find the idea that the soul has a womb in which God may “implant virtues,” making it “bring forth what is good.”\(^{84}\) *Exeg. Soul* develops the metaphor in a similar direction, but

\(^{81}\) See *Exeg. Soul* 133.3.

\(^{82}\) *Exeg. Soul* 137.6–7.

\(^{83}\) The one passage in the text that may possibly be interpreted in this way is 137.5–9, where it is “the treachery of Aphrodite” (ταμαθη ἵπτερολευτη) that is said to be luring the soul away from her perfect husband. There are, however, several possible ways to interpret this passage.

\(^{84}\) *Leg*. 3:180: θεος ο… του μονου δυναμένου τας ψυχον μήτρας ἁναγνώναι καὶ σπείρειν ἐν αὐτας ὁμέτας καὶ ποιεῖν ἐγκυμονος καὶ πτηνούς τα καλα/“God, who alone is able to open the womb of the soul, and to implant virtues in it and to cause it to be pregnant, and to bring forth what is good” (Leopold Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini opera*...
also significantly extends its usage and exploits its entailments in novel ways. When the tractate contrasts the state of the womb of the fallen soul with that of a proper woman, the anatomical imagery takes a turn towards the surreal:

\[\text{ⲙⲯⲙⲧⲣⲁⲅⲁⲣ ⲙⲡⲥⲱⲙⲁⲉⲩϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲙⲫⲟⲩ ⲛⲃⲟⲗ ⲛⲑⲉ ⲛⲁⲙⲩⲛ ⲙⲡⲃⲟⲗ} \]

for the womb of the body is on the inside of the body like the other internal organs, but the womb of the soul is turned outside like the genitals of the male which are on the outside. (Exeg. Soul 131.23–27)

This is an important rhetorical move, for by describing the womb of the fallen soul as resembling male genitalia, Exeg. Soul infers male characteristics to the soul in her fallen state.\(^85\) It should be noted that certain medical theories in antiquity presented the male and female genitals as being analogous, the one being like the other, only turned inside out. Thus, as Exeg. Soul points out, when turned the wrong way out the womb resembles male genitalia.\(^86\) This allows for the presentation of the soul not only as an immoral woman, but also as having transgressed gender-boundaries. As Richard Smith and Maddalena Scopello have argued, the way in which the narrative also portrays the soul as actively seeking out partners herself is in many ways in the manner of a male.\(^87\) This makes for an interesting mix of gender imagery, where we find that the metaphor

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\(^85\) See Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 83, 134. Wisse does not see the inverted womb as signifying any maleness on the part of the soul, but interprets it as “indecent exposure” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73), while Scopello, on the other hand, sees an element of exhibitionism in the soul’s maleness (see Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 133–134). Rose Horman Arthur thinks this imagery is due to a redactor whom she terms “a literal-minded male reader,” who “took exception to the strong feminine imagery, and corrected it by adding the explanation that the soul’s womb was formed like a male” (Arthur, Wisdom Goddess, 49).

\(^86\) For similarities between Exeg. Soul and Galen’s descriptions of male and female genitalia, see e.g. Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, comps., Women’s Life in Greece & Rome: A Source Book in Translation (2d ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 243–246; Richard Smith, “Sex Education in Gnostic Schools,” in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 354–355. The fall of the soul from her original marital unity to her status as a single “manly” woman may also be compared with ancient theories of the wandering womb (for a short account of this and other parallels between Nag Hammadi-texts and ancient medical discourse see R. Smith, “Sex Education”).

of the soul as a woman, with the connected aspects of prostitution and submission, is blended with male characteristics of activity, autonomy, and external genitalia. The image of the soul’s external male genitalia-like womb serves to highlight the male aspects of this behaviour, while simultaneously presenting it as an inherently unnatural type of behaviour for the soul. After all, the womb is not supposed to be on the outside resembling male genitals. The result is that both the soul’s actions and her physiology violate category boundaries, and in the final analysis the soul has paradoxically both male and female characteristics in her fallen state, being in a sense both a female prostitute and a male fornicator. The imagery of the inverted womb reinforces this blend by representing male and female genitalia simultaneously.

There is a pervasive rhetoric of naturalness in *Exeg. Soul*, and its use of the terms φύσις and φυσικός is significant. We need only recall the opening lines of the tractate, where it is pointed out that the soul is female “in her nature” (γυναικευματική), which is further explicated by the fact that the soul possesses a womb. The phrase that is later used to denote “the genitals of the male” is ἤφυσικον ἔφορον, and in her baptismal purification the soul will again receive “her original nature” (πεσυσκικον ἔρωστι). This terminology is also echoed later on when the soul’s rightful husband and saviour is twice referred to as “her natural master” (πεσυσκικος ἔρωστι). In this way, the proper conduct on the part of the soul is linked metaphorically to physical characteristics and natural dispositions. Thus, from *Exeg. Soul*’s perspective it is in accordance with the natural order of things for the metaphorically female soul to submit to her “natural” master, and to him alone. While she has her womb on the outside resembling a male, however, it is not only her actions that are wrong, but also her physical characteristics, which are presented vividly as being in a state that is contrary to nature, thus making an even more forceful statement concerning the depravity of the soul in her fallen state.

Moreover, the way this is presented recalls the description in Rom 1:26 of the women who “changed the work of their nature to one against their nature” (ἀνομίων ἡμῶν ἤτεροψεις εὐπαρκείας) with regard to the

88 *Exeg. Soul* 127.21.
89 *Exeg. Soul* 127.21–22.
91 *Exeg. Soul* 132.1.
92 *Exeg. Soul* 133.8–9, 24–25.
soul’s fallen state, and potentially also 2 Pet 1:4, which describes the sal-
vific goal of becoming partakers of the divine nature (ἀπὸ Ἡκοιμώνος ἱνθεφύς καὶ ἦγε 
after having escaped the lust and corruption of the world (παρὰ ἐβολὴ ἑπετιοῦμα ήπτακο ἑτριπο-

3.1.5. Baptism is Washing

The turning point in the narrative comes when the soul realises the
gravity of her situation and repents:

As long as the soul runs around and has communion with whomever she
may meet, becoming defiled, she suffers what she deserves, but when she
becomes aware of the afflictions she is in and weeps to the Father and
repents, then the Father will have mercy on her and turn her womb from
the outside and he will again turn it inside, and the soul will receive her
particular nature.94 (Exeg. Soul 131.13–22)

The motif of repentance which is on display here is pervasive through-
out Exeg. Soul.95 True repentance is the only way to salvation, but it is
not sufficient in itself. For unless repentance is followed by purification
and marriage with the Saviour salvation cannot be attained. So, follow-
ing repentance, the next step on the way to the soul’s salvation is her
purification—the washing away of her sins in baptism. Exeg. Soul con-
nects repentance and the baptismal washing away of sins by citing Acts
13:24, where John the Baptist’s “baptism of repentance” is presented as
a necessary precursor to the salvation brought about by the arrival of
Christ:

94 It is difficult to decide the exact meaning of the term ἡρκόν in this context. The
suggestions have been many, including “disposition propre” (Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme,
71), “proper character” (Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 155), “ursprüng-
liche Besaffenheit” (Kulawik, Die Erzählung, 43), “Eigenliebigkeit” (H. Bethge, “Die
Exegese,” 100; Franke, “Die Erzählung,” 272), “Individualität” (Krause and Labib, Gnos-
tische und hermetische Schriften, 75).

95 It has been argued that this is the main theme of the tractate (see Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 68–81, esp. 75; see also Pheme Perkins, Gnosticism and the New Testament
For the beginning of salvation is repentance. Therefore, “before the arrival of Christ, John came, preach[ing] the baptism of repentance.” 96 And repentance comes about in pain and grief. (Exeg. Soul 135.21–26)

We shall later return to the intertextual implications of Exeg. Soul’s comment that repentance involves pain and grief, a theme that is especially pervasive in the homiletic part towards the end of the tractate and which here recalls both 2 Cor 7:10 and John 16:20–22, 97 but first we shall consider Exeg. Soul’s interpretation of baptism.

Exeg. Soul introduces baptism in a rather unique way, utilising the womb imagery that is such an integral part of the conceptual blend the soul is a woman as it is employed in this text:

So, when the womb of the soul turns itself, by the will of the Father, to the inside, she is baptised and immediately she is cleansed of the defilement of the outside, this which was pressed upon her, like [garments when they are filthy] are lifted into the [water and] are turned 99 until their dirt [is] brought [out] and they are cleansed, but the cleansing of the soul is to receive again her newness of her original nature and to turn herself again, this is her baptism. (Exeg. Soul 131.27–132.2)

The soul is here described as being washed like a garment in the waters of baptism. The cleansing of the soul is thus connected to the ritual act of baptism by means of the metaphorical blend BAPTISM IS WASHING

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97 Cf. also Acts 2:38 for another connection between repentance and baptism.
99 Layton’s translation of ἤρετκτοου as “made to go about” (Layton, “Dirty Garment”) here obscures Exeg. Soul’s important rhetoric of turning.
in a metonymically motivated metaphorical blend (see fig. 8), where water serves as a material anchor. In this conceptual integration network, water, cleansing, and immersion, which are found in both inputs, are fused in the blend, and there are mappings of counterpart relations between soul and garment and between sins and dirt. There are here several kinds of outer-space vital relations, both analogy, identity, and part-whole, between the input spaces. Importantly, two of the counterpart-relations are also identical with two conventional metaphors that were widely used in early Christianity, namely *sin is dirt* and *the soul is a garment*. In the blend, it is the concrete relationship between the elements in the washing input, i.e., the garment, the dirt, and the cleansing action in water, that structures the relationship between the ritual act of baptism and the effect this has upon the soul, and thus also, by way of backwards projection, the understanding of the effects of baptism on the soul in the baptism input. Thus, in baptism, sins are removed from the soul like dirt, and the soul is washed like a garment.

This use of the *baptism is washing* blend also primes the reader’s memory of other well-known uses of the motif of the soul as a garment, and has the potential to bring to mind the richness of the garment-metaphor with its wider implications and its diverse use in early Christian literature, particularly in connection with baptism. The existence and

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101 The only direct use of the garment-metaphor in *Exeg. Soul* appears here in connection with baptism. Unfortunately the manuscript has lacunae at critical points in this passage. The actual word for garment, ρύγιον, has had to be reconstructed, but in this case the reconstruction seems quite safe (see Layton, “Dirty Garment,” 155 n. 2). For a rationale for Layton’s reconstruction of this passage and an account of the washing practices of the period, see Layton, “Dirty Garment.”

popularity of the image of the soul as a garment and its frequent use in baptismal contexts could thus be said to contribute to the effectiveness of the, to our knowledge, relatively unconventional way it is used in Exeg. Soul, on the one hand making it easier to grasp the basic metaphor underlying it, while contributing to the impact of its unusual aspect on the other.

The washing action in the framing washing input includes the information that the garment is turned. This is an aspect of some significance. In the baptism is washing blend, the soul is metaphorically a garment. However, the soul is not just a garment, but first and foremost a woman. This range of the target ICM—the fact that the target ICM is blended with different source ICMs—is exploited to interesting effect. In Exeg. Soul’s description of baptism, this double metaphorical identification of the soul as both a woman and a garment is blended within the overall baptism is washing blend (see fig. 9 for this blend-within-the-blend). This is facilitated by a metonymic tightening of the projection from the source ICM of woman which causes a shift from the soul is a woman, to the soul is a womb. The subsequent blending of the latter with the soul is a garment creates a temporary fusion in the blend of the image of the womb and that of the garment, a fusion which exists only in the blended space. This blended space can further be conceived of as existing within the washing input space of the baptism is washing


103 See chapter 2 for a discussion of Zoltán Kövecses’ concepts of the scope of the source and range of the target in metaphorical relations.


105 This happens by way of the metonymy the womb for the woman.

106 John D. Turner, however, draws the conclusion that the womb of the soul is actually “the vehicle of the soul” which surrounds it “as a dirty and polluted garment” (John D. Turner, “Ritual in Gnosticism,” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts [ed. John D. Turner and Ruth Majercik; SBLSymS 12; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000], 104). This does not seem to be the case, however, for the identification of the womb with the garment seems rather to be a temporary mental representation cued by Exeg. Soul in order to highlight, by way of metaphor, certain aspects of the soul’s baptism.
blend as it is constructed in *Exeg. Soul*. The resulting blend is significantly altered by the fact that the soul is already a product of several stages of blending, making the present baptismal network a complex multiscope one (see fig. 10).107

In this larger blend, the turning of the garments in washing is fused with the turning of the womb of the soul in baptism. Interpreted within the contextual framework of the real world knowledge of the ICM of washing, more specifically the knowledge that in the washing of garments, the garments are often turned inside out, the implication is that the baptism of the soul involves the washing of the, now mentally fused, womb/garment in water, an action which then *ipso facto* involves the turning of the womb/garment inside-out.108 We thus see how the basic metaphor BAPTISM IS WASHING, when it also involves the two metaphors THE SOUL IS A GARMENT AND THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, can produce, by elaboration in the process of blending, such creative imagery as the turning inside-out of the womb of the soul in baptism.109 This is facilitated by the exploitation of certain potential entailments of one of the basic metaphors underlying *Exeg. Soul*, namely THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, in a surreal but suggestive blend that constitutes a creative elaboration which is subsequently utilised in the unfolding narrative.

The agent of the effects of the washing/baptism is the Father. We saw from the passage quoted above that the soul is turned in accordance with “the will of the Father” (ⲡⲟⲩⲱ ϲⲉⲓⲧ),110 and in another passage the Father is referred to directly as the one who effects this turning, when it is stated that, “then the Father will have mercy on her and turn her womb from the outside, and he will again turn it inside.”111

The image of the turning of the womb serves several purposes.112 We have seen that it is a striking way to describe the transformation

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109 Robinson admits that he does "not understand this figure of speech, of itself and in the present context." According to Robinson, "the chief difficulty is that at this point in ExSoul one expects the sexual individuality to be nullified by restoration of the original androgynous union" (Robinson, "Exegesis on the Soul," 115). Wisse calls it "a difficult and perhaps not entirely successful metaphor" (Wisse, "On Exegeting," 73).
of the characteristics of the soul from male into female, but an equally significant aspect of the womb-imagery is the way it functions to highlight certain aspects of the rhetorically important inside-versus-outside dichotomy. In *Exeg. Soul*, the outside has a negative valuation and is connected with things like matter, pollution, deception, and unimportance. The inside, on the other hand, is connected with positive things like spirit, purity, truth, and importance. Moreover, inside and outside are also associated with the directions up and down respectively.\(^{113}\) The womb of the soul is a central point of reference in showing “the outside” as bad and “the inside” as good and is also used to illustrate the change from the former to the latter condition.

The aspect of the opposition between the outside and the inside that is most closely connected to the specific metaphorical source input of the womb, however, has to do with the soul’s receptivity of good seed and her procreative ability. While it is on the outside, the womb of the soul is polluted, receives bad seed, and bears children that are weak and stupid. Only after she is cleansed and her womb is turned toward the inside can the soul receive good seed and produce good children. The cleansing and turning of the womb in baptism are thus necessary preconditions for the soul’s unification with the Saviour and set the stage for further metaphors of salvation later on in the narrative. Thus, the outside-inside dichotomy also plays an important part in the imagery of turning that is of such great significance in the tractate’s rhetoric of conversion and redemption.

*Exeg. Soul*’s account of baptism follows its description of the soul’s life of sin and precedes her marriage with the Saviour. There is a logical transition in the text from the soul’s life of sin, via her baptismal purification, to her wedding, as baptism effects the necessary transition from the defilements of the soul in her former life to her new life with the Saviour. The process of baptism, including the turning of the womb, has the important function of setting the stage for this new marriage. Not only is the soul cleansed of her sins and turned into a proper female in this process, but the process is also described as a renewal, and

\(^{113}\) This alignment corresponds to the general conceptual metaphors *good things are up* and *bad things are down* (see Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* [Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, Second Series; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 44; Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 14–21).
being renewed she is also turned into a virgin again,\footnote{Cf. Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’amé, 83. In Philo we find the closely related notion that God’s intercourse with the soul renews its virginity (see Cher. 50; Richard A. Baer, Philo’s Use of the Categories Male and Female [ALGHJ 3; Leiden: Brill, 1970], 51–53, 75; see also Verna E.F. Harrison, “The Allegorization of Gender: Plato and Philo on Spiritual Childbearing,” in Asceticism [ed. Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantasis; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], 520–534).} thus making her into a proper bride for the upcoming wedding.\footnote{William Robinson has argued that the cleansing of the soul has nothing to do with the sins of the soul described in the narrative prior to her purification, claiming that it is only connected to the marriage symbolism. Robinson holds that “instead of being set in motion by the preceding narrative, the wedding story seems to originate in theory,” a theory which according to Robinson is “the doctrine of deficiency as the mark of this earthly life” (see Robinson, “Introduction,” 138). There does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between such a theory and the function of the wedding story within the total narrative context of Exeg. Soul, however, and it seems unnecessary to create a rift between the preceding account of the soul’s life of sin and the following description of baptismal cleansing followed by marriage. Madeleine Scopello holds that the turning of the womb protects the soul from being polluted by her lovers (see Madeleine Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines in the Nag Hammadi Library,” in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism [ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988], 73; Maddalena Scopello, “The Exegesis on the Soul [II,6]: Introduction,” in The Nag Hammadi Library in English [3rd revised ed.; ed. James M. Robinson; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990], 190), but it seems reasonably clear from the overall narrative that it is not the turning of the womb in itself that protects the soul, but rather her new husband.}

3.2. Marriage and Procreation

“The Nag Hammadi texts have reminded us,” Wayne Meeks observes, “of the extent to which the unification of opposites, and especially the opposite sexes, served in early Christianity as a prime symbol of salvation.”\footnote{Meeks, “Image of the Androgyne,” 165–166.} Exeg. Soul is certainly no exception in this regard, for in our tractate the soul becomes the bride, and subsequently wife, of Christ, who is correspondingly the bridegroom and husband. The relationship between the soul and Christ is thus described primarily using framing inputs taken from the ICM of marriage.\footnote{This ICM itself comprises the ICMs of wedding, procreation, etc.} An understanding of Exeg. Soul’s account of the relationship between the soul and Christ thus relies on the recruitment of inputs from the marriage ICM and related ICMs, as well as intertextual inputs from Scripture evoked by the recruitment of these ICMs within the context of Exeg. Soul’s narrative of the soul’s salvation. Recruitment of inputs from marriage-related ICMs contributes,
for instance, a great deal to one of the main underlying themes of the tractate, mentioned above, namely the theme of the soul’s subordination to male power. By way of the marriage ICM the inference is made that the soul should submit to the authority of Christ in a manner analogous to the way a wife should submit to her husband. The soul without Christ is, on the contrary, described metaphorically as a prostitute and as an adulterous, fornicating, dysfunctional and category-transgressing woman. We will now take a closer look at the marriage-related blends in *Exeg. Soul*.

The main overarching blend in this regard is the single-scope, metaphorical blend *Christian life is a marriage with Christ* (see fig. 11). Now, what does this blend tell us concerning *Exeg. Soul*’s views on salvation and Christian life? As we shall see, this blend especially highlights aspects of power and hierarchical complementarity. Let us take a closer look at what the marriage with Christ implies for the soul. First we will look at the nature of the union between the soul and the Saviour. *Exeg. Soul* describes this relationship in interesting ways that rely on intertextual connections with a broad range of both Old and New Testament texts. The descriptions of the soul’s bridegroom and spouse are important, and he is identified in seemingly contradictory terms. We have seen that the soul’s original spouse is not only identified as her husband, but also as her brother.118 This fact is also explicitly stated with regard to her “new” husband:

> ἀπεστή τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἑλπὶ ἡμερῶν τῆς ἐπιτύπωσε τὴν εἰς πατρὶ ἕνας

the Father sent her from heaven her husband who is her brother, the firstborn.  

*(Exeg. Soul 132.7–9)*

Later, this husband/brother is also directly identified as the Saviour:

> εἰς τὸ ὅτι τῇ ἁγιότητι εἰς ἡμέραν ἐπανεστή συνεκκόμισες περὶ ἡμῶν ἔφευρος εἰς ἀνδρὶ ἑνὸς 

So, when she becomes renewed she will ascend, praising the Father and her brother, this one by whom she was saved.  

*(Exeg. Soul 134.25–28)*

These references to the Saviour and bridegroom as the soul’s brother serve to connect the soul’s redeemed, married state with her original state together with the Father as a virginal daughter existing in a male-female pair. In this way, her new husband, the Saviour, is identified with her

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118 See *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6.
original brother and husband whom she left in the beginning. This means that the Saviour is identified with Adam, and it is the reunion with him in marriage that brings about the salvation of the soul:

Again this marriage has brought them together and the soul has united with her true love, her natural master, as it is written, “for the master of the woman is her husband.”

(Exeg. Soul 133.6–10)

The further identification of this Adam, who is the soul’s saviour, brother, and husband, with Christ is never explicitly made in Exeg. Soul. Indeed, the name Christ (ποσὶ) is mentioned just once in this tractate. Nevertheless, the identification of the Saviour (ποσὶ) with Christ is evident throughout the text. Exeg. Soul introduces its quotations of Jesus’ words in John 6:44 and a paraphrase of his words in Matt 5:4, 6 and Luke 14:26 by identifying them as the words of the Saviour, and also uses the phrase “the apostles of the Saviour” (μαθηται του ποσι) in its introduction of a New Testament paraphrase at Exeg. Soul 130.28–29, all of which support the identification of Exeg. Soul’s Saviour with Christ.

Exeg. Soul’s account of the bridegroom who saves the bride, and the statement that “the master of the woman is her husband,” brings to mind several scriptural passages, chief among them Genesis 3:16, 1 Cor 7:4 and 11:3, and Eph 5:22–24, which, when taken together, both strengthen the theme of submission and the Adam-Christ connection. All these passages stress the subordination and submission of woman to man, the Genesis passage and the two New Testament ones treating Adam and Christ respectively in the role of the superordinate part. Exeg. Soul’s point

119 Cf. Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.
120 See Exeg. Soul 135.23.
121 See Exeg. Soul 134.34–135.4; cf. Majella Franzmann, Jesus in the Nag Hammadi Writings (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 110.
122 See Exeg. Soul 135.16–21.
123 The paraphrase in question, at Exeg. Soul 130.30, is of any of the following texts: Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1 Cor 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1.
124 Sevrin, however, holds these quotations to be the work of a later redactor and claims that “seul le dossier d’attestations scripturaires contient des éléments explicitement chrétiens. En aucun cas le frère-époux n’est, même allusivement, rapproché du Christ” (Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 30; and cf. ibid., 58).
concerning the soul’s need to submit to the authority of Christ in his role as husband and identified with Adam thus makes profound sense in light of these passages.\textsuperscript{125}

The motif of the bridegroom as the brother of the bride is found also in the Song of Songs, where the bridegroom addresses the bride as his sister (ἀδελφή),\textsuperscript{126} while the motif of the bridegroom as the Saviour of the bride recalls Ephesians 5.\textsuperscript{127} With Ephesians already primed from earlier references,\textsuperscript{128} once the identification of the bridegroom as the soul’s brother has been made, whether through the intertextual blend between \textit{Exeg. Soul} and Genesis that furnishes the identification of Christ with Adam and the soul with Eve, or through the Song of Songs, the passage in Ephesians 5 about Christ the bridegroom is readily brought to mind and interpreted in light of this blend.\textsuperscript{129}

By means of intertextual connections to Genesis and First Corinthians, the pair constituted by the soul and Christ is effectively identified with the original pair of Adam and Eve, and Christ as Saviour is implicitly presented as a second Adam, simultaneously as, and intimately connected with, the identification of the soul with Eve. As it is presented in \textit{Exeg. Soul}, the fall is thus not mapped onto the eating from the tree of knowledge,\textsuperscript{130} but instead onto Eve’s separation from Adam.\textsuperscript{131} Consequently, the soul’s marriage with the bridegroom becomes a return to paradise, and to the situation before the fall, i.e., before Eve was separated from the original ἄνθρωπος. To sum up, the soul’s original state entails existence in a male-female pair together with Adam, while the soul in her fallen state exists as a lone female who, contrary to her nature, has male characteristics, fornicating and prostituting herself with a mul-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[127] For the contrary view that this motif in \textit{Exeg. Soul} is independent of Ephesians, see Robinson, “Introduction,” 140.
\item[129] In light of this important Adam-Christ rhetoric in \textit{Exeg. Soul}, I take all the references to the soul’s brother to refer to both her original brother and husband, Adam, and Christ, the Saviour, bridegroom and second Adam. I thus disagree with Wilson who thinks that the reference to the soul’s brother (μεσος) in 13:4,27, which he mistakenly reads as “her brothers” in plural, “derives from the gnostic myth of the fall of Sophia” (Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 223).
\item[130] Cf., however, Arthur, \textit{Wisdom Goddess}, 42, who argues that this is in fact the case.
\item[131] I.e., the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–23.
\end{footnotes}
tude of adulterers. The redeemed soul, on the other hand, is once again the female part of a male-female pair, this time together with Christ, the second Adam.

We saw above that the Genesis accounts of the creation of woman and of Eve’s transgression are blended in the interpretation of *Exeg. Soul*. In addition, the punishment of Eve in Gen 3:16 may be recalled in *Exeg. Soul*’s description of the soul’s troublesome childbirth:

\[
\text{ⲧⲟⲧⲉ ⲥⲛⲁ ̄ⲣⲁⲣⲭⲉⲓ ̄ⲛⲃⲱⲗⲕ ⲉⲣⲟⲥ ⲟⲩⲁⲁⲧ ̄ⲥ ̄ⲛⲑⲉ ̄ⲛⲛⲉⲧϣⲁⲩⲙⲓⲥⲉ ̄ⲧⲉⲩⲛⲟⲩ ⲉⲫⲁⲡⲡⲏⲣⲉ ϣⲁⲩⲕⲟⲧⲟⲩ ⲉⲣⲟⲟⲩ ⲟⲩⲁⲁⲩ ϩ̄ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲃⲗⲕⲉ}
\]

Then she will start to rage at herself like those who give birth. Immediately when they give birth to the child they turn upon themselves in anger.

(Exeg. Soul 132.2–5)

According to Gen 3:16, God’s punishment of Eve involved travail in childbirth, desire for her husband, and submission to his rule. The first of these punishments is echoed in *Exeg. Soul* 132.2–5, quoted above, and the latter two are, as we have seen, important themes throughout the tractate.\(^{132}\)

When it comes to the nature of the relationship between the soul and Christ, we may note once again the contrast between the way the soul is treated by the adulterers and by her true husband. The former are described as uncaring and even violent, while the latter is described as a wise and loving husband. Correspondingly, while the soul is driven by passions and lust with the adulterers, she is driven by love and repentance together with the Saviour. It is small wonder, then, that the soul henceforth does her best to make the bridegroom stay with her. As *Exeg. Soul* puts it,

\[
\text{ⲧⲉϣⲁϫⲡⲏⲣⲉ ⲉⲣⲟⲫⲟⲩ ⲟⲩⲁⲁⲩ ϩⲧⲟⲧ̄ⲥ}
\]

she greatly adorned herself so that it might please him to stay with her.

(Exeg. Soul 133.14–15)

This effort to make the bridegroom stay also mirrors the preparations for the soul’s wedding, and the wedding itself, which may be regarded as a significant entailment of the Christian life is a marriage with Christ blend, is important.

\(^{132}\) The passage might also conceivably bring to mind Ps 4:5 LXX and Hos 7:14. For a discussion of these verses, see Michael L. Barré, “Hearts, Beds, and Repentance in Psalm 4,5 and Hosea 7,14,” Bib 76 (1995): 53–62.
3.2.1. *Wedding Feast and Bridal Chamber*

The metaphorical Christian initiation is a wedding blend (see fig. 12) can be regarded as a blend within the overarching Christian life is a marriage with Christ network. Metaphors relying on framing inputs from marriage and wedding ICMs are indeed central to *Exeg. Soul*, and in relation to the soul’s wedding the tractate also describes her wedding preparations. In an intriguing passage *Exeg. Soul* tells us that:

\[\text{She abandoned her former prostitution, and she cleansed herself of the defilements of the adulterers, and she became renewed to be suitable as a bride.}\]

She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with perfume, and sat within it waiting for the true bridegroom. No longer does she run around in the marketplace having communion with whomever she wants

(Exeg. Soul 132.10–17)

The soul is then cleansed and renewed in baptism, as we have seen, but the bridegroom, whom she can no longer remember, she only receives after having waited a while for him in fearful anticipation, and after having dreamed of him:

\[\text{She continued waiting for him, “When is he coming?” fearing him, for she did not know what he looked like.}\]

(Exeg. Soul 132.17–19)

This description may serve to recruit intertextual input spaces from the parable of the Ten Virgins (Matt 25:1–13) and Ephesians. First of all it recalls Matt 25:13 with its exhortation to the ten virgins to watch for the coming of the bridegroom on the grounds that “you know neither the day nor the hour” (ἴητε νῖκος οὐ γνίσις τῆς γῆς). This connection between *Exeg. Soul* and the parable is strengthened further through subsequent intertextual blends. Another New Testament passage that is easily evoked here and elsewhere in *Exeg. Soul* is Eph 5:22–33 concerning wives and husbands. In this particular case it is Eph 5:33, with its admo-

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133 The text literally states that “she became renewed to brideness.”
134 Note the possible allusion to Cant 3:2.
nition that a woman should “fear her husband” (ῬΩΣΔΙΣ ΣΙΝΘΙΩΤΙ ΧΙΛΙΩΣΧΙΩΤΙ), that is called up through Exeg. Soul’s reference to the soul fearing the bridegroom. Eph 5:33 itself follows on the heels of the description of the relationship between man and woman and their becoming “a single flesh” (σὐκαρᾶ ρῶγοῦ) as a great “mystery” (ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ) that also refers to the relationship between Christ and the church,¹³⁵ a passage that is also evoked elsewhere in Exeg. Soul.

Finally, after much tribulation, the soul receives her bridegroom and saviour. His coming down to the soul is an event that is described in quite puzzling terms:

\[
\text{ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ} \quad \text{ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΩΤΗΡ}
\]

So then, according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage which was prepared, and he adorned the bridal chamber. (Exeg. Soul 132.23–27)

The interpretation of this passage is complicated by the fact that the text uses two different terms, one Coptic and one Greek, ma ⲉⲡⲉⲡⲧⲣⲉⲡⲧ and ηγωφων (νυμφὼν) respectively, which may both be translated as “bridal chamber.” But should we treat the two terms as they are used in Exeg. Soul as synonyms,¹³⁶ or should we rather construe them as having different referents or functions? If the terms have different referents, then what might they be? And if they are to be interpreted as synonyms, then why does Exeg. Soul use both terms in the same passage? Since the text does in fact employ different terms, we should at least consider the possibility of differences in meaning, which is why I have chosen to distinguish the two in my translation by rendering ma ⲉⲡⲉⲡⲧⲣⲉⲡⲧ as “place of marriage,” and reserving the term “bridal chamber” for ηγωφων.

¹³⁵ See Eph 5:31–32.
¹³⁶ This is what, e.g., Robinson, Scopello, Sevrin, Krause, and Bethge do. Robinson translates both terms as “bridal chamber,” (Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157), Krause and Bethge translate both as “Brautgemach” (Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 55; H. Bethge, “Die Exegese,” 100), while Scopello, Sevrin, and Kasser use the French equivalent, “chambre nuptiale” (Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 107–108; Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 73; Kasser, “La gnose,” 39). Franke, however, translates ma ⲉⲡⲉⲡⲧⲣⲉⲡⲧ as “Brautgemach,” while rendering ηγωφων as “Hochzeitssaal” (see Franke, “Die Erzählung,” 273), and Kulawik translates “Brautgemach” and “Hochzeitsgemach” respectively (see Kulawik, Die Erzählung, 45). In comparison, Gos. Phil. employs three different Greek terms that are usually translated by scholars as “bridal chamber,” namely κοστόν, νυμφὼν, and παστός, but the Coptic term ma ⲉⲡⲉⲡⲧⲣⲉⲡⲧ is not found there. In Auth. Teach. we do find ma ⲉⲡⲉⲡⲧⲣⲉⲡⲧ, but none of the Greek terms.
It is of course possible that the variation in terms is due to stylistic reasons, simply in order to vary the language and avoid unnecessary repetition of the term ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ, but before we jump to this conclusion we should give due consideration to the possible differences in meaning in the way the two terms are employed in the current context. The Coptic word ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ in itself means both “bride” and “marriage” and can be used, as evidenced in the Sahidic New Testament, to translate the Greek words γάμος, νύμφη, and γυνή.\(^\text{137}\) The phrase ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ literally means “place of marriage” and can be used as a translation of the Greek terms νυμφών and παστός, but it too can be used to translate the Greek γάμος.\(^\text{138}\) Moreover, the Greek phrase ἔνδυμα γάμου, “wedding garments” (Matt 22:11, 12), is rendered ϰⲟⲩⲱ ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ in the Sahidic New Testament, which, in addition to “wedding garment,” may thus also conceivably be understood as “garment of the place of marriage” or “garment of the bridal chamber.”

An intertextual analysis may help us discover a possible rationale for the use of the two terms νυμφών and ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ in the passage in question. Looking at the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:1–14), what is rendered as γάμος in verses 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the Greek version of the New Testament is translated as ⲙⲁ ̄ⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ in the Sahidic version. As for νυμφών, a term Exeg. Soul uses just once, at 132.26–27, quoted above, it is used in neither the Septuagint nor the Sahidic New Testament.\(^\text{139}\) In the Greek New Testament, however, we find it in a textual variant of Matt 22:10, where it is used instead of γάμος.\(^\text{140}\) In other words, both terms seem to point us in the direction of the parable of the Wedding Feast in Matthew 22:1–14. Let us therefore consider the possible implications of reading our passage in Exeg. Soul intertextually with Matt 22:1–14.

Exeg. Soul does not seem to be interested in the broader context of the parable of the Wedding Feast, but seems content merely to refer to the

\(^{137}\) See Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1196–1197.

\(^{138}\) See Crum 560b–561a; Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1197.

\(^{139}\) It is, however, attested at Matt 9:15 in the Codex Schøyen version of Matthew in the Middle Egyptian (M) dialect of Coptic (see Hans-Martin Schenke, *Das Matthäus-Evangelium im mittelägyptischen Dialekt des Koptischen [Codex Schøyen] [Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection 2, Coptic Papryri 1; Oslo: Hermes, 2001]*, 59). The Middle Egyptian dialect is also referred to by some as Oxyrhynchite (see Ariel Shisha-Halevy, “Future, Present, Narrative Past”).

\(^{140}\) See *NA27*. It is also found in the three parallel passages Matt 9:15, Mark 2:19 and Luke 5:34, but these passages do not seem to be relevant for an intertextual understanding of the use of the term νυμφών in Exeg. Soul.
general idea of God holding a wedding feast for his son, the preparation of the place of marriage and the importance of the wedding garments. I will split the *Exeg. Soul* passage in two and analyse them one part at a time:

\[ \text{τότε ὅπερ ἔσται καταπογομένη ἡπειροτ \άψει ἐπί \άρος ἐρούν ἐπίλα \ωραλετ \ετοιμάτω} \]

So then, according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage which was prepared.

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.23–26)

The most obvious intertext to this passage is Matt 22:8: \πῶς ἔσται \μεν \ςτίν \παρός ἐρούν \ἐπίλα \οραλετ \ετοιμάτω, “the place of marriage is prepared.” In addition, *Exeg. Soul* may here once again evoke the parable of the Ten Virgins (Matt 25:1–13), which should already have been primed by the direct activation of Matt 25:13 in the above mentioned blend with *Exeg. Soul* 132.17–19. In this context it is especially Matt 25:10, “the bridegroom came and those who were prepared went in with him to the place of marriage” (\άψει \ποπατομέλαι \αγίο \νετοιμάτω \νμα \ερούν \ἐπίλα \οραλετ), that is recalled, and which may thus set up an intertextual multiple-scope blend (see fig. 13) that also serves to strengthen the mental connections already established between *Exeg. Soul* and the parable of the Ten Virgins.

In the second part of our *Exeg. Soul* passage we encounter the term \πνυμφαί:

\[ \αἱκοσμεί \δε \πνυμφαί \]

And he adorned the bridal chamber.

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.26–27)

As mentioned above, a variant of Matt 22:10 has “the bridal chamber (\νυμφαίων) was filled with guests.” Based on this variant reading of the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:1–14), which uses both \γάμους and \νυμφαίων, we could read \να \ωραλετ in *Exeg. Soul* as a translation of \γάμους, and we might further regard \να \ωραλετ as being a more general term in relation to the more specific term \νυμφαίων. The reference to both \πνυμφαί and \κοσμεί in *Exeg. Soul* 132.26–27 may thus in this context serve as a cue for bringing to mind the discussion in Matt 22:10–14 concerning the man who lacks wedding garments. In this scriptural

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141 The Greek has \ό μὲν \γάμους \ετοιμός \εστίν. Cf. also Matt 22:4: \πάντα \ετοιμά \δεύτε \εἰς τοὺς \γάμους /“everything is ready; come to the marriage feast.” The Sahidic version of this is \ήκα \ήν \ςτίν \λιντά \ωραλετ, which may be understood as either “everything is prepared, come to the marriage (or: marriage feast),” or “everything is ready, come to the bride.”
passage it is made clear that it is a very serious offence indeed not to wear wedding garments at the wedding feast, for it results in being thrown “into the outer darkness” (Matt 22:13). By having the Saviour come down to the soul in the ὡρεῖται and adorning (i.e., dressing) the γυνήφων, *Exeg. Soul* directs attention to the Matthean parable and attributes the Saviour with acting to prevent such a fate—which again recalls the inside-outside dichotomy discussed above—by virtue of his dressing activity. However, the fact that *Exeg. Soul* has the Saviour adorn/dress the bridal chamber (ἡγυνήφων), rather than the bride (ἡγυνή), is still puzzling. This could conceivably be due to an error in the transmission of the text, and if we emend ἡγυνήφων to ἡγυνή, this would give us a straightforward reference to the soul as the bride of Christ the Saviour, and the latter dressing the former. Without evidence to the contrary, however, I think we should primarily trust the manuscript and work from the assumption that this is not an error. Retaining the reading ἡγυνήφων we may still understand the passage in much the same way as if we emend it, but with a twist, as this reading has the potential to provoke additional reflection on the part of the reader. For if the Saviour adorns not simply the soul as bride, but rather the bridal chamber, then how are we to understand the nature and identity of the bridal chamber?

When trying to be more specific concerning the target referents for ὡρεῖται and ἡγυνήφων, we are, however, venturing into more speculative territory. Some possibilities may nevertheless be outlined. Since the bridal chamber is here described as being adorned/dressed, it would seem to be possible to understand the bridal chamber (ἡγυνήφων) as the body within which the soul unites with Christ, and consequently that

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142 As Wissen notes, “It is peculiar to read in 132,26 f. that the groom decorated the bridal chamber (νυμφών) after it had been stated in the preceding sentence that he came down to the ready (!) bridal chamber (αὐρεῖετ)” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 74).

143 If the use of ἡγυνήφων in *Exeg. Soul* is an error, it is more likely to have been made by the translator, rather than the scribe of Nag Hammadi Codex II, since the difference between the two Greek terms when rendered in Coptic also involves a difference in grammatical gender.

144 If we are right to identify the bridal chamber with the body, such use of the term would then be similar to what we find in the Syriac tradition, not least in Ephrem, who, with clear Eucharistic connotations, refers to the human body as the bridal chamber where the soul mingles with Christ the Bridegroom (see Thomas Koonamakkal, “Ephrem’s Polemics on the Human Body,” in Ascetica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999 [ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001], 432).
the dressing of the bridal chamber may refer to an adorning/dressing of the body. Understood in this way, and considering the clear connection in *Exeg. Soul* between the marriage preparations and baptism, it is possible to understand this adorning/dressing of the bridal chamber to refer to a postbaptismal dressing in white garments as attested in numerous early Christian sources. While this interpretation does not depend upon seeing ṣⲃⲁⲇⲉⲉⲧ and ⲛⲕⲓⲧⲟⲣ as having different referents, ṣⲃⲁⲇⲉⲉⲧ might in such a context be regarded as a reference to the place of the marriage in a wider sense, and perhaps as a reference to the place where baptism and the marriage with the Saviour take place. It would, for example, make sense to interpret the ṣⲃⲁⲇⲉⲉⲧ as a church building or baptistery where the soul is baptised, cleansed, and wedded to Christ in the complete Christian rites of initiation, and united with him, above all in the Eucharist. It may also, on similar grounds, denote the Christian rites of initiation as a whole. 

3.2.2. *The (Re)union*

The significance of the marriage (γάμος) between the soul and the Saviour is repeatedly stressed throughout *Exeg. Soul*. The tractate states that the soul will become one in a lasting union with her true bridegroom, which constitutes a return to the original male-female state, and emphasises that they will be satisfied in their communion with each other:

επιτήλεια γὰρ εὐημορία ἐπὶ ἀγάπης ἔκρηκτος ἐνεργόνησις ἔκτος ἔννοιας έξω ἔννοιαν ἐνεργόν ἔκτος ἔννοιας έξω ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔννοιαν ἔν

For that marriage is not like the fleshly marriage. (In the fleshly marriage,) those who will have communion with each other have enough of that (fleshly) communion and like burdens they leave behind them the annoyance of the desire and they [turn their faces from] each other, but this […] is [not] this marriage, but when they unite with [each other] they become a single life. Therefore the prophet says concerning the first man

and the first woman: “They shall become a single flesh.”146 For they were at first united with each other beside the Father, before the woman lost the husband who is her brother. (Exeg. Soul 132.27–133.6)

The marriage (γάμος)147 with the Saviour is described as being far superior to the soul’s former communion with adulterers and “wanton men,” against which it is compared at length, but it also compares favourably to “the fleshly marriage” (γάμος ἱμαρκίκος). The use of this term in this context calls specifically to mind the source ICM of the metaphorical blend Christian life is a marriage with Christ, pointing out some important differences between it and the target concept while stressing the metaphoricity of the blend.

Damage to the manuscript makes the quoted passage a difficult one to interpret. Frederik Wisse’s reconstruction of 132.32 as ἰςετη[πορφρογ εβ]ολ (“they do not [separate from]”)148 makes good sense in conjunction with the text’s subsequent quotation of Gen 2:24 at 133.1–3: “they shall become a single flesh” (συναργειο νυγαργ υγυτ). The problem with this reconstruction is that it is impossible to reconcile with the presence of a faint trace of a superlinear stroke near the middle of the lacuna. The reconstruction in Layton’s edition of the text, which was suggested by Stephen Emmel, ἰςετη[το] η[νοχο εβ]ολ, takes this fact into account,149 but Robinson’s accompanying translation of the passage, where he understands τκοινωνια ετιμαι (“that communion”) at 132.29–30 as a reference to the marriage between the soul and the Saviour,150 does not make sense of the Genesis quotation, nor does it fit in with the overall rhetoric of Exeg. Soul. However, if we regard τκοινωνια ετιμαι at 132.29–30 as

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146 Gen 2:24; cf. Matt 19:5; Mark 10:8; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31.
147 In the Sahidic New Testament the Greek term γάμος is found only at Heb 13:4 and Rev 19:7 (see L.-Th. Lefort, Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique: I. Les mots d’origine Grecque [CSCO 124, Subsidia 1; Leuven: Peeters, 1950], 54). Rev 19:7, which concerns the marriage of the lamb, fits well into the context of Exeg. Soul: “the marriage of the lamb has come and his bride has prepared herself” (אפה νυγαμας ἵμεριβ αυῳ τεμφελας ακοποτε ἵμας), while Heb 13:4 is notable for its condemnation of the fornicators and adulterers: “The marriage is honoured in all things and the bed pure, for God will judge the fornicators and the adulterers” (πυγαμας ταινη γηρωλ ην αυῳ παι νυκτοκ τιβυμα νυφως γαρ ημινοικ νεπερνοιτε νακρινε νυου). Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 75 n. 21; also followed by Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 72 who has ἰςετη[πορφρογ εβ]ολ.
a reference to “the fleshly marriage” (παράξων ἄσκαρκικός), what we get is a contrast between “the fleshly marriage,” where the married couple tire of each other, and the marriage with Christ, where he and the soul become “a single life.” We thus see that this passage also provides us with a suitable contrast to 128.7–11, where the soul’s relationship with the adulterers is described using the imagery of turning. The imagery of turning is indeed pervasive throughout Exeg. Soul. As we have seen, the womb of the soul is turned, the soul turns her face, first from her original husband and then from successive fornicators, while the latter turn away from her after having had their way with her. In contrast to the soul and the adulterers, and in contrast to “the fleshly marriage,” the soul and her true husband, Christ, do not turn away from each other once they have been (re)united. Rather than tiring of each other like those who are united in “the fleshly marriage,” the soul and Christ truly become “a single life.” In contrast, Robinson’s interpretation reverses the meaning of the passage and hence does not fit the argument Exeg. Soul seems to be making here. Why would the soul and Christ turn their faces from each other? Granted, in this communion the soul renounces desire, but it does not seem appropriate for her to renounce the metaphorical intercourse with her true husband or desire for him. What the soul renounces is her desire to seek new lovers, since she is now fully satisfied with her communion with Christ, her true husband. Instead it is the common human couple who will eventually have enough of the desire for fleshly communion with each other, and who will therefore turn away from each other.

The contrast between the soul’s original and fallen states is thus not one between an original state of sexuality and a fallen state characterised by sexuality, but rather a contrast between the ideal γάμος and πορνεία, i.e., between a state of legitimate marital relationship versus illicit and fleeting relationships with a multitude of partners, relationships that are characterised by the text as prostitution, fornication, and adultery. Exeg. Soul makes clear that there is in fact such a thing as legitimate

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152 For the notion that that the marriage with Christ is a perpetual union where the married do not separate, and which is therefore much better than a human marriage, see Harrison, “Gender, Generation, and Virginity,” 52–53, who quotes a translation of Gregory of Nazianzus’ poem Exhortatio ad virgines, PG 37.632–634. Cf. also Aphrahat, Dem. VI:6 (PS I, 269:20–24) (see the translation in Kuriakose A. Valavanolickal, The Use of the Gospel Parables in the Writings of Aphrahat and Ephrem [Studies in the Religion and History of Early Christianity 2; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996], 183).
sexual intercourse for the soul, metaphorically speaking, but only with her true spouse, Christ. Everything else is characterised as πορνεία or μορχεία.

The quoted passage from Gen 2:24, “they shall become as one flesh” (συνήλθσαν αὐχαρίζων οὐκατε), is a passage that is closely paraphrased in 1 Cor 6:16, Eph 5:31, and in the parallel accounts in Matt 19:5 and Mark 10:8, and its use in Exeg. Soul may recall any or all of these New Testament passages. Especially the latter two passages, where Gen 2:24 is used by Jesus in an argument against divorce, blends easily with the rhetoric of Exeg. Soul. The potential blends created on the basis of 1 Cor 6:12–20 and Eph 5:22–33, on the other hand, address somewhat different concerns. Where the focus in Matt 19 and Mark 10 is on the wrongness of divorce, 1 Cor 6:16 cites Gen 2:24 in a metaphorical argument relating to idolatry. Here it is stated that if one joins with a prostitute one becomes one body with the prostitute, or likewise one body with Christ if one joins with him. The emphasis in First Corinthians on joining with Christ instead of the prostitutes is echoed in Exeg. Soul, and the concern with idolatry may also be of some importance in Exeg. Soul as well. As for Eph 5:31, it quotes Gen 2:24 within a different metaphorical argument relating to the joining of Christ and the church. While Eph 5’s collective focus seems to be rather different than Exeg. Soul’s focus on the individual soul, the insistence in Eph 5 on the wife’s submission to her husband blends perfectly with our Nag Hammadi tractate.

Finally, in view of the already established intertextual connections with First Corinthians, one might well in this context recall the statement in 1 Cor 7:2 that to avoid πορνεία every woman should have a husband, and 1 Cor 11:11 stating that “there is no woman without man, nor man without woman in the Lord” (ἡμεῖς άξιοροώτ οὐκ ξοοτ πορεψτ εν Κυρίῳ εν τημπλαικε).155

3.2.3. Conception, Birth, and Rebirth

Another major group of metaphorical blends that are closely related to the marriage ICM consists of blends with inputs from the domain of

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153 Exeg. Soul 133.3.
155 οὔτε γυνὴ χωρὶς ἀνήρ οὔτε ἀνήρ χωρὶς γυναικὸς ἐν κυρίῳ.
procreation. When the soul is united in communion with the Saviour, she receives from him “the seed” (πεσπέρνα) which makes her bear good children:

\[ \text{And when she had communion with him she receive[d] the seed from him} \]

that is the life-giving spirit, \(^{156}\) so that she gave birth to good children from it and nourished them. For this is the great perfect marvel of birth, as it is by the will of the Father that this marriage is fulfilled. \(^{156}\)

(Exeg. Soul 133.34–134.6)

Only with the Saviour can the soul produce good children. As long as she prostitutes herself and “has communion” (κοινωνεῖν) with others, her offspring are of a decidedly less than perfect nature:

\[ \text{offspring generated by the soul from the “seed” provided by the Saviour are thus effectively contrasted with offspring resulting from her encounters with “the adulterers” (μοιχώς).} \] \(^{157}\) Moreover, Exeg. Soul stresses that the Father sent her a husband from heaven “since she is a woman unable to engender children on her own” (επει οὐχ ἤττως πρὸς εὐαγγελίαν ἔδωκεν αὐτῇ τὸν ἀνθρώπον). \(^{158}\) The effectiveness of the imagery of Christ implanting “seed” in the soul at this point, and the subsequent imagery of childbirth, are both facilitated by the references to the anatomical detail of the womb earlier on in the text. \(^{159}\)

It is significant that the result of the soul’s communion with Christ is described in terms of conception and birth. The imagery of birth is here linked to the implanting of the seed by the Saviour and is described as “the great, perfect marvel of birth” (πίος ἠτέλειον ἡσυχία ἔκπαι). \(^{160}\) The latter comment seems slightly out of place in its immediate narrative.

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\(^{156}\) Cf. John 6:63; 1 Cor 15:45.


\(^{158}\) See Exeg. Soul 132.6–8.


\(^{160}\) Exeg. Soul 134.4–5.
context, however, prompting us to consider reading it as an allusion to John 3, with its discussion of rebirth through water and spirit. Especially John 3:7, “Do not marvel that I said to you, ‘You must be born again’” (μὴ θαυμάσας ὅτι εἶπον σοι δὲ ὑμᾶς γεννηθήναι οὖν θαυμάζεις), with its combination of the themes of marvelling and rebirth, is easily evoked and creates a productive blend with this passage in Exeg. Soul.

When blending John 3 with the passage in Exeg. Soul, the process of salvation that Exeg. Soul refers to as “the great perfect marvel of birth” (ἡ ἀρχαία ἐν οὐρανοῖς ἔρημος) is in the resulting blend mapped onto the rebirth through water and spirit mentioned by Jesus in John 3.

Exeg. Soul also deals with the question of rebirth more directly. Following a quotation of Ps 102:1–5 LXX, which concerns the renewal of the soul and its subsequent ascent, ending with the phrase “Your youth will be renewed like that of an eagle” (τὸν ἄγγελον ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀναψωματίζεται), Exeg. Soul comments:

εἰ ἐφυγήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν ἀπὸ ὑμᾶς, ἀναψωματίζεται, ἐκ νεότητος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν οὐρανόν μικρὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ νεότητος ἐκ νεότητος ὑπάρχει ὑπάρχει ὑπάρχει. ἐὰν ἑτέρῳ μὴ ἐκ νεότητος ὑπάρχῃ, ὑπάρχει ἐκ νεότητος, ἄμεσα ἕως ἐκ νεότητος ὑπάρχει ἐκ νεότητος. ὅταν ἑτερος ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθῃ κήρυξεν ἅμα ἐκ νεότητος, ὑπάρχει ἐκ νεότητος. ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος, ἐκ νεότητος Ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότητος. ἐκ νεότητος ἔρθη ἐκ νεότηtau ψυχή ἀναψωματίζεται.

So, when she becomes renewed she will ascend, praising the Father and her brother, this one by whom she was saved. Thus the soul will be saved through the rebirth. But this comes not from ascetic words nor from skills nor from written teaching, but the of [. . .]. For this thing is heavenly.

161 Sevrin, however, prefers to interpret this phrase as a reference to the (“Gnostic”) Pleromatic realities (Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 107), rather than reading it intertextually with Scripture.

162 μὴ διαμηνύσῃς ὅτι εἴπον σοι δὲ ὑμᾶς γεννηθήναι άνωθεν.

163 The intertextual connection between Exeg. Soul and John 3 is further strengthened by the fact that Jesus is referred to as the “bridegroom” (νυμφιός) at John 3:29.


165 The υ in υ ὑπάρχει is barely visible in the facsimile, but has been read with ultraviolet light (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 160).

166 Possible reconstructions include ὑπὸ[ὁνοτε]τε, ὑπὸ[ὁνοτε τε]τε, ὑπὸ[ἐκακυ τε]τε, ὑπὸ[ἰδω. τε], ὑπὸ[ὁλος τε]. For the various suggested reconstructions, see appendix A.

167 It seems probable that the first word of this lacuna should be restored ἡ ὑποτε, but the rest of the lacuna is highly uncertain. For the various suggested reconstructions, see appendix A. Sevrin, partly following Krause, reconstructs the passage as follows: ταχρ[ε]τ[ε]τε ἡ ὑποτε [ἐκακυ] τε ἀλλὰ ταχρεβ ἡ ὑποτε[γνωστικ] τε[τε] (Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 76), acknowledging that while the first part of the reconstruction (“the grace of [the father]”) is probable, the rest is guesswork (Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 110).

This intriguing passage emphasises that salvation entails rebirth. The nature of this rebirth, however, is not clear. For a start, the phrase “the soul will be saved through the rebirth” (ⲧⲬⲱⲭⲏ ⲉⲥⲛⲁⲟⲩϫⲡⲡⲟ ⲉⲕⲉⲥⲟⲡ), is ambiguous, especially in light of the intertexts it evokes.

We have already seen that the soul is described, at the beginning of page 134, as giving birth to good children from the seed received in her communion with the Saviour. Now we are told near the bottom of the same page in the manuscript that salvation will be attained by means of rebirth. The use of the phrase ⲉⲕⲉⲥⲟⲡ (“through the rebirth”) is significant, since ⲉⲥⲛⲁ ⲉⲕⲉⲥⲟⲡ can here be understood not only as referring to the soul being reborn, but also to her giving birth again. The exact phrase ⲉⲥⲛⲁ ⲉⲕⲉⲥⲟⲡ (“the rebirth”) is attested only twice in the Sahidic New Testament, namely in Matt 19:28 and Titus 3:5,169 in both instances as a translation of the Greek παλιγγενεσία.170 In Matt 19:28, Jesus is presented as saying that those who follow him in “the rebirth” (ⲉⲥⲛⲁ ⲉⲕⲉⲥⲟⲡ) will be able to sit alongside him in heaven and will receive eternal life. The phrase “when she becomes renewed she will ascend” (Exeg. Soul 134:25–26) thus evokes both the preceding quotation of Ps 102:5 LXX, “Your youth will be renewed like that of an eagle,” and Jesus’ answer to the disciples in Matt 19:28. The soul who has been renewed through the rebirth is in this way identified with the eagle in the quoted Psalm, and in the blend the eagle/soul will ascend to heaven together with Christ.

But there are also other, even more relevant intertexts. In Titus 3:1–11, which has been described as an exhortation to training in Christian virtue,171 we find a very interesting passage that dovetails nicely with the concerns of Exeg. Soul:


170 See Wilmet, Concordance, 3:1638–1639.
For we too were at that time ignorant, disobedient, being in error, being slaves to the different desires and pleasures, walking in depravity and jealousy, being hated, hating one another. But when the goodness and the philanthropy of God our Saviour was revealed, not from works of righteousness which we have done ourselves, but according to his mercy, he saved us through the washing of the rebirth and the renewing of the Holy Spirit, which he poured upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour (Titus 3:3–6)

This passage, which contains the only explicit reference to Christian ritual in the Pastoral Epistles, parallels our text in several interesting ways. First, the emphasis here on the point that salvation does not come from works done by the Christians themselves, but from the mercy of God, is similar to Exeg. Soul’s statement that the soul’s salvation is a “gift” (ΔΩΡΕΑ) and a “grace” (ΧΑΡΗ) and will not come from “practised words” (ΝΟΤΑΣ ΝΙΚΑΝΗ), “skills” (ΗΓΓΕΧΗ), or “written teaching” (ΣΒΩ ΝΙΚΑΙ). Moreover, the theme of renewal which is illustrated by Exeg. Soul partly by means of the quotation of Ps 102:1–5 LXX is in this passage in Titus connected directly to the Holy Spirit and baptismal rebirth. An explicit connection between the metaphor of rebirth and the ritual of baptism is made through the phrase “the washing of the rebirth” (ΠΝΟΜΗ ἩΝΙΧΗΝΤΟ ἩΝΙΚΕΩΝ). Baptismal washing is thus attributed with salvific power, and there is a close connection between renewal and the Holy Spirit, the latter presented as being given by Christ. In a reading of Exeg. Soul 134.28–29, the Titus 3 input space thus has the potential to direct attention to the previous passage in Exeg. Soul dealing with the baptismal washing of the soul. The specific passage in Exeg. Soul that calls up the Titus input space suppresses the direct reference to baptism that is present in Titus 3:5, by skipping the word ΠΝΟΜΗ (“the washing”), but at the same time the implicit activation of the Titus 3:5 input space may still direct attention to the baptismal washing of the soul—paradoxically by means of the very part of the Titus intertext that Exeg. Soul here leaves out. This suppression on the part of Exeg. Soul is also significant for the way it opens up for yet another relevant intertext to be brought into the interpretive blend. For there is also another New Testament passage that closely resembles Exeg. Soul’s phrase ἘΣΝΙΔΟΥΧΑΙ ΡΓΙΝΗΧΗΝ ἩΝΙΚΕΩΝ, “she will be saved through the rebirth (or: birth again),” namely 1 Tim 2:15: ἘΣΝΙΔΟΥΧΑΙ ΔΕ

173 See Exeg. Soul 134.16–25.
Let the woman learn in gentleness in all subordination. But I do not permit a woman to teach nor to rule over her husband, but to come to be in gentleness. For it was Adam who was formed first and afterwards Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, when she was deceived she came to be in sin. But she will be saved through childbirth, if they remain in faith and love and purity and wisdom. (1 Tim 2:11–15)

As we can see, there are several themes here that parallel those of Exeg. Soul. The issues of the salvation of woman, the subordination of woman to man, the relationship between Adam and Eve, Eve’s culpability, and the connection between salvation and birth are found in both texts. Blended with the account in Exeg. Soul, the references to woman in this passage in First Timothy are readily mapped onto the soul. It would thus be among the inferences created by this blend that the soul should submit to her husband and that she will be saved by giving birth. In this light we may interpret Exeg. Soul’s statement that the soul will be saved though ἐλευθέρω ἔκειται to mean that the soul will be saved by giving birth again, referring to the birth of good children from the seed of the Saviour.¹⁷⁴

In the greater intertextual blend, then, which also includes the Titus passage just discussed, we see the possibility of a simultaneous reference to the soul’s rebirth and her giving birth again, through a parallel activation of input spaces in a multiple-scope blend. This dual reference seems also to be supported more directly by Exeg. Soul, when it states in another passage that,

{oμέ νε β αρέτιιξεν χνος οὐλατᾷ ϊκεσαν ὁν ἱτεμεν ἑωρᾷ}

it is necessary for the soul to give birth to herself and to become once again as she was before. (Exeg. Soul 134.6–8)

This statement of the soul’s need to give birth to herself thus undergirds the ambiguity created through the blending of the Titus and First Timothy intertexts, namely that the soul must both give birth again and become reborn. The fact that this process is also subsequently described as an ascent to heaven,\textsuperscript{175} again tightens the intertextual links to the Ps 102 LXX and Matt 19:28 intertexts.

In summary, we find that the way in which rebirth and ascent are mentioned in \textit{Exeg. Soul} \textsuperscript{134.25–34} serves to call up intertextual input spaces from Titus, First Timothy, Matthew, and the Psalms, leading to a rich polysemic integration network of intertextual mental spaces, some of which have already been primed by previous references, and some, most notably those from Titus and First Timothy, that are called up for the first time—and in parallel (see fig. 14).

But let us now return to the passage under scrutiny to consider the statement that the soul will not be saved though ἰσχύσε ψυχής (“practised words”), ἵπτος (“skills”), or σπυρὶς (“written teaching”). What specifically do these terms refer to? Frederik Wisse speculates that they “perhaps mean that salvation does not come through ascetic practices, (cultic) acts or (the belief in) written doctrines,”\textsuperscript{176} but, as Wisse rightly notes, “the sentence does not seem to say this.”\textsuperscript{177} So what does it say? In contrast to these three terms, \textit{Exeg. Soul} specifies that salvation is to be regarded as a grace (χάρις) and a gift (δωρεά).\textsuperscript{178} The gist of the passage thus seems to be the message that the soul cannot save herself, but needs help,\textsuperscript{179} a point that is also brought home through the description of the soul being unable to give birth on her own, without the seed that is provided by Christ. This does not necessarily mean, however, that ἰσχύσε ψυχής, ἵπτος, or σπυρὶς work counter to salvation, nor indeed that they are unimportant.\textsuperscript{180} It may simply mean that one must acknowledge that salvation is unattainable without the help of God, the Father. Salvation is thus first and foremost a gift and a grace from him and not something for which one can purely depend on one’s own actions, whatever they may be.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Exeg. Soul} \textsuperscript{134.13–15}.
\textsuperscript{176} Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.
\textsuperscript{177} Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.
\textsuperscript{178} Cf. Eph \textsuperscript{2:8–9}.
\textsuperscript{179} Cf. Sevrin, \textit{L’Exégèse de l’âme}, 110.
\textsuperscript{180} Cf. the discussion below.
Another interesting feature of this part of the *Exeg. Soul* passage is its intertextual connections, for “le passage est tissé de réminiscences néotestamentaires,” as Scopello puts it. We have already seen how Titus 3:5, with its statement that one is saved “not from works of righteousness which we have done ourselves, but according to his mercy,” blends well with *Exeg. Soul*, but there is also a passage from Ephesians that is brought to mind in this context:

And as for you, you are dead in your transgressions and your sins in which you walked at that time according to the ruler of this world, according to the power of the air, of the spirit, which works in the children of unbelief. And we have also walked in these at that time in the lusts of our flesh, doing the wishes of the flesh and its lusts and our thoughts, and we are by nature the children of anger, like the rest of men. But God, being rich in mercy because of his great love with which he has loved us, and we being dead in our transgressions, he made us alive in Christ. For you are safe in grace. And he raised us up with him and he seated us with him in heaven in Christ Jesus, so that he might reveal in the coming times the great richness of his grace in kindness upon us in Christ Jesus. For it was through his grace through faith that you were made alive, and this also is not from yourselves. It is the gift of God. It is not from works, that no one should pride himself. (Eph 2:1–9)

We see that this passage is already likely to be primed through the parallels to *Exeg. Soul*’s descriptions of the soul’s sinful life in the flesh, but we also see that there are several points of contact between the *Exeg. Soul* passage under discussion this part of Ephesians, namely the ascent and enthronement, and God’s saving actions, which are described as a gift and a grace.

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182 Cf. also Titus 3:7.
to become yet another input space that may be added to the intertextual integration network we have discussed here. The same can moreover be said with regard to further parts of Eph 2 that speak of the former separation from God and Christ in the world and in the flesh, and of “he who made the two one” (πενταψηχαν μοι).

3.3. Concluding Analysis: The Feminisation of the Soul

In Exeg. Soul, the soul is metaphorically a woman, and, as we have seen, this metaphor is expanded using related metaphors like the soul is a prostitute, the soul is a bride, and the soul is a wife. We encounter intertextual triggers at various points throughout the narrative that enable the activation of different external texts as input spaces for various blends that are employed in the narrative of the soul’s fall and redemption. Different intertexts, which highlight different aspects of the various metaphorical representations of the soul, are thus activated. Some of these intertexts, like for instance Hosea and First Corinthians, are activated by way of explicit citations, while others are activated implicitly through allusions. When they are primed and activated as input spaces, or sources for input spaces, these intertexts contribute to establishing, as well as highlighting, different aspects of what may be regarded as the main conceptual metaphor in Exeg. Soul, namely the soul is a woman. Hosea, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, for instance, flesh out the the soul is a prostitute metaphor, while inputs from, e.g., Ephesians, Matthew, and the Song of Songs, help set up metaphorical blends around the conceptual metaphor the soul is a bride. Interestingly, while Exeg. Soul uses lengthy quotations from Jeremiah, Hosea, and Ezekiel in its descriptions of the soul’s former life of prostitution, fornication, and adultery, the focus shifts noticeably to New Testament allusions with regard to the soul’s salvation through marriage.

We have seen that the conceptual metaphor the soul is a woman is employed throughout the narrative, and that this is a single-scope network that is conducive to metaphorical interpretation. But at the same time as the soul is metaphorically a woman, we may also to some extent understand it as a part for whole metonymy with the soul referring to the whole person. Moreover, the womb of the soul also has an important

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183 Eph 2:12.
184 Eph 2:14.
185 See Exeg. Soul 129.8–22 (Jeremiah); 129.23–130.11 (Hosea); 130.11–20 (Ezekiel).
metonymic function in this tractate. First of all, the womb may in some respects, especially in connection with the turning of the womb from the outside to the inside, be seen to stand metonymically for the whole metaphorical woman, and thus, inter alia, for the entire soul, in which case the turning of the womb can also be understood metonymically to refer to the conversion of the whole person (for these metaphorical and metonymical relations, see fig. 15).

Now, in *Exeg. Soul* the soul is metaphorically a woman. But does this mean that the tractate is only concerned with the souls of women? 186 This does not seem to be the case. The overall rhetoric of the tractate seems rather to imply that the soul is metaphorically female regardless of the gender of the body it inhabits. 187 In this conceptual **the soul for the person** metonymy, however, the person is not just anybody, but would represent, again metonymically, by a **member of category for category** metonymy, the prototypical Christian convert, and we may thus speak of the metonymy **the soul for the Christian**. The soul may therefore be regarded at various points in the tractate as both a metaphor and a metonymy for the Christian (see fig. 16).

186 By interpreting the imagery of the soul as a woman literally rather than metaphorically, Scopello has used *Exeg. Soul* as evidence for “the historical and social reality of women in the gnostic communities” (Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines,” 87–90). Scopello even thinks the author of *Exeg. Soul* was probably a woman, since in Scopello’s view “the sexual accounts of a text such as the *Exegesis on the Soul* are more probably ascribed to a woman than to a man” (ibid., 90). Birger Pearson shares the view that “a female author could easily be posited” (Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 642 n. 43). Julia Iwersen argues that *Exeg. Soul* is likely the product of a female proselyte (see Julia Iwersen, “Metanoia und Brautgemach: Der frühgnostische Seelenmythus als Konversionsmythus,” in *Religionswissenschaft in Konsequenz: Beiträge im Anschluß an Impulse von Kurt Rudolph* [ed. Rainer Flasche, et al.; Marburger Religionsgeschichtliche Beiträge 1; Münster: Lit, 2000], esp. 78). For the view that *Exeg. Soul* does not address the question of real women, see Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 174. See also the comments of Douglas M. Parrott, “Response to ‘Jewish and Greek Heroines in the Nag Hammadi Library’ by Madeleine Scopello,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 91–95; Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 44; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 6.

3.3.1. *The Soul and Christ*

Since the husband in this case is Christ and the woman in question is the soul, more specifically, considering the metonymy mentioned above, the soul of the Christian initiate, the language of cleansing and marriage becomes easily understandable. The individual Christian soul has to become as a virgin bride in relation to Christ in order to submit to him as a proper Christian in a metaphorical marriage which also constitutes a return to the primordial state of male-female union in paradise before the fall. In summary, the ideal marriage of the soul with Christ described in *Exeg. Soul* has the precondition that the female part of the union acts like an ideal female, which *inter alia* involves an abandonment of any resemblance of maleness on her part, a maleness which is described vividly in terms of the soul actively seeking different lovers and having her womb on the outside like male genitalia. She needs to become a proper, pure, female virgin, with her womb on the inside like it should be, and subsequently submit herself to Christ the Saviour, her true husband and master. In this union, the male and female parts are obviously not equal. The soul of the individual Christian, constituting the female part of the unity, is clearly supposed to be subordinated to Christ, the male part, and we may speak of a relation of hierarchical complementarity.

Rose Horman Arthur has claimed that *Exeg. Soul* “treats most of the feminine elements pejoratively.” But is this really the case? One might for instance observe that in this text it is wrong for the soul to have both male and female characteristics at the same time, as is the case in her fallen state, and becoming completely male is not an option. What is proper for the soul is to be fully female. The crucial point, however, is that in her femaleness she needs a man in order to bring about a return to the original male-female state, and not just any man, but Christ her true bridegroom and perfect husband.

The effectiveness of this symbolism stems from the tractate’s opening premise that the soul is female, combined with a cultural understanding of the role of the wife in relation to her husband in marriage that is also strengthened by scriptural intertexts, as we have seen above. Therefore,

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when the soul is turned into a proper woman, it is quite “natural” for her to receive her proper husband and submit herself to his rule.\textsuperscript{190} This does not mean that \textit{Exeg. Soul} disparages feminine elements or characteristics. On the contrary, femininity is what the readers are to strive for, albeit a femininity of the soul in relation to Christ. For it is the relational aspects between the Christian and Christ that are highlighted by the metaphorical femininity and marriage, as common and basic ICMs are used to conceptualise the abstract qualities and demands of life as a Christian.

By framing its discourse on Christian life with an allegorical narrative of the fall and redemption of the soul portrayed as a woman, \textit{Exeg. Soul} creates ample opportunity for the utilisation of a whole range of rich and interlinking metaphors together with corresponding scriptural and other literary intertexts. \textit{Exeg. Soul} draws on and expands upon the idea that the soul is female and blends this with the traditional myth of the fall and return of the soul,\textsuperscript{191} and various authoritative sources containing literary and historical female figures and stereotypes. In this way the tractate draws upon aspects of female anatomy and literary descriptions and discussions of female transgression and prostitution, as well as female roles in marriage and procreation, for its conceptual and intertextual blends.

4. \textit{Sitz im Leben}

What implications may be drawn with regard to the \textit{Sitz im Leben} of the tractate? Who may have produced and used it, when, and for what purpose(s)? What way of life is advocated, and what can be made of its sacramental references?

\textsuperscript{190} Cf. Williams, “Variety,” 15.
4.1. Literary Structure and Function

It seems that as Samuel Rubenson has strikingly put it with regard to the rhetoric of patristic homilies and monastic exhortations, so it is with *Exeg. Soul*: “What is really being said is not explicitly spelled out but visible in the gaps between the words, stories or examples.”\(^{192}\) As we have seen in the analysis above, in a reading of *Exeg. Soul* meaning is produced in the interrelations between mental input spaces, that may be regarded as both conceptual and intertextual. A rhetoric that lets the readers or audience reach the most important insights on their own, in light of shared cognitive models and texts which are already established as authoritative, serves at least two important purposes. Firstly, it is a highly effective pedagogical device, since insights that are gained though one’s own reasoning are more easily remembered and become more easily entrenched than those that are simply postulated and not understood on a deeper level. Secondly, it may serve an equally important communal function, since such insights are gained to a significant extent on the basis of shared knowledge and cognitive models. Moreover, if parts of this shared knowledge, be it knowledge of intertexts, practice, or doctrine, are of an esoteric nature, known only to a select group of people, this communal function is strengthened.

With regard to the intertexts evoked by *Exeg. Soul* it is important to note that not only is *Exeg. Soul* itself illuminated by its intertexts, but, crucially, these intertexts are themselves given additional meaning and significance by being evoked in blends that are cued in a reading of *Exeg. Soul*. Indeed, one might say that the main function of many of *Exeg. Soul’s* intertextual blends lies in the backwards projections to their respective input spaces. Or, to put it differently, the blends that are cued by *Exeg. Soul* invite its readers to identify the various intertexts and re-read and reinterpret these texts in light of the emergent meanings arising from the blends, which may again result in additional structure and elements being projected to the blends in a new reading of *Exeg. Soul*, thus causing further reinterpretations of them and their literary contexts. This, then, is a potentially infinite process of interpretation and reinterpretation of interlinked texts.

The authorial blends as they appear through their linguistic expressions on the pages of *Exeg. Soul* may be regarded as manifestations of frozen stages in their construction by a hypothetical author. We may for example regard fig. 17 as a representation of part of a hypothetical authorial blend resulting in the production of *Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34. However, these linguistic manifestations must be seen merely as cues to the potentially infinite process of further construction and running of conceptual and intertextual integration networks on the part of the reader, an example of which is represented by fig. 10, discussed above. It is evident, however, that the meaning-production constituted by this process is inherently unstable. Nothing prevents us, as readers, from running the blends differently than the author, or from constructing different integration networks and blends than the ones constructed in the mind of the author as he wrote the text. Indeed, considering the inherent complexities of these processes, a complete correspondence between the two is extremely unlikely.

Still, we might venture some qualified guesses concerning possible ideal readers of our text. We can for instance safely say that an ideal reader of *Exeg. Soul* would be a Christian reader in antiquity with a good knowledge of Scripture, as is clearly implied by the findings of the present analysis. It is apparent that an internalised knowledge of the scriptural intertexts as interdependent authoritative texts is an essential requirement for a satisfactory understanding of *Exeg. Soul* along the lines of this analysis. The same could moreover be said with regard to Christian ritual practice—at least basic knowledge is implied. Nevertheless, such an ideal understanding of the tractate through intimate knowledge of the required intertexts does not seem necessary in order to grasp some of the basic messages of *Exeg. Soul* regarding, for instance, the importance of repentance, conversion, and faithfulness to Christ. On such grounds we may further speculate that, regardless of the nature of the hypothetical authorial intentions behind it, *Exeg. Soul* may have been used for different purposes among different audiences, perhaps even at different stages of initiation or instruction, or at different stages in the monastic life.

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193 It should be noted, however, that a detailed knowledge of the Old Testament texts that are extensively quoted is by no means as necessary as a good knowledge of the evoked New Testament texts (cf. Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 44).

194 Cf. the comments regarding the function of allusions in some Nag Hammadi tractates in Perkins, “Gnosticism and the Christian Bible,” 365.
4.2. Literal or Metaphorical Rituals?

We can therefore say that *Exeg. Soul* may give rise to different interpretive blends as different readers activate different aspects of the intertextual input spaces, use different contextual frames, and run the blends to different degrees, perhaps even recruiting various additional input spaces in the process. For example, although the reference to baptism is not made explicit in *Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34, it is present in the Titus 3:5 input space and may easily be brought to mind by the readers or hearers of the passage when they “run the blend,” assuming of course that they know and recognise Titus 3:5. When 1 Tim 2:11–15 is also taken into account we may interpret *Exeg. Soul* to refer to the soul’s necessary baptismal rebirth, and that this again leads to her renewed ability to give birth—both to good children and herself. These processes may again be given several metaphorical interpretations, however. For how are we to interpret the imagery of the soul giving birth again or her being reborn? And how are we to interpret the tractate’s references to ritual?

At several points throughout the tractate *Exeg. Soul* refers to ritual practice, both overtly and rather more allusively. As Majella Franzmann has pointed out, however, it is often difficult to know whether ritual terminology in the Nag Hammadi material is used metaphorically or whether it refers directly to actual ritual practice. With regard to the passage discussed above, where the purification of the soul is described in terms of the washing of garments, the concluding statement that “this is her baptism” (ⲡⲁⲉⲓ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲉⲥⲃⲧⲓⲥⲙⲁ), can be interpreted to indicate either that the description pertains to what happens to the soul of an initiate in the ritual of baptism, or that the baptism of the soul is a metaphor for something else, like for instance mental or spiritual processes. We know from other early Christian sources that, at least

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195 Cf. Sevrin, who equates the soul’s birth of good children with her giving birth to herself, seeing these as the same thing (see Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 107).


197 *Exeg. Soul* 132.2.


for some Christians, the ritual of baptism was thought to have a direct influence on the soul. This is attested by among others Tertullian, who states that “the flesh is washed so that the soul may be made spotless,” and also that “we are washed with water because the defilement of sin is like dirt.” Similarly, Cyril of Jerusalem claims that while “the water is poured externally, the Spirit also totally baptizes the soul from within.”

Exeg. Soul seems to be open to an interpretation along these lines, i.e., that the text is describing real effects that are brought to bear upon the soul through ritual actions.

In the narrative, baptism is effectively presented as an important turning point in the story of the soul, highlighting repentance, purification, and conversion. Whether this baptism of the soul is itself to be understood metaphorically, or whether it, through a metonymic substitution with the soul representing the whole individual, is to be understood as a direct reference to the physical baptism of the Christian convert is in the final analysis a question of interpretation. It is possible to read the text either way. This means that depending on the postulated hypothetical context, and on the reader, we may interpret the various references to baptism in Exeg. Soul strictly literally, or as either the framing or focus inputs in conceptual integration networks. A combination of these alternatives is also possible. It is in any case quite apparent that Exeg. Soul refers to rituals, like baptism, in some way, regardless of whether they are

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201 Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, 8.3; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 339.

202 Ut quoniam vice sordium delictis inquinamur aquis abluamur (Tertullian, De baptismo, 4; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 338; Latin text quoted from ibid., 338 n. 2).

203 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἔκωσεν περιζέται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν ἐνδοθεν ψυχὴν βαπτίζει ἀπαραλείπτως. (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses illuminandorum, 17:14; W.C. Reischl and J. Rupp, Cyrilli Hierosolymorum archiepiscopi opera quae supersunt omnia [2 vols.; Munich: Lentner, 1848/1860]; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 340). Such examples could easily be multiplied, but these should be sufficient to show the existence of such ideas.

204 It should be noted that I follow Patrick Colm Hogan and others in rejecting the existence of literal or metaphorical utterances per se, acknowledging only literal and metaphorical interpretations (see Hogan, Cognitive Science, 91, and the discussion in chapter 2).
to be understood metaphorically or not.\footnote{I therefore disagree with Wisse who thinks that the account of the soul’s baptism is just an allegory which has nothing to do with actual baptism (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79), and Segelberg who similarly thinks that the purification and baptism of the soul is “a purely mental-spiritual process” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 60). The baptism of the soul may of course be an allegory, but I do not agree that it can be just an allegory, one that does not refer in any way to actual ritual practice.} And from these references we may gain some insight into the structure and content of the baptism ICM that is presupposed, and thus into the ritual practice and understanding underlying this document.

So, how is baptism portrayed in \textit{Exeg. Soul}? We have seen that there are two main themes that are in focus. Baptism is interpreted in terms of washing, and in terms of begetting and birth, both of which carry important connotations of renewal that are highlighted by the tractate. In addition, directly following \textit{Exeg. Soul}’s description of the soul giving birth to herself, we are presented with the following:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ⲁⲥϫⲓⲡⲑⲉⲓⲟⲛ ̄ⲛⲧ ̄ⲙⲡⲉⲓⲱⲧ ⲁⲧⲣⲉⲥ ̄ⲣⲃ ̄ⲣⲣⲉ ϫⲉⲕⲁⲁⲥ ⲟⲛ ⲉⲩⲛⲁϫⲣⲉ ⲉⲡⲙⲁ ⲉⲛⲉⲥ ̄ⲙⲙⲁⲩ ⲫⲛϣⲟⲣⲡ ⲧⲉⲓ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲁⲛⲁⲥⲧⲁⲥⲓⲥ ⲉⲧϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩ̄ⲛⲛⲉⲧⲙⲟⲟⲩⲧ ⲡⲉⲓ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲥⲱⲧⲉ ̄ⲛⲧⲁⲓⲭⲙⲁⲗⲱⲥⲓⲁ ⲧⲉⲓ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲁⲛⲁⲃⲁⲥⲓⲥ ̄ⲛⲃⲱⲕ ⲉϩⲣⲁ ⎕ ⲉⲧⲡⲉ ⲧⲉⲓ ⲧⲉ ⲑⲟⲇⲟⲥ ̄ⲛⲃⲱⲕ ⲉϩⲣⲁ \textit{¨} ⲉ ⲡ ⲓ ⲱ ⲧ}
\end{quote}

She received the divinity from the Father for her to be renewed, so that she may also be taken to the place were she was from the beginning. This is the resurrection from the dead. This is the redemption from captivity. This is the ascent up to heaven. This is the way to go up to the Father. \textit{(Exeg. Soul 134.9–15)}

The renewal of the soul and the reception of the divinity from the Father are here directly connected with ascent and resurrection. The reception of “the divinity” (ποσειων) from the Father should probably be seen in connection with the reception of “the seed” (πεσειρια) referred to a few lines previously.\footnote{Exeg. Soul 134.1.} However, it is impossible to know from this whether this passage should be understood as a direct reference to the effects of baptism, anointing, or other ritual actions, or whether it simply refers in a more general sense to the salvation brought about by the renewal of the soul with the Father’s help. All we can say is that there is an unverifiable possibility that the references to resurrection, ransom, and ascent may be inspired by an understanding of baptism in those terms, even though \textit{Exeg. Soul} seems to understand baptism primarily in terms of the conceptual domains of renewal and procreation.
Exeg. Soul does not give us any details of the actual ritual enactment of the baptism it refers to, except by way of its metaphorical framing input, from which it seems we may at least surmise that it probably involved full immersion, but few further details are recoverable, although one might perceive an allusion to an anointing in Exeg. Soul’s description of the soul preparing for her marriage with the Saviour:

\[\text{ cumshot ρήμα ονέλετε αςογι γνήσιο όνομα τρούν γνήσι εκσάωτ εβολ γνήσι υπεροχελετε υψή}\]

She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with perfume, and sat within it waiting for the true bridegroom. (Exeg. Soul 132.13–15)

The reference to σήνογιας, which denotes perfume or a pleasant smell in general, may refer to the use of perfumed oil in a ritual anointing, but it may also simply be used as a metaphor for virtue without any sacramental connotations.\(^\text{208}\) If the passage is taken to refer to ritual actions it could allude to a ritual sequence of baptism (the cleansing) followed by an anointing (the perfume) and a Eucharist (the expected union with the bridegroom). The references to the “water” (μούγ), “oil” (νηψ/νηγ), “clothing” (σωος), “garments” (οτην), “bread” (οεικ), and “wine” (νηπ) which the soul receives from the adulterers\(^\text{209}\) may likewise be regarded as implicit contrasts to the water, oil, clothing, bread, and wine she receives from the Saviour, and which may well be interpreted as allusions to the Christian sacraments.

With regard to the μα ονέλετε/γενιφων, Krause sees a reference to a special sacrament in its own right, different from Christian baptismal rites. According to him, this ritual, which he links to Gos. Phil. and “Valentinianism,” is where the salvation of the soul takes place.\(^\text{210}\) He is not sure whether the “Christian Gnostics” who read the tractate would regard baptism as a sacrament, however, or whether it was “nur eine Waschung als Vorbereitung auf das Sakrament des Brautgemaches.”\(^\text{211}\)

On the basis of Exeg. Soul 132.13, cumshot ρήμα ονέλετε, however, he

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\(^\text{207}\) This possibility has been suggested, but ultimately rejected, by Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52.

\(^\text{208}\) The use of the term σήνογιας in this sense is for instance attested by Shenoute (see Crum 363a).


\(^\text{211}\) Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52 see also ibid., 55.
draws the conclusion that baptism took place in the bridal chamber.\textsuperscript{212} While Krause and others have here seen affinities with a supposed bridal chamber sacrament in “Valentinianism,”\textsuperscript{213} Frederik Wisse, on the contrary, holds that “there is no hint in ExSoul that the bridal chamber has something to do with a sacrament.”\textsuperscript{214}

As we have seen, the translation of both \textit{ⲙⲁ ـⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ} and \textit{ⲛⲩⲙⲱⲛ} as “bridal chamber” may be misleading. Translating only the latter as “bridal chamber,” I argued above that this term may be used in \textit{Exeg. Soul} as a reference to the place where the communion (\textit{κοινωνία}) with Christ takes place. If we here take \textit{ⲛⲩⲙⲱⲛ} to refer metaphorically to the body, the reference to Christ adorning the bridal chamber (\textit{ⲛⲩⲙⲱⲛ})\textsuperscript{215} may possibly be understood as a reference to a post-baptismal dressing in new garments. \textit{ⲙⲁ ـⲛϣⲉⲗⲉⲉⲧ}, on the other hand, may refer to a specific ritual space or process where the wedding with Christ takes place, e.g., a church building/baptistery or simply the Christian rites of initiation as a whole. The idea of the body as the abode of the soul and identified with a “bridal chamber” is consistent with an interpretation of the body as the place where the unification of the soul and Christ takes place. This is especially the case if we interpret this communion in terms of the Christian communicant mingling with the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{216} Although Wisse may have been too quick to rule out the sacramental connotations of this imagery, we may in any case agree with him that “in the allegory of the soul the bridal chamber plays a role in the purification and preparation of the soul to receive her bridegroom,”\textsuperscript{217} and that “It helps to bring out an important aspect of repentance.”\textsuperscript{218}

Ultimately, however, these potential allusions to ritual actions are impossible to verify, and may equally well be given a spiritual, non-sacramental, interpretation, depending on what sacramental and scriptural input spaces one calls upon in the interpretive blending networks that come into play in a reading of \textit{Exeg. Soul}.

\textsuperscript{212} See Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52 (note that Krause erroneously refers to 123.13, meaning 132.13).
\textsuperscript{214} Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79.
\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Exeg. Soul} 132.26–27.
\textsuperscript{216} Cf. \textit{Exeg. Soul} 134–135; Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship.”
\textsuperscript{218} Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 80.
4.3. Implied Lifestyle

What kind of life would follow from the teaching of *Exeg. Soul*? “Only celibacy would be consistent with the teaching of the tractate,” claims Frederik Wisse.219 Once again, however, this depends on our interpretive strategies and presuppositions. The crucial question in an allegorical reading of *Exeg. Soul* is the identification of the target of *Exeg. Soul*’s allegorical source story. In the source story, sexual connotations and procreational imagery are important, but in an interpretation of the tractate these framing inputs must be understood in connection with their respective focus input(s). Although a celibate life would certainly not contradict what we have found in our analysis of *Exeg. Soul*, bodily celibacy is not necessarily assumed by, or even necessarily an issue in, this tractate. The faithfulness of the soul, however, is clearly an issue. *Exeg. Soul* emphatically states the need for the soul to turn her back on worldly things and embrace life with the Saviour. The “prostitution of the soul” should not simply be equated with bodily prostitution, but must be regarded as a single-scope blend that indicates the soul’s passion towards, and attachment to, material and external things as opposed to spiritual ones. This kind of “prostitution” and “fornication” leads the soul away from salvation, represented by the Father and the Saviour, and towards its opposite, which is described using many of the same terms that are also used to describe salvation. The prostitution of the soul is thus in many ways the negative mirror image of salvation, which is depicted as a stable marriage with Christ in the presence of the Father. The soul is not supposed to have dealings with any other man than Christ, but whether a

219 Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 78; cf. Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 171–177. Perkins connects the teaching of *Exeg. Soul* to asceticism. She characterises the teaching about the repentance of the soul in this tractate as “conventionally Christian” (ibid., 177) and also states that it, together with *Auth. Teach*, “seems more at home in third-century disputes about asceticism in the Christian life than in the wide-ranging, mythic syncretism of the second century” (ibid., 174). She even goes so far as to call it an exposition of “Christian ascetic praxis” (ibid., 177). See also Peter Bruns, “Exegesis de anima,” in *Lexicon der antiken christlichen Literatur* (ed. Siegmar Döpp and Wilhelm Geerlings; Freiburg: Herder, 1998), 228. But cf. Richard Valantasis, who does not include *Exeg. Soul* among the thirteen Nag Hammadi treatises he deems to refer to asceticism in his article “Nag Hammadi and Asceticism: Theory and Practice,” in *Ascertica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999* (ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 172–190, where he includes it among those texts which “do not intersect with the ascetical tradition of Late Antiquity in any way at all” (ibid., 188).
celibate bodily life is the only way to achieve such chastity of the soul is not a question that is explicitly answered by *Exeg. Soul*, although it would indeed be an obvious interpretation in certain interpretive communities. We have seen that on the surface level of the narrative, the soul is not supposed to renounce sexuality, but only to reserve it exclusively for her true husband. It is her infidelity in relation to him that is her sin, not sexuality per se. Whether celebacy is the only way of life that is consistent with the theology of *Exeg. Soul* is therefore a question which does not receive a definite answer from a reading of this text, unless we postulate a hypothetical context where such an exegetical strategy is presupposed. The question of what kind of life would be consistent with the tractate's view of the soul thus seems ultimately to be a question of context and of the perspective of the reader and his or her interpretive community.  

4.3.1. Repentance and Prayer

Among the most pervasive features of *Exeg. Soul*, however, is the constant focus on the necessity of repentance, weeping, and prayer. In this regard the tractate refers to the authority of the Saviour himself:

> Πάλιν πεκαὶ ἄξεσθαι ἡς τετελεσμένης φιλανθρωπίας ἢ οὐκ οἴει τάρχι γὰρ ἡπογούσα, περὶ τῆς τελικαίας τῆς τελείως. Εἰς τούτο ἡ προσευχή ἡ πρόερχε, ἐκ τῆς ἱπποτριγίας ἡ πρόερχε, ἐκ τῆς ἱπποτριγίας τῆς τελικαίας. Ἐν τῷ µάρτυρε ἡ μεν ὁ ἱπποτριγίας ἡ πρόερχε, ἐν τῷ µάρτυρε ἡ ἱπποτριγίας τῆς τελικαίας. Εἰς τῷ µάρτυρε ἡ μεν ἡ πρόερχε, ἐκ τῆς ἱπποτριγίας τῆς τελικαίας. Ἐν τῷ µάρτυρε ἡ μεν ἡ πρόερχε, ἐκ τῆς ἱπποτριγίας τῆς τελικαίας.

Again he says: “If one does not hate his own soul he will not be able to follow me.” For the beginning of salvation is repentance. Therefore, “before the arrival of Christ, John came, preach[ing] the baptism of repentance.” And repentance comes about in pain and grief. But the Father is a good philanthropist and he hears the soul who calls up to him and he sends her the saving light.  

(*Exeg. Soul* 135.19–29)

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220 For the role of “interpretive communities” in the interpretation of texts, see Fish, *Is There a Text*, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

221 As mentioned above, Wisse argues, quite convincingly, that repentance is the main theme of *Exeg. Soul* (see Wisse, “On Exegeting”). Kasser agrees that it is the paraenetic sections on repentance that are the main point of the tractate (see Kasser, “L’Ekségésis,” 77).


There are references to the necessity of repentance and prayer all the way through *Exeg. Soul.* In these passages it seems that we may also quite safely understand the descriptions of the life of the soul as metonymical references to proper Christian conduct:

So it is appropriate to pray to God night and day, stretching our hands up to him like those who are sailing in the midst of the sea. They pray to God with all their heart without hypocrisy, for those who pray hypocritically deceive only themselves. (*Exeg. Soul* 136.16–22)

The fact that the tractate chooses to end on this note also highlights the importance of repentance in *Exeg. Soul.* Repentance is the focus of the last three manuscript pages, and the tractate finally ends with the statement that,

If we will truly repent, God will hear us, the patient and abundantly merciful. (*Exeg. Soul* 137.22–25)

Significantly, in this and a couple of related passages, *Exeg. Soul* uses the first person plural, revealing the direct importance of repentance and prayer for the Christian:

It is therefore appropriate to pray to the Father and for us to call up to him with all our soul, not with the external lips, but with the spirit within, the one which came from the deep, sighing and repenting for the life we

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224 See *Exeg. Soul* 128.6–7; 128.28–129.3; 129.20–22; 131.16–19; 133.11–13; 135.4–137.25.
225 According to Wisse, this is a statement of the main point of the tractate (see Wisse, "On Exegeting," 81).
226 Cf. 1 Cor 2:10–13.
have led, confessing the sins, perceiving the empty error we were in and the
empty haste, weeping like we were in the darkness and the wave, mourning
ourselves so that he may have pity on us, hating ourselves as we are now.

(Exeg. Soul 135.4–15)

Repentance, weeping and prayer are advocated, but the kind of prayer
that is prescribed seems to be an inward prayer of the soul, rather than
an external prayer of the lips. Whether this statement is to be under-
stood as an advocacy of silent prayer to the exclusion of external prayer,
or simply as a statement of the absolute necessity that the prayer is sin-
cere, is impossible to say. But the passage clearly underlines the impor-
tant point that emerges from the whole tractate, that it is primarily the
inclinations and actions of the soul that are at issue, and not those of the
body. Moreover, activating the allusions to 1 Cor 2:10–13 and Rom 8:26,
which Wisse regards as “obvious,” also heightens the emphasis on the
importance of the soul’s reception of the spirit in this process of repen-
tance.

4.4. Date and Provenance

The scholarly responses to Exeg. Soul have been quite representative of
scholarly reactions to the Nag Hammadi texts in general. There has been a
marked proclivity for dealing out sweeping judgments regarding both the
perceived theological contents of the tractate and its hypothetical author.
We may only recall Robert McL. Wilson’s rather negative evaluation in
his 1975 article “Old Testament Exegesis in the Gnostic Exegesis on the
Soul,” cited at the beginning of this chapter. Although Wilson’s descrip-
tion of the viewpoints of the “modern scholar” was presented thirty years
ago, and although he conceded that the exegetical method of Exeg. Soul
would indeed make sense from the ancient author’s perspective, his
comments are indicative of the low esteem in which Exeg. Soul and other
texts from the Nag Hammadi library have been held by many of their
modern interpreters. Jean Doresse, for example, who was the first mod-
ern scholar to study the text, stated rather bluntly that Exeg. Soul “is not a
great prophetic revelation but a long treatise by some anonymous doctor,”
upon which, he said, “we must not linger too long.”

Frederik Wisse,

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228 See Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.
who has an altogether more positive view of the importance of the tractate, lamented in 1975 what he saw as the adverse effects of this evaluation on the subsequent study of the text. In Wisse’s view, “the evaluation of ExSoul has not been able to free itself from the dubious stamp put upon the tractate by Jean Doresse.”[231] Wisse himself instead characterised Exeg. Soul as “One of the most interesting Christian writings in the Nag Hammadi collection,”[232] an evaluation with which the present author, who has lingered quite a while upon this treatise, is inclined to agree. Unfortunately the text has still not been freed from the confines of the general categorisation of it that was first made by Doresse half a century ago and subsequently followed by a majority of scholars.

As is the case with most of the Nag Hammadi tractates, the category of “Gnosticism” has been central in the study of Exeg. Soul. In fact, a primary concern of most research on this text has been to place it chronologically and doctrinally on a “Gnostic” trajectory.[233] Although there are exceptions, among them Frederik Wisse, who has placed it among a group of Nag Hammadi tractates which he feels “hardly deserve to be called Gnostic,”[234] most scholars have taken it for granted that Exeg. Soul is a “Gnostic” text. Christopher Tuckett even goes so far as to say that with regard to its use of scriptural quotations, this tractate is “perhaps the closest to what one might have expected a Gnostic text to look like from the reports of the Church Fathers.”[235]

Although there is no consensus with regard to its dating or interpretation, the a priori assumption of the text’s “Gnostic” character has

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233 For the problematic aspects of “Gnosticism” as a category, see the discussion in chapter 1.
235 Tuckett, Nag Hammadi, 51–52.
thoroughly influenced the way in which such questions have been approached. The basis for Martin Krause's proposal for a late date in his 1975 article “Die Sakramente in der ‘Exegese über die Seele,’”236 for instance, was the then commonly held scholarly assumption that “the Gnostics” thought themselves to be saved by nature or “gnosis” alone, and therefore had no need for sacraments. The fact that there are numerous references to ritual in *Exeg. Soul* therefore did not really square with Krause's ideal picture of “Gnosticism,” so to account for this anomaly he drew the conclusion that the presence of such references had to be due to influence from the mystery religions or from Christianity. “Gnosticism” was of course regarded as something altogether different from both of these categories, and especially from the latter.237 In order to allow time for such external influence, Krause consequently assumed that the tractate had to be among the later “Gnostic” texts.238 And, based on the assumption of “Gnostic” borrowing from Christianity, he accordingly characterised the author of *Exeg. Soul* as a “Christian Gnostic.”239 To be sure, Krause indeed emphasised the Christian character of *Exeg. Soul*, and even regarded the text’s Christian features as more prominent than its “Gnostic” ones,240 but he nevertheless concluded that the text depended crucially upon “gnostischen Lehrsätzen.”241

Similar lines of reasoning have, however, also led to quite different conclusions. Indeed, it may be observed that it is largely the individual scholar’s view of “Gnosticism” that has determined whether the text has been seen as an example of “Gnosticism” influenced by Christianity,242

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236 Krause, “Die Sakramente.”
237 Certainly, in much of what has been written about *Exeg. Soul*, and indeed on the subject of the Nag Hammadi library in general, Christianity, Judaism, and Paganism have been regarded as separate and well-defined entities. As for “Gnosticism,” while having been assumed to be fundamentally different from either, it has also been regarded as being fundamentally characterised by pervasive and syncretistic borrowing from any or all of them (cf., e.g., Scopello, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 191–192).
238 Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 47. Krause is not alone in arguing for a late date on such grounds. On a similar note, Birger Pearson sees the text’s “eclecticism” as indicating that the text is “clearly a ‘late’ product of Christian Gnosticism” (Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 643).
or vice versa. There have also been those who have seen in the treatise evidence not of a late form of “Gnosticism,” but rather of an early one. Some have linked it with the supposed teachings of Simon Magus, while others have based their early dating on the conclusion that the myth of the soul in this tractate is an early version of the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia. On such grounds, Sevrin, for example, places Exeg. Soul in Alexandria and dates it between 120 (due to the use of the gospel of John) and 135 (when Valentinus left Alexandria for Rome). Sevrin also uses the lack of polemics in Exeg. Soul to argue for an early date, and suggests that it was written prior to the Christian heresiological reactions. Scopello also connects Exeg. Soul with the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia and places the tractate in Alexandria, but prefers a date around the end of the second and beginning of the third century. A notable exception, however, is constituted by Kulawik, who does not regard Exeg. Soul as a “Gnostic” text, but instead places it in third century Alexandria on the basis of its similarity with Alexandrian theology as represented by Clement and Origen.

The perception that Exeg. Soul is in some way related to “Gnosticism” has also influenced assessments of the theological contents of the tractate in several ways. Scopello, for example, has interpreted Exeg. Soul as a


See Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 100.

See Kulawik, Die Erzählung, esp. 6.
“gnostic novel,” an exoteric text aimed at explaining gnostic doctrine in an attractive manner to a large audience, with the soul representing the “gnostic heroine,” while William C. Robinson, by taking pessimism as a defining trait of “Gnosticism,” has concluded that “Exeg. Soul is of interest as an example in Hellenistic Christianity of a Platonizing doctrine of the soul whose dualism was pessimistic enough to turn it gnostic.” His conclusion that the text primarily aims to warn its readers against sexuality, also squares well with traditional theories of “Gnosticism” as a religion characterised by ethical extremism, whose adherents are often supposed to have been either libertines or ascetics.

When it comes to placing the tractate more specifically within the history of “Gnosticism,” Robinson thinks that Exeg. Soul, which he characterises as an “exhortation to otherworldliness,” “as a whole ... shows marked affinities with the Naasene views,” and locates the origins of what he regards as “the narrative source” of the text “among Pythagoras’ disciples,” claiming that this source did not contain anything “distinctively Christian, Jewish, or ... Gnostic.” The Naassene connection has also been emphasised by other scholars. Pearson, for instance, who classifies Exeg. Soul among the “doctrinal treatises” of the Nag Hammadi Library, finds its affinities with “the Naassene Gnostic system” to be “noteworthy,” but that it may also have been influenced by “Gnosticism” of the “Valentinian” type. As for Exeg. Soul’s possible links to “Valentinianism,” these are usually seen in the tractate’s references to a

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250 See Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines,” 72; Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 96, 100. Scopello claims that Exeg. Soul “n’est ni un discours de révélation ni un λόγος réservé à une élite restreinte” (Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 96); cf. also Kasser, “La gnose,” 27.
251 Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 689; Robinson paraphrases Sevrin, L’Exégèse de l’âme, 42. For the problematic aspects inherent in classifying a text as “Gnostic” on the basis of “dualism” or “pessimism,” see Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”.
253 For a discussion and critique of libertinism or asceticism as defining characteristics of “Gnosticism,” see Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 139–188.
“bridal chamber.”259 and in similarities with the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia.260

However, as should be apparent from the analysis above, it is not necessary to adduce categories such as these in order to understand Exeg. Soul.261 On the contrary, I have tried to show that the tractate is perfectly

259 See, e.g., Ménard, “L’Évangile selon Philippe’”; Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52–55; Pétrement, A Separate God, 485. Cf., however, Frederik Wisse who finds it “difficult to see what the marriage imagery in ExSoul has in common with the Valentinian sacrament of the bridal chamber” and rightly points out that “The use of marriage symbolism to express the relationship between Christ and the soul was no invention of the Valentinians, and it is common in patristic sources” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79). This point is also made by Kulawik, who rightly points out that Exeg. Soul is here closer to Origen than to “Valentinianism” (Kulawik, Die Erzählung, 9).


261 For a similar approach to Exeg. Soul, see Kulawik, Die Erzählung. Cf. also the discussion in chapter 1.
well understood simply within the context of an intertextual reading with Christian Scripture, without making prior judgments regarding the text’s supposed leanings toward either orthodoxy or heresy.

With “Gnosticism” and related categories out of the picture, *Exeg. Soul* appears as a thoroughly Christian text, but where does it belong within the history of Christianity? Since *Exeg. Soul* has been almost exclusively dated and placed on the basis of perceived affinities with one or more “Gnostic” movements or systems, be it “Valentinian,” “Naassene” or “Simonian,” the tractate will now have to be re-dated on the basis of other criteria. Such criteria are, however, difficult to come by in *Exeg. Soul*. We may, however, conclude from the state of the canon that emerges from the tractate’s extensive use of quotations and, especially, allusions to New Testament Scripture, that it can hardly be dated to a time much prior to the middle of the second century. At the other end of the scale the latest possible date of Codex II gives us an absolute *terminus ante quem* for *Exeg. Soul* probably sometime in the fifth century. Other reasonably secure bases for assigning a date to this tractate are difficult to find.

One might perhaps think that such liberal use of Homer in a Christian context as that which is in evidence in *Exeg. Soul* would indicate a relatively early date, with reference to similar use of Homer by Clement of Alexandria. However, as Robert Lamberton has pointed out, “it should be no surprise that Christians taught Homer to Christians in the schools of the fourth century empire.” He notes that Methodius of Olympus shows a similar attitude to Homer as that which we find on display in Clement of Alexandria. As Lamberton puts it, “Here again are the marks of the assimilation of an authoritative Homer and a fabricated connection between his poetry and the Hebrew scriptures.” Methodius’ use of Homer is indeed close to what we find in *Exeg. Soul*. “The Homeric poems serve Methodius most strikingly as sources of warnings,” states Lamberton. “The Christian will not desire to hear the Sirens’ song in bondage, but to hear the voice of God in freedom. Such images and myths are ingeniously manipulated; the Hellenic myth ‘becomes a Christian

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262 See chapter 1 for a discussion of the date of the manuscript.
As Vinzenz Buchheit has put it, “Am meisten überrascht hat uns, daß Homer als literarische Autorität in hohem Ansehen steht bei den Kirchenvätern. Man beruft sich auf ihn als Gewährsmann im gleichen Maße wie auf die Hl. Schrift.” Buchheit stresses that Homer “hat auch bei den Vätern nichts von seinem Ansehen eingebüßt, vielmehr ist er durch sie zu neuer Geltung gelangt.”

Unfortunately it does not seem possible to date Exeg. Soul with any reasonable degree of probability within the outlined period (roughly mid-second to mid-fifth century), besides acknowledging the fact that the relative probability tapers off at either end of the scale. What we may say, however, is that although the text may conceivably be dated as early as the middle of the second century, there does not seem to be any internal evidence in Exeg. Soul that necessitates a dating prior to the fifth century. I therefore think it would be wrong to give priority to a relatively early date of the text over a relatively late one. There has, however, been a marked bias in scholarship, that is now in need of redress, towards a comparative focus on material of an early date. Since a thorough comparative analysis of Exeg. Soul with other early Christian literature is outside the scope of the present study, I will here only offer some thoughts on the possible benefits of comparing Exeg. Soul with comparatively later sources and suggest some potentially fruitful avenues of further research.

The Nag Hammadi Codices have often been linked to the fourth-century Pachomian monasteries in the vicinity of where they were found. It is therefore interesting to note that there are in the Pachomian sources potentially significant parallels to major themes in Exeg. Soul. We have seen that Exeg. Soul is shot through with quotations from Scripture, as well as an abundance of allusions. The way this text uses Scripture in rather intricate ways seems to presuppose a rather literate readership or audience. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the ideal recipients of this text seem, at least in light of the present cognitive poetic analysis of its Scriptural intertextuality, to be steeped in Scripture. In a fourth or fifth century Egyptian context we find this kind of literary culture especially within the monastic communities. Palladius, for example, reports in his *Lausiac History* from the early fifth century, that the Pachomians “learn

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268 For an up to date discussion of the provenance of the Nag Hammadi Codices, see Goehring, “The Provenance.”
all the scriptures by heart.” 269 William Graham has emphasised the pronounced centrality of Scripture in the Pachomian tradition, and states that “in even the most cursory reading of the Pachomian sources, one is struck by the often almost seamless web of scriptural allusions and citations that runs through nearly every document written by or about Pachomius and his disciples.” 270 Graham points out how this fact, “reflect the daily role of scripture in the chanting of psalms, the special gatherings for instruction on the meaning of scripture, and the reading or recitation during daily work and night vigils.” 271 Armand Veilleux similarly stresses the way in which “The spiritual life of the pachomian monks was constantly nourished by the Scriptures,” and that this is reflected in their style of writing. Veilleux also highlights the way in which Scripture is quoted rather freely in these texts, and how it is adapted to suit the context. 272

On the basis of a study of Pachomius’ letters, Christoph Joest has described Pachomius’ style of writing and Scriptural exegesis in terms that also fit well as a description of Exeg. Soul. Joest speaks, for instance, of the way in which Pachomius uses metaphor and allegory without explanation and without identifying it as such, and he points out how Pachomius has a tendency to compress citations of different biblical passages within the same sentence. 273 Philip Rousseau has in a recent article argued for certain overlapping interests in this regard between the Nag Hammadi codices and texts by Theodore and Horsiesios, the successors of Pachomius. Rousseau points out how Horsiesios combines Old and New Testament quotations and allusions in his presentation of the monastic life, and how he in one example strings together “beads from Hosea, Psalms, Malachi, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, passing then to Matthew and Romans, and finally returning to Deuteronomy; a passeggiata of which every step rings out the theme of the heart’s return to God,” as Rousseau puts it. 274

269 Palladius, Historia lausiaca, 32.12.
271 Graham, Beyond the Written Word, 129.
274 Philip Rousseau, “The Successors of Pachomius and the Nag Hammadi Codices: Exegetical Themes and Literary Structures,” in The World of Early Egyptian Christianity:
What emerges from the Pachomian sources is a picture of a monastic culture that literally breathed the Scriptures. In the *Bohairic Life of Pachomius* Theodore is made to admonish the monks to “have always at hand the holy Gospels of our Lord Jesus Christ and all the rest of the holy Scriptures and their thoughts.” We may thus safely conclude that the monastic reading and writing practices that emerge from the Pachomian sources would seem to constitute an historical context within which the rhetoric of *Exe. Soul* would make very good sense. Moreover, the focus in *Exeg. Soul* on repentance and a pure life of the soul committed to Christ fits remarkably well with the interests of the writings of Theodore and Horsiesios. Moreover, such a culture of Scriptural memorization would indeed fit the patterns of Scriptural allusions identified in the present cognitive poetic analysis of *Exeg. Soul*. Interestingly, *Exeg. Soul* also seems to point out that mere memorization and recitation of Scripture, which may well be what the tractate means by the phrase, ἡγμένη πρόσκυνσις, “ascetic words,” does not bring about salvation unless it is accompanied by genuine repentance and prayer—because salvation, as *Exeg. Soul* makes abundantly clear, is ultimately a gift from God and cannot be obtained without his good will.

As we have seen, the theme of repentance and prayer is a central concern of *Exeg. Soul*. Scopello has linked these features mainly to Jewish sources and argued for a Jewish background, but while she has argued in favour of Jewish precedents for the imagery of repentance, weeping, and prayer in *Exeg. Soul*, these features are also widespread in Christian, and especially monastic, sources. Indeed they are among the features that would seem to make *Exeg. Soul* especially congenial to a monastic reading. The theme of repentance and return to God, which Rousseau highlights in the Pachomian sources, thus resonates very well with *Exeg. Soul*, although Rousseau himself does not actually refer to this particular text. In fact, all the major themes Rousseau singles out in the Pachomian

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275 In *The Instructions of Theodore*, one of Pachomius’ successors, Scripture is even referred to repeatedly as μὴν ἀναιρεῖται, “the breath of God” (see *Theod. Instr*. 19, 35, 38).


277 *Exeg. Soul* 134.30.

sources are also found in *Exeg. Soul*. Apart from the style of the Pachomian writings, Rousseau also points out their focus on rebirth and revelation, redemption and rest, prophecy and fulfillment, all of which are interests that are prominently on display in *Exeg. Soul*. With regard to rebirth, we indeed find that the Pachomian sources use this term to refer both to baptism and to the monastic life itself. Repentance is described as a rebirth in the Bohairic version of the *Life of Pachomius*, while Theodore, for instance, refers to the monastic life as “the holy vocation of rebirth” (�티ɣρι ἐτοχλαυ ἀνεξίῳ ὑκεσοὶ), and states that through the monastic life “we renew ourselves” (γενερε ἀνεν ὑβρα). Although he argues on more general grounds, building primarily on Michael Williams’ argument for the intentional arrangement of individual tractates within each of the Nag Hammadi codices, Rousseau’s suggestion that “people who thought like Theodore and Horsiesios would have found the Nag Hammadi codices useful,” may thus also find support in the internal evidence of texts like *Exeg. Soul* and, as we shall see in the next chapter, *Gos. Phil*.

We may perhaps also venture some more specific suggestions concerning the possible function of *Exeg. Soul* within such a monastic context. We know, for instance, that there were cathecumens in the Pachomian monasteries. It could thus have been possible, considering the way in which *Exeg. Soul* treats Christian ritual practice, to read it as a homily delivered to those about to be baptized or, perhaps more likely, to the newly baptised monks—people who would relate to the text’s allusive

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284 See SBo, 81. For a discussion of this passage and other references to baptism in the Pachomian sources, see Lundhaug, “Baptism.”
references to baptism and the Eucharist, as well as to its focus on a life in total devotion to Christ filled with constant repentance and prayer. If we also choose to read the description in *Exeg. Soul* of the soul's union with Christ, her bridegroom, as a reference to the first eucharistic communion of the newly baptised, the fear and trembling experienced by the soul prior to her union with Christ, as described in *Exeg. Soul*, is very much in line with what we find in the Pachomian sources with regard to the first communion. Both Theodore and Horsiesios express such an attitude of fear in relation to the Eucharist, and the former even mentions it explicitly in connection with an admonition to the catechumens in the monastery to weep and lament their past sins in preparation for their first reception of the body and blood of the Saviour.

Much of what I have outlined here is not necessarily specific to Pachomian monasticism, but the sources we have for the practices of the Pachomians are far better than what we have for other monastic movements in this period and area—with the exception, of course, of the writings of Shenoute, abbot of the White Monastery in Upper Egypt from 385 to 465, whose monastic community was situated not far from the site of the discovery of the Nag Hammadi codices and close to several Pachomian monasteries.

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286 “As for the catechumens in the monasteries who are expecting the awesome remission of sins and the grace of the spiritual mystery, let them be taught by you that they must weep and lament their past sins and prepare themselves for the sanctification of their souls and bodies, so that they may bear the reception of the Lord Saviour’s blood and body, the very thought of which is awesome” (Theodore, *Letter* 1.6; translation from Veilleux, *Pachomian Koinonia*, 3:124) The fear described here in connection with the catechumens’ reception of the Eucharist is similar to what we find in relation to the soul’s anticipation for the bridegroom in *Exeg. Soul* 132.17–21.

writings that I have just mentioned is also found in the writings of Shenoute. The picture we get from the Pachomian sources of a monastic community steeped in the Scriptures is, for instance, one that is also reflected in the Shenoutean corpus. Also in Shenoute’s White Monastery the practice of memorizing and internalizing Scripture was important enough to be included among the monastic rules. In this regard Bentley Layton speaks of “the totalizing character” of Shenoute’s monastic system, which, as he puts it, “even extends into the mind and voice of the monk when he is alone in the cell,” for even when he is alone, the monk is commanded by the rules to do constant handiwork and to meditate “with his brain and his vocal cords.” Layton speaks of “the constant recitation or mumbling of prayers and passages of Scripture,” and asserts that “there is no silence in this monastery, but rather a constant buzzing sound like a flight of bees, as everyone continually mumbles prayers and passages of Scripture in a low voice.” Layton argues that when the mind is constantly permeated by monasticism in this way, free thought is replaced by constant meditation on Scripture and prayer.

Such controlled memorization practices would ideally serve to create a highly uniform body of Scriptural memory among the monks, and thus of a similar basis for associative thinking. That is, of a group of monks who would possess similar grounds of reference with regard to Scriptural references, doctrines, rules and regulations. The aim and effect of these practices would thus be to create as uniform an interpretive community as possible. Significantly, this kind of monastic community would seem to constitute an ideal interpretive community for such an intricately allusive text as *Exeg. Soul*, which seems to presuppose considerable knowledge of Scripture and Christian religious practice on the part of its readers or hearers.

There is, however, an even closer parallel to *Exeg. Soul* to be found in the writings of Shenoute than the purely stylistic ones. As is the case with our Nag Hammadi text, Shenoute also understands the Old Testament allegorical descriptions of Israel’s infidelity to apply to the soul. In surviving fragments of a writing known as *So Listen*, Shenoute

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explicitly makes this identification and even quotes a part of the same passage from Ezekiel that *Exeg. Soul* quotes at 130.11–20:

εἰς ἀνήρ καὶ ἥπειραν πονον ἠμέταλλη ὑπορίαν κατάθηκαν ἡνεμοπροφητής ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ ἀδικοῦς τινῶν ἐτεκτυχοῦν τε ὑπορίαν· ἢ ἠμέταλλη οἰκονομὶς ἠμέταλλη ἐτεκτυχοῦν τε ἰππορνηγεύει καὶ τὰ ἀνώτερα ἡ ἀνέφερεν·

So, if you do not want to say to yourself here, brother, “the prostitute soul,” according to the word of the prophet, for how was the city of faith, which is your soul, a prostitute, or, “you prostituted yourself to the sons of Egypt,” which is your soul who prostitutes herself in her thoughts, according to the words of the [prophets] (Shenoute, *So Listen, XO*).

Unfortunately the fragment breaks off at this point, but Shenoute returns to the same theme on the following leaf, where he addresses “those who have become weak in the true teaching” (ἡνετκχροῶν ἤγερες ἰμα), of whom he says that the Old Testament

... smites them with the following words: “Therefore, prostitute,” which is your soul, “listen to the word of the Lord, because you have poured out your copper,” and all the other words which the Old (Testament) says like this in its anger against the souls that go a whoring from God and his true teaching, always, “because you have spread your legs for everyone who passes by,” which is the soul of people like you and those who are

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291 Ezek 16:26; cf. *Exeg. Soul* 130.19. Shenoute had no qualms about using this negative biblical image of Egypt and the Egyptians, and we also find similar use of this motif in Philo, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen (see Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 147), thereby showing that the use of this reference cannot be used as an argument against an Egyptian provenance for *Exeg. Soul*.

292 This fragment of White Monastery codex XO, which is in the collection of the Institut français d’archéologie orientale, Cairo (EG-CF Copte 2 f. 1), remains unpublished. The present reading is based on a photograph. For the reading ἡ ἀνεσχεύει καὶ τὰ ἀνώτερα ἡ ἀνέφερεν ἡ ἀνέφερεν· ἡ ἀνέφερεν ἡ ἀνέφερεν· ἡ ἀνέφερεν... I am indebted to Anne Boud'hors, who is preparing an edition of this manuscript for the IFAO series, as well as a critical edition of Shenoute’s *Canon 8.*

293 Cf. Ezek 16:35–36.


defiled in every way, spreading its thoughts or its considerations beneath the demons for them to defile it with their badness and their pollution and their disobedience. And they fornicate with it with their deceitful counsels which are like the flesh of the donkeys and the dogs according to the words of the prophets.296

(Shenoute, So Listen, XO 49–50)297

Like Exeg. Soul, Shenoute identifies the prostitute in Ezekiel’s parable, not with Jerusalem, but with the soul, and the soul’s prostitution is explicitly identified with its impious thoughts.298 To my knowledge the writings of Shenoute thus provide the closest parallels to Exeg. Soul’s application of the Old Testament accounts of Israel’s infidelity to the actions and inclinations of the soul. Scopello has brought to light the sixth homily of the Syrian church father Jacob of Serugh as an interesting parallel to Exeg. Soul’s use of this Old Testament imagery.299 Indeed utilising many of the same Old Testament passages concerning Israel’s infidelity as does Exeg. Soul, Jacob of Serugh does not, however, apply the prophetic imagery of Jerusalem as a whore to the soul, but rather to the Church.

There is, however, a prominent feature of Exeg. Soul that is not at all compatible with the views of Shenoute, namely the idea we have seen presupposed in Exeg. Soul of the pre-existence of souls prior to their fall into material bodies. Significantly, this is an idea that is associated with Origen300 and the later so-called “Origenists”—and one for which they were indeed vehemently attacked by people like Shenoute, Theophilus of Alexandria, and others.301 We could perhaps suggest that Origenist monks of some kind might have constituted an ideal fourth/fifth century Egyptian readership/audience for this particular text? As Samuel

298 It may also be noted that while Shenoute is here using the metaphor the soul is a woman, he is addressing a male interlocutor, possibly a fellow monk. Shenoute is here using a female stereotype, the prostitute ICM, which he takes from Ezekiel, as a metaphorical source in order to describe the sins of the soul.
Rubenson has convincingly argued, Origenism was widespread among the monks in fourth century Egypt.\textsuperscript{302} Also Shenoute implicitly testifies to the currency of this idea in his own lifetime and his own area of influence in Upper Egypt, when he attacks it in the writing known as \textit{I Am Amazed}.\textsuperscript{303} As for the presence of Origenists in Upper Egypt at the time of Shenoute, this is also attested by a partially preserved letter sent by Dioscorus, the archbishop of Alexandria, to Shenoute sometime between 444 and 451.\textsuperscript{304} Dioscorus is in this letter worried about the presence of Origenist monks in the vicinity of Shenoute’s monastic community and even singles out as a specific problem the presence of the writings of Origen and other heretics in one of the nearby monasteries.\textsuperscript{305} Moreover, the possibility of an “Origenist” provenance for \textit{Exeg. Soul} would also find support in the many similarities, shown by Kulawik, between \textit{Exeg. Soul} and Origen not only with regard to the pre-existence of souls, but also with regard to bridal mysticism and the use of Scripture.\textsuperscript{306} Still, it seems clear, as we have seen, that in its main themes, not least in its emphasis on repentance, as well as in its style, \textit{Exeg. Soul} would also have been amenable to the interests of the Pachomians and even to those of Shenoute’s monastic community.

At the very least, these examples would seem to warrant further comparison with other related writings of the period. Such analyses are, however, well outside the scope of the present study, so I will content myself with these observations and a call for a thorough comparative analysis of \textit{Exeg. Soul} with sources of the fourth and fifth centuries. With the abundance of sources available to us from this period there is truly much comparative work yet to be done.


\textsuperscript{303} See Shenoute, \textit{I Am Amazed}, 333–344, 357.

\textsuperscript{304} This letter, \textit{Epistula ad Sinuthium} (which also includes within it \textit{Epistula ad Sabinum et Gemmadium [et Hermogenem]}) is partly preserved in four folios from White Monastery codex XZ. The first three folios have been published by Herbert Thompson, “Dioscorus and Shenoute,” in \textit{Recueil d’études égyptologiques dédiées à la mémoire de Jean-François Champollion} (BEHE 234; Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1922), 367–376, while the fourth folio has been published by Henri Munier, \textit{Manuscrits coptes} (Catalogue Général Des Antiquités Égyptiennes Du Musée Du Caire 9201–9304; Cairo: Imprimerie de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1916), 147–149.


\textsuperscript{306} See Kulawik, \textit{Die Erzählung}. 
5. Concluding Discussion

Logion 114 of the Gospel of Thomas, undoubtedly one of the most well known and often cited passages in the entire Nag Hammadi corpus, famously states the need to become male in order to be eligible for salvation:

耶穌說: “你看吧, 我要引導她, 使她成為男性, 她就必成為活靈, 仿效你們的男性。因為一切成為男性的女性, 將進入天國。”[307]

Numerous scholars have seized upon this, and a handful of similar passages in the Nag Hammadi texts,[308] either as evidence for the supposedly “Gnostic” soteriological imagery of turning female into male, or as an example of “Gnostic” or more general late antique misogyny or “antifemininity.”[309] Regarding such attitudes as being especially pervasive in the Nag Hammadi texts, Frederik Wisse has even suggested that there is “the possibility that the Coptic owner or owners of the Nag Hammadi Codices selected tractates for inclusion on the basis of their antifemininity stance.”[310] But how does Exeg. Soul fit into this picture? As we have seen, we find in Exeg. Soul a rather unusual take on metaphors of


310 Wisse, “Flee Femininity,” 298. However, the imagery of gender transformation from male into female in this period is not confined to so-called “Gnostic” sources. Indeed, as Kari Vogt has shown, this imagery is actually more common in early “mainstream” Christian sources (referred to by Vogt simply as Christian), than in sources commonly classified as “Gnostic” (Kari Vogt, “‘Becoming Male’: A Gnostic and Early Christian Metaphor,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition [ed. Kari Elisabeth Borresen; Oslo: Solum, 1991], 172–187).
male and female, and gender transformation. As Marvin Meyer has put it, “Rarely does a religious text from antiquity and late antiquity recommend that one become female.”

311 Exeg. Soul, however, is one of those rare occurrences where the metaphorical sex-change takes the opposite direction of what we have come to expect, and thus constitutes an interesting departure from the usual metaphor of “becoming male” prevalent in early Christian literature.

312 However, while Meyer’s statement seems to be true with regard to the three earliest Christian centuries, there seems to have been a shift in Christian discourse in the fourth century, where the Christian ideal becomes for the male to be like a female virgin, in contrast to the two preceding centuries where the norm was the female becoming male.

313 Depending on how we date it, then, Exeg. Soul may either be regarded as a very early example of this kind of imagery, or as a part of a broader trend.

However this might be, Exeg. Soul may be described as a sustained elaboration of the conceptual metaphors the soul is a woman and Christian life is a marriage with Christ. The soul’s fall into matter and attachment to transitory and material things is described in terms of a wife leaving her husband in favour of a life of adultery and prostitution, and in terms of an unnatural masculinisation. The salvation of the soul consequently requires her to regain her original femininity and virginity, marry Christ, and stay faithful to him as a subordinate wife.

But, as we have seen, Exeg. Soul is also much more complicated than it might appear at first sight. While the tractate gets its main points across by manipulating a relatively small number of overarching conceptual blends and by exploiting the connections and primings offered by their activated mental spaces, it also prompts for the creation of complex additional structures of conceptual and intertextual blending of which we have barely scraped the surface in the present analysis. Here the complex

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312 Some scholars have nevertheless made Exeg. Soul conform to expectations. See, e.g., Peter Cramer, Baptism and Change in the Early Middle Ages, c. 200–c. 1150 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life & Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27, who describes the Father in Exeg. Soul as turning the womb of the soul from the inside to the outside, rather than the other way around as explicitly stated in the manuscript.

313 See Boyarin, Dying for God, 74–77.

314 As such it conforms to Quintilian’s and Demetrius’ definition of allegory, that is, as a sustained metaphor (See Innes, “Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory,” 12).
web of multiple interrelations with a substantial corpus of canonical texts is especially worthy of note as the primary mechanism of *Exeg. Soul*'s considerable interpretive polysemy.
CHAPTER FOUR

NO LONGER A CHRISTIAN, BUT A CHRIST: DEIFICATION AND CHRISTOLOGY IN THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP

“All this time I have been with you, and you have not known me, Philip? He who has seen me, he has seen the Father. And you, how can you say, ‘Show us your father?’ Do you not believe that I am in my Father and my Father in me?” (John 14:9–10)

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we saw that the concepts of birth and rebirth are of central importance in Exeg. Soul, even to the point where salvation is said to depend on it. In that text we are told that “the soul will be saved through the rebirth” (τὰ γυνὴ ξαναγέννησα γίνεται ἰκέσον). Gos. Phil. strikes a similar note, stating that “it is truly necessary to be born again” (ὡς ἄναγεννησα καιροῦ καταγέννησα ἰκέσον), but adds the important specification “through the image” (γινετὰς καταγέννησα). For, as Gos. Phil. makes clear, “there is a rebirth and an image of rebirth” (γινετὰς καταγέννησα καὶ ἰκέσον). This relationship between the thing itself, the reality, and its image or type, is an important feature of Gos. Phil., with reflections on this general theme constituting one of the major strands that are woven together to create the rich rhetorical tapestry of this text.

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1 Exeg. Soul 134.28–29.
3 Gos. Phil. 67.12–13.
As we shall see, Gos. Phil. devotes considerable space to the problems and significance of what has been described in the present study as conceptual blending. For Gos. Phil. is to a significant degree concerned with the relationship between types, images, and symbols and their various referents. Aside from harnessing a wide range of conceptual blends as rhetorical devices in a complex and at times playful manner, Gos. Phil. also devotes considerable attention to discussions of the ontological status of the various concepts it evokes and the connections between them. Special focus is given throughout Gos. Phil. to questions concerning the means, possibility, and, indeed, necessity of a passage or projection from an ontologically lower level of reality to a higher.

In the present chapter, I will analyse how much of Gos. Phil.’s rhetoric is structured around certain key conceptual blends, and I will draw some tentative conclusions with regard to its overall theology and possible Sitz im Leben on the basis of this analysis. The main focus will be on how the text functions on the basis of an interplay between intertwined conceptual blends, scriptural intertexts, and highly complex intratextual references. The complexity of Gos. Phil. can hardly be overstated. Confronted with its intricate system of single-, double-, and multiple-scope blending, and a constant and obliquely structured interaction of complex metaphor systems, many scholars have given up trying to make sense of Gos. Phil. as a meaningful whole. Instead they have opted to treat it as a composite document made up of diverse and more or less unconnected parts. Others have tended to base their explanations of the doctrinal contents, of the tractate as a whole or its constituent parts, on perceived heresiological parallels, rather than on links and cues within the text itself. Although trying to understand the text on its own merits, as a complete literary statement, has even been described as a hazardous enterprise, I aim to show in this chapter that it is possible to understand Gos. Phil. on its own terms, that is, on the basis of an analysis of the conceptual as well as the intra- and intertextual blends it activates, the most relevant intertextual context, as in the case of Exeg. Soul, being that of authoritative Scripture.

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2. Textual and Redactional Issues

_Gos. Phil._ is the third and longest tractate of the seven that make up the contents of Nag Hammadi Codex II, where it is found between the _Gospel of Thomas_ and the _Hypostasis of the Archons_. Our tractate was copied into the codex by the same scribe who in addition to producing most of this codex, including _Exeg. Soul_, may also have been responsible for the surviving parts of Codex XIII. There are several critical editions of the Coptic text, the most important being that of Bentley Layton, with English translation by Wesley Isenberg, from 1989, and the monumental study by Hans-Martin Schenke, published in 1997. In the present study,

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5 See, e.g., the helpful figure in Williams, *Rethinking "Gnosticism*”, 243.
all known editions of the Coptic text have been taken into account, alongside the *Facsimile Edition* of Codex II.8

### 2.1. Textual Coherence and the Question of Redaction

One of the major issues in previous scholarship on *Gos. Phil.* has been how to account for its highly complex literary structure. As Wesley Isenberg has put it, *Gos. Phil.*’s structure “is neither strictly topical nor predictable.”9 As it stands, the tractate interweaves discourses on a seemingly wide range of topics concerning bodily, social, and sacramental processes, all done in a rhetorically highly ornamental fashion that relies upon frequent use of metaphors, similes, paradoxes, wordplays, citations, and allusions. Moreover, in doing this the text has a tendency to jump back and forth between its key themes in a seemingly unpredictable fashion while alternating its use of literary devices.10 The fact that *Gos. Phil.*, unlike *Exeg. Soul*, does not utilise a narrative structure to tie its various discourses together certainly does not make things easier. At the SBL meeting in 1959 Robert M. Grant famously stated that both *Gos. Thom.* and *Gos. Phil.* seemed “to be arranged chaotically, if one can speak of chaotic arrangement.”11 The result of all this is a text

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8 All translations from the Coptic throughout are my own. For the complete Coptic text utilised in this study, with my own English translation, see appendix B, were I have noted all divergences from the Coptic text of the major critical editions. Since the manuscript pages containing *Gos. Phil.* have suffered significant damage, it is important to refer to the photographic reproduction of the manuscript (see *Facsimile Edition: Codex II*), supplemented by Emmel, “Unique Photographic Evidence.” The first photographic edition was that of Pahor Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo: Volume 1* (Cairo: Government Press, 1956), plates 99–134, but the quality of these photographs is decidedly poor.


that, as Martha Lee Turner has put it, “both intrigues and frustrates its readers,” and which is “very rich in provocative enigma.” Hans-Martin Schenke shares this sentiment and links the attractiveness of Gos. Phil. as “ein geheimnisvoller und faszinierender Text,” with its literary structure, “der dem Betrachter den Eindruck vermitteln kann, als habe er es mit einem Kaleidoskop zu tun.”

Considering this state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that there has been substantial disagreement on the degree, nature, and significance of Gos. Phil.’s coherence, or lack of it. We may speak here of two types of coherence, however, textual and doctrinal, and various combinations of the two. While on one end of the scale some scholars have argued that Gos. Phil. is both textually and doctrinally incoherent, others have argued in favour of the coherence of both, with the majority of scholars positioning themselves somewhere in between these two extremes.

There has been no shortage of proposed explanations for the literary structure of the text, ranging from seeing it as a collection of excerpts from a variety of different sources, to seeing it as the work of a single author, an author who is supposed to have composed the text as we have it for reasons that may have been more or less intentional or well thought

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14 Martha Lee Turner has summarised the situation by pointing out that, “most interpretations of the Gospel according to Philip have been based on the tacit assumption that a single viewpoint, theology, or set of ritual practices can be recovered from the document by considering all the passages it presents on a given theme or topic of interest.” She divides those who have used this approach into two groups, (1) those who defend Gos. Phil.’s coherence as an original work or as an anthology “shaped by a strong redactor,” and (2) those who have simply focussed on specific issues in the text without explicit consideration of its coherence. As for the opposing view she notes that “several of those who have focused on the nature of the document, rather than on the meaning of its contents, have insisted on its composite nature, but this assessment has had little or no impact on the actual procedures used by those who sought to interpret the document’s contents” (M.L. Turner, Gospel According to Philip, 58). Turner herself, who belongs to the latter group, admits that her argument for the composite nature of the text is circular (see ibid., 15).
In 1962 Robert McL. Wilson came to the conclusion that “it cannot be contended that Philip is a single coherent text, composed according to normal standards of writing. That any such claim would be erroneous is evident on every page.” Wilson even went so far as to claim that “to speak of ‘structure’ or ‘composition’ in relation to such a document as the Gospel of Philip may appear at first sight to be a misuse of these terms.” A few years prior to Wilson's study, Hans-Martin Schenke had argued that Gos. Phil. should be regarded as a collection of excerpts, notes, or instructions expressing diverse and even contradictory doctrinal contents, and in a highly influential move he divided the text into numbered “Sprüche” similar to Gos. Thom. Schenke had little doubt concerning the nature of the text, stating that, “nach Form und Inhalt muß man unsere Schrift als eine Art Florilegium gnostischer Sprüche und Gedanken bezeichnen.” Moreover, he argued that these various “Sprüche” stand in relation to each other “unvermittelt oder nur durch Stichwortanschluß.” Among those who have agreed with Schenke in regarding the text as some kind of florilegium or collection from different sources, there have been disagreements concerning the nature and

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16 For a strong statement in favour of the coherence, singularity of thought and intentional rhetorical structure of Gos. Phil., see Painchaud, “La composition.”
20 He first did this in his 1959 article, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]”; but later made several subsequent changes to his original division and numbering of the text (see, e.g., Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip”; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium). For critiques of Schenke's division of the text, see, e.g., Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 26–29; Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 22–33; Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4167–4169.
23 In his later works, however, Schenke conceded that the excerpts might all come from the same work. Schenke stated in 1994 that, inspired by Layton and Isenberg in particular, he tried “das Philippus-Evangelium als eine Sammlung von Exzerpten zu verstehen, die möglicherweise aus ein und demselben umfangreichen Werk stammen, dessen zentrale Themen Bekehrung und Initiation gewesen sein müßten” (Schenke, “Zur Exegesis,” 123; cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 11–12), and came to tentatively identify this hypothetical single source as the lost Acta Philippi (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 7–8, 12, 251–252, 255–256, 278, 436). He also conceded elsewhere that he tried in his latest work to put the various pieces together again “searching for the line, or lines, of thought running through the document” (Hans-Martin Schenke, “The Work of the Berliner Arbeitskreis: Past, Present, and Future,” in The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration [ed.
significance of the connections or thematic overlap between these various excerpts or “Sprüche.” While some have held these connections to be meaningful on a fundamental level, others have regarded them as superficial. Martha Lee Turner, for example, has argued strongly in favour of seeing the tractate as a collection, while at the same time acknowledging that it still displays some degree of organisational and conceptual coherence.24 She ends up characterising Gos. Phil. as “a lightly edited notebook,”25 which can be characterised as “a sourcebook for speculation,”26 and “a tinker’s collection of odds and ends, an assortment of texts that might come in handy in gnostic bricolage.”27

A majority of scholars have indeed found some degree of doctrinal coherence in spite of the tractate’s seemingly incoherent textual nature. While agreeing with Schenke concerning the textual state of the document, even asserting that “the textual incoherence of Gos. Phil. is an indisputable fact,”28 but acknowledging that “it is less evident how this incoherence should be explained,”29 Einar Thomassen is among those who hold that the work still shows a high degree of doctrinal coherence, stating that “it expresses a reasonably coherent system of thought, which can have represented the shared beliefs of a community, and is hardly adequately described as an unmethodical collection of disparate quotations.”30 On a similar note, Gaffron concluded that Gos. Phil. “ist weder

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30 Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 279. Thomassen mentions three possible, and not mutually exclusive, explanations for the literary character of the text: (1) “A process of excerpting and compilation from older written sources”; (2) the text may be “a series of personal notes made by an individual writer, either for the purpose of oral expansion in a sermon or a teaching situation, or as materials for a written work”; or, as Thomassen deems likely, (3) the text might have been “rearranged at a stage subsequent to its original composition by a redactor, or even by a scribe arbitrarily displacing passages in the text.” Thus, according to Thomassen, the version of Gos. Phil. that has come down to us might be “the outcome of several successive stages of excerpting, collecting, independent note-composition, redaction and scribal confusion” (ibid., 252–253). See also David
ein Florilegium gnostischer Sprüche und Gedanken noch ein Brief oder
eine Abhandlung im strengen Sinne,”31 while arguing that its style, as
well as its “einheitliche Denkstruktur und Bilderwelt” indicates that Gos.
Phil. is the work of a single author, “der sich verschiedenartigen Tradi-
tionsstoffes bedient, ihn aber mit persönlicher Hand, wenn auch nicht
immer glücklich und überzeugend, gestaltet.”32 But how textually inco-
herent is Gos. Phil.? Grant suggested early on that it seemed like the lack
of arrangement in Gos. Phil. could be intentional,33 and this suggestion
was later taken up by Isenberg, who in his doctoral dissertation argued
that much of Gos. Phil. consists of parts that have been intentionally dis-
joined and distributed to various positions in the text by a compiler-
editor.34

The individual scholar’s stance with regard to these questions has nat-
urally also to a significant degree influenced the interpretation of Gos.
Phil’s contents. Bentley Layton, for example, claims that “it would be mis-
leading to reconstruct a single theological system” from the entire Gos.
Phil. since in his opinion the text is an anthology representing “probably
more than one Valentinian theological perspective.”35 Therefore, Layton
argues, “individual groups of excerpts” are better “studied in isolation,
with comparison of other works or fragments of Valentinianism or of
classic gnosticism.”36 Layton thinks it is probably only “through an inad-
vertence” that “the excerpts are not divided from one another” in the
manuscript.37

For the scholar seeking to understand the doctrinal contents and
function of the text there are, however, serious problems connected
with treating the text as a collection of excerpts.38 Michael Williams has

8th International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford from 3 to 8 Sept. 1979 (ed.
Elisabeth A. Livingstone; St Patr 17:1; Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 251–252, who regards the text as a collection of “sermon notes.”
31 Gaffron, Studien, 220.
32 Gaffron, Studien, 220.
33 Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 3.
36 Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 326. Layton characterises the text as “a Valentinian
anthology containing some one hundred short excerpts taken from various other works,”
although admitting that these works “have not been identified, and apparently they do
not survive” (ibid., 325).
38 Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley even characterises Schenke’s division of the text into
numbered sayings as a “violation of the text” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4167).
argued that the task of dividing the text into various groups of excerpts is methodologically problematic, and that “our best hope probably remains with understanding the text as we have it. The existence of the text itself justifies the working assumption that for its composer it somehow ‘held together’ and was not merely a collection of mutually contradictory teachings.”

Finally, some scholars have in fact argued in favour of the document as we have it as a complete literary work that is both textually and doctrinally coherent. Søren Giversen has pointed to the fact that the damaged state of the manuscript may make it seem more incoherent than it really is, an especially pertinent comment considering the intricate nature of the textual and rhetorical structure of the surviving parts of the document. Giversen rejects the view that Gos. Phil. is a kind of florilegium. He argues, on the contrary, that the tractate is not only doctrinally coherent, but that it also has many compositional traits in common with other contemporary texts. Similar views concerning the doctrinal and textual coherence of the tractate have also been argued by, among others, Gerald Borchert, Edward Rewolinski, Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, and Louis Painchaud. For the purposes of the present analysis, I have chosen to treat Gos. Phil. as a coherent composition, with a coherent theology. This approach also implies a reluctance to dismiss problematic passages by appeals to redactional layers or different sources. I tend to agree with Giversen that there is indeed a high degree of probability that several keys to the

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41 See Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, esp. 16–34. Without arguing for any direct influence, Giversen finds the text to be comparable to Hebrews, as well as the writings of Philo and Clement of Alexandria, in terms of rhetorical style and composition (see Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 33).

understanding of the text have been lost in the manuscript’s many lacu-
nae, and that mistaken reconstructions have led to further misinterpre-
tations. The focus will therefore be purely on the poetics of Gos. Phil. as a
coherent text in the form in which it has been preserved in Nag Ham-
madi Codex II, and not on some hypothetical original or source(s).

Louis Painchaud has argued that in order to perform a literary analy-
sis of Gos. Phil. one has to work on the basis of the hypothetical Greek
original. However, as argued in chapter 1, and in line with the present
study’s focus on the perspective of the reader as outlined in chapter 2,
there is no reason not to perform a literary analysis on the basis of our
preserved Coptic text. The latter approach would also seem to have the
advantage of being the less hypothetical venture of the two.

This is not to say that I do not think it is possible, or even probable, that
the text may have gone through a long history of redactional change and
augmentation. The very nature of the textual composition of the tractate
invites changes in light of contemporary theology. This is especially
the case considering the mystagogical emphasis of the tractate, since,
in order to stay relevant, the tractate would need to stay in tune with
contemporary ritual practice. We should therefore not be surprised
to find references to practice and theology datable relatively close to
the time of the production of the manuscript, while at the same time
preserving considerably older layers. In any case, what we have is a Coptic
document that may be analysed on its own terms. A reader encountering
this Coptic text in the fourth, or even fifth century, would encounter
it as a single text, even a text that bore the name “The Gospel according
to Philip” (ⲡⲉⲩⲁⲅⲅⲉⲗⲓⲟⲛ ⲡⲕⲁⲧⲁⲫⲓⲡⲡⲟⲥ). We should therefore give the
text the benefit of the doubt and try to understand it as a whole before
we start to dissect it.

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43 See the discussion in chapter 1.
45 Cf. Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 538.
46 See, e.g., Bradshaw, Search for the Origins, 91–92.
47 As argued in chapter 1, we know even less concerning the date the manuscript was
buried than we do concerning its date of production. Proposals in this regard amount to
little more than speculation.
48 Gos. Phil. 86.18–19.
2.2. Scriptural Intertextuality

As Robert McL. Wilson has noted, Gos. Phil.’s references to the New Testament “range from clear and unmistakable quotations down to echoes which may appear significant to one scholar yet unimportant, or even non-existent, to another.”\(^49\) Unlike Exeg. Soul, none of Gos. Phil.’s quotations and paraphrases of Scripture are introduced by explicitly naming the source, and the allusions are usually “worked into the context as if [the author] were a man steeped in the Scriptures, to whom their language and phrases came as a natural vehicle for the expression of his ideas,” as Wilson puts it.\(^50\) Another difference in relation to Exeg. Soul is that not only do we not find a single quotation specifically identified as being from any of the Old Testament Scriptures, but there does not seem to be any direct quotations of these texts at all,\(^51\) although there are abundant allusions to them, and especially to Genesis.\(^52\)

As for the New Testament texts, Grant noted already in 1960 that Gos. Phil. uses the Gospels of Matthew and John extensively,\(^53\) and several scholars have later noted that Gos. Phil. shows a clear preference for Matthew among the synoptic gospels.\(^54\) In an overview of Gos. Phil.’s use of the synoptic tradition, Christopher Tuckett concludes that apart from the use of the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan,\(^55\) all the synoptic allusions can be explained as deriving from Matthew,\(^56\) and he agrees with Wilson that the tractate shows a preference for Matthew and


\(^{50}\) Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 7.


\(^{52}\) As Segelberg puts it, “These references clearly show that the author or authors of the Gospel of Philip had access to basic Old Testament teaching about the beginning of the world and of the elect people of God in Abraham” (Segelberg, “The Gospel of Philip,” 204).

\(^{53}\) Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 5. See also Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 7.


\(^{55}\) Gos. Phil. 78.7–10, referring to Luke 10:34.

\(^{56}\) See Tuckett, Nag Hammadi, 81; see also 74, and Christopher M. Tuckett, “Synoptic Traditions in Some Nag Hammadi and Related Texts,” VC 36:2 (1982): 178. Tuckett even expresses doubts that Gos. Phil. has derived its reference to the Good Samaritan directly from the Gospel of Luke, and suggests that it might just as well have known the parable independently of the complete gospel (see Tuckett, Nag Hammadi, 80).
John among the four Gospels. As we shall see in the following analysis, however, Gos. Phil. also seems to allude to several distinctly Lukan passages aside from the parable of the Good Samaritan. In addition it has been acknowledged that there are multiple references to the Johannine writings (John and 1 John), as well as several Pauline (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians), Pseudo-Pauline (Hebrews), and Catholic (1 Peter) Epistles. Scholars have in fact detected references to a wide range of New Testament texts in Gos. Phil. Wilson mentions Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians as among the few texts to which he could not detect references, while Gaffron finds no evidence for the use of Acts, the Pastoral or Catholic epistles, or Revelation. As we shall see in the following analysis, however, there are in fact indications of the use of most of these.

3. Analysis of Major Blends

In the previous chapter we saw how the conceptual blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN is fundamental to the rhetoric of Exeg. Soul and how it interacts crucially with various scriptural intertexts and other conceptual blends. In the present chapter I will approach Gos. Phil. from a similar angle and investigate the function of certain key conceptual blends and their interrelations. Analogous to the previous chapter’s focus on the blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, the main focus here will be on that of THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST.

One of the main obstacles to a coherent analysis of Gos. Phil. is the highly intricate web of interconnections among its many conceptual and intertextual blends. I have already mentioned the phenomenon that many of the themes and discussions running through the tractate seem to have been cut up into pieces and distributed variously around the tractate. Whether or not Isenberg’s theory that this arrangement is that of a

58 The overwhelming majority of scholars recognise the fact that Gos. Phil. refers to the canonical gospels. An exception to this rule is Richard Longenecker, who thinks Gos. Phil. is probably independent of the canonical gospels (see Richard N. Longenecker, The Christology of Early Jewish Christianity [London: SCM Press, 1970], 82).
60 See Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 7.
compiler-editor is correct or not, this literary structure necessitates, as Michel Desjardins has pointed out, “that the work must be treated as a whole. Yet one pericope cannot be understood necessarily by setting it into its immediate context. Accordingly, the full meaning of each pericope … must be determined by examining the relevant issues in the entire work.”62 There are complex linkages between the various themes and discussions that run considerably deeper than the level of catchword connections or thematic overlap. The complexity and multidimensionality of these connections not only present an obstacle to our understanding of the tractate, but also complicate the attempt to make a linear exposition and explication of it.63 Pressing such a multidimensional tractate into a linear one-dimensional format for the purposes of academic analysis inevitably involves a reduction of its complexity, and also leads to some repetition, as a considerable number of passages function within several of the discourses that make up Gos. Phil’s web of signification.

3.1. The Christian as a Christ

The identification of the individual Christian with Christ is a central theme in Gos. Phil. and seems to be a premise underlying much of its rhetoric. The most direct statement of this identification occurs at the end of an important passage referring to Christian initiation, where the fully initiated person is described with the words, “this one is no longer a [Christian], but a Christ” (ⲡⲉⲓ ⲅⲁⲣ ⲝⲟⲩⲕⲉⲧⲓ ⲝⲟⲩⲭⲣⲏ Ⲡⲉ ⲁⲗⲁ ⱥⲓ Ⲣⲏⲧ ⲑⲧⲩ ⲑⲇⲓ Ⲝⲃⲧⲓ ⲈⲟⲧⲰ Ⲑⲟⲩⲧⲉ).64

In the present section we shall see how the conceptual blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST serves a similar function in Gos. Phil. to that of THE SOUL IS A WOMAN in Exeg. Soul. The present tractate is, however, a considerably more complex composition than Exeg. Soul, and has a much greater tendency to use framing inputs from the same ICMs in different blends, and it is more prone to link together blends in intricate ways. Moreover, in contrast to the single-scope blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN in

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63 As Isenberg has noted, a description of the contents of Gos. Phil. “is complicated by the eccentric structure, by the many lacunae, by the diverse locations of statements on any one topic, and by the numerous and varied subjects of interest in which it appears to delight” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 37–38).
64 Gos. Phil. 67.26–27. See below for an analysis.
Exeg. Soul, the blend the Christian is a Christ is a double-scope one.\textsuperscript{65} This means that while Exeg. Soul draws on the woman ICM to supply framing structure to the blend and subsequent significant backwards projections to the soul-input, and not the other way around, we shall see that in Gos. Phil’s blend the Christian is a Christ it is of fundamental importance that the process works in both directions. Taken together, these traits make for far more complex interpretive processes in Gos. Phil. than those encountered in Exeg. Soul.

The passage quoted above concerning the Christian becoming a Christ sets up a conceptual blend of the initiated Christian and Christ as shown in fig. 18. This blend will be the main focus of the following analysis. As already mentioned, this is a conceptual blend of the double-scope variety, which means that each of the two inputs provides important structure at various points throughout the tractate that may cause a reinterpretation of them both. As will be shown in the following analysis, this conceptual integration network is fleshed out throughout Gos. Phil. by means of complex intertextual and conceptual blending.

Several important questions present themselves at this point. Implicit in the abovementioned blend lies the need to consider the question of the properties of the Christ input space in order to grasp its potential implications. We may say that the sentence identifying the Christian with Christ activates certain aspects of the reader’s knowledge of what we may term the concept of Christ. That is to say, the sentence activates certain properties of this ICM in the reader’s long-term memory depending upon the context in which it is brought to mind,\textsuperscript{66} and it primes the rest of the ICM for potential subsequent activation.\textsuperscript{67} It is an inherent feature of this point of view that the Christ ICM would to some degree be constructed differently by each individual reader. Its various aspects would thus also have different potential for activation, causing potentially different interpretations. The Christ ICM would, for instance, have been interpreted differently depending on the reader’s knowledge and memory of Scripture, creeds, exegetical tractates and traditions, experienced ritual practice, and various forms of catechetical and mystagogical instruction. The interpretation of what it means for the initiated Christian to have become a Christ would therefore be differently construed according to a reader’s

\textsuperscript{65} For the distinctions between single-, double-, and multiple-scope blends, and the notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), see chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{66} Cf. Gibbs, “Prototypes.”
\textsuperscript{67} For the notion of “priming,” see chapter 2.
prior knowledge of the cognitive models called upon in the reading of the text. This thus illustrates the individual and context-dependent nature of the activation of a reader’s knowledge of the relevant cognitive models when prompted by particular integration networks. In this case, what intertextual and conceptual knowledge, which mental images, will be brought to the reader’s mind by the reference to Christ will of necessity vary, as will the features that are projected to the blend to mutually reframe the concepts of the Christian and Christ in a reading of Gos. Phil.

The construction of such interpretive blends is not only dependent on the reader’s prior knowledge of Christ, but is of course also shaped by the tractate’s rhetoric. Of prime importance in this regard is the manner in which a number of conceptual, intertextual, and intratextual blends is cued and combined throughout the text. Here it must again be emphasised that Gos. Phil. gives its readers rather free reins with regard to the construction, combination, and running of these blends, as many of the blends in Gos. Phil., and the inferences they create, are left unstated for the reader to make on his or her own.68 It is basically this openness which has made it so difficult for modern scholars to get a firm grip on Gos. Phil. It is an openness that makes for a potentially very wide and diverse range of interpretations, especially among readers who are far removed from, and lack knowledge of, the tractate’s original context(s), as modern treatments of Gos. Phil. amply attest to.

3.1.1. Christology and Anthropology

With regard to the statement that the initiated Christian has become a Christ, the central issue is one of Christology. In cognitive terms this entails a question of the contents of the CHRIST ICM as it is presupposed by Gos. Phil. It further raises the issue of how the ICM is utilised in a triggering of interpretive blends. Which elements of the CHRIST ICM are called upon and projected to the interpretive blend to enlighten the reader’s understanding of the anthropology of the individual Christian? And in what ways are the CHRIST ICM itself affected by the blend? Since the specific nature of the projection is not specified in the passage in question, and we lack any firm knowledge of the extra-textual context of Gos. Phil., such as its date and provenance,69 we have to infer which

69 Although one might get the impression from recent scholarship that Gos. Phil. can be confidently classified as a “Valentinian” text, the fact remains that we really do not
elements are involved on the basis of information gained from other parts of Gos. Phil., and on the basis of intra- and intertextual cues found there. As we shall see, Gos. Phil. is a tractate that expresses its underlying Christology in a variety of ways, and to uncover this Christology we need to interpret a wide range of blends.

The conceptual blend of Christ and the Christian initiate is not metaphorical in the strict sense. Since both input spaces project structure to the blended space, they are both framing inputs, and the inferences created in the blend are projected backwards to both inputs, not just to one of them. The concept of the Christian is illuminated by the concept of Christ, but at the same time the opposite is also true. Not only may the reader’s experience of ritual initiation, and of bodily experience in general, inform his or her understanding of Christ, but Gos. Phil.’s references to Christ’s baptism, for example, may also help the reader to conceptualise his or her own experience of baptism and chrismation. Moreover, the reader’s own experience of baptism and chrismation also creates a frame of reference with regard to the understanding of the baptism of Christ in the river Jordan. In what follows we shall see how Gos. Phil.’s descriptions and discussions of Christ’s names, titles, constitution, birth, death, baptism, and other works or deeds may inform our understanding of the tractate’s underlying sacramental soteriology.

Before we do that, however, we need to consider the basic anthropology underlying the tractate, that is, its basic views concerning the constitution of the human being. Gos. Phil. seems to presuppose a relatively simple constitution of body and soul, and no division of the latter into separate parts seems to be implied. There is not much direct information concerning the human soul in Gos. Phil., but we do learn that “it is a valuable thing, and it has come to be in a contemptible body” (οὐράω εὐταξίαν πε αὐχώπε ρηνοῦσανα εύωχον). Moreover, the trac-

70 This is thus a double-scope blend rather than a single-scope one. As DesCamp and Sweetser put it, “Double scope blends, like single scope blends, involve inputs … with different organizing frames. The more one feels that a single input’s inferential structure dominates in the final blend, the more a given cognitive construction will feel like a metaphor, or single scope blend” (DesCamp and Sweetser, “Metaphors for God,” 223, emphasis in original).

71 In this study the term “chrismation” is used to denote any application of chrism (cf. E.C. Whitaker, Documents of the Baptismal Liturgy [3d ed.; revised by Maxwell E. Johnson; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2003], 308).

72 Gos. Phil. 56.25–26.
tate emphasises that the state of one’s soul is important, pointing out that a proper “disciple of God” (Μαθητής θεογνής) will not be deceived by “the bodily forms” (κωπφή ἱσωματική), but will see “the condition of each one’s soul” (ταῖς ἑσεῖς ὑπογέγυχν ἑπογξονα). In addition to the body and the soul, however, there is also the spirit (πνεῦμα), but where the latter enters into the picture is not immediately apparent, nor is it easy to discern the relationship between it and the soul. Is the spirit to be regarded as a part of the human constitution to begin with, or is it rather a gift received in connection with ritual initiation? It is also worth noting that although the text employs the terms ψυχή (γυχη) and πνεῦμα (πνευμα), a term such as νοῦς is absent, and the word χρή, which is often used as an equivalent in Coptic, does not seem to be used in this sense in Gos. Phil. It is thus a rather simple anthropology that seems to be presupposed by Gos. Phil. and its discourse is distinctly non-technical. There are no detailed discussions on either the human soul or its relationship with the body, nor of a human spirit and its relationship to the soul. As we shall see, however, the text rather confusingly uses the terms “body” (οὐμα), “flesh” (οὐφί), “soul” (ψυχή), and “spirit” (πνεύμα) in several different senses for different purposes in different contexts. We will return to the several ways in which these terms are used as we proceed.

The Christology of Gos. Phil. draws to a considerable extent on the Gospel of John, and we will see that certain passages, such as the prologue, the discourse on the bread of life, and the Nicodemus dialogue, are fundamental. Secondarily, it seems to draw on Hebrews, Revelation, the Johannine epistles, and several of the Pauline epistles. The synoptic material primarily from Matthew, but also from Luke, cited and alluded to by Gos. Phil. seems to be interpreted primarily from the perspective given by the abovementioned material.

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73 Gos. Phil. 81.1–6.
74 The Coptic word χρή can be used as an equivalent not only of the Greek νοῦς, but also of καρδία (cf. Crum 714a; Rubenson, The Letters of St. Anthony, 69 n. 1).
3.1.2. The Names and Titles of Christ

Christ is referred to in a number of ways in Gos. Phil. Apart from “Christ” (πνεῦ), “Jesus” (ἰς), and “Jesus Christ” (ἰς πνεῦ), he is also called “the Nazarene” (πνᾷδρινος or πν/mainwindow), “Saviour” (σωτήρ), “Lord” (χοῦς), “Messiah” (με shemale), “perfect man” (τελειος ἤρωος), “the Son of Man” (παρή ἤρωος), “the Son of God” (παρή ἤπω), and “Pharisatha” (φαρισας), the latter being explained as a Syriac term meaning “the one who is spread out” (πετποφρ ἠβολ). In cognitive terms, then, these names and titles can all be said to activate mental spaces that are connected to different aspects of the same Christ ICM. Gos. Phil. gives outright explanations of the significance of some of them, like “the Nazarene” and “Pharisatha,” while most are used without direct explanation. In the following analysis we will see how some of these titles function in the rhetoric of the text.

75 The following names and titles all seem to refer to the same character (cf. Franzmann, Jesus, 34–5, 50 n. 3). Contrary to certain scholars (see, e.g., Bernard Barc, “Les noms de la triade dans l’Évangile selon Philippe,” in Gnosticisme et Monde Hellénistique: Actes du Colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve (11–14 mars 1980) [ed. Julien Ries, et al.; Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 27; Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1982], 361–376, who argues that “Jesus,” “the Nazarene,” and “Christ” refer to different manifestations of the Saviour), I see no reason to suppose that, e.g., “Jesus” and “Christ” are to be regarded as different entities in Gos. Phil.

76 The spelling varies: πνεῦ: Gos. Phil. 52.19; 56.9; 61.30; 62.15; πνεῦ: Gos. Phil. 55.6, 11; 56.13; 62.9; 68.17; 71.19; 74.15–16; πνεῦ: Gos. Phil. 62.10; 68.20; 69.6–7; πνεῦ: Gos. Phil. 52.35; 56.4, 7; 62.12; 70.13.

77 The spelling varies: Ἰς: Gos. Phil. 56.5; 57.2; 62.10, 13, 16; 63.21; 71.12; 73.23; 77.1, 7; 83.16; Ἰς: Gos. Phil. 57.28; 63.24; 70.34; ἰς: Gos. Phil. 56.6; Ῥς: Gos. Phil. 62.8; 78.15; Ῥς: Gos. Phil. 62.9.

78 Gos. Phil. 80.1.

79 πν/AIDS: Gos. Phil. 56.12; 62.11, 14–15, 16; πν/mainwindow: Gos. Phil. 62.8, 9.

80 Gos. Phil. 64.3.

81 Gos. Phil. 55.34, 37; 56.16; 59.7, 24; 62.6; 63.25; 64.10; 67.27; 68.6–7; 74.25; 78.22, 25; 81.16. In one instance, however, at 68.27, it may be used as a reference to God.

82 Gos. Phil. 56.8–9; 62.8, 11.

83 τελευος ἤρωος: Gos. Phil. 55.12; 60.23–24; τελευος ἤρωος: Gos. Phil. 58.20–21; 75.19, 20–21; 80.4.

84 Gos. Phil. 63.29–30; 76.1–2, 2–3; 81.14–15, 15–16, 16–17, 17–18, 18–19, 19.

85 Gos. Phil. 78.20–21.

86 παρη is clearly used to designate Christ at Gos. Phil. 53.30; 54.7; 59.11–12; 67.20; 74.17, 23.

87 Gos. Phil. 63.22–23.

88 Gos. Phil. 63.22–23.
3.1.3. The Constitution of Christ

A christological term of considerably greater complexity in this tractate than those mentioned above, however, is “the Logos / Word” (πλορος). In cognitive terms, the Logos seems to be a highly significant constituent part of the Christ ICM as it is constructed and reflected in Gos. Phil., but its function is not immediately apparent.

3.1.3.1. Christ’s True Nature

Indeed, the status and function of the Logos is one of the most interesting and puzzling aspects of Gos. Phil., albeit one that has attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention. We find Gos. Phil.’s first direct reference to the Logos in connection with the Eucharist, where we are told that it is to be identified with the “flesh” (σαρξ) of Jesus. Later, we come across it in an interpretation of the transfiguration story, where Gos. Phil. refers to “his Logos” (πνευμονη) and says about Jesus that,

\begin{quote}
it was as [they would] be able to see him that he appeared. [All these ways], he appeared to them. He [appeared] to [the] great as great. He [appeared] to the small as small. He [appeared] to the angels as angel and to the men as man. Therefore his Logos hid itself from everyone. Some saw him thinking that they saw themselves, but when he appeared to his disciples in glory upon the mountain he was not small, he became great, but he made the disciples great so that they might be able to see him being great.
\end{quote}

(Gos. Phil. 57.30–58.10)

Although this passage might be based on, and refer the reader to, any of the synoptic accounts of the transfiguration, it seems to be the Lukan account, which is the only one that mentions Jesus’ “glory” (δόξα / εοργ), that is the primary reference here, as Luke tells us specifically that the disciples Peter, John and James saw Christ’s “glory.”

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89 It should be noted, however, that the word πλορος is also used at least three times to refer simply to the word of Scripture (Gos. Phil. 80.5; 83.11; 84.8).
90 Gos. Phil. 57.6. See below for further discussions of this important passage.
92 Luke 9:32. That it was Peter, John, and James who witnessed the transfiguration is
In *Gos. Phil*’s account of what actually transpired in the transfiguration, the Logos is presented as a part of Christ’s constitution that was normally kept hidden from view. We are told that it was hidden as long as people, including his disciples, were unable to see Jesus’ true appearance, which thereby implies that the Logos was an integral part of his true being and appearance. Significantly, however, the Logos was kept hidden according to the principle that like sees like; and thus the Logos was hidden from view until the disciples became like Jesus. Normally, however, people did not see Jesus as he truly was, but according to their own status and abilities. It is significant that in what *Gos. Phil.* presents as the only exception to this rule, namely in the transfiguration, our tractate emphasises that Jesus did not make himself (and hence “his Logos”) visible to the disciples “in glory” (ϝανογεγούρ) by making himself small, but rather by making them great. According to *Gos. Phil.*, then, Jesus’ appearance to his disciples was as a reflection of themselves, and thus only by becoming truly like him could they see Jesus as he really was. This also recalls 1 John 3:2, which, like *Gos. Phil.*, makes the causal connection between becoming like Christ and seeing him as he is: “when he appears we shall become like him, for we shall see him as he is” (εάν ἔναντι αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ὁ θεός αὐτῶν καθάει εἰκόνος αὐτῶν ἀρτερί). Another passage that may be recalled in this context is Phil 3:21, where Jesus is described as “this one who shall change the body of our humility into the likeness of the body of his glory” (παύει εἰκόνα εἰκόνα ἡπενθυμβίο εἰκόνα ἡπεφεοοῦ). According to *Gos. Phil.*, Jesus

mentioned by all the synoptics (Matt 17:1; Mark 9:2; Luke 9:28). In Patristic interpretation the transfiguration is commonly interpreted as a revelation of the pre-existent Logos (see John Anthony McGuckin, *The Transfiguration of Christ in Scripture and Tradition* [Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity; Lewiston / Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986], 110–111). According to Origen, as in *Gos. Phil.*, Christ changes his appearance in accordance with the spiritual state of those who see him (see Origen, *Commentary on Matthew*, 12.36–37).

93 See the discussion below.

94 Majella Franzmann claims that the Logos is here “a kind of heavenly garment of glory which must hide itself in certain circumstances, so that Jesus can be seen” (Franzmann, *Jesus*, 35). However, *Gos. Phil.* only states that the Logos was hidden to those who were not like Jesus in power, it does not say that it had to be hidden in order for Jesus to be seen. A more plausible interpretation is thus that it only becomes visible to those who are like him.

95 “The disciples are able to see Jesus because he has created a situation of compatibility,” as Buckley puts it (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4172).

96 ἐὰν ἐκεῖνοι ὁμοιοί αὐτῷ ἐσομίηται, ὀτι ὁμοιοία αὐτῶν καθώς ἦσαν.

97 ὁς ἡμῶν ἡμῶν τῆς ἡμῶν τῆς σώματα σώματι σώματος τῷ σώματι τῆς
appeared to people as they would be able to comprehend him, which in this context means that they were only able to see him on their own level, and thus the only way to achieve a vision of the real Jesus, was to be made equal to him in greatness by Jesus himself. Then, and only then, was “his Logos” (ὁ λόγος) visible.

But what does it mean for the disciples to be able to see “his Logos”? Just prior to the passage cited above, Gos. Phil. identifies the Logos with Jesus’ flesh, stating that “his flesh is the Logos” (ἡφασματίζεται ημέρας). To be able to see “his Logos,” then, should by extension refer to the ability to see and comprehend the nature of Jesus’ flesh, a flesh that was kept hidden from everyone who was not on the level of the glorified Jesus. When one reaches this level, however, “[If] you become Logos,” as Gos. Phil. puts it, “it is the Logos that will mix with you” (εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐλευθεροποιεῖται οἱ λόγοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ημῶν). The question of how to achieve this kind of equality with Jesus and his Logos is indeed one of Gos. Phil.’s main concerns. It involves acquiring his Logos as an important part of one’s own being, as will be shown in detail below. First, however, we need to investigate further the identity and function of the Logos itself.

In Gos. Phil., the Logos does not operate in isolation, but is intimately connected with the Holy Spirit and with mystagogy. The tractate’s most explicit statement of this relationship appears in the passage, already referred to above, which identifies Jesus’ flesh with the Logos:

ΠΕΤΑΣΩΝ ἂν ἡθανατώσῃ ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν κυρίως ἡμῖνεσται ὃ ἐν τῇ θεσμῷ ἐν θλόγῳ ἢ λεγόμεν ἡμῖν ἡμῶν ημῖν εἶσαι.

“He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him.”

What is it? His flesh is the Logos, and his blood is the Holy Spirit.

(Gos. Phil. 57.4–7)

The passage is mystagogical, in that it concerns the Eucharist, but also exegetical, consisting as it does of an interpretation of one of Jesus’ statements in the Gospel of John. It is the words of Jesus from John 6:53–54

δῶσῃ αὐτοῖς. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Hom. Div. 9, where this passage is invoked in the context of the transfiguration.

98 Gos. Phil. 57.6.
99 Gos. Phil. 78.34–79.1, and cf. 78.29–30. See below for discussion.
101 For the view that this passage refers to the Eucharist, see, e.g., Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 197, 306; Gaffron, Studien, 180; Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 333; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 234. Borchert, however, “finds it rather doubtful that this logion has a sacramental emphasis,” on the grounds that the flesh and blood are identified with the Logos and the Holy Spirit (Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 126 n. 4); Thomassen
that Gos. Phil. paraphrases here, but in order to see the rationale for the direct connection between the eucharistic flesh of Christ and the Logos, we should read this passage not only in conjunction with this Johannine passage, but also with John 1:14a: “the Word became flesh” (ὁ λόγος σωκρί ἐγένετο σαρκί). Gos. Phil. 57.4–7 may in fact be described as a blend of John 6:53–54 and John 1:14a (see fig. 19).

This, however, is not the intertextual integration network that would be composed by a reader of Gos. Phil. 57.4–7. In a reading of this passage, what is shown as a blended space in this figure becomes itself an input space that calls up the two inputs from the Gospel of John. Moreover, the latter two intertextually triggered mental spaces from the Gospel of John are not likely to be confined purely to the directly evoked verses. Upon grasping the references to John 6:53–54, a reader well acquainted with John is likely to recall additional aspects of the discourse on Jesus as the bread of life in John 6:48–58. Similarly, upon realising the reference to the Johannine prologue, that input space will not likely be limited to 1:14a. The resulting interpretive blend thus has the potential to create wideranging inferences, as the possible emergent meanings far surpass the simple statement of Gos. Phil. 57.4–7. For what does this blend of the Fourth Gospel’s prologue and bread of life discourse entail? What does it mean that the flesh of Jesus is directly identified as the Logos? For one thing it implies a direct link between Jesus’ flesh and the preexistent Logos of John 1, at the same time as this flesh is identified with the Eucharist and the flesh of the Son of Man mentioned in John 6. Some of the possible entailments of such a readerly intertextual integration network based on Gos. Phil. 57.4–7 are shown in fig. 20.

both argues in favour of a eucharistic interpretation (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 349), but also expresses his doubts, stating that “it remains uncertain” whether this passage refers to the Eucharist (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 345); cf. also Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine.”

102 This Johannine passage certainly establishes a eucharistic setting for this section in Gos. Phil. (cf. Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 195). Although Schenke notes that, “Man darf ja nicht ohne weiteres voraussetzen, daß unser Autor—wie wir Modernen—in Joh 6,51b–58 einen Zusatz sieht, in dem das Symbol des Lebensbrotes, unter dem bis dahin Jesus selbst und seine Worte verstanden wurden, gewaltsam und massiv auf die Eucharistie umgebogen worden ist. Es wäre ja durchaus möglich, daß er umgekehrt, tapfer und arglos, Joh 6,52b–58 von Joh 6,22–51a her interpretiert,” he comes to the conclusion that, “Im EvPhil insgesamt sind die Sakramente—mit Einschluß der Eucharistie—ein so wichtiges Thema, daß in diesem Lichte der theoretisch mögliche Zweifel an der sakramentalen Auffassung von # 23b doch verstummen muß” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 234).

103 Cf. the discussion of the blend at Exeg. Soul 134.28–29 in chapter 3.
A conspicuous aspect of *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7, which we have yet to take into consideration, however, is the identification of Jesus’ blood with the Holy Spirit. What does this blend tell us concerning the status and function of the Holy Spirit? The identification of the Holy Spirit with the blood of Jesus must be seen in connection with several other descriptions of the Holy Spirit in *Gos. Phil.*, as well as a range of important scriptural intertexts. Throughout *Gos. Phil.* the Holy Spirit is connected to such concepts as life, light, fire, blood, breath, wind, to motherhood and virginity, and sacramentally to both the chrisms and the Eucharist. We will look closer at each one of these connections, but first, in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Logos, we should once again take the Johannine prologue into consideration. We see from the figure above that with Jesus’ flesh being the Logos, and his blood the Holy Spirit, a possible inference from this blend is that the Holy Spirit is within the Logos in the same way as the life—which-is-light is within the Logos according to John 1:4, and as blood is within the flesh of the human body.

As we shall see in what follows, the relationship between the Logos and the Holy Spirit is crucial to the Christology of *Gos. Phil.* and central to the understanding of the relationship and parallelism between Christ and the individual Christian. We saw that *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7 described Jesus saying that those who do not eat his flesh and drink his blood do not have life in them. There is also another important Johannine intertext that must be taken into consideration with regard to the concept of having life in oneself, namely John 5:26:

> ἥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἔτεκτεν παῦρ γρααὶ ἡρῴτη ταξι σὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ἐνεμερε ἤν οὐκ ἔδωκεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ.  

For as the Father has life in him, thus also he has given to the Son to have life in him. (John 5:26)

It has been argued that this Johannine passage draws on the discourse in Wis 15:15–19 concerning the maker of idols who is unable to pass on his own “borrowed” life to the idols. In what follows we shall see that this passage from the Wisdom of Solomon is in fact alluded to elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, and that the concept of the transfer of life from father to son is highly significant in *Gos. Phil.*’s overall rhetoric.

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104 The Greek text reads: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τῷ νἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

3.1.4. *Procreation and Kinship*

Metaphors of procreation and kinship are indeed pervasive in *Gos. Phil.*, and are used in most of its major discourses.

3.1.4.1. *Adam as Prototype*

*Gos. Phil.* refers to the account of the creation and fall of Man in Genesis in several ways to set up an antitype to Christ, and to explain the ultimate cause of the wrongs the Saviour comes to right, i.e., it is used as a background for the Christ event. The description of the creation of Man in Gen 2:7 is for instance employed in quite an original fashion by *Gos. Phil.* to argue that Adam had two mothers:

\[
\text{Adam came into being from two virgins, from the spirit and from the virgin earth.} \quad (\text{Gos. Phil. 71.16–18})
\]

Genesis 2:7 describes how Adam was formed “from the earth” (ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς) and given life by the inbreathing of “the breath of life” (πνεῦμα ζωῆς). *Gos. Phil.* identifies the latter with the spirit, and in this way gets its “two virgins.” Moreover, since he came into being from two virgins, Adam has two mothers. We may infer that these “mothers” are not on the same level, however, since it is described on the previous page of the manuscript that what came into being from the spirit/breath was his “soul” (ΨΥΧΗ). This passage also utilises Gen 2:7, but sets up a blend that also includes several other important Genesis passages, and offers the following intriguing exegesis:

\[
\text{It was from a breath that Adam’s soul came into being. Its partner was the spirit. That which was given him was his mother. His soul was [taken] and he was given [life] in its place.} \quad (\text{Gos. Phil. 70.22–26})
\]

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106 ΨΥΧΗ is no longer visible on the photographs in the *Facsimile Edition*, but has been read in earlier photographs of the manuscript (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 182).

This passage not only refers to Gen 2:7, but also to 2:21–23 and 3:20. The first part, describing how the soul of Adam came into being from “a breath” (ὀνειρεῖ) and that its/her partner was the spirit clearly recalls Gen 2:7. The further, and on the face of it puzzling, statement that Adam was given “his mother” is easily explained as Adam’s reception of the spirit, based on Gen 2:7, and by the statement, quoted above, that Adam came into being from two virgins, the spirit and the earth. Since Adam has the spirit as one of his two virgin mothers, and since the spirit is described as being given to him, it stands to reason that Adam was in fact given “his mother” when he was given the spirit.\(^{108}\) The spirit is thus paradoxically at the same time both Adam’s mother and his soul’s partner.\(^{109}\) Moreover, with the spirit being specifically the mother of Adam’s soul, as this passage states it, his other mother, “the virgin earth” (πηγὴ ἀναγεννησός), may by extension be regarded simply as the mother of his body.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{108}\) Thomassen, however, asserts that “the phrase πηγη ἀναγεννησός . . . τεκμασί cannot be correct” and suggests that some words might be missing, venturing as a possible emendation, πηγη ἀναγεννησός πατρὶ μοι (ἐκ θεοῦ γεννήτοις θεταί) το τεκμασί (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 445). As Schenke points out, however, the manuscript reading is “in sich grammatisch und auch semantisch ohne Tadel” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 415). Nevertheless, Schenke, who, like Thomassen, interprets the text on the basis of “Valentinianism,” also has problems making sense of the text as it stands, and opts to change it. Schenke argues that one does not expect the text to go on from its identification of the spirit as the soul’s partner to a statement concerning what the spirit is, but rather one concerning its origin or who gave it, concluding that, “wenn man diesen Satz im Kontext verstehen will, kommt man wohl nicht um die Diagnose einer Textverderbnis herum,” and suggests to change the text to πηγη (τι) το πατρί μοι, and translates “Der, (der) ihn ihm gegeben hat, war seine Mutter” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 415). A description of the spirit is, however, exactly what I think we have here, and there is consequently no need to emend the text, which in my view makes good sense as it is.

\(^{109}\) Although it is a feature that has often given its modern interpreters a hard time, sometimes even causing them to alter the preserved text (see above), Gos. Phil. seems to revel in paradoxes. See below for a discussion of how Gos. Phil.’s views on the Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene parallels this motif of the spirit as both mother and partner.

\(^{110}\) Both of these terms, “the spirit” (πνεὺς) and “the earth” (πηγὴ) are grammatically masculine in Coptic. In Greek, “the earth” (ἡ γῆ) is feminine, while “the spirit” (τὸ πνεῦμα) is neuter. In Hebrew and Syriac, however, both terms are feminine (see, e.g., Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 220–221; Pétrement, A Separate God, 75). Reference to Adam having been brought forth by the virgin earth is also found in, e.g., Ireneaeus, Haer. III.21.10; Ephrem, HNat. 1,16 (see Robert Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition [London: Cambridge University Press, 1975], 145 n. 2); and in Jacob of Serugh (see Sebastian P. Brock, “Baptismal Themes in the Writings of Jacob of Serugh,” in Symposium Syriacum 1976: célébré du 13 au 17 septembre 1976 au Centre Culturel “Les Fontaines” de Chantilly (France) [OrChrAn 205; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1978], 332).
The final part of the passage quoted above is somewhat more complicated. Adam’s ψυχή is taken, and he is given something else in its place. Now, what was he given in return for his ψυχή? Unfortunately there is a lacuna at exactly this point in the manuscript. In 1959, Schenke proposed to reconstruct [πῦ ἐ]πεσμα, “[Geist] an ihrer Stelle,” a reconstruction that was later adopted by, among others, Layton in his critical edition.\(^\text{111}\)

This reconstruction is problematic, however. In the first part of the passage Adam is clearly given the spirit, but in the latter part it does not really make sense that it is “the spirit” (πῦ), which has just been identified as the soul’s “partner” (ψωτρ),\(^\text{112}\) which is given to Adam as a replacement for his soul (ψυχή).

The idea that Adam’s soul was taken from him is evidently an interpretation of the account of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–23. The description of God taking Adam’s rib to create his female counterpart is here interpreted as his soul being taken away from him, an interpretation that finds support in the fact that Eve, as the female part of the original ἄνθρωπος, was often interpreted as originally being inside him,\(^\text{113}\) as we have also seen in our discussion of Exeg. Soul. Like in Exeg. Soul, the part taken out of the original ἄνθρωπος is also in Gos. Phil. interpreted as his soul. The novel twist in Gos. Phil. lies in what Adam is given in return. Gen 2:21 notes that the place from where Adam’s rib was taken is filled with flesh, but this does not seem to be relevant to Gos. Phil.’s interpretation, and the lacuna in question is not large enough to reconstruct ψαρξ (“flesh”).\(^\text{114}\) Instead, Gos. Phil. seems to focus on the fact that Gen 2:22 says that Adam is given a woman in return, a woman that Adam in Gen 3:20, after the fall, names “Eve,” “because she was the mother of all living” (ὅτι αὕτη μήτηρ πάντων τῶν ζῶντων). In the Greek of the Septuagint, “Eve” is here rendered ζωή, which means “life,” and the Coptic equivalent of this is θεώ.\(^\text{115}\) It thus seems likely that Adam is here given θεώ (“life”) in return for his soul, i.e., he is given Eve as described in Gen 2:22–23 and 3:20. I have therefore chosen to reconstruct the lacuna at Gos. Phil. 70.26 accordingly as άρπν ἔνογθεν ἑπεσμα, “he was given [life] in

\(^{111}\) See note 107 above.

\(^{112}\) Gos. Phil. 70.23–24.

\(^{113}\) See, e.g., Kugel, Traditions of the Bible, 85–86; Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, 83, 301–304.

\(^{114}\) The Coptic equivalent άρπν is too short, and only attested at Gos. Phil. 80.27 in a very different context. The term ψαρξ, however, is used frequently throughout the text.

\(^{115}\) See Crum 525b.
Adam thus has one feminine aspect taken away from him and another one given back. His “soul” (ψυϰη) is taken and, if my reconstruction is correct, “life” (ⲱⲛϩ) is given in return.

Here we should also take into consideration the fact that the Greek word ψυϰη (ψυϰη) not only denotes “soul,” but also “life.” There is thus a potential play on words in this passage, where the tractate makes a point both of the connection between Eve, as the woman given Adam in return, and “life,” and between the “soul” and “life.”117 Thus in a polysemically based blend, Adam’s original life (his soul/life) is taken from him and a new “life” is given in return. This should probably not be taken too literally, but the juxtaposition between the taking of Adam’s original life and its replacement by a new one, would rather seem to highlight his loss of eternal life and its replacement by its earthly counterpart, i.e., mortality. Nevertheless, the passage may function on several levels simultaneously, as we will see below when we turn to consider the meaning of “life” and “death” in Gos. Phil. more broadly, and the tractate’s many parallelisms between the garden of Eden narrative and the life and deeds of Christ. It is, however, the latter, the life and deeds of Christ, which we will turn to first.

3.1.4.2. The Conception and Birth of Christ
A logical place to continue our analysis of the Christology of Gos. Phil. is with its views on Christ’s incarnation. Here the tractate is rather difficult to interpret. The first problem concerns the role of the Virgin Mary. That “Christ was born from a virgin” (ἀγνηπεξεχε εβο λ ριουταρθηνος)118 is affirmed in a comparison with Adam, who, as we have seen, is alleged to have come into being from two virgins.119 Gos. Phil. also stresses the virginity of the Virgin Mary in connection with the birth of Christ in an apparently polemically slanted and rather tricky passage:


116 The giving of life is also nicely paralleled a few lines above where it is said of Christ that he shall come to those who have died and ευαγγελιζω “he will give them life” (Gos. Phil. 70.16–17). We shall return to this passage in detail below.

117 The latter also seems to be the case in Gos. Phil. 53.6–9.

118 Gos. Phil. 71.19.

119 Gos. Phil. 71.16–17.
Some say that Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit. They are wrong. They do not know what they are saying. When did a female ever conceive by a female? “Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled.”

(Gos. Phil. 55.23–28)

The suggestion that the Virgin Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit is ridiculed by Gos. Phil. on the grounds that the Holy Spirit is female. Since females do not conceive by females, argues Gos. Phil., the Virgin Mary cannot have conceived by the Holy Spirit. Mary is still to be referred to as a virgin, but this is in relation to the “powers” (ⲏⲡⲙⲓⲧⲓ), and not in relation to Joseph, whose actual fatherhood Gos. Phil. indeed seems to stress:

120 αὐ: ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχειν (cf. Matt 1:23).
121 For this phrase, see also Hyp. Arch. 92.2–3. It may be worth noting that the Coptic word that is here translated as “defiled,” χαρέ, is closely related to the word χαρέ, which means “smear,” or “anoint.” Considering the importance of the anointing in relation to sacramental begettings in Gos. Phil., the description of Mary’s undefiled state in relation to the “powers” might thus conceivably be read as a pun on the anointing, in which case it may signify that Mary did not conceive by the Holy Spirit because she was not defiled/smeared/anointed by any “power,” including the Holy Spirit. See below for a discussion of the continuation of the passage in relation to Gos. Phil.’s views regarding Hebrews/Jews and apostles.


123 According to Elaine Pagels, “Philip castigates those who believe that Jesus’ birth was an event that derived its significance from its uniqueness, a miraculous event in which a woman conceived by parthenogenesis” (Elaine H. Pagels, “Ritual in the Gospel of Philip,” in The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration [ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997], 285, and later in Elaine H. Pagels, “Irenaeus, ‘the Canon of Truth,’ and the Gospel of John: ‘Making a Difference’ Through Hermeneutics and Ritual,” VC 56 [2002]: 357). That Gos. Phil. holds that Jesus was conceived parthenogenetically is also the view of Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 77. It is quite clear, however, that it is not a theory of conception by parthenogenesis that is being confronted by Gos. Phil., but simply the idea that Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit (rather than by Joseph). Yet another idea has been presented by Brian McNeil, who argues on the basis of a rather late Christian Arabic Sibylline prophecy that if Jesus was born from two women he would be the Antichrist, and suggests that there might thus be “more to this logion than a sophisticated sneer at the illogical beliefs of the simple” (Brian McNeil, “New Light on Gospel of Philip 17,” JTS 29 [1978]: 143–146, esp. 144). This parallel seems quite spurious, however (cf. the refutation of this theory in Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 176 n. 133).

124 See Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, The Nature of the Archons: A Study in the Soteriology of
And the Lord [would] not [have] said, “my [father who is] in heaven,” unless he had [another] father, but he would simply have said, “[my father].”

(Gos. Phil. 55.33–36)

Scripture is here invoked to argue in favour of Christ having more than one father. The allusion, as so often in Gos. Phil., is to the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus repeatedly refers to “my father who is in heaven,” a phrase that is unique to Matthew among the four canonical gospels. That Christ has two fathers thus seems to imply the fatherhood of Joseph, a fatherhood which is also affirmed elsewhere in Gos. Phil. where Jesus is referred to directly as Joseph's seed. A biblical intertext that may be recalled here is Rom 1:3, where Paul describes Christ as one “who came into being from the seed of David according to the flesh” (παύς ἐπταμοῳμενῃ ἐβολῃ μηνεσπερῃ Μάγγας κατάκαρο). We have seen that Jesus is the “seed” of Joseph and that he is born by the Virgin Mary, who is a virgin only in relation to the “powers.” It is thus hard to resist the conclusion that in Gos. Phil.’s view, Jesus had Mary and Joseph as his real earthly parents.

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125 This part of the manuscript is heavily damaged, but on the basis of the preserved letters and Matt 16:17 the restoration of the passage is reasonably secure (cf. Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 47 n. 9).

126 For Gos. Phil.’s preference for Matthew among the synoptic gospels, see, e.g., Tuckett, Nag Hammadi, 72–81.


128 Gos. Phil. 73.9–15, esp. 14–15: μηνεψήρω το ἦν; (“his seed was Jesus”), but cf. Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 268; The Spiritual Seed, 91, who holds “Joseph” to be simply a reference to the Valentinian demiurge, a possibility that has also been suggested by Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 177. See below for a discussion of this passage.

129 Rom 1:3 (γενόμενον εὐ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα). By explicitly stating that Joseph’s “seed” was Jesus, Gos. Phil. also recalls Gal 3:16, where Christ is directly identified as the “seed of Abraham.” This is interesting not least in light of the fact that Gal 3 is also triggered elsewhere in the tractate.

born from Mary complete with the Logos as his flesh and the Holy Spirit as his blood? Or was just the earthly man, the material body of Jesus, born in this way? After having affirmed Jesus’ descent from David “according to the flesh,” in Rom 1:3, Paul continues in the next verse by describing Jesus as “the one who was fixed as Son of God in power according to the Spirit of purity from the resurrection of the dead” (πανταξτητοῦ ὑψηλῶς ἐπηνευτείτε γενναῖον Κατανεωμένῳ ὑπερβαίνω ἐπωνημοῦν). From a blend created from Rom 1:3–4 together with the Matthean phrase concerning his “father in heaven,” explicitly used by Gos. Phil., we may in fact infer that Christ in a sense had two fathers, and that he was first begotten and born according to the flesh and only later achieved the status of being the Son of God. Rom 1:4 indicates that Jesus’ sonship is connected to the resurrection. In what follows we will see whether this connection is made in Gos. Phil. as well, and we will investigate how and when Christ attains to full sonship. For if Gos. Phil. does not regard him as being born from Mary as the complete saviour there are basically two alternatives open to the tractate. He must either have attained to full sonship through adoption or some kind of second begetting and birth.

Keeping in mind the double-scope blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, which underlies much of Gos. Phil.’s rhetoric, the tractate’s insistence on the fatherhood of Joseph also has important implications for its underlying sacramental soteriology, since it strengthens the parallelism between the individual Christian and Christ. This parallelism will become especially apparent when we now turn to consider Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of the Jordan event, where it is useful to keep in mind the importance of the Spirit for Christ’s sonship according to Rom 1:4.132

3.1.4.3. The Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan
At the end of page 70 in the manuscript we encounter an enigmatic, but crucially important, passage that is most likely an interpretation of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan:

\[\text{ἀλεθινὸς} \text{πνεῦμα ἐν} \text{φωνῇ} \text{ἐκ} \text{πνεύματος θεοῦ.}\]

131 Rom 1:4 (ὁρισθέντος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεύμα ἐκ πνεύματος θεοῦ παλιν ἐπηνευτείτε γενναῖον Κατανεωμένῳ ὑπερβαίνω ἐπωνημοῦν).

132 We will return to the relationship between Gos. Phil. and Rom 1:3–5 below.
Jesus revealed [...] the Jordan, the [fullness of the kingdom] of heaven. He who [was begotten] before all things was begotten again. He [who was anointed] first was anointed again. He who was redeemed redeemed again. Indeed it is fitting to speak of a mystery. The Father of all things joined with the virgin who came down, and a fire illuminated him. On that day he revealed the great bridal chamber. It was because of this that his body came into being. On that day he came out from the bridal chamber like the one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride. Thus Jesus established everything within himself through these, and it is appropriate for each one of the disciples to walk into his rest. (Gos. Phil. 70.34–71.15)

The major problem of this notoriously difficult passage concerns the identities of “the virgin who came down” (τὴν ἐρχόμενην τὴν ἐμφάνισθην), “the father of all things” (πατὴρ ἐστὶν ὅλη σοι), and “the great bridal chamber” (παρθένου μνήμης). Despite the regrettable damage to the beginning of the passage, we may here still discern a direct reference to the river Jordan and to Jesus revealing or opening (εἰρήνη ἑαυτοῦ) something. I suggest that the passage is best understood primarily in the light of the canonical accounts of the Jordan event, cued already by the direct reference to the river. We shall see, however, that there are also other crucial intertexts that need to be invoked in order to make sense of the passage.

In the canonical gospels the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan is described in Matt 3:13–17, Mark 1:9–11, and Luke 3:21–22, while John only refers to it indirectly (John 1:31–33). From the references to begetting, and the phrase “on that day” (ἡ λήξις ἐγένετο) in the passage quoted above, the Lukan variant reading with the wording “this day I have begotten thee” seems to be the most relevant of these accounts for the interpretation of our passage. Moreover, while all the synoptic accounts and even the Gospel of John include the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus in the form of a dove, only Luke specifies that the Spirit comes down “in bodily

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133 ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε (Luke 3:22). David Tripp (Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 254–255) rightly notes that Gos. Phil. probably knew this version of the gospel tradition. This wording also appears, however, to have been the one used in the Diatessaron (see Kilian McDonnell, The Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan: The Trinitarian and Cosmic Order of Salvation [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996], 93), so we cannot rule out the possibility of the Diatessaron, rather than Luke itself, being the chief authorial input text, and also a more relevant intertext for the prospective reader. The formula is also found in Heb 1:5, 5:5, and Ps 2:7.

134 Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32.
form” (σωματικῶς/ρήγοςιντίκως), which may be echoed in Gos. Phil.’s reference to “his body” (πεισόμα).

Taking the primary setting to be the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, my suggestion is that the “virgin who came down” is to be identified with the Holy Spirit descending upon Jesus. There are several reasons for this. As we have already seen, the Holy Spirit is regarded as a female entity in Gos. Phil. Secondly, the identification of “the virgin who came down” with the Holy Spirit also accords with the identification of the spirit as one of the virgin mothers of Adam in the paradise account discussed above.135

The identification of “the father of all things” is more difficult, 136 but if we proceed from the assumption that “the virgin who came down” refers to the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan,

135 There has been no lack of suggestions with regard to the identity of “the virgin who came down,” including Sophia (see Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 177; Jean-Daniel Kaestli, “Valentinisme italien et valentinisme oriental: leurs divergences a propos de la nature du corps de Jesus,” in The School of Valentinus [ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1980], 399; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 92); Sophia Achamoth (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 17 n. 154; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 53 n. 11; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 419; Jean-Marie Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles dans l’Évangile selon Philippe,” Mus 87 [1974]: 160; Franzmann, Jesus, 50–51); Sophia-Mary Magdalene (see Yvonne Janssens, “L’Évangile selon Philippe,” Mus 81 [1968]: 109); the Holy Spirit (see Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 164; Pagels, “Ritual,” 285); Mary, as the psychic consort of the demiurge (see Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 177, who rejects this possibility); the Virgin Mary (see Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 146; Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 202); “the heavenly Mary” (see Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley and Deirdre J. Good, “Sacramental Language and Verbs of Generating, Creating, and Begetting in the Gospel of Philip,” JECS 51 [1997]: 17); Jesus (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 257; see also note below).

136 Suggestions have included the Father (see Franzmann, Jesus, 50); the supreme aeon (see Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 146; Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 202; see also Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 177, who ultimately rejects it); Christ (see Franzmann, Jesus, 50); the Saviour (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 17 n. 153; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 53 n. 10; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 419; Janssens, “L’Évangile selon Philippe,” 109; Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 160; Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, 177; Franzmann, Jesus, 50); the Logos-Saviour (see Kaestli, “Valentinisme,” 399; Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 202). Einar Thomassen, interpreting Gos. Phil. on the basis of “Valentinian” theology, suggests and rejects the possibility that the father in this passage may be the Saviour and that “the virgin who came down” is Sophia, and comes to the conclusion that “the virgin who came down” is actually Jesus, who in baptism is re-united with the pleromatic “Father of the Totality” (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 257). In his recent monograph, however, Thomassen seems rather to want it both ways, and now holds “the virgin who came down” primarily to be Sophia (see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 92), but also “the Saviour … cast in the role of the female partner and bride in the marital union” (see ibid., 98).
then the “father of all things” should in some way refer to Jesus. The use of
the title “the father of all things” (πατὴρ όλων τῶν ἔχουσιν) presents him as the cre-
ator of all things, which makes good sense in light of the prologue of the
Gospel of John, where it is the Logos who is specifically described in such
terms: “It was through him that everything came into being” (ὁ πατὴρ όλων τῶν ἔχουσιν
ἐστι σὺν τοῖς ἐναὐσιν), states John 1:3.137 As we shall see, it is also highly
significant that John goes on to state in 1:4 that, “that which came into
being within him was life, and life was the light of men” (ὁ πατὴρ όλων τῶν ἔχουσιν
γενναίος ἑστι καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστιν).138 Moreover, the
reference in this passage to “He who [was begotten] before all things”
(ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πρῶτος ὁ λόγος) also recalls the statement that the Logos
was with God in the beginning (John 1:2), and other statements to that
effect elsewhere in John. So it seems to fit the context best to identify “the
Father of all things” with the Logos,139 and “the virgin who came down”
with the Holy Spirit. Significantly, it is these two entities that constitute
the flesh and blood of Jesus according to Gos. Phil. In the present passage
we thus seem to be witnessing the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the
Logos at the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, which, Gos. Phil. informs us,
is properly described as “a mystery” (ὁμογενεσία), where “the Father
of all things joined (πατὴρ) with the virgin who came down, and a fire
illuminated him (πάντα οὐδὲν ἐγένετο).
137 πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο.
138 Ὅ γενότεν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐστιν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
139 For the identification of Christ, the Logos, as “the Father of all things” (πατὴρ όλων τῶν ἔχουσιν), see also Shenoute, The Lord Thundered, DU 18 (É. Amélineau, Œuvres de
1:368).
140 Gos. Phil. 71.8.
141 Suggestions have included the Pleroma (see Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 147),
the Virgin Mary (see Sebastian P. Brock, “Passover, Annunciation and Epiclesis: Some
of the body of Christ also seems to be described in terms of a begetting and seems to involve an anointing. As is stated at the beginning of the passage, he who was begotten and anointed in the beginning was anointed and begotten again.\textsuperscript{142} Joining and begetting are of course exactly the kind of things that are supposed to happen in a bridal chamber. The imagery of begetting and joining is thus connected logically to the imagery of the bridal chamber by way of being closely linked concepts within the same domain or ICM of marriage and procreation. The connections to the anointing and the illuminating fire do not belong naturally to that same ICM, but the association of fire and light to begetting on the one hand, and to anointing with chrism on the other, is explicitly stated in \textit{Gos. Phil.:}

\begin{verbatim}
εβολ  ψωγιμοοι  νιογκιατ  ιτατγιξ[ν]  νιππαι  οκπε  εβολ  ψωγιμοοι
νιογκιατ  ινιογαιε  ιταντιμε  ινιγιμφαι  πκαρτ  ιε  παρεια  πουαιν
πε  πκαρτ

It was from water and fire that the soul and the spirit came into being. It was from water and fire and light that the son of the bridal chamber (came into being).\textsuperscript{143} The fire is the chrism, the light is the fire.\textsuperscript{(Gos. Phil. 67.2–6)}

So, water, fire, and light are the elements needed to generate a “son of the bridal chamber,” and both fire and light are connected with the chrism. Water, in the context of a discussion of Jesus’ baptism in the Jordan, must of course refer to the baptismal waters. The description of the fire illuminating Jesus at his baptism, when the Logos joined with the Holy Spirit and “his body came into being,”\textsuperscript{144} seems to refer to the chrismation,\textsuperscript{145} and light seems here as elsewhere in \textit{Gos. Phil.} to refer to the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{146}

The connection between fire and chrism is also made elsewhere in \textit{Gos. Phil.:}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{142} This may either refer to his creation before all things, or alternatively, to Jesus’ later anointings referred to in the canonical Gospels (Matt 26:7; Mark 14:3; Luke 7:37–38; John 12:3; 19:39–40; cf. Craig A. Evans, et al., \textit{Nag Hammadi Texts and the Bible: A Synopsis and Index} [NTTS 18; Leiden: Brill, 1993], 160).
\textsuperscript{143} Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
\textsuperscript{144} See \textit{Gos. Phil.} 71.6–8.
\textsuperscript{145} Cf. Thomassen, \textit{The Spiritual Seed}, 94. Pagels takes the reference to “his body” here to indicate the church as the body of Christ (Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 164).
\textsuperscript{146} The connection between the Holy Spirit and fire is also made in Matt 3:11 = Luke 3:16, and John 1:33 in certain manuscripts (including P\textsuperscript{70} and the Sahidic manuscripts) in a baptismal setting, and in Acts 2:3–4 at Pentecost.
\end{flushleft}
It is by means of water and fire that everything is purified, the revealed by means of the revealed, the hidden by means of the hidden. There are some (things) that are hidden by means of the revealed. There is water in water, there is fire in chrism. (Gos. Phil. 57.22–28)

Put slightly differently, then, when Jesus was baptised in the waters of the Jordan and he was anointed with the Holy Spirit, “his body” (περισσωμ) came into being as a result of the unification of the Logos and the Holy Spirit. This anointing thus seems at one and the same time to constitute both a joining and a begetting, and is consequently aptly described in terms of the goings on in a bridal chamber. Later, the tractate supplies more details of this process:

He who has been anointed has everything. He has the resurrection, the light, the cross, the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him this in the bridal chamber (νυμφών). He received, and the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the Father. (Gos. Phil. 74.18–24)

In his anointing, then, Christ, and it seems also the individual Christian, receives “everything” (παντα), as it is also stated in the Jordan passage that through the processes associated with his baptism, “Jesus established everything within himself” (ανε τε εντε παντα ερασυ ερα ανε αμη). And “everything” here includes the Holy Spirit, a reception of which is also referred to towards the end of the tractate, once again directly connected to the imagery of the bridal chamber: “If one becomes a son/child of the bridal chamber (νυμψων), he will receive the light” (εφαγων ομω
Another clue to the nature of the “everything” contained within Jesus is given in a passage close to the beginning of the tractate, which states that, “Christ has everything within himself, whether man or angel or mystery and the Father” (πεπλήρωκεν οὐκ ἡμί ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἑκάτερον ἄγγελος ἐν αὐτῷ μυστήριον ἐκ τοῦ πατρός). These statements must of course be read in light of such New Testament passages as Col 2:9, concerning the bodily indwelling of all the fullness of the divinity in Christ, and the verses in John referring to Jesus and the Father as being one, and within each other.

That the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and the begetting of the body of Christ as described in these passages may aptly be presented metaphorically in terms of bridal chamber imagery is readily understandable, but it still does not answer the question concerning the identity of the metaphorical target which Gos. Phil. describes in terms of a “bridal chamber.” It will be shown below that this is an ICM that may be used to frame several different inputs, so at this point we will limit the analysis to the identity of “the great bridal chamber” (πίστεν ἐν αὐτῶ) mentioned in the Jordan passage. The setting being as it is, and the joining being one between the Logos and the Holy Spirit, there seem to be two possibilities available to us. One is simply that the term refers to the ritual act(s) of baptism and/or chrismation at the Jordan, which opened up these ritual acts for the (re)enactment by Christians. Another compelling possibility is that the term may be understood as a reference to the body of Christ, for the body of Christ may itself be regarded as the “bridal chamber” within which the Logos and Holy Spirit, the flesh and blood of Jesus, are joined. Finally, the concept of the bridal chamber may here simply be understood as a reference to the process of joining and begetting rather than as a reference to where it took place.

Importantly, however, these possibilities are by no means mutually exclusive. In an interpretation of the passage in question the more specific referential and christological aspects and the more general processual

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153 Gos. Phil. 86.4–5. Cf. also Gos. Phil. 67.3–5.
154 Gos. Phil. 56.13–15.
155 xheire̱p̱w̱a̱ḵ tw̱i̱f̱i̱ ẖi̱ṯw̱i̱ ṯẖi̱o̱γ̱w̱ṯe̱ o̱g̱a̱ ẖi̱ṯw̱i̱ c̱a̱w̱ṉṯi̱ḵa̱c̱ /ɔ̱p̱i̱ e̱ṉ a̱u̱ṯw̱ ḵa̱ṯo̱m̱e̱i̱ p̱a̱ṉ ṯo̱ ẖi̱ḻm̱o̱m̱e̱i̱ ṯẖɔ̱ ṯẖi̱ṯẖe̱ṯẖo̱s̱ s̱o̱m̱a̱ṯi̱ḵo̱s̱.
156 See John 10:30, 38; 14:7, 9–11, 20; 17:21, 23.
157 Such a three-levelled constitution of Christ may also be implicit in some of Gos. Phil.’s uses of temple imagery (see below for discussion).
and ritual aspects may fruitfully be blended, not least in subsequent interpretations of the deeper meaning and significance of both the rituals in question and the tractate’s implied Christology. We will return to the question of the implications of this understanding of the baptism of Jesus for the understanding of the function of the Christian rituals below, but first we must take a look at how this understanding of the generation of Christ parallels the tractate’s understanding of the constitution and actions of the first man, Adam.

We have seen that through his (first) begetting and birth, from Joseph and Mary, either as simply the body of the earthly Jesus, or as the Logos incarnated, and his second begetting and birth at the baptism in the Jordan, with its joining together of the Holy Spirit and the Logos, Jesus “established everything within himself.” In fact, these conclusions regarding the birth and baptism of Jesus reveal an interesting conceptual blend between the figures of Adam and Christ, and one that is also pointed out quite explicitly by Gos. Phil. in a passage already referred to several times in the discussion above, where the tractate explains exactly why it is that Jesus must be born from a virgin:

Adam came into being from two virgins, from the spirit and from the virginearth. Therefore Christ was born from a virgin, so that he might rectify the fall that happened in the beginning.  

(Gos. Phil. 71.16–21)

Several scholars have assumed that since Adam is described as having come into being from two virgins, and since Christ came specifically to rectify Adam’s primordial mistakes, then Gos. Phil. here implies that Christ had to be born of one virgin mother, rather than two as was the case with Adam. From what is stated in various places throughout the text, however, it may be gathered that Christ in fact also seems to have come into being from two virgin mothers, namely the Virgin Mary and “the virgin who came down,” i.e., the Holy Spirit, and that he

160 Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 422; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 92.
indeed also had two fathers, Joseph and God the Father. We thus get the Adam-Christ conceptual integration network shown in fig. 21. We see that both Adam and Christ have two mothers, one of which is earthly and the other being a spirit. The latter is indeed in both cases described as being the mother of its recipient, and as the partner of, in Adam’s case, the soul, and, in the case of Christ, the Logos. A highly interesting entailment of this blend is that the Logos, Christ’s flesh, is conceptually on the level of Adam’s soul, an entailment which we shall see carries potentially great significance for the sacramental soteriology of the tractate as a whole.

The enigmatic reference to Christ coming out of the bridal chamber recalls Ps 18:5 LXX. It may, however, also be interpreted as a metaphor highlighting the parallels between this second begetting and birth in the Jordan and the first, natural one, since Christ is described as coming out “like the one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride.” It may thus be read as a metaphorical description of what happened at Jesus’ baptism in the river Jordan, which at one and the same time refers to subsequent ritual reenactment by Christian priests and initiates, and recalls his begetting and birth from the Virgin Mary. Jesus’ birth according to the flesh thereby becomes simultaneously a metaphor and a prefiguration for both his own baptism and that of the Christians.

From what we have found concerning Gos. Phil’s statements on the birth and baptism of Jesus, it seems reasonably clear that Jesus was not born completely as the Saviour until his baptism in the Jordan. It also seems clear that the Holy Spirit did not enter into Jesus until this event, where it united with his Logos, and the body (ⲥⲱⲙⲁ) of Christ was “begotten.” Thus, Gos. Phil’s statement concerning the baptismal rebirth

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162 Cf. Franzmann, Jesus, 49, 52; Pagels, “Ritual,” 285. According to Thomassen, however, Jesus’ two virgin mothers are Sophia and Mary, and his two fathers are “the transcendent father” and “the Demiurge (‘Joseph’)” (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 91–92). Catherine Trautmann argues that the Saviour’s two fathers correspond to Adam’s two mothers (see Catherine Trautmann, “La parenté dans l’Évangile selon Philippe,” in Colloque International sur les textes de Nag Hammadi [Québec, 22–25 août 1978] [ed. Bernard Barc, BCNH Études 1; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1981], 274).

163 The contrast between the first Adam as the one brought forth by “the virgin earth” and the new Adam (Christ) brought forth by the Virgin Mary is also found in, e.g., Irenaeus, Haer. III.21.10 (like Gos. Phil., Irenaeus uses it as an argument for the fact that Christ was born from a virgin), as well as in Ephrem, HNat. 1,16 (see Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, 145 n. 2), and in Jacob of Serugh (see Brock, “Baptismal Themes,” 332).

164 Cf. also Joel 2:16.
of the Christian initiates, namely that “when we were begotten we were joined” (ἡντρογχυμαν ἀγνοτρηί),¹⁶⁵ may be said to be equally true for the baptism of Jesus, where he was begotten when his Logos united with the Holy Spirit.

As for the Logos, here there are two main possibilities. Either it was born through the Virgin Mary or it descended at the Jordan along with the Holy Spirit. However, the fact that there is a clear reference to the descent of the spirit at the Jordan, but no references that may reasonably be taken to refer to any descent of the Logos, makes it seem most probable that the Logos was born through Mary. Now, where does this leave Joseph? And does this mean that the Jesus who was born of Mary was incorporeal? We have seen that the Logos is described as both “the father of all things” and as existing “before everything,” both of which make it unlikely that it is to be equated with the seed of Joseph. We thus seem to be left, as the most viable solution, with the conclusion that the earthly body of Jesus was begotten by Joseph and born of Mary, while at the same time containing the Logos within it. Jesus’ true body then seems only to come into being when the Logos is united with the Holy Spirit at baptism, within the body of the earthly Jesus.¹⁶⁶

Majella Franzmann has argued that even though Jesus is described as having flesh and blood, “this does not mean that he is human,” and she suggests that even though Jesus might be a human being prior to the Jordan event, “his transformation there leaves no doubt that thereafter he is a spiritual being. The gospel tells us that his flesh is the Logos (57.2) and his blood is the Holy Spirit (57.6–7).”¹⁶⁷ We should remember, however, that “his flesh” in this context should most probably be understood as Jesus’ true flesh, which, as we have seen from Gos. Phil’s interpretation of the transfiguration, was normally hidden from view.¹⁶⁸ That his true flesh (σὰρξ) is the Logos, and his blood (σῶμα) is the Holy Spirit does not necessarily imply that Jesus did not have a material body (σῶμα) in addition to the body that came into being at his baptism. One implication we may draw from Gos. Phil. is that Jesus’ true flesh and blood—his true

¹⁶⁵ Gos. Phil. 69.8; see below for a discussion of this passage.
¹⁶⁶ This view is not without patristic attestation. See, e.g., Aloys Grillmeier, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) (vol. 1 of Christ in Christian Tradition; trans. John Bowden; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975); Grillmeier, The Church of Alexandria.
¹⁶⁷ Franzmann, Jesus, 72.
¹⁶⁸ Cf. Gos. Phil. 58.2–3. The term “true flesh” seems to be used at Gos. Phil. 68.35 ([OFΣΙΑΡΣ ΤΗ ΗΛΙΟΝΗ], but the damage to the manuscript at this point sadly makes any reconstruction and interpretation of the passage where it appears highly conjectural. For a hypothetical reconstruction of the passage, see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 46.
body—was in a sense normally hidden within his material body, the body that may be identified with the seed of Joseph. We shall see more indications that point in this direction when we later turn to consider Gos. Phil’s interpretation of the crucifixion, where Christ’s divinity abandons the earthly body on the cross.

3.1.4.4. Kinship
By now it should be evident that imagery related to procreation and kinship is central to the rhetoric of Gos. Phil. It is precisely this aspect we will now turn to, starting with the tractate’s construction and prompting of blends involving fatherhood and sonship. In the following passage, which will serve as our starting point, Gos. Phil. calls upon biological aspects of the ICM of a father-son relationship as a conceptual framing (source) input:

\[ \text{The father makes a son, and it is impossible for the son to make a son. For it is impossible for the one who has been born to beget, but the son acquires/begets brothers, not sons.} \]  
\[ \text{(Gos. Phil. 58.22–26)} \]

Gos. Phil. here seems to play on the polysemy of the Coptic word χιο. The word may be translated variously as “beget,” “give birth to,” or “acquire,” and, remarkably, the passage seems to utilise all three of these denotations. Gos. Phil. asserts that the son cannot, like his father, create sons, but may only acquire/beget (χιο) brothers. The explanation given for the son’s inability to create a son is that “it is impossible for the one who has been born (χιο) to beget (χιο).” Now, what are we to make of this passage, and why is it impossible for the son do as his father? It is safe to assume that this father-son relationship should be interpreted metaphorically, and the tractate is here giving us only framing inputs, while keeping the target(s) implicit. What may be the reason for the son’s inability to beget? From the everyday-life source ICM of fatherhood and sonship, the inference may be drawn that the son should here probably be regarded as a child. Children, as we all know, cannot reproduce. Bentley Layton’s free translation makes this assumption explicit:

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170 Buckley’s assertion that the Coptic term χιο here “implies a spiritual, not a material, creation of siblings” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4182) is only half right. The term denotes literal biological begetting, a denotation which in this context is used metaphorically and in playful combination with the word’s sense of “acquire.”
A parent makes children and a (young) child is powerless to make children. For one who has (recently) been born cannot be a parent: rather, a child gets brothers, not children. 171

Significantly, the further inference may be drawn from this ICM that when the son eventually grows up and becomes mature, as sons do, he may one day become a father himself. 172 But what is the target input we are here implicitly prompted to activate? 173 To answer this question we need to consider a couple of other passages where Gos. Phil. uses metaphors of procreation. In another intriguing, if slightly confusing, passage, the tractate discusses the terms “create” (ωντ) and “beget” (χιο). Notice the nice rhetorical symmetry of the statements:

πενταρχι ετρευσώντ ουγιον ςε
πενταρχι εχιον ουχιον ςε
πετκοντ ηιδον ηιξιον
πετκνο ουηιον ηικιον
cεκαν δε ηιον χεπτκοντ χιο
cλα πευχιον ουγιον ςε

He who has received the ability to create (ωντ) 174 is a creature (ωντ). 175

He who has received (the ability) to beget (χιο) 176 is a begotten one (χιο). 177

He who creates (ωντ) cannot (ηιδον) beget (χιο). He who begets (χιο) can (ουιον) create (ωντ).

They say that he who creates (ωντ) begets (χιο), but his “offspring” (χιο) is a creature (ωντ). 178 (Gos. Phil. 81.21–26)

171 Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 334. Although this translation obscures the word-plays and hence does not capture the passage’s broad range of connotations, I would argue in favor of the gist of this interpretation since it does indeed highlight the potentiality of the son to eventually become mature. See also Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 191, and the discussion in Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 257–260. Cf. also Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 157.

172 Cf. Gos. Phil. 60.1–6; 61.29–32.

173 Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley and Deirdre Good claim that in this passage and in its discussion about being born of one versus two parents, the difference highlighted in Gos. Phil. is one between a horizontal versus a vertical relationship, and anacronistically invoke the difference between cloning and generation (Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 6–7).

174 ωντ: κτιζειν, ποιειν.

175 ωντ: κτισις, κτισμα, ποιημα.

176 χιο: γενεσις, γενετη, γενναν, γενναθαι, τεκνογονειν, τικτειν, σπειρειν.

177 χιο: γενεσις, γεννασθαι, γεννημα, γεννητος, (παλαγ)γενεσια, ροομα, τεκνογονια.

178 For a highly similar discussion of the differences between creating and begettting, see Coptic Manuscript М76б in the Pierpont Morgan Library, published by Leo Depuydt as Coptic fragment No. 82, a Homiletic Fragment without attribution (Leo Depuydt,
Once again Gos. Phil. is playing on words, this time σωτρ and χιο, which are here both used as predicates and objects. According to Gos. Phil., then, only those who have been begotten have the potentiality to beget. While such a person may also create, it is impossible for those who have merely been created to beget, despite the fact that one may refer metaphorically to an act of mere creation as begetting. In other words, only one who has been begotten himself can create others who may also obtain the power to beget. In contrast to proper begetting, creating does not imply any kinship relations, descent, succession, or inheritance. It is here of utmost significance that begetting involves fathers and sons, rather than creators and creations. In order to be able to continue a lineage, and to receive one’s “maker’s” abilities, it is necessary to be begotten, rather than made.

Gos. Phil. links its discussion of the differences between being created and begotten directly to Christ, referred to here as the Son of Man:

There is the Son of Man and there is the son of the Son of Man. The Lord is the Son of Man and the son of the Son of Man is he who creates through the Son of Man. The Son of Man received from God the ability to create. He has the ability to beget. (Gos. Phil. 81.14–21)

Here Christ as the Son of Man (ποιηρε ἔπρωμε)\(^\text{179}\) is described as having received the power to create (σωτρ) from his father. This does not mean that he himself is a creature (σωτρ), however, since he is also described as having the ability to beget (χιο). And, as we have seen, one who has been begotten may both create and beget. It follows from this that the son of the Son of Man (ποιηρε ἔπρωμε ἔπρωμε), who is described as creating (σωτρ) through the Son of Man,\(^\text{180}\) since he is a son, is also begotten and hence also has the power to beget (χιο). We will return below to the

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\(^{179}\) Layton, however, chooses to translate the term as “the child of the human being,” relegating the traditional epithet, “son of man,” to a footnote (Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 350).

identity of the son of the Son of Man, but first we need to consider some related uses of procreation imagery in Gos. Phil. It may be remarked here, however, that whoever he is, the son of the Son of Man stands in a direct line of descent from God, the Father, through Christ, the Lord, and has the ability to extend this lineage through his own offspring. His act of creating (σωτρ) through the Son of Man must therefore be understood as a begetting (χηρο).

3.1.4.1. Creating and Begetting
Metaphors of procreation and discussions concerning the differences between creating and begetting are pervasive in Gos. Phil. In several passages, such imagery is used to contrast the Christians with the Jews. The first of these, which comprises the very first lines of the tractate, makes for an interesting parallel to the passages discussed above:

οὐχερβραυεψάράμε[ὁ]λαυταμεβραυεψαροι[ν]ο[υ]ω[φα][νο][γ][ο][ι][α][ν]ε[βεμνε]
lexerχεπορορχητοςουπ[ροσ]λαγτοςδεμαυταμερορχητος

A Hebrew man creates Hebrew, and [those] of this sort are called “proselyte,” but a proselyte does not create proselyte.

(Gos. Phil. 51.29–32)

the son of the Son of Man as being the one who is created through or by the Son of Man. For the active sense, as it is understood in the present study, cf. Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 203; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 71; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:210; Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 350; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 205. Schenke, however, translates the sentence rather freely as “the son of the Son of Man is the one who creates in the power of the Son of Man” / “der Sohn des Menschensohnes ist derjenige, der in der Kraft des Menschensohnes schafft,” thus adding the word “power / Kraft” which is not in the Coptic text.

181 Frederick Houk Borsch, for example, understands this figure as “the gnostic believer formed in some likeness to the Son of Man” (Frederick Houk Borsch, The Christian and Gnostic Son of Man [SBT Second Series 14; London: SCM Press, 1970], 82), but as we shall see in the discussion below, it is possible to be more specific regarding the nature and function of this character.


183 Jeffrey Siker has argued that Gos. Phil. refers to two distinct groups by the terms “Hebrew” and “Jew.” According to Siker the former refers to “non-gnostic Christians” and only the latter to Jews proper (Jeffrey S. Siker, “Gnostic Views on Jews and Christians in the Gospel of Philip,” NovT 31:3 [1989]: 275–288). I see no reason to make such a distinction, however, and treat both terms as references to Jews and Judaism. See discussion below.

184 Schenke rightly notes that Gos. Phil. “beginnt abrupt und genau so seltsam, ja rätselhaft, wie es der gesamte Text ist” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 139, Schenke’s emphasis).

185 ταμιο: ποιεῖν.
According to Gos. Phil. the product of a Hebrew creating a Hebrew is a proselyte. We may observe that this Hebrew-proselyte relationship is analogous to the father-son relationship seen in the passage concerning the father making a son who is in turn unable to make his own sons. Just as the son in that passage cannot create sons, the proselyte cannot create proselytes. This sets up a blend between the father-son relationship and the relationship between the Hebrew and the proselyte (see fig. 22).

There are here counterpart mappings between the father and the Hebrew, and between the son and the proselyte. In setting up this conceptual integration network, Gos. Phil. both suggests, but also resists, the implication that the relationship between the Hebrew and the proselyte may be regarded as a father-son relationship. For there is a clash of contextual frames in the blended space. The first implication one is likely to draw from the blend is that the Hebrew is analogous to the father creating the son who is unable to reproduce, and that the proselyte is analogous to the latter.186 In this sense, the unproductive proselyte is a child like the unproductive son.

There is, however, also an implicit difference between the two, which follows from the knowledge of the father-son ICM, namely that the son has the potential to grow up, mature, and become a father himself. In the case of the proselyte, this potential implication suggested by the blend, that he may become a productive Hebrew too, is resisted both by the absence of any direct statements to this effect in Gos. Phil. and by real-world knowledge of proselyte initiation.187 But why is this? What is the actual difference between the Hebrew creating the proselyte and the father creating the son?

Gos. Phil. states that “he who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still” (πενταχθίζως καὶ ο ἐπεβαίος ἐτι),188 thus inferring that the reception or not of Christ is a vital difference between the two processes. The statement may be understood metaphorically as referring to the acceptance of Christianity, but it may also be seen as a direct reference to the Eucharist and the rites of initiation. In the Eucharist the Lord is received by means of the eucharistic elements, and in the initiation

186 Both these passages use the term θανο, rather than αὐτ or χίο to denote this creative process, and Gos. Phil. thus manages to steer clear of any obvious identification of these processes with any of the two latter opposing terms, thus keeping the passage ambiguous with regard to the exact nature of the generative processes that are compared here.
187 See the discussion below.
188 Gos. Phil. 62.5–6.
rites we shall see that this may be a part of both baptism and chrisma-
tion. Another equally conspicuous difference between the Jews and the
Christians is spelled out in terms of parentage:

When we were Hebrews we were fatherless. We had our mother, but when
we became Christians, we got (both) father and mother. 189

(Gos. Phil. 52.21–24)

Here the difference between Hebrews and Christians is identified as the
Hebrews’ lack of a father; and, by extension, we see that this also differenti-
teiates the son from the proselyte. The son has a father, the proselyte does
not. And what is it that differentiates the father’s creation of a son from
the Hebrew’s creation of a proselyte? From the father-son source ICM
and from certain other passages in Gos. Phil. 190 we may infer that the
father’s creation of the son who cannot yet reproduce is a begetting. We
are thus left with the conclusion that the difference between the Hebrew’s
production of the proselyte and the father’s production of the son is the
one between creating (σωτερ) and begetting (χρησις) discussed above. The
son is begotten, while the proselyte is made. And, as we have seen, he
who has merely been made, and not begotten, does not have the power
to beget, as Gos. Phil. makes clear.

Gos. Phil. here also blends two time-frames, namely the wider histori-
cal one before and after the coming of Christ, and the time frame before
and after the individual’s initiation in the contemporary period with both
Judaism and Christianity in existence. In this way, Judaism is effectively
presented as merely a bygone earlier phase of history that has now been
superseded by Christianity, and the term “Hebrew” is used metaphorically
to refer to such a pre-/non-Christian state, both of the individual
and in a broader historical sense. 191

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189 Einar Thomassen is of the opinion that this passage presupposes the Valentinian
myth (Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 254). Although I agree that it may be possible to
read the passage in the light of the Valentinian myth I see no compelling reason why the
passage should necessarily presuppose it.

190 Cf., e.g., Gos. Phil. 81.14–21.

191 A number of scholars have taken these passages quite literally, however. See, e.g.,
Schenke, who takes this passage to refer to the author’s previous state of actually being
a Jew (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 159). Similarly, Isenberg states that “Philip’s
readers were once ‘Hebrews’” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 42). See also Grobel, review of
Wilson, 318; Gaffron, Studien, 65–66, 69. Se below for a more in depth analysis of Gos.
Phil.’s polemics against Judaism.
Gos. Phil. also uses the created-begotten opposition in another argument, however, once again hailing back to the garden of Eden:

In this paragraph it is clear that a beautiful creation is still just a creation, while one born beautiful would be of noble “seed” (σπέρμα), i.e., of noble descent. While the latter is clearly the best, there does not seem to be anything inherently wrong in being a beautiful and noble creation. What is clearly wrong, however, which the tractate describes as “adultery” (ὕπτινθείκ), is a creature that begets. In this case such mixed communion, a communion between those who do not resemble each other, led to the creation of Cain, who killed his brother Abel. Gos. Phil. holds this to be due to the fact that a moulded creature, in this case the serpent, had

192 Layton emends η[ε][κ][κ][α][ρ][ε] (λο) α- (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 160; and cf. Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 336). I have chosen to follow the manuscript reading, η[ε][κ][κ][α][ρ][ε] α- (“you would find”). Schenke also sticks to the manuscript reading and translates “würdest du finden” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 33).

193 Cf. John 8:41–44.

194 I have chosen to interpret the passage as a continuous whole. Schenke originally divided this passage into his sayings number 41 and 42 (Schenke, Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959], 10–11; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 45; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 193), but later divided it even further into 41, 42a, and 42b (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 33; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 197). Schenke regards the one who is described as being “moulded” in 60.34 as Adam. Although this interpretation can be supported by seeing this terminology as an allusion to Gen 2:7, it is problematic if the passage is to be read together as a whole. The father of Cain is clearly the serpent, and it seems to be the serpent’s mating with Eve that is described as adultery (cf. Isenberg, “Introduction,” 135). This means that the one who was moulded and begot should here be the serpent, not Adam. The
communion with one that was not like him, namely Eve, and through this adulterous relationship begot an offspring that was decidedly less than perfect.\textsuperscript{195} Despite the serpent being a beautiful creation, then, his adulterous relationship with Eve led to death. That not only Cain, but also the serpent is called a murderer is probably due to the fact that it was his bad advice that led to Adam and Eve's eating from the Tree of Knowledge, which became the beginning of mortality, and hence death.\textsuperscript{196}

3.1.4.4.2. Fathers and Sons
As we have seen, the father-son imagery in \textit{Gos. Phil.} is closely connected to Christ, and we will now take a closer look at some aspects of what Christ and the individual Christian have in common, and how they are related. In a passage that, significantly, deals directly with the rituals of baptism and chrismation we learn that,

\begin{quote}
\textit{The chrism is superior to baptism, for from the chrism we were called Christian, not because of baptism, and it was because of the chrism that Christ was named (such). For the Father anointed the Son, and the Son anointed the apostles, and the apostles anointed us.}\textsuperscript{\textit{(Gos. Phil. 74.12–18)}}
\end{quote}

identification of the moulded creature with Adam is also made by Layton, \textit{The Gnostic Scriptures}, 336; Wilson, \textit{The Gospel of Philip}, 104; Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 8. Grant interprets the serpent as lalabaoth (Robert M. Grant, “The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip,” \textit{VC} 15 [1961]: 135; cf. also Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 175–176). Trautmann holds that it is Adam who is the father of Cain and argues that the union between Adam and Eve is described as adultery because Adam in her opinion is equated with the serpent (see Trautmann, “La parenté,” 271). Pagels has argued that Eve’s adultery with the serpent should here be regarded as the union between ψυχή, represented by Eve, and υλή, represented by the serpent (Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 163; Elaine H. Pagels, “Pursuing the Spiritual Eve: Imagery and Hermeneutics in the \textit{Hypostasis of the Archons} and the \textit{Gospel of Philip},” in \textit{Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism} [ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988], 199–200).

\textsuperscript{195} The notion that Cain was the son of Eve and the Serpent is also found in other sources, e.g., the \textit{Protevangelium of James}, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, and \textit{Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer} (cf. Kugel, \textit{Traditions of the Bible}, 147; Gary A. Anderson, \textit{The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination} [Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001], 90–92).

\textsuperscript{196} See Gen 3:4–5.
There are several interesting features in this passage. First, the name Christ and the name Christian are here both derived etymologically from the chrism. This connection serves several purposes. Not only does it connect the abovementioned names to the ritual act of chrismation, it also strengthens the identification between Christ and the individual Christian, and it makes the point that chrismation is of greater importance than baptism. The special importance of the chrism is highlighted in several places throughout the tractate, and we shall later return to a more detailed analysis of what this and other passages have to say concerning the function of the anointing in relation to baptism and Eucharist.

Equally significant in this passage as the concern with the relative importance of the chrism, however, is the emphasis upon the unbroken succession from God the father, via Christ and the apostles, to the authorial “us,” and the role of the chrism in this process. It is also highly significant that God and Christ are here referred to as Father and Son, thereby creating the inference that the relationship between the other pairs in the sequence are analogous to a father-son relationship. This is especially the case in light of certain other passages in Gos. Phil. which we will return to below. We will also see how this important feature functions rhetorically elsewhere in Gos. Phil., but first let us take a look at the analogies that are implied here (see fig. 23).

We are prompted by the very juxtaposition of these relationships to consider each pair in terms of the others and to consider what they might all have in common. Each of the input spaces consists of a relationship between an anointer and an anointed, and there are extensive mappings of counterpart-relations between them. There are vital outer-space role-relations between Father, God, Christ, and Apostles, and similarly between Son, Christ, Apostles, and “Us.” Moreover, there is a vital analogy-relation between the anointer-anointed relationships in each of the four inputs. This relation between an anointer and an anointed is common to all input spaces, and is consequently projected to the generic

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197 It does not seem to constitute an argument against baptism per se. The importance of baptism in its own right seems to be confirmed elsewhere in the tractate (see Gos. Phil. 67.27–30; 69.22–23; 77.7–12). Nor does it seem to be directed against what is usually regarded as “normal,” “mainstream,” or “orthodox” Christian practice. It seems merely to be an argument for the higher importance of chrismation relative to baptism. See below for a discussion of the polemical aspects of Gos. Phil.


199 For a discussion the concept of “vital relations” between input spaces, see chapter 2.
space. Moreover, two pairs of these input spaces also have their own local generic spaces. The Father-Son and God-Christ inputs are linked by vital outer-space role-relations and share the Father-Son input’s generic properties, in this context most notably that of a begetter-begotten relationship. The other pair of inputs, the analogically linked Christ-Apostles and Apostles-“Us” inputs, are both initiator-initiate relationships, and this relationship is thus duly projected to their shared local generic space (see fig. 24).

The two pairs of inputs may thus be blended individually, but what is of special interest here is the greater blend caused by the four together, including their two local generic spaces. Significantly, these generic spaces, the initiator-initiated and the begetter-begotten spaces, are themselves linked by analogy, and themselves become input spaces in their own local integration network. This is a highly important double-scope blend, and from their position as higher-level inputs within the overall integration network, these generic-inputs project important structure to the main blend. The most notable entailment of this local integration network is the inference that initiation can be regarded as a begetting and vice versa. We may isolate and analyse this conceptual integration network as shown in fig. 25.

We may also regard as properties of this common generic space the relationships between a predecessor and a successor, and that of a giver and a receiver, as well as a hierarchical power relationship. In the overall blended space which receives elements and structure from all six input spaces—the four original ones plus the two local generic spaces—God’s begetting of Christ may consequently be regarded as an initiation, the apostles’ initiation of “us” by means of an anointing may be regarded as a begetting, and the relationship between the initiator and the initiated may be seen as a father-son relationship, to mention just a few of the many possible entailments of this mega-blend. With its three levels of generic spaces, fig. 26 shows the interaction between the two networks, and illustrates how the two generic spaces on the lowest level also function as input spaces. Significantly, all who are on the “father”-level in these input spaces may be regarded as begetters, and what may be seen as characteristic of all who are on the level of “sons” is that they are all begotten. We may also note that in this blend too, the relationships projected from

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200 This link is also made explicit by certain passages in Gos. Phil. which will be discussed below.
the input spaces are all compressed to the same human scale.\textsuperscript{201} Moreover, each of the mental spaces in this network will prime knowledge of related intertexts and ICMs for easier subsequent activation, all of which may provide additional structure to feed the blend under consideration here. For example, the fact that Christ appears in this network as both father and son primes the passages in John were Jesus refers to himself and the Father as being one and within one another.\textsuperscript{202} We may therefore indeed consider the conceptual integration network shown in the previous figure as merely a small part of a potentially much larger network of mental spaces, but we will focus on this model for the time being.

As we have seen, this is an integration network that creates counterpart relations between a set of linked input spaces containing initiator-initiated and begetter-begotten relations and blends them. On the level of begetter/initiator we have Father, God, Christ, and Apostles, while on the begotten/initiator side we have Son, Christ, Apostles, and Us. Of major significance here is the fact that Christ appears both as begotten and as a begetter in this network, that is, as a counterpart of both Father/begetter/initiator and Son/begotten/initiated. A major inference of this blend, which lies close to the surface of the passage quoted above, is the instrumentality of the chrismation in the blended processes of begetting and initiation. Throughout Gos. Phil., baptism and chrismation is closely connected to begetting and birth, as for instance when we are told that “the son of the bridal chamber” (πώμα τῆς γυναικείας)—an epithet that seems to point simultaneously to Christ and the Christian initiate—comes into being through “water and fire and light” (γῆρος ἡμοίωσε τήν οἰκογένεια), the latter two being subsequently identified with the chrism.\textsuperscript{203}

Now, with all this in mind we may go back to the overarching the Christian is a Christ blend we started out with. Since Christ appears as both father and son, the Christ ICM thereby comes to contain the roles and aspects of both son and father. Both of these elements, fatherhood and sonship, become part of the Christ ICM and may be projected to the blend, creating the inference that the Christian as Christ may be

\textsuperscript{201} For the concept of compression to human scale, see, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, “Compression and Global Insight”; Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 322–324, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

\textsuperscript{202} See John 10:30, 38; 14:7, 9–11, 20; 17:21, 23.

\textsuperscript{203} Gos. Phil. 67.3–6. See below for the further connections that are made elsewhere in the tractate between the chrism and the resurrection, baptism, the cross, and the Tree of Life (Gos. Phil. 73.8–19). Cf. Williams, “Realized Eschatology,” 12–13, 16.
both father and son. We may consequently infer from this blend that the Christian initiate also has these two potential roles in and of his state of being a Christ, and that through the anointing with chrism the Christian may be both an initiate and an initiator, father and son, and begetter and begotten. It is clear that we can make inferences in several directions in this conceptual integration network. The initiator may be regarded as a father, as (a) Christ, and as an apostle. Similarly Christ may be regarded as an initiator and as a father, but he is also a son and an initiate, and the initiate is a Christ. Significantly, the authorial “Us” may refer simultaneously not only to the Christians, including the implied author of Gos. Phil., as initiates, but also to the implied author and his colleagues as initiators, and hence fathers. We will return below to the possible implications of this conceptual integration network with regard to the possible community organisation that may be presupposed by the tractate and the wider implications with regard to the tractate’s Sitz im Leben. However, it may be noted already at this point that Gos. Phil. here seems to presuppose a system of apostolic succession presented as a succession of father-son relationships that are ultimately analogous to the relationship between God the Father, and Christ the Son.

3.1.4.4.3. Baptism and Chrismation

Ritually, begetting and birth are in Gos. Phil. closely connected to chrismation and baptism. We have seen that “the son of the bridal chamber” (παρθένου ἐνταφιάσθη) comes into being through “water and fire and light” (οὔτω οἰκείως οὕτως οὕσιος), and that Gos. Phil. identifies fire with the chrism and the light with the fire. What is needed to generate a “son of the bridal chamber,” then, is baptism (water) and anointing with chrism (fire and light).

Fatherhood is also directly connected to Gos. Phil.’s concept of the “name of the father” (πρωτό ἄνωτο), for the tractate states that for the son to become father he needs to put on the father’s name:

οὐράνιος οὐράνιος μαγευόμενος πρωτό ἄνωτος ταῦτα ὑποθέτεται βαπτίσματος ἐνταφιάσματος ἐνταφιάσματος ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐνθαδέλφου ἐ

204 Cf. Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 13, 158.
205 Cf. 1 Clem., 42.2: ὁ Χριστός οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Greek text from Bart D. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 1:108).
206 See Gos. Phil. 67.3–6.
A single name is not uttered in the world, the name which the Father gave to the Son. It is exalted above every (other name), that is, the name of the Father. For the Son would not have become father unless he had put on the name of the Father. Those who have this name know it, but they do not speak it, but those who do not have it do not know it.207

(Gos. Phil. 54.5–13)

This special name seems at least partly to be an allusion to the Divine Name, the Tetragrammaton (YHWH).208 This description of the name may be understood in light of Phil 2:5–11, Rev 19:12–13, and several passages in John.209 It is stated in Phil 2:9 that Christ was given by God “the name that is above every name” (τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ύπερ πᾶν ὄνομα / ἡ πάντα ἐπικράτησαν), and in the following verse this name is identified as the name possessed by Jesus.210 Philippians 2:11 then goes on to imply that Jesus Christ is “Lord” (κύριος / πάσως) exactly because he possesses this name. According to Charles Gieschen, this name is the Divine Name.211 Revelation 19:12 describes Christ wearing a name that only he himself knows, and the following verse (19:13), which describes him as being dressed in a robe dipped in blood, identifies this name as the Logos of God.

In Gos. Phil. this name is associated with the chrismation, since we are told that “it was because of the chrism that Christ was named (such)” (ὑπὲρ χρισμοῦ ὑπὲρ ἑκείνου ἑτερογενῆς).212 We are also told that “the name of the father and the son and the Holy Spirit,” are received,

in the chrism of the […] of the power of the cross. The apostles called this “[the] right and the left,”213 for this one is no longer a [Christian], but a Christ.

(Gos. Phil. 67.23–27)

Chrismation, we are told, is what makes the Christian initiate into a Christ.214 So, becoming Christ, which involves the acquisition of sonship

211 See Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 129.
212 Gos. Phil. 74.15–16.
213 Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.
214 Cf. e.g., Franzmann, Jesus, 63, 175.
and gaining the “name of the father,” requires chrismation. The “name of the father” mentioned here is thus closely connected to the name “Christ,” which, as we saw earlier, connects father and son through chrismation.\(^2\) The son becomes Christ, like his father, and the means by which this is effected is the anointing with chrism. Chrismation, then, is the fundamental ritual act that makes the Christian initiate into a Christ. But does this anointing take place prior to baptism or after it? Or should it be considered a ritual separate from baptism at all? There are strong indications in Gos. Phil. that its chrismation is of the baptismal variety:

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If one goes down to the water and comes up without having received anything and says, “I am a Christian,” he has borrowed the name at interest. But if he receives the Holy Spirit he has the gift of the name. He who has received a gift does not have it taken away from him, but he who has borrowed at interest has it extorted from him. Thus it is for us if one comes into being in a mystery.\(^{216}\)

(Gos. Phil. 64.22–31)

From this passage it is clear that the reception of the name is associated in a temporal sense with baptismal immersion and functionally with the reception of the Spirit. Since we have seen that both the reception of the name and the reception of the Holy Spirit is connected with chrismation, it seems evident that in order to receive the name “as a gift” in baptism one needs to receive it together with the Holy Spirit by means of a chrismation.\(^{217}\) This chrismation thus seems to take place as a part of the baptismal ritual itself.

Revelation 19:12 speaks of the name worn by Christ as being known only by Christ himself, but as Charles Gieschen points out, this is hyperbolic “insider” language, since Revelation states the saints are sealed with the name of Christ and bear it on their foreheads. As in John 17 where

\(^{215}\) For patristic attestations of the connection between the chrismation and the name “Christ,” see, e.g., Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 139–141.

\(^{216}\) Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.

\(^{217}\) The connection between the name of Christ and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit is also made in John 14:26. Charles Gieschen notes that the imagery of the reception of the name in the New Testament “is grounded in the writing, speaking, and imparting of the Divine Name during the baptismal rite” (Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 133). Buckley sees a polemic against “Orthodox, ineffectual baptism,” which in her view “is likened to a transaction in which the recipient unwittingly remains in debt” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4189).
Jesus states that he revealed his (hidden) name to his disciples..., the enlightened reader of Revelation is expected to know this secret name that only Christ knows.218

This point is made explicit in Gos. Phil., which states that only those who wear the name know it. This also seems to connect the wearing of the name closely to the name Christ in Gos. Phil. It is a name that is worn by all Christians, and by Christians only.219

The close connection between baptism and chrismation is, moreover, emphasised in a couple of passages with clear allusions to John 3:3–9 which stress the importance of being reborn through both water and spirit, which in the context of Gos. Phil. is to be understood as baptism and chrismation:

\[ \text{it is necessary to baptise in both: in the light and the water, and the light is the chrism.} \]
\[ \text{(Gos. Phil. 69.12–14)} \]

In accordance with John 3:5, Gos. Phil. stresses the necessity of both baptism in water and baptism in the Holy Spirit as bestowed by means of the chrism, and interprets the process in terms of begetting and rebirth:

\[ \text{We are born again by means of Holy Spirit, but we are begotten by Christ in the two.} \]
\[ \text{(Gos. Phil. 69.4–8)} \]

This links directly back to Jesus’ baptism in the river Jordan, in which all these aspects are closely connected in Gos. Phil.’s interpretation. The connections between the two can be illustrated as shown in fig. 27.

Both Christ and the Christians are baptised in water and receive the Holy Spirit by means of an anointing. This anointing is connected to a joining and a begetting. In the case of Christ, he received the Holy Spirit which united with his Logos, and his “body” came into being. The baptism and chrismation of the Christians thus parallel those of Christ himself by involving the reception of the Holy Spirit, as well as a joining

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219 Charles Gieschen sees in Gos. Phil’s references to putting on the name of the father reflections of “older Jewish-Christian adoptionist Christology” (Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 155).
220 Cf. Titus 3:5.
221 Cf. John 3:5.
and a begetting. But in the latter case, what is it that the Holy Spirit joins with, and what kind of body is it that comes into being? It is apparent from this conceptual integration network that the crucial question here is the identification of which part of the individual Christian’s constitution that corresponds to, and is thus mapped onto, Jesus’ Logos. From the connections of this blend to the Adam-Christ blend discussed above, and from the logic of the present baptismal blend, the most logical answer seems to be that the part that corresponds to the Logos is actually the individual Christian’s soul, or perhaps a part of it. By extension, then, what takes place in the baptismal chrismation is the reception of the Holy Spirit, which joins with the individual initiate’s soul, thus causing a begetting and a rebirth. The metaphor of a “bridal chamber” is evidently quite apt with regard to the ritual interpretation outlined here.

3.1.4.4.4. The Kiss

We have seen how Gos. Phil. plays with the polysemic possibilities of the word χίλο to denote begetting, birth and acquisition, and how the unproductive child could not make sons, but only acquire brothers. The use of the term χίλο in the latter statement may, however, also function as an intratextual connection to another passage in Gos. Phil., where begetting is associated with kissing. These intratextually linked passages may also function simultaneously as composite allusions to Scripture and ritual, by way of an interesting twist on the imagery connected with the term χίλο:

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for it is by means of a kiss that the perfect conceive and beget. Therefore we too kiss one another, conceiving from the grace that is in one another. (Gos. Phil. 59.2–6)

It is especially interesting to note that Gos. Phil. here explicitly connects conception and birth with a kiss and with grace (χίλος). A ritual kiss was common in Christianity from a very early stage, and is also referred

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223 According to the editors of the new English edition of the Apostolic Tradition, “the ritual kiss appears to be a distinctively Christian practice that emerged in the New Testament Period” (Paul F. Bradshaw, et al., The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary [ed. Harold W. Attridge; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002], 42), and according
to in several New Testament texts.\textsuperscript{224} In all these cases, as also in Gos. Phil., the kiss is closely connected to the reception of grace (χάρις). The most notable scriptural intertext to this passage in Gos. Phil., however, is 2 Cor 13:12–13, where Paul advises his “brothers” (ἀδελφοί) that they should “greet one another with a holy kiss.” He follows this with the statement that, “The grace (χάρις) of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love (ἀγάπη) of God and the communion (κοινωνία) of the Holy Spirit be with you all.” Moreover, Gos. Phil. also refers to the repeated begetting of sons or children elsewhere, referring to “the sons/children of the perfect man” (HandlerContexts) as “these who do not die, but are always begotten” (ιδαίως ἐξεχυτο ἄλλα σεξπό ὑμοιογος υμιν).\textsuperscript{225}

3.1.4.4.5. Rest

The concept of “rest” (ἀνάπαυσις/μὴν) is used in at least three different senses in Gos. Phil.\textsuperscript{226} It is used to refer to the heavenly rest after this worldly life, as the goal of salvation which is also related to the idea of a “restoration” (ἀποκατάστασις), and it is used to denote the giving of relief or being at ease in this world. In addition, it is used in a sense that is related to the present theme of marriage, unification, and procreation, with sacramental connotations.\textsuperscript{227} Most importantly, we find the term used in the latter sense in yet another passage that deals with the differences between creating and begetting:

\begin{quote}

IFIED CONTEXTS.
\end{quote}

to Robert Taft, “the kiss of peace is one of the most primitive rites of the Christian liturgy. Originally it seems to have been a common greeting, probably exchanged at every Christian synaxis” (Robert F. Taft, The Great Entrance: A History of the Transfer of Gifts and Other Pre-Anaphoral Rites [vol. 2 of A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom; 2nd ed.; OrChrAn 200; Roma: Pontificio Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1978], 375).

\textsuperscript{224} 1 Thess 5:26; 1 Cor 16:20; 2 Cor 13:12; Rom 16:16; 1 Pet 5:14.

\textsuperscript{225} Gos. Phil. 58.20–22.

\textsuperscript{226} Judith Hoch Wray, who has studied extensively the use of “rest” as a metaphor in Gos. Truth and Hebrews, strangely claims that ἀνάπαυσις/μὴν occurs more than five times in only four Nag Hammadi tractates, namely Tri. Trac., Paraph. Shem, Gos. Eg., and Gos. Truth (see Judith Hoch Wray, Rest as a Theological Metaphor in the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Gospel of Truth: Early Christian Homiletics of Rest [SBLDS 166; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 35), thus ignoring the fact that these words actually occur a total of 14 times in Gos. Phil. Wray neither discusses nor mentions any of the occurrences of ἀνάπαυσις/μὴν in Gos. Phil.

As is the truth with the works of man, they result from his power. Therefore they are called the acts of power. They are his works. It is from rest (ἀνάπαυσις) that his children come into being. Therefore his power resides in his works, but it is in the children that the rest (ἀνάπαυσις) is manifested. And you will find that this extends to the image. And this one is the man pertaining to the image. It is from his power that he does his works, but it is from rest (ἀνάπαυσις) that he begets his children. (Gos. Phil. 72.4–17)

There has been considerable variation in the ways scholars have understood this passage. One of the main difficulties lies in the problem of how to render the Coptic text ετελεύησεν εἰσοδὸς εἰσοδοῦς εὐρύχωρης θεωρῆσαι εἰσοδοῦς καὶ προδείπτως εἰσοδοῦς θεωρῆσαι εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει εἰσοδοῦς ἐπιτυγχά


229 If one chooses to read ἐνεργεῖν ις ἐνεργεῖν as a unit and translates “his works are his children,” this contrast between works and power on the one hand, and children and rest on the other, is broken. As Schenke comments regarding the solution also chosen in the present study, of treating ἐνεργεῖν ις as a nominal sentence in itself, “Der kleine kommentierende Nominalsatz erscheint dabei zwar als ein bisschen redundant. Aber besser Redundanz als Widersinn!” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 428). Cf. also Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 76 n. 1; Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 150–151; and the discussion concerning creating and begetting in the present study.
power and begets from rest. But how are we to understand the term “rest,” and what is the identity of “the man pertaining to the image”? The reference to the begetting of children from “rest” rather than “power” plays on the creating-begetting dichotomy, but also seems to allude to the important metaphor of the “bedroom” or “bridal chamber.”

We saw above that at the end of the discussion of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, Gos. Phil. states that “it is necessary for each one of the disciples to walk into his rest” (ὡς ετρήσκοι ποια διώκεται καὶ ποιλεῖ τὴν ἑταομαπάσας).230 The designation “his rest” (τεχναμαπάσας) seems to refer back to Jesus,231 but what does it mean that it is appropriate for the disciples to enter Jesus’ rest? The reference to entering “his rest” recalls Heb 3:1, 18 and 4:3–11,232 as well as Ps 94:11 LXX which partly underlies the references in Hebrews, but all the references to entering God’s “rest” in Hebrews233 are rendered using the Greek word κατάπαυσις in the Greek New Testament and the Coptic equivalent ḫϣⲉⲉⲣⲉⲡⲉⲡⲁⲡⲟⲩⲡⲉⲩⲛ ⲥⲉⲩⲕⲧⲉⲩⲩⲉ ⲧⲉⲧⲉⲩⲩ ⲫⲧⲓ ⲧⲉⲧⲉⲩⲩⲉ in the Sahidic version, and not ἀνάπαυσις as in Gos. Phil.234 Ps 22 LXX, however, does use the word ἀνάπαυσις, and with its reference to “the water of rest” (ὕδατος ἀναπαύσεως) and to an anointing of the head with oil, as well as to a table, a cup, and wine,235 it constitutes a highly relevant intertext considering the baptismal context of the Gos. Phil. passage. Read in the light of Ps 22 LXX, then, what Gos. Phil. refers to with its emphatic statement that the disciples should enter “his rest” may simply be understood as a statement of the necessity for the disciples to undergo baptism, a baptism modelled on the baptism of Christ himself, which would thus be entirely in line with Gos. Phil.’s baptismal theology, with its parallelism of

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231 Schenke, however, who treats this sentence as a separate saying (82a), chooses to read τεχναμαπάσας, “his rest,” as referring to ποια ποια, “each one,” with the following interpretation: “Jeder einzelne Jünger muß in den jeweils nur für ihn ‘bereiteten’ Ruheort eingehen. Man müßte also bei ‘Einblendung’ des größeren Zusammenhangs dann schon verstehen, daß jeder Jünger/Pneumatiker einen speziell für ihn freigehaltenen Ruheort innerhalb des großen, endzeitlichen, himmlischen Brautgemachshat” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 421). Schenke’s emphasis.
233 See Heb 3:11, 18; 4:1, 3, 5, 10, 11.
234 The word used in Ps 94:11 LXX is also κατάπαυσις.
235 In the patristic sources, from Origen and onwards, this Psalm is often interpreted in a baptismal light (see, e.g., Sebastian P. Brock, The Holy Spirit in the Syrian Baptismal Tradition [2d ed.; Syrian Churches Series 9; Pune: Anita, 1998], 123).
Christ, the apostles, and “us.” If we also understand the reference to “rest” in Gos. Phil. 72.4–17 to refer to “the water of rest,” and thus to baptism, including chrismation, then “the man pertaining to the image” begets his sons/children in the ritual of baptism, including the chrismation. Understood in this way, the passage simply refers to the begetting of new Christian initiates through baptism and chrismation. The “man pertaining to the image” may thus be taken as a simultaneous reference to Christ and the individual Christian, entirely in line with the overarching blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, and the fact that Christ is both father and son, thus makes both the initiate and the initiator a Christ. The “rest” that is to be entered, then, may be understood as a reference to both the “rest” achieved by means of baptism as well as to baptism itself. Although there is no direct parallel in Psalm 22 LXX to Gos. Phil’s reference to enter “his rest,” a connection between the Gos. Phil. passage and both Psalm 22 LXX and Hebrews 4 could easily have suggested itself in Coptic, where both ἀνάπαυσις and κατάπαυσις are translated by Ṣⲉⲧⲓ.236 Such a connection, if made, would have the potential to bring into play the Joshua–Jesus comparison that seems to underlie the argument of Heb 4:11–11.237 That is, the contrast between the “Jesus” who could not give “rest” to his people and the “Jesus” who could.238 In this sense, the passage in Gos. Phil. may also be read in light of the contrast on display elsewhere in the tractate between the previous stage of history, and of being “Hebrews,” before the coming of Christ, and the present one where it is possible to enter by means of the Christian rites of initiation the “rest” that was previously unattainable.

3.1.4.5. Procreation and Kinship: Summary
In terms of conceptual metaphor theory we may identify the underlying higher-order conceptual metaphors CHRISTIAN INITIATION IS PROCREATION and THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IS A FAMILY in Gos. Phil. These are conceptual metaphors that are extremely rich in their entailments, as the entire conceptual domains of procreation and kinship may be utilised and elaborated upon in the interpretation of Christian initiation

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236 See Crum 194b.
237 This comparison is at least partly based on the fact that in Greek, “Joshua” and “Jesus” are both rendered as Ἰησ/οῦς.
and in conceptualising Christian community organisation. Conception, birth, fatherhood, motherhood, sonship, brotherhood, inheritance, lineage, succession, marriage, etc. All of these may give rise to numerous additional conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions, which they certainly do in Gos. Phil.

As we have seen, activation of the father-son ICM primes the reader’s knowledge of a prototypical father-son relationship, with all that entails, e.g., in terms of the relationship of authority between the two and in terms of the father’s role in procreation. Throughout Gos. Phil. different aspects are at various points brought to the fore and projected to the blend in order to structure the information projected from the target input of ritual initiation. It is worth noting that fatherhood and sonship are presented in strictly biological terms in Gos. Phil. At no point in this tractate are fatherhood and sonship understood in terms of adoption. This comes especially to the fore in the tractate’s emphasis on the differences between creating and begetting, and in the way it contrasts Christian initiation with Jewish proselyte initiation.

3.1.5. Death and Resurrection

As is the case with its mystagogical use of the concepts of begetting and birth, Gos. Phil. also blends the death and resurrection of Christ with aspects of the sacramental life of the individual Christian in conformity with the overarching blend the Christian is a Christ.

3.1.5.1. Life and Death

In order to grasp Gos. Phil.’s understanding and use of the concept of the resurrection, it is essential to understand the multi-layered and shifting ways in which the concepts of life and death are employed in the tractate. Gos. Phil. makes a point of the general relationship between life and death. There can be no life without death, or vice versa, for

\[\text{ποιοις ημιπακε ποιη μηποι \ ηοιοιοι \ ημιποιουρ \ ιενηυ \ πε ιποηερυ \ ιμηοε \ ιεεαπερχ \ αιοηερυ} \]

light and darkness, life and death, right and left, they are brothers of one another. It is impossible for them to be separated from each other.\(^{240}\)

\[(\text{Gos. Phil. 53.14–17})\]

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\(^{239}\) I will return to the question of community organisation below.

\(^{240}\) Cf. 2 Cor 6:14.
Life is to death as light is to darkness and right is to left. What we have here is a conceptual integration network created from three pairs of opposites. It goes for each of these conceptual pairs that their constituents are impossible to separate from each other, since none of these concepts can exist meaningfully apart from the contrast supplied by the existence of the other. They are all relative, not absolute concepts.\textsuperscript{241} Gos. Phil. subverts the polar opposition of these conceptual pairs, however, by metaphorically likening the relations with siblingship. By likening the life-death and light-darkness pairs with that between brothers, the equality between the opposites is highlighted and the connections between them are strengthened. In doing so, however, the tractate also contributes to destabilise the usual hierarchical, good-bad valuations of the relationships. The tractate pushes even further in this direction in drawing the conclusion that,

\begin{scriptsize}
\begin{verbatim}
ⲉⲧⲃⲉⲡⲉⲓ ⲟⲩⲧⲉ ⲛⲉⲧⲛⲁⲩ ⲟⲩⲛⲁⲩⲩ ⲟⲩⲧⲉ ⲛⲉⲑⲟⲟⲩ ⲥⲉϩⲟⲟⲩ ⲟⲩⲧⲉ ⲡⲱⲛϩ ⲩ ⲱ ⲛ ϩⲡ ⲉⲟ ⲩ ⲧ ⲉⲡ ⲙ ⲟ ⲩⲟ ⲩ ⲙ ⲟ ⲩⲡ ⲉ
\end{verbatim}
\end{scriptsize}

therefore, neither are the good good, nor are the bad bad, nor is life life, nor is death death.

\textit{(Gos. Phil. 53.17–20)}

In a manner quite typical of Gos. Phil. this conclusion does not actually follow logically from the premises presented prior to it, for it does not actually follow automatically from the connectedness and equality of the constituents of the conceptual pairs in question, that life is not life, nor death death. In order to understand this reasoning, then, one has to take into account what the tractate goes on to state concerning the deceptive nature of names in the world:

\begin{scriptsize}
\begin{verbatim}
̄ⲛⲣⲁⲛ ⲉⲧⲟⲩϯ ̄ⲙⲙⲟⲟⲩ ⲁⲛⲕⲟⲥⲙⲓⲕⲟⲥ ⲟⲩ ̄ⲛⲧⲉⲩ ̄ⲙⲁⲩ ̄ⲛⲟⲩⲛⲟϭ ̄ⲙⲡⲗⲁⲛⲏ ⲥⲉⲡⲱϣ ̄ⲥⲅⲁⲣ ̄ⲙⲡⲟⲩϩⲏⲧ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩ̄ⲛⲛⲉⲧⲥⲙⲟⲛⲧ ⲉϩⲟⲩⲛ ⲉⲛⲉⲧⲥⲙⲟⲛⲧ ⲁⲛ
\end{verbatim}
\end{scriptsize}

The names that are given to the worldly contain a great error, for they turn the mind aside from what is right to what is not right

\textit{(Gos. Phil. 53.23–27)}

Therefore, continues Gos. Phil., people do not “understand” (ῥιων) “what is right” (πετσωντ), but rather “what is not right” (πετσωντ ανι),242 when they hear terms such as “the life” (ψῳν), “the light” (ψογοσιν), or “the resurrection” (ταναςτασιν).243 That is, however, “[unless] they have learned what is right” ([πλιν] αρχεβο ανετσωντ).244 This caveat is important, for this is one of the major themes of Gos. Phil., to get across the correct understanding of certain key terms and concepts—or the correct contents of various ICMs of prime importance for the, according to Gos. Phil., proper understanding of the Christian message, to put it in terms of cognitive theory. So, then, what is the correct understanding of these terms according to Gos. Phil.? The tractate is fond of turning common concepts on their heads and confounding readers’ expectations. In describing the relationship between, and meaning of, such concepts as life and death in terms such as we have seen here, Gos. Phil. furnishes us with an important interpretive key to the understanding of many puzzling statements throughout the text, however, for it has done nothing less than make us aware of the fact that whenever such important concepts are mentioned in the text, the tractate may in fact be referring to its opposite. At the same time we have been made aware of the close connection between these concepts, including, most significantly, life and death.

Let us now take a closer look at the tractate’s views on the primordial origin of death before we go on to investigate its interpretation of the death of Christ in particular, and then proceed with an analysis of its views concerning the resurrection.

3.1.5.2. Paradise and the Origin of Death
Our tractate traces the origin of death to two primordial events in the Garden of Eden, namely to the creation of Eve from Adam (Gen 2:21–24), interpreted as the separation of the former from the latter, and to the eating of the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge (Gen 3). We saw in the discussion above that the taking of Adam’s soul, based on Gen 2:21–23, is understood by Gos. Phil. as the taking of his life. In accordance with this understanding of the event, Gos. Phil. tells us that,

242 The terms πετσωντ and πετσωντ ανι should here be understood also in the sense of the firm, or fixed and that which is not, referring to the immutable realities and the changeable worldly “realities” respectively (cf. Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4173).
243 Gos. Phil. 53.27–34.
244 Gos. Phil. 53.34–35.
The days when Eve was [in] Adam, there was no death. When she separated from him, death came into being. (Gos. Phil. 68.22–24)

Originally there was no death, Gos. Phil. informs us, for death only came into being with the separation of Eve from Adam. This of course refers to the account in Gen 2:21–23 of the creation of woman, also discussed in connection with Exeg. Soul’s concept of the fall of the soul in the previous chapter.246 As in Exeg. Soul, the emphasis in Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of Gen 2:21–23 is on the separation of the female element from the male, rather than on the incident as a creative act, and in both tractates the episode is interpreted negatively, as a fall. Gos. Phil. also returns to this episode a couple of pages later:

Had the female not separated from the male, she would not have died with the male. It was his separation that became the beginning of death. (Gos. Phil. 70.9–12)

We saw above that, if the reconstruction of ἄντι ἡν ἤνογ [ων ε]πιενα ("he was given [life in] its/her place") at Gos. Phil. 70.25–26 is right, Adam was given a new "life" in return for the loss of his original one. Seen in connection with the tractate’s statements concerning the deceptiveness of names and concepts and its reversal of the death-life dichotomy, the life Adam was given in return must in this context actually be regarded as death. Adam was given a life of the world, a mortal life which is equated with death. The question then becomes how to regain true life. In this regard Gos. Phil. states, directly following the statement quoted above concerning the origin of death as a result of the separation of Eve from Adam, that

again, when he enters and receives it for himself, no death will take place. (Gos. Phil. 68.24–26)

245 Schenke here reconstructs [τ]ίνι [Δ]ῶμ and translates “Als Eva [mi]t A[d]am (zu sammen) war” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 46–47). As will be shown in the discussion below it fits better into the overall argument of Gos. Phil. to follow Layton and restore [τ]ίνι [Δ]ῶμ.

246 See chapter 3.
This passage is linguistically ambiguous, for it is by no means clear who or what the referents here are. It is clear that the text cannot mean what one would perhaps expect, namely that it should refer to Adam receiving Eve again. To accommodate this view one would have to emend the text to, e.g.,

\[
\text{πάλιν ε}(\zeta)\omega\alpha\omega\rho[\kappa\varepsilon\rho]\text{γην ἡξιτ}(\zeta)\ eροι νήσυου νάυχοπε}^{247}
\]

again, when \(\langle\text{she}\rangle\) enters and he receives \(\langle\text{her}\rangle\) for himself, no death will take place.

It is possible, however, to understand the text as it stands, thereby rendering such an emendation unnecessary. Isenberg translates the Coptic text quite freely as, “If he enters again and attains his former self, death will be no more,” understanding “he” as Adam, and the “it” as Adam’s “former self.”\(^{248}\) I think, however, the actor is here better understood not as Adam himself, but as Christ, the second Adam. If so, it follows that we cannot understand what he receives as “his former self,” but rather as something else. In the lines just prior to the one quoted here, we hear that death (\(\nu\nu\nu\nu\)) came into being, and thus it seems probable that what Christ as the second Adam receives for himself in order to abolish death is in fact death itself.\(^{249}\) So, to paraphrase the passage I would suggest the following: “Again, when Christ enters and receives death for himself, no death will take place.” Now, how does Christ “receive death for himself,” and what is it that he enters as the second Adam in order to do so? We shall return to these questions in more detail below, but first we must consider some closely related aspects of the origins and remedies of death.

In both \textit{Exeg. Soul} and \textit{Gos. Phil.} the fall is linked to the primordial separation of Gen 2:21–23. It is therefore not surprising that also in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, as in \textit{Exeg. Soul}, salvation is related to the rectification of this primordial error, and that it is the return to the original paradisal state that will ultimately lead to salvation. So, Christ comes to remove death, but that is not all. He also comes to unite and to give life:


\[\text{248 Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 179.}\]

\[\text{249 This is also the view of Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 386.}\]
Therefore Christ came so that the separation that happened in the beginning might be rectified. Again he will join them both together, and to those who have died in the separation he will give life, and he will join them.

(Gos. Phil. 70.12–17)

We see here that Christ comes to “give them life” († ἁγ ἁπογοῦν), which nicely parallels the giving of worldly “life” to Adam in return for the ἀρχα that was taken from him. At the same time Christ comes to join what was separated in the beginning, that is, in one sense, Adam and his life / soul (ἀρχα), and in another, Adam’s soul with his spirit. In describing Christ as both joining those who were separated and giving life to those who died, Gos. Phil. in this passage combines the rectification of the two adverse effects of the primordial separation, namely the separation which was interpreted as a taking of life, and the giving of new life which was really death.

We thus see that there are three main interlinked aspects to Christ’s salvific actions that are directly related to what we have discussed above. He removes death, he gives life, and he reunites the separated. Gos. Phil.’s views on how Christ accomplishes this, and what this implies for the tractate’s sacramental soteriology, will be discussed in detail below. At this point it should suffice to say that in Gos. Phil., as in Exeg. Soul, death is linked to separation and life to unification.250

Still, Gos. Phil. does not content itself with the abovementioned accounts of the origin of death. In addition to the separation narrated in Genesis 2, the tractate also utilises the Genesis 3 story of the eating from the Tree of Knowledge. Gos. Phil. here sets the stage by emphasising the existence of two trees in paradise,251 the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life, and by stressing the important differences between them. Gos. Phil. has this to say concerning the Tree of Knowledge (παντὶ ἀρχα):

251 Gos. Phil. 70.22–23.
That one killed Adam, but here the Tree of Knowledge has made man alive. The Law was the tree. It could give knowledge of good and evil. It neither removed him from evil, nor did it place him in the good, but it created death for those who ate from it. For when he said, “eat this, do not eat that,”252 it became the beginning of death. (Gos. Phil. 74.3–12)

At first sight Gos. Phil. here seems to contradict itself when it asserts that the Tree of Knowledge brought death to Adam in paradise, but life here. That the Tree of Knowledge killed Adam fits in well with the tractate’s interpretation of what transpired in the Garden of Eden, since the eating from the tree caused Adam’s expulsion from paradise and his reception of mortality, as we saw above. Before the tractate goes on to explain that “the law” (ⲡⲛⲟⲙⲟⲥ) was the tree, and that this law brought death, however, Gos. Phil. pauses to refer to the lifegiving effects of the Tree of Knowledge “here.” It thus seems like we are here in a sense dealing with two trees of knowledge.253 The first, which is later identified with the law, is the traditional Tree of Knowledge from the Genesis account. This part of the passage is unproblematic. For the identification of the other tree, however, we may want to take into account how Gos. Phil. here plays on several Pauline passages, first and foremost centred on Gal 3:13 and Phil 3:8–9 (see fig. 28).

The Gal 3:13 input, where Paul states that Christ has bought “us” free from the curse of the law through his crucifixion, is connected to the Gos. Phil. input by its discourse on the law, causing counterpart mappings between the two mental spaces. There are in addition counterpart mappings between Gal 3:13’s reference to the cross as the tree, and the Tree of Knowledge in the Gos. Phil. input. At the same time, the Phil 3:8–9 input, referring to the knowledge of Christ as a counterpart and contrary to the law, is connected to the Gos. Phil. input primarily through its references to knowledge and the law. In the blend the Tree of Knowledge is connected both to the law as a bringer of death, and to the cross as a bringer of life. We thus get the conceptual blend shown in fig. 29.

We have here what seems to be a case of conceptual disintegration,254 where a single Tree of Knowledge turns into two separate, but connected, conceptual entities. In the Gos. Phil. passage the two trees are only implicitly separated, by means of the spatial references “that tree” and “here”

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254 For conceptual disintegration, see Hougaard, “Conceptual Disintegration”; Bache, “Constraining Conceptual Integration Theory”, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.
and the references to their different effects, but without directly stating that there are two trees. In the blend, however, it becomes evident that there are two different but related trees of knowledge. By understating this implication in the text, Gos. Phil. manages to keep the two trees of knowledge at the same time both separate and intimately connected, which nicely suits its overall rhetorical strategy.255

Together these conceptual and intertextual blends lead to the emerging entailments that not only is the old Tree of Knowledge the law and the new one the cross, but also the implication that to follow the law, i.e., Judaism, as exemplified by its dietary restrictions, equals Adam’s eating of the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge in the garden of Eden, and can only lead to death. Eating from the new Tree of Knowledge, on the other hand, brings life. Since the new Tree of Knowledge is the cross, and what hung on it as its “fruit” was Christ, it is Christ’s death on the cross, and the eating of Christ that brings life. Moreover, since the eating is in this passage connected both to knowledge and to eating, we also have here a possible simultaneous reference to gaining knowledge of Christ and participating in the Eucharist. Another implication is that the new Tree of Knowledge, the cross, also replaces the old Tree of Knowledge, making the law, and hence Judaism, obsolete and brings life in place of death (see fig. 30). In this way the new tree replaces the old, the new knowledge replaces the old, the new death—which-brings-life replaces the old death, and consequently Christianity replaces Judaism.

The conceptual and intertextual blends shown here only represent the tip of the iceberg, however, since the recollection of Gal 3:13 in this context also primes the rest of Paul’s discussion of the law in Galatians, and Phil 3:8–9 likewise primes the broader discussion in Phil 3 concerning death and resurrection, for possible subsequent recall. Moreover, the integration network shown in fig. 30 may further trigger passages like Col 2:21–22, Eph 2:15, and several passages in Romans (e.g., 4:15; 5:13; 7:7–13).256 In fact, each one of the implications we have seen arising from the

255 Schenke wonders why the text does not simply state something like “Dort befindet sich jener Baum der Erkenntnis, der Adam getötet hat. Hier aber befindet sich dieser Baum der Erkenntnis, der den Menschen lebendig gemacht hat” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 444). However, while such a statement would certainly have been clearer, it would not have achieved the same rhetorical effects as the actual manuscript reading. Buckley, for her part, holds that “we can postulate one tree, acting in contrasting ways... Depending on the status of the eater, the one tree may deal death or life” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4177–4178).

blending processes discussed here have the potential to activate further mental input spaces, the possible cumulative effects of which are difficult to assess.

3.1.5.3. The Crucifixion
We have now seen a glimpse of the importance attached to the cross and the crucifixion in the rhetoric of Gos. Phil. In the present section we will look closer at the tractate’s interpretation of this event. We have seen that Gos. Phil. identifies the cross with the new Tree of Knowledge, but this is not the only tree that is blended conceptually with the cross in this text. Other connections are also drawn between the events in Eden and the crucifixion, with vital implications for the underlying sacramental soteriology. In a creative blend Gos. Phil. connects the crucifixion with both the paradise account in Genesis and Jesus’ earthly father Joseph:

Φαίλιππος Παπστόλος Περὶ Χαίρων στοιχείων λυπητάσιος Χάριτος Χριστός σου σε Θείον καθώς ἐν υἱῷ νησίδων Καινοτομικά εἰς τὴν καταραμένην ἴδων προσκυνήσας ἐν θεῷ ἔναθεν χριστιανόν ἔναθεν χριστιανόν ἐν καιρίν υἱὸν ἡμῶν ζητήσασθιν ἀπαραθάδειος αὐτῷ ὕπαρκε γιὰθαντάα αὐτῷ τενείκειται ἡ τυπαράδεισα ναυε ἔναθεν ἔναθεν ἔναθεν ἔναθεν ζητήσασθιν ἀπαραθάδειος αὐτῷ ζητήσασθιν ἀπαραθάδειος αὐτῷ

Philip the apostle said, “Joseph the carpenter planted a garden because he needed wood for his trade. It was he who made the cross from the trees that he planted, and his seed hung upon that which he planted. His seed was Jesus, and the plant was the cross.” But the Tree of Life is in the middle of the garden, and it is from the olive tree that the chrism came, and from it (i.e., the chrism) the resurrection. (Gos. Phil. 73.8–19)

In this interesting passage, Gos. Phil. sets up a blend between the garden (παραθάδειος) planted by Joseph and the garden of Eden. At the same time Joseph’s vocation as a carpenter is utilised to connect him to the making of the cross and thereby also to link the cross to the Tree of Life. Moreover, by describing Joseph’s “seed” as hanging “on that which he planted,” the text also makes a pun on the multiple meanings of

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257 Cf. Gal 3:16 where Christ is described as “the seed” (σπέρμα) of Abraham.
259 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 91.
260 From the point of view of a “Valentinian” reading of Gos. Phil., Thomassen holds Joseph to represent the “Valentinian” Demiurge, the garden to represent the cosmos, the cross to represent matter, and Jesus hanging on the tree to represent his birth in a material body (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 268–269; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 91). The connection between crucifixion and incarnation is also made by Catherine
“seed” (σπέρμα), denoting both the “seed” of plants, human “sperm,” and “offspring”261 (see fig. 31).

This is a crucial blend in the overall rhetoric of Gos. Phil. Most significantly, by blending the two gardens and identifying the cross with the Tree of Life, Jesus is implicitly identified as the fruit of this tree. In Genesis, eating from the Tree of Life is said to bestow eternal life.262 Jesus, as the fruit of the Tree of Life, brings life by dying, thus reversing the meaning of life and death, and at the same time reversing the effects of the opposing (old) Tree of Knowledge. To counter the effects of the primeval eating from the Tree of Knowledge in paradise, what is needed is the fruit of the Tree of Life, i.e., Christ, and his “death” on the cross (the Tree of Life) was not really death, for it brought life (see fig. 32).263

Gos. Phil. makes clear the sacramental entailments of this passage, firstly by connecting the cross with the Tree of Life and its fruit with Christ, thus indicating the Eucharist, and secondly by associating the chrism with this tree. There is thus a simultaneous connection from the Tree of Life/cross to both the chrismation and the Eucharist. As for the latter, it is clear from the blend that partaking of Christ in the Eucharist brings life, and that this eucharistic effect is intimately connected with Christ’s life-giving death on the cross. Moreover, by connecting the chrism to the Tree of Life/cross and to the resurrection, the life-giving qualities of the chrism are also directly connected to Christ and the cross (see fig. 33).264

Interestingly, it becomes clear from this analysis that in Gos. Phil. the two trees from the Genesis account are blended in, and with, the crucifixion, and, by metonymical extension, with Christianity, as the cross becomes simultaneously the Tree of Life and a new Tree of Knowledge (see fig. 34). Crucifixion, then, is the crucial event where death is connected with life and the differences between the two are subverted. These effects should be seen in connection with the statements discussed above concerning Gos. Phil.’s views on the relationship between life and death,


261 The Greek equivalent is σπέρμα (see Crum 831b).

262 Gen 3:22.

263 As Buckley puts it, Gos. Phil. “clearly associates the cross, the tree of life, and Jesus’ life-giving death” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4179).

and also the passage where Christ says that he has come to make the below like the above and the outside like the inside.265

Gos. Phil. further makes the connection between the body of Jesus, the Eucharist, and the crucifixion by way of a Syriac etymology:

\[
\text{ невърітівія не и егьос єр єроі ѣнчсєрєс љєфърєсъв єтєпєи ѡе петтємъръ евол ѡи ѡєр ё єєстјєро љ љєпъосъ}
\]

The Eucharist is Jesus, for in Syriac he is called Pharisatha, that is, “the one who is spread out,” for Jesus came crucifying the world.

(\textit{Gos. Phil. 63.21–24})

That Jesus came crucifying the world may perhaps seem strange at first sight, but clearly recalls Gal 6:14 where Paul states that Christ has crucified the world to him and him to the world.266 Moreover, the dual reference to the Eucharist and the crucifixion is done rather cleverly with the use of this Syriac etymology, for the word “Pharisatha” denotes simultaneously the spreading out of the body of Jesus on the cross and the distribution of the bread in the eucharistic ritual.267 Segelberg points out that this Syriac word may mean both “spread” and “break” and also points to parallel words in Hebrew and Aramaic with the same double meaning of spreading and separating.268 What Segelberg does not mention, however, is that this wordplay also works well in Coptic with the phonetically similar words \textit{ⲡⲟⲣϣ} (spread out) and \textit{ⲡⲟϣⲁⲧ} (divide/be divided), which are often confused, as Crum notes.269

\begin{itemize}
\item[265] See \textit{Gos. Phil. 67.31–35.}
\item[266] See W.C. van Unnik, “Three Notes on the ‘Gospel of Philip’,” \textit{NTS} 10 (1964): 469. Cf. also Col 2:14. Segelberg, however, finds this to be “a peculiar interpretation of [\textit{Gos. Phil.}], where we would expect to find the Gnostic way of thought revealed” (Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 219).
\item[267] See Unnik, “Three Notes,” 468–469; Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 218–219; Jacques-É. Ménard, “Beziehungen des Philippus- und des Thomas-Evangeliums zur syrischen Welt,” in \textit{Altes Testament—Frühjudentum—Gnosis: Neue Studien zu “Gnosis und Bibel”} (ed. Karl-Wolfgang Tröger; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus / Gerd Mohn, 1980), 318. Segelberg states that this seems to be based on “traditional Christian thinking,” and that “it may be interpreted in an orthodox Christian way.” W.C. van Unnik points out that the word “pharisatha” is used in the Syriac translation of Acts 2:46: “and they brake the pharisatha in the houses” (Unnik, “Three Notes,” 469). He concludes that “It must be assumed that the author of this saying stood not far apart from the church and its vocabulary, but he gave the words a typical twist” (ibid.). Thomassen, however, connects the term to “the abstract notion of an emanation from unity to plurality,” and holds its use here to represent “a characteristic Valentinian synthesizing of protology, salvation in history, and redemption in ritual” (Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 275).
\item[269] See Crum 271b. Moreover, \textit{ⲡⲟϣⲁⲧ евол} is also used in Coptic texts to denote
\end{itemize}
Gos. Phil. also deals with what transpired in the crucifixion in more detail, giving its own interpretation of Jesus’ final words on the cross:

"[My] God, my God, why, Lord, [have] you forsaken me?"

It was on the cross that he said these (words), for it was in that place that he was divided [...]

(Gos. Phil. 68.26–29)

With one exception, the insertion of the word “Lord" (πιθοεις), Gos. Phil. here closely follows Matt 27:46 / Mark 15:34 in rendering the words of Jesus on the cross. Jesus is said to be divided on the cross, and this seems to be presented as the reason why he uttered the quoted words, thus presenting what seems to be an argument for the separation of the divinity from the earthly Jesus at the crucifixion. This division on the liturgical preparation (see, e.g., Theophilus of Alexandria, Letter to Horsiesios, 47 in Crum, Papyruscodex, 14, and see also Crum’s remarks in ibid., 68 n. 1).

270 I follow Schenke’s reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 46). Layton has [sic] χιπνυρχ (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 178).

271 Cf. Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34.

272 Schenke, however, thinks this is a scribal error. According to him, πιθοεις is written too early and should come after ἀκακα, and hence translates the passage “’[M]ein Gott, mein Gott, warum { } hast du mich verlassen?’ (Der Herr) sprach diese (Worte) am Kreuz” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 46–47). The passage makes good sense as it is, however, and there is in my view not sufficient justification for making such an emendation. Cf. Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 382–392, esp. 391, who argues strongly in favour of reading the text as it is.

273 Cf. Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 383; Tuckett, “Synoptic Traditions,” 175. Unfortunately the following lines in the manuscript are heavily damaged, so we must acknowledge the uncertainty caused by the loss of the possible continuation of the argument. Schenke has proposed reconstructions for most of these lines (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 46), but due to the highly speculative nature of such a reconstruction, I have chosen to disregard this heavily damaged part of the text (cf. Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 71 n. 3).

274 This separation of the divinity from the humanity is also argued by Ambrose, who states that “it was the man who cried out as he was about to die by separation from the divinity” (Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 10.127; translation quoted from Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600) [vol. 1 of The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971], 245), and Theodore of Mopsuestia is reported to have held similar views (see Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, 246). Shenoute attributes such a view to Nestorius: πε[λ]ας κεκακαλαν τετευμενον εραίν ου βεβαίως ημωντειοντος κεκακαλαν ημικ καθο καθο κεκακαλαν τιμον εκειν εκκακαλαν ακακαλαν τιμον "he (i.e., Nestorius) said that it is the flesh which calls up toward the divinity, ‘Why have you forsaken me?’ and that the divinity departed to the height and abandoned the flesh on the cross’” (Shenoute, I Am Amazed, 469 [DR 131 = IT-NB IB14 f. 217]; This reading is based on a photograph of a leaf of Codex DR, now at the Biblioteca Nazionale “Vittorio Emanuele III” in Naples, which is better
cross may also be seen in connection with the reference to Jesus as “the one who is spread out,” as we saw that this terminology also carries connotations of separating and dividing in several languages including Syriac and Coptic. Not only is Jesus “spread out” on the cross and in the eucharistic ritual, but he is also divided in both places, on the cross and in the ritual. In this way, Gos. Phil. reinforces the links between crucifixion, Eucharist, and Christology. In its description of Jesus' separation on the cross, Gos. Phil. also sets up yet another paradox. Not only does Christ bring life by dying, but analogically it is also in a sense by means of his own division that he mends the primordial separation. Separation is thus connected to unification as death is connected to life.

3.1.5.3.1. The Rending of the Veil
As Louis Painchaud has suggested, this passage should be read in conjunction with what Gos. Phil. has to say concerning another effect of the crucifixion, namely the rending of the veil of the temple.275 All the synoptic gospels report that when Christ died on the cross, the veil of the temple was torn.276 This means that exactly at the point when Christ, according to Gos. Phil., was divided on the cross, the veil of the temple was divided as well. Gos. Phil.'s argument for the division of Christ on the cross is thus lent additional weight by this simultaneous rending of the veil. It is, as we have seen several examples of already, a pervasive rhetorical practice of Gos. Phil. to set up several parallels to important events in the life of Christ, and we shall see that this particular blend, of the rending of the veil and the division of Christ, has important ramifications with regard to both the Christology and the soteriology of the tractate. The significance of this conceptual blend is only fully realised, however, when it is connected to the identification, made in Heb 10:20, of the veil of the

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276 Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.
Deification and Christology in the Gospel of Philip: Temple with the flesh of Jesus\textsuperscript{277} (see fig. 35). The intertextual connection with Heb 10:20 creates a direct connection between the division of Christ and the rending of the veil, and also strengthens the eucharistic implications of the two events. If we also take the local intertextual context in Hebrews into consideration, the statement in 10:19 that one may enter into the holy of the holies by means of the blood of Jesus is significant, along with 10:20 stating that this entry is through his flesh.

Gos. Phil. refers to the temple veil at several occasions, each time in connection with the New Testament motif of it being torn, and uses it to describe the soteriological effects of not only the crucifixion, but also of the Christ event in general:

The veil covered at first how God administered the creation\textsuperscript{278} but when the veil is rent and those of the inside are revealed this house will be left behind [as] a desert,\textsuperscript{279} or rather, it will be [destroyed],\textsuperscript{280} but the entire divinity\textsuperscript{281} will flee [from] these places, not into the Holies [of the] Holies, for it will not be able to mix with the unmixed [light] and the [fault]less fullness, [but] it will come to be under the wings of the cross\textsuperscript{282} [and under] its arms. This ark will [become their] salvation when the flood of water bears down upon them. If some happen to be of the priestly tribe, these will be able to enter inside the veil with the high priest.

\textit{(Gos. Phil. 84.23–85.5)}

This is an allusive passage that has the potential of prompting the creation of highly complex blends, of which we will here only scratch the surface. First of all we notice an interesting blend of the two arks, namely that of the covenant, located inside the temple, and that of Noah, which saved men and animals from the flood. These two arks are not only blended

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{277} “through the veil, that is, his flesh” (ῥηματικαπτατασανανεπαινεπαοποσυγμαῖονεικακατακαταληκτικακαταθήκηνοιεκακατακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκηνοιεκακαταθήκη

\textsuperscript{278} Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

\textsuperscript{279} Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

\textsuperscript{280} Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

\textsuperscript{281} Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

\textsuperscript{282} Cf. Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34.
with each other, however, but also with the cross, which here becomes both the ark of the covenant and Noah’s ark. Now, what implications may arise from this blend? If we choose to read this passage as an allegory of the eschaton, which is suggested by the imagery of the flood and the destruction of the temple, we get a blend where “this house” (τὸ ἱλικίον), i.e., the temple, may be mapped onto the material world. It is thus the destruction of this world that is prefigured in this way by Christ’s death on the cross. As the metaphorical veil is torn and the secrets of the material world are laid bare, the world will be destroyed. The rather oblique term “the entire divinity” (τὸ ἱλικίον τῆς σωτηρίας) should in this context probably be understood, as Schenke has suggested, as denoting “all the righteous,” reading ἱλικίον as the equivalent of εὐνοεῖται and not as δειοῦται.283

“The priestly tribe” (τὸ ἱλικίον τῆς σωτηρίας), on the other hand, may be understood as a reference to the Christians.284 When the material world is destroyed, the Christians, as “the priestly tribe,” may thus enter heaven within the veil together with Christ “the high priest.” While all the Christians will be saved and enter heaven, all the righteous non-Christians will attain to a kind of secondary salvation. They may not enter inside the veil with the high priest, by they will be able to seek refuge under the arms of the cross, like chickens taking cover under the wings of a hen, as is clear from the allusions to Matt 23:37–38 / Luke 13:34–35. They will not be able to “mix” (τὸ ἱλικίον) with “the unmixed light” (τὸ ἵππος ἰκάττως). This privilege is reserved for those who have become perfect light, namely the Christians. For, as we learn elsewhere in the tractate, in order to mix with the light one must become light.285

Shifting its metaphors in accordance with the temple imagery and

283 See Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 509–510. In the context of the crucifixion we might have expected τὸ ἱλικίον to refer to the divinity of Christ separated from his material body. The use of the term in this sense is attested by Shenoute (see Shenoute, I Am Amazed, 469), but it does not make sense in Gos. Phil. that the divinity of Christ would not be able to enter “the holies of the holies” or that it would be unable to “mix with the unmixed light.” It has been argued that τὸ ἱλικίον τῆς σωτηρίας should here be taken as a reference to the Valentinian demiurge (see, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 35; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186). As Schenke rightly notes in his critical edition, however, “Die einfache Deutung auf die Gestalt des valentinianischen Demiurgen geht jedenfalls (schon wegen des Augens τῆς σωτηρίας) nicht auf” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 509 n. 1404). Thomassen sees a reference to “a special kind of salvation” for “the psychic powers,” although he admits that “Gos. Phil. never uses the word ‘psychic’” (Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 274).


285 See Gos. Phil. 78.31–32; 79.1–3, and the discussion below.
key intertexts, *Gos. Phil.* then states that for these people the cross will function as an ark when the flood comes. This blend of the two arks with the cross may moreover be blended with the reference in Wis 14:5 concerning people trusting their souls/lives to a “piece of wood,” that is, to a wooden vessel on the sea, a passage that may also be given a Christian interpretation as a reference to the cross. Another possible entailment of the blending of the ark of the covenant with the cross and the ark of Noah can be drawn by way of its relation to the tablets of the covenant, and thus to the law, which again makes it possible to understand the righteous who are saved by the blended ark/cross as Jews. It is thus possible to interpret *Gos. Phil.* as envisioning some kind of salvation for the righteous Jews, albeit a second rate one. On the other hand, these righteous may also simply be understood as references to less perfect Christians, perhaps catechumens, or maybe even to good people in general, including pagans.

Even though the Christians are Christs, in relation to Christ himself they are as sons in relation to a father, for the relationship of identity between the Christians and Christ is always to some extent subverted by the hierarchical aspect of the relation. In this example they are priests, while he is the high priest, but they are all of the same “tribe” (Φυλή).

The tractate continues by stressing the fact that the veil was rent completely:

\[
\text{Therefore the veil was not rent above only, since it would have been opened to those above only, nor was it rent below only, since it would have been revealed to those below only, but it was rent from above to below.}^{286}\text{ Those above opened those below for us so that we may enter the hidden of the truth.} (\text{Gos. Phil. 85.5–13})
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Here the focus of the discourse seems to shift again to the crucifixion and its combined revelatory and soteriological effects. It is the crucifixion, then, which opens up the way from the things below to the things above. With the crucifixion and the rending of the veil the workings of the material world are laid bare and the way to salvation is opened. The motif of the complete rending of the veil is also utilised elsewhere in the tractate to make the slightly different point that it is necessary to ascend:

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286 Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.
Therefore its veil was rent from above to below. 287 For it was necessary for some from below to go up above.

(Gos. Phil. 70.1–4)

Gos. Phil. elsewhere identifies Christ as the one who reveals what is hidden, by way of an interpretation of his epithet “the Nazarene” (παραζαρηνος). 288 This explanation is later expanded when Gos. Phil. states that, “Nazara is the Truth, the Nazarene, then, is the Truth” (ναζαρα τε ταλησεις παραζαρηνος [ινα] σε τε ταλησεις). 289 For it is truth that reveals what is hidden. That Christ as truth reveals what is hidden must again be seen in connection with the fact that by his crucifixion Christ becomes the fruit of the new Tree of Knowledge, not least because it is his “death” on the cross that causes the rending of the veil of the temple and the revelation of the hidden things within. 290

Christ is divided on the cross and his divinity leaves his humanity behind, but another question that naturally arises from this, which we have yet to consider, is which part or parts of Christ’s constitution, outlined above, leave and which part or parts are left behind? We will get back to this question after we have considered the closely related question of the resurrection, for, as we shall see, Gos. Phil. closely connects the crucifixion, Eucharist, and chrismation with the resurrection.

3.1.5.4. Resurrection
The question of what it is that arises from the cross when Christ is divided must be seen in connection with the rhetorical question asked by the tractate concerning what it is that arises at the resurrection.

288 Gos. Phil. 56.12–13.
3.1.5.4.1. Resurrection Prior to Death

Gos. Phil. closely connects the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of the Christians, and does so from a rather interesting perspective:

Those who say that the Lord died first and then arose are wrong, for he arose first and then he died. If one does not acquire the resurrection first he will not die. As God lives, that one would die!

(Gos. Phil. 56.15–20)

Somewhat paradoxically, resurrection is presented as being necessary in order to die. This passage thus furnishes us with yet another example of Gos. Phil’s playful inversion of the concepts of life and death. By giving death a positive valuation, making it dependent on resurrection, and making it equal salvation, the tractate gives another statement of the important point it emphasises elsewhere, namely the deceptive nature of names and concepts in the world, and the close relation between such dichotomic conceptual pairs as life and death. The text then goes on to confound our expectations, however, by suddenly using the concept of death with its usual commonsense meaning, emphatically stating that one who does not receive the resurrection while being alive will surely die.

The concept of death is here certainly not used in a positive sense.

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291 The scribe has left this gap empty, probably due to damage to the source manuscript (cf. Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 153; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 227). For this emendation, see Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philipe, 56. Schenke translates, in accordance with this reconstruction of the Coptic text, “Gott lebt, würde jener st(erben)!" (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 23), and Wilson, likewise presupposing this reconstruction, translates "As God lives(?) this one would [die]” (Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 32). Layton has ΛΝΜ(- - -), and Isenberg translates "As God lives, he would …" (Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 152–153). Giversen chooses not to reconstruct, reading ΛΡΑ as “cypress,” and translates “Så sandt Gud lever, ville denne cypres?” (Giversen, Filipesevangeliet, 48). While Giversen’s understanding of this passage is certainly commendable in not requiring an emendation, the evidence of the manuscript does seem to suggest that there are at least a couple of letters missing at this point. Moreover, despite Giversen’s ingenious interpretation, the use of the term “cypress” is rather counter-intuitive at this point in the text, and also not mentioned at any other point in its preserved parts.

292 Note again the use of the word χρω, here primarily in its sense of “acquire,” but with connotations of begetting and birth.

293 Cf. Hermas, Sim. 93 (IX.16). Schenke translates this part as a rhetorical question: “muß er dann nicht sterben?” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 23).

294 This interpretation is of course dependent on the reconstruction of ΛΡΑ(γ) at the end of this sentence. See note 291 above for discussion.
It startles the reader, however, and signals not only the fact that terms and concepts should not be taken at face value, but it also keeps the reader on his or her toes, so to speak, by making clear that the text does not simply reverse the signification of such concepts as life and death throughout. The use of the word death in its normal sense in this punch-line thus serves as a reminder to its readers that every reference to seemingly simple concepts in Gos. Phil. must be understood in its rhetorical and theological context.

Gos. Phil. quite matter-of-factly connects the resurrection of Christ with that of the individual Christian, and argues on the basis of the implicit THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, that since it is a general requirement to acquire the resurrection first, in order to die, this must also have been the case with Christ. But how did Christ arise before he died? It seems that Gos. Phil. here interprets two main events in the life of Jesus in terms of resurrection. One of these is directly connected with death, namely the crucifixion, which may be interpreted in terms of Christ arising to the cross prior to dying. And as Christ arose to the cross and died, so too the Christians need to arise before they die. But how? Gos. Phil. links the crucifixion to resurrection mainly by way of the event’s sacramental connotations. First of all, Gos. Phil. connects resurrection closely with chrismation. For, as Gos. Phil. tells us,

\[ \text{ἡ ἑσορία ἕντεκαν ὅπερ ἐβολὴ ἑρίτη ἐβολὴ ρυτοῦ ἐχαναστάται} \]

it was from the olive tree that the chasm came, and from it (i.e., the chasm) the resurrection. (Gos. Phil. 73.17–19)

We have seen how Gos. Phil. connects the cross to the Tree of Life and how Jesus becomes the fruit of that tree through the crucifixion. By also connecting the chrism to the cross/Tree of Life, the tractate links the crucifixion to both chrismation and Eucharist. Moreover, by also in effect making the crucifixion the source of the chasm, and the chasm the means to the resurrection, it makes two equally important links. On the one hand it connects the crucifixion directly to the resurrection, and on the other it specifies the chrismation as a ritual bestowing it. Thus, Christ’s arising before death is also linked to chrismation by means of the crucifixion, but it is also associated with Jesus’ baptism through the

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295 The identification of Christ as the olive from which the chism is derived is also attested in the Syrian tradition, including the writings of Aphrahat and Ephrem (see Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, esp. 124–130, 320).
links made elsewhere between the chrismation and the Jordan event, which then in effect comes to constitute begetting, (re)birth, and resurrection.

It would seem that the most probable reason why the tractate insists on the importance of resurrection prior to death, for both Christ and the Christians, is mystagogical. That is, Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of ritual practice requires the abovementioned sequence of resurrection prior to death. The arguments advanced by Gos. Phil. in this regard also seem to have a polemical edge against certain opposing points of view. First, we should probably see the polemic against those who believe that Christ died first and then rose in connection with a later passage directed against an erroneous interpretation of baptism:

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\text{ⲛⲃⲦⲉ ⲛⲩⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲩ ⲛⲓ ⲛⲓ ⲛⲓ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛⲟⲩ ⲛ)o
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As Jesus perfected the water of baptism, thus he poured out death.
Therefore we go down into the water, but we do not go down into death, so that we may not be poured out in the spirit of the world.

\((\text{Gos. Phil. 77.7–12})\)

It has been argued that this passage is directed against those who, following Romans 6, regard baptism in terms of death and resurrection. However, while this passage is certainly directed against the view that baptismal immersion is a descent into death, there is nothing in the passage that speaks against an interpretation of baptism in terms of resurrection. On the contrary, Gos. Phil.’s emphasis on the necessity of acquiring the resurrection prior to death indicates that resurrection is something that must be experienced and/or gained ritually. The statement that in baptism “we do not go down into death” is in accordance with the claim that one is not supposed to die first, before acquiring the resurrection. But does Gos. Phil. interpret baptism in terms of experiencing or acquiring resurrection?

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296 There might be a wordplay here that carries the transition from the passage on pouring to that on blowing.
As we have seen, baptism is certainly interpreted in life-giving terms. It is interesting to note also how Gos. Phil. in the passage just quoted weaves together different aspects of Jesus’ baptism by way of a pun. Jesus is described as having “perfected,” χωκ εβολ, the baptismal waters,299 a phrase which may mean perfected or completed, but which also carries connotations of filling.300 Especially in this context, involving the element of water, this meaning of the word χωκ is relevant and easily primed and brought to mind. This meaning is moreover prone to be activated when seen in connection with the following verb the text uses to describe Jesus, namely that he “poured out,” παρτ εβολ, death. There is also at the same time a pun on the Coptic words μοογ and ογγ, meaning “water” and “death” respectively.301 Thus, by predicating of Jesus simultaneously χωκ εβολ μμογ and παρτ εβολ μμογ at his baptism, a neat and effective parallel is created between Jesus filling the baptismal water with life and emptying it of death.302 Yet again Gos. Phil. closely links life and death

299 For the idea of the importance of ritually perfecting the baptismal waters, see Theophilus, Letter to Horsiesius, 46–48; Lundhaug, “Baptism.”

300 See Crum 761–762. The connotations of “filling” have been made explicit in Schenke’s later translations: “As Jesus filled the water of baptism (with Spirit), so he emptied out death” (Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 201); “Wie Jesus das Wasser der Taufe erfüllt hat, so hat er es vom Tod entleert” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 65; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 208). This stands in contrast to his earlier translation, “Wie Jesus das Wasser der Taufe vollendet hat, so goß er den Tod aus” (Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 20; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 58).

301 The wordplay and rhetoric of this passage work exceedingly well in Coptic with its juxtaposition of χωκ εβολ μμογ and παρτ εβολ μμογ. Schenke has argued that the μοογ vs. ογγ wordplay may indicate a Coptic original for this passage (Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 2). Against this it has been argued that the similarity between the two words in Coptic is simply a coincidence, and that the association of baptism with death goes back to the New Testament and esp. Romans 6 (see Johannes B. Bauer, “Zum Philippus-Evangelium Spr. 109 und 110,” TLZ 86:7 [1961]: 554; Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 168; cf. also Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 12). But these objections do not take into consideration the fact that even though the argument of the passage may ultimately be derived from the Greek of the New Testament, it certainly works even better rhetorically in Coptic. Nor do these objections take into account the Coptic wordplay on χωκ εβολ and παρτ εβολ. Schenke subsequently changed his mind, however, and no longer argued in favour of a Coptic original for this passage, suggesting either τελευν/κενον or πληροιν/ἐκειν as the Greek Vorlage for χωκ εβολ/παρτ εβολ (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 474). This suggestion shows quite clearly the rhetorical superiority of the Coptic reading in relation to the proposed Greek original. Nevertheless, Johannes Bauer is of course right to note that “auch Übersetzer bilden mitunter Wortspiele” (Bauer, “Zum Philippus-Evangelium,” 554; cf. also Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 12).

in a manner that is rhetorically highly effective. The wordplay creates a seemingly intuitive link between the two and makes the mystagogical claims that are made concerning baptism seem logical and intuitively persuasive.

In this context we recall Gos. Phil. 68.22–26, discussed above, where Christ is described as entering and receiving death for himself and thus abolishing the death which came into being from the separation of Eve from Adam, thus recalling not only Christ’s crucifixion, as we have already suggested, but also his emptying the baptismal waters of death. In this way Gos. Phil. cleverly sets up a simultaneous reference to events narrated in Scripture as well as to sacramental (re)enactment. On the one hand, Christ entered the world, acquired death by crucifixion, and became the fruit of the Tree of Life, but on the other hand he also entered the baptismal waters of the Jordan and emptied the waters of death, simultaneously filling them with life. Gos. Phil. thereby also makes baptism parallel the Eucharist as a life-giving sacrament, the former being linked primarily to Christ’s baptism and the second to his crucifixion.

Now, let us return to the issue of the resurrection. As we have seen, the text seems to presuppose the necessity of attaining the resurrection prior to death, that is, the necessity of attaining it ritually. We have seen above that the reception of resurrection is closely related to chrismation, and chrismation to baptism. We may therefore draw the conclusion that one may receive the resurrection in a baptismal chrismation. In terms of ritual enactment it would seem most probable that baptismal immersion immediately preceded chrismation, in such a way that chrismation and the act of arising from the baptismal waters are interpreted together in terms of resurrection. Thus one is resurrected ritually in the baptismal chrismation in order not to die at the end of life.

The necessity of arising before death is also emphasised elsewhere in the tractate, with clear sacramental overtones:

\[
\text{ἡ εὐχῶν ῥησαται \ οὐρα \ τιμώμενος \ γινώσκει \ καταθέτοι \ χρίσμα \ \κατακυρίωσιν \ αὐτοῦ.}
\]

303 Significantly, the baptismal water is also referred to as ἑτέρῳ ἐνωμ, “the living water,” at Gos. Phil. 75.21.
Those who say that they shall die first and (then) they shall arise are wrong. If they do not first receive the resurrection while they live, they will receive nothing when they die. Thus also when they speak about baptism they say that baptism is a great thing, for if they receive it they will live.

(Gos. Phil. 73.1–8)

In the same way as those who say that Christ died before he arose are wrong, those who hold that they shall die first and then be resurrected are likewise wrong. Interestingly, Gos. Phil. connects this error to that of believing baptism to be a sufficient criterion for salvation, or perhaps the error is simply the belief that it is the baptismal water in itself that constitutes resurrection? In any case, it seems Gos. Phil. is arguing for the fundamental importance of the anointing with chrism in addition to baptism in water, against those implied opponents who do not share Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of the chrismation as resurrection. But does Gos. Phil.’s emphasis on the chrismation necessarily imply that baptism is unimportant? This does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, baptism seems to be regarded as an important ritual of cleansing which is necessary in conjunction with chrismation.304

Gos. Phil.’s argument is held together by the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, which emphasises the parallelism between the Christ event and the life of the individual Christian. Importantly, the blend is, as we have seen, a double-scope one, with inferences projected backwards to both inputs. In this case, when it comes to the chrismation and resurrection, since Christ prefigured what is to happen sacramentally to each individual Christian,305 and each individual Christian passes through a chrismation that is interpreted as bringing about a resurrection, it may also be regarded as important that Christ followed the same sequence in his prefiguration as the Christians do ritually in the sacraments.

Scriptural support for this view of Christ’s resurrection before death, may be found in the same passage in Romans that we identified earlier as a possible intertext with regard to Gos. Phil.’s theology of the dual birth of Christ, namely Rom 1:3–4. We saw that in Rom 1:4 Paul refers to Christ as being “designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness

304 I do not think, then, that there are any grounds for claiming, with Wilson, that this passage implies “a certain disparagement of Baptism” (Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 19, 153) or that it should be understood as “a piece of polemic against the beliefs of the ‘orthodox’ Church” (Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 153). For the view that this passage does not involve a denigration of baptism, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 273 n. 1.

305 This is one of the possible interpretations of Gos. Phil. 67.27–30. See below for discussion.
by his resurrection from the dead.” When read in light of the ritual act of chrismation, and the interpretation of this ritual as connected both to the bestowal of the Holy Spirit and to resurrection, we see that this passage in Romans is indeed a powerful intertext.

Gos. Phil. also argues for the importance of receiving the Holy Spirit in order to be resurrected, using a simile describing the making of glass and pottery:

\[
\text{Glass vessels and pottery vessels come into being by means of fire, but if glass vessels are broken they are remade, for they came into being by means of a breath (ⲧⲉⲕⲉ), whereas if pottery vessels are broken they are destroyed, for they came into being without breath (ⲧⲉⲕⲓ).} \quad (\text{Gos. Phil. } 63.5-11)
\]

As W.C. van Unnik has rightly pointed out, the difference between the pottery vessels and the glass vessels only becomes clear once the vessels are broken. Therefore, van Unnik argues, the breaking of the vessels probably signifies death, and the difference highlighted in the simile is between those who have been created by means of breath, who will survive death, and those who have not been made with breath, who will not survive death.\(^{306}\) This then seems to be an argument regarding the requirements for resurrection.\(^{307}\) If we regard ritual initiation as the target input of the simile, it seems clear that the glass vessels, people who have come into being by means of “breath” (ⲧⲉⲕⲉ/ⲧⲉⲕⲓ), i.e., those who have received the Holy Spirit, are the Christians, while the others, the pottery vessels who did not receive the spirit, are the non-Christians. The Christians, then, who have been made Christians by their reception of the Holy Spirit by means of the chrism, will be resurrected, while the others, as for instance the Jews, will not. The similarities in the processes described in the simile, where the only difference between the making of the vessels of pottery and those of glass is the addition of the spirit in the latter, recalls Gos. Phil’s other comparisons between Christian initiation and Jewish proselyte initiation, where the difference also has to do with

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\(^{306}\) See Unnik, “Three Notes,” 467. Contrary to van Unnik, however, I do not think there is any good reason to identify “fire” in this context with sexual passion (ibid.).  
\(^{307}\) Van Unnik has brought to light an astonishingly close parallel to the present simile in Genesis Rabbaḥ 14.7 which is used in an intra-Jewish debate concerning the resurrection (see Unnik, “Three Notes,” 467-468).
the lack of spirit, chrism, and begetting. This comparison is thus primed and ready for recall, making the identification of the pottery vessels with Jewish proselytes quite intuitive. It seems we may therefore also regard this simile as having a polemical edge against Judaism.

The necessity of gaining life before death is also spelled out in another passage, however, where Gos. Phil. singles out the “gentile” (Ῥωμαίος) as one who has never lived, and thus cannot die the proper death of the Christian:

οὐρωμαίος ἡμών ἔγραψε ἵνα ἐπιμεθυνθῇ γαρ ἐνεργή τινα ἐνθεομονετάτευκτον ἐκ τῆς λειτουργᾶς τοῦ χρίσματος ἔνοχον γαρ τῇ ζωῇ ἐνομίζεται εἰ

A gentile man does not die, for he has never lived so that he may die. He who has believed in the truth he has lived, and this one is liable to die, for he is alive since the day Christ came. (Gos. Phil. 52.15–19)

“Death” in this sense is reserved for those who have been made alive through Christ, i.e., the Christians. If one has not received life ritually, then, one has not lived and therefore cannot die.

In summary, Gos. Phil. shows the necessity of becoming Christian, and of passing through the required initiation rites including the vital chrismation, in order to be able to arise after death rather than simply remain dead. As Gos. Phil. presents the issue, neither the Jews nor the gentiles satisfy these criteria.

3.1.5.4.2. Postmortem Resurrection

Gos. Phil.’s Christology not only influences its views of the ritual resurrection of the Christians, but also the anticipated postmortem one. In a long polemical passage the tractate specifies some of the details of this process,

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309 There has been some disagreement as to whether the end of the passage as quoted here is to be understood as the end of the present argument, or as the beginning of the next. Schenke, in his first translation of the text, took χαίρεινον ἑξῆς εἰ to be the start of the next sentence and his saying number 5 (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 6; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 39; for this solution, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 352; Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 329; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip”; Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 49). Some years later Schenke changed his mind and adopted the solution followed here, reading χαίρεινον ἑξῆς εἰ as the end of the present passage, his saying number 4 (see Schenke, “Die Arbeit am Philippus-Evangelium,” 325; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 188. For this solution, see also Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 29; Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippus, 9; Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 41). In his critical edition, Schenke once again changed his mind and chose to read χαίρεινον ἑξῆς εἰ as an independent unit, numbered 4b (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 14).
presented rhetorically in opposition to at least two opposing viewpoints. First, Gos. Phil. engages what it presents as the erroneous belief in the actual resurrection of the material body:

There are some who are afraid that perhaps they might arise naked. Therefore they want to arise in the flesh, and [they] do not know that it is those who wear the [flesh] who are naked. These [...] to unclothe themselves, [they are] not naked. (Gos. Phil. 56.26–32)

Once again Gos. Phil. plays on the deceptiveness of concepts, this time by reversing the meaning of nakedness and clothing in its its argument against the implied interlocutor that there is no need to be worried about rising naked, i.e., without the flesh, stating that it is really those who “wear the flesh” who are naked. Those who “wear the flesh” are naked because they lack the proper clothing, while those who undress have it. This clothing, which is more valuable than those who put it on, is of course exactly what the model reader of Gos. Phil. will acquire in his or her resurrection.311

Gos. Phil. continues its polemic against those who believe in a resurrection of the material flesh by way of an exegesis of 1 Cor 15:50, in a passage which utilises composite allusions to First and Second Corinthians as well as a paraphrase of John 6:53–54:312

“Flesh [and blood shall] not inherit the kingdom [of God].”313 What is this that shall not inherit? (It is) this which is on us. But what also is this that shall inherit? It is Jesus’ (flesh) and his blood. Therefore he said, “He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him.”314

(Gos. Phil. 56.32–57.5)

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310 Cf. 2 Cor 5:2–4, esp. 3.
311 We will return to the imagery of nakedness and clothing below.
312 For Gos. Phil’s blending of 1 Cor 15:50 with John 6,53–56, see Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.
313 1 Cor 15:50.
The passage, quoted and discussed above, specifying that “his flesh is the Logos\textsuperscript{315} and his blood is the Holy Spirit” (τεῦσαρξ πε πλογος ψω ψευςμοι πε πιπω ετογκλ),\textsuperscript{316} follows directly after this statement against the belief in the resurrection of the flesh. So, it is not the material flesh and blood, “this which is on us” (ταει ετριων),\textsuperscript{317} that shall inherit the kingdom of God, but rather the flesh and blood of Jesus.\textsuperscript{318} And this is the reason, argues Gos. Phil., using Jesus’ words paraphrased from John 6:53–54, that it is necessary to consume his flesh and blood. We will return below to the metaphor of inheritance, but first we shall follow Gos. Phil’s argument as it turns to engage apparently the opposite viewpoint to the one confronted above, for it now argues with equal force against those who reject the resurrection of the flesh completely:

\begin{quote}
As for me, I find fault with the others who say that it will not rise. Or both of them are at fault. You say that the flesh will not rise, but tell me what it is that shall arise, so that we may honour you. You say, “The spirit in the flesh,” and “It is this other light in the flesh.” It is a Logos, “this other” that is “in the flesh,” because whatever you will say, you say nothing apart from the flesh. It is necessary to arise in this flesh, for everything is in it.
\end{quote}

(Gos. Phil. 57.9–19)

In the words of Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, Gos. Phil. “hurls sarcasm at the opponent who thinks that he can speak as a disembodied spirit.”\textsuperscript{319} By first engaging those who believe in the resurrection of their own material flesh, and then those who do not believe in any resurrection of the flesh at all, Gos. Phil. does indeed seem to place itself in the middle, embracing neither of these extremes.\textsuperscript{320} But what is really at stake here?

\textsuperscript{315} Cf. John 1:14a.

\textsuperscript{316} Gos. Phil. 57.6–7.

\textsuperscript{317} The interpretation of ταει ετριων (“this which is on us”) as the material flesh, and that the contrast is between this flesh and the flesh of Jesus, is made explicit by Schenke in his translation, "Welches ist das (Fleisch), das nicht erben kann? Das (Fleisch), das wir an uns tragen! Welches aber ist das, das doch erben kann? Es ist das (Fleisch) Jesu—nebst seinem Blut!” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 25).


\textsuperscript{319} Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4188.

Is the difference between Gos. Phil. and the implied opponent as great as Buckley implies? We have seen that Gos. Phil. rejects the resurrection of the material flesh, so what the text is here defending must be the resurrection of some other kind of flesh, for Gos. Phil. is adamant that the phrase “to rise in this flesh” (ⲉⲧⲱⲟⲩⲩ ρⲉⲧⲉⲉⲓⲥⲏⲣⲝ) describes the reality of the resurrection. Gos. Phil. must therefore count on some sort of resurrection of the flesh, but what kind of flesh? Since the concluding statement of this long polemical passage insists that it is “necessary to rise in this flesh,” a key issue for the interpretation of the passage is thus the identity of “this flesh” (ⲣⲉⲧⲉⲉⲓⲥⲏⲥ). We saw above that it was Jesus’ flesh and blood that would inherit the kingdom of heaven, so “this flesh” should logically refer to the flesh of Jesus here as well, an identification that seems quite clear within the context of the passage as a whole.321 Gos. Phil.’s solution to the problem of the resurrection of the flesh thus seems to be based on its identification of the flesh of Christ with the Logos. Those who think the Logos rises apart from the flesh are wrong. No Logos can rise independently of the flesh—it is the flesh. On the other hand, those who think that only the spirit rises are equally wrong, on the same grounds, because they do not understand that the flesh in question, the flesh that really does rise, is the Logos. So, within the theology of Gos. Phil., where the Spirit is united with the Logos, and the Logos is the flesh, the Spirit cannot rise independently of the flesh, since it cannot rise independently of the Logos, it is its blood. This may also indicate that the Spirit is not only joined to the Logos, but that it actually resides within the Logos, as life is said to be within the Logos in John 1:4, as Eve was originally within Adam when no death existed, and as blood must always be within flesh.322

Now, why does Gos. Phil. take such pains to argue for the necessity of rising “in this flesh” (ⲣⲉⲧⲉⲉⲓⲥⲏⲣⲝ) when it could easily have put the matter in less ambiguous terms, such as, e.g., “in the flesh of Jesus”? The stress on the correctness of the phrase “in this flesh” and the way it is reinterpretated here clearly indicates that the phrase is important in itself.323 And it

321 Cf., e.g., Isenberg, “Introduction,” 136; Rudolph, Gnosis, 193–194; Franzmann, Jesus, 63. Cf. also Elaine H. Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1979), 12 who takes the reference to the necessity of rising “in this flesh” to be ironic.
322 See Gos. Phil. 68.22–23; cf. Gen 2:21–23; 3:20. There is a parallelism throughout the tractate between the Spirit and Eve. The knowledge of the framing input of human flesh and blood, namely that the latter resides within the former, supports the inferences from John 1:4 and Gen 2:21–23; 3:20.
would seem most probable that the importance of such a phrase would stem from its use in either confessional or credal statements, or doctrinal debates, or indeed both. Otherwise it seems there would be scant reason for this kind of verbal and exegetical acrobatics. We will return to this question below in more detail, since it may give us clues to the tractate’s *Sitz im Leben*, but we still have not really answered the question of what it is that shall rise. Granted, we have seen that it is the flesh of Christ, rather than the material flesh, but what does this actually mean with regard to the human constitution? What happens to the human soul, and what about the spirit? We saw earlier that in the Adam-Christ blend, the Logos was on the level of Adam’s soul. Now, if we take that blend into consideration with regard to the *The Christian is a Christ* blend, there are several significant entailments (see fig. 36), for it emerges from this that, as with Adam, the individual Christian soul is on the level of Christ’s Logos, while the spirit is on the level of the Holy Spirit, and the material body is on the level of Christ’s material body. This also seems to imply that we may regard the Logos as Christ’s soul. Since it is Christ’s flesh, together with the Holy Spirit that rises in the resurrection, we may surmise that for the individual Christian it is the transformed soul that rises together with the Holy Spirit. If we apply this insight to the crucifixion it seems probable that that separation involved the Logos and the Holy Spirit, together constituting Christ’s divinity, separating from the material body. So, it seems that in the system of *Gos. Phil.* it is the combination of soul and spirit that rises, while the material body is left behind.

What does this view of the resurrection imply with regard to *Gos. Phil.*’s attitude towards the material body? Although the material body does not rise, *Gos. Phil.* does not seem to advocate any form of extreme bodily mortification:324

324 Cf., however, *Gos. Phil.* 82.26–29, which may indicate a practice of bodily mortification with its statement, at 82.29, that “it is necessary to destroy the flesh” (οὐδεὶς ἐτάκο ὅτι τὸ σώμα).

325 Layton emends to σωμάτικα κατὰ τὸν θεότητα ὅτι τὸν φυσικόν κατὰ τὸν θεαματικόν (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 172).
this world or in the resurrection or in the places which are in the middle. Do not let it happen that I be found in them! (Gos. Phil. 66.4–9)

The material flesh is neither to be loved nor hated. Instead, it is to be treated with indifference. In order not to end up in the dreaded “middle,” but rather “in the resurrection” (γίτανακταςις), used here in a spatio-temporal sense rather than as an event, one must acquire the resurrection in this world. This point is unambiguously made directly after the statement that in this world good is not good and evil is not evil, for, as Gos. Phil. makes clear, the state of affairs is different after this world:

οὐκ ἔστω ὕπατος ἐρωτικός ἢ πίπτω ὑπὸ χόρον ἡγεῖται ἔρως ἡγεῖται. Θεοτικός ἢ πληρωτικός ἢ ἀκατακτός ἢ μαθητικός ἢ μιατικός ἢ παλαιστικός. But there is evil after this world that is truly evil, that which is called the middle. It is death. When we are in this world it is necessary for us to acquire (ἐν) for ourselves the resurrection so that when we strip ourselves of the flesh we may be found in the rest (Ἀνάπαυσις), and not walk in the middle. (Gos. Phil. 66.13–20)

Gos. Phil. here introduces the term “rest” (Ἀνάπαυσις) as a synonym for resurrection in its spatio-temporal sense. We saw already above in the passage concerning the baptism of Jesus that the tractate there stated that it is appropriate to enter “his (Jesus’) rest” (τεκτανικός). “Rest” is here clearly the opposite of “the middle” (Τῆςετος), which is specified as being the real death.

The present passage also contains certain baptismal connotations in its use of the imagery of stripping, which may remind readers of the prebaptismal divesting of garments. The fact that the present passage does not specifically focus on baptism, but rather on the metaphorical stripping of the garments of flesh after death, in no way precludes the simultaneous baptismal connotations of the passage, especially for a reader familiar with the ritual action of prebaptismal undressing and

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326 See above for discussion.
Chapter Four

Gos. Phil.'s mystagogical interpretation of the baptismal rite in terms of acquiring the resurrection. That this acquisition of the resurrection is in many ways paralleled by, and connected to, the metaphor of putting on clothing will become clear from the discussion below concerning the tractate's concept of deification.

3.1.5.4.3. Inheritance

Resurrection and the acquisition of life are also connected to the concept of inheritance. Life and death are once again contrasted, and here it seems it is the Christians who are the living, while everyone else are regarded as dead.331

Those who inherit the dead (pl), they too are dead, and they inherit the dead (pl).

Those who inherit the living (sgl.m), they are alive and they inherit the living (sgl.m) and the dead (pl).

The dead (pl) do not inherit anything, for how will the dead (sgl.m) inherit? If the dead (sgl.m) inherits the living (sgl.m) he shall not die, but the dead (sgl.m) shall rather live. (Gos. Phil. 52.6–15)

An important feature of this passage332 that has sometimes been obscured in translation, is the difference between the plural of “the dead”

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331 I have chosen to present this passage in a way that shows more clearly the rhetorical structure.

332 In his later works, Schenke regarded this passage as three separate Sprüche, 3a: 52.6–11, 3b: 52.11–13, and 3c: 52.13–15 (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 15; Schenke,
(ἡττοοούτ) and the singular of “the living” (πετων) that are inherited. If we understand those who are alive as the Christians, it seems most probable that the singular living (πετων) that they inherit is simply Christ. So, by inheriting Christ, the Christians are alive. By contrast, those who are dead, who may by extension be identified as the non-Christians, i.e., Jews and Gentiles, simply inherit their own dead (ἡττοοούτ) and stay dead. The Christians, however, not only inherit Christ, “the living” (πετων), but also the, plural, “dead.” This may be taken to mean that the Christians, and Christianity, also inherit the dead, that is, they supersede Judaism and gentile religion and inherit everything.

The final paragraph in my division of the passage seems to change the simile from a simple contrast between the Christians (“the living”) and the others (“the dead”) and turns to what seems to be an argument for conversion. If one chooses to stay dead, one cannot inherit, but if one is dead and chooses to inherit the living, i.e., Christ, then the dead person will no longer be dead, but he will have gained life. The only way to gain true life, then, is to be initiated into Christianity, and thus become one of Christ’s heirs. The importance of inheriting eternal life is of course stressed in the synoptic Gospels, and has its Pauline parallel in the inheritance of the kingdom of God, in Revelation the reference to the inheritance of all things, and in Hebrews the idea, which is highly important in Gos. Phil., of the inheritance of the name.

See, e.g., Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 329. Layton does not indicate the singular of the living that is inherited, but indicates the plural of the inherited dead by translating “dead things.” There is, however, no word in the manuscript that corresponds to the word “things.”

Layton, however, understands “the dead” (ἡττοοούτ) that are inherited as “dead things” and translates, rather freely, “Those who inherit dead things are also dead, and what they inherit are dead things. Those who inherit the living are alive, and they inherit both the living and the things that are dead. Dead things inherit nothing, for how could a dead thing inherit anything? If a dead person inherits the living, that person will not die, but rather will greatly live” (Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 329).

See also Matt 19:29; Mark 10:17; Luke 10:25; 18:18; cf. also Tit 3:7.

1 Cor 6:9–10; 15:50; Gal 5:21; cf. also Rom 8:17; Gal 4:7; Eph 5:5; Col 3:24; Jas 2:5.


Heb 1:4.
We have already seen how *Gos. Phil.* points out in relation to pro-
creation that the son needs to become mature in order to reproduce
as his father does. The tractate makes a similar point with regard to
inheritance. Before he can collect his inheritance, the son must grow
up:

That which the father has belongs to the son, and he himself, the son,
as long as he is little he is not entrusted with those (things) that are his. When
he becomes a man his father gives him everything that belongs to him.  
(*Gos. Phil.* 60.1–6)

This is very close to Gal 4:1, which states that the heir is no different from
the slave as long as he is a child, even though he is the rightful new lord.
*Gos. Phil.* indeed nicely utilises Paul's teaching in Gal 4:1–2 and 4:7 also
in another passage:

The slave only seeks to be free, but he does not seek the property of his
master. But the son, not only is he son, but he ascribes to himself the
inheritance of the father. (*Gos. Phil.* 52.2–6)

*Gos. Phil.* here effectively makes the point that the inheritance is reserved
for the son, as opposed to the slave, but also that maturation is required
to collect it. If these references also remind the reader of the rest of
Gal 4:1–7 he or she might discover that this Pauline passage in fact
dovetails nicely with much of *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse concerning Christ
and the Christian's sonship. Christ is here presented as God's son born
from a woman under the law in order to redeem those who are under
the law. Those who are redeemed are also adopted as sons, receive the
spirit of God, and are made heirs of God through Christ. Apart from the
use of the term adoption, the passage provides a fitting intertext to *Gos.
Phil.*

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341 It may also be noted that Gal 4:8 resonates with certain other passages in *Gos. Phil.*
3.1.6. Deification

Considering the importance of the blend the Christian is a Christ in Gos. Phil. it is clear that the means by which one may become a Christ is a major issue. The way it produces an understanding of this process may even be said to be one of the primary functions of this conceptual blend, and the process may be said to be one of deification. In his recent monograph on deification in the Greek patristic tradition, Norman Russell quotes the definition of Pseudo-Dionysius: “Deification (θέωσις) is the attaining of likeness to God and union with him so far as is possible.”342 This is an apt description of what it entails to become Christ in Gos. Phil., as is also Augustine Casiday’s definition of deification as “that transformation of human persons which results in the legitimate ascription to them of divine attributes and names.”343 Both of these definitions capture important aspects of the logic that underlies Gos. Phil.’s presentation of Christian initiation and perfection.

3.1.6.1. Humans and Animals

Animals are mentioned quite a few times in Gos. Phil. In the majority of instances, however, they are used as metaphorical representations of humans. “There are many animals in the world in human form” (οὐχὶς ἦν ἄνθρωπος ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἄ

he will throw acorns to the pigs, but he will throw barley and chaff and hay to the cattle. He will throw bones to the dogs, to the slaves he will give the first (course), and to the children he will give the complete (banquet).

(Gos. Phil. 81.9–14)

344 Gos. Phil. 81.7–8.
345 Gos. Phil. 81.1–2.
We may say that Gos. Phil. here employs the conceptual metaphor human is animal, and it is those humans that are decidedly less than perfect that are referred to as animals. We may indeed specify the metaphorical blend as it is used here as lesser humans are animals, or indeed even non-Christians are animals. The only ones worthy of being characterized as humans in this tractate are the Christians. These humans, moreover, are supposed to strive to become “perfect” (телειος). In the hierarchical Great Chain of Being, man is on a higher level than the animals. When animals are used metaphorically to refer to humans it is usually instinctual behaviour that is highlighted, as opposed to higher-order behaviour or attributes, like thought and rationality, which are usually associated with humans. In Gos. Phil. man is clearly superior to the animals, and becoming “perfect man” is the ultimate goal. The description of the lesser human beings, the non-Christians, as animals thus also highlights the absolute superiority of the perfect man in this metaphorical scheme. The “perfect man” in Gos. Phil. is of course none other than Christ.

3.1.6.2. Putting on and Becoming Perfect Man

One of the clearest indications of the importance of deification in Gos. Phil. is indeed the multiple references to Christ as “the perfect man,” and the concomitant insistence on the importance of becoming Christ and “perfect man.” Christ is first identified as the perfect man in a passage that with clear eucharistic connotations states that

\[\text{when Christ came, the perfect man, he brought bread from heaven so that man would be nourished with the food of man. (Gos. Phil. 55.11–14)}\]

Christ, as perfect man, comes from heaven with nourishment suitable for those who are not, metaphorically speaking, animals, but humans. The tractate later states that Jesus Christ is “a blessed one” (οὐ̅μακαριος) for the very reason that he is “a perfect man” (οὐ̅τελειος ἱματια).349

346 Kövecses mentions the conceptual metaphors objectionable human behavior is animal behavior and objectionable people are animals as common specifications of the generic level metaphor human is animal (Kövecses, Metaphor, 125).

347 For the Great Chain of Being and metaphors based on it, see Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason, 170–181; Kövecses, Metaphor, 124–127.

348 See Kövecses, Metaphor, 126.

349 Gos. Phil. 80.1–4.
Becoming perfect man is also a major goal for the Christian, and must be understood in terms of the overall goal of becoming a Christ. Gos. Phil. describes this process partly by using metaphorical imagery of the putting on of clothing, and as is the case with the acquisition of the resurrection, becoming perfect man is closely linked to ritual acts. Interestingly, however, it does not seem to be linked to just one particular ritual, but rather to several.

3.1.6.2.1. Baptism
First of all, Gos. Phil. clearly associates the putting on of the body of “the living man” (πρῶμε ετος) with baptism:

πνεον ἑτος οὐγῶνα πο ρβ έτρητζαdos ἑπρῶμε ετος ετβεπαε εβελ ἐβάνε ἑπν οου άφακεξ άρνη ωι επιη αθηπατην γιανα

The living water is a body. It is necessary for us to put on the living man. Therefore, coming down to the water he strips himself naked so that he may put that one on. (Gos. Phil. 75.21–25)

One goes down into the baptismal waters naked in order to put on “the living man.” As we have seen, the tractate stresses the life-giving effects of baptism and rejects an interpretation of the immersion in water as death, and this putting on of the living man seems to be one of the vital goals of baptism. The identification of the living water as “a body” (ουγωνα) is what specifically creates the mental link here between the immersion and the donning of the new body of “the living man” (πρῶμε ετος).

3.1.6.2.2. Chrismation
In addition to putting on “the living man,” however, becoming perfect man is also associated with the reception of the “perfect light” (πεθέκσιον νογοει) and with the effects of the Eucharist. As for the reception of the perfect light, we have already seen how the imagery of light is intimately connected with the Holy Spirit and with the chrism. Gos. Phil. states that,

350 Cf. Heb 10:5.
351 See Gos. Phil. 77.7–12 and the discussion below.
352 April DeConick, however, takes the reference to “the living water” (πνεον ετος) in this passage to refer to the Eucharist, rather than to baptism (see April D. DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence: Sacramentalism in the Gospel of Philip,” SBLSP [1998]: 503).
353 Gos. Phil. 76.27.
he who has been anointed has everything. He has the resurrection, the light, the cross, the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him this in the bridal chamber. He received, and the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the Father.  

(Gos. Phil. 74.18–24)

The chrismation is connected to the cross (Tree of Life), the resurrection, the light, and “the bridal chamber” (πνευμα). The acquisition of the light thus takes place through chrismation, and is moreover further described in terms of the garment metaphor when Gos. Phil. describes the effects of putting on the perfect light in terms of becoming invisible to “the powers” (πνευμα):

(Gos. Phil. 70.5–9)

The donning of the light is here explicitly stated to happen “in the union” (φως) which must be seen in connection with the passage cited above, which refers to the reception of the light “in the bridal chamber” (φως). As we saw earlier, what happens in the chrismation of the individual Christian is interpreted in relation to the events at the Jordan. We saw that in the unification of the Logos with the Holy Spirit, an event that is described as both a mystery and as a revelation of “the great bridal chamber” (φως), the true body of Jesus came into being. That passage also states that in this unification, “a fire illuminated him” (φως). So, the light is intimately connected to the union and the bridal chamber with regard to Jesus’ baptismal chrismation, and the same is true with regard to that of the Christian: the reception of the light is associated with the joining that takes place with the chrismation, and is thereby linked to the metaphor of the bridal chamber. 

355 Cf. 1 Cor 10:16; Rev 19:13.
356 See Gos. Phil. 71.3–8.
357 Wilson, however, instead takes the close association between the anointing and the bridal chamber in Gos. Phil. 74.18–24 to indicate “How far Philip is from distinct and clear-cut ideas on the subject of the sacraments” (Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 20).
Gos. Phil. emphasises at several points that the wearing of the perfect light makes one invisible with regard to “the powers” (ἁγιάσμενοι), and stresses that indeed the only way to attain such invisibility is to put on the perfect light and thus become perfect light:

Not only will they not be able to detain the perfect man, but they will not be able to see him. For if they see him they will detain him. No one will be able to acquire for himself this grace in another way [except by] putting on the perfect light and himself becoming perfect light.

(Gos. Phil. 76.22–29)

This metaphorical cloak of invisibility not only secures the initiated’s postmortem ascent, however, but also life in this world:

If one becomes a child of the bridal chamber, he will receive the light. If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it in the other place. He who will receive that light will not be seen nor can he be detained, and no one will be able to trouble such a person even while he dwells in the world.

(Gos. Phil. 86.4–11)

In order to be able to enjoy these benefits one needs to receive the light here in this world, and the light is only given to those who become a “child of the bridal chamber” (οἱ παῖς ἡγιασμένοι). It seems, then, that also with regard to these questions Gos. Phil. emphasises the necessity of becoming a true initiated Christian by receiving the chrism in this world, in close relation to the baptismal ritual, and so become perfect light and invisible to the powers. Becoming a properly initiated Christian, a “child of the bridal chamber,” thus has profound implications not only with regard to life in the next world, but also in the present one.

360 Cf. Gos. Phil. 67.3–5.
Eucharist

The deificatory process of becoming perfect man does not end with the chrismation, however, for Gos. Phil. also connects this motif closely with the consumption of the eucharistic elements. We saw already in the passage cited above that Christ as the perfect man brings “bread from heaven,” but there are also other passages that link the imagery of the “perfect man” to the Eucharist. Gos. Phil. describes the elements of the Eucharist as follows:

πιστησιν ὑπωτρίᾳ οὐρανοῦ ὑπωτρίῳ οὐρανοῦ ἐκχθεὶ εἰπότος ὑπεκγνατο εὐπρεποῖ

The cup of prayer contains wine and it contains water, for it is laid down as the type of the blood over which thanks is given. (Gos. Phil. 75.14–17)

This passage gives us a rare glimpse of the ritual enactment presupposed by Gos. Phil’s mystagogy by stating that the eucharistic cup, “the cup of prayer” (πιστησιν ὑπωτρία), is filled with “wine” (ὕπατο) and “water” (ὕπατο). The tractate then gives a mystagogical explanation for the contents of the cup, with the statement that this mixture is a “type” (τύπος) of the blood of Jesus. First and foremost, the reference to the blood of Jesus being a mixture of blood (the wine) and water recalls John 19:34, which relates that when Jesus was pierced on the cross with the spear there came out “blood and water” (γυνηγίνον γάμμα καὶ ὕδωρ). By being specifically mentioned in connection with the crucifixion, this Johannine passage fits well Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of the Eucharist.

In addition to this Johannine reference, however, the Gos. Phil. passage also has the potential to recall Luke 22:43–44. This much-debated passage follows the description in verses 41–42 of Jesus kneeling down,

361 See Gos. Phil. 55.11–14.
362 Cf. 1 Cor 10:16. In his later works, Schenke suggests that the text should here be emended to better match the structure of 1 Cor 10:16, and translates, “Der Kelch des Gebets (, über dem gedankt wird,) enthält sowohl Wein als auch Wasser. Er ist als Zeichen des Blutes ( ) eingesetzt” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 61; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II.3],” 206, the emphasis is that of Schenke). For the rationale for this emendation, see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 456. I prefer to stay with the manuscript reading, however, since the text makes good sense as it is.
363 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 349.
Deification and christology in the Gospel of Philip

Praying and asking God to remove “this cup” (τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον). Luke 22:43–44 describes Jesus being in agony, praying earnestly and breaking into a sweat resembling blood: “and his sweat became like great drops of blood” (καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἱδρὼς αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ ὃρματος αἵματος). Of special interest in light of the eucharistic setting for the Gos. Phil. passage in question is the fact that Luke 22:43 relates that Jesus encounters “an angel from heaven, strengthening him” (ἄγγελος ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ ἐνισχύων αὐτόν). A possible intertextual integration network based on a reading of Gos. Phil. 75.14–21 may thus look like the one shown in fig. 37. The three mental input spaces share a generic space that consists of the generic references to blood and water. Moreover, the Gos. Phil. and Luke input spaces share a local generic space containing the references to prayer and cup. The blend as a whole not only reinforces the connection between the crucifixion and the Eucharist, but also at the same time strengthens the link between the eucharistic prayer and the angels that is evident elsewhere in the tractate.

The Gos. Phil. passage continues by describing the contents of the “cup of prayer” (ποτήριον ἡμῶν) in the following way:

And it fills with the Holy Spirit, and it is that (i.e., the blood) of the completely perfect man. Whenever we drink this we will receive the perfect man.

(Gos. Phil. 75.17–21)

367 It is worth noting that in several manuscripts, Luke 22:43–45a has been moved to Matt 26:39, and that many manuscripts entirely omit Luke 22:43–44. It has recently been argued convincingly that in the cases where Luke 22:43–45a has been moved to Matt 26:39 this has been done for liturgical purposes (see Clivaz, “The Angel and the Sweat”).
368 Water is a generic level conceptual constituent of the ICM of sweat.
369 See Gos. Phil. 58.10–14.
370 As Schenke points out, here “zeigt der Umstand, daß nicht der im Präsens übliche Stativ νηρὲς, sondern der (durative) Infinitiv νοῡς gebraucht ist, daß nicht der Zustand des Erfülltseins gemeint ist, sondern das Geschehen des Erfülltwerdens” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 456, Schenke’s emphasis). See also Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 81. Both Layton and Isenberg (in the critical edition), however, translate “it is full of the holy spirit” (Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 347; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 193; cf. also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 384, where Isenberg translates “it is filled with the Holy Spirit”).
371 For the identification of πα - (“that of”) in παγγελειον with πετασω (“the blood”), see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 61, 456–457; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:206. Schenke had previously suggested that it should be identified with πνευμα (“the spirit”) (see Schenke, Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959], 19; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 56).
The eucharistic cup contains the Holy Spirit and is thus the blood of the completely perfect man, the blood of Christ. Drinking from this spirit-filled cup, which presumably goes together with the eating of the eucharistic bread, thus causes the communicants to receive Christ. Through the cup they receive his blood, the Holy Spirit, and through the bread they receive his flesh, the Logos. One thus puts on the perfect man not only in baptism, but also in the Eucharist, and consequently the fact that the eucharistic cup contains water in addition to wine may be seen as an additional reference to baptism as well as to the scriptural passages mentioned above. 372

Significantly, this process is also described in terms of the garment metaphor at the end of an important passage that we have already encountered several times:

he said, “He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him.” What is it? His flesh is the Logos, and his blood is the Holy Spirit. He who has received these has food, and he has drink and clothing. 373

(Gos. Phil. 57.3–8)

Gos. Phil. here paraphrases John 6:53–55 and adds what seems to be an allusion to Matt 6:25 and 31. 374 We have already seen how in this Johannine passage Jesus is identified with the Son of Man, and how this Gos. Phil. passage also sets up a blend with the Johannine prologue. What is significant in the present context, however, is the connection that is made between the Eucharist and the garment. The use of the garment metaphor here is as evocative as it is unexpected and creates a potential link between the Eucharist and the various other contexts in which the garment shows up in Gos. Phil. For the garment imagery is an important reference with regard to intertextual and conceptual blends involving, in


373 I take ὑπάρξαω to be a contraction of ὑπάρξαο (cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 24; Andrew Helmbold, “Translation Problems in the Gospel of Philip,” NTS 11 [1964]: 91). The wording ὑπάρξαο ὑπάρξαω may perhaps also be construed as wordplay on ὑπάρξαο (“drink”) and ὑπάρξαω (“clothing”), which becomes even clearer with the omission of the ὑ in ὑπάρξαο which leaves us with the pair καὶ ὑπάρξαο connected by καὶ.

addition to this eucharistic reference, not only baptism and chrismation, but also marriage and resurrection. One of the most direct statements of the deificatory aspects of the garment metaphor is found in a passage where the tractate juxtaposes the garments of this world with those of the kingdom of heaven:

\[ \text{In this world those who wear the garments are better than the garments.} \]

\[ \text{In the kingdom of heaven the garments are better than those who have put them on.}\]  

(Gos. Phil. 57.19–22)

This may seem to be an almost tautological statement of the fact that the heavenly garments are heavenly, i.e., that in this world the clothes are worth less than the person who wears them, while in heaven, the clothes are more valuable than the person. This comparison, however, prompts the question of the nature and identity of the heavenly garments.

The significance of the comparison becomes clear when we, in light of some of the passages discussed above, identify the garments in this world metaphorically with the material body and the garments in the kingdom of heaven with the body of Christ, in the post-initiatory and postmortem wearing of the “perfect man.” It thus seems that Gos. Phil. here, as in 56.29–30 where “those who wear the [flesh]” (\(\text{ἡ ἐφορεῖ ἄντικρώ}\)) are discussed, utilises the common conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A GARMENT\(^{377}\) (see fig. 38). Gos. Phil. adds the twist, however, of blending this metaphor with the identification of the heavenly garment with the body of Christ (see fig. 39).\(^{378}\) This earthly, material body is of less worth than the soul who wears it, while the heavenly garment of light, on the other hand, which is the body of the perfect man, is more valuable.\(^{379}\)

In this way the wearer also in a sense becomes deified by wearing the

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\(^{376}\) This reconstruction is clear from the context.

\(^{377}\) For the use of this metaphor in early Christianity, often based on an exegesis of Gen 3:21, see, e.g., J.Z. Smith, “Garments of Shame.”


\(^{379}\) I do not think, however, as does Gaffron, that Gos. Phil. is here trying to make a point concerning the constant value of the one who wears these garments (see Gaffron, Studien, 162), since Gos. Phil. seems to make a point elsewhere of the deification of the individual soul. The main thrust of the blend seems rather to be on the fundamental difference between the material body, that one will take off, and the body of Christ, which is what one ought to put on. Gaffron, however, does not equate the garment with the body of Christ, but speaks of the true flesh wearing the garment of light (see Gaffron, Studien, 162–163).
heavenly garments, in a way which nicely dovetails with another simile used by Gos. Phil., discussed below, where the process of dyeing clothes is the primary framing input. In the final analysis, what we have here is simply another perspective on the necessity of putting on and arising in the flesh of Jesus, as we saw in the analysis of Gos. Phil.’s discourse concerning the resurrection of the flesh, which is of course the very passage that directly precedes the one presently under discussion. The picture that emerges from this analysis, then, is that of a functional overlapping of the sacraments, with the reception of “the perfect man,” being associated with both baptism, chrismation and the Eucharist. At the same time, the theme is also connected to a series of interrelated conceptual domains, including resurrection and deification. We may therefore, in cognitive terms, describe the garment as a concept that is used as a framing input in blends involving many different targets, often simultaneously.

3.1.6.3. Dyeing

Closely related to the aforementioned motifs of resurrection and the garment-metaphor of putting on “the perfect man,” Gos. Phil. also utilises imagery of dyeing:

\[\text{πηνοῦτε οὐχὶτ pe ἱνάξαθε ετυλιγμόνον ἵδιχνατε ἐρωοὺ ἕνηλθηνον ἱδιχνον μὴνεκτάχωδε γραὶ ἰρητού ταῦ τε ἐκ οἰνετάχνοντε ἡμῶν ἐταλμάτω ἵδιχνας ἕνηλθαν έμποτινε ἑνηθανάρῃ πηνοῦτε ἐρ ἐπάλησε ἑνετυλμάτησε ἡμῶν ρηγούηον}^{384}\]

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380 See below. This parallel is also noted by Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 31; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 239–240.

381 Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 240.

382 Gos. Phil. 56.26–57.19. See discussion above.

383 This, I think, may be the reason why the garment metaphor in Gos. Phil., as Thomassen notes, “is not … explicitly connected with a specific act such as either the anointing of the body or the subsequent donning of baptismal robes” (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 348).

384 The manuscript continues with, ἰδιαλακαί ἰναῖ, with the scribe having cancelled the letters ογ in ἰναῖογον (see Facsimile Edition: Codex II). Several scholars have suggested that the text has not been properly corrected by this scribal correction: De Catanzaro translates, “in water and power. No one sees” (Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 45), which indicates that he has chosen to emend the text to ἰναῖογον ἰδιαλακαί ἰναῖ (cf. Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 162); Isenberg thinks that the ογ in ἰναῖογον should not be cancelled, and reads ἰδιαλακας as a conjunctive, translating, “in water and power. And no one sees” (see Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 364, 422); Schenke suggests the emendation ἰναῖογον ἰναῖ (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 304); Charron and Painchaud argue that Schenke was basically on the right track but suggest instead the emendation.
God is a dyer. Like the good dyes—they are called the true (dyes)—die with those (things) that have been dyed in them, thus it is with those whom God has dyed. Since his dyes are immortal, they become immortal by means of his remedies. But God dips (ραττίζε) those whom he dips (ραττίζε) in water.385

(Gos. Phil. 61.12–20)

_Gos. Phil._ here sets up an interesting baptismal metaphor.386 Regine Charron and Louis Painchaud have rightly noted that the point concerning the “good” and “true” dyes is that the colours, rather than fade away, last as long as that which is dyed in them.387 Good and true dyes thus perish with the things dyed in them. _Gos. Phil._ then adds the twist that since God’s dyes are immortal, those that are dyed with these dyes will also become immortal. The somewhat reverse logic seems to be that since these dyes will never die, this means that the things dyed in them must also by necessity become immortal. That is, the immortality of the dyes requires the subsequent immortality of the recipients, for otherwise they would perish with the latter like the good and true colours of the world.388

In addition, _Gos. Phil._ plays on the double meaning of the word ἀφράτης, which denotes medicine/drug/remedy, as well as colour.389 In using this

385 For a thorough discussion of this passage, see Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer.”
386 As Charron and Painchaud rightly note, “The fact that the simile in the first part of the passage is about baptism is self-evident” (Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 44).
388 In order to explain the immortalising effects of this process of dyeing, Charron and Painchaud argue for a close connections between _Gos. Phil._ and alchemical literature (see Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 47–49). Although this suggestion is intriguing, Charron and Painchaud do not convincingly show that these parallels are relevant in the context of the passage in question, and ultimately they are not necessary in order to understand _Gos. Phil_’s argument, which seems to have a clear internal logic of its own.
389 See Crum 282b.
particular word to denote colour at this point, rather than χόρευ, which is used earlier in the passage, Gos. Phil. manages to stress the medicinal, life-giving aspect of the baptismal process, while at the same time preserving the metaphorical source input of dyeing. God’s dyes, then, have a medicinal, immortalising effect. Thus far the interpretation of the metaphor BAPTISM IS DYEING is relatively straightforward. The final part of the passage, however, then adds a direct reference to baptism, using the term ΨΑΡΤΩΓΙΖΕ, stating that God dips those whom he dips in water. This term in itself, of course, not only refers to the ritual of baptism, but may also simply mean wash, dip, or submerge in a general sense, and thereby also feeds directly into the metaphorical framing input of dyeing.

Gos. Phil.’s use of this sentence as a punchline, however, seems to call for a slight reinterpretation of the metaphor. We are left with two main interpretive possibilities here. It may simply be a more direct reference to the fact that the dyeing Gos. Phil. has just described should be interpreted as a metaphor of baptismal immersion in water, and that it is the water itself that is to be mapped onto the dye. This solution plays down the importance of the use of the word χορευ, however. If we take the multiple meanings of this word into consideration, not least its medicinal connotations, the chrism would probably be the most readily available counterpart in the conceptual integration invited by the tractate, rather than the water itself. In that case, the final sentence seems to introduce a contrast between God’s dyes / remedies and the water, a contrast that seems to parallel the contrast between baptism and chrismation elsewhere in

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390 Cf. Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 57 n. 3. Charron and Painchaud claim that with the shift to χορευ, Gos. Phil. puts the emphasis on the instrumentality of God’s dyeing in the transformative process of baptism (Charron and Painchaud, ”God is a Dyer,” 48). It seems to me, however, primarily to stress the life-giving effects of the remedy that is added to the water, rather than the actor and his actions.

391 Schenke, however, in his later works prefers to regard this sentence as a separate saying, 43b (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 33; Schenke, ”Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 197), but concedes that it may be related to 43a (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 303–304). In his early translations, Schenke emended the text and translated, “Gott aber taucht (ψαρτιζε) das, was er (färbt) (ψάρτιζε) in Wasser unter” (Schenke, ”Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 11; Schenke, ”Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 45).

392 Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 304: “Unsere These dürfte also im Klartext einfach noch einmal sicherstellen wollen, daß das Gleichnis die Taufe und ihre göttlichen Wirkungen meint.” Cf. also Borchert, ”Literary Arrangement,” 178.

393 In the Sahidic New Testament, the word is, e.g., used in Rev 3:18 as a translation of καλλιμακος, ”eye salve” (see Wilmet, Concordance, 2:647–648; Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 57 n. 3).
**Gos. Phil.** The interpretation would then be that the baptismal washing takes place in water, but the particular remedy that helps bring about immortality is the chrism (see fig. 40). Interestingly, this blend thereby not only stresses the immortalising qualities of the chrism, but also the indispensability of baptism in water as well as the simultaneity of baptism and chrismation. We thus seem to have yet another indication that the chrismation presupposed by **Gos. Phil.** was closely connected to baptism, rather than a completely separate ritual.

We saw above that **Gos. Phil.** elsewhere connects apostolic succession through ritual initiation specifically to the effects of the chrismation. Significantly, we also seem to have indications of the dyeing-metaphor being connected to succession when we connect the passage concerning God as a dyer, discussed here, with the fact that we read elsewhere in **Gos. Phil.** that

\[\text{Ἀπάδωσις οὐκ ἐρω}[τὴν] ἐπὶ ἰδιοὺς ἰδιερευνά \\
κληματικωθεσθε \\
ἀπὸ διακόσμου τοῦ ἀόρατος ἐρώτημα τοῦ ἀποκλείον ἐκεῖνος \\
εἰς ἅπαντας ὑποπληρωμένος ἀνθρώπου ἵππος ἔκτος τοῦ ἰδιερευνάκτες \\
ταῦτα ἐπιθυμεῖ \\
ἐν χρισμῷ ἀποβλήθη \]

the Lord went into Levi’s place of dyeing and took seventy-two\(^{394}\) colours and threw them into the vat and brought them out all white, and said, “Thus the Son \([\text{of the Son}]\) of Man has come \([\text{as}]\) a dyer.”\(^{395}\)

\-(\text{Gos. Phil. 63.25–30})-

Even the scribal error and its later correction may here indicate a connection of this “dyeing” with chrismation and apostolic succession. The scribe first wrote “the son of the Son of Man,” before he or someone else corrected the text to read simply “the Son of Man.” This scribal error may itself be seen as an indication of the degree of blending between the levels and functions of Christ, who is the Son of Man, and his successors in their individual capacities of being a son of the Son of Man. God is metaphorically a dyer, as is Christ, and Christ’s successors may also be dyers, using God’s life-giving remedies and bestowing immortality to successive generations of Christians by means of baptism and chrismation.\(^{396}\)

3.1.6.4. **Seeing and Becoming**

Another major and pervasive theme relating to deification in **Gos. Phil.** has to do with the reciprocity between the one who sees and that which


\(^{395}\) Cf. Mark 9:3.

\(^{396}\) The white colour may also conceivably be read as an allusion to the white garments of the angels (see, e.g., John 20:12).
is seen. We have already encountered this concept in connection with *Gos. Phil.*’s description of the transfiguration of Christ. We saw there that in order to make the disciples able to see him in his full glory on the mountain, Christ made the disciples great. This was due to the fact that people could only see Christ according to their own abilities, and thus his glory, the Logos, was hidden from view until the disciples were themselves elevated to that level. This theme recurs in various guises at several points throughout the tractate. In the discussion of the transfiguration the disciples are changed in order to see, but sometimes the causal relationship is also reversed:

\[\text{nicosson – Gen. 1:31} \]

It is impossible for anyone to see any of the ordained (things) unless he becomes like them. It is not like it is with the man who is in the world. He sees the sun while not being sun, and he sees the sky and the earth and all the other things while not being those (things). Thus it is in truth. But you have seen something of that place, and you have become those (things). You have seen the Spirit, and you have have become spirit. You have seen Christ, and you have become Christ. You have seen the [Father, and you] will become father. Therefore, [here] you see everything and you do not [see yourself], but you see yourself in [that place], for you will [become] that which you see. (Gos. Phil. 61.20–35)

This passage follows directly the passage concerning God as a dyer, discussed above, and is linked to that passage by the theme of transformation. At the beginning of this excerpt, seeing follows transformation, like in the transfiguration account, but then *Gos. Phil.* flips this logic on its head and seemingly presents the act of seeing as what causes the change. The overall logic thus seems decidedly circular: it is the change


398 Schenke solves this problem by regarding the end of the passage, from ἅ τοῦτο at 61.32, as a new and unrelated saying (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 32–33, 306; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 198). In his earlier work, however, Schenke regarded the whole passage as one saying (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 11; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 44).
that causes one to see, and it is the seeing that causes one to change. In any case, if one becomes what one sees, one in fact logically ends up seeing oneself as in a mirror. Moreover, the causal relationship between viewing an image of oneself in the mirror and being that image is a thought-provoking one and one that to some extent is blurred in these passages. The metaphor of the mirror becomes especially significant when we consider the possible sacramental connotations of the passage.

As Schenke has pointed out, the change at 61.27 from third person present to second person singular perfect, coupled with the Trinitarian references at 61.29–32, give the impression of "eines Rückverweises auf eine von den Adressaten im Kultgeschehen, also in der Taufe (auf den dreieinigen Gott) und/oder in der Salbung, bereits gemachte ‘mystische’ Erfahrung."\(^{399}\) We have already seen at several points how closely connected baptism and chrismation are in this tractate, and the imagery and importance of seeing oneself is in fact also taken up directly in the context of a mystagogical interpretation of baptism and chrismation:

\[
\textit{ⲙⲛⲃⲁⲩ ⲛⲁⲗⲩ ⲉⲣⲟⲥ ⲟⲩⲧⲉ ϩ̄ⲙⲙⲟⲟⲩ ⲟⲧⲉ ϩ̄ⲛⲉⲓⲗ ⲭⲟⲣⲓⲥ ⲟⲩⲟⲉⲛ ⲡⲗⲓⲛ ⲡⲗⲓⲛ ⲛⲁⲗⲩ ⲇⲉ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲭⲣⲓⲥⲙⲁ}
\]

No one will be able to see himself in water or in a mirror without light, nor again will you be able to see in light without water (or) mirror.\(^{400}\) Therefore it is necessary to baptise in both: in the light and the water, and the light is the chrism.\(^{\text{Gos. Phil.} 69.8–14}\)

Here, the imagery of seeing oneself is used to argue for the necessity of the combination of baptism and chrismation. At the same time Gos. Phil. here furnishes us with a direct connection between the soteriological metaphors of seeing and becoming and sacramental action. It is necessary, argues Gos. Phil., to baptise in both water and chrism, since the former is the mirror and the latter is the light without which it is impossible to see oneself (see fig. 41).

Combined with the evidence of the passage discussed above, the importance of this seems to be that if one cannot see oneself, neither can one become what one sees. One can see oneself, however, with the help of a mirror (water) and light (chrism).\(^{401}\) Since we have already seen that

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\(^{400}\) Cf. 1 Cor 13:12; 2 Cor 3:18.

\(^{401}\) Schenke rightly notes that since ‘‘Wasser’ nur Wasser meinen kann, braucht bloß noch der Begriff des ‘Lichtes’ aus dem Gleichnis ausdrücklich auf die gemeinte Sache bezogen zu werden’’ (Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 403).
by means of baptism and, especially, chrismation one becomes a Christ, what one sees as a result of baptism and chrismation should be just that, oneself as Christ. Through the chrismation one receives the name of Christ and may see oneself as Christ and become a Christ. Or rather, when one sees oneself as Christ one has become a Christ.

This also has an important eschatological component, that may be discerned in the statement that “[here] you see everything and you do not [see yourself], but you see yourself in [that place]” (.Fields, 61.32–34), a statement that, taken together with the mirror imagery, recalls Paul’s promise in 1 Cor 13:12: “For we see now through a mirror in a likeness, but afterwards face to face” (Fields, 61.32–34).

It is important to note that Gos. Phil. here stresses the fundamental importance of both baptism and chrismation. With just one of these elements, and not the other, the ritual process would be ineffectual. This passage, which stresses the necessity of baptism and chrismation in order to be able to see oneself/Christ thus nicely complements the passages we have already discussed concerning the necessity of both baptism and chrismation in order to be reborn/begotten, and in order to receive the resurrection, as well as those passages that stress the connection between chrismation and the reception of the name. The use of the metaphors of mirror and light in connection with the close conceptual connection made in the tractate between seeing and becoming, that is, between seeing and transformation on the one hand, and seeing and being on the other, thus creates a highly evocative and productive blend that sheds light simultaneously on a number of theological and sacramental concepts as well as on key scriptural intertexts.

There are also other potential entailments of the use of this metaphorical blend, however. Not only does the argument that both mirror and light are necessary in order to see oneself indicate the explicitly stated fact that both the water and the chrism are necessary, but it would also logically indicate the simultaneous presence of both elements in the ritual. For not only does one need both a mirror and light in order to see one-
self, but they need to be present at the same time. So, if we project to the blend this insight from the source input it would seem that the chrismation takes place at the same time as the baptism in water. It would, in other words, indicate that we are here looking at neither a strictly postbaptismal nor a strictly prebaptismal chrismation, but rather a chrismation taking place while the initiate is in the water. It might, for instance, take place after the full immersion(s), but while the candidate is still standing in the water, prior to emerging from it to dress in, possibly, white garments. However, the blend works even without drawing the logical inference of the simultaneity of water and chrism if one simply shifts the focus to the ritual complex as a whole.

However this might be, it is becoming abundantly clear that the tractate by no means disparages baptism, even though it singles out the chrismation for special treatment. What this emphasis on the chrism might further indicate is perhaps that there might have been scant reason to argue in favour of the necessity of baptism, which may have been taken for granted, but rather for the necessity of the use of chrism. What may, moreover, be significant in light of the tractate’s polemics against Judaism, is the fact that this would also be an aspect of the initiatory baptismal ritual that distinguished it from the Jewish practice of proselyte baptism.

As for Jewish proselyte baptism, it was preceded by circumcision. Gos. Phil. does not spend much time discussing or redefining circumcision, but it does mention it once, and it does indeed redefine it:

\[\text{ ...(text in Greek)}\]

As Gaffron has put it, “An einer Diskreditierung der Taufe hat das EvPh kein Interesse, wenn auch sein spekulatives Denken in stärkerem Maße der Salbung gilt. Hinsichtlich ihrer Wirkung sind beide Sakramente voneinander nicht zu trennen, wohl aber hinsichtlich ihres Bedeutungsgehaltes und ihrer spezifischen Deutungsmöglichkeiten” (Gaffron, Studien, 221). Majella Franzmann has observed that Gos. Phil. contains “polemics against baptism as practised by some other group, but give a positive view of that ritual as practised by their own group” (Franzmann, “The Concept of Rebirth,” 37). It should be noted, however, that Gos. Phil. directs its critique not only against diverging baptismal practice, but also, perhaps even more importantly, against diverging interpretations of baptism.

When Abraham [...] for him to see that which he would see, [he] circumcised the flesh of the foreskin,\(^{407}\) [telling] us that it is necessary to destroy the flesh.\(^{408}\)

\[\text{(Gos. Phil. 82.26–29)}\]

\textit{Gos. Phil.} here alludes primarily to Gen 17:23–18:2 and seems further to blend this with Col 2:11. The Genesis passage relates Abraham’s circumcision of his household and himself, an act which is followed by a vision of God as “three men” (τρεῖς ἄνδρες). It is especially significant that \textit{Gos. Phil.} in its allusion to Abraham’s circumcision makes reference to his seeing. While \textit{Gos. Phil.} does not explicitly state that Abraham saw God, it emphasises that circumcision was necessary in order for him to see what he was going to see. The fact that the object of Abraham’s seeing remains unstated in this \textit{Gos. Phil.} passage keeps open the possibility of reading it as an allusion not only to Gen 18:1–2, but also to John 8:56–58,\(^{409}\) where Jesus strongly implies that he has been seen by Abraham.\(^{410}\) It thus seems that we may legitimately connect this passage in \textit{Gos. Phil.} with the other passages that speak of seeing Christ, God, or even the Spirit.\(^{411}\) Seeing these, then, requires a metaphorical circumcision, which is here identified as the destruction of “the flesh” (τοσοφάντας υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡμῶν),\(^{412}\) an identification that recalls Col 2:11, where the circumcision of Christ is associated with “the stripping off of the body of the flesh” (παλαιώσας τοὺς ἡμῶν). The theme of seeing Christ and God in \textit{Gos. Phil.} also significantly echoes key passages in John and 1 John, and 1 and 2 Corinthians. We saw above how 1 John 3:2, with its statement that “when he appears we shall become like him, for we shall see him as he is” (ἐφανερώθη εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ), was

\(^{407}\) Cf. Gen 17:23–18:2; cf. also John 8:56.

\(^{408}\) Cf. Col 2:11.

\(^{409}\) The connection between this passage and chapter eight in John is also made by Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 501.

\(^{410}\) In John 8:56 Jesus states that, “Your father Abraham rejoiced that he might see my day and he saw and he rejoiced” (ἀβραάμ ὁ πατὴρ ἰσχύς ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἕρατον καὶ μαρτύρηται ἤφειλεν). Interestingly, the Sahidic New Testament manuscripts are among those that have the Jews in verse 57 asking Jesus whether Abraham has seen him: “Abraham has seen you?” (ἀβραάμ ἰδαν ἐρώκει), rather than whether he has seen Abraham.

\(^{411}\) For Trinitarian interpretations of Gen 18:1–2 in patristic sources, see, e.g., Kugel, \textit{Traditions of the Bible}, 342.

\(^{412}\) This is yet another example of a metonymically based metaphor (see chapter 2 of the present study).

\(^{413}\) Cf. also 2 Cor 3:15–18: ἅλλα ὑπάρχει εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐντολὴ ἡμῶν ἤπατεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἑκκλησίᾳ; εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἑκκλησίᾳ ἐντολὴ ἡμῶν ἐντολὴ ἡμῶν. ἦπατεν ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑκκλησίᾳ; εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑκκλησίᾳ ἡμᾶς ἐντολὴ ἡμῶν ἐντολὴ.
reflected in Gos. Phil’s account of the transfiguration, and the same goes for the present context. The importance of Gos. Phil’s mirroring logic of having to become the higher realities in order to be able to see them is also given another, rather unique, twist which links up with the highly important metaphorical complex of marriage and bridal chamber:

\[ \text{ὁ ἡγεμόνις Φίλιππος ἔγνωσεν τὸν ἡρῴδην ἐν 

Bridegrooms and brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to see the bridegroom with the bride unless [he becomes] this.

(Gos. Phil. 82.23–26)

This is a rather difficult passage, the obvious interpretive problem being the decision whether “this” (παρτος), which is what one has to become in order to see the bridegroom and the bride, refers to “the bridegroom” (πυγμαχος) or “the bridal chamber” (πυγμαχος). Both of these solutions are well within the logic of the passage. One may in both cases be said to be able to see the bridegroom and the bride, and both solutions may be defended on the basis of other parts of the tractate. One of these solutions does seem to make better sense than the other within the context of the tractate as a whole, however.

First it should be noted that what one is supposed to see is “the bridegroom with the bride” (πυγμαχος καὶ πυγμαχος). Schenke points out that in real life only “die vier Wände des Brautgemachs” may see a bridegroom together with his bride, and draws the conclusion that what one must become in order to see them is therefore a bridal chamber, understood by him to refer metaphorically to the human soul as the place

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{ἐναρέῳ ἤνεγος ἤνοιγε τῇγίγαντι κτίσμα ἤγκις ἢγοιτ εὐαλ ἡγεμόος εὐαλο ἄνω ἔργας εὐαλ ἠγίας εὐαλος \\
\text{κατάκος εὐαλ ἠγίας εὐαλος εὐαλος εὐαλος εὐαλος} \\
\end{align*} \]

\[ \text{But until today whenever Moses is read there is a veil upon their minds, but when one turns to the Lord he lifts the veil. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and the place where the Spirit of the Lord is there is freedom. But all of us, with unveiled face, seeing the glory of God in a mirror, receive the likeness of that single image from glory to glory as from the Lord the Spirit.} \]


415 The possibility that the passage may be intentionally ambiguous on this point should of course also be kept in mind.

where the person’s heavenly double is united with his or her own “Licht-Selbst.” I think Schenke is right in identifying what one must become as “the bridal chamber” (ⲡⲛⲟⲙⲱⲛ), but the further connection he makes between the bridal chamber and the human soul, and his identification of the bridegroom and the bride, are problematic.

A vital key to the understanding of this passage seems to me to lie, here as above, in the important blend the Christian is a Christ. In accordance with this blend, what one should strive to become as a Christian is nothing less than Christ. We should, moreover, keep in mind Gos. Phil.’s use of the mirroring theory of seeing and becoming, namely that one must become Christ in order to see Christ. Here in this passage one must become a bridal chamber in order to see the bridegroom and the bride. This, then, implies the identification of “the bridal chamber” in this passage with Christ, but it also, seemingly paradoxically, identifies the bridegroom and the bride with Christ’s true nature. This, however, makes good sense in the overall system of Gos. Phil. The disciples had to be changed in order to see Christ in his glory in the transfiguration. That is, by becoming Christ they saw his true flesh, the Logos. In this passage then, by becoming Christ as bridal chamber one may see Christ as the bridegroom and the bride. This recalls the revelation of “the great bridal chamber” (ⲡⲛⲟϧ ⲫⲡⲡⲧⲧⲟⲥ) and the creation of the body of Christ at his baptism in the Jordan, which consisted of the unification of the Logos and the Holy Spirit. Seeing the bridegroom and the bride by becoming a “bridal chamber” (ⲡⲛⲟⲙⲱⲛ) would thus involve seeing Christ as the unification of the Logos (his flesh) and the Holy Spirit (his blood). We may therefore identify the bridegroom and the bride with the Logos and the Holy Spirit respectively (see fig. 42). And where would one be able to see the Logos and the Holy Spirit together if not in the Eucharist? Christ as the union of Logos and Holy spirit is, as we have seen, represented in the eucharistic ritual in the form of the bread and the wine mixed with water. In the Eucharist, then, the Christian would be able to see Christ as Logos (bread) and Holy Spirit (wine). And the place where these two elements would mix would be in the bridal chamber constituted by the

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417 See Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 500–501. Schenke argues that ⲡⲛⲟⲙⲱⲛ should here be regarded as synonymous with ⲡⲟⲣⲓⲩⲧⲗ, as “das ‘Allerheiligste’ einer Hochzeit” (ibid., 500). See below for a discussion of the various terms used in Gos. Phil. that may be rendered as “bridal chamber.”

418 See Gos. Phil. 71.4–13.

419 See discussion above.
body of the Christian in the consumption of the eucharistic elements. Analogically to how Christ’s constitution was Logos and Holy Spirit within a material body, then, the individual Christian receives the Logos (bridegroom) and Holy Spirit (bride) within the bridal chamber of his or her own “Christlike” body (see fig. 43). We will return below to an extended consideration of the question of sacramental connotations in connection with a discussion of certain other passages in Gos. Phil. that seem to undergird this interpretation.

3.2. *Communion Blends*

In this section we will focus on the blends that revolve around issues of communion and mystery. This means that we will look closer at blends involving joining, unification, and mixing, as well as those dealing with hiddenness, secrecy, and mystery. The reason for treating these two categories of phenomena under the same heading is the fact that in Gos. Phil. they are often blended by means of certain key ICMs that encompass both the theme of joining and unification, and that of hiddenness and secrecy.

3.2.1. *Joining and Mixing*

“One might say—only slightly mischievously—that Christianity is all about mixture,” observes Philip McCosker, and specifies that “it is concerned with bringing into union what seem to be more or less contrary/different realities: divinity and humanity, Creator and creature, ‘agenetic’ and ‘genetic’, self-existent and contingent.”

Such issues and questions come especially into focus in christological matters. As McCosker puts it, “Christians hold that there is a paradigmatic ‘mixture’ in the person of Christ: the mingling of human and divine natures in the person of Christ is not only paradigmatic in an exemplary (imitative) sense, but also, more essentially, the Word’s incarnation fundamentally alters the recipe for such mixtures.”

Christ is thus “the recipe and ingredients rolled into one,” as McCosker strikingly puts it.

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421 McCosker, review of Russell, 8.
422 McCosker, review of Russell, 8.
We have seen at several points in the preceding analysis that questions concerning this recipe and its ingredients are of fundamental importance to Gos. Phil., and we have seen that this issue correlates with imagery of separation on the one hand, and joining, mixing, and unification on the other, in a manner that is central to the rhetoric of the tractate. In this section we will look closer at the function of such interlinking metaphorical imagery as participation, communion, marriage, procreation, and eating in Gos. Phil., and the way it highlights a variety of different theological issues relating to the abovementioned recipe, to borrow McCosker’s metaphor.

3.2.1.1. Like Mixing With Like

In several passages Gos. Phil. treats the theme of joining and mixing analogically with the theme of seeing and becoming. The tractate informs us that if you become a logos, the Logos will mingle with you, and if you become spirit, the spirit will mingle with you.

\[\text{ epileπων τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ἔφεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπάρχει[ον τῷ ἄν ην ἄνοδος ἐνακτῶν [ἡν] ὠραόθεν ταὶ τε θεῷ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ άνθρωπῳ πλο[ρός] ὑπάρχει[ον ἑν] ἐν ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ ἑν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐ

423 This has been noted by several interpreters, see, e.g., Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language” (this article focuses especially on the Coptic terminology used in the tractate, with an emphasis on the function of the words χι, χιο, and χωτ).  

424 Buckley takes this as indicating “a tone of optimism and confidence regarding human capacities” that in her opinion “permeates the text” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4170).
those that are below, neither man nor Spirit nor Logos nor light nor those above nor those inside will be able to love you. They will not be able to rest within you and you have no part in them. (Gos. Phil. 78.25–79.13)

Here again the animals are metaphorical humans, and the passage must be understood as an injunction to become a perfect Christian. “Man” in this passage seems to be equivalent to the term “perfect man” in other parts of the text. In this conceptual blend the animals represent the not-so-perfect men, and the perfect Christian, being at the top of the metaphorical chain of being, is presented as human. If one becomes “man” (ⲣⲱⲣⲓⲗ), then, one may be loved by “the man” (ⲧⲣⲱⲓⲗ), Christ, and “have communion” (.xpathⲡⲟⲩⲓ) with the Logos and the light. It is this necessity of becoming man, metaphorically speaking, that seems to be the main thrust of the passage.

It is interesting to note the many different words that are here used to denote the conceptual domain of joining, communion, and mixing. The verbs ta(y) (“mix”),.xpathⲡⲟⲩⲓ (“have communion”), ⲙⲧⲱⲓ (“join”), ⲡⲧⲟ (“rest”), and even ⲡⲣⲓⲗ (“love”) are here employed in a parallel manner. Schenke holds that “love” is here the main term that all the other terms refer to, being themselves simply “Umschreibungen bzw. Entfaltungen von ⲡⲧⲓ.” But do we really have any good reason to privilege the term “love” over the other terms used here for joining and mixing? The first part of the passage, where the word ta(y) is used, sets

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426 As Schenke rightly notes, in this passage ⲧⲱⲓⲩⲓ does not refer to the same thing throughout the passage: “In der Bildhälfte ist es das irdische Wesen, das so heißt, schlecht-hin, während in der Anwendung der Begriff ‘Mensch’ übertragen gebraucht sein dürfte; vermutlich irgendwie im Sinne von ‘wahrer Mensch’, vielleicht sogar im Sinne von ‘Menschensohn’.” This leads Schenke to suggest the following as a possible paraphrase: “Wenn du zum Menschensohn wie Jesus wirst, wird der Menschensohn Jesus dich lieben” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 482).
427 Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 482.
428 Isenberg’s translation significantly obscures the way these terms are used, by translating ta(y) variously as “have intercourse,” “associate,” and “mingle”; xpathⲡⲟⲩⲓ as “con-sort with” and “share”; and by translating xoroc with “thought” (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 199, 201; Wesley W. Isenberg, “The Gospel of Philip [II,3],” in The Nag Hammadi Library in English [3rd revised ed.; ed. James M. Robinson; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990], 156).
429 Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 483. Schenke concludes that the point of the passage may be summarised with the following paraphrase: “Du sollst den Menschensohn lieben! Dann wirst du als Menschensohn einer von oben. Und er und die Oberen können dich dann auch lieben und sich mit dir verbinden (, so daß du schließlich auch solche Früchte hervorbringst, wie sie einem/dem Menschensohn angemessen sind)” (ibid.).
up a framing input space in a conceptual integration network where the inputs created by the latter part of the passage are more or less metonymic representations of the target ICM. Since the mixings in the first part have a clear sexual/procreational focus, this input is especially prone to highlight this aspect in the input or inputs activated by the latter part of the passage. At the same time, the change from τῷ to ἐκκοιμάοντι when the discourse shifts from the zoological examples to the pairings of Logos with Logos and light with light is significant. The shift to this word at the same time as the term Logos is mentioned prompts for a Christian, and in this text sacramental, context for the interpretation of the blend.

Now, where does one mingle, or have communion with Logos or Spirit? Buckley takes the description of the fact that when one becomes logos or spirit the Logos or Spirit will reciprocate by mingling or joining with the person in question as an allusion to ritual activity. The reference to those above “resting upon you” (ἳπτοι ἰμώον ἐφαβεῖ ἐκώ) recalls the reference to the Holy Spirit resting upon Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan, and by extension the baptismal anointing with chrism administered to the Christian initiates.

On the grounds of Gos. Phil.’s identification of the flesh of Christ, and hence the eucharistic bread, with his Logos, and his blood, and hence the eucharistic wine, with the Holy Spirit, the eucharistic ritual also comes readily to mind here as Gos. Phil. envisages it, an important aspect being that logos mixes with Logos, and spirit mixes with Holy Spirit. In order to be able to have communion in this way, however, the communicant needs to have become what he or she is to have communion with. For the focus seems here, in the excerpt quoted above, as in the seeing and becoming passages, to be on the necessity of becoming what you want to commune with. If one stays as an animal one may only have communion with animals. Communions happening contrary to the principles outlined above, however, are characterised by Gos. Phil. as “adultery” (ἵπττοποικ):

κοινωνια δε ηνιν ἵπττοποικ ἐβολα ῥηνετε αν ηπνοερνη ουαἰτποικ τε
And every communion that has taken place between those who do not resemble each other constitutes adultery. (Gos. Phil. 61.10–12)

430 See Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4170.
431 See John 1:33.
By designating communions between “those who do not resemble each other” (ἡμιών ἄνθισσαμεν), the imagery of mingling and communion of like with like, including that of logos with logos and spirit with spirit, is connected even more closely to the ICMs of marriage and sex, and hence, as we shall see, to metaphors like that of the bridal chamber.

Intertextually, both the use of the designation “adultery” and the use of the term κοινωνία in this context point primarily to Paul’s letters to the Corinthians. The description of the communion of those who are unlike one another as adultery must specifically be seen in the light of Paul’s interpretation of Lev 19:19 in his second letter to the Corinthians. Lev 19:19 prohibits the mating of unlike animals, and Paul, in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1, applies this prohibition to human relationships, arguing that Christians should not marry non-Christians.\footnote{See Gaca, The Making of Fornication, 150–151. Similarly, Mishnaic law likens the union between a Jew and a gentile with the forbidden union of a horse with a donkey (see Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties [Hellenistic Culture and Society 31; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999], 306).}\footnote{For the connection of this passage with the paradise story of Eve and the serpent, cf. also Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 301.} Gos. Phil. takes this one step further, and applies Paul’s analogy metaphorically, this time not to the relationship between humans, but rather to the relationship between Christians and Christ. At the same time, the positioning of the above quoted statement at the end of the passage concerning Eve’s conception of Cain from her relations with the serpent, also connects the sinfulness of the mating of different species to the story of the fall and the paradise narrative in general.\footnote{434 For the connection of this passage with the paradise story of Eve and the serpent, cf. also Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 301.}

3.2.1.2. Eating and Becoming

Closely related to the motifs of seeing and becoming and like mixing with like, outlined above, Gos. Phil. also focuses on the theme of eating from the perspective of transformation and reciprocity:

There are two trees growing in paradise. One produces [animals], the other produces men. Adam [ate] from the tree that produced animals, [and he became] an animal and he begot [animals]. Therefore the children of Adam worship the [animals].

\[(Gos. Phil. 71.22–28)\]
It is significant that Gos. Phil. here once again plays on the term χινο. Because Adam ate from the tree that produced (χινο) animals, he too became animal and begat (χινο) animals. The tree Adam ate from was of course the Tree of Knowledge, which is here contrasted with the Tree of Life.435 That he became animal seems in this context to entail first and foremost Adam's acquisition of mortality—his death sentence from eating from the forbidden tree.436 Adam eats from the animal tree, becomes animal and begets animals. This mirrors the above discussed passage concerning the different species only mating with their own, and also reflects the various passages that deal with seeing and becoming. It is also highly significant that eating is here closely connected to procreation. Adam eats from the tree, is changed, and produces offspring that are less than desirable. The full significance of this imagery only becomes clear, however, when Adam's food is contrasted with that of Christ:

Before Christ came there was no bread in the world, like in Paradise, the place where Adam was, there were many trees for the food of the animals. It had no wheat for the food of man. Man was feeding like the animals, but when Christ came, the perfect man, he brought bread from heaven so that man would be nourished with the food of man. (Gos. Phil. 55.6–14)

This juxtaposition of the former state (before Christ) of nourishing like the animals, with the new state of eating the food of the perfect man, sets up a counterpart relationship between Adam's eating and begetting and the individual Christian's eating of the bread from heaven. The passage clearly alludes to the discourse in John 6:31–58 concerning Jesus as the bread of life from heaven and cannot be properly understood apart from this intertext. This intertext furnishes a connection of the bread from heaven with Jesus and the Eucharist. Thus it follows by implication from the blend that since Adam's eating from the tree that produced animals—the Tree of Knowledge—led to him to become animal, produce animals, and worship animals, eating the bread from heaven brought by Christ

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equals eating from the tree that produced men/humans—the Tree of Life—and leads to those eating from it becoming men/humans, and producing men/humans. By implication, those who eat the bread from heaven should also worship men/humans, which makes sense when the man in question is identified as Christ. The bread from heaven is after all to be identified with Christ as the Eucharist. One thus becomes Christ and will worship Christ by eating Christ. And, as we have already seen, Christ is in Gos. Phil. not only equated with the bread from heaven, but also with the fruit from the Tree of Life. It might also be noted here that the close connection that is established between eating and procreation thereby also connects the Eucharist to procreative imagery.

The identification of the eater with the eaten is also one of the ways in which Gos. Phil. argues for the necessity of gaining eternal life prior to death, and the logic mirrors that of the seeing and becoming passages:

This world is a corpse-eater. All that are eaten in it also die themselves. Truth is a life-eater. Therefore no one among those who nourish on [Truth] will die. It was from that place that Jesus came, and he brought food from there, and those who wanted he gave them [to eat, so that] they might not die. (Gos. Phil. 73.19–27)

In this passage as well, Gos. Phil. contrasts worldly food with heavenly, and the contrast is cleverly presented by means of a comparison by partial blending of two metaphors, namely that of the world as a corpse-eater and truth as a life-eater. One must eat the heavenly food brought by Jesus in order to gain eternal life. The argument employs a conceptual blend between the domains of eating and death and also makes use of the logic of identity between the eater and the eaten (see fig. 44). The world eating corpses may be understood as a metaphorical description of the burial and/or decomposition of corpses, and as a contrast to this, Gos. Phil. presents truth as an eater of life, a metaphor that is only understandable when it is contrastively blended with that of the world as

437 I follow Schenke’s reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 56, 441–442; Schenke, “The Berliner Arbeitskreis,” 70–71). Layton, following Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 18, has [ηνοις] (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 188. As Schenke puts it in his later article, “Layton thought I was right, and I was not” [Schenke, “The Berliner Arbeitskreis,” 70]).
a corpse-eater. From this blending of metaphors important implications arise. Those who die in the world are eaten by the world, while those who gain life will be eaten by truth, which means that instead of being dissolved into the material earth they will be dissolved into truth.\textsuperscript{438}

And as we find elsewhere in Gos. Phil., truth is to be equated with the inner, true reality hidden within the worldly types and images. Included among these worldly types and images are of course also the Christian sacraments, without which it is impossible to gain truth. For how does one attain life and thus become eaten by truth? One does this by means of the food of life brought by Jesus, for if one draws nourishment from truth one will not die.\textsuperscript{439} By implication, if one metaphorically eats from the worldly things one will also be eaten by the world, which means that one will die completely, in that one will simply be dissolved into the material elements.\textsuperscript{440} The use of the metaphor of eating in this way, so closely connected to the food brought by Jesus, strongly alludes to the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{441}

3.2.2. Marriage and Related Imagery

Gos. Phil. gives the following explanation for the primordial separation of Adam and Eve:

\begin{verbatim}
ⲛⲉⲛⲧⲁϩⲱⲧ ̄ⲣⲇ ⲉϩ ̄ⲙⲡⲡⲁⲥⲧⲟⲥ ⲟⲩⲕⲉⲧⲓ ⥉ⲛⲡⲣⲓⲧⲓ ⲇⲓⲁ ⲧⲟⲩⲧⲟ ⲁⲉⲩϩⲁ ⲡⲱⲣⲫⲧⲧⲧⲉ ⲇⲎⲓ ⲧⲟⲩⲧⲟ ⲁⲉⲩϩⲁ ⲡⲱⲣⲫⲧⲧⲉ
And those who have joined in the bridal chamber will no longer be separated. Therefore Eve separated from Adam, because it was not in the bridal chamber that she joined with him. (Gos. Phil. 70.19–22)
\end{verbatim}

Adam and Eve separated because they did not join with each other in a “bridal chamber.” In a basic sense, this means that they were not properly married, which again may imply that their joining lacked the proper

\textsuperscript{438} Cf. Gos. Phil. 53.20–23.

\textsuperscript{439} For an alternative, but ultimately unconvincing interpretation of the metaphor of truth as a “life-eater,” see Patricia Cox Miller, “‘Adam Ate from the Animal Tree’: A Bestial Poetry of Soul,” in The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 27–28. Ignoring the context of the statement in Gos. Phil., Miller suggests that “Perhaps the Gospel of Philip describes truth as a life-eater because truth seems destructive and subversive” (ibid., 28).

\textsuperscript{440} If we follow this logic one step further we might also argue, as Buckley has done, that the reason why the world eats what is dead is because it is itself dead (see Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4176).

\textsuperscript{441} This is the case regardless of whether the Eucharist alluded to is itself to be understood metaphorically or literally.
ceremony and/or that it was not performed in the proper place. What is certain is that, according to Gos. Phil., Adam and Eve were joined, but not in the way they should have been. But what does this entail in Gos. Phil’s rhetoric? Generally speaking, the ICM of marriage may be utilised as an input in different conceptual blends in order to highlight certain aspects of different target inputs. Among the central constituents of the marriage ICM we find notions of the joining/unification of two people of opposite sex, the ceremonies associated with a wedding, and various ideas and aspects related to sexual procreation. We saw in the previous chapter how Exeg. Soul employs the marriage ICM as a powerful conceptual framing input that may shed light on several aspects of conversion, initiation, and Christian life. We will now look closer at the varied use of this conceptual domain in Gos. Phil. As in Exeg. Soul, blends involving marriage imagery are pervasive in Gos. Phil. too, and the cognitive model is employed in several different ways.

3.2.2.1. Marriage with Christ
A highly important “marriage” referred to by Gos. Phil. is that of the individual Christian with Christ. Gos. Phil. refers directly to this marriage by addressing its implied readers as “you who dwell with the Son of God” (ἰησοῦν ἡμῖν ὑπʼ ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ) in an interesting passage where the tractate outlines a couple of basic principles that should guide the conduct of the individual in this marital relation:

Hewhomthewomanloves,itishimthatthoseshieldbearresemble.
If it is her husband, they resemble her husband. If it is an adulterer, they resemble the adulterer. Often, if a woman sleeps with her husband out of necessity, but her mind is on the adulterer whom she usually has communion with, the one she will bear she bears resembling the adulterer. But you who dwell with the Son of God, do not love the world, but love the Lord, so that those you will bear may not come to resemble the world, but that they may come to resemble the Lord. (Gos. Phil. 78.12–25)

Gos. Phil. here makes it clear, through a comparison with ancient medical theory, that if one focuses mentally on a person other than one’s spouse while having intercourse, the resulting children might turn out to
resemble the other one.\textsuperscript{442} The point appears to be that it is not enough for the Christian to have communion with Christ if one’s heart and mind is not with Christ.\textsuperscript{443}

This is yet another passage where \textit{Gos. Phil.} uses human procreation metaphorically to get a theological message across. As in \textit{Exeg. Soul}, the children referred to here should probably be understood metaphorically as thoughts or works.\textsuperscript{444} When living and having communion with the Lord, one has to make sure that one’s (metaphorical) offspring will not resemble someone else. And in this regard one may be said to be known by one’s offspring, i.e., one’s thoughts and actions, like a tree is known by its fruit. One should bear spiritual offspring rather than fleshly.\textsuperscript{445} This should also be seen in connection with the exhortation not to love nor fear one’s material body.\textsuperscript{446} We might take all this to mean, then, that even though one is a Christian and thus “lives with” and “has communion with” Christ, one must still make an effort to love Christ and not the material world. The focus of the Christian should be strictly on Christ, and not on worldly things. That this also implies that one ought to imitate Christ in his capacity as a moral exemplar becomes clear from other sections in \textit{Gos. Phil.} that focus on his conduct in the world.\textsuperscript{447} The use of

\textsuperscript{442} See, e.g., Denise Kimber Buell, \textit{Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 63; Williams, \textit{Rethinking “Gnosticism”}, 294 n. 26; Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 135; for a discussion of such beliefs in various cultures throughout history, see Wendy Doniger and Gregory Spinner, “Misconceptions: Female Imaginations and Male Fantasies in Parental Imprinting,” \textit{Dædalus} 127:1 (1998): 97–129. Strangely, Isenberg translates the opening sentences in a completely opposite way as, “The children a woman bears resemble the man who loves her. If her husband loves her, then they resemble her husband” (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 199; Isenberg, “The Gospel of Philip [II, 3],” 156; this is repeated by, e.g., Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4179), which, in addition to being incompatible with the Coptic text, completely obscures the point of the whole passage. Isenberg did not make this mistake in his dissertation, however, where he instead translated, “As for him whom the woman loves, it is he that those whom she will beget resemble. If it is her husband, it is her husband that they resemble” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 388). On this point, see also the comments in Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 481 n. 1327.

\textsuperscript{443} Grant, however, takes this to mean that “the Gnostic must not love the ‘unclean spirits’ which wish to unite with him in adulterous unions” (see Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 135–136).

\textsuperscript{444} Cf. \textit{Exeg. Soul} 128.23–26; 133.34–134.6, and the discussion in chapter 3. For the connection with \textit{Exeg. Soul}, see also Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 481.

\textsuperscript{445} Cf. Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 481.

\textsuperscript{446} See \textit{Gos. Phil.} 66.4–6.

\textsuperscript{447} See \textit{Gos. Phil.} 79.33–80.4.
the term ἐνυπηκοιός to refer to one’s marital life with Christ may be taken as a reference to the Eucharist as the locus of the individual Christian’s most intimate relations with him.

3.2.2.2. *Marriage in this World*

There is no doubt that marriage imagery is important in Gos. Phil., but it is often difficult to pin down the degree to which such imagery is to be interpreted metaphorically or literally:

εἰσοφικαῖς ἠτὶος [Χάδωι . . . . ] οὐρ[φι ξενογίας ἔμαχ [ . . . . . ] ἀναληιπτικοὶ
εὐσοφὶ ρίσοι[χρ] [严厉打击]

[The] mystery of marriage [is] great, for [without] it the world would [not] have [come into being]. For [the] composition of [the world . . . .], but the composition [ . . . the] marriage. Consider the [communion . . . .] defiled because it has [ . . .] power. Its image is in a [defilement].

(Gos. Phil. 64.31–65.1)

Marriage is described as a mystery, but deciding whether Gos. Phil. is here referring simply to normal marriage between two people, which results in procreation and thus contribute to the existence of the world, or whether it should be understood as a reference to something else is by no means unproblematic. Regrettably, this passage is badly damaged, but it may still give us a couple of clues with regard to the nature of the marriage described at this point in the manuscript. If the reconstructions above are correct,448 we seem to be told that “its image is in a [defilement]” (τεσσαρακοὶ εὐσοφὶ ρίσοι[χρ]). This may indicate that “the communion,” however we may understand that term in this particular context, is reflected in marriage, and that the latter is a “defilement.” We shall see that the text elsewhere refers to “the marriage of defilement” (πάροικος ἔνυπηκοι),449 which makes it probable that it is indeed marriage that is here identified in such terms. So it seems that we may understand the passage to describe marriage as an “image” (ἵκων) of “the communion” (κοινωνία). The reference to marriage as a great mystery seems to reflect Eph 5:31–32, where the words of Gen 2:24 concerning the joining of man and woman as “one flesh” is described as a great mystery and interpreted

448 I have here followed the relatively conservative reconstructions that are used in Layton’s critical edition (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 170). Schenke, on the other hand, reconstructs all these lacunae (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 38).
449 Gos. Phil. 82.4.
as a reference to Christ and the church.\textsuperscript{450} If we see in the description of marriage as a great mystery an allusion to Eph 5:31–32, and apply to our interpretation of Gos. Phil. the explanation given in verse 32, namely that this should be understood to refer to the relationship between Christ and the church, then we might understand the term “communion” in this section of Gos. Phil. as a reference to this communion of Christ and the church. By further blending this understanding with the application of the term ξωινονία in 1 Cor 10, its eucharistic connotations are inevitably highlighted.

We may here further note that Gos. Phil. describes “the communion” as being reflected in the marriage.\textsuperscript{451} This means that from Gos. Phil.’s point of view, the concept of marriage may tell us something about the nature of “the communion,” even though the former is to be regarded as a “defilement.” Understood in light of the blend with Eph 5:31–32 and especially 1 Cor 10, we may take Gos. Phil. to imply that the eucharistic mystery, and especially its aspect of communion between Christ and the Christians, is somehow reflected in the concept of marriage.

Gos. Phil. indeed emphasises elsewhere that its use of marital imagery may be understood metaphorically. In fact, the tractate even points out explicitly some of the differences between the conceptual framing input of worldly marriage and the implicit target(s):

\begin{quote}
епρατη τοοο ρηβωκονος τοοοτ τερινε υνα έτοον μητηνωοβ
ρηπλων κεουα τε πεινε έπρατη ρημουε δε έροοο ινεβιαν ουνημηνουε
δε οοοο σεουε παρακαλη ενα ετοιρανοβε ινοοο αυν σεουοε
επικωνε
\end{quote}

In this world the union is male and female, the place of power and weakness. In the aeon the likeness of the union is another one, but we refer to them with these names. But there are others that are superior to every name that is named and they are superior to the strong.

\textit{(Gos. Phil. 76.6–12)}

There is a difference between what the imagery of marriage entails in this world, and what it entails when it is used to describe the heavenly realities. According to April DeConick, what Gos. Phil. is here describing is the confusion caused by “the constraints of language,” that “arises since


\textsuperscript{451} As we saw in chapter 3, one of the possible connotations of the term ξωινονία is sexual intercourse. As seems also to be the case in Exeg. Soul, however, Gos. Phil. seems to play on both the the sexual and the technical ritual connotations of the term.
human marriage is reflective of the perfect marriage which takes place in
the heavenly realm.” It seems to me, however, that rather than having
to do with any “confusion” or “constraints of language,” what *Gos. Phil.*
is doing here is to highlight some potential inferences that may arise
in a conceptual blend from the framing input of this-worldly human
marriage, and/or intercourse, that one is not supposed to project back
onto the unstated target input pertaining to the other world. What we
are witnessing here, then, are some direct instructions with regard to
the interpretation of the blend between the this-worldly concept and
the other-worldly one, highlighting some metaphorical entailments that
do not apply to the heavenly realities and concepts that *Gos. Phil.* is
trying to describe. For what *Gos. Phil.* seems to be doing is to use the
metaphorical input of human marriage, intercourse, and procreation in
order to conceptualise central religious mysteries, mysteries that call for
metaphorical modes of discourse in order to be understandable to the
human mind. *Gos. Phil.*’s emphasis seems not to be on the constraints
of language, but rather on the exalted nature of the realities that are
merely reflected in names, symbols, and actions in the world. Rather than
presenting a negative view of language, then, *Gos. Phil.* seems to focus on
the positive and exalted qualities of its ultimate heavenly referents.

The tractate also points out elsewhere some similarities and differences
between the marriage of this world, and that of its unstated metaphorical
target:

No [one will be able to] know [when the husband] and the wife have
communion with each other except they alone. For the marriage of
the world is a mystery for those who have taken a wife. If the marriage of
defilement is secret, how much more is the undefiled marriage a true
mystery! It is not fleshly, but pure. It is not of desire, but of the will.
It is not of the darkness or the night, but it is of the day and the light.453

(*Gos. Phil. 81.34–82.10*)

453 Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.
The unstatedness of the target, however, that is, the unstated identity of what Gos. Phil. here refers to as “the undefiled marriage” (ⲡⲅⲁⲙⲟⲥ Ⲣⲓⲧⲧⲭⲏⲣⲓⲓ), has caused significant confusion among scholars. That “the marriage of defilement” (ⲡⲅⲁⲙⲟⲥ Ⲣⲡⲧⲭⲏⲣⲓⲓ) is to be understood simply as another way to refer to “the marriage of the world” (ⲡⲅⲁⲙⲟⲥ Ⲣⲡⲧⲧⲟⲩⲟⲩⲓ), and that this refers to a typical marriage in the literal sense, has been a view shared by most scholars.\(^{454}\) But what is the identity of “the undefiled marriage” against which it is contrasted? And in what sense is the worldly marriage “defiled”? With regard to the latter question, there are two possibilities. Either the marriage of the world is defiled in an absolute sense, in which case it is most probably to be regarded as something to be avoided. The other possibility, however, is that it is simply defiled in a relative sense in relation to “the undefiled marriage.” So, does the fact that the tractate here uses the term “the marriage of defilement” (ⲡⲅⲁⲙⲟⲥ Ⲣⲡⲧⲭⲏⲣⲓⲓ) imply a disparagement of marriage in general,\(^{455}\) or is it simply to be understood as a contrasting term to “the undefiled marriage” highlighting the elevated status of the latter?\(^{456}\) These questions obviously have far-reaching implications for the tractate’s implied views regarding the social order and lifestyle of its adherents, but are notoriously difficult to answer.

The identity of “the undefiled marriage” is open to various interpretations, as Gos. Phil. is content to simply contrast it with the worldly marriage of defilement while keeping its exact identity implicit. There are here several possibilities, and the fact that no explicit identification is made also keeps open the possibility that one may take it to refer simultaneously to more than one referent, i.e., that one may blend this framing input with several different target inputs. The possibilities may be divided into three main groups. The first is that it may refer to a marriage that is literally not of this world, but rather on a higher, heavenly, plane.\(^{457}\) The second possibility is that it may refer to an earthly image or type of such a heavenly marriage, as for example in a marriage of continence, which would mimic the “marriage of defilement,” but without the defiling element of sexual intercourse.\(^{458}\) The third pos-

\(^{454}\) See, e.g., Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 144.
\(^{455}\) This is the view of, e.g., Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 144.
\(^{457}\) Among the suggestions have been a spiritual marriage between the initiate and his or her heavenly double (see, e.g., Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 144).
\(^{458}\) That is to say, either a marriage without sexual intercourse (see, e.g., Williams,
sibility, which I think makes most sense in an overall understanding of the rhetoric of *Gos Phil.*, is that it refers first and foremost to a sacramental act or acts that are understood in terms of the ICM of marriage, but without involving actual human marriage in a basic sense. Finally, these interpretive possibilities may also be combined in various ways.\(^{459}\)

In order to gain a better understanding of “the undefiled marriage,” however, we need to take a closer look at how marriage imagery is employed in various contexts throughout *Gos. Phil.*

3.2.2.3. *The Wedding Feast*

In the previous chapter we saw the importance of the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:2–14) in *Exeg. Soul*. Significantly, this parable, which focuses on the importance of wearing proper wedding garments, is also alluded to in *Gos. Phil.*

3.2.2.3.1. The Wedding Feast and the Transfiguration

We encounter the allusion to the parable of the Wedding Feast in an interesting passage that follows directly after *Gos. Phil.*’s account of the transfiguration. Having told us that Jesus made his disciples great so that they would be able to see him being great, *Gos. Phil.* continues:

\[\text{\underline{\text{ⲡⲉϫⲁϥ ̄ⲙⲫⲟⲟⲩ ⲉⲧ ̄ⲙⲙⲁⲩ ϩ̄ⲛⲧⲉⲩⲭⲁⲣⲓⲥⲧⲉⲓⲁ ϫⲉⲡⲉⲛⲧⲁϩϩⲱ ̄ⲧ ̄ⲣⲁⲡⲓⲩⲙⲉⲓⲟⲥ ⲡⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ ∣ⲥ ₋ⲛ ⲉⲧⲟⲩⲁⲁⲃ ϩⲟⲧ ̄ⲣⲁⲅⲅⲉⲗⲟⲥ ⲉⲣⲟⲛ ϩⲱⲱⲛ ⲁⲛϩⲓⲕⲱⲛ ̄ⲙⲡ ̄ⲣⲕⲁⲧⲁⲫⲣⲟⲛⲉⲓ ⲇⲉⲉⲉⲉ ⲁⲧⲃ ⲅⲁⲣ ⲙⲓⲥϭⲟⲙ ⲉⲛⲁⲩ ⲡⲣⲟⲟ ⲇⲉⲉⲉ ⲛⲁϣϯⲡⲉϥⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓ ⲉϩⲟⲩⲛ ∣ⲥ ₋ⲛ ⲉϥⲕⲏⲕⲁϩⲏⲩ}}\]


\(^{459}\) See, e.g., Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 149. Cf. also Pagels, who has suggested that *Gos. Phil.* deliberately refuses to take sides for or against celibacy (see Elaine H. Pagels, “The ‘Mystery of Marriage’ in the Gospel of Philip,” in *The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in Jungian Psychology and Contemporary Culture* [ed. Robert A. Segal; Chicago: Open Court, 1995], 112). Discussing the problem in 1991, Pagels stated that “As I now read the text, its author intends to reject entirely the question concerning sexual practice, the same question that contemporary scholars have been trying to use the text to answer” (Pagels, “‘Mystery of Marriage’ Revisited,” 444).

\(^{460}\) Both Layton and Schenke regard ⲡⲣⲟ as a scribal error and emend it to ⲡ⪜ⲧⲧⲟ (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 156; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 26–27, and the discussion below).
He said on that day in the Eucharist: “He who joined the perfect, the light, with the Holy Spirit, join the angels with us also, with the images!” Do not despise the lamb, for without it it is impossible to see the door. No one will be able to approach the king naked. *(Gos. Phil. 58.10–17)*

This is the only instance in which *Gos. Phil.* recounts a prayer of Jesus. Significantly, the transitional phrase between the transfiguration account and this prayer, the information that the prayer took place “on that day” (*ⲙⲫⲟⲟⲩⲉⲧ ⲙⲁⲩ*), seems to place the prayer on the same day as the transfiguration, while the use of the term *ⲉⲩⲭⲁⲣⲓⲥⲧⲉⲓⲁ* relates the prayer to the eucharistic ritual, and implies that this is in fact a eucharistic prayer. However, as Rewolinski has rightly noted, Jesus’ prayer is not the words of institution, but is rather more like an epiclesis. But how do we account for a eucharistic prayer performed by Jesus at the transfiguration? “How do we account for a eucharistic action on the mountain after the transfiguration with no elements, and then the numerous references elsewhere in the text to the elements to be eaten or drunk,” asks Rewolinski, and suggests that the focus of this particular paradigmatic action is squarely on the epiclesis, and that this epiclesis is primarily what effects the union with the angels. I think Rewolinski is right in identifying the prayer as an epiclesis, but is he right in his assumption that the Eucharist referred to here did not contain any eucharistic elements, and is he right in seeing it as a “post-transfiguration celebration”? The fact that the elements are not explicitly mentioned does not automatically mean that they were not included, and the fact that the account of the prayer follows that of the transfiguration in *Gos. Phil.* does not necessarily mean that *Gos. Phil.* holds this to have been the sequence of the events. Another possibility would be to see the description of Jesus’ prayer

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461 Schenke, however, suggests that these might be the words of Philip, excerpted from an earlier work, rather than Jesus (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 251–252).
462 Cf. Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 168; Pagels, “Pursuing the Spiritual Eve,” 203. Segelberg takes this prayer as an indication that “certain Gnostics … had not reached a stage when prayer was without any meaning to them” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 58).
as a description of what took place directly prior to or during the transfiguration, rather than after it. My proposal is in fact that the eucharistic ritual this epiclesis prayer of Jesus is a part of is instrumental in effecting the transformation of the disciples which enabled them to see Jesus in his glory at the transfiguration. The words, “he said on that day in the Eucharist” may thus point to a eucharistic epiclesis prayer, of which Jesus’ words are paradigmatic, but they may also point simultaneously to the process by which he made the disciples great. As we shall see, such a close connection between the Eucharist and the transfiguration is mystagogically highly significant.

For analytical purposes the passage under discussion may be divided into two parts, containing different but related references to the Eucharist. We will now look at the two parts separately and then show how they are connected. I will start with the latter half before returning to a further analysis of the part containing the prayer.

3.2.2.3.2. The Wedding Feast and the Eucharist

The second half of the passage begins with an admonition and continues with an explanation that is highly allusive:

Do not despise the lamb, for without it it is impossible to see the door. No one will be able to approach the king naked. (Gos. Phil. 58.14–17)

This may be read as a clever composite allusion. The final sentence, which states that no one may approach the king naked, is a reasonably clear allusion to the parable of the Wedding Feast, more specifically Matt 22:11–14 concerning the man who shows up at the wedding feast without a wedding garment. Interestingly, being without a wedding garment

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469 See Gos. Phil. 58.5–10 and the discussion above.
472 See, e.g., Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 42; Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 147; Evans, et al., Nag Hammadi Texts, 151–152. Cf. also Wilson, who cautiously states that “some connection … is perhaps to be suspected” (Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 93), and Tuckett, who thinks the allusion is “very indirect” (Tuckett, Nag Hammadi, 77).
473 The parable of the wedding also states that the man who lacks wedding garments is thrown out into “the outer darkness” (Matt 22:13). This Matthean phrase, πᾶς ος ἔχειν πάντας ἑαυτὸς τὸ ἔξωτος τὸ ἔξωτος (Matt 8:12; 22:13; 25:30), is quoted at Gos. Phil. 68.7–8 and probably also at 67.1.
is in Gos. Phil. equated with being naked, i.e., without any garment at all. This should be understood in conjunction with the other passages in Gos. Phil., discussed above, that stress the importance of putting on and rising in a garment, a garment which, as we have seen, is gained through ritual actions. Without having put on this previously discussed garment one may not approach the king, which must be understood as a reference to God.\footnote{God as king is of course connected to the general concept of the kingdom of heaven.} The interpretation of this sentence is thus relatively unproblematic.

But how is this statement connected to the one preceding it? Based on the fact that the Coptic word for “door,” ṣro, is similar to that for “king,” ṣrāp, Layton, Schenke and others have proposed to emend the former to the latter, making the sentence read “king” instead of “door.”\footnote{Layton regards ṣrāp as an error and emends it to ṭr(ﬅ)po, and Isenberg translates it accordingly as “king,” rather than “door” (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 156–157; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 360). Schenke likewise thinks ṣrāp is an “Irreguläre Schreibung” for ṣrāp and translates “den König” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 26–27; see also Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 9; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 43; Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 93; Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippus, 18–19. Till does not emend the Coptic text, but translates both ṣrō and ṣrāp as “König”). Most scholars have retained this emendation, see, e.g., Stephen Gero, “The Lamb and the King: ‘Saying’ 27 of the Gospel of Philip Reconsidered,” OrChr 63 (1979): 178; Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 253; DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 504. As will be argued here, however, the manuscript reading makes good sense as is, and there is thus no reason to emend it (cf. Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 20–21, 52 n. 3).} Rather than taking the Coptic term ṣro (“door”) as a scribal mistake for ṣrāp (“king”), however, we may instead read the passage as playing on the words ṣro and ṣrāp.\footnote{Stephen Gero notes that if ṣro is not emended, the two parts of the passage “may not have had a connection in the Greek Vorlage” (Gero, “The Lamb and the King,” 178 n. 7). Another possibility is that there was no Greek Vorlage for this passage. John Barns has suggested that the similarity between the words ṣro and ṣrāp is purely coincidental (see John Barns, review of Robert McL. Wilson, The Gospel of Philip: Translated from the Coptic Text, with an Introduction and Commentary, JTS 11 [1963]: 496–500).} We thus get a transition between the two sentences that is based on a pun, and also a pun that makes good sense on several counts. Firstly, on a literal level it is of course difficult to enter into the chambers of a king without finding the door. But how is the part concerning the lamb related to the ability to see the door?\footnote{Ménard sees in ṣro (“door”) a connection with Naassene texts and suggests a baptismal context (see Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe, 147); Kasser, who primarily emends ṣro to ṣrāp, does not exclude the possibility of the reading ṣro and suggests a possible connection to the story of Ulysses and Polyphemous (see Rodolphe Kasser, “Bibliothèque gnostique VIII/IX: L’Évangile selon Philippe,” RTP 20 [1970]: 29 n. 1). In a text that is in such consistent dialogue with the Gospel of John as is the case with Gos. Phil., however,}
fact it makes perfectly good sense if we understand it as a play on two Johannine identifications of Jesus combined with Gos. Phil.’s logic of becoming and seeing, which is also, as we have seen, to some extent itself based on the Gospel of John. “I am the door” (ἄνωθεν πρὸ/ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ἡ θύρα), Jesus states in John 10:9, and adds that those who enter by him will be saved. 478 As for the lamb, John the Baptist identifies Jesus as “the lamb of God” (περιεβ Νινογτι/ὁ ἄμωσ τοῦ θεοῦ) in John 1:29 and 36, and Jesus as the lamb (ἀρνίον in Greek, but ꜀ⲉⲓⲉⲃ in Coptic) 479 is of course also the most important christological title in Revelation. 480 We may thus identify both the lamb and the door with Jesus. 481 As we have seen, it is an important principle in Gos. Phil. that to be able to see something of the true realities one needs to become like them. Thus, to be able to see Jesus as he really is, one needs to become like him. This implies, in this passage, that one must become like Jesus in order to see “the door.” Jesus as lamb, on the other hand, obviously has sacrificial, and hence eucharistic, connotations, 482 and, as we have seen, to become Christ-like by putting on the perfect man 483 and gaining clothing 484 are among the effects of the eucharistic ritual. Thus the logic seems to be that by ingesting Jesus in the Eucharist, and thereby not despising him as the lamb, one may become like him, according to the principle that one becomes what one eats. How consuming Jesus in the Eucharist (as the lamb) and seeing him (as the door) are related to the statement that one may not approach the king naked then becomes clear in relation to the references to putting on the garment by means of the Eucharist. 485

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478 Cf. also John 10:7 in NA 27. For extensive exegesis of Jesus’ reference to himself as “the door,” see, e.g., Origen, Comm. in Jo., 2.10–11, where Origen connects Jesus as door with entry to the Father/King.

479 See Wilmet, Concordance, 3:1404.


481 Gero instead rather awkwardly identifies the lamb with the “little ones” of Matt 18:10 (see Gero, “The Lamb and the King,” 180). For the possible connection of our passage with Matt 18, see the discussion below.


483 See above.

484 See above.

485 Tripp, however, has a slightly different interpretation, stating that, “The reference to Matthew xxii.11 (no Lukan parallel) and the wedding feast guests improperly dressed is made more probable by, and itself supports, the natural reading of ‘the Lamb’ as a reference to the Eucharist, eaten by the neophytes in their baptismal robes” (Tripp,
So, to sum up, one becomes like Christ by participating in the Eucharist and may thus see him, so that one may enter by him into the kingdom of heaven. This logic is thoroughly Johannine. Then, in accordance with Matthew, one may approach the king, since one is not naked but has attained the proper garment by means of the Eucharist. The passage thus seems basically to be an argument for the importance and indispensability of the Eucharist. One should not despise this ritual,\(^{486}\) for it is indispensable if one wishes to enter the kingdom of heaven.\(^{487}\)

3.2.2.3.3. Eucharistic Epiclesis and Joining with Angels

Now it is time to return to the start of the passage under discussion, namely the part containing the eucharistic epiclesis prayer of Jesus:

*ⲡⲉⲧⲉⲛⲧⲁϩϩⲱ ⲧⲣⲃⲧⲉⲗⲉⲓⲟⲥ ⲡⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ ⲃⲩⲡ ⲉⲧⲟⲩⲁⲁⲃ ϩⲟⲧⲛⲁⲅⲅⲉⲗⲟⲥ ⲡⲟⲩⲉⲓⲛ Ⲅⲛϩⲓⲕⲛ*  

He said on that day in the Eucharist: “He who joined the perfect, the light, with the Holy Spirit, join the angels with us also,\(^{488}\) with the images!”  
*(Gos. Phil. 58.10–14)*

There are several problems with this passage. We may assume that the one referred to as “He who joined …” (ⲡⲉⲧⲉⲛⲧⲁϩϩⲱ ⲧⲣⲃⲧⲉⲗⲉⲓⲟⲥ) should be understood as God the Father, and that the prayer is in effect an epiclesis for the Father to send the angels to join Jesus and his disciples. We are then left with two main problems in this prayer. The first is the nature of the joining that is envisaged between the angels and the images, and the other is the nature of the joining between “the perfect, the light” (ⲧⲱⲓⲧⲓⲓⲟⲥ ⲙⲟⲩⲟⲩⲓⲛ)\(^{489}\) and “the Holy Spirit” (ⲧⲫⲉ ⲛⲧⲟⲩⲓⲧⲕⲣⲓⲁⲃ), with the attendant problem of the further identity of these aspects or entities.\(^{490}\)

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\(^{487}\) For an, although ultimately unconvincing, alternative interpretation based on “the Valentinian myth,” see Gero, “The Lamb and the King.” Gero’s exegesis depends, however, on the simplification of the passage constituted by the emendation of ȧo (“door”) to ṣo (“king”).

\(^{488}\) Cf. John 1:51.


\(^{490}\) Most scholars have interpreted the passage in light of “Valentinian” theology. Mé-
Taken at face value, Jesus here refers not only to the disciples, but also to himself as an “image” (ἡμίκων).⁴⁹¹ If this is the case, then what they are images of cannot simply be Jesus himself, but rather the angels. It thus follows from this that Jesus himself is an image of an angel. Now, in what way may Christ be regarded as the image of an angel? Elsewhere in Gos. Phil. the disciples are images of Christ. Could it be that the disciples should here be regarded as the images of both Christ and the angels?

I propose that we may understand this passage on the basis of the passage just discussed, which directly follows this prayer, together with the transfiguration scene that directly precedes it. This means that we should regard it as an epiclesis prayer that is linked to the eucharistic appropriation of the perfect man and of the garment, and which takes place on the day of the transfiguration. To understand how these aspects are connected, however, we need to read this part of Gos. Phil. intertextually with the transfiguration accounts in Matthew and Luke. The Lukan account of the transfiguration, which is the only one that connects the

⁴⁹¹ Gaffron finds this to be rather strange, stating that “Merkwürdig ist, daß er bei der folgenden Bitte um die Vereinigung der Jünger mit ihren Engeln sich selbst mit einschließt,” and offers the suggestion that it may be due to “die zuvor berichtete Polymorphie Jesu,” and that “die Bitte ist also im uneigentlichen Sinne zu verstehen; sie hat ihren Sinn vom Assimilationsgedanken her” (Gaffron, Studien, 184). Sevrin likewise finds it strange that the prayer is put into the mouth of Jesus, but suggests that “Cette difficulté se résout au mieux si l’on considère cette ‘eucharistie’ comme une formule liturgique mise à posteriori, et quelque peu maladroitement, dans la bouche du Christ. Dans ce cas son lien au contexte demeure fragile, et témoigne, au mieux, de l’interprétation qu’en donne le rédacteur” (Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 152). Segelberg thinks that it is “without careful consideration” that this “liturgical prayer has been put into the mouth of Jesus,” and suggests that what is is quoted here may be only a part of a longer prayer, and that the reason why the phrasing has not been changed is that the phrase itself “was well known and unchangeable” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 58).
transfiguration with Jesus praying, in fact states that his appearance changed “as he prayed” \(\text{Ὑπενεγκώνων ἵππαι ἐν χριστίῳ ἐστιν} \) \(^{492}\). It is also, as mentioned above, the only one that mentions Jesus’ "glory." Moreover, while all the Synoptics report that Moses and Elijah appeared at the transfiguration, only Luke states that they appeared “in glory” \(\text{ἐν δόξῃ} \) \(^{493}\). However, in all the Synoptics the transfiguration narrative is preceded by a reference to the coming of the Son of Man in glory, and they all mention the angels in this context. Luke, however, states that the Son of Man shall come in his Father’s glory, his own glory and the glory of the angels. \(^{494}\) These details are significant, and it is worth quoting the relevant Lukan passage in full: 

For he who will put me and my words to shame, the Son of Man will put this one to shame when he comes in his glory and that of his father and that of his angels. Truly I say to you, there are some among those who stand here who will not taste death until they see the kingdom of God. And it happened after these words on the eighth day he took Peter and John and James and went up to the mountain to pray. And it happened while he was praying that the likeness of his face changed and his garment shone white.  

(Luke 9:26–29)

If we identify the prayer quoted by Gos. Phil. with the prayer of Jesus referred to in Luke 9:29, it becomes clear that it is closely connected with the transfiguration. Moreover, since we have already seen that the prayer referred to in Gos. Phil. is eucharistic, it fits in with what we have seen several times already, namely that the Eucharist effects a transformation of the communicants. That this transformation is a transformation into the likeness of Jesus again dovetails with what we have seen elsewhere of Gos. Phil’s interpretation of the Eucharist, and with the tractate’s treatment of the transfiguration, where it is the disciples who are changed rather than Jesus.

\(^{494}\) Luke 9:26. Matthew and Mark state that the Son of Man shall come with his angels, but they only mention the glory of the Father (Matt 16:27; Mark 8:38).
Now, what are we to make of the epiclesis for the sending of the angels? One possibility is to understand the first joining to be that of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and hence to see “the perfect, the light” as a reference to the Logos, an identification that may find support in Gos. Phil. 57.15–16, although elsewhere in Gos. Phil. the light is more often a property of the Holy Spirit. An alternative may be to understand “the perfect, the light” in accordance with the Gospel of John as a more general reference to Christ. In that case we may simply understand this joining to refer to that of Christ receiving the Holy Spirit at his baptism in the Jordan. The second joining, which is what Jesus prays for, is more problematic. As we have seen, “us” should here logically include Jesus, which means that Jesus refers to himself and the disciples as images of angels and prays for the angels to join with them. That Jesus may be referred to as an image of an angel can be supported by reference to what is stated just a few lines previously in Gos. Phil’s transfiguration account, where it is stated that “he [appeared to the] angels as an angel” (αὐτὸν ἰδοὺ ἔβολ· ἡς αὐτῶν· ἄγγελος ἀγελός), and the statement elsewhere that “Christ has everything within himself, whether man or angel or mystery and the Father” (πεκτός ὑμᾶς ὤν εἴσαρκ ὄρθος ἐστί. ὦν ἀγελός ἐστι. ἀμυτηρον ὄψιν πεζω). But what kind of joining with the angels is Christ praying for in this Gos. Phil. passage?

As mentioned above, the angels are referred to directly prior to the transfiguration account in the Synoptics. Also of note is the close connection between the transfiguration accounts and the post-resurrection accounts in the New Testament. For in the New Testament the manifestation of Jesus’ glory in the transfiguration has clear parallels in the appearance of the resurrected Christ. A particularly significant parallel is found between the Synoptics’, and especially Luke’s, account of the appearance of Moses and Elijah at the transfiguration, and the account of the ascension of Jesus in Acts 1. The latter relates that when Jesus ascended to heaven, two men stood by the disciples “in white garments” (ἡμεῖς ἐθήσαμεν λευκοὶ ἐν ἐν ἐσθήσαμεν λευκαῖς). In the transfiguration scene Jesus is described as having white and shining garments, and both he, Moses, and Elijah are described by Luke as appearing in “glory.”

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495 See John 8:12; 9:5.
496 Gos. Phil. 57.35–58.1.
497 Gos. Phil. 56.13–15.
499 Acts 1:10; cf. Matt 28:2–3; Mark 16:5; John 20:12.
appearance of Moses and Elijah at the transfiguration is thus mirrored by the appearance of the two men in white garments at the ascension of Jesus in Acts 1:10. Thus the “two men” in Acts who parallel Moses and Elijah in Luke may be interpreted as angels, and it is consequently easy to make the connection in the opposite direction as well, once the two passages have been mentally connected. Jesus, for his part, may thus also be understood to appear here in a way as an image of the angels, in that he has white and shining garments and appears in “glory.”

Considering the fact that the following part of the passage alludes heavily to the Matthean parable of the Wedding Feast, and considering the widespread use of Matthew elsewhere in Gos. Phil., we should not discount the possibility of also drawing on Matthew with regard to the transfiguration account and the prayer of Jesus. Matthew’s description of Jesus’ garments being white “as the light” (ἡ αἱματοθεία ὡς τῷ φῶς) and of Jesus’ face shining like the sun,⁵⁰⁰ may in fact provide a rationale for the reference to the joining of the light to the Holy Spirit. Since we have already seen that Christ’s true body in Gos. Phil. is constituted by the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, his true flesh and blood, within an earthly body, and that the Spirit is sometimes connected with the garment, the joining of the light with the Holy Spirit could simply be understood as a reference to the synoptic account of Jesus and his garment being made bright and shining at his transfiguration.

The sequence of events relating to the transfiguration and the eucharistic prayer of Jesus may thus be construed as follows: First the Holy Spirit joins with the light causing Christ to become angelic (i.e., an image of the angels). Then the disciples are made great so as to become equal to him, thus becoming themselves images of angels in the process. This is achieved by the partaking of the Logos and the Holy Spirit by means of the eucharistic flesh and blood of Jesus, i.e., the bread and the mixed cup in the Eucharist.⁵⁰¹ Jesus then prays to his father, referring back to the

⁵⁰⁰ Matt 17:2.
⁵⁰¹ This, along with several other eucharistic passages in Gos. Phil., recalls the sacramental theology of Athanasius. According to Norman Russel, for Athanasius “[t]he divine Word is a heavenly food which nourishes our souls.” Athanasius asserts that “[w]e no longer eat the flesh of a lamb but Christ’s own flesh.” As in Gos. Phil., Athanasius also connects salvation to the partaking of the Logos: “we may no longer, as mere earth, return to earth, but as being joined to the Logos from heaven, may be carried to heaven by him... no longer as being men, but as proper to the Logos, [we] may have a share in eternal life” (Athanasius, C. Ar. 3.33). For Athanasius, Russel argues, “[t]his transcendence of human nature is not, as in Origen, because we have become pure noes, but because we come to be wholly directed by the Logos and therefore receive his characteristics, characteristics
previous joining and asking for the sending of the angels to join him and his disciples, who have now all become images of angels.  

Another possibility, which does not exclude the previous one, is to regard this as a prayer taking place within the rites of initiation, being a eucharistic prayer specifically connected with the first communion. Since this is said to be a eucharistic prayer, the reference to the angels recalls the Sanctus. Since the prayer refers back to what may be regarded as a process of becoming images of angels, and refers forward to the joining with the angels, it might have functioned as an introduction to the Sanctus. In that case, the joining with the angels might refer to joining the angels in the heavenly liturgy. What the prayer refers back to may thus be the process by which one becomes angelic and Christlike through the rituals of baptism and chrismation. The joining of the perfect with the Holy Spirit would in that case refer both to the baptism of Christ in the Jordan and the Christian initiates’ reception of the Holy Spirit in their baptismal chrismation. The interpretation of this ritual process as becoming like the angels may stem from a practice, which we have possible allusions to elsewhere in Gos. Phil., of donning white garments after emersion from the baptismal water. The angels that are referred to in the prayer may refer simply to angels, but if this is a prayer used in an initiatory setting it could also simply be a reference to the congregation of already initiated Christians whom the newly initiated are now ready to join in the celebration of the Eucharist. In either case, the reference in the prayer to a joining with the angels could simply refer to a joining together in worship of the heavenly Father.

Gos. Phil. 57.28–58.17 is, as we can see, richly evocative, setting up composite allusions to the transfiguration narrative, and several passages relating to angels, in both Matthew and Luke as well as to the ascension which may be summed up in the expression, ‘life in itself.’ The enjoyment of this life is presented in eschatological terms, when we shall have ascended into heaven. There we shall sit on thrones. There too we shall contemplate the Father, for that which participates in the Logos joins the angels in the everlasting contemplation of God” (see Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 183–184).

502 Jesus’ eucharistic prayer may thus be said to have, in a sense, a bipartite anamnesis-epiclesis structure.


504 The possibility that the references to the angels have been influenced by the Sanctus has been suggested by David H. Tripp, “‘Gnostic Worship’: The State of the Question,” Studia Liturgica 17 (1987): 218. For an extensive treatment of the use of the Sanctus in early Christian eucharistic prayers, see Bryan D. Spinks, The Sanctus in the Eucharistic Prayer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
scene in Acts. This still does not exhaust the allusive potential of the passage, however.\footnote{Matthew also provides us with a link between Jesus praying and the sending of angels when Jesus is described, when he is arrested, as asking whether they do not believe that he could, if he wanted to, ask God and he would send him more than twelve legions of angels (Matt 26:53). Matthew also provides a connection between the admonition not to “despise” and a reference to angels in 18:10–11, although it does not seem to make sense to connect the lamb in Gos. Phil. with the “little ones” of Matt 18 (for an interpretation of the passage based on such an identification, see Gero, “The Lamb and the King”). Neither should we forget the connection in Luke 22:41–44 between prayer, the cup, and angels. For, as mentioned above, in the scene where Jesus prays and sweats drops of blood, an angel appears to him from heaven. Luke 22:39–46 has several features in common with the transfiguration account in the same gospel. In both Matthew and Luke there is a reference to the ascent of a mountain, to Jesus praying, and to the disciples falling asleep (cf. also Matt 22:30; 25:31).} Another intertext that deserves consideration is the vision of the throne room described in Rev 7:9–17. This passage contains such a significant number of themes and terms that echo those which we have discussed in Gos. Phil., especially in relation to the latter’s interpretation of the Eucharist, that it would seem to be readily brought to the mind of a reader familiar with this canonical text in a reading of Gos. Phil. Rev 7:9–17 describes a multitude clad in white robes standing before the throne of God and the Lamb. We are further told that there are angels standing around the throne giving thanks to God. Those who are standing there in white garments are identified as those who washed their robes and “made them white in the blood of the Lamb,” which, we are told, is why they are allowed to stand before the throne of God serving him. These people will no longer hunger or thirst, nor be bothered by the sun, since they get food and drink from the Lamb, and, as we have seen, they also have white garments. They thus have “food and drink and clothing,” just like those who participate in the Eucharist according to Gos. Phil.\footnote{See Gos. Phil. 57.3–8.} These people described in Rev 7:9–17 may be said to have been made angel-like, wearing white garments and having joined the angels in giving thanks to God like they do. There are, as we can see, multiple connections between this vision in Revelation and the sacramental interpretation of Gos. Phil. Not only is the transformation of the believers into the likeness of the angels by means of the blood of the Lamb and their entry to the throne room and the king reflected here, but even Gos. Phil.’s garment metaphors and its similes of dyeing and Jesus’ making all colours white are reflected in Rev 7:9–17.
3.2.2.4. **Spiritual Love**

The parable of the Wedding Feast is not the only Matthean parable that is used in *Gos. Phil.* in connection with themes with wedding-related imagery. Both the term κοιτών (“bedroom”) and νυμφών (“bridal chamber”) are used in a passage that plays on the parable of the Ten Virgins. Blended with the Matthean parable, the reference to the entry into the bedroom (κοιτών) in this *Gos. Phil.* passage seems to equal the entry through the door to the marriage (γάμος). In both cases, entry is closely connected to the lighting of the lamps. In the *Gos. Phil.* passage, however, the actual entry seems to precede the lighting of the lamps, rather than the other way around, a sequence of events that seems to be confirmed in the following sentences, where *Gos. Phil.* states that one may receive the light by becoming a “child of the bridal chamber” (παιδί ἡγγυφών):

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508 I follow Schenke’s reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 78). Layton has ἂπογγυφήν . . . ] (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 212).
If one becomes a child of the bridal chamber, he will receive the light. If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it in the other place. (Gos. Phil. 86.4–7)

This passage seems to confirm the sequence of entry into the bedroom followed by the reception of the light, by emphasising that in order to receive the light “in the other place” (ⲅⲡⲉⲡ, elsewhere referred to as “the aeon” or “the kingdom of heaven,” one needs to receive it here in this world. A vital requirement for receiving the light, however, is implied by the Matthean intertext, namely the possession of “oil” (ἁ/ἔλαιον) for the lamps. Without this oil, the lamps cannot be lighted. The basic lesson Gos. Phil. draws from the parable, then, is not the fact that the virgins missed salvation because they were not present when the bridegroom arrived, but rather the fact that they lacked the necessary oil. Now, what are the target referents of the “oil” (ἁ/ἔλαιον) and the “bedroom” (κοινθων), and how does one become a “child of the bridal chamber” (ⲅⲣेⲩ ⲉⲏⲉⲩⲝⲟⲩⲝ)? We shall return to these questions, but first we shall look closer at another passage that may shed light on the reception of the light in relation to the entry to the “bedroom.” The passage in question follows an account of the rending of the temple veil, and describes the revelation of the heavenly realities through their earthly types and images:

Those above have opened those below for us so that we may enter the secret of the truth. This truly is that which is honoured, which is strong, but we will enter there through despised types and weaknesses. They are humbled in the presence of the perfect glory. There is glory superior to glory, there is power superior to power. Therefore the perfect was opened for us with the secrets of the truth, and the Holies of the Holies were uncovered and the bedroom has invited us in. (Gos. Phil. 85.10–21)

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511 Cf. Gos. Phil. 67.3–5.
512 Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.
513 Cf. 2 Cor 3:18.
514 Cf. 1 Thess 2:12; 1 Pet 5:10.
The only way to enter into “the Holies of the Holies” (ⲉⲧⲩⲧⲟⲩⲁⲁⲃ) and the “bedroom” (ⲡⲟⲓⲧⲱⲛ) is to enter by means of their “types” (ⲣⲩⲡⲟⲥ) here in this world. These types are certainly described as being weak and despised in relation to the higher realities they signify, but the focus seems to be on the positive side of the equation, namely the fact that these lowly types give access to the higher realities. Indeed, they are indispensable if one is to enter the bedroom. A vital point that is also stressed here, however, is the fundamental importance of the revelatory acts of Christ. It is the rending of the veil that caused the uncovering of the Holies of the Holies, and opened up the possibility of entry into the truth by means of the worldly types and images. This clearly points in the direction of the Christian sacraments as the necessary and effective means of attaining salvation and entry into heaven. The “bedroom” seems here to have primarily an eschatological focus, being the destination reached by means of the ritual types. However, the fact that these rituals are regarded as types of the higher realities indicates a dual referent for the term in this passage. Such mirroring of the eschatological goal with the sacramental acts is also reflected a few lines after the passage quoted above:

but whenever it (i.e., the perfect light) is uncovered, then the perfect light will flow out upon everyone, and all those who are in it will [receive chrism.] Then the slaves will become free, [and] the captives will be redeemed.  
(Gos. Phil. 85.24–29)

The uncovering of the perfect light may here be read as a dual reference to the rending of the temple veil and the entry into the eschatological bedroom. Significantly, however, what is experienced eschatologically reflects what has already been experienced in ritual. When one enters the bedroom and the light is uncovered, one will be bathed in a light which is also described as chrism. This eschatological bathing in light in the bedroom is thus fundamentally reflected in its type, the ritual chrismation. We have already seen that the ritual chrismation is closely connected with the bestowal of light and that it is also described in terms of a “bridal chamber.” Moreover, these aspects are found both with regard to the chrismation as it is experienced by each and every Christian initiate, but also in the paradigmatic chrismation of Jesus in the river Jordan. We see here that the reception of the light is intimately connected with the “oil” mentioned in the parable of the Ten Virgins, and
ritually with the “chrism.” In order to receive the light / chrism in “the other place,” then, one needs to have received the light / chrism ritually in this place—and this requires oil. Through the imagery of the lamp and the allusion to the parable of the Ten Virgins we may also see more clearly the metonymical link between fire and light and the oil, and thereby of fire and light with the chrism.

Gos. Phil. also elsewhere links oil in various ways with themes of love, chrism, and ointment, in passages blending multiple references to sacraments and biblical intertexts. The tractate crucially employs the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan515 to make the link between “oil” (ἡγη) and “ointment” (σοῶ):

The Samaritan did not give anything to the wounded man except wine and oil.516 It was nothing else except the ointment, and it healed the wounds. For “love covers a multitude of sins.”517 (Gos. Phil. 78.7–12)

The final statement here, that “love covers a multitude of sins,” is a quotation of 1 Pet 4:8, while the reason for linking the Samaritan’s “wine and oil” (ἡρι γης) is given a few lines earlier, which states that “spiritual love is wine and fragrance” (ταξιν ἡπνεια[ς]η[της] οὑρι τε ειςτωει).518

The passage continues by describing the benefit gained by those who anoint themselves with it:

All those who will anoint themselves with it [benefit from] it. Those who stand near them also benefit, like those who are anointed who stand there. If those who are anointed with ointment leave their side and go, those who are not anointed, who are only standing near them, once again remain in their (own) stench. (Gos. Phil. 77.36–78.7)

It is clear, then, that the “oil” (ἡγη) refers to the same as the “fragrance” (εὐή), and that “spiritual love” (ταξιν ἡπνεια[ς]η[της]) is equated with “ointment” (σοῶ).520 The latter, moreover, is the same as the pair ἡρι
The main difficulty here is the identification of the pairings of ἡρπ γινε ("wine and oil") and ἡρπ γιςτος ("wine and fragrance") with σοσι ("ointment"). The oil/fragrance may plausibly be seen as a reference to the chrism,\footnote{Cf. Thomassen, \textit{The Spiritual Seed}, 347.} not least by way of metonymy, since both oil and fragrance are properties of the ointment. This identification is made even more probable by the reference to the "olive tree" as the source of chrism,\footnote{See \textit{Gos. Phil.}, 73.17–18.} to the connection between the oil, lamps, and light, discussed above, and a couple of other links which will be discussed shortly. The identification of the "ointment" (σοσι) with both wine and oil/fragrance, and with "spiritual love," may thus prompt a blend in which ointment is to be regarded as a metaphorical expression of spiritual love,\footnote{See Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 479.} which again may be regarded as a metaphor, by way of metonymy, for chrismation (oil/fragrance) and Eucharist (wine).\footnote{Thomassen interprets the passage as referring to "a eucharistic agape-meal shared by those who have been anointed" (Thomassen, \textit{The Spiritual Seed}, 347). I think, however, the passage is better understood as a general reference to aspects of the chrismation and the Eucharist as seen through the lens of a dual allusion to Luke 10:30–37 and Cant 1:2–3 (see below for the latter allusion). Schenke takes the identification of the ointment with both oil and wine to indicate an ointment consisting of wine and oil (see Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 480).} This is only one of several possibilities, however. We might for instance understand the connections made in these passages primarily as an equation of the references to "oil" (ἡρπ), "fragrance" (στοι), "ointment" (σοσι), and "chrism" (χρισμα).\footnote{Thomassen has argued that in the phrase ἔν μη ἡρπ γινε κεάλα ἀλ πε ἐν ἤντη λοκοσι (\textit{Gos. Phil.}, 78.8–10) the subject of the latter clause refers back only to ἡρπ and not to ἡρπ γινε (see Thomassen, \textit{The Spiritual Seed}, 347). Such an understanding is in line with the simple identifications outlined here.} An equation of "ointment" (σοσι) and “chrism” (χρισμα) may also present itself by way of an important intertext which we have not yet discussed and which is especially pertinent with regard to the use of marriage imagery in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, namely the Song of Songs.\footnote{Cf. Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 479 n. 1323; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 284.} In Cant 1:2–4 we find that “ointment” (μύρον) is mentioned in connection with wine and love, and the text also highlights the “fragrance” (δομη). The Coptic word σοσι is equivalent to the Greek μύρον.\footnote{See Crum 388b; René Draguet, \textit{Index Copte et Grec-Copte de la Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique} (CSCO 124, 173, 183, 185) (CSCO 196, Subsidia 16; Leuven: Peeters, 1960), 126; Wilmet, \textit{Concordance}, 2:898.} Not only is it highly probable that the chrismation discussed in
Gos. Phil. was done with μύρον,528 but there is also the significant identification in Cant 1:3 of the “ointment” and “the name” of the bridegroom.529 As we have seen, the bestowal of the name seems to be an important aspect of the rite of chrismation in Gos. Phil. These considerations thus make it possible to see in “ointment” (κοσμη/μύρον) a reference to the chrism. Moreover, the Greek word ὀνόμα is often translated by the Coptic word ⲧⲁⲅⲁⲡⲏ ̄ⲙⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁⲧⲓⲕⲏ.530

Identifying those who are described as being anointed as the initiated Christians, one of the main points of the passage may concern their ethical conduct. That is, Gos. Phil. argues, using the metonymically motivated metaphor of good fragrance for the positive effects of the anointed upon the uninitiated, which could plausibly be interpreted in terms of either good works in a literal sense or of other, “spiritual,” benefits of being close to the anointed.531 The latter seems more probable on the grounds of the fact that the unanointed are described as being left in their own stench if they are not near the anointed, and on the grounds of the close connection between the anointing and the Holy Spirit throughout Gos. Phil. The interpretation Gos. Phil. gives of the parable of the Good Samaritan in terms of the Samaritan’s remedies being equated with “spiritual love” also seems to point in this direction.532

Now, the discussion and the identification above of κοσμη, ṉερ, and ⲧⲁⲅⲁⲡⲏ ̄ⲙⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁⲧⲓⲕⲏ with ⲧⲁⲅⲁⲡⲏ ̄ⲙⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁⲧⲓⲕⲏ and “spiritual love” (ταγάλη ὑπερωματική)533 are helpful to keep in mind with regard to the interpretation of one of Gos. Phil.’s most well-known and enigmatic passages:

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529 καὶ ὀνόμα μύρον σου ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ἁρώματα, μύρον ἐκχενωθέν ὁνομά σου (Cant 1:3).
530 This is the case in John 12:3; 2 Cor 2:14, 16 (see Wilmet, *Concordance*, 2:827; cf. also Draguet, *Index*, 133). It is also used in Luke 23:56 and Rev 18:13, however, as a translation of μύρον (ibid.).
531 Like, e.g., the access to instruction, good advice, powers of healing, etc.
532 Schenke argues that the parable of the Good Samaritan is used only as an allegory of God’s love for mankind, and not of any spiritual love the adherents of Gos. Phil. are supposed to bestow upon others (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 480). There is no necessary contradiction between these two interpretations, however, and both implications may without problem be drawn at the same time.
533 Schenke suggests that “Statt ‘geistliche Liebe’ könnte man auch ‘göttliche Liebe’ übersetzen” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479), but as we shall see in the discussion below, such an understanding does not seem to cover the whole range of the concept of ταγάλη ὑπερωματική in Gos. Phil.
and [the] companion of the [...] Mary Mag[dale]ne [...] loved her] more than the disciples [...] he kissed her on her [...] times. The rest of [...] they said to him: “Why do you love her more than all of us?” The Saviour answered and said: “Why do I not love you like her?”

(Gos. Phil. 63.32–64.5)

This severely damaged passage may shed further light on the relationship between “spiritual love” and the anointing in Gos. Phil. From the preserved parts of this excerpt it seems clear that Jesus loves Mary Magdalene more than the other disciples, and that Jesus’ answer in the form of a rhetorical question does not really seem to answer the question they pose to him. In fact, Jesus seems merely to repeat the question. However, Jesus’ rhetorical retort constitutes a critique of the disciples that may be understood on the basis of Gos. Phil’s general rhetoric of reciprocity, for an implication of Jesus’ reply may be that the disciples have not loved Jesus like Mary Magdalene has done, and that this is the reason why he loves her more than he loves them. He loves her according to the manner in which she loves him.539

This understanding of the passage is supported by a couple of key New Testament intertexts. Gos. Phil. seems here to allude to a combination of Luke 7:36–50, John 11:1–5, and John 12:3–7.540 In particular, it is

537 I have chosen a conservative approach and only retained those reconstructions that seem reasonably certain. Schenke has offered suggestions for most of these lacunae (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 36).
538 I do not think the following simile concerning light, darkness, blindness, and seeing is to be regarded as a part of Jesus’ answer to this question.
539 This may conceivably also be strengthened by the possibility of understanding the Coptic ἱρτηφε, here translated as “like her” (a translation that is supported by similar usage in the Sahidic New Testament), quite literally as “in her manner.”
540 Since Gos. Phil. alludes to Matthew throughout, Matt 26:6–13 is also a passage that would be easily called to mind by a reader of Gos. Phil. The combination of the intertexts...
significant that the tractate appears to regard Jesus’ love for Mary of Bethany, mentioned in John 11:5, to refer to Jesus’ love for Mary Magdalene and further to identify the anonymous anointers in Luke 7 and Matt 26 with her. As Robert Murray has pointed out, “It is notorious that the early Christian world was in a state of inextricable confusion on the subject of the Maries in the gospels.”

Gos. Phil. is not alone when it here seems to blend Mary of Bethany and the anonymous sinner of Luke 7:37–50 with Mary Magdalene. The similarity in the account of the sinful woman’s anointing of Jesus in Luke 7 with Mary of Bethany’s anointing of Jesus in John 12:3–7, and also referred to in 11:2, is such that once Mary of Bethany is conflated with Mary Magdalene, the identification of the anonymous anointer in Luke 7 with her is quite apparent. In addition, the fact that Gos. Phil. here and elsewhere refers to Mary Magdalene as Jesus’ “companion” (κοινωνος) indicates that she has also been blended with the beloved disciple in John.

Let us now see how a blend with the Lukan and Johannine intertexts may inform our reading of the Gos. Phil. passage concerning Jesus’ love for Mary Magdalene. Luke and John tell us that Jesus has his feet anointed with “ointment” (μύρος), in Luke’s case by the anonymous sinful woman, and in John’s case by Mary of Bethany, and has them wiped with her hair. Luke adds to this that she also kisses his feet and washes them with her tears. Luke also has Jesus rebuke those who would criticise him for letting himself be touched by a sinful woman, pointing out that whereas they have neither given him any water for his feet, anointed his head with “oil” (νεξ/Ξελαυον), nor kissed him, she has washed his feet, anointed them with “ointment” (κοινοι/μύρος), and has ceaselessly kissed from Luke and John seems to be sufficient in this case, however. I have found no instances in Gos. Phil. that necessitates a Markan intertext, but the parallel to Matt 26:6–13 in Mark 14:3–9 is also a possible, although ultimately unnecessary intertext.

541 Both the reading περεπτε δε με γινορο κηνναρα τεσσυνε και περεπτε δε με γινορο κηνναρα τεσσυνε are attested in Coptic manuscripts (see Quecke, Das Johannevan- gelium saäisch, 150–151).

542 This possibility has been paranthetically suggested by Antti Marjanen (see Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 157 n. 43).


544 See Gos. Phil. 59.8–9; cf. also 59.11, where the equivalent Coptic term γαρτερ is used.

his feet. Luke then has Jesus state that she has loved much and that her sins have therefore been forgiven and that she has been saved by her faith.\textsuperscript{546}

John relates that when Jesus was anointed “the house was filled with the fragrance of the ointment” (ἀπεικόνισεν ἐν τῷ ὡμίῳ ἐξέπεσε τοῦ μυρίου),\textsuperscript{547} which strongly recalls Gos. Phil.’s discourse concerning the “ointment” and the “fragrance” discussed above. When taken together with the Lukan passage, we also see that Gos. Phil.’s identification of the “ointment,” “fragrance,” and “oil” with “spiritual love” is easily blended with Luke’s reference to Mary Magdalene’s abundant love for Jesus and Gos. Phil.’s passage concerning Jesus’ love for Mary Magdalene. From this interpretive blend we may then surmise that Mary Magdalene’s love for Jesus is the kind of “spiritual love” that in Gos. Phil. is equated with the anointing, and that it also involves her kissing his feet. Whether we should understand Mary Magdalene’s anointing of Jesus, which is thus implied in Gos. Phil., to be an anointing of Jesus’ feet, head, or body depends on whether, and how, we also choose to read the Matthean account into this blend. For Matthew does not mention any anointing of the feet, but rather of the head (26:7) and body (26:12).

In any case, it seems to be Mary’s spiritual love for Jesus, expressed by means of her kissing his feet and anointing him, that leads Jesus to kiss her (probably on her mouth, but perhaps even her feet)\textsuperscript{548} and love her more than the other disciples. Significantly, there are also further links between this anointing and the chrismation with regard to their relationship with the resurrection. We have already seen that the chrismation in Gos. Phil. also bestows the resurrection upon its recipients. When we go to the Johannine and Matthean intertexts outlined here, we see there that the anointing of Jesus is done with a view to his burial, thus indicating the resurrection.\textsuperscript{549}

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\textsuperscript{546} Only two verses after this, Luke identifies Mary Magdalene as a woman out of whom seven demons has gone (see Luke 8:2), thus providing a potential link between her and the anonymous anointer who had her sins forgiven.

\textsuperscript{547} John 12:3.

\textsuperscript{548} Cf. note above.

\textsuperscript{549} It may in this regard, considering the fact that the chrism is closely connected with the identity of Christ in Gos. Phil., also be mentioned that Jesus states in John 11:25 that “I am the resurrection and the life” (Ἐγώ εἰμί ᾿Η ἀνάστασις καὶ ᾿Η ζωή/ἀνω τῆς ζωῆς ἢ ᾿Η ἀνάστασις ἢ ᾿Η ζωή τῆς ἀνάστασις ᾿Η ζωή ἢ ᾿Η ζωή τῆς ἀνάστασις).
The theme we have touched on here concerning the relationship between loving and giving and receiving is also taken up elsewhere in Gos. Phil.:

Faith receives, love gives. [No one will be able to receive] without faith. No one will be able to give without love. Therefore we believe in order that we may receive, but give in order that we may love. For if one does not give with love, he does not benefit from that which he has given. He who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still. (Gos. Phil. 61.36–62.6)

As we can see, this passage also echoes the discourse in Luke 7:44–50 and Jesus’ answer to the disciples in Gos. Phil. 64.1–5. Especially worthy of note here is how giving and receiving love is connected with receiving the Lord so as not to stay a Hebrew. In order to receive the Lord, one needs to have faith and dedicate one’s love to him. Receiving one’s reward for loving Christ is here directly linked to receiving the Lord. If we link this discourse on love with the passages discussed above, we see that it is easy to draw the conclusion that the reception of the Lord referred to here has to do with the anointing with chrism, since we have seen love linked to the ointment, and the reception of and becoming Christ closely connected to the chrismation. The additional points made here, then, are on the one hand the necessity of faith and love in order to receive Christ, and on the other hand that the undesirable alternative situation entails the continued existence as a Hebrew. This means in basic terms that without faith and love of Christ one cannot become a Christian, and in that case one stays on the pre-Christian level of the Hebrews.

Gos. Phil. seems not only to link the reception of Christ and spiritual love strictly to ritual initiation, however, but also to doctrine.

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550 Cf. Gos. Phil. 54:15–18.
552 As Isenberg rightly notes, “Here ‘the Hebrew’ need not mean the Hebrew by racial descent,” but is rather used “typologically for all who have not yet experienced the ‘receiving of the Lord’ and the blessings of the New Age” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 193). His assertion, however, that this should therefore not “be construed as anti-Jewish feeling” on the part of Gos. Phil. (ibid., 193 n. 1) is not convincing, since the way Gos. Phil. here uses the ICM of Hebrew metaphorically is also at the same time an integral part of the tractate’s overall anti-Jewish polemic. See below for discussion.
Deification and Christology in the Gospel of Philip

Truth is one thing and it is many, and it concerns us to teach this one alone with love through many.\(^{553}\) (Gos. Phil. 5.4.15–18)

Significantly, Gos. Phil. stresses not only the importance of the reception of truth, i.e. the correct doctrine of Christ, but also the importance of giving this truth to others. This point becomes especially clear when we consider the Pauline intertexts that are likely to be activated in a reading of this passage. In particular, a passage from Ephesians and one from Philippians have the potentiality to be triggered, partly through their common use of the phrase γίνομαι (“with love”). Philippians states that some speak “the word of God” (παρακάταψαν “from envy and quarrel, while others preach Christ willingly” (εἰσεγέρθησαν ἵνα γίνηται ἐναντίας ἐν ἀγάπῃ), the latter doing it “out of love” (ἐβολὴ γίνομαι).\(^{554}\) This intertext may thus help us identify the referent for παρακάταψαν (“this one”) in Gos. Phil’s phrase τεσσεραυ οὕλη (“teach this one alone”) as Christ.\(^{555}\) As for Ephesians, Eph 4:7–16 is especially relevant, as it connects the loving teaching of truth with deification, stating that “speaking truth with love we shall grow into him completely, that is, the head, Christ” (ἐνανθρεμεν... γίνομαι ἵνα γίνηται ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνεφέλεται πεντεκοσία).\(^{556}\)

We saw that if one does not receive Christ one will metaphorically stay a Hebrew. This is not all, however, for one will also stay a slave and a captive. We saw above that in the eschatological reception of the chrism, the slaves would be set free and the prisoners redeemed. The distinction between slaves and free also surfaces in another passage in Gos. Phil., where it is directly connected to the requirements for experiencing the “bridal chamber” (παντοκράτος):

Αμετέρος ὁ πάπας ἦλθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔθελεν ἔν πρῶτον ἔνοχον ἀλλὰ ἀμετέρος ἦλθεν ἔνεπερεσ τοῦ παντοκράτος

A bridal chamber does not take place for the animals, nor does it take place for the slaves, nor for defiled women, but it takes place for free men and virgins. (Gos. Phil. 69.1–4)

\(^{553}\) Cf. Eph 4:15–16; Phil 1:14–16.

\(^{554}\) Phil 1:14–16. γίνομαι here corresponds to the Greek phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ.

\(^{555}\) It cannot point directly to “Truth” (ἡ θεότης), since the latter is a feminine noun.

\(^{556}\) Eph 4:15 (Horner, Sahidic New Testament). γίνομαι here corresponds to the Greek phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ.
There is no bridal chamber for animals or slaves, but for free men, and not for defiled women, but for virgins. We could say that according to the ICM of marriage, a bridal chamber is, quite naturally, something reserved for human beings, and it is also here reserved for free men and virgins. This rather commonsense statement is, of course, to be regarded as a construction of a mental framing input space, while the significance of the statement only becomes clear when it is mentally blended with one or more target, or focus, inputs and thus interpreted metaphorically.

In an interpretation of the passage as a metaphor, the use of the terms “free men” (Ῥωμαίοι ἐλευθεροί) and “virgins” (Ῥυμαίες) to designate those who may experience the bridal chamber is significant. In John 8:33–36 those who are referred to as free are those who are not slaves to sin.\textsuperscript{557} Accordingly, in early Christian usage the term ἐλευθεροίς is often used to refer specifically to Christians as being those who are free from sin, and in many cases the term is directly associated with freedom from sin as something achieved through faith and baptism.\textsuperscript{558} The animals must again, as elsewhere in Gos. Phil., be understood as metaphorical representations of human beings, more specifically non-Christian human beings, as we have seen above. As for the virgins, it is open to interpretation whether this designation is to be understood literally or metaphorically in the blend. We will return to this question below.

Taking the human beings in this passage to refer only to the Christians, and the free men and virgins to refer to Christians who are free from sin, and who most probably have been baptised, the “bridal chamber” (παναγός) is only for these people. But what should we understand the bridal chamber to refer to? The important references to joinings and unifications we have identified in Gos. Phil. in the analyses above have been the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, the Christian and Christ, and image and reality. In this case, having identified the people who are allowed into the “bridal chamber” as Christians who are free from sin, the joining in this case seems most likely to be that of the Christian with Christ. Whether this joining is here to be regarded simply as a mental/spiritual joining with Christ, perhaps through prayer, or a ritual one, like for instance baptism, chrismation, or Eucharist, or rather an eschatological one, is open to interpretation. From an overall understanding

\textsuperscript{557} Cf. also Gal 4–5.
\textsuperscript{558} See, e.g., Lampe 449b.
of this tractate, however, it seems that it may profitably be seen to refer to
both a ritual and an eschatological dimension. We have already seen that
aspects of both the chrismation and the Eucharist may be described and
understood in terms of the imagery of a “bridal chamber,” and we have
seen that the entry into the kingdom of heaven may also be regarded as
an entry to the wedding feast, or to the “bedroom.”

3.2.2.5. The Hidden and the Revealed
Another theme that surfaces at various points throughout Gos. Phil. has
to do with the relationship between the hidden and the revealed, secrecy
and openness, and the tractate uses several different source inputs for
metaphorical blends relating to these conceptual pairs. These framing
inputs are mostly taken from three main ICMs, namely that of the human
body, the Jerusalem temple, and marriage. In each case important scrip-
tural input spaces are recalled that partly explain and partly heighten
the significance of the blends. We will start by considering an extended
passage\(^{559}\) where Gos. Phil. sets up anatomical and botanical conceptual
framing inputs which are blended with scriptural intertexts in an argu-
ment that engages several issues at once. The passage will be tackled in
four parts. The first one goes as follows:

[Most (creatures/things) of [the] world stand and are alive as long as
their [insides are hidden. When they are revealed], they die, according to
the [example] of the visible man. [As long as] the innards of the man are
hidden the man is alive. When his innards are revealed they come out of
him and the man will die. (Gos. Phil. 82.30–83.2)]

The basic interpretation of this passage is pretty straightforward. Worldly
things stand and live as long as their insides are hidden. If they are
revealed, they die, like a human being does if his bowels are exposed.
Here we might detect a faint allusion to the death of Judas in Acts 1:18,
but otherwise, the passage presents an easily understood argument from
a general premise applied to a specific example. The passage then goes on
from the human example to a botanical one:

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\(^{559}\) Gos. Phil. 82.30–83.30.
Thus also with the tree. As long as its root is hidden, it blossoms and grows. If its root is revealed the tree dries up. Thus it is with every offspring in the world, not only the revealed, but also the hidden. For as long as the root of evil is hidden it is strong, but if it is recognised it has died, and if it is revealed it has been destroyed. (Gos. Phil. 83.3–11)

As with the human being, so also with the tree. Just as the man dies when his entrails are revealed, so too the tree dies if its root is exposed. From these two examples Gos. Phil. concludes that this is the case with every “offspring” (χιόνοι) in the world. The tractate then shifts, rather unexpectedly, from these examples to make a metaphorical connection between the tree and evil. Like the tree, evil thrives when its root is hidden, but dies when its root is revealed. With the hindsight provided by this explicit metaphor, the example of the man who dies when his bowels are exposed becomes a decidedly stronger allusion to the death of Judas. Like the evil Judas died when his entrails came out, evil in general dies when its root is brought out into the open. Gos. Phil. then round off the first half of the simile with a fitting quotation from Matthew and a general conclusion:

Therefore the Word says, “Already the axe is laid at the root of the trees.”

It will not (simply) cut—that which will be cut blossoms again—but the axe burrows down beneath until it brings out the root. Jesus plucked out the root completely, but others partly. As for us, let each one among us dig down to the root of the evil that is within him and pluck it out from its root in his heart. (Gos. Phil. 83.11–21)

Like Jesus did, then, each and every Christian should dig into his or her own heart and bring evil out into the open and thus remove the

560 Matt 3:10.
561 For this understanding of ψάλτων τιρίκουντας in an adverbial sense, see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 503, and cf. also ibid., 4, 478; Painchaud, et al., “Le syntagme πνευματικοῦ,” 626.
root of sin. The quotation from Matt 3:10 is used both to illustrate the destruction of evil, and to make the allegorical point that evil needs to be taken by the root—it is not enough only to cut off its visible manifestations. In order to be able to dig out this root, however, one needs to be aware of it:

And it will be uprooted when we are aware of it, but if we are ignorant of it, it takes root within us and it produces its fruits in our heart. It rules us, and we are its slaves. It captures us so that we may do what we do [not] want to. Those things that we want to do we do [not]. [It is] strong because we have not become aware of it. As long as [it exists] it works.

(Gos. Phil. 83.21–30)

So, when one becomes aware of the root of evil in one’s heart one may remove it, and thus stop it from bringing forth its fruit. Gos. Phil. also stresses the point that evil thrives as long as it exists, even though one may not be aware of it—or especially when one is not aware of it.

In the cases discussed above, the revelation of what is hidden is a good thing. This is not always the case, however. There are indeed some things that should remain hidden:

562 Peter Brown reads this passage as referring strictly to the renunciation of sexuality, and connects it with an account of self-castration in the Acts of John (see Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity [Lectures in the History of Religion; New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 117). For the identification of the evil that is to be removed with sexuality, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 347. There is nothing in the context, however, that connects the evil that is to be uprooted with sexuality.


564 Cf., however, Gos. Phil. 85.21–24.
If a marriage is stripped naked it has become fornication, and not only if the bride receives the seed of another man, but even if she comes out of her bedroom and is seen she has fornicated. Let her only be revealed to her father and her mother and the friend of the bridegroom and the children of the bridegroom, these to whom it is given to enter the bridal chamber daily. But let the others desire even to hear her voice and enjoy her ointment, and let them nourish from the crumbs that fall from the table, like the dogs. Bridegrooms and brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to see the bridegroom with the bride unless [he becomes] this. (Gos. Phil. 82.10–26)

Gos. Phil. stresses that the inner goings on of the marriage should not be revealed. On the one hand it is pointed out that what takes place in the bedroom between the bridegroom and the bride should not take place outside it, and on the other it is made clear that only a select few are allowed inside the bridal chamber. This is especially understandable on the basis of the logic outlined above concerning the fact that hidden things thrive, while if the hidden things are brought out into the open they die. Thus, if the marriage becomes an open business it becomes adultery and consequently “dies.”

We are given a clue to the identity of the metaphorical target of this marriage in the description of the small benefits that are to befall those on the outside of the bridal chamber. They may feed on the crumbs that fall from the table, and they may enjoy the bride’s “ointment” (κοπαίνη). This clearly links up with the motif discussed above concerning the oil, ointment, and fragrance. The fragrance and the crumbs that benefit those who stand outside would seem to indicate a kind of general moral obligation on the part of the initiated Christians to provide some kind of benefit to those who are not initiated, whether it be of a spiritual or of a more concrete kind. At the same time, however, we may here, as above, identify the ointment with the chrism and the bride with the Christian initiate, from which it follows that the bridegroom is Christ. The connection between the “ointment” and the chrism moreover primes a sacramental context for the entire simile, making it easy to make the connection between the implied wedding and Christian initiation, and between the bread and the Eucharist. The point that the marriage is

to remain hidden seems in this context to indicate the fact that these Christian mysteries should remain hidden and secret to outsiders and that only insiders are allowed to participate.

3.2.2.5.1. Names, Types, Symbols, and Images

_Gos. Phil._ devotes considerable space to reflections on themes related to mirror images, copies, names, and symbols, especially with regard to their relationships with their respective originals or referents. _Gos. Phil._’s main interest in these themes has basically to do with the relationship between absolute truth and its imperfect referents in the material world, and the function of the latter as the means of passage to, and understanding of, the former.\(^568\)

In a tricky but crucial passage, _Gos. Phil._ gives an extended exposition of the important relationship between absolute truth and its manifestations in the world in such a context (I have split up the passage in numbered sections for ease of reference):

> τὰληθεία ἢνεεῖ εἰποκοχος εἰκασάρην ἄλλα ἦτασεὶ ὑπητύποις ἡμῶν ὑπερῆνεν θεάτης λασίνθεν ἀν ἡκάτης

(1) Truth did not come to the world naked, but it came in types and images. It (i.e., the world) will not receive it (i.e., truth) in any other way.

> οὐδέποτις ἢκετοι μοιόν ἡμῶν ὑπητύποιν ἡχοὶ ἢκετοι ὅμωλος ἀνθρώποι ὑκετοι ὑπητύποιν

(2a) There is a birth and an image of rebirth.\(^569\) It is truly necessary to be born again\(^570\) by means of the image!

> καὶ τε ταπακτάς καὶ ὁ σκότην ὑπητύποιν ὅμοιο εὐρετωρόμεν

(2b) What is the resurrection and the image? By means of the image it is necessary for it (i.e., the resurrection) to arise.

> πνεύμφοις ἑπίθεν ὑπητύποιν ὅμοιο ετρογεὶ εργοῖ ἐταλήθεια ετετείς τε ταπακαςτάςκεις

(2c) The bridal chamber and the image? By means of the image it is necessary for them to enter the truth, that is, the restoration.

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\(^569\) Cf. Titus 3:5.

\(^570\) Cf. John 3:7.
It is not only necessary for those who acquire the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but they too have been produced for you. If one does not acquire them for himself, the name will also be taken from him. But one receives them in the chrism of the power of the cross. The apostles called this "[the] right and the left." For this one is no longer a Christian, but a Christ.

(Gos. Phil. 67.9–27)

The passage seems to be structured as (1) a basic proposition followed by (2) three examples, two of them in the form of a question and an answer, and (3) a final extended application of some implications of the principles outlined in the previous parts.

Truth did not come naked to the world, but instead of being described as covered in names, as in Gos. Phil. 54.13–15, Truth is here clothed in what seems to be sacramental types and images. This means on the one hand that truth is conveyed through such types and images, and on the other that there is a higher reality behind them. The argument seems to go as follows: (1) Truth is accessible to us in the material world only by means of types and images. (2a) There is a true rebirth and there is an image of it that is available to us in this world. In order to be truly reborn it is necessary to use the image of the rebirth that is available to us in this world. This is a rebirth which, from what we have seen of Gos. Phil.'s sacramental theology, is probably to be identified as a combination of baptism and chrismation. (2b) Gos. Phil. then asks a rhetorical question concerning the identity of the true resurrection and its image. Instead of answering this question directly, the point that the worldly images are necessary in order to gain access to the heavenly realities is simply restated. (2c) Then follows yet another question that is not answered.

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571 Layton emends to καὶ ἐκ τῆς χρυσός, “(those who) have produced them” (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 174–175).
573 Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.
574 Schenke, however, divides the passage into five separate sayings, 67a–e (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 45; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II.3],” 201), although he does concede that 67a–c and 67d–e form two groups and that 67b–c could almost be regarded as a single unit (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 373–377).
575 See Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 375.
directly, this time concerning “the bridal chamber” (πυγμής) and its image, and the answer is yet again that “the image” (ἰκών) is necessary. This example is, however, interesting also in its equation of entry into the bridal chamber with entry into “the truth” (ταλάνθημα), and its equation of the truth with “the restoration” (ταποκαταστάσις). Entry into the true bridal chamber, then, requires entry into its this-worldly type. The three examples thus stress the same point, acquisition of the truth requires the experience of its types and images in this world.

(3) The linguistically difficult final section then seems to argue that one needs to receive not only the names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but also in a sense the realities to which these names refer. This takes place in the chrismation, which seems to be accompanied by a Trinitarian formula and probably also the sign of the cross. By means of such a chrismation, then, one becomes “a Christ” (οὐχρῆς) only if one has truly received the realities that go with the names. 576

The point that truth is present in the world in a hidden sense is also expressed elsewhere in the text by means of a botanical metaphor:

ταλάνθημα σείτε ἰνός ἴνα μὴν τεταγμένης κείμενης ἀνὴρ ὕπερ ἑρός εὐχετε ἰνός ρίγκοιει δὲ εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἑρός εὔως ἰνός

Truth, which has been in existence since the beginning, is sown everywhere, and there are many who see it being sown, but there are few who see it being reaped. (Gos. Phil. 55.19–22)

Here the sowing is mapped onto the “types and images,” while the real truth hidden in them is mapped onto the reaping. Thus, by means of this blend several important aspects of the process of gaining insight into the truth are cleverly laid out simultaneously. Among the significant entailments of this blend is the insight that the process of gaining knowledge of the truth is one of maturation; that truth is hidden in the world in a manner analogous to the way a plant or a tree is hidden within a seed; and that the act of apprehending the truth is analogous to harvesting, i.e., to the reaping of a reward, to put it with another metaphorical blend. Moreover, since truth has been sown everywhere since the beginning it has always existed in the world, even though it has been hidden.

Now, who are those few who see the reaping of the truth? Gos. Phil. states rather tautologically that to be able to see, one must not be blind:

576 See Gos. Phil. 64.22–29; 74.13–16.
A blind person and a seeing one who are both in the dark are not different from each other. When the light comes, then he who sees will see the light, and he who is blind will remain in the dark.

(Gos. Phil. 64.5–9)

The important point here, then, seems to be the stress on the importance of gaining sight prior to the coming of the light. That is, if one cannot see, one will not benefit from the light when it comes. As long as it is dark, however, there is no difference between the seeing and the blind. The coming of the light may here be interpreted in an eschatological sense, and understood quite simply to refer to the fact that when the light comes, only the Christians will see it and be saved. Another possibility is to map the coming of the light onto the coming of Christ into the world, and thus interpret the seeing person as a representative of all Christians in the world, and the blind one of all the others who are not convinced by the Christian message—they still do not see, even after the coming of the light into the world.

In any case, those who are able to receive this light will themselves not be seen by the hostile powers, neither in this world nor in the next:

(Gos. Phil. 86.7–18)

Interestingly, this passage, which constitutes the very end of Gos. Phil., also displays a rather positive view concerning the state of the enlightened person in this world. Not only will he be saved, but he will also

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577 Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.
578 Only the title, πενταχτελος παταφιλιπος, ”the Gospel According to Philip” (Gos. Phil. 86.18–19), follows it.
perceive the higher realities in the types and images in this world, and is
safe with regard to the hostile powers. The goal thus seems to be not only
to achieve salvation in the next world, but also to realise that the aeon
(the next world or the other world) is reflected already in this world,
albeit imperfectly. That is, the fully enlightened Christian will be able
to successfully blend, so to speak, the heavenly reality with the earthly.
This is achieved by becoming a heavenly being (a Christ) and by being
able to see truth in the worldly types and images. The causal relationship
between becoming and seeing seems to be blurred in accordance with
what we have seen in other passages discussed above.

In the context of the hidden and the revealed, it is interesting to com-
pare the statement at the end of the passage concerning the “undefiled
marriage,” discussed above, with that found in the very last sentence just
quoted. The first excerpt concerns the “undefiled marriage,” while the
second concerns “the aeon”:

\[
\text{ⲉ ϥ ⲏ ⲡⲁ ⲛⲉ ⲡ ⲕ ⲁ ⲕ ⲉⲏⲧ ⲟ ⲩ ϣ ⲏⲁ ⲗ ⲗ ⲁⲉ ϥ ⲏ ⲡⲉ ⲡ ⲉ ϩ ⲟ ⲟ ⲩⲙ̄ⲛⲡⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ}
\]
It is not of the darkness or the night, but it is of the day and the light.
\text{(Gos. Phil. 82.8–10)}

\[
\text{ⲉϥϥⲥ ⲁⲛ ϩ̄ⲙⲡⲕⲁⲉ ⲙ ̄ⲛⲧⲟⲩϣⲏ ⲉϥϥⲥ ϩ̄ⲛⲛⲟⲩϩⲟⲟⲩ ̄ⲛⲧⲉⲗⲉⲓⲟⲛ ⲙ ̄ⲛⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ}
\]
It is not hidden in the darkness or the night, but it is hidden in a perfect
day and a holy light. \text{(Gos. Phil. 86.16–18)}

It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Coptic wordplay created by the
use of the words Ⲝⲫ (“be counted/belong”) and Ⲝⲫ (“be hidden/secret”)
in these very similar constructions can hardly be accidental. The similarity
of the passages also invites us to interpret them together in an intra-
textual blend. In the same way as “the undefiled marriage” belongs to the
day and the light, “the aeon” is hidden in a perfect day and a holy light.
The aeon, the kingdom of heaven, is thus nicely reflected in “the unde-
filed marriage.” When we connect initiation into Christianity with this
undefiled marriage, i.e., the marriage of each initiate with Christ and/or
an angel, we see how Gos. Phil. describes heaven as being reflected on
earth in the Christian sacraments—both in the rituals of initiation and
in the repeated eucharistic communion.

3.2.2.5.2. The Works of Christ “In a Mystery”
It is not only the world in general or the sacramental types and images
that have a hidden dimension, however, but also the acts of Christ:
The Lord [did] everything in a mystery: a baptism and a chrismation and a Eucharist and a redemption and a bridal chamber.

(Gos. Phil. 67.27–30)

Described by Hans-Martin Schenke as “eine oder sogar die Zentralstelle für die Sakramentslehre des EvPhil,” this passage has most commonly been understood to refer to a sequence of rituals of consecutively higher importance, but there is no consensus among scholars on this point. As we shall see, however, it is actually doubtful that the focus of this passage is on a sequence of rituals. Among the most difficult problems of this frequently cited passage is the question of what the phrase ό όν, “everything,” actually refers to, and how to understand the Coptic phrase ρινογνυςτηριων. Several scholars have argued convincingly that γυςτηριων here should not be taken in the sense of a sacrament, and that the phrase ρινογνυςτηριων should be understood adverbially. They have, however, differed somewhat with regard to the underlying Greek, and with regard to their overall interpretation of the sentence. Rewolinski suggests that ρινογνυςτηριων may be a translation of the Greek μυστικῶς, and that it should be understood as “secretly,”

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579 Another possible reconstruction could perhaps be αποστηριων όν, [c F]ως όν.

580 The passage is here broken off by a lacuna of between five and ten letters. This means that, in theory at least, another term could follow and conceivably make this passage into a sequence of more than five terms.

581 Rewolinski suggests Didache 11:11 (ποιον εἰς μυστήριον κοσμίκον ἑκκλησίας, quoted from Aaron Milavec, The Didache: Text, Translation, Analysis, and Commentary [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2003], 28) as a parallel to this phrase (see Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 101). This parallel seems somewhat tenuous, however.

582 Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 381, the emphasis is Schenke’s own.


584 See Gaffron, Studien, 108–109; Einar Thomassen, “Gos. Philip 67:27–30: Not ’In a Mystery’,” in Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Mélanges offerts à Wolf-Peter Funk (ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier; BCNH Section “Études” 7; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), 925–939 (I thank Professor Thomassen for giving me access to an advance copy of this article).


or ‘mystically,’ i.e., prophetically.”587 He concludes that the phrase should be understood “in a broad sense” to refer to the fact that “everything Christ did had a deeper significance,” i.e., that “the actions of Christ have a deeper significance pointing beyond their one time (or more) performance.”588 Rewolinski’s overall interpretation seems sound, but is ἐν μυστηρίῳ a translation of μυστικῶς? Gaffron, later followed by Schenke and Thomassen, has also argued that ἐν μυστηρίῳ should be understood in an adverbial sense, but rather as a translation of μυστηριωδῶς.589 On a general level, Gaffron, Schenke, and Thomassen are of course right to point out that ἐν μυστηρίῳ is a possible translation of μυστηριωδῶς. I would argue, however, that in the context in which it appears in Gos. Phil. it makes more sense to read it as the Coptic equivalent of the Greek ἐν μυστηρίῳ.590 While the term μυστηριωδῶς is not used in the New Testament at all, ἐν μυστηρίῳ is found in 1 Cor 2:7, where it is in fact rendered as ἐν μυστηρίῳ in the Sahidic New Testament.591

First Corinthians is, as we have seen, an important intertext to Gos. Phil. that is both quoted and alluded to throughout the tractate, thus keeping this text at a high level of priming in a reading of Gos. Phil. What should directly prompt us to investigate the benefits of reading this Gos. Phil. passage intertextually with 1 Cor 2:7 is the fact that this is the only passage in the entire Sahidic New Testament where the phrase ἐν μυστηρίῳ appears, and it does so as a translation of the Greek ἐν μυστηρίῳ. In Greek, the Pauline verse reads: ἀλλὰ λαλῶμεν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεφαλημένην, ἣν προώμοισεν ὁ θεός πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς δοξὴν ἡμῶν. The phrase ἐν μυστηρίῳ may here be understood adverbially, as in the KJV: “But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory” (1 Cor 2:7 KJV).592 In the Sahidic version,

589 See Gaffron, Studien, 108–109; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 381–383; Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery’.”
590 This is also mentioned as a possibility by Sevrin (see Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 289).
591 See Thompson, Coptic Version, 121; Horner, Sahidic New Testament; Lefort, Les mots d’origine grecque, 177.
592 Contrary to the KJV translation, however, RSV reads ἐν μυστηρίῳ adjectivally: “But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification” (1 Cor 2:7 RSV). As Conzelmann points out, it is impossible
the verse reads: ἀλλὰ ἐπικλάξει θυγατερεῖν την κειμένην τῆς ἱδρύματος τοῦ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ ἑτερογένεσιν, which may be translated as “But we speak wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which God set apart before the ages for our glory” (1 Cor 2:7). Here it is also of interest that the preceding verse, 1 Cor 2:6, starts off with the declaration that “it is among the perfect that we speak wisdom, but a wisdom that is not of this age, nor of the rulers of this age, these which will be brought to naught” (ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἑτερογένεσιν ἑκάτερον ἀντὶ τῶν ἑν ἀγάπῃ ἑτερογένεσιν).593

I have chosen to understand ἱδρύματος in Gos. Phil. as an adverbial prepositional phrase modifying ἐπή, specifying the way in which the Lord “did everything” (ἐπή ἐτυγκόσια), namely that he did everything “in a way...
mystery” (ἐν μυστηρίῳ), 594 that is, with a hidden meaning. 595 Now, what does ὅψιν ("everything") refer to in the Gos. Phil. passage? While Schenke takes it to refer strictly to the following five terms (οὐθαν[τι]ς χρησιμοθηκως ἐν ὑπογεγραμμενων ἄρχων), Sevrin argues that the five terms are only examples of what is encompassed by ὅψιν. 596 Gaffron takes ὅψιν to refer to what is revealed in the following five terms understood by him as sacraments, 597 and Thomassen understands ὅψιν to refer to “the essential soteriological work carried out by the Saviour in his earthly incarnation: the redemption he received at his baptism in the Jordan and in which his followers share through their own baptism.” 598 I suggest that we understand ὅψιν here as a reference to everything which Jesus did, as related in Scripture, and following Sevrin I understand the five terms to be examples of these important acts. 599 Of these, “baptism,” “chrismation,” and “Eucharist” seem pretty straightforward. The first two were shown by Jesus in his baptism in the Jordan, while the latter is reported most directly in the institution narratives. “Bridal chamber” may, as we have seen, point to an interpretation of aspects of especially the chrism and the Eucharist, but it might also be read in this context as an allusion to the wedding at Cana, 600 where Jesus did things with a deeper meaning, and even, as John relates, manifested his “glory” for the first time. 601 As for “redemption” (σώτερι), this

594 It is enough to acknowledge the adverbial sense of the prepositional phrase “in a mystery” (as in the KJV translation of 1 Cor 2:7) and no need to change the translation (contrary to Thomassen, "Not 'In a Mystery' ").
595 See Lampe 892b. For a similar understanding of the meaning of ρηματιστήριον in Gos. Phil., although based on the questionable assumption of μυστηριωδῶς as the Greek Vorlage, see Thomassen, “Not 'In a Mystery'.
596 See Sevrin, "Pratique et doctrine," 289.
597 See Gaffron, Studien, 109. Schenke rightly notes that this interpretation violates Gaffron's own insight that ρηματιστήριον should be understood adverbially (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 381).
598 Thomassen, "Not 'In a Mystery'." 934–935. Thomassen suggests the following translation of the passage: “The Lord did everything with a symbolic meaning: baptism, chrism, Eucharist, redemption, and bridal chamber” (ibid., 934). He also suggests that ὅψιν should be taken to refer exclusively to what Jesus revealed in his baptism in the Jordan. Thomassen is then left, however, with the Eucharist as the odd one out in the sequence, which leads him to propose that perhaps the only reason why the Eucharist is mentioned in the list is because it is a part of the initiation ritual, and not because it has anything to do with what Jesus revealed (see ibid., 934–936).
600 John 2:1–11.
term may refer to the deeper meaning of several acts of Jesus, but might also be understood in a more specific sense as referring to his redemptive death on the cross.\textsuperscript{602}

The hidden meaning of these acts is further to be understood in terms of what Paul refers to in 1 Cor 2:6 as the hidden wisdom of God which is imparted “among the perfect/mature” (\textgreek{γνώτελειος}). Here we might also recall that Gos. Phil. states concerning “the disciple of God” that he shall give food that is proper to the recipients, including bones to the dogs and acorns to the pigs. For the slaves, however, no specific food is mentioned, but rather that “he will give them the first (course)” (\textgreek{φιλον ην ϊωρον}), and “to the children he will give the complete (banquet)” (\textgreek{γνωρε ριαν ην γνρελειον}).\textsuperscript{603} While I have chosen to translate the passage in a way that keeps it in line with the metaphorical source domain of food and eating, Isenberg’s understanding of this passage is perfectly in line with both Gos. Phil. and 1 Cor 2:6 when he freely translates “To the slaves he will give only the elementary lessons, to the children he will give the complete instruction.”\textsuperscript{604}

3.2.2.5.3. The Temple
An important motif Gos. Phil. utilises in several contexts is the Jerusalem temple. This is also yet another motif that is used to provide framing inputs in different metaphorical blends. We have already seen how the tractate employs temple imagery in an eschatological context and in connection with the effects of the crucifixion. We will now take a closer look at a passage where temple imagery is employed to make quite different points. In an intriguing passage that is unfortunately cut short due to the state of the manuscript, Gos. Phil. describes the layout of the Jerusalem temple and its significance:

\begin{quote}
\textgreek{ηγηπουντ ιηει ινα ιπροσεφορα γνυεροςγυμα πους ειογεν εαπιεντε εγιυοτε εφον δεπετουλαβ πκεογα ειογας ειπάρμις εγιυοτε εφον δεπετουλαβ ιπετουλαβ πκαρουντ ειογας απαιευτε εγιυοτε εφον δεπετουλαβ ιπετουλαβ πικα ειρεππαρκγεγ[κ] βυκ εφογα ειακ ογα[α]κ ιναιπιπεια πε τειε ετουλαβ [π][κ][τ]ε δεπετουλαβ ιπετουλαβ πετ[ογα]αβ
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{602} Cf. Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 382.

\textsuperscript{603} See \textit{Gos. Phil.} 80.23–81.14. Cf. Layton, who makes a similar decision, translating “if slaves, a first course (that is, a single dish); if children, a complete meal” (Layton, \textit{The Gnostic Scriptures}, 350).

There were three houses of sacrifice in Jerusalem. The one, which is open to the west, is called the holy. The other one, which is open to the south, is called the holy of the holy. The third, which is open to the east, is called the holy of the holies, the place where the high priest enters alone. Baptism is the holy house, [redemption] is the holy of the holy. The holy of the holies is the bridal chamber. [Baptism] contains the resurrection [in] the redemption, the redemption being in the bridal chamber. But [the] bridal chamber is in that which is higher than [...].

(Gos. Phil. 69.14–28)

Contrary to Gos. Phil.'s eschatological references to the temple, in the present passage such important features as the veil or the ark of the covenant are not mentioned. The focus of this simile is rather on the three houses of increasing holiness and secrecy. Segelberg has commented that Gos. Phil. here makes use of what he calls "the mistaken idea that there were three halls in the temple at Jerusalem." The way in which Gos. Phil. utilises temple imagery seems to draw heavily upon the epistle to the Hebrews. Indeed, Gos. Phil. may even have drawn its tripartite division of the Temple directly from Heb 9, since, after a description of the two tabernacles in Heb 9:1–10, Heb 9:11 introduces "the great perfect tabernacle" (τον Ναὸν τῆς Αγίας Αγίας), which is "not of this creation" (誓ον αὐτῷ αὐτούςΤην Ἀγίαν), thus indicating not two, but three tabernacles. Similarly it is stated at Heb 9:24 that Christ did not enter "the holies" (νευγναών), which are only "patterns of the true" (εἰς τὴν Αγίαν), but into heaven, indicating the latter as the third, higher, tabernacle. Significantly, his entry into "the holy" by means of his own blood is associated with

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605 This lacuna may also be restored π[κρα]ς ("the [chrism]").
607 The rest of this passage is unfortunately damaged too severely for us to be able to reconstruct it with any degree of certainty. For an attempt, see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 48.
608 Segelberg, "Sacramental System," 198. Schenke proposes that the imagery may have resulted from 'eine Kontamination' der (drei oder) zwei Teile des Tempelhauses ... mit den drei Höfen des ganzen Tempelbezirks" (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 404, Schenke's emphases). Rewolinski points out that the Jerusalem temple had three "courts" and translates Νευω in this sense (see Rewolinski, "Sacramental Language," 125).
609 The terminology used in Heb 9 is not the same as in this passage in Gos. Phil., however, as the first two tabernacles are referred to as νευγναών, "the holies" (Heb 9:2) and νευγναών νευγναών, "the holies of the holies" (Heb 9:3). The latter term is, however, used at Gos. Phil. 85.19–20.
“redemption” (σωτερία). In chapter 10, Hebrews then goes on to describe the entry of the Christians, referred to by the authorial voice as “my brothers” (νἀσιν), into this place by means of the blood of Jesus, and “through the veil which is his flesh” (φύλακας τῆς φυλάκες τῆς φύσεως). For a schematic representation of the temple as described in Gos. Phil., see fig. 45.

Now, how are we to understand Gos. Phil’s use of this temple simile? As usual in Gos. Phil., the target input of this metaphorical blend is left unstated. It has been assumed by most scholars that the three houses of the temple here represent successive sacramental stages. This view is suggested by the fact that the first house is identified with baptism. To read the other two houses as representing sacraments, however, then requires the direct identification in this passage of the terms “redemption” (σωτερία) and “bridal chamber” (ηυμνίον) with sacraments, but such an identification is problematic. It has usually been supported by reference to the famous list of five terms in Gos. Phil. 67.28–30, which includes the terms “bridal chamber” (ηυμνίον) and “redemption” (σωτερία) in addition to “baptism” (βαπτίζων), “chrism” (χρισμός), and “Eucharist” (εὐχαριστία), but as we have seen, it does not seem likely that this list in fact refers to five sacraments. Moreover, as Segelberg has noted with regard to the temple metaphor, “The question may be asked as to why only three sacraments are thought of in this context. Why not build five rooms in the temple at Jerusalem when the argument at any rate involves the alteration of its actual structure?” Why not indeed? The fact that

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610 Heb 9:12.
611 Heb 10:19.
612 Heb 10:20.
613 For a similar illustration, see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 404. For a different solution, see Schmid, Die Eucharistie, 119.
615 For the identification of “redemption” (σωτερία) with ἀπολύτρωσις, see, e.g., Pagels, “Irenaeus,” 357. Segelberg connects the second “house” with the chrism, but still identifies σωτερία with ἀπολύτρωσις (see Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 198–200). For the identification of “the redemption” (πατισμός) with the Eucharist, see DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 499–505; DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions,” 337–338. For the various identifications of “the bridal chamber” (ηυμνίον), see discussion above.
616 Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 199. Segelberg’s comment is based on the assumption that the description of the temple has been created specifically to fit the simile, but it still points to an important problem with the ritual-sequence interpretation of the simile. Schenke suggests that βαπτίζων may here designate not only baptism, but rather baptism,
the chrismation or the Eucharist is not mentioned in the temple simile seems to me to indicate that it does not here refer to baptism, redemption, and bridal chamber as three rituals.

There are other possibilities that seem to make more sense of the passage. Baptism is identified as “the holy house” (πνευματικός), but the other two “houses” do not need to be interpreted as rituals. Instead I would argue that they are better understood as references to successively important aspects of baptism, an interpretation that works from the imagery of the three houses being within each other and being of successively greater importance and mystery. Rather than representing successive rites, the houses may represent successive levels of significance, or successive realities, one within the other, in three levels. At the primary level there is the ritual act of baptism, represented as the holy house. Since one is redeemed through baptism, redemption could be said to constitute the deeper significance of baptism, and hence be represented as “the holy of the holy” (το το τε αγιόμενον), which is hidden within “the holy.” As for “the bridal chamber” (τὸ γυμνοτρίτον), we have already seen that the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, Christ and Christian, soul and spirit, are aspects of, at least, the rituals of chrismation and Eucharist, and may be described metaphorically in terms of marriage-related imagery like the “bridal chamber.” If “baptism” is here to be understood as baptism in water and chrism, the “bridal chamber” fits nicely into the scheme as the highest hidden reality of that ritual process. The whole description of the layout of the temple may thus be regarded as a metaphorical description of the effects of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, and by extension that of each individual Christian initiate, comprising the closely associated ritual acts of baptism and chrismation.

But what are we to make of the latter part of the passage, which describes baptism as containing the resurrection “[in the] redemption” ([ἰδίᾳ]σωτερία), and the latter again as being “in the bridal chamber” (ἡ συνθηκὴ τῆς συνθηκῆς)? As we have seen, Gos. Phil. holds resurrection to be one of the important effects bestowed by means of the initiatory rituals. It may thus be argued that resurrection is an aspect of the redemptive function of baptism. Baptism may therefore be said to contain the resurrection “[in

chrism, and Eucharist, or, alternatively, that ἁπατωμα is to be understood as referring to baptism and chrism, and σωτερία to Eucharist and redemption (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 406).

617 Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 406; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 342 n. 16; Gos. Phil. 69.12–14.
the] redemption” ([Greek] σωτε). As for the statement that “the redemption is in the bridal chamber” (επισωτε γινθεσαυν), this may be understood in terms of an understanding of redemption as an effect of the joining described in terms of a bridal chamber. In this sense the redemption may be said to be “in the bridal chamber.” Another possible solution would be to shift the focus of the blend at this point and understand the latter use of the term “bridal chamber” once again as a reference to the body of Christ. In that case redemption may clearly be understood as an effect residing in the body of Christ, both in terms of his soteriological work, and in terms of the soteriological potentiality residing in the eucharistic elements.618

Another interesting aspect of this description of the temple is the focus on the facing of the doors in the three “houses.” It is said that the first one faces west, the second south, and the third east, but what may be the significance of these directions? April DeConick suggests that the directions “may reflect the geography of heavenly journeys in Jewish apocalyptic literature where the hero often visited the farthest corners of the world and heaven,”619 but there are other possibilities that seem more intuitively relevant in the present context. The outermost house, that of baptism, faces west. Now, the term “west,” ἀνατολή, in Coptic also denotes the underworld or death, designations that resonate with baptismal interpretations having in some way to do with death. Since the interpretation of the descent into the baptismal waters as a descent into death is rejected in Gos. Phil. in favour of seeing the ritual as life-giving,620 we may perhaps instead regard the western door as signifying the entry into the holy house from the realm of death, that is, one passes from death and into life as one enters into the baptismal rite.621

The innermost house, however, “the holy of the holies” (πνευματική ἱεραι τήρων) or “the bridal chamber” (πνευματική), is open towards the east. This direction has several relevant connotations. For one thing,
“east” (ἀντωτε) is the direction of paradise and may thus point in the direction of Gos. Phil.’s overarching sacramental logic of paradise regained. If this passage in Gos. Phil. is read intertextually with the description of the heavenly temple in Ezek 43, however, the easterly direction also takes on another special significance. According to Ezekiel 43:4, “the glory of the Lord” (δόξα χυμίου) enters the temple through the door facing east.622

3.2.2.6. The Body as Bridal Chamber

As we have seen, there are several passages in Gos. Phil. where the “bridal chamber” imagery may be understood as a metaphor for the body, both the body of Christ and the body of the Christian. We have seen that the body of Christ at the Jordan may be described in terms of a “bridal chamber,” and we saw that the Christian needed to become Christlike by becoming a “bridal chamber.” We shall now consider some related passages:

622 See Ezek 43:1–5. As for the door facing south, it is difficult to see the significance of this direction in itself, other than as the mid-way direction between west and east.

623 David Brakke identifies the “forms” (σχήμα) that the souls are said to “live in” (ἡπολιτεύεσσαν πώ) with the material bodies of the individual souls, and concludes from this that the human beings themselves are regarded as genderless on the level of their souls (see David Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006], 200).

624 Schenke’s interpretation is based on his belief that the passage presupposes the “Valentinian” myth: “Auf jeden Fall müßte gemäß dem betreffenden valentinianischen Mythologumenon vorausgesetzt sein, daß der innerste Mensch, die Braut des Engels, die
bridal chamber in which the individual’s “Licht-Selbst” as bride is united with its “himmelischen Paargenossen” understood as its bridegroom.\textsuperscript{625} He builds this argument on Irenaeus’ account in \textit{Adversus haereses} I.13 of the liturgical practices of Marcus the magician.\textsuperscript{626} Schenke concedes, however, that this interpretation would fit better if the text at \textit{Gos. Phil.} 65.11–12 would read simply ρύθμισθεῖς, which would correspond to Irenaeus’ ἐν τῷ νυμφώντι, rather than ἐβολὰ ρύθμισθεῖς, which instead corresponds to the phrase ἐκ τοῦ νυμφώνος.\textsuperscript{627} As a solution to this problem Schenke proposes that “die Vereinigung findet in der Seele statt, aber die dadurch freier werdende Kraft ström t aus der Seele auf den ganzen Menschen über.” I would, however, argue for a simpler solution, using the phrase χι εβολὰ ρύθμισθεῖς, which caused Schenke trouble, as a valuable clue.

Schenke himself mentions the fact that the troubling phrase χι εβολὰ ρη is actually attested in the Sahidic version of 1 Cor 10:17. The passage, which is found in the middle of a Pauline discourse concerning the Eucharist and demons, reads as follows:

\texttt{Paul then continues by arguing that by eating the body of Christ one becomes his “partner” (κοινωνος), while if one eats what has been sacrificed one becomes a “partner” (κοινωνος) of “the demons” (ἱδαλισμοιον). In \textit{Gos. Phil.}, in order not to be possessed by the “unclean spirits” one pneumatische Kraft zwar schon hat, aber nur der Anlage nach. Zur Entfaltung kommt sie jedenfalls erst durch seine Vereinigung mit dem Engel. Die potentielle weibliche Kraft wird erst real, wenn die männliche Kraft dazukommt” (Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 352). Such a complicated interpretation does not seem to be called for by the text, however. See below for a much simpler way of accounting for \textit{Gos. Phil.}’s metaphorical argument at this point.}

\textsuperscript{625} See Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 354.

\textsuperscript{626} See Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 353–354. There does not seem to be any text-internal reasons for interpreting ῥύθμισθεῖς ἐπικοινωνικος as the human soul, and this view is also rejected by Gaffron, \textit{Studien}, 213; Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 154.

\textsuperscript{627} See Schenke, \textit{Das Philippus-Evangelium}, 354 n. 876.
must receive the bridegroom and the bride; the male and female powers, and we learn that “one receives from the symbolical bridal chamber” (οὐὰς ἄνθρωπων ἐκ τῆς ἱππώσεως ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ). In 1 Cor 10:17, the phrase ἀνὸν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἱππώσεως ὑπὸ ἡγούμενον (“for we all receive from this one bread”) clearly refers to the eucharistic body of Christ. In Gos. Phil. we may likewise understand ἱππώσεως ὑπὸ κόσμον to refer to the eucharistic representation of the body of Christ, the symbolical manifestation of his real body, the true bridal chamber. The local context in Gos. Phil. is important. The bridegroom and bride may be taken to represent the Logos and Holy Spirit respectively, received by means of the Eucharist. It is thus from the Eucharist as the symbolical bridal chamber that one may receive through the bread the male power / bridegroom that is the Logos, and from the cup the female power / bride that is the Holy Spirit. In this way one becomes united with Christ in a symbolical marriage, and thus becomes immune to the “unclean spirits.”

The passage then continues, in a sense, the same theme, but in a somewhat different fashion:

Whenever the ignorant women see a man dwelling alone they leap upon him and play with him and defile him. Thus also with ignorant men, when they see a beautiful woman dwelling alone they seduce her and force her, wanting to defile her. But if they see the husband and his wife dwelling together, the women are not able to enter in to the husband, nor are the men able to enter in to the woman. Thus, if the image and the angel join with each other, neither will anyone be able to dare to go in to the [man] or the woman. (Gos. Phil. 65.12–26)

Here the antidote is no longer described in terms of receiving a male and a female power, but instead in terms of “the image” (ἐικόνα) joining with “the angel” (παντελεοςος). The description of the “ignorant” men or women who prey on men and women living alone should therefore probably not be taken as a straightforward continuation of the description of the demons in male and female shapes, but should rather be understood

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metaphorically. That is, in the same way as a normal marriage works as an antidote against becoming the sexual prey of “ignorant” men or women, and thus against the defilement caused by this victimisation, Christian life, conceived of as a marriage of the Christian with Christ, wards off evil spirits in a general sense. As we saw above, the Christians are described elsewhere in Gos. Phil. as “you who dwell with the Son of God” (ἲησος τῆς αἰωνίας ἅπας ἐκ τῶν ἑορτῶν ἔλθειν).629 Gos. Phil. makes it clear that when one has been united with Christ, and has thus received the Holy Spirit, no evil spirits or demons can mingle with them:

There are some who [say,] “We are faithful,” in order that [... unclean spirit] and demon, for if they had the Holy Spirit, no unclean spirit would join with them. (Gos. Phil. 65.36–66.4)

This passage provides us with a nice parallel to the passage discussed earlier concerning those who come up from the baptismal waters claiming to be Christian, but without having received anything, i.e., without having received the Holy Spirit.630 The Holy Spirit is, as we have seen, received both by means of the chrism and by way of the eucharistic cup. The effect of the image joining with the angel is here presented as being the same as the effect of the reception of the Holy Spirit. Could it be that “the image” here represents the Christian, or more specifically the Christian’s Logos-like soul, receiving and joining with the Holy Spirit? In that case “the angel” in this passage could either simply be a reference to the Holy Spirit, or it could indicate the similarity in function between the Holy Spirit and the angels.

3.3. Implications

It is now time to summarise some of the implications of the preceding analysis with regard to Gos. Phil.’s implied underlying sacramental system and community organisation, as well as its Christology, anthropology, and soteriology.

629 Gos. Phil. 78.20–21.
630 This parallel is also noted by Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 358.
3.3.1. Sacramental System and Community Organisation

Apart from the issue of Gos. Phil.’s composition and textual coherence, the main focus of attention among scholars has been on the sacramental system presupposed by the tractate.631 It is Gos. Phil. 67.27–30, already discussed above, that has been the starting point for most of these studies:

\[\text{ⲁⲡϫⲟⲉ ⲓⲱⲡ ⲟⲧⲓ ⲩⲉⲓⲧⲣⲓⲟⲛ ϲⲟⲩⲇⲏⲙ ϩⲛⲟⲩⲛⲩⲛⲱⲧ ⲛⲧⲣⲓⲟⲛ ⲛⲧⲣⲓⲟⲛ ⲛⲧⲣⲓⲟⲛ \}

The Lord [did] everything in a mystery: a baptism and a chrismation and a Eucharist and a redemption and a bridal chamber. (Gos. Phil. 67.27–30)

As we have seen, scholars disagree over the number of rituals that are actually referred to by the sequence of terms “baptism” (ⲃⲡⲧⲓⲥⲙⲁ), “chrismation” (ⲭⲣⲓⲥⲙⲁ), “Eucharist” (ⲉⲩⲭⲁⲣⲓⲥⲧⲓⲁ), “redemption” (ⲱⲧⲉ), and “bridal chamber” (ⲛⲩⲙⲫⲱⲛ). The most common solution has been to regard the sequence as referring to five separate sacraments,632 but as we saw above in our previous discussion of this passage there is not much basis for the identification of the latter two terms in the sequence as separate sacraments. As several scholars have argued it is more likely that Gos. Phil. simply presupposes three sacraments: baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist.633 The interpretation of how the last two terms in the sequence then fit in has been disputed.634 We saw above that the terms


632 Schenke, for instance, has come to the conclusion that the phrase refers to five sacraments, which he sees as constituent parts of a ritual of initiation, that "sind begründet in der Taufe Jesu, in der Verleihung des Geistes an und durch ihn, in der Einsetzung der Eucharistie, in seiner Kreuzigung und in seiner Auferstehung” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 382). For the view that Gos. Phil. here refers to five sacraments, see also, e.g., Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Eric Segelberg, "The Baptismal Rite According to Some of the Coptic-Gnostic Texts of Nag-Hammadi," in Liturgica, Monastica et Ascetica, Philosophica: Papers Presented to the Third International Conference on Patristic Studies Held at Christ Church, Oxford 1959 (ed. E.L. Cross; StPatr 5; TU 80; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1962), 117–128; Stroud, "Ritual"; Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism,” 120; Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 326; Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism, 95; Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 2.

633 Edward Rewolinski concluded that, “The thesis . . . that the GPh holds to a system of five sacramental actions cannot be sustained. There is water baptism, chrismation, and eucharist.” (Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 140). See also, e.g., Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 256–258.

634 David Tripp outlined four possible ways of interpreting the sequence of five terms in relation to Gos. Phil.’s sacramental system. Listed in a sequence of increasing probability,
sanctification and manifestation in this list may simply be regarded as works or deeds done or manifested by Christ in his earthly mission. That Gos. Phil. presupposes the ritual actions of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist is, however, quite clear. It is now time to summarise what we may say concerning the practice and interpretation of the rituals underlying Gos. Phil., on the basis of the present analysis.

3.3.1.1. Baptism and Chrismation
Gos. Phil. spends much time on questions relating to the interpretation of baptism and chrismation. The interpretation given by Gos. Phil. of these ritual acts is as we have seen profoundly tied up with its views on the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan. It is this paradigmatic event, coupled with the blend the Christian is a Christ, which guides the tractate’s interpretation of the baptism of the individual Christian initiate, not only the process Christ himself went through, but also his baptismal preparations, like for instance his act of emptying the water of death and making baptism life-giving.

As for the exact ritual procedure, however, it is taken for granted and not described. In order to glean some insights into the actual ritual practice underlying Gos. Phil’s discourse on the sacraments, we are therefore in most cases left having to decide to what degree the metaphorical descriptions of the rites are to be understood metonymically. With regard

the four possibilities were: i) as a six-phase programme: mystery + baptism + chrism + Eucharist + redemption + bride-chamber; ii) as a five-phase programme, the whole being a “mystery”: baptism + chrism + Eucharist + redemption + bride-chamber; iii) as a three-phase programme, or mystery, consisting of baptism + chrism + Eucharist, the whole process being characterized as an act of redemption, and as constituting the scene of spiritual marriage; or iv) as a three-phase programme, or mystery, consisting of baptism + chrism + Eucharist, baptism and chrism together being alternatively described as “redemption” and the Eucharist as “bride-chamber” (see Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 256). As we shall see, however, these four alternatives do not exhaust the possible interpretations of the sentence. Rewolinski has argued that as Gos. Phil. presents baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, “the context which immediately suggests itself is that of initiation. The entire ritual is designated under the term of the bridal chamber” (Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 140). Thomassen sees initiation as the focus and has linked baptism and chrism closely together as one sacrament, while seeing the “bridal chamber” and the “redemption” as aspects or summaries of that ritual (see Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery’”). Thomassen has suggested elsewhere that the reason why “redemption” and “bridal chamber” have been “added to the list of ritual acts in 67:28–30” may be “the fact that the set of physically performed ritual acts is there not distinguished from the number of components in the redemptive process symbolically contained in these acts” (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 100).
to baptism, about the only direct description of practice is the reference to going down to the water (ⲯⲟⲛ ⲉⲝⲉⲧ ⲡⲙⲟⲟ) and coming up (ⲇⲱⲡ ⲡⲣⲏⲧ) again,⁶³⁵ and the tractate’s reference to a person who “going down into the water he strips himself naked” (ⲡⲁⲱⲥ ⲡⲙⲟⲟ ⲟⲗⲟⲁⲑⲧⲡⲏ) in order to put on “the living man” (ⲧⲣⲟⲩⲥ ⲡⲛⲟⲩⲧ).⁶³⁶ The rest are more or less metonymically based metaphorical descriptions that have mostly to do with ritual effects, rather than ritual acts.

Gos. Phil.’s use of the metaphor of dyeing, for instance, may indicate that the tractate presupposes a baptismal rite involving full immersion,⁶³⁷ but there is no way we can actually be sure of this. Similarly, although metaphors involving garments are pervasive in Gos. Phil., there is no way we can know whether the underlying rites actually involved ritual dressing in baptismal robes after emersion from the baptismal water.⁶³⁸ It does seem likely, however, from the description referred to above concerning stripping oneself naked when going down to the water in order to put on the living man, that these metaphors are to some degree metonymically motivated and that the rituals actually involved some kind of ritual dressing in baptismal robes.⁶³⁹

Baptism is associated with putting on the body of “the living man,” with rebirth, and with resurrection. While the putting on of the living man is most easily mapped onto either the immersion in water or the postbaptismal donning of robes, it would seem that the moment of rebirth and resurrection is most easily mapped onto the emersion from the water.

We have seen that Gos. Phil. interprets baptism in profoundly life-giving terms using metaphors of begetting, rebirth, and resurrection, while rejecting an interpretation of the immersion in the baptismal waters as a descent into death. The fact that the text stresses the rejection of the latter interpretation probably indicates that this was a current and well-known interpretation at the time. The tractate’s use of canonical Scripture throughout, including Romans, as clearly authoritative texts indicates that Gos. Phil. is not engaged in any direct polemic against

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⁶３⁶ See Gos. Phil. 75.21–25.
⁶３⁹ If this is the case, then it would seem probable, on the grounds of the dyeing metaphors and the references to becoming like the angels, that these robes were white.
Paul and Romans 6, but rather against contemporary applications of Romans 6 to the interpretation of the ritual act of baptismal immersion.

Now, what about the chrismation? The relationship between baptism and chrismation in Gos. Phil. is an interesting one. Does the tractate presuppose a prebaptismal or postbaptismal chrismation? Scholars have come to different conclusions. Tripp, for example, thinks that the chrismation took place after the ascent from the water and “Perhaps after a long interval for instruction.” As we have seen from the analysis above, chrismation is in Gos. Phil. treated as being intimately connected with baptism in water, and it may seem most likely that it took place while the person being initiated was still standing in the water, or that it was closely connected to the emersion from the water. There is no indication in Gos. Phil. that baptism in water and chrismation were separated in time, and several indications that they took place more or less simultaneously. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the mirror-and-light metaphor and the statement of the necessity of “baptising” in both water and chrism. The dyeing metaphor is another indication, if we map God’s colours/remedies onto the chrism, and the examples we have seen of the effects of the chrismation being referred to as taking place prior to the ascent from the baptismal waters, like for instance the reception of the name, is yet another. While Gos. Phil. makes it abundantly clear that the chrism is of higher importance than the water, what is said by Gos. Phil. concerning the relationship between baptism and chrismation also stresses the necessity of both baptism in water and anointing with chrism and the close connection between the two. Moreover, the close connection we have seen between the chrism and the resurrection makes an association between the chrismation and emersion from the water a logical possibility.

We also have indications that this chrismation was accompanied by a Trinitarian formula and the sign of the cross, and the close connection...
between this rite and the bestowal of the name would seem to render it probable that the initiate was signed on the forehead with chrism. From Gos. Phil.’s metaphorical references to the chrismation, it would also seem probable that the ointment used for this rite contained some kind of scented olive oil. As for the interpretation of the chrismation, Gos. Phil. connects Jesus’ baptismal chrismation with the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, which is also referred to in terms of a “bridal chamber.” In summary, the effects that Gos. Phil. seem to associate with the chrismation are the reception of the name, the putting on of light, a begetting, becoming a Christ/perfect man, the reception of the resurrection in this life which makes postmortem resurrection possible, the reception of the Holy Spirit, and a unification of Logos and Holy Spirit, or perhaps Logos-like soul and Holy Spirit/angel.

3.3.1.2. Eucharist
The Eucharist presupposed by Gos. Phil. seems to involve the use of bread (οἰκ) and a mixed cup (ποτηριον) of wine (ηρι) and water (μοου). The bread is as we have seen identified as the flesh of Jesus, which is further identified as the Logos, while the content of the cup is identified with

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644 See, e.g., Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 480 (who also holds that the ointment consisted of oil and wine), and Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 347. Isenberg, Schenke, and Thomassen have argued on the basis of the fire-symbolism associated with the chrism in Gos. Phil. that the chrism might have been heated (see Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 308; Isenberg, “Introduction,” 137; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 243; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 347). There is little reason to suppose that this was the case, however, since the connection between fire and chrism does not presuppose heated chrism. There is for example a metonymic relationship between the chrism and fire and light since olive oil was not only used for the chrism, but also as fuel for lamps (cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 243 n. 395). Lamps burn oil and thereby create light, and we have seen that the motif of lighting lamps is used in Gos. Phil. in relation to the chrism. The connection between fire and chrism may also simply derive from the connection between the chrism and the Holy Spirit (cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 243), since the connection between the fire and the Holy Spirit is a common one (see, e.g., Brock, Holy Spirit, 27–36). Thomassen suggests on the basis of the description of the eschatological chrismation with light in Gos. Phil. 85.24–28 that the chrism “was probably poured over the initiate …, rather than just applied by hand” (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 347). It should be noted, however, that the phrase εὑρετε ἐμοί εὑρη- is in this passage applied to the flowing out of light and is not directly used as a description of chrismation.

645 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 349. Segelberg finds it “remarkable and interesting to find in [Gos. Phil.] a form of eucharist with bread and a mixed cup which appears to correspond entirely to the order of the early Church” (Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 199).
the blood of Jesus, which is the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{646} Gos. Phil. states that the cup “fills with the Holy Spirit” (ⲭⲟⲩⲩⲓ ⲕⲓⲟⲩⲓ ⲉⲛⲟⲩⲧⲏⲗ ⲁⲧⲟⲩⲁⲃ),\textsuperscript{647} which may indicate that the tractate presupposes some kind of epiclesis of the Spirit upon the elements, or at least upon the cup.\textsuperscript{648} There are also several references in Gos. Phil. to the Eucharist being accompanied by prayer. We have already seen how Jesus himself is described as praying in connection with the Eucharist that is associated with the transfiguration,\textsuperscript{649} and we have also seen a direct reference to the eucharistic cup as “the cup of prayer” (ⲏⲛⲟⲩⲣⲫⲓⲟⲛ ⱅⲯⲉⲟⲩⲓⲉ).\textsuperscript{650} Moreover, we have seen indications of an epiclesis and possibly the use of the Sanctus.

Gos. Phil. evinces a close, almost symbiotic, relationship between the ritual effects of baptism/chrismation and Eucharist.\textsuperscript{651} One seems to receive the Logos and the Holy Spirit through both baptism/chrismation and the Eucharist, and both rituals seem to be described in terms of marriage- and bridal chamber related imagery.\textsuperscript{652}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[646] In his Paedagogus, Clement of Alexandria offers an interesting interpretation of the figurative meaning of the eucharistic flesh and blood of Christ: “The flesh figuratively represents to us the Holy Spirit; for the flesh was created by Him. The blood points out to us the Word, for as rich blood the Word has been infused into life; and the union of both is the Lord, the food of babes—the Lord who is Spirit and Word” (Clement, Paed. I.6.43.2; translation from Maxwell E. Johnson, “The Archaic Nature of the Sanctor, Institution Narrative, and Epiclesis of the Logos in the Anaphora Ascribed to Sarapion of Thmuis,” in Essays on Early Eastern Eucharistic Prayers [ed. Paul F. Bradshaw; Collegeville, Minn.: Pueblo/Liturgical Press, 1997], 102). Thus, Clement parallels Gos. Phil. in his identification of the Holy Spirit and the Logos with the flesh and blood of Christ. He comes, however, to the complete opposite conclusion as to which is which. While, as we have seen, Gos. Phil. identifies the flesh with the Logos and the blood with the Holy Spirit, Clement in this figurative interpretation has it vice versa.
\item[648] Gos. Phil’s corresponding reference to the eucharistic bread being the Logos may indicate the existence of a corresponding epiclesis of the Logos upon the bread. An epiclesis of the Logos is known from the Egyptian Sacramentary of Serapion of Thmuis. Here the Logos is called upon to make the bread become “the body of the Logos.” The content of the cup is here described as “blood of the truth” (ⲧⲧⲧⲧ ⲁⲧⲧⲧ ⲉⲧⲧⲧ ⲉⲧⲧⲧ), but there is no epiclesis of the Spirit, only of the Logos (see M.E. Johnson, “Archaic Nature,” 86. Interestingly, Johnson states that the only parallel he has been able to find to the reference in the Sacramentary of Serapion to “blood of truth” is the reference in Gos. Phil. 73.23 to nourishing on truth [see ibid., 104 n. 104]). There is the possibility that Gos. Phil. combines an epiclesis of the Logos upon the bread, as seen in the Sacramentary of Serapion, with an epiclesis of the Spirit upon the cup.
\item[649] Gos. Phil. 58.10–14.
\item[650] Gos. Phil. 75.14–15. There is also another probable reference to a eucharistic prayer at Gos. Phil. 59.27–31, in a passage that is unfortunately riddled with lacunae.
\item[651] Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 344–345.
\item[652] A close connection between baptism/chrism and Eucharist is a prominent feature
\end{footnotes}
In light of the findings of the present study it is interesting to observe how other scholars have treated the bridal chamber imagery in Gos. Phil. As we have seen, there are several terms used throughout Gos. Phil. that may be translated as “bridal chamber.” These are the Greek words παστός, νυμφών, and κοιτῶν. Scholars have in various ways understood these terms to refer to either a single ritual, a sequence of rituals, or the inner or hidden meaning of one or more rituals, but they have disagreed as to the nature of the ritual or rituals referred to in this way. One of the main dividing lines between scholars in this regard has been to what degree the bridal chamber references have been taken in a literal sense. Dan Merkur here echoes the majority view when he notes that “The motif of the bridal chamber was metaphorical, but likely also pertained to a Gnostic sacrament whose precise ritual details are not fully understood.” Most scholars have been in line with this view and held that the term refers to a single sacrament and have moreover taken this to be a specifically “gnostic”
one. There has been considerable disagreement among these scholars with regard to the nature of the sacrament, however, both with regard to its ritual enactment and its interpretation.

At the literal end of the spectrum it has been argued that the “bridal chamber” ritual involved a human couple having actual sexual intercourse.655 This suggestion has most recently been reiterated by April DeConick,656 who in her interpretation couples a theory of “Valentinianism” with an exceedingly literal interpretation of the “bridal chamber” in Gos. Phil. DeConick claims that the “spiritual marriage” advocated by Gos. Phil. entails a “Valentinian” couple having sexual intercourse while focusing on Christ and spiritual things. Such a “spiritual marriage” would then result in the begetting of actual human children possessing spiritual seed. According to DeConick, procreation of “spiritual children” in this way contributed towards salvation for the “Valentinians” by incarnating spiritual seed needing to be perfected in the material world.657

Also at the literal end of the scale, Michael Williams has come to a conclusion that is in a sense both related and contrary to that of DeConick. He is in agreement with DeConick and others who hold the “bridal chamber” to refer literally to a marriage of two human beings, and has argued that “the mystery of marriage” referred to in Gos. Phil. “was acted out concretely by couples who were living together.”658 Contrary to


657 In DeConick’s interpretation, “This was the great mystery of their marriages—to conceive a child who would resemble the Lord, a child with a spirit-infused soul. In this way, the pre-existent pneumatic seed would be drawn down from the heavens above to sojourn on earth. Here it would mature and finally be harvested at death. Sexual intercourse between Valentinian spouses was to continue until the last spiritual seed was embodied and harvested. On that great day, the Bridal Chamber would open and their spirits would reunitie with God. How important was sex to the Valentinians? The coming of the final day and the redemption of God depended on it” (DeConick, “Great Mystery of Marriage,” 342, DeConick’s emphasis. See also DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions,” 338).

658 Williams, “Uses of Gender Imagery,” 205.
DeConick, however, Williams focuses on what he interprets as negative depictions of sexuality in Gos. Phil. and imagines an ascetic, enocratic “spiritual marriage” of continence where the couple lived together, but refrained from sexual intercourse. The “spiritual children” emerging from such marriages would therefore not be of the literal flesh and blood variety, but would rather have to be understood metaphorically.

Most scholars, however, have held the “bridal chamber” to be a metaphoriical reference to some kind of ritual that probably did not involve any kind of ritualised sexual intercourse or actual human marriage. Some, Schenke in particular, have connected it with the ritual kiss, while others have proposed that it is some kind of sacrament for the dying. Others again have noticed striking similarities with Christian ritual practice. Elaine Pagels for example, even though she insists upon calling it “a secret Gnostic sacrament,” admits that it may have served a function similar to that of a “mainstream” Christian Eucharist. Others have gone further in this direction and actually identified the “bridal chamber” directly with Christian ritual practice, or baptism and / or anointing. Some have preferred to see “the bridal chamber” as specifically the “inward and hidden aspect” of the ritual, rather than any specific ritual in itself. On this view the “bridal chamber” is not a replacement for baptism, chrism, or Eucharist, nor is it a ritual in addition to these, but instead a term covering the real significance or hidden meaning of any or all of them.

Due to the highly allusive nature of the mystagogical discourses in Gos. Phil. and the text’s confusing literary structure, scholars have had difficulty getting to grips with any exact reference for the concept. One

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659 See Williams, “Uses of Gender Imagery,” 205–211; Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 148–149. This has also been suggested by Rudolph, “Response,” 238.
661 See, e.g., Gaffron, Studien, 222; Rudolph, Gnosis, 245.
662 Pagels, “Mystery of Marriage,” 108–110. Later she has argued that the bridal chamber (which she erroneously refers to as υἱὸς ζωής rather than ζωής) should be understood as “the whole process through which a Christian who is spiritually ‘mature’ receives these sacraments” (Pagels, “Irenaeus,” 355).
of the main difficulties scholars have had with the kind of kaleidoscopic discourse evident in *Gos. Phil.* is that it has resisted attempts to read into it preconceived notions of its theological or sacramental system. Rewolinski has pointed to “an overly zealous attempt to harmonize the reports of Marcus the Magician and his so-called spiritual marriages,” as reported by Irenaeus, with *Gos. Phil.* to explain why, in his words, “there is scarcely universal consensus on the exact meaning of bridal chamber” in *Gos. Phil.*

It should be clear from this brief overview that there has been no shortage of proposed answers to the question of the identity and significance of the “bridal chamber” in *Gos. Phil.*, but what unites most of these proposals is that they have been attempts to pin down a single referent for this concept and related imagery in the text. Most have regarded the concept as being unambiguous in its reference, and have taken it to refer to ritual actions in one way or another, some preferring to see it as a reference to a single ritual, while others have understood it to cover an entire ritual process comprised of several sub-rituals. The only, minor, exceptions have been those who in various ways have combined the above-mentioned proposals and for instance taken the concept of the “bridal chamber” to simultaneously refer to one or more sub-rituals as well as the ritual process as a whole.

But does the imagery of the “bridal chamber” necessarily refer to the same thing, or the same ritual, or indeed the same concept, throughout the entire tractate? Another explanation that emerges from the analysis of *Gos. Phil.* presented in the present study is that there is in fact no “exact meaning” of the concept of “bridal chamber” to be found in this tractate.

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666 See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132. There have indeed been many attempts to analyse *Gos. Phil.*‘s “bridal chamber” references along such lines. As David Tripp has noted, “Irenaeus’ account of followers (apparently) of Marcus, and so, it seems, of the Valentinian school who had special rites of *redemptio* and *sponsale cubiculum* . . . could encourage the view that these terms when found in Philip should refer to distinct rites of the initiatory scheme” (Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 256). Tripp concluded, however, that “Irenaeus’s supposed scheme is not found here” (ibid., 257). Rewolinski especially faults Sevrin for this exegetical procedure, and criticises him for first “reconstructing an ideal type of Valentinian bridal chamber mythos and practice” on the basis of the heresiologists and then applying this to his interpretation of *Gos. Phil.* rather than first analysing *Gos. Phil.* on its own merits (see Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132). Rewolinski’s own solution to the problem of the “bridal chamber” is that it is “not a rite but the complex of initiatory steps marked by ritualized observance which were understood to be effective on the spiritual essence of a person. To enter the bridal chamber is in Philip’s use of the concept to be reborn ritually and nourished by the Perfect Man. Entering symbolically the bridal chamber means to be united with one’s angelic double” (ibid., 139).
Instead, this conceptual domain is used to describe several more or less related but different entities and phenomena. As we have seen, the term “bridal chamber,” as well as other marriage and unification imagery, are employed metaphorically in several different ways throughout the tractate, as these ICMs are used to provide framing inputs to structure our understanding of several different targets. Therefore, when it sometimes seems that Gos. Phil. is contradicting itself when it comes to the use of such imagery, this does not necessarily imply that Gos. Phil. is a composite text, as has sometimes been assumed, but rather that it may, for rhetorical purposes, be drawing on the same ICMs to provide framing structure to different targets, exploiting different metaphorical entailments in the process. As we have seen at several points in the analyses above, this state of affairs also seems to apply to several of the other terms and motifs that are employed throughout the tractate, even to the point where this practice may be regarded as an important rhetorical principle in Gos. Phil. We find that some key metaphors and their intertexts seem to be employed in this tractate to refer to, and shed light on, a wide variety of different issues, in an interlinking and constantly shifting fashion that may indeed frustrate modern readers, and perhaps especially scholars, who would most often like to pin down unambiguous referents for the metaphorical imagery of this and other texts.

It seems clear from the present analysis that we ought not to generalise about Gos. Phil’s use of the terms παστος, πνευμα, and κοσμος, but we should rather try to understand them within the contexts they are used, as rhetorical devises for the construction of input spaces in various conceptual and intertextual blends, that is, in integration networks where these inputs are blended with several different, mostly unstated, inputs that may be described as the foci, or targets, of the discourse.

3.3.1.4. Prayer
We have seen that Gos. Phil. clearly presupposes the use of liturgical prayer. In one passage, however, the text seems to show a negative attitude towards praying, or at least towards “praying in the world”:

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\text{εὐτυχή ἐκπέπερα ἐμπεῖρο ἐπιπέρεα ἐπὶ πνεύματος παρά πνεύματος ἐπὶ πνεύματος ἀριστερά ἐκπέπερον ἐκπέπερα ἐπὶ πλατείᾳ ἐπὶ πλατείᾳ ἐπὶ πλατείᾳ.}
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\[
\text{εὐτυχή ἐκπέπερα ἐμπεῖρο ἐπὶ πνεύματος ἐπὶ πνεύματος ἐπὶ πνεύματος.}
\]
Those who sow in the winter reap in the summer. The winter is the world, the summer is the other aeon. Let us sow in the world so that we may reap in the summer. Therefore it is appropriate for us not to pray in the winter. That which follows the winter is the summer, but if one reaps in the winter he will not reap, but he will pluck out. (Gos. Phil. 52.25–32)

It is proper not to pray “in the winter” (ῥητερω), and “the winter” is equated with “the world” (πκοσμος). Praying “in the world” is thus clearly disparaged, but how are we to understand it? Is Gos. Phil. against the practice of prayer in general? To help us understand this passage we should read it in conjunction with another passage on prayer later on in the text:

Ἡσυχα υπερασπιζονται ετρωπισαντινεραν ερουν επεκταμενον ἶγωτας ἵππερο ερων ἰγωνα διακεκομεν ετρωπισαντιν ετελειε πε πετρικα ερουν ἰμοου τηρου

He said, “My Father who is in secret.” He said, “Enter into your closet and shut your door behind you and pray to your Father who is in secret,” that is, the one who is within them all. (Gos. Phil. 68.8–13)

Taken together, these passages do not seem to advocate an end to praying. Rather, the advice not to pray in the world, but instead in “your closet” (πεκταμενον) may be understood to prescribe a practice of inward, silent, prayer. In that case, prayer in the world may be taken to refer to outward, vocalised prayer as opposed to inward, silent prayer. Another significant message in these passages seems to be related to the addressee of the prayer and what one may pray for. It is clear that one is to pray to the Father “who is in secret” (ετρωπισαντιν). Moreover, the statement that if one reaps in the winter/world one will not be able to reap in the summer/other world seems first and foremost to be an admonition not to try to reap any rewards, or pray for anything, in the material world.

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667 Thomassen has suggested a connection here with the use of the metaphor of sowing and reaping in Fragments 32–36 by Heracleon (as reported by Origen, Comm. Jo.) (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 275). However, the way the metaphor is used in the Heracleon fragments differs significantly from its use in Gos. Phil. For example, in Gos. Phil. those who sow are the Christians themselves, and the metaphor is related to praying, while in the Heracleon fragments it is the Son of Man who sows. The references to sowing in the winter and reaping in the summer, which are also found in Heracleon Fragment 36, are also used differently in Gos. Phil. than in Heracleon. In Gos. Phil. the focus of the metaphor is on the importance of not trying to reap the harvest prematurely, in the winter, an aspect that is absent from the Heracleon fragments.

668 Segelberg, for example, has called this passage “an anti-prayer text” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 56).

Instead one should be content to reap rewards in the next world, and hence only pray for such things. This interpretation also seems to be supported by another passage in Gos. Phil., where Jesus rebukes a disciple who asks for “a thing of the world” (ὀγγοβ ητεπκοσος).670

3.3.1.5. Community Organisation

Several interpreters have claimed that there is nothing in Gos. Phil. which indicates the existence of any ordained clergy or ecclesiastical hierarchy.671 Eric Segelberg, for instance, has argued that Gos. Phil. “does not appear to know of any ministers of religion such as bishop, priest and deacon. Nor is there any indication that this baptism was anything but self-baptism similar to the Jewish baptism of proselytes.”672 Contrary to Segelberg’s claim, however, Gos. Phil. seems in fact not only to be very keen to contrast Christian initiation with Jewish proselyte initiation, but even to presuppose a hierarchical community organisation. Gos. Phil. highlights important differences between Judaism and Christianity having to do with differences in ritual enactment and efficacy. Some of these differences are, as we have seen, described metaphorically in terms of procreation and creation. The tractate points out that the result of a Hebrew creating a Hebrew is a proselyte, and that this proselyte cannot himself create proselytes. The Jews are also presented as having only a mother and no father. The metaphors employed highlight both similarities and differences between Judaism and Christianity, with regard to ritual process, efficacy, and subsequent membership status of the initiated. The description of the Hebrews’ creation of proselytes can be understood as a reference to Jewish proselyte initiation. One of the main target domains for the procreation- and kinship-metaphors discussed above thus seems to be ritual initiation. That is, Gos. Phil. contrasts ritual initiation into Christianity with ritual initiation of proselytes into Judaism. Ritual initiation was required of non-Jews seeking to become Jews, but apart from circumcision in the case of males, no initiatory rituals were required of those who were born of Jewish parents. Moreover, as Gos. Phil’s metaphorical comparison indicates, even after initiation, the converts to Judaism would still be counted as mere proselytes, i.e., as Jews of lower status than

670 See Gos. Phil. 59.23–27.
those of biological Jewish descent. According to Gos. Phil., proselytes cannot “create” proselytes, which indicates that they could not initiate other non-Jews into Judaism. Gos. Phil. presents such a Jewish system as a contrast to Christianity, where ritual initiation was required of everyone in order to become a Christian. In addition, Gos. Phil. stresses that after having been ritually initiated all Christians were in principle of equal status. According to Gos. Phil. they were all “Christ,” and everyone seems, at least in principle, to have the potential for spiritual maturation and the attainment of fatherhood. The Jewish proselytes, on the other hand, could never attain the same status as those who were physically born Jews.

Gos. Phil., as we have seen, traces this difference in ritual efficacy back to the lack of a father in Jewish initiation, and the concomitant fact that Jewish proselytes, in contrast to the Christian initiates, are not begotten, but made. The target input for the father-metaphor in this contrasting function in relation to Judaism may be understood as the one who administers the ritual process of rebirth, i.e., the ritual officiant. While the officiant administering the Christian rites of initiation is metaphorically a father who begets sons, the Jewish officiant administering the Jewish rites of proselyte initiation is metaphorically an artisan who creates proselytes.

Contrary to Segelberg, neither Jewish proselyte initiation nor Christian initiation seems to have been self-administered. The differences delineated by Gos. Phil. seem rather to imply that both Jewish proselyte baptism and Christian initiation involved the agency of a ritual officiant of some sort. Gos. Phil. infers from the inferior status of the proselyte in relation to full-blown Jews that the Jewish officiants do not, metaphorically speaking, have proper “procreative” powers, but only the powers of an artisan. Gos. Phil. can consequently describe Christian initiation in terms of a biological process of begetting and birth, with the officiant as a father, and Jewish proselyte initiation as mere creation (see fig. 46).

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673 For a discussion of the inferior status of proselytes in relation to those who were Jews by birth, see, e.g., Cohen, Beginnings of Jewishness, 324–340.

674 As Thomas M. Finn states it, “To the outsider, the convert became a Jew. But to the insider, or at least to some insiders, converts did not achieve full equality with the native-born: membership in the community, yes; full equality, no” (Thomas M. Finn, From Death to Rebirth: Ritual and Conversion in Antiquity [New York: Paulist Press, 1997], 98, see also 99). See also Cohen, Beginnings of Jewishness, 324–325.

675 The description of proselyte initiation in late antique Judaism as a kind of creation is indeed also attested by some rabbinic sources, most notably Genesis Rabbah 39. In a discussion of Gen 12.5 the following is said: “R. Eleazar in the name of R. Yoše b. Zimra: ‘If all of the nations of the world should come together to try to create a single mosquito, they could not put a soul into it, and yet you say, ‘And the soul that they had made?’ [They
In light of the present analysis, the reference in Gos. Phil. to “the son of the Son of Man,” who is described as “the one who creates through the Son of Man,” could plausibly be identified with the officiant of the Christian rites of initiation, i.e., a bishop or priest (see fig. 47). A possible interpretation of this passage would then be that only those who have received from Christ, and ultimately from God, by way of apostolic succession, the ability to beget are able to create new Christians. The existence of an important post-initiatory hierarchy is implied rather strongly by the additional insistence upon the fact that the newborn son is unable to beget. The only begetting (γνωστός) they may do is the acquisition/begetting (γνωστός) of brothers. This distinction between the father’s and the son’s begetting may again be seen in connection with Gos. Phil.’s reference to begetting by means of a kiss. The ritual kiss as it was used in early Christianity was exchanged both between initiated Christians on the same level, but also administered, with added significance, by the

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676 Gos. Phil. 81.14–21.  
677 The metaphorical use of the term “father” or “parent” to refer to members of the clergy is well attested in early Christianity (see, e.g., 1 Cor 4:15; M. Polyc. 12.2; Irenaeus, Haer IV.41.2; Clement, Strom. I.1.2–2.1; Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. 6.14.9. John Chrysostom, for example, states that “God has bestowed a power on priests greater than that of our natural parents. . . . For our natural parents generate us unto this life only, but the others unto that which is to come” (De sacerdotio, 3.6; NPNF3). The bishop is especially often referred to as a father. In the Apostolic Constitutions, this fatherhood of the bishop is explicitly connected to the rebirth through water and spirit (II.26.4). See also Lloyd G. Patterson, “Fathers of the Church,” EEC: 424–425). According to Edward Kilmartin, “Fourth- and fifth-century patristic writers describe the office of priest as ordered to the ministry of teaching, baptizing, reconciliation of sinners, and eucharist. In virtue of the ministry of education, regeneration, and reconciliation, the priest’s role was conceived as that of spiritual fatherhood.” (Edward J. Kilmartin, “Priesthood,” EEC: 948).  
678 For the parallelism between Christ, apostles, and bishops in the Syrian tradition, see Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, 159–204.  
679 Denise Kimber Buell notes with regard to Clement of Alexandria that by using “the analogy between parent-child relations and divine-human relations (that all Christians are children in relation to God), Clement can argue that Christians are all essentially the same type of being, although they may differ from each other in their respective states of spiritual development.” Buell, Making Christians, 117–118.  
681 See Gos. Phil. 59.2–6.
bishop or priest to the newly initiated.\textsuperscript{682} The passage quoted earlier about the son “acquiring” or “begetting” brothers may thus refer to this dual significance of the kiss. The wordplay in that passage may serve as a reference to both the kiss between members of the clergy and the regular Christians on the one hand, and the kiss exchanged between members of the latter group on the other. It may also signify that the kiss given by the priest or bishop has greater significance or power than the kiss exchanged between “brothers.”\textsuperscript{683} The kiss between brothers on the one hand and that between fathers and sons on the other is thus elegantly connected by means of a play on the different meanings of the word χιλιαο.

The reference to the Jews having only a mother and no father may further be taken as an allusion to the matrilineal principle in Judaism. \textit{Gos. Phil.}’s rhetoric would here fit nicely in a context where it was sufficient to be the offspring of a Jewish mother in order to be counted as a Jew.\textsuperscript{684} Here it is not proselyte initiation that is the focus, but rather the normal Jewish system of descent. The contrast created by \textit{Gos. Phil.} could thus be construed here as one between Jews born of a Jewish mother, in whose case their fathers would be of no consequence, versus the Christians who have a bishop or priest as their “father.” In their case the reference to their mother may be regarded as a reference to their biological mothers, but it may also be taken to refer to the Church as mother.

So, what can be said concerning the function of procreation and kinship metaphors in \textit{Gos. Phil.} with regard to community organisation? From the preceding analysis we may conclude that metaphors of kinship and procreation are used throughout \textit{Gos. Phil.} to explain the relationship between Christ—and ultimately God—and the individual Christian, as

\textsuperscript{682} It was strictly something that was restricted to the community of fully initiated Christians, and was for instance not allowed among catechumens. See L. Edward Phillips, “Kiss, Ritual,” in The New SCM Dictionary of Liturgy and Worship (ed. Paul F. Bradshaw; London: SCM Press, 2002), 267.

\textsuperscript{683} “And let the deacon say to all: ‘Greet one another with a holy kiss,’ and the members of the clergy kiss the bishop, the laymen [kiss] the laymen, the laywomen [kiss] the laywomen.” (\textit{Apos. Con.} VIII.11.7–9; Quoted from Taft, \textit{The Great Entrance}, 389).

mediated by a clergy in ritual. Gos. Phil. traces religious lineage through the rites of initiation, with a special focus on the chrismation. Newly initiated Christians do not produce sons, but they produce/acquire brothers, as Gos. Phil. punningly states it. Thus, as the conceptual metaphors analysed above indicate, although everyone from the newly initiated Christian to the senior members of the clergy may be regarded as Christ, there is still an important distinction between Christ as son and Christ as father. Another key passage in this regard is also one of the tractate's clearest references to the Eucharist. As is the case with much of Gos. Phil., this passage is not without its problems of translation and interpretation:

priome etoiaab qoulaab tibri akriap epip concl eipkhakih gar hinoeik qualaq qoulaab h pioni epi h pekebebe tibri etchi hinoow etiowbo hinoow axo pico qhatoqbo wii hikoconma

The holy man is completely holy, including his body. For if he takes the bread he will make it holy, or the cup or all the other things that he takes and purifies. And how will he not purify the body too?

(Gos. Phil. 77.2–7)

“Who this holy man is might be difficult to decide,” states Segelberg, but ends up making the assumption that the holy man is “the man who is fully initiated, the pneumatic; he has so much of the pneuma that he in his turn can sanctify.” From this Segelberg draws the conclusion that “we have here a kind of ‘receptionism’ so that the sanctity of the receiver sanctifies the sacrament which then in turn sanctifies the receiver. If this is so there would be no need to have a special priest or bishop—the Gnostics then had as it were a ‘general priesthood’.” A similar conclusion has been

685 This conclusion is thus contrary to that of Trautmann, who has argued that Gos. Phil. abolishes the idea of kinship through lineage (Trautmann, “La parenté”).

686 Buckley and Good overlook this important relationship between Christ and the Christians when they argue that, “Since Christ performs the sacraments, no minister or priest need serve as conduit for the presence of Christ at the sacrament or as the guarantor of the sacrament’s efficacy” (Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 2). They claim further that “Absence of human agents distinguishes Gos Phil from ancient and modern descriptions of sacraments,” and fault “modern translators” for having difficulty with this notion and who “therefore read human agents into the text” (ibid., 2–3). On the contrary, however, Gos. Phil. seems indeed, as we have seen, to stress the importance of human agency in ritual initiation.

687 Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 196. Stroud follows Segelberg, stating that “all the members of the community could be holy men,” and also draws the conclusion that the Eucharist was self-administered (Stroud, “Ritual,” 33). For the view that Gos. Phil. here implies a general priesthood, see also Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 472 n. 1288. Henry Green, however, rejects Segelberg’s contention that Gos. Phil. implies a priesthood
reached by Buckley and Good, who argue that in Gos. Phil. “there is an absence of sacramental agents except for Christ.”

They conclude that “the holy man” (πρωτεύτων ετούχας) in this passage does not refer to a priest or any member of a clergy, but rather to a “holy person,” contrary to, e.g., Isenberg who even translates πρωτεύτων ετούχας as “priest” rather than “holy man.”

In stating that there is an absence of sacramental agents apart from Christ in Gos. Phil., however, Buckley and Good overlook the references we have seen to an apostolic succession. We saw that Gos. Phil. creates a blend between Father and Son, God and Christ, Christ and the Apostles, and the Apostles and “us,” and we saw that the tractate describes this succession in terms of an anointing. In fact, Gos. Phil. states explicitly that “the apostles anointed us,” thus at the very least implying the sacramental agency of the apostles and not just of Christ. Of course, we saw that both initiator and initiated in the implied chain of apostolic succession function as “Christs,” but this does not necessarily mean that the tractate holds the Christlike function of initiatory fatherhood to be available to just anyone. On the contrary, we have seen that there are indications that Gos. Phil. makes a clear distinction between the roles of father and son, and that there are special requirements attached to the former role.

Buckley and Good also argue that χί in this passage should not be taken in the sense of “taking” the bread and the cup, but rather in the sense of “receiving.” In arguing this, however, not only do they of all believers, and comes to the conclusion that Gos. Phil. “provides evidence for a Valentinian institutionalized sect with some degree of formalized structure, hierarchy and systematized rituals, that on the surface might appear similar to developing Catholic Christian orthodoxy” (Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism,” 121).

Isenberg translates the passage as follows: “The priest is altogether holy, down to his very body. For if he has taken the bread, he will consecrate it. Or the cup or anything else that he gets, he will consecrate. Then how will he not consecrate the body also?” (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 197; cf. Isenberg, “Introduction,” 137). With regard to Isenberg’s translation of πρωτεύτων ετούχας as “priest,” I share the sentiment of Schenke, who has characterised it as “eine maßlose Überspitzung, die mir aber immer sehr hilfreich als ein wichtiger Hinweis darauf gewesen ist, von welcher Art von Heiligung des Brotes, des Kelches und noch anderer Dinge hier eigentlich geredet wird” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 472 n. 1288).

See Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 4–6. For this understanding, see also Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 53, 167; Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 83. Williams chooses to render χί rather freely as both “eat” and “partake” (see Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 136). For the understanding of the term in the sense of “take,” as it is also understood here, see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 197; Schenke, Das
overlook the usage in Coptic liturgical texts, but also 1 Cor 11:23 which
in its description of the Last Supper states that Jesus “took the bread” (tıογοῖς ἔλαβεν ἀρτον), which in the Sahidic New Testament is
rendered using exactly this term. The continuation of this Pauline passage
is also relevant in the present context, in that Jesus is described in the
following verse as blessing and breaking the bread and referring to it as
his body. The eucharistic context of Gos. Phil. 77.2–7 is unmistakable,
and the allusion to 1 Cor 11:23–25 is, as we can see, strong. Read together,
this intertextual blend creates a counterpart connection between “the
holy man” in the Gos. Phil. passage and Jesus in 1 Corinthians (see fig. 48).
This double-scope blend may give rise to relevant implications for the
interpretation of both inputs. Firstly, “the holy man” takes Christ’s place
in consecrating the elements of the Eucharist. This is completely in line
with the logic of the important underlying THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST
blend in Gos. Phil., and there is thus no reason not to take the description
in this passage to refer to the consecratory function of the officiant in the
eucharistic ritual. We have seen from the analysis above that this function
is presented in Gos. Phil. as being in principle available potentially to
all Christians, but in practice only to those who are regarded as having
matured to the level of father. Whether the transition from the level of
son to the level of father was subject to hierarchical control and required
additional ritual actions is, however, left unstated in this text.

Another potential implication that may be drawn from this intertextual
blend comes from understanding “the holy man” as a direct reference
to Jesus himself and “the body” (πυτίων) as a reference to his earthly
body. In this case, the passage may be understood christologically, to
imply that since he makes the bread and the cup holy, then it follows
that he also sanctified his assumed material body. In accordance with

Philippus-Evangelium, 63. The use of exactly the term 智造 and its dual meaning of “receive”
and “take” seems to be rhetorically important both here and elsewhere in Gos. Phil. Lay-
ton’s translation of the term as “pick up” obscures both the allusion to 1 Cor 11:23 (see
below) and ritual action, and the connotations of receiving (see Layton, The Gnostic Scrip-
tures, 348).
692 See, e.g., J. Doresse and E. Lanne, Un témoin archaïque de la liturgie copte de S. Basile
(Bibliothèque du Muséon 47; Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1960), 16, 18.
693 See 1 Cor 11:24.
694 For a survey of the early Christian practice of ordination, see Paul F. Bradshaw,
695 To this we might compare Athanasius’ statement that Christ “vivified and purified
the mortal body” (see Roelof van den Broek, “The Theology of the Teachings of Silvanus,”
VC 40:1 [1986]: 9).
the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend this entailment may subsequently be applied to the sanctifying power of both the officiating priest and the eucharistic elements themselves with regard to their effect on the communicating Christians.696

3.3.2. Christology, Anthropology, and Soteriology

*Gos. Phil.* may be regarded as a sustained meditation upon the implications arising from the Conceptual Integration Network the christian is a christ. This network creates inferences that are not only projected back onto the input of the Christian, but also the other way around, so that the Christian’s own experience structures his knowledge and understanding of Christ. Thus, in this two-way relation, the Christian’s understanding of the rituals is structured by his or her knowledge of Christ, including the scriptural descriptions of Christ’s baptism, while at the same time the Christian’s experience of his or her own participation in the rituals, i.e., his or her own baptism, likewise structures and enriches this person’s knowledge about Christ’s baptism, both supplementing and structuring the person’s understanding of the scriptural descriptions of this event.

Through the use of intricate conceptual and intertextual blends, *Gos. Phil.* describes the process of Christ’s (double) birth, life, death, and resurrection, and the connections between his experiences and actions and those of the individual initiated Christian. The emphasis in *Gos. Phil.* is, however, clearly not on Christ becoming human (there is no discernible doctrine of kenosis here), but rather on the deification, or “christification,” so to speak, of the Christian. By showing the parallelisms between the actions, experiences, and constitution of Christ, and the ritual actions performed and experienced by the Christians, *Gos. Phil.* maps out the way to salvation by means of the appropriation of divine life obtained by becoming like Christ according to the example set by him, as laid down in Scripture and ritual. Often passages in *Gos. Phil.* seem to be deliberately ambiguous when it comes to whether a passage refers to Christ or the Christian. By keeping this ambiguity in such a high number of passages, the tractate heightens the effect of the parallelism and contributes to a blurring of boundaries between the two conceptual

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domains. The overall effect of this is a strengthening of the identification of the individual Christian and Christ, where each significant event in the ritual life of the Christian has significance for the understanding of the nature of the Saviour and his actions, at the same time as scriptural and confessional information concerning Christ directly reflects upon the life—especially the sacramental life—of the Christian.

Somewhat surprisingly, considering previous research on the tractate, it transpires that not only are Christ’s baptism and resurrection highly important in Gos. Phil.’s rhetoric, but the crucifixion and transfiguration seem to be of at least equal significance, aspects that have in fact largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. Moreover, we have seen that in addition to the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, the related Adam-Christ blend is of profound importance.

I have here tried as far as possible to analyse Gos. Phil. primarily on text-internal grounds. I have not tried to give a “gnostic” or “Valentinian” reading of the tractate, but have rather worked from the simple assumption that it is possible to understand the text on its own terms in an intertextual relationship with Scripture and sacraments. The readings I have given presuppose knowledge of a number of Septuagint and, especially, New Testament Scriptures, but they do not presuppose knowledge of any “gnostic” or “Valentinian” theological system. Such a “gnostic” or “Valentinian” reading would certainly be possible, but would require the additional use of input spaces derived from these conceptual domains.

3.3.3. Literary Structure and Function

On the basis of the present analysis, Michel Desjardins’ observation that Gos. Phil. resembles “the embroidery of God’s name and attributes by Muslim calligraphers,” seems an apt one. “In both artistic media,” Desjardins states, “the units of expression, whether consonants and words or metaphors and images, blend into one another to produce variety and unity at the same time.” But why does Gos. Phil. set up all these intricate conceptual blends, and in such a complicated way? Why not explain the meaning and significance of the rituals of Christian initiation in a more simple and straightforward manner? What Régine Charlton and Louis Painchaud refer to as the “basic presupposition” in their own work on Gos. Phil. seems no less plausible in light of the results

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697 Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism, 92. Desjardins also considers Gos. Phil. to proclaim “a simple and consistent message” (ibid., 91).
of the present study. According to them, “Gos. Phil. is a coherent literary work, which does not show any major doctrinal inconsistency, and where the art of allusion and of ellipse, together with the apparent lack of order are aimed at making the reader experience by himself or herself the illumination of true gnosis.” For it does in fact seem, as Gerald Borchert has put it, that it might have been the intention “to develop a treatise which would give an external appearance of confusion, yet offer to the one who searched behind the external appearance a hidden organization.”

Now Gos. Phil. would doubtlessly have seemed much less confused to its intended late antique readers than it does to us, and, as Michael Williams has pointed out, an explanation based on a theory of intentional obscurity would seem to be “unnecessary in light of the rambling style, often just as obscure and confusing, found frequently in rabbinic, New Testament, and Patristic literature.” Nevertheless, considering the highly complex, allusive and disjointed nature of Gos. Phil., it does seem probable that it would have presented a challenge even to its intended, or model, readers. The structure of the text in fact seems to require at least a second reading in order for the reader to be able to draw some of the inferences suggested by its intricate intratextual connections.

Isenberg has suggested that the probable reason why “the compiler-editor chose to arrange this material strangely: sometimes logically, by means of association of ideas and catchwords, and sometimes illogically, by sprinkling ideas here and there in incoherent patches,” was in order “to heighten the effect of the mysterious.” Whether or not Isenberg is right regarding the actions and intentions, or even existence, of the “compiler-editor,” we may offer the following observation regarding the effects of the arrangement of the material in Gos. Phil.: The way the various pieces of discourse are seemingly cut up and distributed throughout the tractate, creates new connections between the various themes through catchwords and thematic associations that would not be apparent if the tractate had been thematically structured in a more coherent way, with the various pieces of discourse neatly reassembled in accordance with Isenberg’s outline of how Gos. Phil. would more coherently fit together.

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698 Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 43 n. 6.
700 Williams, “Realized Eschatology,” 2.
702 See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel.”
3.3.3.1. The Title
The title of the tractate, often dismissed by scholars as merely an unimportant secondary addition to the text, may also provide us with a clue to the main thrust of Gos. Phil's rhetoric. We have seen that the Gospel of John is an intertext of major importance to the tractate—it may even be argued that it is the single most important intertext. If we now take a look at the so-called farewell discourse in the Fourth Gospel, we actually find that it dovetails nicely with what we have seen in the analysis above of Gos. Phil's Christology and its emphasis on the importance of seeing Christ. Of special importance here are the questions asked first by the apostle Thomas, and then Philip, and the answers given by Jesus. The apostle Philip's question to Jesus follows the latter's answer to a similar question put to him by Thomas:

\[
\text{Philipsaidtohim, “Lord, showusyourfatherandsatisfyus.” Jesus said to him, “Allthis time I have been with you, and you have not known me, Philip? He who has seen me, he has seen the Father. And you, how can you say, ‘showusyourfather’? Do you not believe that I am in my Father and my Father in me?” (John 14:8–10)}
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We may in fact regard much of Gos. Phil. as an extended answer to this question. In order to understand the nature of God the Father, one needs to understand the nature of his Son. Thus, by seeing and understanding Christ one sees and understands, and even becomes Christ, and subsequently also father, the very process of deification we have identified in Gos. Phil. The continuation of Jesus’ answer to Philip and the other disciples in John 14 is also relevant:

\[703\] See, e.g., M.L. Turner, Gospel According to Philip, 9–10. The reason most often given as to why the title should be secondary is the fact that the style of the title as it appears in the manuscript at the end of the text differs from the other titled works in Codex II. This does not necessarily imply anything more than a possible difference in style in the scribe's exemplars which he then copied into Codex II, however, or that something similar may have happened at some earlier point in its transmission, and there is no way for us to know what may have caused the specific style that is here used for the title of Gos. Phil. The suggestions that the title is simply a scribal addition, or “a librarian's attempt to identify the work,” on the grounds that the apostle Philip is mentioned in the text (see ibid., and cf., e.g., Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 3) do not amount to more than speculation.

\[704\] It is worth noting the fact that this sequence is mirrored, intentionally or not, by Codex II having Gos. Phil. follow Gos. Thom.
Do you not believe that I am in my Father and my Father in me? The words I say to you, these I say not from myself alone, but my Father who is within me he does his works. Believe me that I am in my Father and my Father is in me. If not, believe in his works.

(John 14:10–11)

Understanding the relationship between the Father and the Son is of prime importance, and one way of gaining insight into this relationship is through the works, the works done by the Father through the Son. In Gos. Phil. as well it is important to understand the hidden deeper mystery of the works of Christ, works which indeed constitute important means of understanding this fundamental Father-Son relationship. So, in the form in which it has come down to us, the title of the tractate, the Gospel of Philip, corresponds well with its contents and helps strengthen the associations, running throughout the tractate, with the Gospel of John.705 This is of course the case regardless of whether this was also the title of the hypothetical original or whether it was simply added at some point in the text’s transmission.

It may here also be noted that the beginning of Gos. Phil., abrupt as it is, does set the stage for several of the most important themes that are discussed throughout the text. Not only does it strike a polemical note towards the Jews, but it also introduces in its very first lines the theme of religious kinship and that of making and begetting. At the other end of the tractate many of the threads are wrapped up in a longer and more coherent section that focuses especially on the aspect of realised eschatology706 and on how the material world reveals the higher realities to the perfect initiated Christian.

A text by the name of the Gospel of Philip is mentioned by the late sixth century church fathers Timotheus of Constantinople707 and pseudo-Leontius of Byzantium708 both refer to the use of a Gospel of Philip among Manichaeans, but it is impossible to know whether they refer to the text known to us from Nag Hammadi Codex II or to another text altogether.

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705 Another potential association given by the title of Gos. Phil. which fits in well with the overall theme of the tractate is to the account of Philip’s baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch given in Acts 8.
706 See Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 194; Williams, “Realized Eschatology.”
707 De receptione haereticorum (PG 86.1.21.C).
708 De sectis 3.2 (PG 86.1.1213.C).
Epiphanius of Salamis even quotes a passage from a Gospel of Philip which he claims to be in use among libertine Gnostics in Egypt in the fourth century, but the passage he quotes does not correspond to our Gos. Phil. from Nag Hammadi.

4. **Sitz im Leben**

“Long after their discovery and laborious publication, the Nag Hammadi Codices continue to betray the hopes of scholars,” states Mark Edwards. “Almost any date is arbitrary, any assignation to a sect is unconvincing.” This observation is unfortunately no less true with regard to Gos. Phil. than with regard to the other Nag Hammadi texts, but what are the implications of the present analysis with regard to Gos. Phil.’s possible Sitz im Leben? Although little may be said with any certainty, I will in this section outline some potential implications with regard to polemical and rhetorical context, as well as questions concerning the date, provenance and wider social and religious setting and affiliation of the tractate.

4.1. “**Gnosticism**” and “**Valentinianism**”

In much of what has been written concerning Gos. Phil., evidence from the early heresiologists has taken precedence over Gos. Phil.’s own internal logic, as scholars have explained (and explained away) various features of Gos. Phil. by reference to what these early Church Fathers wrote concerning the views of their opponents. That Gos. Phil. can be used as direct evidence of the views of the heresiologists’ opponents has been the starting point of most studies of the text, but scholars have spent precious little ink arguing in favour of this presumption. Moreover, the use of Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria as main sources for Gos. Phil.’s theology presupposes a date of the tractate that is not too far removed from them chronologically. But what if Gos. Phil. significantly post-dates Clement and Irenaeus?

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709 Panarion 26.13.2–3.
710 But cf. Schenke, who holds it as possible that all these testimonies may be referring to the same text, namely the one partly preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II (see Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 1–2).
711 Edwards, “The Epistle to Rheginus,” 76. Cf. the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the dating of the Nag Hammadi Codices.
The common presumption of the tractate’s “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” character is indeed a factor that may account for many of the problems scholars have had in making sense of Gos. Phil. For the tractate has usually been interpreted as a “Gnostic” text, and more often than not with the added specification “Valentinian.”\(^{712}\) Wilson’s confident statement in 1962 is representative: “So far as Philip is concerned, the document is definitely Gnostic,” and “it can be located with confidence as a work deriving from the Valentinian school.”\(^{713}\) Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, who has rightly observed that “it is evident that some scholars wish to localize it immediately upon having first read it,”\(^{714}\) points out the serious problem with this approach, that “an attempt to establish Gos. Phil’s pedigree will help little toward interpreting it, and a genealogy including ‘Valentinian theology’ may merely reinforce certain prejudices.”\(^{715}\)

No one has stated the assumption that Gos. Phil. is a “Valentinian” text more emphatically than Hans-Martin Schenke. “Unser EvPhil repräsentiert eine ganz besondere Art des Christentums,” claims Schenke. “Es ist ein gnostischer, und zwar ein valentinianischer Text: von einem Valentinianer für Valentinianer aus valentinianischem Textgut kompiliert, als Evangelium benutzt zunächst von valentinianischen Gemeinden.”\(^{716}\) It is in fact Schenke’s introduction to his 1959 German translation of the tractate (which was the first translation of Gos. Phil. to be published) and his own subsequent publications on the text, that have been by far the most influential with regard to the labelling of Gos. Phil. as a “Valentinian”

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\(^{714}\) Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4168. On a similar note, A.H.C. van Eijk has criticised an excessive focus on what he labels “the full-grown shape gnosticism takes in Manicheism” instead of a greater awareness with regard to Gos. Phil.’s similarities with the New Testament and “orthodox” texts (see Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 97). He especially faults Jacques Ménard for this approach.

tractate.717 Since most scholars have subsequently been content with simply referring to Schenke on this point, let us therefore take a closer look at his arguments. As Schenke himself noted at the outset, Gos. Phil. "enthält zwar keine Kosmogonie, auch keine Topographie der oberen Welt, die die besten und sichersten Kriterien für die Zuweisung eines Textes zu einer bestimmten Gruppe von Gnostikern abgeben würden."718 Still, Schenke argued that certain passages in the text showed that Gos. Phil. had a "Valentinian" origin: "Die Charakterisierung des EvPhil als valentinianisch ergibt sich daraus, daß sich in ihm eindeutig valentinianische Theologumena finden bzw. daß das Charakteristischste und sozusagen Profilbestimmende der sich in ihm findenden Lehren und Vorstellungen valentinianisch ist."719 In summary, Schenke (1) finds presupposed the “Valentinian” doctrine of the Saviour as the bridegroom of the lower Sophia, and the angels of the Saviour as the bridegrooms of the seed of the lower Sophia.720 (2) He further argues that the names Echamoth and Echmoth discussed by Gos. Phil. should be identified with the “Valentinian” higher and lower Sophia. 721 (3) Furthermore he sees references to a specifically “Valentinian” “Mysterium des Brautgemaches,” 722 and (4) to the relative redemption of the “Valentinian” psychic Demiurge.723 In addition to these points, Schenke claims that “there are many other sections which only take on colour on a Valentinian interpretation.”724


719 Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 8. See also Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 2. Gaffron has expressed profound agreement with Schenke’s views in this matter: "Das EvPh ist in seinem Grundstock valentinianisch. Aus valentinianischer Sicht sind auch alle diejenigen Vorstellungen und Darlegungen des Ph zu exegesieren, die spezifisch jüdischen oder christlichen Hintergrund zeigen, da der Verfasser als Valentinianer sie nicht anders verstehen konnte" (Gaffron, Studien, 69). Gaffron does not argue specifically for the “Valentinianism” of Gos. Phil. other than by referring to the analyses of Schenke, Wilson, and Ménard (see ibid., 68).


With regard to the fourth point, Schenke himself changed his mind in his 1997 critical edition, where he argued against seeing a reference to the Demiurge in the passage in question, and with regard to all four points, we have seen in the present analysis that the passages Schenke refers to may well be interpreted without recourse to specifically “Valentinian” theology.

While Schenke has been of the opinion that Gos. Phil. contains material from several different “Gnostic” groups, and that it “cannot be traced back to, or identified with, a particular Valentinian school,” some scholars have tried to locate the text more precisely. Roelof van den Broek, following Jean-Daniel Kaestli, has characterised Gos. Phil. as belonging to the Eastern branch of “Valentinianism” on the grounds of its Christology. Whereas the “Western” branch of “Valentinianism” is supposed to have held that Christ’s body was of a psychic substance, the “Eastern Valentinians” are supposed to have taught that Christ had a spiritual body, which is what van den Broek finds in Gos. Phil. As we have seen above, however, it is difficult to pigeonhole Gos. Phil. according to these criteria since Christ here seems to take on a material, earthly body, while his true, internal, body consists of the Logos (his flesh) and the Holy Spirit (his blood). The tractate thus resists being classified as a representative of either Eastern or Western “Valentinianism” on the grounds of the nature of Christ’s body.

Nag Hammadi texts included under the label “Provenance valentinienne certaine, ou très probable,” on the grounds of its soteriology and the “bridal chamber” imagery in particular.

729 Since, as we have seen, the Logos functions on the level of the soul, it seems that we, if we were to classify the text according to this criterion, we could just as well classify it as a “Western Valentinian” text.
730 More recently, Einar Thomassen has also come to the conclusion that Gos. Phil. has affinities with “eastern Valentinianism,” mainly on the grounds of what he regards as its “soteriology of mutual participation” (see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, esp. 90–102, esp. 102). See also Thomassen’s article “How Valentinian is the Gospel of Philip?,” where he tries by means of what he calls a “Valentinian interpretation” to find out what kind of “Valentinianism” Gos. Phil. is an example of, and how the various features of the text would fit into a “Valentinian” framework. Thomassen has also suggested that certain additional features of the text “indicate a Valentinian provenance for Gos. Phil.,” namely a “relatively optimistic cosmology”; the interpretation of the Eucharist; the notion
In the present study I have refrained from employing heresiological and/or modern scholarly (re)constructions of “Gnosticism” or “Valentinianism” in my analysis. I have not assumed from the outset that Gos. Phil. is “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” and have therefore not read “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” myth or theology into it. Instead I have attempted to work my way out from the poetics of the text itself, as it has come down to us in its Coptic Nag Hammadi Codex II incarnation, to an evaluation of its doctrinal contents. Another major implication of labelling Gos. Phil. as a “Gnostic” tractate has been the way it has led scholars to use the tractate mainly as a source for documenting Christianity’s opponents, rather than as a source of late antique Christianity in itself. A few examples should suffice.

Borchert, for example, has seen Gos. Phil. as a work of “a Gnostic who claims to be a Christian,” and as a representative of the “Gnostic threat” towards Christianity. In his view Gos. Phil. “exhibits a consistent theology which is in direct confrontation with Christianity,” and he even goes so far as to characterise the message of the tractate as “an insidious warping of the Christian message.” Such a document as Gos. Phil., Borchert claims, was a grave threat towards Christianity and “gave the heresiologs

of the Son as the Name of the Father; the use of the metaphor of sowing and reaping at Gos. Phil. 52.25–33 which is also attested in Fragments 32–36 by Heracleon as reported by Origen; and possible echoes of the fragments of Valentinus as quoted by Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 273–276). None of these arguments are persuasive, however. A “soteriology of mutual participation” is for instance something we find in prominent orthodox Christian sources of the fourth and fifth centuries (see, e.g., Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria), and the same can of course be said with regard to Gos. Phil.’s “relatively optimistic cosmology.” Moreover, the sowing and reaping metaphor is used differently in Gos. Phil. than in the Heracleon fragments and as for the other features brought forward by Thomassen we find closer parallels elsewhere.

As Rewolinski has rightly emphasised in a critique of what he sees as Sevrin’s method of first constructing a theory of “Valentinianism” and then reading it into Gos. Phil., “We must first attempt to glean what can be gleaned from the GPh itself and only then turn towards the comparative approach which was Sevrin’s first step in his exegetical procedure” (Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132).


Borchert, “Gnostic Threat,” 84.

(sic) nightmares." Indeed, several scholars have suggested that Gos. Phil. is only superficially Christian, but really “Gnostic.” Kurt Rudolph, for example, notes concerning the eucharistic theology of Gos. Phil. that “it appears outwardly ‘Church Christian,’ but within the framework of the text as a whole it is manifestly gnostic.” Isenberg provides us with another example, stating that, “since ‘Christian’ in the gnostic glossary normally designates the psychic rather than the pneumatic, Gos. Phil. is offering the psychic the chance to rise to the pneumatic level—by sacramental means.” Seeing Gos. Phil. as a “Gnostic” document, Isenberg overlooks the possibility that the term “Christian” as it is used in Gos. Phil. could simply refer to “Christian” in the same way as in standard early Christian usage. Isenberg dismisses the fact that Gos. Phil. does not mention “psychics” or “pneumatics,” or indeed any tripartite division of humanity, with the understatement that “the tripartite division of humanity—fleshly, psychic, pneumatic—is not emphasised.”

Based on the premise that Gos. Phil. is “Valentinian,” and on what he perceives as its many parallels with “Catholic” Christian practice as we know it from patristic sources, David Tripp asserts that the tractate “belongs to a Valentinian tradition still in close, if not amicable, contact with ‘Catholic’ Christians.” Tripp also suggests that Gos. Phil. “belongs to a time when some Christians did not anoint,” but holds that “some whom later Catholics could recognize as orthodox” must have done so, “for if the usage had been always a Valentinian or otherwise sectarian peculiarity it could hardly have won acceptance in Catholic churches.” But what if Gos. Phil. is not a “Valentinian” text, but instead is rather closer to early Christian “orthodoxy”? The polemic of Gos. Phil. does not seem to be directed against “the Great Church,” but rather against several different groups against which it defines its own viewpoints.

Robert M. Grant has claimed that Gos. Phil.’s references to the “holy kiss” is “quite out of harmony with the mind of the Church as a whole,” but is this really the case? A ritual kiss is frequently mentioned in the

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736 Rudolph, Gnosis, 241.
737 Isenberg, “Philip, Gospel of,” 313.
738 Isenberg, “Philip, Gospel of,” 313. In my reading of Gos. Phil. there is no evidence of any tripartite division of humanity into fleshly, psychic, and pneumatic.
739 Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 258.
741 Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 140.
An especially interesting discussion is found in John Chrysostom’s *Homily on Second Corinthians*. Here Chrysostom refers to 2 Cor 13:12 in order to explain the significance of this particular liturgical practice. The kiss, according to Chrysostom, is given in order

that it may be fuel unto love, that it may kindle the disposition, that we may so love each other, as brothers brothers, as children parents, as parents children; yea, rather even far more. For those things are a disposition implanted by nature, but these by spiritual grace. Thus our souls bound unto each other. And therefore when we return after an absence we kiss each other, our souls hastening unto mutual intercourse.

( *Hom. 2 Cor.*, 30.2; *NPNF* 1)

Chrysostom then continues by setting up a metaphorical blend between the body of the Christian and a temple, and in the process connects the ritual kiss to the Eucharist. According to Chrysostom,

we are the temple of Christ; we kiss then the porch and entrance of the temple when we kiss each other. See ye not how many kiss even the porch of this temple, some stooping down, others grasping it with their hand, and putting their hand to their mouth. And through these gates and doors Christ both had entered into us, and doth enter, whencesoever we communicate. Ye who partake of the mysteries understand what I say.

( *Hom. 2 Cor.*, 30.2; *NPNF* 1)

There is nothing in *Gos. Phil*’s allusions to the ritual kiss that would seem to be fundamentally at odds with the kind of practice or interpretation of it Chrysostom gives here. 744

Grant claimed that the “Valentinians” he saw behind *Gos. Phil.* “were making use of Christian materials but were exaggerating some elements and neglecting others. They were laying unusual emphasis on the uniquely Christian doctrine of the union of Christ with his Church and were ‘literalizing’ the metaphors used by the Christians.” 745 From the present

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744 Cf. Pagels who describes the kiss referred to in *Gos. Phil.* 59.2–6 as a “eucharistic ‘kiss of peace’” where the members of “the pneumatic church” express “their oneness with one another” (Pagels, "Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church," 169; Pagels, "Pursuing the Spiritual Eve," 204). Cf. also Penn, *Kissing Christians*.

745 Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 139–140.
analysis, however, it seems rather like it is Grant and others who have literalised the metaphors used in Gos. Phil. and interpreted them in ways that make the tractate seem much less like a representative of “mainstream” Christian theology than what may now seem to have been the case.

Literalising interpretation is not the only interpretive strategy that has made Gos. Phil. conform to preconceptions of it being an aberration in early Christianity, however. There has also been a strong tendency towards allegorising its metaphors and similes in conformity with theories of “Gnostic,” and especially “Valentinian,” teaching. Thus, as we have seen, rather than, e.g., treating Joseph as Joseph, he has been interpreted as representing the “Valentinian” Demiurge, references to the Holy Spirit have been taken to refer to Sophia, and the serpent in paradise has been equated with Ialdabaoth. To Schenke’s assertion that there are many sections in Gos. Phil. “which only take on colour on a Valentinian interpretation,” one might reply that Gos. Phil. indeed only takes on a specifically “Valentinian” colour by reading it in the light of “Valentinian” theologoumena. One may certainly interpret Gos. Phil. as a “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” text, but it should be noted that such a reading requires an allegorical interpretation of the tractate on the basis of an a priori notion of “Gnosticism” or “Valentinianism.” Such a reading would require the recruitment of additional input spaces taken from “Valentinian” practices and mythologoumena to contribute to our interpretive blends, enabling us to regard, for example, Gos. Phil.’s reference to Joseph the carpenter as a reference to the “Valentinian” demiurge. I hope, however, to have demonstrated in the present analysis that it is perfectly possible to read Gos. Phil. without resorting to such an exegetical strategy, and I thus hope to have given a simpler, more straightforward, and historically more likely, interpretation of the text than what has been the result of the “Valentinian” and “Gnostic” interpretations of it. Below I will outline some alternative possibilities regarding the religious affiliation and polemical setting of the text, which brings us first to the important, but difficult, question of the tractate’s date and provenance. As we shall see, conclusions based on circular reasoning regarding the tractate’s “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” character have also been used to date the tractate. The “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” character of Gos. Phil. is, however, at best far too vague to allow us to use it as a criterion for dating.

4.2. Date and Provenance

Most scholars have tentatively placed the composition of Gos. Phil. in Syria, with the main argument being its explicit discussions of certain Syriac terms. As Kendrick Grobel put it in his review of Wilson’s edition of the text,

Why the interest in Syriac? Why, indeed, unless the author’s brand of “Christianity” had come down to him in the Syriac language? Perhaps more—perhaps he even wrote this book in Syriac. Then was there a Greek intermediary translation between the hypothetical Syriac and the Coptic? Not necessarily. The many Greek words in the Gospel of Philip prove nothing: Coptic can no more be written free of Greek than can English free of Latin or French-Latin. Of course a Syriac original and a Greek version may have been used together …

Although few scholars have actually argued that the text was most likely composed in Syriac, many have held the presence of discussions of Syriac words in the text to indicate a probable origin in Syria. The majority of those who have placed Gos. Phil. in Syria on such grounds have held it to have been written in Greek in a Greek-Syriac bilingual milieu, Antioch or Edessa being the favoured locations. However, Gos. Phil. in fact not only discusses the meaning of words in “Syriac” (ܡܪܝܐ), but also mentions explicitly the languages “Hebrew"

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749 For this view, see Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, 25–26.


(��думалו) and “Greek” (嬴요람). The fact that Syriac, Greek, and Hebrew words are explicitly discussed as such, would to the present author not primarily indicate a Syrian origin of the text. Instead, the fact that Gos. Phil. feels the need to discuss the meaning of certain words in these languages would rather indicate that at least these parts of the tractate were not actually composed in any of them. The most probable setting for such a discussion would rather seem to be a Coptic-speaking one. In a Coptic text directed to a Coptic audience it is quite appropriate to discuss the meaning of certain words of theological importance in Syriac, Hebrew, and Greek.

Moreover, as Grobel and others have rightly noted, the presence of Greek words does not indicate a Greek original, nor, necessarily, does the identification of possible wordplays or catchword connections in the hypothetical Greek original. Such features do not necessarily indicate anything more than that the tractate makes use of ideas or sources that may have originated in Greek- or Syriac-speaking milieus. There does not seem to be any hard evidence, then, that Gos. Phil. cannot have been composed in Coptic in the first place. A Coptic-speaking milieu would also seem to be indicated by the Coptic wordplays we have discussed at several points in the analyses above, which would seem to indicate that even if Gos. Phil. was indeed in the main translated from a Greek original or originals, which it might well have been, substantial changes were made in its translation into Coptic and/or in its subsequent Coptic phase(s) of transmission. The fact that some catchword connections and puns seem to work only in Coptic increases the likelihood of this possibility. Such a transmission history, however, does not in any way decrease the value of the present text as a complete Coptic document in its own right attesting to the milieu where its latest substantial modifications were made, i.e., where the text assumed more or less the shape of the exemplar contained in Nag Hammadi Codex II.

752 See Gos. Phil. 56.8–9; 62.13–14.
753 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 400 n. 16.
754 I think Gaffron’s claim that the author of Gos. Phil. “muß jedenfalls eine Grundkenntnis des Syrischen gehabt haben” (Gaffron, Studien, 65) is too strong. The knowledge of etymologies of certain words in another language does not presuppose any direct knowledge of that language as such.
The other main argument for a Syrian provenance for Gos. Phil. has been its perceived affinities with Syrian or generally Eastern sacramental practice and interpretation. Isenberg argues that the fact that Gos. Phil. seems to presuppose only a single anointing suggests an Eastern provenance, but he neglects to take into consideration the fact that Gos. Phil.'s anointing does not seem to be a prebaptismal one, as is the case with early Eastern practice, making this an argument of dubious value. Isenberg's appeal to parallels to Gos. Phil. in the ritual interpretation on display in Eastern catecheses of the fourth and fifth centuries carries more weight, but for this period there are also interesting parallels to be found not only in Eastern, but also in Western and Egyptian sources that are not mentioned by Isenberg.

Our sources for Egyptian ritual practice are scarce and little is known for the pre-Nicene period, but it is worth noting that, as Maxwell Johnson has shown, most elements of the early Egyptian initiation rites and their accompanying theology seem to have had their closest parallels in the Syrian tradition. As Johnson puts it, “Although the sources for the rites of Christian initiation in Egypt are neither as numerous nor...”

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758 For a refutation of this argument by Isenberg, see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 400–401 n. 16.
762 See Johnson, Liturgy in Early Christian Egypt, 15; Maxwell E. Johnson, The Rites of Christian Initiation: Their Evolution and Interpretation (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999), 51.
as clear as they are for the early Syrian tradition, it would appear that both these traditions shared a great deal in common.”763 Among these common features, Johnson lists an understanding of initiation modelled on Jesus’ own baptism, and an interpretation of it in terms of begetting and birth.764 In neither the Syrian nor the Egyptian sources does Johnson find any evidence of postbaptismal anointing in the early period, but rather a prebaptismal one. In fact, in both the Syrian and the Egyptian material he sees “a ritual sequence in which no postbaptismal ceremonies are present other than participation in the Eucharist.”765

The ritual interpretation on display in Gos. Phil. seems to be closer to that of Syria and Egypt than to that of North Africa or Rome. Jesus’ baptism in the Jordan is central and the anointing is closely connected with the reception of the Holy Spirit and is of a higher importance than the baptism in water. Baptism is primarily interpreted in terms of begetting and birth and John 3 rather than death and resurrection and Romans 6. Moreover, we do not find any clear traces in Gos. Phil. of any prebaptismal rites of renunciation, purification, exorcism, or strengthening. In these respects, then, Gos. Phil. is closest to what we know of Syrian and Egyptian practice.766

There are certain features of Gos. Phil., however, that do not fit very well with this picture of Syrian and Egyptian practice. As we have seen, the chrismation presupposed by Gos. Phil. does not seem to be a prebaptismal one, and there is no evidence for a postbaptismal anointing in Syria in the pre-Nicene period.767 So, perhaps Gos. Phil. is not of Syrian provenance,768 nor Egyptian, after all? It is important to remember, however, that we are here speaking about the pre-Nicene period. In the post-Nicene period of the fourth and fifth centuries, on the other hand,

763 M.E. Johnson, Rites of Christian Initiation, 59.
764 See M.E. Johnson, Rites of Christian Initiation, 59.
767 See, e.g., Thomas M. Finn, Early Christian Baptism and the Catechumenate: West and East Syria (Message of the Fathers of the Church 5; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992), 20. As Thomassen rightly observes, however, there may have been greater variety in Syrian practice in this period than is evident in the extant sources (see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 400).
768 See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 400.
postbaptismal anointing with chrism is also found in the West Syrian and Egyptian rites. A date for Gos. Phil. in this period would thus better fit the evidence of Eastern and Egyptian sacramental practice.

With regard to such conclusions regarding eastern or western ritual practices it is worth noting that the picture is becoming increasingly blurred. Maxwell Johnson has for instance recently shown in an overview of western evidence that it no longer seems possible to sustain the common view that the interpretation of baptism in terms of rebirth and John 3 is specifically eastern. Johnson even goes so far as to conclude that “baptism as ‘new birth ex aqua et spiritu’ is part of the ancient, common, and ecumenical liturgical heritage of the Church, both East and West.” It thus seems that we cannot after all use Gos. Phil.’s emphasis on an interpretation of ritual initiation in terms of begetting and birth to argue for an Eastern provenance of the tractate. However, there does seem to be more of a christological focus in the understanding of initiation in the Syrian sources than in the Western, and this aspect certainly fits in with the understanding of Gos. Phil. according to the findings of the present study.

Finally, Isenberg has argued for a Syrian provenance on the basis of what he regards as Gos. Phil.’s “encratitic emphasis on virginity and continence.” However, it does not seem necessary to regard Gos. Phil. as a tractate that is inherently ascetic or encratitic in outlook, and Isenberg’s appeal to Tatian, Aphrahat, and Ephrem notwithstanding, this seems in any case to be a far too general argument to allow us to use it to identify the text’s geographical provenance. Isenberg himself shows awareness of this fact when he suggests that the reason why Gos. Phil. “came, by

769 See M.E. Johnson, Rites of Christian Initiation, 113; cf. also Brock, Holy Spirit, 209; Finn, West and East Syria, 21–22. In East Syria there is no evidence of any postbaptismal anointing prior to the seventh century (see M.E. Johnson, Rites of Christian Initiation, 113).
770 Thomassen suggests that the ritual sequence attested by Gos. Phil. may “reflect an earlier Syrian practice than those third century texts that attest the order anointing-baptism” (Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 400), but does not consider the possibility that it may reflect Syrian practice of the fourth or fifth century.
771 See M.E. Johnson, “Baptism as ‘New Birth’.”
772 M.E. Johnson, “Baptism as ‘New Birth’,” 806–807. Moreover, as Paul Bradshaw has pointed out, “we cannot really speak of two principal liturgical traditions in the early Church—Eastern and Western—but should rather acknowledge that there was instead a variety of local practices” (Bradshaw, “Baptismal Practice,” 17).
773 See Bradshaw, Search for the Origins, 155.
the end of the fourth century, to exist in Coptic clothes, is probably due
to the sympathetic reading it could get among Egyptian Gnostic desert
ascetics.776

The Nag Hammadi Codices were most probably manufactured some-
time in the fourth or early fifth century,777 and certainly in Egypt, were
they were also discovered some sixteen centuries later. Acknowledging
the fact that the codices and their place of discovery constitute the only
certain historical context we have with regard to the texts contained in
them, and the fact that the language of these codices is Coptic, fourth–
fifth-century Egypt would seem to present itself as a rather obvious con-
text within which to study them. It is therefore all the more surprising
that comparisons of Nag Hammadi texts with issues that were current in
fourth-century Egyptian Christianity and Coptic sources have been few
and far between in Nag Hammadi scholarship.

Scholarly interpretations of Gos. Phil. illustrate the point. They have
focussed not so much on trying to understand the text that has actually
been preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II, but rather on a text we
in fact do not have, namely its hypothetical Greek original supposedly
written 100–300 years earlier. Since scholars have had this focus, the
chronological spotlight has been pointed primarily at the second and
third century, rather than at the fourth or early fifth. That is not to say
that fourth-century contexts have not been invoked to shed light on
the codices and those who manufactured and used them. This has in
fact been an issue of debate since the very beginning of Nag Hammadi
research.778 What has hardly been done at all, however, is to interpret
the texts from such a perspective, and to use comparative material from
the Egyptian milieu contemporary with the manuscripts to shed light
on their contents. As Tito Orlandi has pointed out, “all sorts of ideas
and religious sects have been called forth to comment upon the [Nag
Hammadi] corpus and to explain, it seems, everything except what was
common in the Nile valley in the fourth and fifth centuries AD.”779

777 See the discussion in chapter 1.
778 See chapter 1.
779 Orlandi, “A Catechesis,” 85. Orlandi elsewhere notes that “it may be observed that
the scholars interested in [Nag Hammadi] texts tend to neglect Coptic literature” (Tito
Orlandi, “Nag Hammadi Texts and the Coptic Literature,” in Colloque international
“l’Évangile selon Thomas et les textes de Nag Hammadi”: Québec, 29–31 mai 2003, ed.
Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier, BCNH, Études 8 [Québec: Les Presses de
l’Université Laval, 2007], 326).
Now, what was “common in the Nile valley in the fourth and fifth centuries,” to use Orlandi’s phrase? About the only thing we may say with certainty is that the picture is very diverse indeed. The fourth and fifth centuries were rife with doctrinal debate, and it was a time of major ecumenical councils delineating the boundaries of accepted Scripture, doctrine and practice. Moreover, in contrast to the situation with regard to the preceding centuries, there is an abundance of sources available to us from this period, making a thorough comparative study of the Nag Hammadi texts within the context of fourth and fifth-century Egypt anything but a trivial undertaking. There are, to put it bluntly, quite a few Egyptian fourth-century contexts to choose from.780 As we saw in chapter 3, however, it is possible to single out one particular context which seems especially relevant with regard to the Nag Hammadi codices, namely monasticism. Since the manuscripts were discovered in the vicinity of the sites of several Pachomian monasteries, in an area where also so-called “Melitian” and other monastic groups and individuals were active, and also not far from the location of Shenoute’s monastic community, the potential relevance of a monastic context for the Nag Hammadi texts should be apparent.781 Moreover, when we, as outlined above, disregard the category of “Gnosticism,” “burdened as it is with misleading stereotype and confusion,”782 and reconsider these writings as constituent parts of early Christianity, a fourth- or fifth-century contextualisation of Gos. Phil. no longer needs to be approached from the point of view of a simple dichotomy between the Nag Hammadi texts as simply representatives of heresy on the one hand, and sources that have customarily been classified as belonging on the right side of the orthodoxy/heresy divide on the other. It thus becomes easier to

780 As David Brakke puts it, “Christianity in fourth-century Egypt was characterized by diverse and conflicting modes of social identity and spiritual formation.” Brakke singles out in particular “study groups led by charismatic teachers, Melitian communities centered around the veneration of martyrs, and the emerging structure of imperial orthodoxy headed by Athanasius,” all of whom “presented themselves as legitimate expressions of Christian piety” (David Brakke, “Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-Century Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria’s Thirty-Ninth Festal Letter,” HTR 87:4 [1994]: 396). See also C. Wilfred Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity from Its Origins to 451 C.E. (3rd ed.; Coptic Studies 2; Leiden: Brill, 1993), 117–231; Stephen J. Davis, The Early Coptic Papacy: The Egyptian Church and Its Leadership in Late Antiquity (The Popes of Egypt 1; Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 43–84; Davis, Coptic Christology, 13–152.

781 Cf. Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism,” 379–380. See also the discussion in chapter 3.

782 Williams, “Was There a Gnostic Religion,” 78.
see the similarities as well as the differences between these texts and other fourth- and fifth-century sources, and consequently to take fully into consideration the diversity of doctrines and religious expressions represented by the Nag Hammadi material as a whole.

While it does not seem possible to place Gos. Phil. geographically with any confidence, neither does there seem to be any good reason why Gos. Phil. could not have had its origin in Egypt, or been significantly edited, or even composed, in Coptic. There is, for instance, evidence from the fourth and fifth centuries that there was regular contact between monks in Syria and Egypt. 783 Such contact would seem to make it feasible that a tractate that may show extensive awareness of Syrian ideas and sacramental interpretation might also have been composed in Egypt, and even in Coptic, and that the favoured view that Gos. Phil. was originally composed in Greek in Syria is only one possibility among many.

In most attempts to place Gos. Phil. chronologically or geographically, questions concerning language and translation have indeed been central. An unfortunate aspect of these discussions, however, is that it has mostly been assumed, in the majority of cases without any attempt to argue the case, that the original version of Gos. Phil. was composed in Greek and that the present document is a more or less direct, although not very good, translation of the Greek into Coptic. 784 This assumption has in turn led to a tendency to focus the analysis on the hypothetical Greek original and to overlook, or explain away, possible puns or catchword connections in Coptic, and has often been accompanied by the tacit assumption that since our Coptic text is a translation of a Greek document it must have been translated and copied into our preserved manuscript at least


784 Segelberg, for instance, states without any argument that "There is hardly any doubt about it that Greek is the original language" (Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 223). Isenberg states at one point in his introduction to the critical edition that Gos. Phil. “must have been composed in Greek,” and at another that it “was presumably composed in Greek” (Isenberg, “Introduction,” 131, 134). In his entry on the text in the Anchor Bible Dictionary he states that it was “very likely a translation of an original Greek document” (Isenberg, “Philip, Gospel of,” 312). Schenke simply states that “Die uns in einer Kopie erhaltene koptische Fassung des EvPhil dürfte—wie es für die koptische Literatur die Regel ist—eine Übersetzung aus dem Griechischen darstellen. Und das Griechische ist dann wohl auch als die Ursprache, in der das EvPhil abgefaßt worden ist, anzusehen” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 4). He takes this for granted and does not attempt to argue it. Cf. also, e.g., Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 325–327.
decades after the production of the original Greek. Why the translation process would have had to take so long is somewhat mysterious to the present author, but it is an implicit argument that has often been used by scholars to move the terminus ante quem for the supposed Greek original back into the third century.

Let us take a closer look at the arguments that have been brought forward in favour of a Greek original. First there is the argument from the Greek words used in the tractate. Walter Till pointed to the fact that Gos. Phil. in many instances uses Greek words even in cases where equally good Coptic ones were readily available, like for instance its use in many instances of Δια τούτο instead of έτερεν, and ἀνασκόλυτα instead of Μέ. From this Till drew the conclusion that the original document must have been composed in Greek. This is, however, an argument that flies in the face of the evidence we have of indigenous Sahidic Coptic writings of the period roughly contemporary with the Nag Hammadi Codices. A quick glance at the writings of Shenoute, for instance, which constitute the largest corpus of indigenous Sahidic texts, shows quite clearly that he did not hesitate to use Greek expressions even when equally good Coptic ones could have been used.

The second argument, also used by Till, has to do with the fact that the New Testament quotations in Gos. Phil. in several cases diverge from the wording of the “standard” Sahidic New Testament, especially with regard to the use of Greek or Coptic words. Till mentions in particular the quotation of Matt 3:10 where Gos. Phil. uses the Greek word ἀγέννημα rather than the Coptic κελερύμα which is used in the Sahidic New Testament. There are several problems with this argument, however. Firstly, we do not have any manuscript attestation for Coptic New Testament translations prior to the fourth century, and it is only from the late fourth and into the fifth century that there is any substantial manuscript attestation for most of the New Testament texts, and even from this period the evidence represents a variety of dialects and independent

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785 See Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippos, 6. See also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 19–20; Stroud, “Problem of Dating,” 228. It should be noted, however, that Gos. Phil. does not exclusively employ these Greek terms, but that it also uses the native Coptic terms ἑτερεν and Μέ.

786 See also the refutation of this argument in Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 13; Grobel, review of Wilson, 318.

787 See Gos. Phil. 83.12–13.

788 See Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippos, 6. This argument is supported by Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 13.
As Frederik Wisse has pointed out, this indicates “that the early history of transmission of the Coptic text of the NT long remained fluid and haphazard.” Moreover, as Wisse has argued, the Coptic text of the New Testament “was open to continuing influence of the Greek text to a much greater degree than the Latin and Syriac versions.” Therefore, even though we do not have manuscript evidence of the Greek word ἀφείνη being used in the Coptic translation of Matt 3:10, this does not mean that there were no translations of Matthew into Coptic that retained this Greek word. Our knowledge of the early translations of the New Testament into Coptic is far too incomplete to allow us to argue that differences from the known Sahidic translations of Matthew in Gos. Phil’s quotations of the New Testament imply a Greek original. Another possibility could be a Coptic-Greek bilingual author writing in Coptic who used the Greek New Testament, rather than any specific Coptic translation of it, and rendered his quotations and paraphrases in Coptic as he saw fit, or the word may have been changed from κελεύνη to ἀφείνη at some point in the transmission of the Coptic text. In any case, the use of a Greek word rather than its Coptic equivalent can hardly be used to prove a Greek original for Gos. Phil.

Till also argued for a Greek original on the basis of the idea seen in Gos. Phil. 71.16–18 that Adam came into being from two virgins, namely from “the spirit” (ψυχή) and “the virginearth” (παρθένως). The text must have been composed in Greek, Till claims, since “earth”

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790 Wisse, “The Coptic Versions,” 133. Tito Orlandi notes that, “a translation may have been conceived and executed by a single translator or a small group of translators, sometimes even for individual use. On the other hand, it may have been produced on the basis of one or more preexistent texts, in the same or in different dialects. It may also have been revised through the use of a Greek text, which may or may not have been the same type as that used in the previous translations. Translations may also have been revised simply to improve the Coptic form, or to make it more correct in comparison with a Greek text that seemed better” (Tito Orlandi, “Coptic Literature,” in The Roots of Egyptian Christianity [ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986], 54). Moreover, there are problems with regard to “the date of the translations, the question of dialectical priority, and the relation between ‘official’ and ‘private’ translations” (ibid., 55).


792 For such changes in transmission, see Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 13.
in Greek (γῆ) is feminine, while it is masculine in Coptic (ⲕⲁϩ).\textsuperscript{793} A problem with this argument, however, is the fact that “spirit” (πνεῦμα) is not actually feminine in Greek, but neuter. We need to look to the Semitic languages Hebrew or Syriac / Aramaic in order to find “spirit” as a feminine noun.\textsuperscript{794} It seems to me that while the idea that Adam came into being from these two virgins would most probably have had its origins in a Semitic-speaking milieu, there is no reason why it could not have been employed just as well by an author writing in Coptic as one writing in Greek, and without its author actually being directly in touch with a Semitic language. We need to distinguish between the origins of ideas and motifs used in the tractate and the composition of the tractate itself, which uses a wide range of ideas, motifs, allusions and metaphors for its own purposes.

Finally it has been argued that the text is stylistically different from indigenous Coptic writings,\textsuperscript{795} but here again the comparative material for this period is sparse, and of debatable value as proof that the Coptic Gos. Phil. is a translation. Now, I am not arguing that Gos. Phil. must have been originally composed in Coptic, only that this possibility cannot be excluded,\textsuperscript{796} and deserves to be taken fully into consideration. What does seem likely on the basis of the present analysis of Gos. Phil., however, is that if it was not originally composed in Coptic, then at least some parts of the text have undergone significant revision in its Coptic phase(s) of transmission.

As for the starting point of its transmission, there is at present no consensus on Gos. Phil.’s date of composition.\textsuperscript{797} Suggestions have ranged from the middle of the first century\textsuperscript{798} to the first half of the fourth,\textsuperscript{799} with the majority of scholars dating the text to the late second or early

\textsuperscript{793} See Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippos, 6. This argument is supported by Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 12; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 21.

\textsuperscript{794} Ruah or ruḥa respectively (see Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, “Le couple de l’Ange et de l’Esprit: Traditions Juives et Chrétientes,” RB 88 [1981]: 46).

\textsuperscript{795} See, e.g., Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 12–13.

\textsuperscript{796} For the difficulty of proving the original nature of a Coptic text, see Peter Nagel, “‘Gespräche Jesu mit seinen Jüngern vor der Auferstehung’: zur Herkunft und Datierung des ‘Unbekannten Berliner Evangeliens,’” ZNW 94 (2003): 234–235.

\textsuperscript{797} Cf. Schmid, who states rather pessimistically that with the exception of certain Scriptural citations “gibt es keine sicherer Anhaltspunkte für eine Datierung des EvPhil” (Schmid, Die Eucharistie, 11).


\textsuperscript{799} Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 349.
third century. Let us take a closer look at the arguments that have been brought forward for a second-century date, taking those proposed by Wilson as our point of departure. Wilson’s first argument was based on his perception of a general agreement between Gos. Phil. and “Valentinianism” as it is presented in Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses and Clement of Alexandria’s Excerpta ex Theodoto. Wilson stopped short of arguing that Irenaeus knew Gos. Phil., but claimed that the tractate “certainly reflects the Valentinian theory as he knew it,” without, however, offering any arguments in favour of this assessment. Gaffron, for his part, went one step further and claimed that Gos. Phil. presupposes “das voll ausgebildete valentinianische System,” and that the date of the tractate would therefore have to be as late as the second half of the second century. Schenkel likewise preferred such a date on the grounds of what he regarded as the text’s affinities with “Valentinianism.” He chose 138–158 as the earliest possible date, since this was the time when Valentinus was active. As for the latest possible date, Schenke has put this around 250, or 200, without in either case bothering to bring forward any arguments to support these dates. Gaffron, however, argued for the latter date as the latest possible on the grounds that “zu jener Zeit ... tiefgreifende Wandlungen vollzogen und sich die Fronten zwischen Kirche und Gnosis verhärterten.” A date subsequent to this would for Gaffron evidently not fit with the tractate’s Christian self-understanding and lack of emphatic polemics against “der Großkirche.”


801 Most scholars have in fact not felt the need to argue for their preferred date for the tractate.


804 Gaffron, Studien, 70.


807 See Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 5.

808 See Gaffron, Studien, 65, 70.
Wilson’s second argument involved the presence of certain similarities in Gos. Phil. with ideas found in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. His identification of orthodox ideas in Gos. Phil. and the text’s professed Christianity led Wilson to argue, on the basis of the belief that “the Gnostics remained fairly close to the ‘orthodox’ Church down to about 180,” and that “some at least of them were, or professed to be, Christians,” that Gos. Phil. probably originated in the second century. According to this logic, a “Gnostic” document like Gos. Phil. would not have professed to be a Christian document, and would not have been so close to orthodox beliefs as Gos. Phil. seems to be, if it had been written significantly later than the second century.

Wilson’s third argument focussed on the state of the canon that emerges from Gos. Phil’s use of Scripture. His assessment was that “it is clear that for the author of Philip the greater part of our New Testament was known and recognized as authoritative,” which Wilson found to be “consistent with a date in the second century.” However, this is once again only an argument for the earliest possible date of the text. Evidence of the use of “the greater part of our New Testament” is of course common in later sources.

Wilson’s fourth argument was not really an argument, but simply an appeal to “the general atmosphere” of Gos. Phil. which Wilson found, still without arguing the case, to be “rather that of the second century than of the third,” offering the rather vague assertion that in Gos. Phil. “the Gnostic system has not yet been dissipated into fantasy as in some other later texts.”

Clearly these arguments are not very strong and can hardly be used to argue anything other than an earliest possible date, and as Wilson himself rightly noted, “there is of course nothing to prevent the use of second-century ideas by men of the third century or even later.” The possibility that the text may retain certain second-century ideas but have been composed later, has, however, not been the focus of much scholarly

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813 See Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 5. Wilson admits that “This last factor is admittedly rather more subjective, since it is a matter of the impression formed by the individual scholar on the basis of his knowledge of the period” (ibid.).
814 Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 4. Why a more “fantastic” and more mythological document would have had to be dated later is not explained.
There has indeed been a marked tendency in scholarship to focus on establishing the *earliest possible* date of Gos. Phil. Once this earliest possible date has been established to the individual scholar’s satisfaction, the preferred *probable* date of composition has generally ended up close to the earliest possible one. Few attempts have been made to establish whether the document could plausibly have originated as late as the fourth century, let alone how it may have functioned in a setting roughly contemporary with the fourth- or fifth-century manuscript it is a part of.

A notable exception to this rule, however, is constituted by Wesley Isenberg’s unfortunately unpublished doctoral dissertation. Based on what he considered to be the date of Codex II, namely the late fourth or early fifth century, Isenberg argued for a *terminus ante quem* for the Greek original of Gos. Phil. of around 350–375. He then proceeded to argue

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816 William Joseph Stroud’s 1970 dissertation focussed specifically on the question of the dating of Gos. Phil. (Stroud, “Problem of Dating”). Stroud came to the conclusion that Gos. Phil. was written between the years 150 and 200, and even went so far as to claim that the evidence he adduced was “strong enough to make this statement without qualification” (ibid., 228). The arguments Stroud put forward in support of this conclusion were highly questionable, however, and the endeavour was also marred by an almost exclusive focus on establishing the earliest possible date. The most questionable aspect of Stroud’s thesis, however, lay in his methodology. His stated method was to build on what he admitted to be the rather weak arguments for such a dating already made by a handful of scholars but encompassed by those enumerated by Wilson (cf. ibid., 2–14, esp. 13–14). The fact that Stroud reached the conclusion that Gos. Phil. was written in the second half of the second century is no wonder, seeing as this was what he set out to prove from the beginning. Stroud candidly admits at the beginning of his study that his purpose is “to account for a second century date for the original composition of GP” (ibid., 14, and cf. also 3). Considering the fact that Stroud did not really consider other possibilities in his dissertation, it is clear that his whole endeavour was intrinsically circular.

817 “It would appear that several mistaken assumptions have guided the scholarly reconstruction of the composition phase of the Nag Hammadi tractates,” states Frederik Wisse. “The first is the tendency to work on the basis of the earliest possible date of a text. In view of the date of the codices, however, and the translation phase some decades earlier, composition could have been as late as the early fourth century. Since the estimated date of composition often has far reaching implications, proper historical method (based on the *simplicior potior* rule) demands that one starts with the latest possible date and move to an earlier one only if there is sufficient internal or external evidence to warrant this” (Wisse, “After the Synopsis,” 149).

818 See chapter 1 for a discussion of the date of the manuscript.

819 Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel.”

820 See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 348. Why Isenberg puts his latest possible date at 375 when he argues that the manuscript may date from the early fifth century is not stated, but one suspects that it is in order to allow time for the supposed Greek original to be translated into Coptic. Why this process would have to take several decades, however, is not stated.
for a probable dating of the original quite close to this latest possible date. Isenberg argued on the basis of extensive parallels to patristic sources that Gos. Phil. is best understood in light of the developed catechumenate of the fourth century, and suggested 300–350 as the most probable time of origin. What is especially intriguing, however, is the fact that Isenberg also showed interesting correspondences that may indicate an even later date for the tractate. Isenberg pointed out that although we do not find any explicit creedal formulations in Gos. Phil., we do find “pieces of paragraphs which reflect the possible content of discussions of various articles of a creed.” In other words, there are indications that there is an important creedal intertext to many of Gos. Phil.’s discussions, and that doctrinal controversy might be an important context. “One has the distinct impression,” states Isenberg, “that Philip is concerned with credal content and may be reflecting the well-known doctrinal difficulties of the Eastern Church during the Fourth Century.” But what might such a creed underlying Gos. Phil. look like? Isenberg argued that the tractate seems to allude to a creed similar to the Constantinopolitan one of 381. His main argument was based on the sequence of terms in Gos. Phil. 53.23–35. These are the terms “God,” “Father,” “Son,” “Holy Spirit,” “Life,” “Light,” “Resurrection,” and “Church.” Gos. Phil. states that these terms are deceptive and likely to be misunderstood unless one is taught their correct meaning. Isenberg points out that these are all “credal” terms, and that the only early creed that contains them all is in fact the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381. Based on his assessment of

821 See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 349. Isenberg’s somewhat understated response to Gaffron’s dating of Gos. Phil. to the second century is also instructive: “it is possible to identify in GP many verbal and conceptual similarities to third and fourth century ortho-
dox Christian sacramental catecheses, especially those of John Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Cyril of Jerusalem. If these are appropriate parallels, then perhaps a date later than AD 200 ought to be considered for this document. A possible dependence in 114:29–115:1 on the Apocalypse of Paul, usually dated ca. AD 250, also suggests a later date” (Wesley W. Isenberg, review of Hans-Georg Gaffron, Studien zum koptischen Philippusevangelium unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Sakramente, JBL 91:1 [1972]: 126). With a few notable exceptions there has indeed been surprisingly little focus on non-heresiological patristic parallels to the themes and theology of Gos. Phil. apart from Isenberg’s dissertation (notable exceptions include Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Eijk, “Gospel of Philip”; Tripp, “Sacramental System”).


825 See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 289–290. Isenberg states that “although no complete creed rises to the surface in Philip, certain ‘credal’ words do, and these … are all found only in the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 AD” (ibid., 348).
a *terminus ante quem* of 375, however, Isenberg concluded that 381 “is too late a date to suggest that *Philip* was influenced by this creed,” and suggested that it might instead indicate “knowledge of an earlier local form of this creed,” which might have been “a local declaratory creed which is no longer extant but which was an earlier relative of the Creed of 381.” But is this date really out of bounds with regard to *Gos. Phil.?* We saw in chapter 1 that the *terminus ante quem* of the manuscript may indeed be well into the fifth century, and there is evidence that Greek texts were quickly translated into Coptic in this period, a fact that is relevant if *Gos. Phil.* is indeed a translation from Greek.

However, even though he argued convincingly for the probability of a fourth-century date in his doctoral dissertation, Isenberg for some reason only mentions the arguments for an earliest possible date of the tractate in his introduction to the critical edition, where he instead ends up suggesting a late third-century date for *Gos. Phil.* on the rather vague grounds that such a date “would suit the many parallels to Gnostic and Christian literature.” This argument is somewhat odd in light of the fact that the many patristic parallels Isenberg showed in his dissertation were mainly from the fourth and fifth centuries. I believe, however, that Isenberg’s suggestion of a possible fourth-century date has been undeservedly overlooked and that it still deserves a hearing.

In this regard it may also be noted that a handful of scholars have in fact seen indications in certain other Nag Hammadi writings that they may have been composed, or at least revised, in the fourth century. In the tractate known as the *Concept of Our Great Power* (NHC VI.4), for example, we actually find a condemnation of the Anomoeans, one of the neo-Arian heresies, which places at least this particular text, and Codex VI which contains it, no earlier than the middle of the fourth century. And, as Mark Edwards has pointed out, “If it is accepted that some Nag Ham-

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826 Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 290. Isenberg specifies that “381 seems a date too late to have this creed be influential on the Greek *Philip*” (ibid., 348–349).
828 Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 290. See below for further discussion of the possibility of a credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*
829 See Orlandi, “Coptic Literature,” 74.
831 Isenberg thus shifted, without explanation, his estimate from a probable date of 300–350 to one of 250–300.
832 Great Pow. 40.5–9 (see Frederik Wisse and Francis E. Williams, “The Concept of Our Great Power: VI.4; 36.1–48.15,” in *Nag Hammadi Codices V, 2–5 and VI with Papyrus Berolinensis* 8502, 1 and 4 [ed. Douglas M. Parrott; NHS 11; Leiden: Brill, 1979], 304).
madi treatises were grounded in disputation of the fourth century, there is nothing to preclude the composition of other treatises in the light of a Church consensus of that time.” Edwards himself has indeed argued in favour of a possible fourth-century date for the Treatise on the Resurrection (NHC I,4). Raoul Mortley has done likewise with regard to the Gospel of Truth (NHC I,3). On the basis of an analysis of its treatment of the issue of “the name of the father,” Mortley concludes that Gos. Truth “seems to bespeak a sophistication in Trinitarian matters which is not characteristic of second century Christianity. The Gospel of Truth responds to a problem which has arisen, and belongs to a period in which the problem has been clearly identified.” The period Mortley refers to is the period of the Arian debate around the middle of the fourth century. This does not necessarily mean that the text in its entirety derives from this period, but Mortley argues that there is a possibility that Gos. Truth “was first written in about 170, subjected to revision and development in later periods, and that the Nag Hammadi text constitutes a version which includes a response to the Arian debate, coming from the period 320–360 AD.” A similar case is constituted by the Teachings of Silvanus (NHC VII,4), which Roelof van den Broek has dated to the second to third decades of the fourth century on the basis of what he has identified as anti-Arian polemics in that text, and Alberto Camplani has argued such a case with regard to the Tripartite Tractate (NHC I,5). Keeping in mind Mortley, Edwards, van den Broek, and Camplani’s arguments for a fourth-century date for Gos. Truth, Treat. Res., Teach. Silv., and Tri. Trac. respectively, and Isenberg’s suggestions with regard to Gos. Phil., it seems we may indeed look more closely into the possibility of a fourth-century date for the latter.

Since it is well nigh impossible to date the hypothetical original version of Gos. Phil., what we may do instead is to evaluate the date of the latest

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834 See Edwards, “The Epistle to Reginus.”
836 Mortley, “‘The Name of the Father.” 249.
837 See Broek, “‘The Theology.”
839 See Mortley, “‘The Name of the Father”; Edwards, “The Epistle to Reginus”; Broek, “‘The Theology”; Camplani, “Per la cronologia.”
significant revision made to it in the course of its transmission to the version preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II. This means that rather than peeling away layers of possible, or even probable, interpolations to get as close as possible to “the original,” we may instead ask whether there are any aspects of the text, whether interpolations or not, which could hardly have been present at a date significantly earlier than the period of the manuscript’s production. That is, we may look for datable evidence of fourth- or fifth-century revision or redaction and evaluate claims of a significantly earlier date of composition from that perspective. 

For, as Larry Hurtado has pointed out, “Gos. Phil. may well preserve some beliefs and practices that characterized Valentinian Christians, and perhaps other Christians as well, from various points diachronically down through the late fourth century.”

4.3. Polemics and Doctrinal Debate

As we have noted at several points in the preceding analysis, Gos. Phil. contains several openly polemical passages in addition to a great deal of implicit polemic. But who are the tractate’s polemics directed against? We have already discussed a handful of passages that refer to Jews/Hebrews in a less than positive sense, but are these passages directed against actual Jews, or against other Christians? And what about the passages that speak about others who “are wrong” in professing this or that point of view? Are they directed against a specific opponent or opponents, or are they simply literary devices used rhetorically in order to get Gos. Phil.’s doctrinal points across, without actually being directed against anyone in particular?

4.3.1. Inner-Christian Polemics

“Behind the arguments of the Gospel of Philip stands its polemic against the official Christianity of the masses,” claims Kurt Rudolph, a sentiment that has been echoed by a significant number of schol-
ars. In Gos. Phil.'s discourse on the relationship between names, types, or images and the realities they refer to, Rudolph sees a polemic “directed against the official church and its understanding of Christian tradition,” an “official church which uses wrong, false notions and names in order to confuse the believers.” But is this really an apt description of the target(s) of Gos. Phil.’s polemics? As we have seen in the discussion above, the tractate seems rather to be engaged in outlining the relationship between the ultimate realities and the names, types, and images that are needed to gain any kind of access to them in this world. That Gos. Phil. stresses the need for instruction in order to learn the proper meaning of Christianity’s key symbols is not in any way at odds with what we find in other Christian sources in the period when Gos. Phil. may have been produced, and especially if we compare it with sources from the fourth or fifth centuries.

One of the key passages that have been used to argue that Gos. Phil. is a “Gnostic” text that has a polemical edge against Christianity is the one which proclaims that the correctly initiated Christian, i.e., the one who has received the name by means of the chrismation, has become a Christ. Commenting on this passage, Borchert asks “who could wish for more? But what true Christian would not be troubled by such a wish?” Similarly, Pagels claims that “those who expected to ‘become Christ’ themselves were not likely to recognize the institutional structures of the church—its bishop, priest, creed, canon, or ritual—as bearing ultimate authority.” But are these scholars right in understanding these passages in Gos. Phil. as having a polemical edge against “conventional Christians” and institutional structures? As I have shown above, the passage in question is better understood as an argument for the importance of receiving the Holy Spirit in connection with baptism, and especially the effects of the chrismation, but without any specific polemical edge.

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846 See Gos. Phil. 67.19–27.
against “conventional Christians.” I have also shown above how this passage works within a rhetoric that in fact seems to argue in favour of a hierarchical community organisation. Moreover, what we know of ritual interpretation from the first Christian centuries does not support the identification of these views exclusively with “heretical” or “fringe” groups, since these are viewpoints that are attested in the writings of decidedly “orthodox” Church Fathers, overlooked by Borchert, Pagels and others. The notion that the initiated Christians in a sense became Christs is indeed widely attested in patristic sources.849

As Gaffron has noted, “es besteht kein Zweifel, daß Ph und seine Gemeinde sich als Christen verstanden haben, und zwar völlig harmlos und ohne das Pathos anderer Gnostiker gegenüber den ‘Psychikern’ der Großkirche.”850 Moreover, Gaffron observed that “die gelegentlichen Polemiken gegen Lehrmeinungen anderer christlicher oder gnostischer Gruppen lassen sich jedenfalls nicht auf die Formel bringen: hie Orthodoxie—hie Häresie.”851 Granted, Gos. Phil. does engage in a polemic against those who falsely call themselves Christian, those who have merely borrowed the name, but in this it is no different from other patristic sources, and hence it does not necessarily imply any polemic specifically directed against the “orthodox/catholic/mainstream” Church.852 It seems more likely that Gos. Phil. is simply engaged in a polemic against certain other interpretations of key Christian theologoumena, rituals, and symbols, but the identity of the Christian groups or individuals that are the targets of its polemics are difficult to decide. I will nevertheless point out some possibilities below, without in any way claiming this to be a comprehensive overview.

849 For the identification of the initiated Christian as “Christ,” see, e.g., Tertullian, On Baptism 7 (see Finn, Italy, North Africa, and Egypt); Cyril of Jerusalem, Baptismal Catechesis 3 (see Finn, West and East Syria, 49–50); Kilian McDonnell and George T. Montague, Christian Initiation and Baptism in the Holy Spirit: Evidence from the First Eight Centuries (2nd rev. ed.; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994), 210.

850 Gaffron, Studien, 65.

851 Gaffron, Studien, 65.

852 As Wilson has noted, “It is a striking fact that some of the closest parallels to the Gnostic Gospel of Philip are to be found not in Gnostic texts but in Irenaeus, and not in his extracts from Gnostic documents but in his own Demonstration of the Christian faith” (Robert McL. Wilson, “Gnosis, Gnosticism and the New Testament,” in Le Origini dello Gnosticismo: Colloquio di Messina 13–18 Aprile 1966: Testi e讨论i [ed. Ugo Bianchi; SHR 12; Leiden: Brill, 1967], 525 n. 2).
4.3.1.1. *Creed*

We noted earlier that there might very well be an important credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*, and the suggestion by Isenberg that this might be an earlier relative of the Constantinopolitan creed of 381. Let us now look closer at some of the indications that there may indeed be a credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*, focusing here first and foremost on Christology. It is outside of the scope of the present study to conduct any in-depth analysis of *Gos. Phil.*’s relationship to early Christian creeds, so I will limit myself to a few remarks on a couple of issues pertinent to the analyses conducted above.

In the words of Gabriele Winkler, “Christological disputes resulted in considerable efforts to clarify Jesus’ relationship to his Father.”853 Questions included whether Christ was to be regarded as pre-existent, whether he was made or begotten, whether he received his sonship from his birth from the Virgin Mary or from baptism, and of the relationship between his human and divine elements. Some, for example, “stressed the beginning of Jesus’ Divine Sonship at the river Jordan: Jesus became the Christ and was proclaimed the Son of God only by virtue of the Spirit who descended on Jesus at his baptism,” while others “insisted on the pre-existence of the Logos and his miraculous birth by the Virgin Mary through the power of the Holy Spirit.”854 These are of course, as we have seen, exactly the kind of issues that are discussed in *Gos. Phil.*

4.3.1.1.1. “Begotten, Not Made”

An especially conspicuous element in *Gos. Phil.* with regard to a possible credal intertext and a clue to the tractate’s polemical context is its emphasis on the crucial differences between begetting and creating, and its focus on the christological point that Christ was not made, but begotten. This is indeed, as we have seen, a highly important aspect of *Gos. Phil.*’s rhetoric since, by means of the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, it underlies most of *Gos. Phil.*’s argument with regard to the efficacy of the Christian rites of initiation. The relationship between the Father and the Son and the subsequent father-son relations perpetuated through apostolic succession, where each generation of Christians is begotten and reborn as

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Christs by one of Christ’s successors, who are all begotten as sons and beget as fathers, are without doubt of fundamental importance to the sacramental theology of Gos. Phil., and as such among the tractate’s main themes throughout, connecting its Christology and anthropology with its mystagogy.

“Begetting” and “creating” were key terms in the Arian controversy of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{855} In the early phases of the trinitarian debates of the fourth century the focus was not so much on the trinity per se, as it was on the relationship between the Father and the Son. One particularly important aspect of the controversy was the question of whether the Son could be described as created by the Father, and the famous statement that the Son was “begotten, not made” (γεννηθηναι ου πουηθηναι ενταυχαι ηταυταιῳ άληθεν) was introduced in the Nicene Creed especially to counter the “Arian” view which was anathematised at this council.\textsuperscript{856} The matter was not finally settled by the decisions at Nicea, however, but the debate raged on for the remainder of the century, with shifting fortunes for those involved, in a historical process of baffling complexity.\textsuperscript{857} It should be clear by now how this is relevant to Gos. Phil., for we have seen that the question of begetting versus creating is of central importance to this text. Indeed, the principle of “begotten, not made” is in fact applied to a range of issues not confined to the simple relationship between God, the Father, and Christ, the Son. While a figure like Athanasius, for example, focused on the relation between the first and the second person of the trinity (God the Father, and Christ the Logos) and argued against the Arians that Christ was not created, but begotten, and hence was not a creature, but an offspring, Gos. Phil. takes this one step


\textsuperscript{856} See, e.g., Grillmeier, From the Apostolic Age, 267; Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 237. For the Coptic text of the Nicene creed, see M. Eugène Revillout, Le concile de Nicée, après les textes coptes et les diverses collections canoniques (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1881).

\textsuperscript{857} See, e.g., Hanson, The Search; R. Williams, Arius; Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy; Grillmeier, From the Apostolic Age; Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines.
further. While being in agreement with a position like that held by Athanasius with regard to the relationship between the Father and the Son, Gos. Phil. also applies this relationship to that between Christ and the Christians, and to an interpretation of the rites of initiation, arguing that a proper Christian initiation involves the begetting of new offspring, new Christians, by a Father. In order to become a proper Christian, which in this text involves an important element of deification, it is crucial that when one becomes “a Christ” one must be begotten, not made, by way of a line of apostolic succession by means of ritual initiation stretching all the way back to Christ’s baptism in the Jordan—a baptism that is also interpreted in terms of a begetting.

In addition, the passage Gos. Phil. 81.21–26, which discusses the difference between begetting ((visitor) and creating (cwnt) at length, seems not only quite clearly to be dependent on the delineation of these important terms in the Arian debate, but we indeed find a close parallel in an unidentified anti-Arian Coptic fragment in the Pierpont Morgan collection. The preserved fragment begins as follows:

\[\text{Ἀνων ἵνα ἄνων πεσάμενται καὶ μεταχείρισεν \\

But as for us, we are creatures and those who have come into being through us are creatures, but in God, the uncreated, his offspring is not a creature. If he begat, then he did not create, but if he begat after the creation, how was he created first and begotten afterwards?\]

While this fragment does not draw the mystagogical and deificatory implications from the christological “begotten, not made”-principle as Gos. Phil. does, it does give us a discussion of the differences between creating and begetting in highly similar terms and, as becomes clear from the fragment as a whole, in a context where the anti-Arian nature of this particular discussion and the post-Nicene date of the text is not in doubt.

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858 See the discussion above.
859 This is Pierpont Morgan Library Coptic Manuscript M706b, published by Leo Depuydt in 1993 as entry No. 82, an unattributed Homiletic Fragment (Depuydt, Catalogue, 1:163).
860 Homiletic Fragment (Depuydt, Catalogue, 1:163).
861 The text also makes reference to questions central to the Nestorian debate of the fifth century.
By implication, then, since, while Origen, for example, did hold the Son to be begotten, the “theology of Origen’s day had not yet established the distinction between creation and generation that was to prove so crucial to the triadological debates of the following century,” it does seem likely that this aspect of Gos. Phil. should not be dated earlier than the Arian debate of the fourth century. Moreover, since this distinction is of key importance in several of Gos. Phil.’s most central discussions, one might indeed go so far as to say that there is an anti-Arian strand running deep throughout Gos. Phil.

With regard to the use of begetting-imagery in Gos. Phil. it is also worthy of note that it also describes “the children of the perfect man” (ἐἰς ὧδε ἐπέτελεν ἔρωμε) as “these who do not die, but are always begotten” (ταῖς ἁμαρτήνιοι ἅλλα σεξήπτι ἔνοιγον υοεων ην), a statement that looks very much like a reference to the doctrine of the eternal begetting of the Son, a doctrine that is found especially in Origen and in the Nicene Creed. Gos. Phil. seems to apply this doctrine not only to Christ, but also, in accordance with the underlying the Christian is a Christ blend, to each individual Christian, who as we have seen are identified as “sons / children of the perfect man.”

4.3.1.1.2. The Virgin Birth

We have seen that Gos. Phil. is adamant that the Virgin Mary did not conceive by the Holy Spirit. How does this stack up against the main early Christian creeds? Most early Western creeds mention Christ’s birth from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, but there were different ways of putting it. Christ was either born “from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary” or “from the Holy Spirit, from the Virgin Mary.” Especially interesting with regard to Gos. Phil., however, is the reading, first attested by Jerome to have been used at Rimini in 359, which stated that Christ

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863 *Gos. Phil.* 58.20–22. Cf. also *Gos. Phil.* 64.10–12, where Christ’s pre-existence is stressed.

864 See, e.g., Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age*, 175–176, 230.

865 The phrase used is mainly *qui natus est de Spiritu sancto et Maria virgine*, as in the Milanese creed we know from Augustine, or *qui natus est de Spiritu sancto ex Maria*
“was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born from the Virgin Mary.”866 This is exactly the kind of interpretation of Christ’s virgin birth that is explicitly rejected by Gos. Phil., and our tractate was by no means alone in rejecting an interpretation along these lines. Rufinus, in his Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed, stresses that Christ was “born by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin,” and is adamant, like Gos. Phil., that this did not in any way involve any defilement.867 The role of the Holy Spirit in this, according to Rufinus, appealing to Ezek 44.2, was to construct a temple for the Son in the womb of Mary.868 In the Eastern creeds, on the other hand, we do not find any close connection between the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary prior to the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381. The Nicene creed does not even mention the Virgin Mary, and the Council of Antioch, early in 325, simply stated that the “Son, the divine Logos,” was “born in flesh from Mary the Mother of God and made incarnate.”869

We may thus conclude that Gos. Phil. is not in line with the kind of addition made to the Apostles’ Creed in Rimini in 359, but it would not have contradicted the Eastern type of creed on this point, and its position may well have been compatible with Rufinus’ interpretation of the nativity.

4.3.1.1.3. The Resurrection of the Flesh
We have seen that the resurrection occupies a prominent position in Gos. Phil. and we saw in the analysis of Gos. Phil.’s views on the resurrection that, although it interprets it in a less than intuitive fashion, Gos. Phil. seems to take special pains to describe the resurrection in terms of the exact phrase “in this flesh” (οὗ ἐκατερω). But why does Gos. Phil. employ the language of arising “in this flesh” when what it is really advocating is a resurrection in the flesh of Christ? We saw that the fact that Gos. Phil. does not formulate its position that one must rise in the flesh of Christ more clearly would seem to suggest that the wording “in this flesh” was important in itself, which would again indicate that Gos. Phil. may be referring to an important authoritative intertext. Could there in fact be a credal formula underlying the use of this phrase in Gos. Phil.?

virgine, as in the Milanese creed of Ambrose and in the creeds of Aquileia, Ravenna, and Turin (see Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 173–174), and indeed in the Apostolic Tradition (see Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 114).
866 See Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 376.
867 See Rufinus, Symb., 9 in Kelly, Rufinus, 42.
868 See Rufinus, Symb., 9 in Kelly, Rufinus, 42–43.
Granted, as all commentators on Gos. Phil. have duly noted, the resurrection was a hot topic in the doctrinal debates of the second century. What has been largely ignored, however, is the fact that the topic returned with a vengeance in the late fourth century, under the aegis of the Origenist controversy, and continued to be of great importance well into the fifth.\(^{870}\) The question of the resurrection of the flesh became an especially important point of contention in the Origenist controversy around the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth. In a letter targeting his former friend Rufinus in 399, Jerome states that

> There are some who believe, they say, in the resurrection of the body. This confession, if only it be sincere, is free from objection. But as there are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial . . . they use the word ‘body’ instead of the word ‘flesh’ in order that an orthodox person hearing them say ‘body’ may take them to mean ‘flesh,’ while a heretic will understand that they mean ‘spirit.’\(^{871}\) (Jerome, Ep. 84.5)

Rufinus, for his part, replies that what rises in the resurrection “will be this very flesh in which we now live. We do not hold, as is slanderously reported by some men, that another flesh will rise instead of this; but this very flesh.”\(^{872}\) In relation to these views, then, it is interesting to note that Gos. Phil. actually affirms the resurrection “in this flesh” while in fact holding that what rises is really another flesh—exactly the kind of redefinition, then, that Rufinus is accused of and tries to defend himself against.

J.N.D. Kelly suggests that the reason why many creeds refer to the resurrection of the flesh rather than to the resurrection of the dead, the form preferred by the New Testament, was in order to “counter antirealist interpretations of the doctrine of the resurrection.”\(^{873}\) Although

\(^{870}\) See, e.g., Clark, The Origenist Controversy. Dechow notes that among Egyptian monastics “the doctrine of resurrection still seems to have been in flux before Shenoute’s time, despite Epiphanius’ polemic and the opposition from simpler Coptic monks to speculative eschatologies” (Dechow, Dogma and Mysticism, 231–232). See also D.W. Young, “The Milieu of Nag Hammadi.” For examples of the fifth-century discussions of this topic in Coptic, see, e.g., Shenoute, I Am Amazed, 389–390, 401–404; Shenoute, There is Another Foolishness; Shenoute, God is Holy; Shenoute, Who Speaks Through the Prophets; Shenoute, A19.

\(^{871}\) English translation from Joanne E. McWilliam Dewart, Death and Resurrection (Message of the Fathers of the Church 22; Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1986), 145.

\(^{872}\) Rufinus, Apology, 3–4; English translation from Dewart, Death and Resurrection, 146.

\(^{873}\) Kelly, Rufinus, 149 n. 258.
the Nicene creed does not treat the resurrection of the dead at all, a statement concerning the resurrection of the flesh is included in a number of other fourth- and fifth-century creeds both Eastern and Western. According to Kelly, however, the addition of “this” before “flesh” “is peculiar to the Aquileian creed,” used by Rufinus. In his *Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed*, Rufinus refers to this wording in order to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material body. “The word ‘this,’” Rufinus states, “refers to the actual flesh of the Christian who recites the creed.” Could it be that *Gos. Phil.* is actually referring to a credal formula with the same wording, which was originally introduced to counter the interpretation that it is not the material body that rises, in order to argue exactly the opposite? This seems to be a distinct possibility, for it would not seem to be necessary for *Gos. Phil.* to emphasise the need to rise in “this flesh” if such a wording was not authoritative in itself, and thus taken for granted, since the most intuitive interpretation of that phrase would run counter to the one actually given by *Gos. Phil.* If we accept this conclusion, *Gos. Phil.* may actually be trying to counter the intended effects of the introduction of the demonstrative “this” in the phrase “this flesh” by affirming that of course we must rise “in this flesh,” while at the same time reinterpreting the phrase to suit its own interpretation of the resurrection that does not, after all, involve the material flesh. The tractate might, in other words, be engaged in a polemic against others who, like Rufinus claims to be doing, use such a credal formula to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material flesh.

A.H.C. van Eijk, however, argues that while *Gos. Phil.* expresses agreement with the formulas “σαρκ/ομικρος ἀνάστασις ἐν (τ/ιος) σαρκ/ί,” which he acknowledges “were accepted by the ‘orthodox’ church,”

874 See Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150 n. 268.
875 Rufinus, *Symb.* 43, quoted from Kelly, *Rufinus*, 81. See also *Symb.* 45 (Kelly, *Rufinus*, 83–84). Kelly notes that one of the Origenist errors Rufinus was accused of was the rejection of the resurrection of the flesh (see Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150 n. 268). This prompted Rufinus to state elsewhere that “I have made mention not only of the body, as to which cavils are raised, but of the flesh: and not only of the flesh, but I have added ‘this flesh.’ Further, I have spoken not only of ‘this flesh,’ but of ‘this natural flesh.’ I have not even stopped here, but have asserted that not even the completeness of the several members will be lacking. I have only demanded that, in harmony with the Apostle’s words, it should rise incorruptible instead of corruptible, glorious instead of dishonoured, immortal instead of frail, spiritual instead of natural; and that we should think of the members of the spiritual body as being without taint of corruption or frailty” (Rufinus, *Apol. Orig.*, 1.9, quoted from Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150–151 n. 268).
the tractate also criticises these formulas.\textsuperscript{877} I think, however, that it is unnecessary to postulate any criticism of the formula itself on the part of Gos. Phil. Instead, it is probably more correct to say that the tractate takes pains to interpret the formula in a way that fits its overall theological system, while taking the formula itself for granted, even attacking those who would deny it. It is diverging interpretations of the formula, and especially attempts to use it to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material flesh (which was indeed its intention) that is criticised.\textsuperscript{878} One indeed gets the impression that Gos. Phil. is here in a sense sailing under false flag, giving the impression of affirming the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, and thus conforming to accepted dogma, while arguing what in reality amounts to the opposite. In the context of the late fourth and early fifth century, this may, however, be quite understandable in light of the increasing importance of being in line with the authoritative statements on key doctrinal issues. What we may be witnessing in Gos. Phil. may thus be an act of redefinition of the doctrinal statement concerning resurrection “in this flesh” in order to make it suit its own quite distinct theological agenda.

As for Gos. Phil.’s interpretation of Scripture in its statements concerning the resurrection flesh, van Eijk noted in his 1971 article on the resurrection in Gos. Phil. that the tractate “offers an interesting and original interpretation” of 1 Cor 15:50, “by linking the flesh and blood in 1 Cor 15,50 with the flesh and blood of John 6,53–56.”\textsuperscript{879} The reason why he found this interpretation to be original was “because this surprising link appears nowhere in the Christian (incl. gnostic) literature on the resurrection up to the end of the third century.”\textsuperscript{880} Since van Eijk assumed that Gos. Phil. should be dated significantly earlier, he argued that because “the link between the Eucharist and the resurrection appears in no other Christian document before the third century, we may assume that the

\textsuperscript{877} See Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 95.

\textsuperscript{878} Dwight Young has shown that Shenoute of Atri was also engaged in polemics regarding the resurrection of the flesh in ways corresponding to Gos. Phil. Commenting on the similarities between a letter of Shenoute directed against “foolish notions” and “senseless ideas” concerning the resurrection, Young notes that Gos. Phil.’s statement concerning the necessity of rising in this flesh “was just as timely in Shenoute’s day as it was when first written. The same argument was still taking place in communities along the Nile” (see D.W. Young, “The Milieu of Nag Hammadi,” 130–131). This leads Young to conclude that “It may be the case that Shenoute was not aware of the existence of Philip, but we need not dismiss the possibility” (ibid., 131).

\textsuperscript{879} Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.

\textsuperscript{880} Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.
author of Ev.Phil. when putting John 6,53 and 1 Cor. 15,50 together, drew his awareness of the existence of such a link directly from the text of John 6.881 It is worth noting, however, that if we redate the text to the fourth or fifth century, Gos. Phil. is not particularly original on this point at all.

4.3.2. Anti-Judaism and Associative Anti-Judaism

Isenberg has claimed that Gos. Phil. "does not engage in any rhetorical invective against the Jews."882 But is this really the case? We have seen repeatedly in the discussions above that there indeed seems to be a noticeable polemic against Judaism throughout Gos. Phil. First and foremost, the initiation procedure of the Christians is contrasted with that of the Jews. Borchert has rightly noted that in Gos. Phil.’s statement that “he who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still” (ⲡⲉⲛⲧⲁϫⲓⲡϫⲟⲉⲓ ⲃⲛ ⲛⲛⲧⲉⲃⲣⲁⲓⲟⲥ ⲉⲧⲓ),883 “the term Hebrew is probably regarded as a derogatory title implying incompleteness or non-transformation.”884 According to this tractate the Jewish initiation rites are inferior to the Christian ones on a number of counts. Not only do the Jews not receive the Lord, but neither do they receive the Holy Spirit in initiation. In Gos. Phil. the reception of the Holy Spirit is closely connected to the chrismation interpreted in terms of a father’s begetting of sons, and regarded as something that bestows the quality of being a Christ. The Hebrews do not have a father, and consequently they do not receive the Holy Spirit, nor do they become Christs. And, as we have seen, due to this lack in their initiation rites Gos. Phil. implies that like earthenware vessels cannot be remade, the Jews will not be resurrected.

What Gos. Phil. seems to be doing is to highlight some important aspects of Christian initiation and community organisation using Judaism rhetorically as the “other” by which it defines itself.885 Procreation- and kinship-metaphors are in Gos. Phil. used to present Christianity as patrilineal against the matrilineality of Judaism, and also to contrast

883 Gos. Phil. 62.5–6.
884 Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 182. Although Borchert suggests that “it may have been used as a reference to ‘orthodox’ Christians, who did not receive the Lord in the manner which Philip advocates,” he concedes that the passage “could be interpreted without any Gnostic premises” (ibid., 182–183).
the begetting and birth of potentially “fertile” Christians through ritual initiation, over against Judaism’s mere creation of “infertile” proselytes. Moreover, the Hebrews/Jews represent not only contemporary Jews, but also Judaism as the state prior to Christianity, both in a historical and in an individual sense, and Judaism is thus presented as having been superseded by Christianity. The differences between Jews and Christians are also discussed in an unfortunately badly damaged part of the manuscript:

from the Jews [...] the Christians [...] these places are called [...] the chosen race of [...] and the true man and the Son of Man and the seed of the Son of Man. This true race is renowned in the world. These are the places where the children of the bridal chamber dwell. (Gos. Phil. 75.33–76.6)

The “children of the bridal chamber” must here be understood as the Christians, and they seem to be contrasted with the Jewish people. Although the passage is riddled with lacunae, it seems probable that Gos. Phil. is here referring to the Christians as a “true race” (γενος ἡλιθενον) in direct polemics against the Jews who claim to be “the chosen race” (πανος ετσοττι).

We have also seen that Gos. Phil. connects the (old) Tree of Knowledge, which brought death, with the Jewish law, and that the tractate rejects the Jewish dietary restrictions. Interestingly, Gos. Phil. not only sets up a dichotomy of the old and new trees of knowledge, the one being the Jewish law and the other being identified with the cross and Christianity, however, but the same dichotomy is also presented in terms of wisdom:

Echamoth is one thing and Echmoth is another. Echamoth is simply Wisdom, but Echmoth is the wisdom of death, which is the wisdom which knows death, this which is called the little Wisdom.

(Gos. Phil. 60.10–15)

886 Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
In light of how Gos. Phil. presents the old and the new knowledge, then, we see here how the wisdom of death is similarly contrasted with the true wisdom, the former thus being easily identified with Judaism, and the latter with Christianity. This contrast between the old and new wisdom is also reflected elsewhere in the tractate, in slightly different terms. We are told twice that wisdom is “barren” (στεῖρα), the second time in highly allusive terms:

τεόφια ετούηνοτ[ε ἐρό]ες ἔπεττηρα ὑτος τε τιςν[γ ὑπά]γες

The wisdom that is called the barren, she is the [mother of the angels]

(Gos. Phil. 63.30–32)

Scholars have come to different conclusions regarding the identity of these angels. It is important, however, to note that the passage evokes Isa 54:1, especially as this passage is quoted and interpreted by Paul in Galatians. Paul quotes Isa 54:1 at Gal 4:27:

γέγραπται γάρ Εὐς φικόρνοι οἵ τινες ἡμάς ἡμέναι δέν καὶ τίκτοις καὶ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου ἢ τῆς ἐν δούλον ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐν ἀνδρά

For it is written: Rejoice, barren one who does not bear; cry out and call out, you who do not give birth, for she who does not have a husband has many more children than she who has a husband.

(Gal 4:27)

887 This passage has most often been interpreted in terms of the “Valentinian” doctrine of the higher and lower Sophia’s (see, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 35; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186; Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 8), but as Thomassen has rightly noted, “Gos. Phil. merely comments on the Aramaic form of a commonly used term, just as it does elsewhere with several other items of theological vocabulary,” and he also points out that the distinction made here “does not correspond very well with the way the two Sophias are described” in the heresiological sources (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 276; cf. also George W. MacRae, “The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth,” NovT 12:2 [1970]: 95).

888 Gos. Phil. 59.31–32; 63.30–32.

889 Schenke, struggling to make the passage conform to his notion of “Valentinianism,” comes to the conclusion that the angels must be the archons, on the basis of the following argument: “Denn, da ja dieser Satz irgendwie in die valentinianischen Grundkategorien hineinpassen muss, können die Engel diese Kinder nicht sein. Von den Engeln des Soter, die die Bräutigame der Geistseelen und also natürlich auch selbst pneumatisch sind, ist sie nicht die Mutter, und die Engel, als diren Mutter sie gelten kann, nämlich der Demiurg und die übrigen Archonten, sind nicht pneumatisch. Gleichwohl können hier mit den Engeln nur diese Archonten gemeint sein” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 335). In the same vein, Wilson identifies these angels with “planetary powers” (see Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 115).

890 γεγραμμένα γάρ, Εὐφράνητη, στεῖρα ἢ οὔ τίκτωρα, ὁτὲς τοι ζών καὶ βόσμους, ἢ οὕς ὕδαινουσα ὡσ τοι πολλὰ τὰ ἑξειμός μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἔχοντος τὸν ἄνδρα.

891 οἰκεῖα is the Coptic equivalent of στεῖρα.
Both of these intertexts resonate well with the passage in Gos. Phil., but especially the way Paul interprets the barren woman in Isa 54.\textsuperscript{892} In Isaiah it is Jerusalem who is the barren woman, and Isa 54.1 is a promise of the future restoration of the city.\textsuperscript{893} In other words, there will come a time when the barren woman will have many more children than she who is now doing well, who probably represents Babylon.\textsuperscript{894} Paul, however, uses this verse in an allegorical interpretation of the story of Sarah and Hagar in Genesis. In Paul’s interpretation the barren woman represents Sarah and the other woman Hagar. Moreover, in Paul’s interpretation Hagar further represents the old covenant and Sarah the new.\textsuperscript{895} Taking our cue from the interpretation of the old and new wisdom/knowledge elsewhere in Gos. Phil., where the old wisdom represents Judaism, and the new wisdom represents Christianity, and blending it with Paul’s allegorical interpretation in Galatians of the two women in Isa 54:1 as the old and new covenant, Judaism and Christianity, the barren wisdom who bears the angels according to the passage in Gos. Phil. may plausibly be taken to represent Christianity. The identity of the angels may then logically be understood as a reference to the Christians. This makes sense in light of what we have seen above concerning both the Christians and Christ being like the angels, and the passage also becomes yet another example of Gos. Phil.’s anti-Jewish polemics, where the Christians, in full accordance with Paul’s intertextual exegesis of Genesis in Gal 4 in light of Isa 54:1, have taken the place of the Jews as God’s chosen people, the “true race” (γένος Ἰακωβειτών) as Gos. Phil. puts it. It is thus Christianity that is the new wisdom, which is giving birth to the angelic race of Christians, while Judaism by implication is obsolete as the old redundant wisdom and covenant, as Judaism paradoxically becomes identified with Hagar and Christianity with Sarah.\textsuperscript{896}


\textsuperscript{893} See Boer, “Paul’s Quotation,” 371.

\textsuperscript{894} See Boer, “Paul’s Quotation,” 371.

\textsuperscript{895} See Boer, “Paul’s Quotation,” 375.

\textsuperscript{896} Cf. the analysis of Paul’s exegesis in Boer, “Paul’s Quotation,” 375–389. Boer argues that Paul is engaged in a polemic mainly directed against the Jewish Christians of the Jerusalem community of James. Gos. Phil., however, seems to use Paul’s exegesis in a polemical delineation of Christianity and Judaism.
Elsewhere, Gos. Phil. also engages in a rhetoric in favour of the Christian idea of the ultimate sacrifice of Christ on the cross, making pagan and Jewish sacrificial customs obsolete. Gos. Phil. points out that the practice of animal sacrifice belongs to the pre-Christian era, and gives a rather unique explanation:

And animals were offered up to the powers, for those who were offered up to were animals (themselves). They were offered up alive, but when they were offered up they died. Man was offered up to God dead, and he lived. (Gos. Phil. 54.36–55.5)

Once again Gos. Phil.'s mirror-logic is at work. The reason why people previously sacrificed animals was because they sacrificed to animals, and not to gods. The tractate also returns to this theme at a later stage in the text where it presents God as the opposite of the “animal” powers to whom people previously sacrificed. Contrary to these, states Gos. Phil., God does not eat animals:

God eats man, and that is why man was sacrificed to him. Man is here of course to be understood as “the perfect man,” Christ, and the sacrifice is the crucifixion. It should be noted that the use of the imagery of eating in this passage also effectively identifies the crucified Jesus with food, and, especially taken together with the rest of Gos. Phil.'s discourse around food and eating, links this sacrifice firmly with the Eucharist. Understood within Gos. Phil.'s logic of deification and succession, within the general framework of the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, when one eats the eucharistic sacrifice one is in a sense on the level of Christ, and by extension God, as a perfect man consuming the perfect.

897 Cf. also Gos. Phil. 71.35–72.4: πιθανότατο ταλαιπωρούν τον θρόνον του Θεού εγγυτέρως, και γίνεται το ερντογανικόν του Θεού, επειδή ο Θεός θα μαθήματα μαθαίνει σπούδασμα μεταβολής και προφήτευσης με την προφητεία της Μαρίας και της Κατερίνας ("God makes [man ... men] make God. Thus in the world men make gods and they worship their creations. It would be appropriate for the gods to worship the men").
In these passages, then, *Gos. Phil.* employs several by now familiar motifs. Interestingly, it also turns this anti-sacrificial polemic\(^{898}\) into yet another argument for the soteriological effects of the Christian sacraments, using its strategy of subverting the meaning of the concepts of life and death. While the animals that were sacrificed were alive when they were sacrificed and ended up dead, Christ was in a sense dead, i.e., not yet alive, when he was crucified, since it was his “death” on the cross that actually led to life. Furthermore, the individual Christian is not fully alive until he has experienced “the power of the cross” through the chrismation and the Eucharist—both of which are life-giving sacraments that are linked to the crucifixion and the resurrection.

This reinterpretation of sacrifice, which basically rejects animal sacrifice in favour of Christ’s once-and-for-all sacrifice and its eucharistic re-enactment, can be said to have a polemical edge towards contemporary pagan practice while at the same time presenting itself as superseding the old and now obsolete Jewish sacrificial practices. It should be noted, however, that the chronological opposition of before and after Christ is elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* explicitly connected to the Hebrew-Christian dichotomy, a fact that would easily bestow an anti-Jewish flavour to its discourse concerning the old and the new mode of sacrifice as well.

So, *Gos. Phil.* is acutely aware of the fact that Christianity sprang out of Judaism and makes a point of presenting the latter as an earlier stage of history that has now been superseded by the former. That this should also mean that the apostles of Christ were in fact at one stage Hebrews is also acknowledged:

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\text{ⲙⲁⲣⲓⲁ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲡⲑⲉⲛⲟⲥ ⲉⲧⲉ ̄ⲙⲡⲉⲇⲩⲛⲁⲙⲓⲥ ϫⲁϩⲙⲉⲥ ⲉⲥϣⲟⲟⲡ ̄ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲛⲟϭ ̄ⲛⲛⲁⲛⲟϣ ⲁⲯ ⲁⲟⲱ}
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“Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled.”\(^{899}\) It is a great oath of the Hebrews,\(^{900}\) who are the apostles and [the] apostolic.

*(Gos. Phil. 55.27–30)*

Scholars have had trouble with this identification of the Hebrews, which is clearly a negative term in the rest of the tractate, with the apostles,

\(^{898}\) This polemic is clearly based on Hebrews 9–10.

\(^{899}\) For the phrase “the virgin whom no power defiled” (τπρφενος ετενεδύναμις χαρις), cf. also Hyp. Arch. 92.2–3, where a highly similar phrase is used of Norea, the daughter of Eve.

who are clearly presented positively elsewhere in the text.\textsuperscript{901} The usual understanding of the passage, along the lines of Isenberg’s translation “She is a great anathema to the Hebrews, who are the apostles and [the] apostolic men,”\textsuperscript{902} has caused scholars trouble, since it, quite out of step with the rest of Gos. Phil., seems to give a negative evaluation of the apostles. Scholars have usually tried to account for this by appealing to the tractate’s supposedly composite nature and by regarding it as an interpolation.\textsuperscript{903} The passage may correspond to the rest of the tractate, however, if we take it to refer to “the apostles” (ἱποστολοκος) and “the apostolic” ([ἱ]αποστολικος) as the good Hebrews, that is, those Hebrews who were the first to become Christians. We have already seen that the criterion for no longer being a Hebrew is to “receive the Lord.” Being the first to “receive the Lord,” the Virgin Mary thus becomes in effect the first Christian. However, what is meant by Gos. Phil.’s reference to Mary as ο γησ ι νηνοι ι νηφεβρως remains unclear. The main problem is how to understand the otherwise unattested term αἰνος. At present there seems to be no better solution than to understand this as an unattested variant spelling of αιων.\textsuperscript{904} If we understand αἰνως in its primary meaning of “oath,” we may perhaps regard the entire phrase “Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled” as an oath—understood as a powerful statement of doctrine by the apostles and the apostolic? I thus take ες- in εςοοοο to refer not strictly to Mary, but to the entire phrase, or simply to the dogma of Mary as a virgin undefiled by the powers.\textsuperscript{905}

\textsuperscript{901} This is in no small part due to the common translation of αἰνως as “anathema.” See note above for discussion. Siker claims that the use of the term “Hebrews” here refers to “non-gnostic Christians” (Siker, “Gnostic Views,” 277).

\textsuperscript{902} See Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 151.

\textsuperscript{903} See, e.g., Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 279.

\textsuperscript{904} The likelihood of this is supported by the spellings χαρινκες and χαρινου at 55:32 and 33 instead of χαρινης and χαρινου respectively (although we do find the spelling χαρινης at 55:28). Giversen instead suggests reading ινωνερη ας ινι-αιωνη, but as ινι-αιωνη, understanding αιων as the plural qualitative of αιων, rather than reading αιωνι as an unattested variant of αιων, and translates “idet hun er herre over dem, der tilhører hebræernes mængder, det vil sige apostlene og de apostoliske” (see Giversen, Filipsevangeliet, 47 n. 7; Crum 22b). Kasser has suggested that αιων should be understood here as “crown” (See Rodolphe Kasser, Compléments au Dictionnaire Copte de Crum [Bibliothèque d'études coptes 7; Cairo: Publications de l’Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1964], 2–3).

\textsuperscript{905} Cf. Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 215. Schenke’s overall solution is somewhat different, however, translating: “Maria ist die Jungfrau, die keine Macht besudelt hat.—Für die Hebräer, das heißt (für) die Apostel und die Apostelähnliche, ist es in höchstem Maße verdammungswürdig” (Schenke, Das Philippus-Evangelium, 23, 215).
Finally, we may also recall that Gos. Phil. reinterprets circumcision, by understanding Abraham’s circumcision as simply a call to “destroy the flesh,” and there may possibly be a critique of Jewish Sabbath practices underlying the badly damaged section Gos. Phil. 52.32–35. In summary it seems quite clear that Gos. Phil. devotes much space to discourses delineating Christianity from Judaism, both with regard to ritual practice, ritual efficacy, historical destiny, and soteriology. Now, the question is, to what degree are the anti-Jewish polemics of Gos. Phil. directed specifically towards the Jews themselves? The fact that Gos. Phil. polemicises against Judaism and Jewish practices in a polemic that may have other Christians both as its primary intended audience and its main targets does not automatically make the tractate’s descriptions of Jews simply into descriptions of other Christians. Gos. Phil.’s anti-Jewish polemics would for instance be easily understandable in a hypothetical general milieu in which there was a relatively strong Jewish presence, that is, in an environment where actual Jews and Judaism would be well known to the Christian audience. Perhaps one might even suggest the presence of a certain competition between Judaism and Christianity underlying some of the rhetoric of Gos. Phil., and consequently a need to argue the case for the supersession of the former by the latter? There are many possible locations that would fit such a description, as there were strong Jewish communities all over the Roman empire and beyond, the greatest number being in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Rome. There was close contact between Christians and Jews well into the fifth century, and thus throughout the period of Gos. Phil.’s possible authorship, and we know that as late as the late fourth century, many Christians even attended Jewish synagogues.

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906 See Gos. Phil. 82.26–29.
907 Contrary to Siker, “Gnostic Views.”
909 See Wilken, Judaism, 36.
910 See Robin Darling Young, “Judaism and Christianity,” EEC: 635. It may also be noted that the Adversus Judaeos genre was popular in the fourth century and beyond, especially in the east where the Jewish presence was strongest. As Young states it, church leaders in this period tried to “dissuade Christians from an apparently customary association with Jews, including participation in Jewish festivals, consultaion of rabbis, and reverence for Jewish scriptures” (ibid., 636). On this genre, see, e.g. A. Lukyn Williams, Adversus Judaeos: A Bird’s-Eye View of Christian Apologiae Until the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935).
However, there are also strong indications that Gos. Phil.’s anti-Jewish polemics are at least not exclusively directed against the Jews themselves. By reading Gos. Phil. in the context of the Arian crisis of the fourth century, we see that Arianism is easily called to mind by way of the pervasive focus in Gos. Phil. on begetting versus creating, which is subsequently connected to Judaism by the tractate’s explicit contrasting of Christianity (i.e., its own brand of Christianity) with Judaism on this very issue. This does not mean, however, that Gos. Phil. refers only to other Christians and not to Jews or Judaism, as some scholars have suggested. What it means is that the text’s explicit references to Jews and Judaism may easily have been read as simultaneously associating contemporary inner-Christian opponents with the practices and beliefs of the Jews, with all the negative implications entailed by such an identification.

Association of Arians and other Christian heretics with Jews was in fact a common rhetorical strategy in patristic literature. Athanasius, for example, often attacked the Arians by way of anti-Jewish polemics. David Brakke shows how Athanasius had no problems lumping together “Jews, Arians, Melitians, and all other ‘heretics” in the same box and thus often polemicises against these groups at the same time. A good example of this is when Athanasius in his 37th Festal Letter connects the Jews who mock Christ, asking him to come down from the Cross if he really is the Son of God, with the Arians and the Melitians, stating that “the Arians and their parasites the Melitians envied these evils, for they procured for themselves the ignorance of the Jews.”

Brakke tries to contextualize Athanasius’ polemics even more specifically, suggesting that with the Jewish quarter being not far from the church where Arius was ministering, “Athanasius’ polemical associations of the Arians with the Jews may have had additional force within the topography of urban Alexandria.” Certainly, in such a historical context, we may safely assume that the possibility of associating the Arians

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911 See e.g. Siker, “Gnostic Views.”
912 For instance, Athanasius argues that in making Christ a creature and denying his divinity, the Arians also deny the resurrection, leaving Christ dead. Thus, Athanasius argues, the Arians manage to do what the Jews had hoped to accomplish, thus making the two groups equivalent (see David Brakke, “Jewish Flesh and Christian Spirit in Athanasius of Alexandria,” JECS 9:4 [2001]: 471).
913 Brakke, “Jewish Flesh,” 454.
914 See Brakke, “Jewish Flesh,” 477.
915 Brakke, “Jewish Flesh,” 465.
with the Jews would spring easily to mind. However, the presence of actual Jews in the vicinity is of course not a necessary precondition for the rhetorical effectiveness of the Judaism/Arianism connection, for the association of one’s opponents with Jews was common practice in Christianity from a very early stage. Miriam Taylor calls it “associative anti-Judaism,” which she defines as “the adaptation of anti-Judaic symbols by the writers of the early church in attempts to discredit views within the church which they oppose.”916 She states further that “in associating an opponent with Jewish faults or characteristics, the authors of the church symbolically associated a position with the typical traits known from salvation history as characteristic of that which was archetypically obsolete and typically wrong.”917 This is a practice that is evident in the writings of Athanasius, and other patristic authors, and it is also what we find in Gos. Phil., whose anti-Jewish polemics would certainly reflect badly on the ritual practices of those who did not share its own christological and mystagogical views. Indeed, the way in which Gos. Phil. presents a dichotomy between proper Christian initiation where there takes place a begetting of new Christians (presented as Christs, even), and Jewish proselyte initiation, which is presented in terms of creating, rather than begetting, could very well be read as disparaging the efficacy of Arian ritual practice—in effect stating that their ritual initiation, like Jewish proselyte initiation, only amounts to creation, and is thus not proper Christian initiation. Indeed, such a polemical inference would suggest that any apostolic succession claimed by Arians and their supporters would be null and void. It would thus amount to a rather strong criticism of their ritual practice argued as a consequence of their Christology.

5. Concluding Discussion

We have seen throughout this chapter that the parallelism between Christ and the initiated Christian is fundamental to the sacramental theology of

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**DEIFICATION AND CHRISTOLOGY IN THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP** 395

*Gos. Phil.* Its Christology is reflected in its anthropology and vice versa. So, to sum up, what may we say about the Christology, anthropology, and sacramental soteriology of *Gos. Phil.?

### 5.1. Christology and Anthropology

First of all, we saw that Christ, or at least the Logos and the Holy Spirit, is pre-existent. Secondly, *Gos. Phil.* affirms the virgin birth of Jesus from Mary, but this is probably not to be understood as a birth of the complete Saviour, which seems to require a second, baptismal, birth in the river Jordan. The Logos, however, is seemingly born from Mary in a material body, a material body that derives from the Virgin and Joseph. At his subsequent baptism in the Jordan, the Logos is then united in a baptismal anointing with the Holy Spirit who is described as “the virgin who came down” (τιμρωστος ἡγησει αὐτή), at which point his true body comes into being. Christ thus seems to consist of the Logos, referred to as his flesh, and the Holy Spirit, referred to as his blood, within a material body. By all accounts the Logos-flesh of Jesus seems to take on the role of his true flesh and “glory” which is revealed at his transfiguration on the mountain. This Logos-flesh also seems in a way to be equivalent to his soul, or at least to be presented as a counterpart of Adam’s soul. This constitution lasts from the Jordan baptism until the crucifixion, where Christ’s divinity is separated from his humanity, i.e., when the Logos-Holy Spirit pair is separated from the material body. This separation on the cross may also be interpreted as a resurrection, but is also crucially interpreted as a life-giving death, which is intimately connected to an interpretation of the Eucharist as both the food of immortality, the acquisition of the perfect man, a unification and mingling with the divine, and a perfect life-giving sacrifice that supersedes previous sacrificial cult.\(^{918}\)

In its basic outline, the Christology of *Gos. Phil.* thus corresponds to statements put in Jesus’ mouth in a text witnessed by a small parchment fragment from Upper Egypt and recently published by Charles

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\(^{918}\) This is in stark contrast to Wilson, who claims that the Christ of *Gos. Phil.* “comes not to save the world by giving his life but to restore things to their proper places and become the father of a redeemed progeny. Deliverance comes through knowledge, not through the sacrifice of Calvary” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 13–14). As in other Christian sources all of these aspects are of crucial importance in *Gos. Phil.*, and there is rather less focus on “knowledge” as such than on the crucifixion.
Hedrick.\textsuperscript{919} In this fragment, referred to by Hedrick as a “revelation discourse,” Jesus describes himself in the following terms:

\[\text{γνωρίσατε ἐμοί ἐμοὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{εἰς ἀμπελόνιον ἐναντίως τοῦ έορτοῦ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{ζωὴν περίτεκανος ζωον ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἦσαν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{γνωρίσατε ἐμοί ἐμοὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{καὶ ὁ θεός ἀπέκρυψεν τὸ σώμαμα μου ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{καὶ ἀπέκρυψεν τὸ σώμαμα μου ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{καὶ ἀπέκρυψεν τὸ σώμαμα μου ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]
\[\text{καὶ ἀπέκρυψεν τὸ σώμαμα μου ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ} \]

I came to this world to save from [death]. My bodily divinity within did not separate from my humanity for a twinkling of an eye. I am the first Logos which came from the Father. I am with my Father before all time, my divinity within being hidden as my inside. It did not separate from my humanity for a twinkling of an eye. It was constant in me until the Jews lifted me up on the cross.\textsuperscript{920}

Just as in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, the Logos is pre-existent. Just as in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, his divinity is hidden inside his humanity and only separates at the crucifixion, and just as in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, Jesus has “come to this world to save from [death]” (ἐι ἐπεκοιμήθη ἐμοί ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῷ θεῷ).

But it is not only the combination of Christ’s divinity with his humanity that is important in \textit{Gos. Phil.}, but also the composition of the divinity itself, that is, the union of the Logos and the Holy Spirit. Interestingly, the Holy Spirit is, as we have seen, described both as Christ’s mother and his partner,\textsuperscript{921} an idea that is paralleled by \textit{Gos. Phil.’s} description of the Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene:

\[\text{ἡ πρεσβύτερης ἡ Μαρία ἡ Θεοτόκος ἡ Μαρία ἡ Μεγαλάθης ἡ Μαρία ἡ Μαγδαλεύς} \]
\[\text{τῇ Μαρίᾳ τῇ Μαρίᾳ καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ} \]
\[\text{καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ τῇ Μαρίᾳ καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ} \]
\[\text{καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ τῇ Μαρίᾳ καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ} \]
\[\text{καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ τῇ Μαρίᾳ καὶ τῇ Μαρίᾳ} \]

There were three who walked with the Lord always: Mary, his mother, and her sister and Magdalene,\textsuperscript{922} who is called his companion. For Mary was his sister and his mother and his partner.\textsuperscript{923} (Gos. Phil. 59.6–11)


\textsuperscript{920} These are lines 5–15 in the fragment published by Hedrick (see Hedrick, “A Revelation Discourse,” 14). The translation is my own.


\textsuperscript{922} Cf. John 19:25; Matt 27:55–56; Mark 15:40–41.

\textsuperscript{923} Either the text is here corrupt and we should emend the first reference to a sister
Antti Marjanen has argued that “the triple function of Mary shows that no historical person is meant. She is to be seen as a mythical figure who actually belongs to the transcendent realm but who manifests herself in the women accompanying the earthly Jesus.”\footnote{Marjanen, \textit{The Woman Jesus Loved}, 161.}

A major problem with this conclusion, however, is that it ignores the fact that a similar blending of the Marys is also found in patristic sources.\footnote{See, e.g., Murray, \textit{Symbols of Church and Kingdom}, 146–148, 329–335.} Ephrem the Syrian, for example, can state that:

\begin{quote}
It is clear that Virginity is greater and nobler than ‘Holiness, for it was she who bore the Son and gave him milk from her breast; it was she who sat at his feet and did him service by washing; At the cross she was beside him, and in the resurrection she saw him.\footnote{Translation quoted from Murray, \textit{Symbols of Church and Kingdom}, 330.}
\end{quote}

\textit{(HArm. 5, 70–73)}

In this way Ephrem blends the Virgin Mary with Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany and the sinful woman in Luke 7.\footnote{Cf. Murray, \textit{Symbols of Church and Kingdom}, 330 n. 3. Such a blending of the Marys is not peculiar to Ephrem, but is also found in other Syrian sources (see Murray, \textit{Symbols of Church and Kingdom}, 146).} There is thus no reason to assume that \textit{Gos. Phil.} disregards the historicity of the Marys. Instead it seems more likely that the tractate is once again pointing out some of the deeper meanings inherent in the details of Jesus’ earthly life. In this case the deeper meaning seems to be that just as Jesus has Mary as mother, companion, and sister, so also he has the Holy Spirit as mother, companion, and sister.

The anthropology and soteriology of \textit{Gos. Phil.} seem to correspond closely to its Christology. Just as Jesus did not become the complete Christ until his reception of the Holy Spirit in his baptismal anointing, when his body truly came into being, so too the Christian only becomes a Christ upon receiving the Holy Spirit by means of a baptismal chrismation. Then

\begin{quote}
from \textit{ἡσύγων} (“her sister”) to \textit{ἡσυγών} (“his sister”), or \textit{Gos. Phil.} holds Jesus’ sister Mary to also have been his mother’s sister. The latter is in fact a possibility that is attested in certain later patristic writers, who has Mary the sister of Jesus marry Joseph’s brother, and her uncle, Clophas, and thus also become the sister of Jesus’ mother (see Richard Bauckham, “Salome the Sister of Jesus, Salome the Disciple of Jesus, and the Secret Gospel of Mark,” \textit{NovT} 33:3 [1991]: 248 n. 16).
\end{quote}
he becomes “a perfect man”—“a Christ.” In this process the soul of the initiate, like the Logos of Christ, unites with the Holy Spirit that is given as a gift and receives “the name.” And corresponding to the way in which Christ’s divinity, his true flesh and blood, is separated from the material body at the crucifixion, so too the material body of the Christian dies, while it is the Christlike resurrection body consisting of Logos-flesh and Holy Spirit-blood that rises.

5.2. Transformation and Deification

Crucially connected to the parallelism between Christ and the individual Christian is also the deificatory focus of Gos. Phil’s sacramental soteriology. As Gos. Phil. describes the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, their primary effect is the transformation of the individual into a Christ and unity with him. Transformation into Christ is the goal, and the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist are the means.

Gos. Phil. summarises important aspects of both the goal and the means in its description of Christ’s transfiguration before his disciples on the mountain. In what amounts to a prefiguration of the resurrection, he there shows himself in his glory to the disciples by making them great so that they will be able to see him as he truly is. There is an important logic of reciprocity at work here, where one becomes what one sees and sees what one has become, which is also mirrored in Gos. Phil’s eucharistic theology where one becomes what one eats and eats what one has become. Another expression of this is the description of the fact that one joins, unites, and has communion with what one has become, and likewise becomes what one joins, unites, or has communion with. Another aspect of the logic of reciprocity in Gos. Phil. is that of paradoxical inversion, most notably the bringing of life through death to counter the original establishment of death through life, and the reunification of the original separation that is itself achieved by means of a separation.

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928 Gabriele Winkler has noted that “even at the epiclesis of a number of Syrian anaphoras, the Holy Spirit manifests himself par excellence at Jesus’ baptism, and at the same time the text of the epiclesis is silent about the role of the Holy Spirit at Jesus’ incarnation!” (Winkler, “A Remarkable Shift,” 1398–1399). This corresponds to what we find in Gos. Phil. where the Holy Spirit does not play any role in relation to Jesus’ birth from the Virgin Mary, but only comes into the picture at his baptism.
This logic of reciprocity is balanced by the equally important logic of procreation and kinship, and succession through descent. The transformation of new converts into Christs/Christians is perpetuated through a system of apostolic succession through ritual procreation and the simultaneous establishment of a kinship with Christ, God, and other ritually initiated Christians. It is the exposition, by means of a wide range of complex conceptual and metaphorical blends, of the function and significance of the Christian rites of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist in this process of ritual generation and transformation that is the central focus of Gos. Phil.

In sum it seems quite clear from the analysis in the present chapter of how Gos. Phil. presents its complicated sacramental soteriology, here outlined in terms as simple as possible, that Wilson's early assessment that Gos. Phil. “gives the impression of being the work of one who knows the language without having penetrated very deeply into the content of Christian thought,”929 cannot be sustained.

929 Wilson, The Gospel of Philip, 12.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION:
THE EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL AND THE
GOSPEL OF PHILIP COMPARED

All that an interpretation may do is to render the pattern of meaning insightful. To the intense oscillation of sense and sensibility it cannot really do full justice and must necessarily remain poor and superficial in comparison to the text and its reading experience. That is why readers feel they have to return to the text itself and experience its richness over and over again.¹

1. The Perspective of the Present Study

At an early stage of Nag Hammadi research Robert M. Grant drew a parallel to the study of the New Testament, stating that “just as we now suppose that Matthew, for example, had not only scissors and paste, but a mind of his own, so even a Gnostic evangelist had some idea of what he was trying to say; his work deserves to be treated as a whole before it is excavated for sources.”² The aim and method of the present study has indeed been to treat the two selected Nag Hammadi texts as far as possible on their own terms as complete and coherent literary expressions. In studies of the Nag Hammadi texts, including Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul, the texts themselves and their own internal logic have often come to play second fiddle to the wealth of comparative material, mostly heresiological, that has been adduced to shed light upon them. In this study I have therefore chosen instead to focus on the internal logic of Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul, and have thus tried to analyse how they

² Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 10–11.
make sense on their own terms, that is, in a reading that takes seriously
the production of meaning that arises from the interplay with Scripture
created by the quotations and allusions that pervade them.

In line with this approach I have also chosen not to try to explain
the various features of Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul on the basis of other
Nag Hammadi texts, not wanting to explain one unknown quantity on
the basis of another. What I will do, however, in this final chapter, is to
compare Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul with each other. The analysis in the
preceding chapters have implicitly brought to light both similarities and
differences between these two texts, many of which were not apparent
prior to this analysis. So, from the perspective of the preceding analysis,
what are the similarities and differences between them?

2. Literary Structure

First of all, the obvious difference in literary structure must be men-
tioned. While Exeg. Soul is a text which has a relatively clear narrative
structure, starting with a mythological story that runs through most of
the text, interspersed with long scriptural quotations, before ending in
an extended paraenetical section, Gos. Phil. sports no narrative struc-
ture, indeed no easily discernible literary structure at all. Moreover, while
Exeg. Soul’s interplay with Scripture is dominated on the surface by a sig-
nificant number of extended Old Testament quotations, Gos. Phil. has
only a limited number of short quotations. Both texts are soaked through
with especially New Testament allusions, however. The tone of the two
texts is also decidedly different. Exeg. Soul is most of all paraenetical,
with no discernible polemics,3 while Gos. Phil., on the other hand, has
a clear polemical edge against what seems to be several opposing groups
and / or points of view. Moreover, contrary to Exeg. Soul’s pervasive focus
on repentance, there is no single discernible focus in Gos. Phil., but rather
a selection of different threads of discourse that are woven unpredictably
but suggestively together throughout the course of the text.

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We saw in chapters 3 and 4 that *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* are structured around different overarching conceptual blends. In *Exeg. Soul* the *soul is a woman* underlies the whole mythological narrative and paraenetic discourse, while in *Gos. Phil.* the *Christian is a Christ* serves a similar function, being the vital principle that unites the various strands of this complex and multi-faceted text. A significant difference between these two conceptual blends, which also contributes to the significant difference in complexity between the two texts, is the fact that while the *soul is a woman* is a single-scope blend, where the *woman input structures the soul input*, the *Christian is a Christ* is a double-scope blend where the two inputs mutually structure each other. In *Exeg. Soul* the concept and life of the soul is presented in terms of the ICM of *woman*, but *not* vice versa. In *Gos. Phil.* one is led to understand the life and ritual practice of the Christian as structured by the knowledge of Christ, but *also* the other way around, its Christology is informed by knowledge of the Christian life and liturgy.

We have seen that both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* base much of their rhetoric on conceptual blends grounded in embodied experience. In both texts conceptual blends relating to sexuality and procreation are central features, as is related imagery of marriage, adultery and prostitution. In *Exeg. Soul* the soul is described as a woman who leaves her father’s house and a stable marriage for a life of prostitution and adultery, losing her virginity and attaining physically masculine properties in the process. The soul’s way to salvation involves regaining her perfect femininity and virginity and re-marrying her perfect husband. In order to be eligible for the marriage with Christ the soul needs to be feminised, and once married to him, she must stay as his wife. The soul’s repentance and return to complete devotion to Christ is thus described as a process of feminisation, and is possibly to be understood, at least partly, as a metaphorical description of ritual initiation. Life without total devotion to Christ is, on the other hand, described in *Exeg. Soul* as prostitution and adultery.

*Exeg. Soul* also plays on the soul’s metaphorical femininity to exploit the imagery of birth in several ways. Not only is the soul’s conversion and
renewal described in terms of her being reborn, but the seed received by the soul in her communion with Christ also causes her to bear good children, in contrast to the imperfect offspring she bore as a result of her communion with the adulterers. The soul not only gives birth to good children, however, but also to herself, which may be understood in terms of the internal effort of the soul that is needed also after the reception of Christ, the bridegroom, and the spirit/seed, in order to attain salvation. And salvation, mirroring the primordial fall, is described in terms of an ascent back into Heaven.

In Gos. Phil., by contrast, salvation does not come about by feminising the soul, quite the contrary. To be able to unite with Christ, which is also a major goal in Gos. Phil., one is instead required to become like Christ, who is described as the “perfect man” (ἠτέλειος ἄρσωι), and to become a Christ one must go through rituals first revealed/performed by Christ “in a mystery” (γινομαιγειστηριον). In a sense, then, we may say that while in Exeg. Soul the soul is turned into a perfect bride, in Gos. Phil. it becomes the perfect bridegroom. While in Exeg. Soul the soul is described as a bride marrying Christ the bridegroom, in Gos. Phil. the bridegroom appears to be the Logos and the bride the Holy Spirit. In addition, however, Gos. Phil. also uses the ICM of marriage to shed light on the union between the individual Christian and Christ, as respectively bride and bridegroom, in order to highlight the need to stay faithful to Christ as opposed to having one’s heart (ρτ) set on the world (ποσιος), metaphorically understood as an adulterer (νοεκ). In this sense Gos. Phil. comes close to the kind of rhetoric employed in Exeg. Soul, presenting unfaithfulness to Christ in terms of adultery and prostitution. In Gos. Phil., however, this is not the major point it is in Exeg. Soul.

For its part, Gos. Phil. focuses more on the contrast between begetting and creating, and on begetting in the context of kinship and succession, than on the specific event of birth, but does nevertheless also refer to the latter in a metaphorical description of ritual initiation. Moreover, as is the case with the soul who in Exeg. Soul bears bad children with the adulterers and good children with Christ, in Gos. Phil. as well one’s offspring resemble their father. Children emerging from communion with Christ resemble Christ, while communion with others, or even mental focus on others, makes for children resembling them instead. In both texts, then, the need for total faithfulness to Christ is stressed, by means of metaphors of marriage, procreation, and adultery.
5. Christology and Anthropology

The connection between Christology and anthropology is, as we have seen, a major concern in Gos. Phil. But how does Gos. Phil’s anthropology and Christology compare with those underlying Exeg. Soul? Now, the latter text does not really focus on Christology, making it difficult to compare the two texts in this regard, but some comments are nevertheless in order.

The focus in Exeg. Soul is on the soul’s life in the body, her repentance, conversion, and marriage with Christ. The anthropology presupposed by this text seems quite simple. There is a material body and a soul, but no mention of any spirit or nous as a part of the human constitution prior to initiation into Christianity. A “life-giving spirit” is given by Christ as a seed, however, being his crucial gift to the soul facilitating her salvation, and the tractate subsequently refers to praying to the Father with the “spirit which is within” (ⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁ ⲉⲧϩⲓⲡⲥⲁ ⲛϩⲟⲩⲛ). The soul in Exeg. Soul is pre-existent, however, existing from the beginning in a male-female symbiotic relationship with her husband, identified with Adam in Genesis. When she leaves him, she falls into a material body. Her conversion involves becoming a perfect submissive virgin bride, thus enabling her to marry her true bridegroom, Christ, who is presented as the new Adam. Salvation then follows his gift of the spirit to the soul and is described in terms of birth, rebirth, renewal, resurrection, and ascent.

As we have seen, Exeg. Soul is not overly concerned with christological matters, being content to describe Christ as a bridegroom and the new Adam, saving the female soul by marrying her and impregnating her with the lifegiving spirit. This is a long way from the complex Christology of Gos. Phil., which stresses the point that Christ, as he is manifested in the material world, is constituted by a union of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, within a material body. In Exeg. Soul on the other hand, there is no mention of a Logos, and the relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit is rather vague. However, in both texts the reception of the spirit is crucial for salvation. Exeg. Soul describes it as a gift given by Christ, but does not specify when it is given, and describes its effects simply as life-giving and renewing. Gos. Phil., on the other hand, connects the gift of the spirit crucially with chrismation, as an important part of the baptismal ritual, and with the Eucharist, more specifically the

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4 Exeg. Soul 135.6–7.
contents of the eucharistic cup. Chrismation in Gos. Phil. also transforms the Christian into a Christ, making the human constitution Christlike, which seems to involve a Logos-like soul united with the Holy Spirit, and enabling the communion with Christ in the Eucharist.

In neither of the texts is it easy to gain a clear picture of the role of the Holy Spirit. In Exeg. Soul it is associated with Old Testament prophecy, but it also appears to be given to the soul by Christ, when it is described as “the seed” (πεσπερία) “that is the life-giving spirit” (ετειπόν πε ο ετειρο). In Gos. Phil., on the other hand, it is a part of Christ, together with, and seemingly on the same level as, the Logos. In both texts the spirit is something that is given to the Christian initiate, and which does not appear to be part of the human constitution prior to ritual initiation.

6. Transformational Soteriology

In both texts salvation entails a marriage with Christ. While in Exeg. Soul the requirement for this marriage involves repentance and conversion through baptism, which makes the soul into Christ’s complementary female half, Gos. Phil., on the contrary, requires one to become like Christ oneself in order to unite with him. In this sense the soteriologies of the two texts are quite different. In both texts conversion and initiation entail a transformation, but while the crucial transformation in Exeg. Soul entails a transformation of the soul from male into female, in Gos. Phil. it is a process of deification making the initiated Christian into a Christ. While in Exeg. Soul the stress is on the submission, difference, and hierarchical complementarity of the soul of the Christian and Christ, in Gos. Phil. there is on the contrary a stress upon the identification of the initiated Christian with Christ. There is thus an important aspect of deification in Gos. Phil. that does not seem to be present in Exeg. Soul.

Here we may also note the crucial difference between the two texts in that the soul in Exeg. Soul is transformed from being improperly male-like into a proper female bride, while in Gos. Phil. the soul becoming Logos-like implies its maleness, since it is to be united with the female spirit. So, while in Exeg. Soul the soul is female and receives Christ as its bridegroom and the spirit as a life-giving seed, the soul (or a part of the soul) in Gos. Phil. is male and receives the female spirit as a bride. In both

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5 See Exeg. Soul 129.6–8; 135.30–31.
texts the reestablishment of the primal unity of male and female, based on an exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 together with 2:21–23, is important, but while in Exeg. Soul this entails a reunification of the female soul, representing Eve, with Christ, representing Adam, in Gos. Phil. it is the male soul, representing Adam, that receives the female spirit representing Eve. In contrast to Gos. Phil., then, the Christian is in Exeg. Soul not identified with Adam or Christ, but in a sense with Eve (see Fig. 49). We might thus even say that while Christ in Gos. Phil. comes to save Adam, in Exeg. Soul he comes to save Eve. In both cases, the primordial unity of the prelapsarian Adam/ἄνθρωπος needs to be reestablished.

7. Rituals and Mystagogy

Baptism plays a major role in both Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul, but in different ways. As we saw in the analysis of Exeg. Soul in chapter 3, the references to rituals in this text may well be understood metaphorically, but, however this may be, baptism is connected with purification and conversion. By way of its cleansing and converting function, baptism is in Exeg. Soul presented as a necessary preparation for the communion with Christ, which may or may not be understood as a reference to the Eucharist.

In Gos. Phil.’s interpretation, however, as we saw in chapter 4, baptism is primarily given a life-giving, rather than a cathartic, function, and is connected with the donning of the “living man” (πρῶτος ἐστός). Baptism in Gos. Phil. is not the important ritual it appears to be in Exeg. Soul, however, for the former lays great emphasis on the superiority of chrismation over baptism. While Gos. Phil. stresses at length the relatively higher importance of chrismation in relation to baptism, there is no direct evidence in Exeg. Soul of any chrismation at all. Although this does not necessarily mean that the initiation process that is presupposed by Exeg. Soul did not involve an anointing with chrism, one would expect such a rite to be at least mentioned if it were of equal significance to the one referred to in Gos. Phil.

As for postbaptismal rites, a dressing in postbaptismal garments may be presupposed by both tractates, and it seems in both cases to be interpreted in a manner that is closely related to the tractates’ respective interpretations of baptism, being connected to conversion and cleansing in Exeg. Soul, and deification in Gos. Phil. Moreover, Gos. Phil. also refers to what seems to be a ritual kiss, but no such kiss is discernible
in *Exeg. Soul*. The Eucharist is definitely a ritual of major importance in *Gos. Phil.*, and it is interpreted by means of several different conceptual blends, relating to food, sexuality, marriage, and procreation. In *Exeg. Soul*, the Eucharist is not explicitly mentioned, but seems nevertheless to be presupposed at important points in the text.

Now, what about rituals that were not performed by the Christian “mainstream”? We have seen in the preceding chapters that there is no simple referent for the concept of the “bridal chamber” in *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* Simply put, *Exeg. Soul’s* references to ἱν ἔνξελετ and νυνιψαν, and *Gos. Phil.’s* to νυνιψαν, παστος, and κοτταν, do not refer to the same target or focus concept throughout. The focus inputs in blends involving these terms may in some cases be ritual practice, and in other cases the body of the Christian, the body of Christ, or ritual space. It is only in *Gos. Phil.*, however, that the body of Christ is a focus input, which in this case follows from the overarching blend the Christian is a Christ. As for the potential focus inputs from ritual practice, it must be said that in neither text is it necessary to postulate any rituals other than baptism, chrismation, or Eucharist, as well as that of a ritual kiss in the case of *Gos. Phil.* In both texts, however, there is also the possibility that the actual ritual space wherein these rituals were performed may serve as a focus for these framing inputs. No single referent, then, neither as focus nor framing input, may be identified behind the abovementioned Greek and Coptic terms used in *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* that are usually translated as “bridal chamber.” It should also be stressed that as these blends function in *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, the framing inputs referred to by these terms seem primarily to be based upon associated scriptural intertexts rather than on an ICM or ICMs based simply on current social practice.

Lastly, while in *Exeg. Soul* the rituals may conceivably be understood as framing inputs in metaphorical blends with other focus inputs, *Gos. Phil.* uses a whole host of framing inputs to shed light on the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, but at no point seems to refer to rituals as metaphors of something else.

### 8. Metaphors and Ontology

Both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* describe Christian initiation in terms of rebirth, both of them employing the conceptual blend *CHRISTIAN INITIATION IS BIRTH*. At the same time, however, *Gos. Phil.* tells us that “there is a
rebirth (χιον ἰκεσον) and an image of rebirth (γιγαν ἰχιον ἰκεσον)”⁶ The “image of rebirth,” seems, as we have seen in chapter 4, to refer first and foremost to the rituals of initiation. But the use of the concept of birth in this way as a metaphor for initiation is only the first stage. For when Gos. Phil. speaks of initiation not only as rebirth, but as an image of rebirth, it implies a change in the ontological status of the input spaces. Not only is initiation simply to be understood metaphorically in terms of birth, but the tractate goes one stage further and identifies this ritual rebirth as only an image of the true rebirth. The ritual acts understood in terms of physical birth, an understanding arising from a blended space, has in this way become an image of the true level of reality it may itself only be an imperfect representation of. In this way, the blend that makes it possible to understand the ritual acts in terms of the ICM of birth is in Gos. Phil. in a sense reinterpreted by being ontologically turned on its head when the tractate presents the blend itself as the more concrete mental space that sheds light upon what amounts to an ontologically higher form of the original framing input, that of birth. Moreover, the blend is understood as a necessary means of attaining this higher reality, for “it is truly necessary to be reborn by means of the image,” (ἤμε νάνως ἀγοραχιον ἰκεσον γιτὴτρικον)⁷ as Gos. Phil. puts it.

9. The Use of Scripture

We have seen how both Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. in important ways operate in constant dialogue with Scripture, relying to a great extent upon links with various key biblical intertexts in interweaving webs of conceptual and intertextual mental spaces. Both Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. betray an awareness of an extensive range of Old and New Testament Scriptures, and while the former is an important reference in both, and especially in Exeg. Soul, it is in both cases their interpretation of the New Testament that ultimately determines their use of the Old.

Of the Synoptic Gospels, Matthew and Luke are employed in both texts, but there is a notable lack of clear references to the Gospel of Mark. Both Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. also use the Gospel of John, but only in the latter text does this gospel permeate the entire discourse. In Gos. Phil., as we have seen, the Gospel of John seems in a way to be the main hypotext,

⁶ Gos. Phil. 67.12–13.
⁷ Gos. Phil. 67.13–14.
to borrow a term from Gérard Genette, for in a way we may read Gos. Phil. as an extended interpretation of the Gospel of John. As we have seen, even the title of the work may hint at this by pointing us to the apostle Philip’s dialogue with Jesus in John 14.

As for Old Testament Scriptures, the first chapters of Genesis constitute a crucially important intertext to both Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. First and foremost the account of the creation of man at 1:26–27 and that of the creation of woman at 2:21–24 are central. In addition Gos. Phil. also refers to the second account of the creation of man at Gen 2:7 and also makes extensive use of the references to the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, and of the fall and punishment of Adam and Eve, passages that are not referenced in Exeg. Soul. On the other hand, the latter’s use of Old Testament Scripture is more extensive.

So, both texts display a wide knowledge and use of both Old and New Testament Scripture, and it probably does not hurt to state the rather obvious fact that although there are certain biblical texts we have not found references to in these texts, this cannot be used to argue that these were not known by those who produced or used Exeg. Soul or Gos. Phil.

10. Ethics and Way of Life

The ethical implications of the two texts also appear to be somewhat different. In Exeg. Soul, the emphasis seems to be on the proclivities of the human soul, i.e., on the internal life of the Christian, stressing the need for total devotion to Christ. What such a devotion to Christ is supposed to entail in daily life is, however, left unstated, with the important exception of the strong emphasis on the necessity of constant prayer. Exeg. Soul’s focus is in this sense relatively introverted.

By contrast, Gos. Phil. does deal in several passages with the Christian’s relations with the world and other people, and does not seem to advocate isolationism. Instead the benefits of being in the vicinity of the fully initiated Christians are highlighted, and the tractate appears to advocate interaction with, and a certain social responsibility towards, other people


of lower spiritual levels, perhaps even non-Christians. *Gos. Phil.* even advocates some kind of universal salvation, and thus seems far removed from the rather more stark impression we get from *Exeg. Soul.*

As for the tractates’ attitudes towards the material world, *Gos. Phil.* seems to evince the more positive view of the two, stressing the, albeit imperfect, reflection of the heavenly realities in the earthly, and seems to advocate indifference rather than hatred towards the material body. *Exeg. Soul* seems more one-sidedly negative in this sense, with its focus on the need for the soul to escape the world and the body. It is of course possible that this impression may simply be a result of *Exeg. Soul*’s rhetorical focus on the internal life of the soul and its advocacy of repentance and devotion to Christ, rather than a direct reflection of an underlying ethical stance. In neither *Exeg. Soul* nor *Gos. Phil.* is the material body destined for salvation. In *Exeg. Soul* the material body is what the soul has fallen into and needs to escape from, while in *Gos. Phil.* it is the part of the human constitution that will not rise in the resurrection. In *Exeg. Soul* the soul is saved by her marriage with Christ, and may thus turn away from the body, while in *Gos. Phil.* one is saved by becoming Christ and wearing his body.

*Exeg. Soul,* as we have seen, stresses the necessity of repentance, weeping, and prayer, but the prayer that is advocated might very well be of the silent variety, since it is the prayer of the soul, the inward prayer, that is explicitly emphasised in contrast to the outward prayer of the lips. *Gos. Phil.*, while clearly presupposing the use of liturgical prayer, also shows a negative attitude towards “praying in the world,” and, as we have seen, might be understood to be advocating a similar practice of inward prayer as seen in *Exeg. Soul.* With regard to non-liturgical prayer, then, *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* may well be in agreement.

11. Reflections on Methodology

Commenting on the usefulness of applying theories developed within cognitive linguistics to biblical exegesis, Leo Noordman has recently pointed out that cognitive linguistics makes us sensitive to pervasive textual phenomena related to mental models and processes, and provides us with theories to both describe and analyse them.10 He emphasises,
however, that his advocacy of cognitive linguistics “should not be interpreted as implying that cognitive linguistics has developed ready made tools that can simply be applied in other disciplines, for instance, in exegesis.”\textsuperscript{11} Acknowledging the truthfulness of Noordman’s comments, this study has been an attempt to adapt and combine some existing tools into something that would prove to be useful in a study of both conceptual and intertextual blending in texts like \textit{Exeg. Soul} and \textit{Gos. Phil}. I hope to have shown that to attain to the questions of conceptual and intertextual blending in the study of these Nag Hammadi tractates is not of mere peripheral importance, but indispensable if we want to provide analyses that do justice to the many-layered complexities of these intriguing texts, and I hope to have shown the usefulness of the outlined Cognitive Poetics methodology in performing this task. In other words, I hope to have demonstrated the usefulness of this theoretical framework in making us aware of the complexities of the texts while at the same time helping us understand how they make sense.

In addition, cognitive poetics is helpful when it comes to the historical contextualisation of the analysed texts. As we have seen, we can employ inputs from previously historically contextualized knowledge experimentally in our Cognitive Poetic analyses of an ancient text, like the ones from Nag Hammadi, in order to analytically map out its meaning potential within that particular historical context. Cognitive Poetics may here help us delineate rhetorical structures within a text, that may more clearly show us its possible polemical edges and thus help us tentatively place the text within an historico-cultural context. For instance, as we have seen, the cognitive poetic analysis of \textit{Gos. Phil.} showing the pervasive emphasis on begetting in opposition to creating, seems to indicate that we could fruitfully read this kind of polemic in light of the Arian crisis of the fourth century. Secondly, a Cognitive Poetic analysis may be used as a basis for a comparison with other sources with a more secure historical context. In such analyses we may conciously choose to refrain from reading certain cognitive models and historically contextualized information into the text from the beginning, in order to level the ground between the sources that are to be compared.

How can Cognitive Poetics help us analyze the possible functions of texts within an historical context? In hypothesising possible functions of a text within specific historico-cultural contexts, a methodology based

\textsuperscript{11} Noordman, “Some Reflections,” 334.
on Cognitive Poetics may in several ways help make us aware of different interpretive possibilities. A Cognitive Poetic study of how Scripture is interpretively recontextualized by way of intertextual allusions or quotations in a reading of a given text, may again serve as a prelude to the study of how this text may again have functioned within different hypothetical historical contexts. The hypothetical historical contexts we choose to apply in such experimental analyses should of course not be arbitrarily chosen, but rather be selected on the basis of clues within the texts, or from external information, like for instance the date and provenance of the material remains in which the texts have been preserved. Such clues trigger contextual inputs from our existing historical knowledge together with the cognitive models that seem most relevant to the text at hand.

The groundwork is thus laid for a comprehensive comparative analysis that has been outside the scope of the present study. As for the evaluation of the results of such analyses, the only criterion I think is theoretically warranted is to what degree the resulting interpretations make sense to us and our peers. For when it comes to what it is that in the final analysis makes an interpretation sensible, I think Stanley Fish has argued convincingly that this has much less to do with the texts we are trying to interpret themselves, than with the socially constrained evaluation of such interpretations made by one interpretive community or another.\(^\text{12}\) For what yields the most coherent and persuasive overall interpretation of a text will always be relative to the existing conventions within the respective interpretive communities.

**12. The Place of *Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil.* in the History of Christianity**

Nearly fifty years ago Robert M. Grant argued that “the new gospels from Nag-Hammadi deserve a welcome because they will help show what Christianity is not, and what our canonical gospels are not,” and added that “They may conceivably help us to see what our gospels are, but the differences will remain more important than the similarities.”\(^\text{13}\) I hope, however, to have demonstrated in the present study that these texts should not be seen as evidence of what Christianity was not, but rather of

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\(^{12}\) See Fish, *Is There a Text*.

\(^{13}\) Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 10.
what it was. Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul should be seen as parts of the fabric of early Christianity, and hence as sources for what early Christianity was like, rather than as contrasts to Christianity in its formative period. I also hope to have shown that in order to properly understand Gos. Phil. and Exeg. Soul, they need not and should not be approached from the perspective of a predetermined category of “Gnosticism.” By eschewing this category, these early Christian texts suddenly appear less as aberrations of early Christianity than as parts of it, and we may more easily focus on the similarities between these texts and other early Christian sources, rather than on the differences.

It seems that a reading of these texts thoroughly within the many-faceted fabric of early Christian discourse promises to yield insights into the fascinating corpus of writings constituted by the Nag Hammadi Codices, and on their place in the history of Christianity, that have hitherto eluded us. For, as Karen King has rightly pointed out, “if we only reproduce the discursive and interpretive position of the ‘orthodox’ winners, we will never understand adequately what was at stake in the early Christian controversies that shaped what has come to be one of the most influential religious traditions the world has yet known.”

Moreover, in such an analysis we should not simply assume that these Nag Hammadi texts are straightforward translations into Coptic of significantly older Greek originals, but rather be open to the possibility that many of these texts should be regarded as “living literature” that may also have undergone significant rewriting in their Coptic phase(s) of transmission, without this fact precluding their status as coherent literary statements. We should consequently be wary of assuming that what we find in these texts can be used as sources for the state of Christianity at a stage long before the production of our preserved Coptic manuscripts.

The great manuscript discoveries of the 20th century, not least the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Codices, forcefully brought home the fact that our puzzle of early Christianity had lacked a great number of pieces, and still does. As Rowan Greer observed already at the Yale conference on “Gnosticism” in 1978, the new pieces soon called into question “the lines along which the puzzle was previously being solved.”

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14 For, as Wisse has correctly pointed out, “few pagan or Christian religious writings of the first three centuries of our era are immune to being interpreted as showing the influence of Gnosticism or as including a polemic against it” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 68).
15 King, Secret Revelation of John, x.
16 See Bradshaw, “Liturgy and ‘Living Literature’” and the discussion in chapter 1.
17 Rowan A. Greer, “The Dog and the Mushrooms: Irenaeus’s View of the Valentinians
Greer rightly noted that it is “tempting to suppose that when new pieces of a puzzle are discovered they can simply be added to the ones already arranged.”18 Despite Greer’s perceptive comments to the effect that the new pieces do not actually fit into the old puzzle, the Nag Hammadi tractates have still been used mainly as pieces in a puzzle that was already being laid according to the heresiological writings of Irenaeus, Clement, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Epiphanius.

Keith Hopkins has strikingly illustrated “how hazardous conventional inductive procedures are, when scholars so carefully reconstruct church history only from surviving sources,” by pointing out that if fifty Christian communities wrote on average two letters per year in the period 50 to 150 CE, this would add up to ten thousand letters, “of which barely fifty survive.”19 From this he drew the obvious conclusion that the sources from this period are appallingly unrepresentative.20 If we extrapolate from this calculation to the whole period up until the time of the production of the Nag Hammadi Codices, taking also the massive growth in the number of Christian communities into consideration, it becomes quite apparent that we still lack a large proportion of the pieces to this puzzle, and that it is far from clear where the diverse Nag Hammadi texts fit in among the thousands of lost documents of early Christianity. It is therefore of utmost importance for the interpretation of the virtually contextless Nag Hammadi texts what categories, contexts, metanarratives, and intertexts we choose to invoke in an effort to make sense of them.

It seems clear from the present study, however, that the puzzle pieces constituted by Exeg. Soul and Gos. Phil. do not readily fit in with previous attempts to assemble the puzzle on the basis of theories of “Gnosticism.” The critique of this particular scholarly category, that has been forcefully fronted by Michael Williams21 and Karen King,22 seems at least on the basis of the present study to have been vindicated. On the basis of the present analysis there are reasons to believe that Exeg. Soul and especially Gos. Phil. have persistently and forcibly been used as pieces in puzzles where they most probably do not belong. I hope to have shown, however,
that it may be possible to see *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as reflecting quite different theological discussions and polemical contexts than those that are reflected in the works of the earliest heresiologists.

What remains to be done, then, apart from a comparison with other related Nag Hammadi texts, which should ideally be based on detailed internal analyses of these other texts, is an extended comparative analysis of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* with other Christian sources. Such a comparative analysis should start with the approximate period of the production of the Nag Hammadi Codices and work backwards from there, rather than the other way around. By analysing *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* also in light of sources from the approximate period of the creation and use of the codices themselves, we may gain a better foundation from which to answer questions concerning the possible identities of the late antique users of these texts, and also that of the manufacturers and users of the codex that contains them, regardless of what conclusions we may come to with respect to the authorship and date of the hypothetical originals.23

Early Egyptian monastic sources, from the fourth and fifth centuries, remain a promising avenue of comparative analysis that has not yet been fully exploited. While, as we have seen, neither *Exeg. Soul* nor *Gos. Phil.* seem to require an ascetic or monastic reading, both texts do seem to lend themselves rather easily to such readings, which would make them compatible with a monastic way of life, and a monastic milieu would appear to be a probable *Sitz im Leben* for both texts in their present form. Indeed, if we also take fully into consideration the possibility of more “orthodox” readings of texts like *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* than we have been accustomed to, and compare them systematically with sources from the fourth and fifth century, we may perhaps find that James Goehring might have been rather close to the mark when he stated that, for the monks of Egypt, “it was not impossible for one to support Athanasius and to read the Nag Hammadi texts.”24 In any case, to study these texts “as part of a gnostic, rather than monastic, trajectory,” seems, as Michel Desjardins has put it, “peculiar at best.”25

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FIGURES
Fig. 1. Basic Conceptual Integration Network

Fig. 2. The Eucharistic Elements
Generic Space

Input 1: Matt 2:1-12
- Magi from the East visit Herod
- Star in the east
- Jesus born in Bethlehem
- Herod summons magi secretly
- Magi follow star
- Magi visit Mary and child in house
- Magi give gold, frankincense, and myrrh

- Census
- Journey from Nazareth to Bethlehem
- No place in the inn
- Jesus born in Bethlehem
- Swaddling clothes
- Manger
- Shepherds in the field
- Angel
- Shepherds visit Mary & Joseph

Blend: Traditional Western Nativity Story

Fig. 3. The Nativity

Generic Space

Input 1: The Soul
- Female
- Soul
- Woman
- Female physiology
- Womb

Input 2: Woman

Soul is a Woman.
Soul has female physiology.
Soul has a womb.
Soul acts like a woman.

Blended Space:
The Soul is a Woman

Fig. 4. The Soul is a Woman
**Fig. 5. The Original State of the Soul**

**Fig. 6. The Fall of the Soul**
Generic Space (1,2,3)

Input 1: 1 Cor 6:16-18

Input 2: Exeg. Soul

Input 3: 1 Cor 10

Joining w/Christ vs. Joining w/prostitute

Communion w/Christ vs. Communion w/adulterers

Communion w/Christ = Partaking of Eucharistic vs. Communion w/demons = Partaking of food offered to idols

Porneia

Porneia = Legitimate communion vs. Illicit communion

Fig. 7. Communion with Christ vs. Communion with the adulterers

Generic Space

Input 1: Baptism (of the soul)

Input 2: Washing (of garments)

Baptism

Soul

Water

Immersion

Cleansing

Ritual actions

Washing

Garment

Dirt

Water

Immersion

Cleansing

Washing actions (incl. turning)

Baptism/Washing of Soul/Garment in Water Cleanses it from Sins/Dirt. This involves the immersion and turning of the Soul/Garment.

Blended Space:
The Baptism of the Soul is the Washing of Garments

Fig. 8. Baptism is Washing
Fig. 9. The Soul is a Garment and a Woman

Blended Space

Generic Space

Fig. 10. Baptism is Washing
Christian Life is a Marriage with Christ

**Fig. 11. Christian Life is a Marriage with Christ**

**Fig. 12. Christian Initiation is a Wedding**
The bridegroom came and those who were prepared went in with him to the place of marriage.

Matt 25:10

The bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage, which was prepared.

Exeg. Soul 132:23-26

The place of marriage and the bride/bridal chamber is prepared.
The bride enters with the bridegroom.

Matt 22:8

The place of marriage is prepared

Preparation of place of marriage

Preparation

Coming of the bridegroom

Fig. 13. The Place of Marriage

Renewal
Ascent
Enthronement

Birth
Salvation

Psalm 102:5 LXX

your youth shall be renewed like an eagle (+crown)

Exeg. Soul

she will be saved through the rebirth

1 Tim 2:15

she will be saved through childbirth

Matt 19:28

you who have followed Me in the rebirth (+throne)

Matt 22:8

you who have followed Me in the rebirth

Fig. 14. Salvation Through Rebirth

The soul will be saved through baptismal rebirth, and by giving birth again to good children and herself. This constitutes renewal and ascent to the Father in Heaven.
metaphor → metonymy ↓

SOURCE

Womb

Woman

Person

TARGET

Soul

Person

Fig. 15. Metonymical and Metaphorical Relations (1)

Fig. 16. Metonymical and Metaphorical Relations (2)
Fig. 17. Salvation Through Rebirth

Fig. 18. The Christian is a Christ
Fig. 19. John 1:14a + 6:53–54

Fig. 20. John 1:1–14 + John 6:48–58
Fig. 21. Adam and Christ

Fig. 22. Hebrew-Proselyte vs. Father-Son
**Fig. 23. Anointer–Anointed Relationships (1)**

**Fig. 24. Anointer–Anointed Relationships (2)**
Fig. 25. Christian Initiation is Begetting

Fig. 26. Anointer–Anointed Relationships (3)
Water
Anointing
Holy Spirit
Joining
Begetting
Birth

Christ
Takes place in water
Anointed with Holy Spirit
Reception of the Name
Holy Spirit joins with Logos
A begetting takes place
Christ’s body comes into being
This is a rebirth.

Christian
Takes place in water
Anointed with Holy Spirit
Reception of the Name
Holy Spirit joins with (soul)
A begetting takes place
a body comes into being
This is a rebirth.

The baptism of the Christian mirrors that of Christ

Fig. 27. The Baptism of Christ and the Baptism of the Christians

Gal 3:13
Christ redeems from the curse of the Law by hanging on tree (i.e., the cross) (and thus himself being cursed)

Gos. Phil. 74.3-12
Tree of knowledge = the Law
Brought Adam (and others) death.
Tree of knowledge makes alive.

Phil 3.8-9
The knowledge of Christ contrary to the Law.

The (old) tree of knowledge = the Law
brought death.
The (new) tree of knowledge = the Cross
brings knowledge of Christ,
abolishes the law/death,
brings life.
Christ’s death brings life,
makes old knowledge obsolete by
bringing true knowledge.

Fig. 28. The Tree of Knowledge and the Law
The Cross caused Jesus’ death, (=caused life).

Tree of Knowledge
Eating from it brings knowledge of good and evil, brings death.

The Law
Distinguishes right from wrong.
What to eat and what not to eat

Blend
Old tree of knowledge=Law
New tree of knowledge=Cross.
Eating from the old tree of knowledge = Following the Law (i.e. Judaism) brought death.
Eating from the new tree of knowledge = eating Christ the Eucharist gives life.
Eating from the new tree of knowledge = gaining knowledge of Christ, gives life.

Fig. 29. The Tree of Knowledge

(Old) Tree of Knowledge

The Law
Dietary restrictions

Tree of knowledge
Fruit

Cross
Christ

Cross=(new) Tree of Knowledge.
Cross makes (old) Tree of knowledge=the Law obsolete
=> No dietary restrictions
Cross reverses effects of (old) Tree of Knowledge
=> Brings life instead of death

Fig. 30. The Two Trees of Knowledge
Fig. 31. Joseph the Carpenter

Fig. 32. The Cross as the Tree of Life
Fig. 33. The Cross, the Tree of Life, and the Chrism

Fig. 34. The Cross as the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life
Fig. 35. The Rending of the Veil and the Separation of Christ

Fig. 36. The Christian is a Christ
Luke 22:41-45a
Jesus prays, refers to cup, meets angel, sweats like drops of blood

Gos. Phil. 75.14-17
(Eucharistic) Cup of prayer, contains wine and water, represents blood over which thanks is given.

John 19:34
Jesus pierced with spear, bleeds blood and water

Luke 22:41-45a
Jesus prays, refers to cup, meets angel, sweats like drops of blood

Interpretive Blend
Jesus' bleeds and sweats blood and water. Eucharistic cup contains Jesus' blood. Wine & water = blood & water Eucharistic cup/prayer related to angels

Fig. 37. Blood and Water

Human Beings
Earthly Garments

The body is the garment of the soul. The soul is more valuable than the body.

Fig. 38. The Body is a Garment
The earthly garment is the body. The heavenly garment is the body of Christ. The heavenly garment is more valuable than the individual human soul.

Fig. 39. The Earthly and the Heavenly Garments

The initiate is dipped in water and takes on the properties of the remedy that is added. Just like dyes transfer their properties of colour to the fabric, the chrism bestows immortality to those who are baptised.

Fig. 40. Baptism is Dyeing
The water is a mirror.
The chrism is light.
One may see oneself as in a mirror.
Both mirror and light is necessary, since the goal is to see oneself. Both water and chrism is necessary. Mirror/water and light/chrism is necessary at the same time.

Fig. 41. Baptism and the Mirror

Logos and Holy Spirit is united with each other within the earthly body of Christ, like a bridegroom and a bride within a bridal chamber.

Fig. 42. Body of Christ as Bridal Chamber
The Eucharist is the symbol of the bridal chamber. The bridal chamber is the body of Christ.

**Fig. 43. The Eucharist as Bridal Chamber**

The world eats corpses.

**Fig. 44. Eating and Death**
The Holy Baptism

The Holy of the Holy [Redemption]

The Holy of the Holies Bridal Chamber

West

Amenite (the Underworld)

East

Fig. 45. The Temple

Fig. 46. Jewish Proselyte Initiation is Creating
Fig. 47. Christian Initiation is Begetting

Fig. 48. The Eucharist
Fig. 49. Different Genesis Interpretations
The following transcriptions of the Coptic text of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* are based on a reading of the *Facsimile Edition* of Nag Hammadi Codex II together with the main critical editions. All divergences in the Coptic text from the editions of Layton, Sevrin, Krause, and Kulawik, in the case of *Exeg. Soul*, and of Layton, Schenke, Ménard, and Till in the case of *Gos. Phil.*, are noted in the apparatus, as well as selected suggestions from other Scholars where I have deemed it relevant. For other variants, see the major critical editions. Only divergences from the Coptic text utilised in the present study are noted in the apparatus. The translations are my own. Rather than offering the most fluent English texts possible, I have aimed to provide relatively literal translations of the Coptic, and have also in some cases chosen to show more than one possible translation of certain words, in order to highlight potential wordplays or to indicate instances where it has not been possible to decide between different translations. The page numbers follow the *Facsimile Edition*, while the plate numbers in parantheses in Appendix B refer to Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri*, which is the numbering scheme referred to in early studies of *Gos. Phil.* The sigla used in the apparatus are as follows:

**Appendix A. The Exegesis on the Soul**

*Bethge*  

*Krause*  

*Kulawik*  


Appendix B. The Gospel of Philip


18 τεξαγνικες ετβετψψχ

ἀλεοφος ετβωοι ριτὶνερι χψο
20 νοναςλα ετψψχ υλογραν \[\(\text{Δέρινε} \)
οντως εν ριτεσφύοις νυχρινε τε
ογιτας υλας \[\(\text{χως} \)
ητεσνιτρα \[\(\text{ζως} \)
πεν ετβωοι νυακτο ραστινεκοτ
ογιαβονος τε \[\(\text{χως} \)
ουγροτρινε τε
25 ηπεσείνε ποταν \[\(\text{λε} \)
επιτη εσονα. ης ενπεβιος τοτε \[\(\text{ας} \)
σζει \[\(\text{κτοοτος} \)
ψζε \[\(\text{ολατος} \)
χως \[\(\text{χως} \)
νυος \[\(\text{ετοοτος} \)
υλογρηνυ

\[\(\alpha\gamma\) \[\(\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \)
ος \[\(\text{ρωειν} \)
σε \[\(\text{χωρω} \)
30 \[\(\text{ας} \)
[\(\text{[\[\text{ουογυβι]ς} \]
[\(\text{ρικοουε} \)
σε \[\(\text{ευπεινε} \)
υνος \[\(\text{χι} \[
[\(\text{γηλατιν} \)
υλοφ[\(\text{οι} \]
[\(\text{γαπας} \)
[\(\text{γαπας} \)
υχωρμε \[\(\text{ας} \]
[\(\ldots \\ldots \text{\(\text{τεχνι} \)
}

127.28 Krause, Sevrin: \[\(\gamma[\text{πρι]}\)ετης \[\(\text{|| 29} \)
Krause: \[\(\alpha\gamma[\text{αυχωρι} \)
υη]\oc; Sevrin: \[\(\alpha[\text{αυχωρι} \)
υη]\oc; Kulawik: \[\(\alpha[\text{αυχωρι} \)
υη]\oc; \[\(\text{κ η}]\oc; \[\(\text{κ η}]\oc; 30 \)
Krause: \[\(\gamma[\text{νιογυβι]}\]ς; Sevrin: \[\(\gamma[\text{νιογυβι]}\]ς \[\(\text{|| 31} \)
Krause: \[\(\pi[\text{οι]}\)γαλατινυλοφ[\(\text{οι} \]
[\(\text{γαπας} \)
[\(\text{γαπας} \)
Krause: \[\(\alpha\epsilon[\text{οιωυ ιτεσιφηt]}\]ς; Sevrin: \[\(\alpha\epsilon[\text{οιωυ ιτεσιφηt]}\]ς; Kulawik: \[\(\alpha\epsilon[\text{τεκο ιτεσιφηt]}\]ς.
The wise who lived before us named the soul with a feminine name. Indeed, in her nature she is a woman. She even has her womb. While being alone with the Father she was a virgin, and she was male-female in her likeness, but when she fell down to a body and came to this life, then she fell into the hands of many robbers, and the wanton men tossed her into each other’s hands, and they [...]. Some used her [by force], while others persuaded her by deception with a gift.

In short, they defiled her, and she [... her]

---

128

1 παρεθείον αὐῳ ἀσπορνεύει γῆνες

2 σωμα αὐῳ ἀσταλη ἱτοοτὴ οὔο νῖν

3 αὐῳ πετασμολέξε ἱνοὐ εσθεύει

4 ἂρτεσφὲι πε ροποτε ἤτασταλε ἵ

5 τοοτοῦ ἵπποιοικος ἱππυρίστις ἵ

6 πιστος ἀγρούρξῳ νὰς τὸτε ἁςἀφεὶν

7 εἰκατε αὐῳ ἁσετάληοι πᾶλιν ἐκσάξ.(ν)

8 κτενεστρν εβὼν ἱπποιοικος ὄμηποτ

9 εἴροιι εἰρικοογε ἱεροναγκαζ ṭος

10 ἀορεαηπε νῆας ἵππαργαδα ἵ

11 ἕο ἱνθοιες ἱκάκινουη ἤγκοτκ

12 εὐόν νὰς ὀγκετε νὰςτολμα

13 εκαὶ ἱκασ ἱτοος ἰὲ ἱκαλακα ἵ

14 ὅς ἱνογνο ἱκρονος ἕο ἵπτα

15 εἰ ἐτηρετ ὁρὴνῃς ρὰς εὐθευγενὴν ὅς

16 εἰκατα εἰς ἱνὲν ἡρὶν ἃ εἰς θρογ

17 ἀλκάς ἱκανοὺ ἱκεβοκ ὅτος ὅ ἃ

18 ἅρα ἀσκαξαὶ ἱτάγαλα οὐς ἱπτροὺ ὅρι

19 κομικεν ἱνὰς ἁρὼ ἑντάσχησ

20 ογ ἱπποιοικος ἱκανος ὅσ

21 ὁ ἄρβλαδας ὅν αὐῳ ἐφ ἄρβλαδα

22 λεξ ποῦῃτ ποὺς ῥοτᾶν ὅ ἃ ἐφαὶ.(ν)

23 πεωτ ετηρετ ἑπτε ἱππεὺρινε ἵ

24 ὁσαὶ ἐπὶ ἑπὶ ἱπλαξ ἱνὰς ἐπο ἐς

25 ἄπει θανενὶ καταμπικε ἑπητεσπὸ

26 νὶς ἱτάγαλας ἁρὼ ἱκαρχεὶ ἤ

27 πικαλε [ἱππεικαι] ἐπαί ἐπ[επ][η]ἀ

28 ἄρινερβονεὶ νὰς ἑ[ἀ . . . . . . . . ἐ]ν

29 ὑπὸ ἑπὶ ἑσχα ἱνὸ ἱς[ὗ ἱς]τοῦχο

30 εἰ παῖδατ ἁεβεβρῆτη [ἱγ]αλογος

31 [鹱κ χερὰκὼ] ἱκανεὶ ἵππανεὶ ἁρῳ


virgin[ity], and she prostituted herself in her body, and she gave herself to everyone, and whomever she would embrace she considered to be her husband. When she gave herself to the hands of faithless wanton adulterers for them to use her, then she sighed very much and she repented. Again, when she turns her face from these adulterers she runs to others and they force her to sleep with them and to slave for them upon their bed as if they are the masters, but out of shame she no longer dares to leave them. And as for them, they deceive her for a long time as if they are true trustworthy husbands, as if valuing her greatly. And at the end of all these things they leave her behind and go. But she for her part becomes a poor barren widow without help, not even a (small) measure did she have from her suffering. For she did not gain anything from them except the defilements they gave her when they had communion with her. And those whom she bore from the adulterers are dumb and blind and sickly and mentally disturbed. But when the Father who is above visits her and looks down upon her and sees her sighing in her passions and disgrace and repenting for her prostitution which she did, and she began to call upon [his name] for him to help her […] all her heart, saying, “Save me, Father, for behold, I will give account to you, for I have left] my house behind and
129

1 ἀσηπῶτε ἐβωλ ἵππαρθενὸν παλι(ν) τχτοεί ἀμροκ ἐοταν ἐφαραν ἐρος εὐχαροο ἴππαρθενὸν τότε ζαρκρίνε
ἁς ἱδέιος ἁρεῖνα ἡς ἁλεῖοε ἱνοκρς

5 ἤταγῷ εὔας ἐξεκα ἱππεῖν ἱόςες εὔη
τπορία ἐε ἣτηύξην ἐφοροντεύει ἦ
ἐπ ἱῆλ ἤπειριά ἐτούλαβ πεὖας
gὰρ ἱππεῖος εὐφοροντεύεσ ἁροτα(ν)

ἦροοραὶ ὁ τοῦειετεύρὶο ἁεῳ ἦς

10 βοὖ ἱππείκεου ᾗς ἱππατο τεῖν
τὴνοῦ ἀπ ἰπούχαρῃ ἵππαρθεν

ἡττεύρῃ ετοῤνα ψῳ ἦτο ἀρεὶο

νεν ἦπαρ ἱῶς ἀς ἀρεὶκτε ὁὰ

τοῦει πεῦξα Ἰο εὐρεῖος ἦ ἱνεβαλ ἐς

15 ὅλ ἐποοούτῃ ψῳ ἤτενα ἰεύταρη

πορνεύει τῶν ἀν ἱπεργοος ἄν γίνε

ἡ ἱππείος ἱππαρθεν ἵππαρθεν


129.30 Krause, Sevrin: ἵ[ν]ἀς ἱππεός ἔος ἱπγκαρ εηῆ


ἀπο[γει] ἔν]ινα ἀν ἱπεσῳρῷ ἔε

ἐπορνεύε ἕος ἱπ[τα]ἱ(ι) ἵπεσỢ[η]


32 Krause: ἱ[ογει] ἔν]ινα ἀν ἱπεσ管理条例; Sevrin: ἱ[ε]  

1 I have run away from my virgin’s quarters. Return me again to you!” When he sees her like this, then he will judge her worthy for him to have mercy on her, for many were the sufferings that came upon her because she abandoned her house. Concerning the prostitution of the soul, then, the Holy Spirit prophecies in many places. For he says in Jeremiah the prophet: “When the husband divorces his wife and she goes and takes another one, shall she return to him from now on? Has not that woman become defiled with defilement? And as for you, you have prostituted yourself to many shepherds and you have returned to me says the Lord. Lift your eyes up to the uprightness and see where you have prostituted yourself. Did you not sit in the streets defiling the land with your prostitutions and your wickednesses? And you have taken many shepherds as obstacles for yourself, and you have become shameless with everyone, and you have not called up to me as a kinsman or as a father or guide of your virginity.”

2 Again it is written in Hosea the prophet: “Come! Go to law with your mother, for she will not become a wife for me, and as for me, I will not become a husband for her. I will take away her prostitution from my presence and I will take away her adultery from between her breasts. I will place her naked as the day she was born, and I will make her barren like a land without [water], and I will make her childless with [a thirst. I] will not have mercy upon her children, for they are children of prostitution, because their mother prostituted herself and she [put her children to shame].

2 Jer 3:1–4.
130  
1 χεσχοουγ χεφιλπορνευε κηνετ  
νε νενιει ηετηναυ νεωτα ναει ηνα  
οεκ κηνεπιοου κηναουτηε κηνα  
γποος κηναπηρι κηνανηρι κηναυ  
5 ηνε ετηφαυ ηαει δα τουτο ειηχηε  
αηνο ηεαουγη κηνουο εκενεσεοι  
οοη κηναυ νελαενεοει αυο εεαο  
ψηε κηναου ηετηνητου επαεχοος  
χεφιλκοτ επαρζει εκοιορπι κηνε  
10 ειφαυ κηνουο ετηναυ κηνου ατε  
νε νενιη εεεεκηια εεαο  
ψηε κηναουρ ηεαουρι κηναυρι  
αυο ηετανευε ιε νουτοποο κηνει  
15 ε ριηιπλευε αυο ερευοτ ιε κηνι  
πορνιον γερι νην αυο αρετεκο ι  
ηεηηνεγειε αυο ερευοτ ιενεγενε  
εεβο εεδηρι νην αυο αρεταυρ ιετεπορ  
δα αρεπορευε κηναηηρε ιεκνε  
20 ηαει ετο ιετεω να ηαηηνοο ιεκαζ ιην  
δε νε ιεκηρε ιεκηνε ηαηηνοο ιεκαζ  
i ε ιηνη αικεκηικν ιεη ναεκεητον  
κηναηηνευ ιεκαζ ιαει ιεηευηηο ιεκυχ  
ξαρη ριηητον ιενεηα ηεοκιεικ ι  
25 τοτου εεδηρπ εεκιεηε εεκιεηο  
o αυο ηεκηιλαηα εεηιηηα εενολ  
ιεκνε κηναηηνα ναει εεηιεγευε  
ηεεεεμα ηαε τεηεποηηα δε αηα  
ποηοτοο κηναυτηρ παραγεηε ιε  
30 αρεφ εραυηε εροο ηεοευηητηε εροο  
εγαηαε εεηεποηηα ογαηες αη κηνωο  
μα αλαη ηεκυηηο ιερυνο ετ[ηεπ]αει  
ποηοτοο κηνα ηεγρεο εγερ[αι ιεηεκηληα]  
i κηναηηνευ οηηα ηεηε[ηεηεηηε]ε η ετεει  
35 ιηιε αηγηε εραι ηεηη[ι]ηα ηλαη πηοο  
[παγαηη εηαο]οοε ετεεποηηα

1 For she said, ‘I will prostitute myself to those who love me. They have given me my bread and my water and my garments and my clothes and my wine and my oil and everything that is useful to me.’ Therefore, behold, I will make her unable to pursue her adulterers, and when she seeks them and does not find them she will say, ‘I will return to my original husband, for I was better off in those days than now.’” 3 Again he says in Ezekiel: “It happened after many evils, said the Lord, that you built yourself a brothel and you made yourself a beautiful place in the squares and you built yourself brothels on every street and you destroyed your beauty and you spread your legs on every street and you multiplied your prostitution. You prostituted yourself to the sons of Egypt, those who are your neighbours, those great of flesh.” 4 But who are “the sons of Egypt, those great of flesh” except the fleshly and the perceptible and the things of the earth, in which the soul have defiled herself in these places, by receiving bread from them and receiving wine and receiving oil and receiving clothes and the other nonsense on the outside surrounding the body, these which she thinks are useful for her? But concerning this prostitution the apostles of the Saviour commanded: “Guard yourselves against it! Cleanse yourselves of it!” 5 speaking not only of the prostitution of the body, but especially that of the soul. Therefore the apostles [write to the churches] of God, so that [things] like this may not happen among us, but the great [struggle] concerns the prostitution.

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3 Hos 2:2–7.
5 Cf. Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1 Cor 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1.


appendix a

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 ⲛⲧⲯⲩⲭⲏ
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ⲡⲕⲉⲥⲱⲙⲁ ϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲇⲓⲁ ⲧⲟⲩⲧⲟ ⲡⲁⲩⲗⲟⲥ ⲉϥ
ⲥϩⲁ¨ⲓ ⲛⲅⲕⲟⲣⲓⲑⲓⲟⲥ
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ⲉⲡⲉⲓ ⲁⲣⲁ ⲧⲉⲧⲛⲏⲡ
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ⲉⲉⲓ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲙⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ
̄
ⲧⲁⲉⲓ ⲧⲉ ⲑⲉ ⲉϥϣⲁ
ϫⲉ ⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁⲧⲓⲕⲱⲥ ϫⲉⲉⲡⲛⲁⲅⲱⲛ
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ⲧⲁϥϫⲟⲟⲥ ⲁⲗⲗⲁ ⲟⲩⲃⲉ ⲛⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲕⲣⲁⲧⲱⲣ
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. Sevrin: ⲛⲅⲕⲟⲣⲓⲛⲑⲓⲟⲥ; Kulawik: ⲛⲅⲕⲟⲣⲓⲛⲑⲓⲟⲥ
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||  Sevrin: ⲙⲛⲡⲟⲣⲛⲟⲥ
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of the soul. From it comes the prostitution of the body too. Therefore Paul, writing to the Corinthians, said: “I wrote to you in the letter: ‘Do not mix with prostitutes,’ by no means (meaning) the prostitutes of this world or the greedy or the robbers or the idolators, since then you would have to leave the world.” Thus he is speaking spiritually, “for our struggle is for us not against flesh and blood,” as he said, “but against the world rulers of this darkness and the spirits of wickedness.” As long as the soul runs around and has communion with whomever she may meet, becoming defiled, she suffers what she deserves, but when she becomes aware of the afflictions she is in and weeps to the Father and repents, then the Father will have mercy on her and turn her womb from the outside and he will again turn it inside, and the soul will receive her particular nature. For these are not like the women, for the womb of the body is on the inside of the body like the other internal organs, but the womb of the soul is turned outside like the genitals of the male which are on the outside. So, when the womb of the soul turns itself, by the will of the Father, to the inside, she is baptised and immediately she is cleansed of the defilement of the outside, this which was pressed upon her, like [garments when they are filthy] are lifted into the [water and] are turned until their dirt [is] brought [out] and they are cleansed, but the cleansing of the soul is to receive again her [new]ness

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6 1 Cor 5:9–10.
7 Eph 6:12.
8 Eph 6:12.
132

1 ἰπεσφυκικον ἵδορι ἱκτος ἰκε

2 σον πειν πε πεσβαττισεν τοτε σλα

3 ῥαρχει ἵναλκ εροσ ουαςτε ἰκε ἱκε

4 ῥακτοκον εροου ουας ρινογακε

5 ἀλλα επει ουρισε τη νισον αγρεαςπε

6 κε ἵναςτε λιπευτ τηναι ης εβολ

7 ριττε ἵνεινουτ ετεπεκον πε

8 πιορι ἵνιο τοτε ἀπρωιελετ ει

9 λειτυ ῥαξελετ αςκω ην ηκως ὑ

10 τεσπορνο ὑδορτι ατογονος αυξαρη

11 ἰνιοεικ ασφύρας δε άγιιιειελετ

12 ατογονος ῥινα ιειελετ αυξαρη ινι

13 ηινοινος εργον ῥιττε εκοιουτ

14 εβολ ριττε ινπωιελετ ἵνε ουκετι

15 σιντι ριτταγορα εκκοινοινη κινπετ

16 ουοοι αλλα αςκω εκοιουτ εβολ ριττε

17 Χεωρ ἴροον ενινευ εκτοτε ριττε

18 νεκεονι γαιη άν άν ίνειονε ουκε

19 τι άρινεευε χινπνοοειν ϵιταςε ε

20 βολ ρινπει άνεεειατ ρινπνουυε

21 δε άιειατ αςτρεπεαιον δε ριοο ηνε

22 ινιοιοε τηε άνυιουυτ τοτε οε

23 πρωιελετ καταλιγουυον ηπειατ

24 αιει επητυ ομρο εροου επια ινυε

25 λεε ετοτιττατ αυκοκεε δε ινινη

26 φαι επεαλος γαι ετιιναυ εμφηοο

27 αλ ινε ιηπαλος ιηαρκηκος νεταρ

28 κοινοινη κινπνερην ωαρα αικο

29 ναναν ετιιναυ αυω ηνε ινεεταω

30 ωαρκω ιναοου ινεααααεις [η]τε

31 πηνινεα αυω ιηετκ[τα] η[ηνογο 0β]ολ

32 ινπνερην αλλα πει[ . . . . ] [λ]η πε

33 πειγαλος αλλα εγωαλ[π]οιρατρ

34 ηλ[ο]|γ[ερ]|γ ωαχυοπην ηχων ωοτ

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16 Bethge: (νε)οιντ || 20 Bethge: 
(ε)/σρεενε || 22 Layton, Kulawik: ιπει(π[/]),ηλ || 31 Sevrin: [η]τε || 32 
Κραυσ: ιπει(πειο [πειραη])αλ; Βίσσε, Σεβριν: ιπειη(πορχοι εβ)[ο]; Σένκε, Βεθγε: 
ιπειη(ηνογη εβ)[ο]; Κασερ: ιπειη(ο)[κο σε εβ][ο] || 33 Κραυσ: ιπει(κοτ) [η] πε; 
Σένκε, Βεθγε, Κουλαωικ: ιπειη(πο[ρχοι εβ][ο]) [κα]η πε; Σένκε: ιπει [ . . . . ] [ κα]η πε; 
Βεθγε: [κα]η [ . . . . ] [ κα]η πε; Κασερ: (κα)ιπει(κοτ γα)[κα]η πε || 34 Κραυσ, ΜοΤν: εγωαλ[ε][
ιρατρ; Σένκε, Βεθγε: εγωα[πο]ις ιρατρ || 35 Κραυσ: [ . . . ] [ . . . ] [ . . . ] οιρατπ; 
of her original nature⁹ and to turn herself again, this is her baptism. Then she will start to rage at herself like those who give birth.¹⁰ Immediately when they give birth to the child they turn upon themselves in anger. But since she is a woman unable to engender children on her own, the Father sent her from heaven her husband who is her brother, the firstborn. Then the bridegroom came down to the bride. She abandoned her former prostitution, and she cleansed herself of the defilements of the adulterers, and she became renewed to be suitable as a bride. She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with perfume, and sat within it waiting for the true bridegroom. No longer does she run around in the marketplace¹¹ having communion with whomever she wants, but she continued waiting for him, “When is he coming?”¹² fearing him,¹³ for she did not know what he looked like. No longer does she remember, since the time she fell from the house of her Father. But by the will of the Father she dreamt a dream of him like women who love men. So then, according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage which was prepared,¹⁴ and he adorned the bridal chamber.¹⁵ For that marriage is not like the fleshy marriage. (In the fleshy marriage,) those who will have communion with each other have enough of that (fleshy) communion and like burdens they leave behind them the annoyance [of] the desire and they [turn their faces from] each other, but this […] is [not] this marriage, but when they unite with [each other] they become a single life.

⁹ Cf. 2 Pet 1:4.
¹⁰ Cf. Gen 3:16.
34Krause: η[τον γω]αυη[αυηηετε] αυω η
35Krause: ταρεσκο[ι]ηνειη ρηναγ [ς]cxi η
Therefore the prophet says
concerning the first man and the first woman: "They shall become a single flesh." The
Jesus the Father,
before the woman lost the husband who is her brother. And this marriage has brought them together and the soul has united with her true love, her natural master, as it is written,
"for the master of the woman is her husband." And she recognised him little by little and she rejoiced again, weeping before him when she remembered her disgraceful conduct of her former widowhood, and she greatly adorned herself so that it might please him to stay with her. And the Prophet says in the Psalms:
"Listen, my daughter, and see and turn your ear and forget your people and the house of your father, for the king has desired your beauty, for he is your master." For he expects her to turn her face away from her people and the multitude of her adulterers, in whose midst she previously was, and to devote herself to her king only, her natural master, and to forget the house of the earthly father with whom she was maltreated, and to remember him, her Father in heaven. Thus also it was said to Abraham: "Come forth from your land and your kin and from the house of your father!" Thus, when the soul [adorned] herself again in her beauty, [she] attain[ed] her beloved and [he also] loved her. And when she had communion with him she receive[d]

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16 Gen 2:24; cf. Matt 19:5; Mark 10:8; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31.
18 Cf. Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.
19 Ps 44:11–12 LXX.
20 Gen 12:1.
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1 πεσπερνά εβολ ριτουτί ετεννέ, πε εττύρο ραμπέτσλπο ρήνορρε εβολ ρήντι ενανθουγ ρέσανθουγ παιε γαρ πε πνου ύτελεον ράγουα
5 ρήπνο ραστε πεειγάλνο εψχιν εβολ ρήπνουγον ρήπεντ ρομέ δε χτετφυ χη χηος ραγάτε ρήνουνε εν ρήτες ρε ρήρρον τφόνη σε ραρεκσιν ουα
10 τρεεηφέρρε λέξανς εο εγναδίτε ε πλα ενεγάθαξ ρίσρορν τάει τε τανάκασε ετροο εβολ ρήνηθυν ούτ παιε πε πναυτε ρήνημαλασσα τά εί τε τανάκασε ρίβων ερράε επνε τάει
15 τε το ράλος ρίβων ερράε ράλεντ δια τούτο πεξεενπρόφητνες χετάγγυ χη ρεπέλογει ρήρροες αχο ράσεα (η) ρογγι τηρού ρήπεραλ ετούαλ τάγγυ χη ρεπέλογει ρήρρούτε πεταρκώ
20 εβολ ρηη[η]ανομα λθρού πενταςτάλ γο ρήθανενε τηρού πενταρσατε ρήπενθα εβολ ρη ρήπου πενταραγ [κ]λον εχορ ρήνοψα πέττ(ς)ει ούτεπν [ο]γνα ρήηρασόν τενετκούει ηα
25 τρεκάρρε εο ερτάλαγετοες εραφάρρερρε σε σμβωκ ερράε εκενου επενατ κηνεεσον παιε ρήτασογεαι εβολ ριτουτί τάει τε σε ρήφγγη εσαμνου χαει ρίτηπενκασο ρέκεον παιε δε
30 εβολ ρήηρακε αν ράκεεκ εαμας ει ρογγε εβολ αν ρήηρεθνυ αυ[λε]ς ρη εβολ ρήραει αλλα τμαρ[ς]ή ρη[.........]ς αλλα ταναρεα ρης [.........]ες
35 τούτο ρ[λε]ακέκ εβολ ρήηρακτήρ

the seed from him that is
the life-giving spirit, so that she gave birth to good children
from it and nourished them.
For this is the great perfect marvel
of birth, as it is by the will of the Father
that this marriage is fulfilled. But it is necessary for the
soul to give birth to herself and to become once again as she
was before. So, the soul moves
by herself, and she received the divinity from the Father
for her to be renewed, so that she may also be taken to
the place were she was from the beginning. This is
the resurrection from the
dead. This is the redemption from captivity.
This is the ascent up to heaven. This
is the way to go up to the Father.
Therefore the prophet says: “My
soul, praise the Lord and all those
within his holy name. My
soul, praise God, who has
forgiven all your lawlessnesses, who has
healed all your diseases, who has saved
your life from death, who has
crowned you with mercy, who satisfies your
desire with the good. Your youth will
be renewed like that of an eagle.” So, when she becomes renewed
she will ascend, praising the Father
and her brother, this one by whom she was saved.
Thus the soul will
be saved through the rebirth. But this
comes not from ascetic words
nor from skills nor from
written teaching, but the grace of [...],
but the gift of [...].
For this thing is heavenly.
Therefore the Saviour cries out:

21 Cf. John 6:63; 1 Cor 15:45.
23 Ps 102:1–5 LXX.
135

1 ΧΕΠΩΛΑΨ ΝΑΟΕΙ ΘΑΡΟΕΙ ΕΙΝΗΤΙ Υ
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15 ΊΝΝΟ ΊΝΕ ΕΤΝΗΡΗΤΗ ΤΕΝΟΥ ΠΑΛΙΝ
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ΡΟΥΣΑ ΊΝΕΡΕΙ ΑΥΘ ΝΙΦΩΡΛΗΝΗΣ[ΕΥ]
ΚΗΡΥΟΟ ΊΝΩΝΠΣΘΛΗ ΙΤΘΕΤΑΝΟΛΑ
25 ΤΘΕΤΑΝΟΛΑ ΔΕ ΘΕΑΘΟΝΙΕ ΡΗΟΥΘΗΘ
ΘΗΙΟΥΚΑΡ ΠΡΗΤ ΠΕΑΘΤ ΔΕ ΟΥΛΑΕΙ
ΡΟΘΝΕ ΠΕ ΝΙΑΓΑΕΟΣ ΑΥΘ ΕΝΑΚΤΘ ΢Γ
ΤΥΧΘ ΕΤΘΕΠΚΑΛΕΙ ΕΡΡΑΙ ΕΡΟΥ ΑΥΘ ΊΗ
ΘΙΘΑΝ ΝΑΣ ΊΡΟΥΘΕΙ ΊΡΟΥΧΛΕΙ ΔΑΙ
30 ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΕΧΛΗ ΡΙΤΗΝΕΠΘΙΑ ΉΠΕΡΟΡΟ-
Φ[ΘΤ]ΗΣ ΞΕΧΟΟΣ ΊΝΘΕΡΗ ΙΓΕΛΑΟΣ
Χ[ΧΕΡΟ]ΘΑ[ΓΑ]ΝΗΕΘΘΟΒΕ ΑΘΑΝΕ ΕΓΟΥΘΟΥ
Χ[ΘΗΠΚΑΣ ΟΑΙΤ]ΘΕ ΑΥΘ ΕΓΟΥΘΑΘΟΘΕ
ΕΓΤΡΕ[ΩΡΆ]ΘΑ ΊΝΕ ΊΘΗΠΚΚΟΚΟΣ ΑΥΘ
“No one will be able to come to me unless my Father draws him and brings him to me and I too will raise him on the last day.” It is therefore appropriate to pray to the Father and for us to call up to him with all our soul, not with the external lips, but with the spirit within, the one which came from the deep, sighing and repenting for the life we have led, confessing the sins, perceiving the empty error we were in and the empty haste, weeping like we were in the darkness and the wave, mourning ourselves so that he may have pity on us, hating ourselves as we are now. Again the Saviour says: “Blessed are those who mourn, for it is they who shall be pitied. Blessed are those who hunger, for it is they who shall be filled.” Again he says: “If one does not hate his own soul he will not be able to follow me.” For the beginning of salvation is repentance. Therefore, “before the arrival of Christ, John came, pre[aching] the baptism of repentance.” And repentance comes about in pain and grief. But the Father is a good philanthropist and he hears the soul who calls up to him and he sends her the saving light. Therefore he says through the spirit in the prophet: “Say to the children of my people: ‘If your sins become extended [from the earth to] heaven and if they become [red] like scarlet and blacker than a [sack, and] ...
you turn yourselves to me with all your soul
and you say to me,

'My Father, I will listen to you like a
holy people.'” 33 Again in another place,

the Lord, the Holy One of
Israel, says: 'When you turn yourself and sigh,
then you will be saved and you will know where you were,
on the day when you trusted the emptinesses.” 34 Again
he says in another place: “Jerusalem
wept profusely: ‘Have mercy on me!’ He will have mercy on the voice
of your weeping and when he saw he listened to you.
And the Lord will give you bread of
affliction and water of oppression. Those
who deceive will not return from now on
to approach you. Your eyes will see those who deceive
you.” 35 So it is appropriate to pray to
God night and day, stretching
our hands up to him like those who are sailing in the midst
of the sea. They pray to

God with all their heart without hypocrisy,
for those who pray hypocritically
deceive only themselves.
For God looks at the kidneys and
he examines the heart below

in order to know whether they are worthy of salvation.
For no one is worthy of salvation who still loves
the place of error. Therefore it is written
in the Poet: “Odysseus sat
on the island weeping and grieving, turning
his face from the words of Calisto
and her deceptions, desiring to see
his village and smoke [com]ing
from it. And had [he not received]
help from heaven, [he would not have been able to return]
to his village.” 36 Again, [Helen] too says:

“My heart has turned itself from me. Again

33 1 Clem. 8:3.
34 Isa 30:15.
36 Cf. Homer, Od. 1.48–59; 4.558.
1 I want to go to my house. 37 For she sighed
and said: 'It was Aphrodite who
deceived me. She brought me out from my village. My
only daughter I have left behind me and my
5 beautiful, wise, good husband.' 38
For when the soul leaves her
perfect husband because of the deception of Aphrodite,
which consists in the begetting in this place,
she will be hurt. But if she sighs
10 and repents she will return to her
house. For indeed, Israel would not have been visited
in the first place so as to be taken out from the land of Egypt,
from the house of slavery, except because it
sighed to God and wept for the oppression
15 of its work. Again it is written in the Psalms:
"I have been greatly troubled in my sighing. I will
wash my bed and my mattress at
night with my tears. I have become old among
all my enemies. Get away from me,
20 everyone who does lawlessness, for behold, the
Lord has heard the call of my weeping
and the Lord has heard my prayer." 39 If
we will truly repent, God will
hear us, the patient and abundantly
25 merciful to whom is the glory in
all eternity. Amen.

27 The Exegesis on the Soul

37 Cf. Homer, Od. 4.260–261.
38 Cf. Homer, Od. 4.261–264.
39 Ps 6:7–10 LXX.
51 (= Plate 99)

A Hebrew man creates Hebrew,
and [those] of this sort are called
“proselyte,” but a p[rose]lyte does not
create proselyte […]
they are like […]
and they create others […]
52 (= Plate 100)

5 ὡ τιμηρε ἀλλὰ τρκληρονεὶς ἤπε ἄτ ἀκας[ε] ἱκαν ρετρκληρονεὶς ἤπετηνοῦτ ἦτοος ἐρουν εὐχαοῦτ
ἀν έγκληρονεὶς ἤπετηνοῦτ νε τρκληρονεὶς ἤπετοιρ ἦτοος εὐοι
10 ἀν έγκληρονεὶς ἤπετοιρ ἠἵνετ
15 ἐφαλωρ ἦποος οὐρενθικός ἤρῳ ἡμαν ἡπεπαν ἐς ἑπε νῦν ἐφαλωρονομενος ετεν ἐς ἄς
ἀν άν ἐπ ὑδηθυμεν εῖς ἐνοι ὑπερ
15 ἐφαλωρονομενος ετεν ἐς ἑπε νῦν ἐφαλωρονομενος ετεν ἐς
20 ἡκατορο πον ἠἵνετον ἐς ἐνοι ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵνετον ἠἵ
25 ἡμετερε ᰽ητπραο ὑμας[ε] ὑποαςν ἁπαρ άπ το ὅ ς ὡμοι ποιεθ ωμοι ποιεθ ωμοι ποιεθ ωμοι ποιεθ ωμοι ποιεθ ωμοι ποιεθ
30 ᰽ητπραο ποιεθ εραμοξα ἐς ἄς ἰρ ᰽ητπραο εραμοξα ἐς ἄς ἰρ ᰽ητπραο εραμοξα ἐς ἄς ἰρ ᰽ητπραο εραμοξα ἐς ἄς ἰrh
35 [ ... . . . . ο]ξακαρπος τε ἀπερ ῥι
52 (= Plate 100)

... only ... suffice for them so that they may come into being. The slave only seeks to be free, but he does not seek the property of his master. But the son, not only is he son, but he ascribes to himself the inheritance of the father. Those who inherit the dead, they too are dead and they inherit the dead. Those who inherit the living, they are alive and they inherit the living and the dead. The dead do not inherit anything, for how will the dead inherit? If the dead inherits the living he will not die, but the dead will rather live! A gentile man does not die, for he has never lived so that he may die. He who has believed in the truth, he has lived, and this one is liable to die, for he is alive since the day Christ came. The world is created, the cities are organised, the dead is carried out. When we were Hebrews we were fatherless. We had our mother, but when we became Christians we got (both) father and mother. Those who sow in the winter reap in the summer. The winter is the world, the summer is the other aeon. Let us sow in the world so that we may reap in the summer. Therefore it is appropriate for us not to pray in the winter. That which follows the winter is the summer, but if one reaps in the winter he will not reap, but he will pluck out. Just like such a person he will not produce fruit [...] not only does he come forth [...] but on the Sabbath too [...] it is fruitless. Christ came

53 (= Plate 101)

1 ὑπὸνε ἔνε ἐπετρεφόντας [ἐ ε] ὑποκοῦς

5 ὑπετενούῃς ἴνει ἤ τὰς κλασὶς ἴνος

10 ὁ ἐν τούτῳ ἔξε ἐξειμέντες ἐπεὶ

15 κε πάντων ὑπὴνοι ἕνοις ἑτερούρι

20 ὅν ἐν ὑπὸ τούτῳ ποῦ ποὺ ἤ ποῖον ἀναλ.

25 πλὴν καὶ ἐπιστοὶ γὰρ ἴνοις ἔφεσις ἐπετείχοντ

30 μὴ παρε ἱπποτὴν ἐπορεύτας μὴ

35 βοῦ ἐπετείχοντες ἔπρα ἰ ἱπποτὴν ἐπορεύτας μὴ

53 (= Plate 101)

to buy some, but
to save others, and to redeem others.
It was those who were strangers that he bought, and he
made them his own and he set
his own apart, these whom he put as a pledge
in his will. Not only when he
appeared did he lay down his life (ψυχή) when he
wanted to, but since the day the world
existed he laid down his life (ψυχή) when he
wanted to. Then he came first to take it, since
it had been put as a pledge. It came to be under the
robbers and they took it captive, but he saved
it, and the good in the world
he redeemed, and the bad. Light and darkness,
life and death, right and left,
they are brothers of one another. It is impossible for them to be separated
from each other. Therefore, neither are the good
good, nor are the bad bad,
nor is life life, nor is death
death. Each one will therefore dissolve
into its origin from the beginning. But those that are exalted
above the world are indissoluble,
they are among the eternal. The names that are given to the
worldly contain a great
error, for they turn the mind aside from
what is right to what is not right,
and he who hears “God”
does not understand what is right, but he understands
what is not right. Thus also with “the Father”
and “the Son” and “the Holy Spirit” and
“the life” and “the light” and “the resurrection”
and “the church” and all the others,
it is not [what is right] that is understood, but it is
what is [not] right that is understood, unless they
have learned what is right. The [names that were heard]
exist in the world […]

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appendix b

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54 (= Plate 102)

[deceive. If they existed] in the aeon they would never have been named in the world, nor have they been placed among worldly things. They have their end in the aeon. A single name is not uttered in the world, the name which the Father gave to the Son. It is exalted above every (other name), that is, the name of the Father. For the Son would not have become father unless he had put on the name of the Father. Those who have this name know it, but they do not speak it, but those who do not have it do not know it. But Truth produced names in the world for our sakes, for it is impossible for us to learn it (i.e., Truth) without the names. Truth is one thing and it is many, and it concerns us to teach this one alone with love through many. The rulers wanted to deceive man because they saw him having kinship with the truly good. They took the name of the good and they gave it to those that are not good so that through the names they might deceive him and bind them to those that are not good, and afterwards, as if they are doing them a favour, to remove them from those that are not good and to place them among those that are good. These things they knew, for they wanted to take the free one and place him in slavery to them forever. There are powers existing who [...] man, not wanting him to be [safe,] so that they may become [...] for if man [was safe], sacrifices [would not] happen [...] and animals were offered

45 Cf. Eph 4:15–16; Phil 1:15–16.
55 (= Plate 103)

1   ἐρράι ἰδιύδναις ἐνι[θ]θ[θ]ριόν γὰρ
    οὐδεντελο ἐρράι θα[γ] νεγτελο
    μὴν ἰδιοῦ ἐρράι εὐον ἑταροῦτε
    λοοῦ ἄρ ἐρράι ἰδιοῦ πρῶνε ἀυτελούν

5   ἐρράι ἱππούτε euποῦτε άυω αὐπον
    ἑταροῦν εὐπαινεὐχεί ἑν ἰννοεικ
    γῆποκοσοχὸ ἐν ἰππαρδικὸς πιά

10  ἡττροφὴ ἡπραχιν ἐνεπροапνε σο
    εῦα ἐν ἰδιον άλα ἰδιαροεὐχεί
    εὐελ ᾠόττε εὔαν ἐρεπρανε ἀντρὲ
    φεσαὶ ἡττροφὴ ἡπράχε φερεῖ

15  ἀρχιν ἕεγε ἀχήρητογον ἰδιογο
    αὐλ εὐερε ἐνετευερε ἰδιογο
    ὑπὲ ἐνετούζο τάλλησα σετε ἰδιος

20  ἰδα νίν ὑτεταὐον ὁινίωρίσα
    αὐ ὀὐγκξ ἅν ἐχο εισε ἱδιος ἱδά
    κούει ἄρ ἐνετοῦξο ἐχο εισε
    ἱδος ἰννοειν ξελάρια αὐ ἐνθο
    ὑπὲ ἐνετοῦξαν ἐτρπαλασα οὐ πε

25  τοῦχω ἰδών εκεοῦν αδ αὐ ἄρο
    αὐ εἰν ἐνταὐζε ἐνθο ἱδάΖ
    ὑπὲ ἱαρα έτε τπαρενας ετεύηε
    ἄννας ἱγνος εκαοον ἰδών
    ἴοος ἰδιανοη νίπεβρας ἐτεηα

30  ποστολος ἄν ἰδύ [κ]αποστόλοκος
    τετπαρενος ετ[κ]ηνεδυναμιν
    ξορνξ ου[. . . . . . κ]ηνεδυναμιν
    ξορνξ αὐν ὀν[εενξ]ροξ αν οὐβι
    πνοεις εζελε[κω τ έτο]ινηγυε

35  εἶνντι χελεγιάζα[κ ἰδα]ν[κ]εσωγετ
    άλας ῥαπλος αὐχοο[κε χελεγιάζα]
    πεχεποτες ἰδὰν[νής κε . . . ]

    ντα[κ]ηνεδυναμιν; Schenke: ο[. . . . . κ]ηνεδυναμιν 34 Ménard: χελε[κω τ πετρη]ινηγυε
    37 Schenke: ἰδαν[κε χελα].
up to the powers, for those who were offered up to were animals (themselves). They were offered up alive, but when they were offered up they died. Man was offered up to God dead and he lived. Before Christ came there was no bread in the world, like in Paradise, the place where Adam was, there were many trees for the food of the animals. It had no wheat for the food of man. Man was feeding like the animals, but when Christ came, the perfect man, he brought bread from heaven so that man would be nourished with the food of man. The rulers thought that it was by their power and their will that they were doing what they were doing, but the Holy Spirit was secretly effecting everything through them as it wished. Truth, which has been in existence since the beginning, is sown everywhere, and there are many who see it being sown, but there are few who see it being reaped. Some say that Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit. They are wrong. They do not know what they are saying. When did a female ever conceive by a female? “Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled.” It is a great oath of the Hebrews, who are the apostles and [the] apostolic. This virgin whom no power defiled, [...] the powers defile[d] themselves. And the Lord [would] not [have] said, “my [father who is in] heaven,” unless he had another father, but he would simply have said, [“my father”]. The Lord said to the [disciples, “...”]

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48 Cf. 2 Cor 11:22–23; Phil 3:3, 5.
50 Cf. Rom 1:3.
56 (= Plate 104)

1 [еb]ол зи[н]и нин ен ен ероун епнепи 
нейкакт нипрэкхюн(e) де ютоq зини 
ей нейкакт нитићи евол ид орул(n) 
пе епнеп пекрс оуран пе епсувор
5 евол виа товто и нен ќајооп ан 
зилалун ниспес алла пеуран пе йис 
нис етогомонд реq нисособ пекрс 
де пеуран [пе] нијумцурц пе нис 
сиас нијумтахедан ви ап нис пб(n)
10 тас икисуе тироу оуитаки нисак 
кататасеп нипога пога њићтогу 
пиаражнос петоугор евол пе 
ниспевип пење оуитак оуог нин 
граи њићтг ейде ране ейде њигелос
15 ейте нустриоион бак нийкакт нитхев 
нисос њељасбак нос нипори бак 
дитакои нипори нипори епнеп 
кольпесн нипори њимакм иј погор
20 њимпуоте нерепи нмн(ог) илла 
ај нарпун ниспун нипрага ейта 
эйх њипун нипар виа алла paragus 
алу њиртва етенћтогу нис нишмакм 
гуроd блоуаспирон таи те ње й
25 титх орпоб ектахни пе акаци 
пе њипунусан апосс њируоиене 
пром те њепениос њетакои еика 
карни етевеп(а)лым епунов етакои 
ритецрз бак [с] евоун ан њенетр
30 фореи іте[арп њтожо]ог пе еткакарн 
нас ете[, . . . . . . ] нисоо екакоу 
[по нппио] њтеп нис те таи етакалн

56.1 Мёнард: [...][...][...][...][и нени епоун] || 2 Мёнард: [и]пјао охге њтожо || 20
For some reason the scribe left an empty gap following нмн. I follow the emendation of Мёнард. Schenke follows this reading in his translation, but does not emend the Coptic text. Layton: нмн( - - - - ) || 28 Мёнард: етве[пе][еи] || 31 Мёнард: ете[навоо]; 
56 (= Plate 104)

1 [from] every [house] and bring into the house of the Father, but do not steal from the house of the Father and do not carry away.” Jesus is a hidden name. Christ is a revealed name.

5 Jesus is therefore not in any language, but his name is Jesus as he is called. But as for Christ, his name in Syriac is Messiah, but in Greek it is Christ. All the others have it according to the language of each one among them.

10 It is the Nazarene who reveals the hidden. Christ has everything within himself, whether man or angel or mystery and the Father.51 Those who say that the Lord died first and then arose are wrong, for he arose first and then he died. If one does not acquire the resurrection first he will not die.

20 As God lives, that one would (die)! No one will hide a great valuable object in a great thing, but many times an innumerable myriad has been put into a thing worth a trifle. Thus it is with the soul. It is a valuable thing and it has come to be in a contemptible body. There are some who are afraid that perhaps they might arise naked. Therefore they want to arise in the flesh, and [they] do not know that it is those who wear the [flesh] who are naked.52 These […] to unclothe themselves, [they are] not naked. “Flesh [and blood shall] not inherit the kingdom [of God].”53 What is this that shall

52 Cf. 2 Cor 5:2–4.
53 1 Cor 15:50.
57 (= Plate 105)

1 ῥονομεὶ ἃν ταῖς ἐτριχών οἴνῳ ἔ ε τῇ ταῖς ῥυσκοὶ ἐπακληρονομεὶ ταῖς

3 τῇ ἡπειρσᾷ ὅᾳ τουτο πεχαὶ ἔε

5 πανου ἡπειρσάς γραὶ ἀρητῇ ἄγ

7 τῇ τεθρασῇ πε πλογοὶ ἔνω πεθεινοὶ

9 πε πῆι ἐτοιγᾶβ πεταρχὲ ἱοε οὐ( nâ)

10 τεβρότην ἄνω οὐηταγω γῆςω

12 αὖ ἀνεικεογοῦν πε γῆτρασζ οὐ̄λο

14 γος πε πεικογοῦν πε γῆτρασζ οὐ̄λο

15 ἀν ἐκεῖλλαὶ ἃν ἡπολ ἡπσυᾳ ἕγα

17 ἐ ἁτὴ ἀγογο οὐστογο γῆνη γῆσω

20 οὐστογο οὐσμύσεα γεστογο ἄε

25 ἐβολ ἀεοὶ ἐκτιμηθῆσαι οὐγῳ


30 ἐποὶ ἀρητῇ ἃ[τε ἀπ]ρο ἂγο

35 ἑνοὶ ἐβολ ἀν ἄρ[σοφο] ἐβολ ἦ[ή]

36 ἑνοὶ ἐβολ ἀν ἄγ[σοφο] ἐβολ ἦ[ή]

not inherit? (It is) this which is on us. But what
also is this that shall inherit? It is Jesus’ (flesh)
and his blood. Therefore he said,
“He who will not eat my flesh and drink
my blood has not life in him.”54 What
is it? His flesh is the Logos55 and his blood
is the Holy Spirit.56 He who has received these
has food, and he has drink and clothing.57
As for me, I find fault with the others who say
that it will not rise. Or both of them
are at fault. You say
that the flesh will not rise, but tell
me what it is that shall arise, so that we may
honour you. You say, “the spirit in the flesh,”
and “it is this other light in the flesh.”
It is a Logos, “this other” that is “in the flesh,” because whatever you will
say, you say nothing apart from the flesh.
It is necessary to arise in this flesh, for
everything is in it. In this world
those who wear the garments are better than the
garments. In the kingdom of heaven, the garments
are better than those who have put them on.58 It is by means of
water and fire that everything is purified,
the revealed by means of the revealed
the hidden by means of the hidden. There are
some that are hidden by means of the revealed.
There is water in water, there is fire
in chrism. Jesus took them all by stealth,59
for he did not appear as
he was, but it was
as [they would] be able to see
him that he appeared. [All these (ways)] he
appeared to them. He [appeared] to [the]
great as great. He [appeared] to
the small as small. He [appeared]
58 (=Plate 106)

1 [m]αγγελος πας αγγελος αχω
  ουρωμε πας ρωνε ετευπαι αιεθ
logos καρνη εουνη νη ροινη
  ηνε ρξη ερο ευνευ πενε ναν
5 εροου νην νηνοου αλλα νηναθου
  ας εβοι ονευναθης ρηνουβεο
  ηγ γιαθηνουν νηνο αη νηνοει αη
  ροπε νηνοου αλλα νηναθηναθης
  νηνον δεκαν ευναθηοου νηνον
10 ερο εγη νηνο νεκαυ νηνον ετη
  ηγ ηνευχαριαεια ενεπιπαζητη
  απηηελειος πουειν εεηη αευ
  αλα ζοτη αγγελειος ερο εακδ αη
  αγκα ανακαθηνηνει αναγει
15 τη γαρ νηνοουν ενη επρο νηλλαυ
  ναξινπεγουνει ερογ ηνεο εη
  κηκαηνυ πριηπε νηενεηνηευνηρε
  ρηνοο αηηηεκασ ενεηεηνηεη
  αηλα αναδειου κατηγοε ηαγηνοη ρο
20 σω ναλλον νηνηρε απηΗειοιος Μοο
  ηε ιει εναγηνον αλλα εεηρο νηνο
  ου ογοηεν νην πειενο ταηεο οφ
  ρε αηω πηηεν νηνουν νηνο νηηα
  νηεηνεη πεηηηςηχηου ναη γαρ νηνον
25 νηνοο νηηξνο αλλα εηπηηερ αηνηη
  ηαη νηηηηηυνυ πριηηηευνηρε ηε ηεηηηυ
  ηξη ηηηουν ηηηυρο νηηηκοιεοηυο
  ευηηνο νηηνο[γ] εβοι εηηθηνης αηνηη
  ω νηνοουε γηη[...].[...].ευηηνο νηηνον
30 εβοι νηηηνηυ [. . . .] αηε εβοι νηηαυ
  επροεινε [. . . .].εηυ εβοι εηηηηρ
  [. . ]ηηε [. . . .]. ηοε νηηκα ηηηνε
  [. . . . .]. νηηοο εβοι ηηηηηερο
  [. . . . .]. πηλογοε ει εβοι νηηαυ

58.15 Layton: en(p)po; Schenke, white choosing not to emend the text, likewise holds enpo to be an "Irreguläre Schreibung für enp(o)" 29 Till: πη(πηηα νετ)ενηξηο; Ménard: πη(πηηα νετ)ενηξηο; Layton: πη(πηηα νετ)ενηξηο; Schenke: πη(πηηα νετ)ενηξηο || 30 Ménard: [εν(πηηα νετ)ενηξηο]; Layton, Schenke: [εεηηο]ω || 31 Ménard: [εεηηο]ω; Layton, Schenke: [εεηηο]ω || 32 Ménard: [π]ητ εε(πηηηο)οε; Layton, Schenke: [π]ητ εε(πηηηο)οε || 33 Ménard: [εεηηο]ω; Schenke: [εεηηο]ω... || 34 Till: [. . . εεηεη]πηλογοε; Ménard: [αχω εεηεη]πηλογοε; Layton: [αχω εεηεη]πηλογοε; Schenke: [πηηηα νηη]απηλογοε.
58 (= Plate 106)

1 [to the] angels as angel and
to the men as man. Therefore his
Logos hid itself from everyone. Some
saw him thinking that they saw
5 themselves, but when he
appeared to his disciples in
glory upon the mountain\textsuperscript{60} he was not small, he
became great, but he made the disciples
great so that they might be able to see
10 him being great.\textsuperscript{61} He said on that day\textsuperscript{62}
in the Eucharist: \textsuperscript{63} “He who joined
the perfect, the light,\textsuperscript{64} with the Holy Spirit,
join the angels with us also,\textsuperscript{65} with the
images!” Do not despise the lamb,\textsuperscript{66} for without
15 it it is impossible to see the door.\textsuperscript{67} No one
will be able to approach the king
naked.\textsuperscript{68} The heavenly man has more children
than the earthly man. If the children of
Adam are many even though they die,
20 how much more so the children of the perfect
man, these who do not die, but are
always begotten? The father makes
a son and it is impossible for the son to
make a son. For it is impossible for the one who has been born
25 to beget, but the son acquires
brothers, not sons. All those who
are begotten in the world
are begotten by means of the physical,
and the others in [..] are begotten
30 by means of it/him [..] out there
to the man [..] in the
[..] above
[..] him/it from the mouth
[..] the word came out thence

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. Matt 17:1–9; Mark 9:2–10; Luke 9:28–36.
\textsuperscript{61} Cf. 1 John 3:2.
\textsuperscript{64} Cf. John 8:12; 9:5.
\textsuperscript{65} Cf. John 1:51.
\textsuperscript{66} Cf., e.g., John 1:29, 36.
\textsuperscript{67} Cf. John 10:7–9.
\textsuperscript{68} Cf. Matt 22:11–14; cf. also Rev 7:9–17.
59 (= Plate 107)

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59.23 Ménard: οὐδὲν οὐρανός || 30 Till: [εὐ ...]α; Ménard, Layton, Schenke: [εὐςοφή]α

32 Till, Layton, Schenke: οὐκέται[α τε αξίη]οὐρέ; Ménard: οὐκέται[α τε αξίη]οὐρέ


34 Till: εὐγνωμον[ας εἰς εὐγνωμον]; Ménard: εὐγνωμον[ας εἰς εὐγνωμον]; Layton: εὐγνωμον[ας εἰς εὐγνωμον]; Schenke: εὐγνωμον[ας εἰς εὐγνωμον] || 35 Ménard: [πνε υἱὸν το].
he would be nourished from the mouth [and] he would become perfect, for it is by means of a kiss that the perfect conceive and beget. Therefore we too kiss one another,\(^{69}\)

conceiving from the grace that is in one another. There were three who walked with the Lord always: Mary, his mother, and her sister and Magdalene,\(^{70}\) who is called his companion.

For Mary was his sister and his mother and his partner. The Father and the Son are single names. The Holy Spirit is a double name, for they are everywhere. They are above, they are below,

they are in the secret, they are in the revealed. The Holy Spirit is in the revealed, it is below; it is in the secret, it is above. The saints are served by means of the evil powers,

for they are blinded by the Holy Spirit so that they may think that they are serving a man when they are serving the saints. Therefore a disciple asked the Lord one day for a thing of the world. He said to him: “ask your mother and she will give you from the others.” The apostles said to the disciples: “Let our entire offering acquire salt.”

They called [...] “salt.” Without it the offering does not [become] acceptable. But Wisdom [is] barren\(^{71}\) [...] child. Therefore [she/it] is called [...], this of salt, the place they will [...]

in their manner. The Holy Spirit [...]

\(^{69}\) Cf. Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20; 2 Cor 13:12; 1 Thess 5:26; 1 Pet 5:14.


\(^{71}\) Cf. Isa 54:1; Gal 4:27.
60 (= Plate 108)

1 [. . .] nāw[e] nesǭhre nēsteuą̄lχį nǭrape nākǭhre nē ayō ̨nītǭ ψω̨ aψ̨ ną̄hre ēr̨sǭon χǫ nīkoųi ną̄h pį̄steug̨e ną̄h ąn̨et̨ęnǫy̨ g̨ǫt̨α̨lį ęq̨ 5 ω̨r̨įk̨ą̨nę p̨rǭ̨h̨ę r̨ąr̨ęp̨ęn̨ęk̨ą̨ę t̨ą n̨ąq̨ n̨ęsteųą̄lχ̨ą̨ę t̨h̨r̨ǫ ų ę̄t̨r̨ǫ ų n̨ęt̨ęp̨ n̨į̨ą x̨ν̨ x̨p̨ ǫ n̨h̨n̨ ǫy̨ų ω̨r̨įs̨ąr̨įh̨ ǫn̨ ęv̨ ǫl̨ g̨įt̨̨ǫ̨t̨ǫ ų t̨ą t̨h̨ ψω̨ t̨ą r̨ ω̨v̨ ǫl̨ g̨įt̨̨į̨p̨į n̨̨ą ǫγ̨ąųt̨ ų̄x̨ęr̨ǫ n̨ęįp̨k̨ąr̨t̨ ąy̨ ąw̨ ϕο̨ąj̨į 10 k̨ęųγ̨ą p̨ę ęx̨ą̨n̨ą̨ę ąy̨ ǫn̨ k̨ęųγ̨ą p̨ę ęx̨ą̨n̨ą̨ę ęx̨ą̨n̨ą̨ę t̨ę t̨c̨ǫf̨įą γ̨ą̨p̨ąl̨ąc̨ ęx̨ą̨n̨ą̨ę d̨ę t̨ę t̨c̨ǫf̨įą n̨h̨n̨ ǫy̨ ęt̨ęt̨ą ęį t̨ę t̨c̨ǫf̨įą [n̨h̨n̨ ǫy̨ ęt̨ęt̨ąį t̨ę] ęt̨c̨ǫ ǫn̨ n̨h̨n̨ ǫy̨ ų t̨ęį ęt̨ǫγ̨h̨ǫųg̨t̨ę ęr̨ǫc̨ x̨ę 15 t̨kǫųγ̨ę įc̨ǫf̨įą ǫυ̨ρ̨į̨n̨ęh̨r̨įɔ̨n̨ q̨r̨ǫǫn̨ ęg̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę n̨įp̨h̨ą̨ę n̨įę n̨h̨n̨ ąc̨ę n̨įp̨h̨ą̨ę n̨įp̨h̨ą̨ę n̨ęųk̨ǫoγ̨ę υ̨t̨ęęįn̨h̨ę υ̨g̨ n̨įp̨h̨ą̨ǫγ̨ųę q̨r̨ǫǫn̨ ęg̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę d̨ą n̨ęγ̨ǫųx̨ r̨į̨ęn̨ęn̨ą p̨r̨ǫn̨ę ęk̨l̨ę n̨į 20 t̨c̨ǫųγ̨ę υ̨τ̨į̨n̨ęh̨r̨įɔ̨n̨ ęt̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę ąy̨ ąw̨ ęv̨ ǫl̨ r̨į̨p̨ąl̨ą q̨r̨ǫǫn̨ įt̨ǫ ψ̨n̨ n̨h̨ n̨ęęr̨įɔ̨n̨ ęt̨ę n̨ęt̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę ęt̨ę n̨ęt̨ r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę d̨ą n̨ę γ̨ǫųx̨ t̨ąę n̨ę t̨ę ψ̨n̨ęl̨ęl̨ǫc̨ p̨r̨ǫn̨ę υ̨τ̨į̨n̨ęh̨r̨įɔ̨n̨ ęm̨įc̨ ęt̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ 25 s̨ę ęx̨k̨l̨ęąį ǫy̨ǫn̨ n̨į ęx̨c̨ǫb̨ęt̨ę ęt̨r̨ǫ ų ω̨r̨įn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ ęt̨ęv̨ęp̨l̨ęį υ̨r̨ χ̨r̨ąįn̨ 30 n̨įl̨įn̨ęn̨įc̨ t̨[n̨r̨ǫ]γ̨ n̨[n̨]ęt̨r̨y̨p̨ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę ąy̨ ąw̨ n̨ęt̨r̨y̨p̨[ǫt̨ąc̨c̨ę d̨ą n̨į n̨įn̨ęt̨ǫγ̨ǫųx̨ k̨ąl̨į̨g̨ąr̨ q̨ǫd̨ę[. . . . ]q̨ ω̨t̨t̨ n̨įh̨n̨ ǫy̨ ų ę r̨γ̨ų h̨ x̨ę[k̨ą̨λ̨ą . . . ]q̨α̨n̨ǫy̨ǫų[n̨][n̨ǫy̨ ų] [b̨][q̨] [ęv̨ ǫl̨ n̨ęt̨]d̨α̨γ̨p̨l̨ąc̨c̨ę n̨įh̨n̨ ǫy̨ 35 [c̨ǫn̨ ąl̨ą h̨]ę[k̨ą]̨[n̨]ę[k̨ą]̨[n̨]ę[k̨ą]̨[n̨]ę[n̨]ę[n̨]ę[n̨]ę[ęy̨ǫ]̨
60 (= Plate 108)

1 [...] her children are many. That which
   the father has belongs to the son, and he
   himself, the son, as long as he is little
   he is not entrusted with those (things) that are his. Then,
5 when he becomes a man, his father gives him
   everything that belongs to him.72 Those who go astray, whom
   the Spirit begets, they also go astray
   because of it. Therefore, by means of that single Spirit
   the fire is kindled and extinguished.

10 Echamothis one thing and
   Echmothisanother. Echamothis simply Wisdom,
   but Echmothis the wisdom of death, that
   is, the wisdom (of death, that is,) which
   knows death, this which is called
15 the little wisdom. There are animals
   that are subordinate to man, like the calf
   and the donkey and others of this sort.
   There are others that are not subordinate,
   living alone in the deserts. Man ploughs
20 the field by means of the subordinate animals
   and from this he nourishes himself and
   the animals, whether those that are subordinate, or those that are
   not subordinate. Thus it is with the perfect
   man. He ploughs by means of powers that are subordinate,
25 preparing for everyone
   to come into being. For it is because of this that everything
   stands, whether the good or the evil,
   and the right and the left. The Holy Spirit
   shepherds everyone, and it rules
30 [all] the powers that are subordinate
   and those that are [not subordinate] and those that are alone.
   For truly he/it [...] imprisons them
   [so that [...] want to, they will not be able
   to [leave. He who has been] moulded
35 [is beautiful, but] you would find his children being

61 (= Plate 109)

1 ἡπλάσαν Ἰεγήνες εὐαχρεποῦρ ἀπάσε ἴνος ἀλλὰ ἄχρον ἄκρω τῇ ἀπευδερῆ εὐχ Ἰεγήνες τῇ ηὐ ἄμε ἀπάσε ἴνος ἄχρον ἄμο
5 Ἰεγήνεια πε προὶ ἀφοὶ ἀκτινῖφθεν εἰκ ὀμοὶ Ἰἄνουσας ἔφυβε αὐῳ ἄῳ ἄπο ἀβο ἄιν ἀτινῖφθεοίκτ ἀναφί ἀπο ἰπ ἴφον ἄ πο τοῦτο ἄχρον ἐῴθον Ἐὐακὴρον  ἴ>Note Ἰεγήνες ηὗ Ἰεγήνες ἴ
10 ὡ ἀγηήοῦτ ἦν Ῥεκνων κοινών ἀῃ ἴν ἰταρηκόπε ἐβολ Ῥίγητε ἰ ἴ ἰνογρη Ῥανγίνθεοικτ ἰ πνοῦ ἰ οὔχῃ ἴ οὐ δὲ ἴ Ῥίκδω Ῥ Ῠνανογο οὐχ  ὠυ οὐχ ἐτι
15 ἴ
20 Ἐ ἴν Ῥονή Ῥινήώο Ῥον [ου] Ῥον ἰτελαλ να ἴν ἰ ἰνήκορον ἰ ὴπετετίναις Ῥαν ἓ ἴ
25 ἄ ἄῳ ἄῳ ἐτε ἴνπας ἴ

61 (= Plate 109)

1 noble creations. If he were not
moulded, but begotten, you would
find that his seed was noble. But
now he was moulded and he begot. What
5 nobility is this? First, adultery
happened, and afterwards, murder.73 And
he was begotten in adultery,
for he was the son of the serpent. Therefore he became
a murderer like his father too,74 and
he killed his brother.75 Every communion
that has taken place between those who do not resemble
each other constitutes adultery. God
is a dyer. Like the good dyes
– they are called the true (dyes)—
15 die with those (things) that have been dyed in them,
thus it is with those whom God has dyed.
Since his dyes are immortal, they
become immortal by means of his remedies.
But God dips those whom he dips
in water. It is impossible
for anyone to see any of the ordained (things)
unless he becomes like
them. It is not like it is with the man who is
in the world. He sees the sun while not being sun,
and he sees the sky and the earth and
all the other things while not being
those (things). Thus it is in truth. But you have
seen something of that place, and you have
become those (things). You have seen the Spirit, and you have
have become spirit. You have seen Christ, and you have become
Christ. You have seen the [Father, and you] will become
father. Therefore, [here] you see
everything and you do not [see yourself],
but you see yourself in [that place],
35 for you will [become] that which you see.
Faith receives, love gives. [No one will be able to]

73 Cf. John 8:44.
75 Cf. Gen 4:8.
62 (= Plate 110)

1 [xi] άχιτητικτικ [h]ίλλαγ ύαμι [αυ] άχι
\( \text{agathē eti} \) άχι
τηρητευτευν ομηλ άη \( \text{etnē} \) et \( \text{etnē} \)
εραχουα \( \text{ērakhoua} \) \( \text{ērakhoua} \) άη
5 \( \text{fēlēa} \) ρητητατητατητ ηερητατητ
παυεί \( \text{παυεί} \) \( \text{παυεί} \) άη \( \text{παυεί} \) άη
στολος έτρητηθερι τεσσε \( \text{τεσσε} \)
τε \( \text{te} \) \( \text{te} \) \( \text{te} \) ηερητατατατατητ ηερητατητ
\( \text{ηερητατητ} \) άη \( \text{ηερητατητ} \) άη
10 \( \text{παυεί} \) \( \text{παυεί} \) \( \text{παυεί} \) άη \( \text{παυεί} \) άη
τησ \( \text{τησ} \) \( \text{τησ} \) \( \text{τησ} \) άη \( \text{τησ} \)
\( \text{τησ} \) άη \( \text{τησ} \) άη
15 Ζαρηνος \( \text{Zařenov} \) \( \text{Zařenov} \) \( \text{Zařenov} \)
\( \text{νεταγατητικον} \) \( \text{νεταγατητικον} \) \( \text{νεταγατητικον} \)
\( \text{εραχουα} \) \( \text{etinēθευν} \) \( \text{αλλα} \) ουγιατη
\( \text{εραχουα} \) \( \text{εραχουα} \) \( \text{εραχουα} \)
\( \text{αλλα} \) ουγιατη
\( \text{εραχουα} \) \( \text{εραχουα} \) \( \text{εραχουα} \)
19 \( \text{Layton:} \) \( \text{Layton:} \) \( \text{Layton:} \)
\( \text{ωυγια} \) \( \text{ωυγια} \) \( \text{ωυγια} \)
\( \text{ωυγια} \) \( \text{ωυγια} \) \( \text{ωυγια} \)
21 \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \)
\( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \)
23 \( \text{Schenke:} \) \( \text{Schenke:} \) \( \text{Schenke:} \)
\( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \)
\( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \) \( \text{ιηθενθευν} \)
25 \( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \)
\( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \)
\( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \)
27 \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \)
\( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \) \( \text{εμε} \)
30 \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
33 \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
\( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \) \( \text{Ménard:} \)
35 \( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \)
\( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \) \( \text{Till:} \)
[receive] without faith. No one will be able to give without love. Therefore we believe in order that we may receive, but we give in order that we may love. For if one does not give with love, he does not benefit from that which he has given. He who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still. The apostles who were before us named (him) in this way: “Jesus the Nazarene Messiah,” that is, “Jesus the Nazarene Christ.” The last name is Christ, the first is Jesus, the one in the middle is the Nazarene. Messiah has two meanings, both Christ and “he who is measured.” Jesus in Hebrew is the redemption, Nazara is the truth. The Nazarene, then, is the truth. It was Christ who was measured. It was the Nazarene and Jesus who were measured. If the pearl is thrown down into the mud it does not become more despised, nor will it become precious if it is anointed with balsam, but it is always valuable for its master. Thus it is with the children of God wherever they may be, they are still valuable for their father. If you say, “I am a Jew,” no one will be moved. If you say, “I am a Roman,” no one will be troubled. If you say, “I am a Greek,” “a barbarian,” “a slave,” “[a free,”] no one will be shaken. [If] you [say], “I am a Christian,” the […] will tremble. If only […] of this sort, this one [who […] will not be able to endure [hearing] his name. God is a man-eater.

63 (= Plate 111)


5 ἱκευκός ἱναβασθεὶς ἱνί κευκός ἱβάδε ἱμαγιναί εβολ ἱτῆνκαρτ ἀλλα ἱκευκός ἱναβασθεὶς εγια ὀμοπα παλιν ἱμαγιναοοου ἱτακ ἁπα γα εβολ ἱποπιπ ἱκευκός

10 δε ὑβδε εὐαγιογωπι ἱμαγικο ἱταγιομε γα ὑπιρε ὑπιροε ἐφικτε Ἰγιομε ἤνογ ἴθιο ἱνιοκ εβολ εὐκοομε ἱταργικαλ εβολ αἀρ ερο ὑν εὐρίπινα πινα

15 οὐγεράμεν ὑφον ἱμάγις ἴθο ὑε εβολ ἴω ὑαὐτοκοπτε ε ἀλλα ἴνα ἴταρεώπογε ὁμπε ἐρο ὑν ὑπονα ἐπολι ὑντε καὶν ὑντε ἱτα ὑντο ὑντε ὑψις ἵθ

20 ἀνάλις ἴηαγελός εἶκν αὐτάλαι παιρος ρίς τε εὐχαρίστηα πε ἴδ εγ ὑνοτε γα ερο ἱμντσυρος ἱεφα ρῖσελ ητεπαι ὑε πετπορο εβολ α漼 γα ε ὑετσαργο ὑῖπκοσνος

25 ἀπογεῖς βακ ἐρο[ι] εἰνα ἰγαμα ἰαγει αῇ ὑβεσιονος ἴκρωνα ἀπογειο αἴροτε αἴῳ το ἐρρά ἐγεφι ρηρος ἵθ θεα ἱεταει τε ὑε ἰταμε ἴνος ἱνπισφῃ ἐ ἴη


35 ὑγο ἴἀνκαντ[εκ] [...] ἱνε[...] ἰἀπαζ ἴνος ἱκε[...] [...] ἰκα[...] ἴν[...] ἰκα[...] ἴν[...]
63 (= Plate 111)

1 Therefore man is [sacrificed]
to him. Before man was sacrificed,
animals were sacrificed,
for those to whom they sacrificed were not gods.

5 Glass vessels and pottery vessels
come into being by means of fire,
but if glass vessels
are broken they are remade, for they
came into being by means of a breath,

10 whereas if pottery vessels are broken they are destroyed,
for they came into being without breath. A donkey
turning against a grindstone did a hundred miles
walking. When it was released,
it still found itself in the very same place.

15 There are men who do much
walking and they do not make progress
toward any place. When evening comes
upon them they have neither seen city nor
village nor creation nor nature and

20 power and angel. The wretches
have laboured in vain. The Eucharist is Jesus,
for in Syriac he is called
Pharisatha,77 that is, “the one who is spread out,”
for Jesus came crucifying the world.78

25 The Lord went into Levi’s place of dyeing
and took seventy-two79 colours
and threw them into the vat and brought them out
all white, and said,
"Thus the Son [of

30 the Son] of Man has come [as] a dyer."80 The
wisdom that is called the barren,
she is the [mother of the an]gel[s]81 and [the]
companion of the […] Ma]ry Mag[da]lene
[… loved her]82

35 more than the disciples […] he
kiss[ed] her on her […]
times. The rest of […]

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80 Cf. Mark 9:3.
64 (= Plate 112)

1 [. . .] ερο [. . .] [. . .] ην φελεγα ηυ χε εττεθη κηε ηηκος παραρον τηρι αυ ογηνηβη ηηποκατηπε ην ην λα [πε ελη χε] εττεθη δηε ηηκος αλ
5 ιτεσει ουβαλη ηηνου αειου αειου αει ενεπαλη κηεσηνα ςειςει οου απηα ηυ αι ροταν εραπειουει ει τοτε πετναβολ ηηπαρε ενοηειει αυω πετο υβαλη ηειμανο ρουπακαλ πε
10 χεπενειες ιενμεπικαλυ εν πεταμ απ ειεηετενεμαειει πεταμ οπ ειεηεηεπε ειεαν πικαι ειειεπε ειεαν εαοε λε πιαη ελ ηηνου εν εαοε πραεη λε πιαη ελ εραη πραη
15 χεει αλεηειον εττνορ εροι ετηε λυ καταλευνυη ενυλ νπλεηνη αυω παιει + ηυ ιπλου αυο ηαο αεηη απεεη λε αιυγονε ενυλ νλεηνη ιεεεεη λυνεεηνηιε
20 αυω ανουελη νπλεηνη ιεεεηνη ετρνη ηενυλ αε ιε ιε ιε ιε απονε ενυλ νπλεηνη λε ακα απ ειεηε ιενευε ιενευενε ειει νεηει ειει ειει ιεει ειει ιεεη
25 ετηνε αηεειε αηεειε ετηνε ευ ακει λε ιππηλη ενογαλ ευεηεη ηυ ιηαλ απεεε αηεει ενεεεη ιηυι εαο ιηεει εαο ιηεει εαο ιηεει εαο ιηεει εαο εαο ετηνε ετηνε ενυλ νλεηνη λεει λε εε
30 ετηνε[θ][η] ιηαλ ερεγουα χαηε ρη ουηεεητηριν[η πη] ενεηεηνιεη εηγκ
35 [. . . . . .] πη] αλνς ερεηει εηεηοι [ηιηηιιιι Χ ωιηιιιθιιιι ειηεη [ . . . . . .] ιληηιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιιι}
1 The Saviour answered and said to them: "Why do I not love you like her?" A blind person and a seeing one who are both in the dark are not different from each other. When the light comes, then he who sees will see the light, and he who is blind will remain in the dark.

5 The Lord said, "Blessed is he who is before he came into being, for he who has come into being and he will come into being." The greatness of man is not visible, but it resides in the hidden. Therefore he is master of the animals that are stronger than him, that are great according to the visible and the hidden.

10 And this one gives them the perseverance, but if man separates from them they kill one another and they bite one another and they eat one another because they have not found food. But now they have found food because man has worked the earth. If one goes down to the water and comes up without having received anything and says, "I am a Christian," he has borrowed the name at interest. But if he receives the Holy Spirit he has the gift of the name. He who has received a gift does not have it taken away from him, but he who has borrowed at interest has it extorted from him. Thus it is for us if one comes into being in a mystery. [The] mystery of marriage is great, for it the world would not have come into being. For [the] composition of the world, but the composition [communion] defiled because it has [power]. Its image

83 Cf. Heb 13:8; Rev 1:8; 4:8; 11:17; 16:5.
84 Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.
65 (= Plate 113)

1 eсανον ῥηνουχα[2и η]¢x[ηη]λ ηηη[λ]
2 ἢκαθαρτον ϑηπροούτ ηρητού ου
3 ἦνπρεπον ἤρουοτ ην ηευ ετρηκο
4 ηννει ανθυχη ετρηπολγηγεσεν
5 ρηνουχαξηνα ηεχινε ηεχινον δε
6 ηε ηετηνη ηηηετηρηνουχαξηναν
7 ηρουοτ ηνοι δηπονια ηαι ευεναρτη
8 νηκ ευετικα ϑηυγον ἤρουοτ ην
9 ρο νερετηνιον ϕετινοςον ηε
10 ηακην πενηηπηφιος ηε ηη
11 τηνηποη ου δε χ ε νολ ρηηνη
12 Φεν ηρηκονιοκος ροτηλ ρεφηξερη
13 ηε ηακτοβαν δαν χρηοοτ ευηνοος
14 ουγηπη ρουχαγε δηρηελ εδηαη νηε
15 καεε νηηηη νερεχοροηνον τεηερη
16 ον τρηοοιηε ρηακτοβαν ευγηανναη εγ
17 ουχιε ευηνοος ουληνε ενεσος
18 ρουχηποη νηηος νερηβιαζε νηηος
19 εγοηαγο ρουχοηε ευγηανναη δε
20 απρουοτ ρηνετηζηε ευηνοος ρα
21 τηνηογερνη λαρηεηζοηε ρμαηο κε
22 ρουη ραλρουοτ ουτε λαρηεηζοοτ
23 ρμαηο ερηοη ουπερηηε τεηε τε ηε
24 ερηρηζοκον νηη[λ]γηεοζ ροτηρ ιε
25 καοηηηο ουτη νη[λα]αν λαορητολοηα
26 απαη ερηοη ραη[ρο]ουτ η τηζηε
27 πετηηηηε ενολ ρηηηοκονιο ηεοε
28 τηηοζηαηηε νηηος ετη ηεηεηζηη
29 πηηοοο εογυον[2] ενολ ρεζηηοεο
30 καεηεγυηα νηη[. . .]ή[. . .]ή[. . .]ή[. . .]ήηρηηε
cα ει ρηβις λ . . . . [ε. . .]ε κε ηηζεηε κε
31 πηη[ε]ξηε[. . . .]γε ει ηελε[λ]γηετη
32 ηηηος εεζηδ[τ οηηο]ηε ηευ ηε[ε]ηε ρηη[ε]
33 λαορηζολ ηηη[οε ηηη]ηηηε[ε η[εε]]ηηηε[ε . . . .]
34 τε περε κηζδε[. . . . . . . . .]
35 κε αυμηηηοενε εγ[εο νηηος κε]
36 αηον ερηηετοσ ηοπρ[ε . . . . .]

2ηε]; Schenke: γοπρ[ε ηηοηα].
65 (= Plate 113)

1 is in a [defilement]. [The forms] of the unclean spirits include among them male ones and female ones. The male ones are those that have communion with the souls that are in female form, and the females are those who mix with those that are in male form—as a result of a lack of mingling—and no one will be able to escape being embraced by these if he does not receive a male power and a female one, which is the bridegroom and the bride, and one receives from the symbolical bridal chamber.\(^8\) Whenever the ignorant women see a man dwelling alone they leap upon him and play with him and defile him. Thus also with ignorant men, when they see a beautiful woman dwelling alone they seduce her and force her, wanting to defile her. But if they see the husband and his wife dwelling together, the women are not able to enter in to the husband, nor are the men able to enter in to the woman. Thus if the image and the angel join with each other, neither will anyone be able to dare to go in to the [man] or the woman. He who comes forth from the world and can no longer be detained because he was in the world, it is apparent that he is above the desire of the […] and the fear. He is master over […] he is superior to envy. If […] comes he is detained. [He] is choked, and how will [he] be able to escape the [great powers …] how will he be able to […] There are some who [say,] “We are faithful,” in order that […]

86 Cf. 1 Cor 10:17.
66 (= Plate 114)

1 [unclean spirit] and demon,
   for if they had the Holy Spirit,
   no unclean spirit would join
   with them. Do not fear the flesh nor
5 love it. If you fear it, it will
   master you; if you love it, it will swallow you and paralyse you.
   And he will either come to be in this world or in the
   resurrection or in the places which are in the middle.
   Do not let it happen that I be found in them.
10 There is good in this world
   and there is evil. Its good things
   are not good and its evil things
   are not evil. But there is evil
   after this world that is truly evil,
15 that which is called the middle. It
   is death. When we are in this
   world it is necessary for us to acquire for ourselves the resurrection
   so that when we strip ourselves of the flesh
   we may be found in the rest and not
20 walk in the middle. 87 For many
   go astray on the way. For it is good to leave
   the world before the man
   sins. There are some who neither want to
   nor are able to, but others who
25 if they wanted to there would be no profit for them
   because they did not act. For is it willing that makes
   them sinners? But if they do not want?
   Righteousness will be hidden from them both.
   And it is not the will and it is not the act.
30 An apostolic person saw [in a] vision
   some people imprisoned in a burning house, and
   [being] bound with burning […], being thrown
   […] of the fires […] them in
   […] and they were told
35 […] possible] for them to be saved
   […] they did not want to, and they received
   […] retribution, this which is called

87 Cf. Heb 4:1.
67 (= Plate 115)

1 ἐρυχ ἔχεικακε ἐτ[γιντ ιβ]ολ ἡεχ. [...] ἐβολ ἱοὐγιοού ἱῳὔκαρτ ἵταττ[τ]τ[ι]

2 ἱ坰ίῳι οὁμο εβολ ἱοὐγιοού οὴ ἐοὐκαρτ ἱἰοὔκαρε οὴ ἱτἄποιρε ἵ

3 πνυγιοφι πκαρτ πε πχρεχα πνογ εἰν πε πκαρτ εκῳακε ἀπ ἀπεικαρτ

4 ετειῳτταχυορφι ἀλλα πχεογα ετε(τε)ρ ἰορφι οὐξαβι ετο οὐξοει ενεσωφ

5 ἀῳ εττιτῃτςα ταλνεβα ἱπεει

6 εἰκοκιος ἐκακαργι ἀλλα ἱτεει 2ἰ

7 ἱττυος ἱ在过渡期ι ἡχαττε ἀν ἱκερν

8 ὁ τε οὐγιοχιο ἱκεοπ οὁοπ ἱниюον

9 ρκωα ἱξπο ἱκεοπ ἱχεο ἀλνοεκ

10 ἀτροχιοοο ἱκεοπ ῦτιττρικιαν αἰ

11 τε ταπακατατατασ ἀῳ ἐθεκον ῦτιτηκαν

12 ὁμε ετρεκτωουφ πνυγιοφι νιοι

13 κωα ῦτιτηκαν ὁμε ετρογει 5εουν

14 εταλνεβα ετεται τε ταπακατατατας

15 ὁμε αινεκα ἀν ηνατε ἦηπαν ἤ

16 πειῳ ἱниюορε νιηπιιι έτογιαν

17 ἀλλα ἱχχυοο ῦκ ρχοο ετιουα ἵκνο

18 ὡ γν πκεραε ενειατητ ητοοτγ

19 οὐα δε ξι ἱννυον ἱχνχρεα ἱπεο. [...] ἡηταλατιι ληπεξ[ο]ε τε[ε]ρ ενελλοετο

20 λοκ μογτε ερος χε [το] ηηαι οἡτεγκογ

21 παιε γαρ οὐκετι ου [χρη]ττ[ι]αιοο πε ἀλλαι

22 οὔχος πε αλχυοε[ς]τ[ε]ρ εν σιν ἱниюον

23 ηυστηριον οὐβα [ἱ]τ[ε]σα ἱɲουχρις

24 ἡν ή.chompουχαρ [ἱ]τ[ε]α ηɲουχαετε

25 ηɲουɲουφαιναι [...] ει η [ε]κ άγ

26 χελε ετραιερ [ηɲαπα η]τ[ε]τ η

27 οε ηɲαπα η[τ]ηε αῳ ηɲαπα η[β]οιηλ

28 οε ηɲαπ[α] [α] ιργοη αῳ ετραιοτ]

29 ρογ ρηɲα ετ[ι] νε[ ] η[ ]

30 ειναι ῦττιτητητ[τοο η[ ]

31 ετηξαι ήɲοιη οε[ ]

32 οὔɲοιει ηɲα ηττε [ [...] κεφια]

33 ιοοε λετογιονερ η[α] εβολ [...]
67 (= Plate 115)

1 “the [outer] darkness,”\textsuperscript{88} for it [...].
   It was from water and fire that the soul
   and the spirit came into being. It was from water and
   fire and light that the son of
5 the bridal chamber (came into being). The fire is the chrism, the light
   is the fire. I am not speaking about this fire
   which has no form, but the other one whose
   form is white, which shines beautifully,
   and which bestows beauty. Truth did not come
10 to the world naked, but it came in
   types and images. It (i.e., the world) will not receive it in any other way.
   There is a rebirth and an
   image of rebirth.\textsuperscript{89} It is truly necessary
   to be born again\textsuperscript{90} by means of the image. What is
15 the resurrection and the image? By means of the image
   it is necessary for it to arise. The bridal chamber and the
   image? By means of the image it is necessary for them to enter
   the truth, that is, the restoration.
   It is not only necessary for those who acquire the name of
20 the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,
   but they too have been produced for you. If one does not
   acquire them for himself, the name will also be taken from him.\textsuperscript{91}
   But one receives them in the chrism of the [...] of the power of the cross. The
25 apostles called this “[the] right and the left.”\textsuperscript{92}
   For this one is no longer a [Christian], but
   a Christ. The Lord [did] everything in a
   mystery:\textsuperscript{93} a baptism and a chrismation
   and a Eucharist and a redemption
30 and a bridal chamber. [...] he [said],
   “I have come to make [the below]
   like the [above and the outside]
   like the [inside, and to join]
   them in the place [...]"
35 here through [types ...]
   Those who say, “[...]”
   there is one above [...] they]
   are wrong. [For] that which is revealed

\textsuperscript{88} Matt 8:12; 22:13; 25:30.
\textsuperscript{89} Cf. Titus 3:5.
\textsuperscript{90} Cf. John 3:3, 7.
\textsuperscript{91} Cf. Matt 13:12; Mark 4:25; Luke 8:18.
\textsuperscript{92} Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.
\textsuperscript{93} Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.
68 (= Plate 116)

1 ό π ετήνατ π[ε]το[γ]νώτερ εροι δε 

2 πετυπάδα νητήν αυξ ψτενεόν

3 ψονη νητάπετυπά πε ετήντε η

4 νοη ψναυς γαρ ψνευσκα χεπσά η

5 ψονη αυξ πετυπάδα ψβολ ψηπετήν

6 πςα νυπά νηπα νυλ ετενεάλ αλχο 

7 εις νοητε λαττάκο χεπσάκε ετήντα (ν) 

8 ψολ ψψεφοον ψψεψάλ πεδαγ 

9 χεπάδαν ετεφίπεον πεδαγ δε

10 βοι ερογι ενεκτείνεν ρήγατα

11 ιεπερκο ερακ δηψάλα ανεκβατ 

12 ετρεψαντε ετενεάλ πε πετίςα (ν)

13 ψονη νηποο ππόγι πετίςα προγι

14 δε ψηποο ππόγι πε ππλάρωα η

15 ψηποο ψψεψάκα ρψογι πά

16 ει πε ετούμαχε εροι χεπατύπα δα

17 της ψηποο ξατερη ψηπεκέ αρσοινε

18 ει εβολ εβολ τας ργκετη ρψηπογι

19 βοι ερογι αυξ αυβακ εταν ργκετι

20 ψηποοι εβολ ανε δε ψηπεκέ νεν

21 ταρβακ ερογι αρτύτου εβολ αυξ νεν

22 ταρβακ εβολ αρτύτου ερογι προογ

23 ψερεψαξ [ε]ψα[δ]α νε νηποο προοι

24 ρταρεψαρχ [ερ]ψψ ηπνοο ρκονε πά

25 λαν εραμαβρ[κ]ερ ιερ ργχατη εροι πρ

26 ρογι ναψωπε [π]ληοτε ναποτε ε

27 τβσον πδοορ [α][κ][κ][κ][κ]ηπο ρκοχε

28 ιεπι πψκος [ντ][κ][κ][κ][κ]αρψα ψαρ ηπα

29 ετ[η]ρψαγ [... ] ... [η]τηρχαρψ εβολ ρη

30 πςτ[......... ε]πολ ρτηψιπνογιτε 

31 [.........] [.........] εβ[β]ως ρψεσθησμογιτ [.........]

32 [.........] [.........] οψον αλα νε [.........]

33 [.........] εψον ρτητέλοιον [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] εψαρβ αλα τεει

34 [.........] [.........] [.........] Φεψαρβ τε Φαλψαβιν

35 [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] [.........] Φρίκοοι Φταλψαβιν

is that [...] that which is called "that which is below," and that which is secret is to it that which is above it, for it is good, and they say "within" and "that which is outside" and "that which is outside the outside." Therefore the Lord called perdition, "the outer darkness," and there is nothing outside it. He said, "My Father who is in secret." He said, "Enter into your closet and shut your door behind you and pray to your Father who is in secret," that is, the one who is within them all. But the one who is within them all is the fullness. After it there is none other inside it. This is that of which it is said, "that which is above them." Before Christ, some went out from where they were no longer able to enter and they went to where they were no longer able to leave. But Christ came, and those who entered he brought out and those who went out he brought inside. The days when Eve was [in] Adam, there was no death. When she separated from him, death came into being. Again, when he enters and receives it for himself, no death will take place. "[My] God, my God, why, Lord, [have] you forsaken me? It was on the cross that he said these (words), for it was in that place that he was divided. It was from that which [...] that he was begotten [... from God. The [...] from the dead [...] exist(s), but [...] he/it is perfect [...] of flesh, but this [...] is true flesh [...] is not true, [but [...] image of the true.

95 Matt 6:6.
97 Cf. Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34.
69 (= Plate 117)

1 ἀναπαραστάτως οὐσίαν ἵππηριον οὖ

5 ἱππηριάδος ἀτομὸς καινὸς (ἢ)

9 ἱππηρίας χρώματος καινὸς ἵππηριον

10 εἰς ἄλλος ὁριζόμενον όυτε πάλιν καθὼς

15 ἦπερ κατάφυσα ἄρηποσολογούμενον ποὺ

20 πλεοῦστε εὐνοῦτε ερωτήσατο ἐρωτήσατο

25 ἔμεν ἤπατον ὁ κατὰ τὸν ἱππηριακὸν [κατὰ] ἐν

30 ἄμα ἴναι εὐθυκρίνειαν

35 ἥς ἵππησαν [..... πίκα]

Παυζότας εἰ ἡ οἰκὼν [...... ἐτ]
A bridal chamber does not take place for the animals, nor does it take place for the slaves, nor for defiled women, but it takes place for free men and virgins.

We are born again by means of Holy Spirit, but we are begotten by Christ in the two. We are anointed by the spirit. When we were begotten we were joined. No one will be able to see himself in water or in a mirror without light, nor again will you be able to see in light without water (or) mirror. Therefore it is necessary to baptise in both: in the light and the water, and the light is the chrism. There were three houses of sacrifice in Jerusalem. The one, which is open to the west, is called the Holy. The other one, which is open to the south, is called the Holy of the Holy. The third, which is open to the east, is called the Holy of the Holies, the place where the high priest enters alone. Baptism is the Holy house, [redemption] is the Holy of the Holy. The Holy of the Holies is the bridal chamber. [Baptism] contains the resurrection [in] the redemption, the redemption being in the bridal chamber. But [the] bridal chamber is in that which is higher than [...] you will not find its [...] where [...]

those who pray [...] Jerusalem [...] Jeru-salem [...] Jerusalem, being seen [...] these that are called [the Holies] of the Holies [...] the veil torn [...] bridal chamber except the image [...] which

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98 Cf. Titus 3:5.
99 Cf. John 3:5.
100 Cf. 1 Cor 13:12; 2 Cor 3:18.
101 Cf. John 3:5.
70 (= Plate 118)

πετασκα [περ] ξινπα [πι] εα [πε]
πει [πρη] περομα Γας [ερε][εθ]
ξινπα [ηπτι] [εκβακ] εε[ηπ]

5 πεντάκτου [πι] [πε]κλειον [πο]
οι [πα] παπογα με [ερ] [αι]
με [αι] [ει] [ει]

10 επε [πιρ] εφοο [πε]κλειον
ει [πε] [πε]κλειον πεπα [πα]
ϕοι [πε]πο με [ει]
με [ει]
ϕοι [πε]πο με [ει]
ϕοι [πε]πο με [ει]

15 παλιν πυρτουρυ [ηπια] [αι]
με [αι] περομα [εκ]

20 η [εκ] [α] [α]

25 τε τεκμαλαι ας [φι] [ητε][η]

30 [τικ ..] [γι] . . . [κι τεον πα]

35 [εβολ ..] [πα] δαινης [πα]

[

70.1 Ménard: [σιπ]εα [ηττ[ε] ε[ηπορο]εια [περκατα] [25 ας] . ] read in photographs (see Layton); Till: τεκμαλαι [γι] [α] [γι] [ητε][η]; Ménard: τεκμαλαι [γι] [α] [μ] [η] [ητε][η]

26 Cf. parallel in 70.16–17; Ménard: [Ηηο] [μι] [πι] [πι] [ηπα] [ξινπα] [σε][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα][ει] [σκα]
70 (= Plate 118)

1 [is above]. Therefore its
   veil was rent from above to
   below,\(^{106}\) for it was necessary for some
   from below to go up above.
5 The powers cannot see
   those who have put on the perfect light,
   and they cannot detain them,
   and one shall put on that light in
   the mystery in the union.\(^{107}\) Had the
10 female not separated from the male, she would not have died
   with the male.\(^{108}\) It was his separation
   that became the beginning of death. Therefore
   Christ came so that the separation that
   happened in the beginning might be rectified.
15 Again he will join them both together and to those who
   have died in the separation he will give
   life, and he will join them. And the woman
   joins with her husband in the bridal chamber.
   And those who have joined in the bridal chamber
   will no longer be separated. Therefore Eve
   separated from Adam,\(^{109}\) because it was not
   in the bridal chamber that she joined with him. It was
   from a breath that Adam’s soul came into being.\(^{110}\) Its
   partner was the spirit. That which was given him
20 was his mother. His soul was [taken] and
   he was given [life] in its place.\(^{111}\) When
   he joined […] words that were
   superior to the powers, and they envied him
   […] spirit[ual] partner
25 […] hidden
 […] namely the
 […] themselves
 […] bridal chamber so that
 […] Jesus revealed
30 […] the Jo[r]dan, the
 [fullness of the kingdom] of heaven. He who
 [was begotten] before all things\(^{112}\)

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\(^{106}\) Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.
\(^{107}\) Cf. 1 Cor 10:16; Rev 19:13.
\(^{112}\) Cf. John 1:2.
71 (= Plate 119)

1 was begotten again.\textsuperscript{113} He [who was anointed] first was anointed again.\textsuperscript{114} He who was redeemed redeemed again. Indeed it is fitting to speak of a mystery. The Father of all things\textsuperscript{115} joined
5 with the virgin who came down and a fire illuminated him.\textsuperscript{116} On that day he revealed the great bridal chamber. It was because of this that his body came into being. On that day he came out from the bridal chamber like the one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride. Thus Jesus established everything within himself through these, and it is necessary for each one of the disciples
10 to walk into his rest.\textsuperscript{117} Adam came into being from two virgins, from the spirit and from the virgin earth.\textsuperscript{118} Therefore Christ was born from a virgin, so that he might rectify the fall that happened in the beginning. There are two trees growing in paradise.\textsuperscript{119} One produces [animals], the other produces men. Adam [ate] from the tree that produced animals, [and he became] an animal and he begot [animals]. Therefore the children of Adam worship the [animals]. The tree […] fruit […] this they have […] eat(s)/ate the […] fruit of the […] beget(s)/begot men […] of the man of […]
15
30 God makes man […] men]

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Rom 1:3–4; Heb 1:5; 5:5; Ps 2:7.
\textsuperscript{115} Cf. John 1:1.
\textsuperscript{117} Cf. Heb 3:11, 18; 4:1–11; Gen 2:2–3; Ps 22:2 LXX; 94:11 LXX.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Gen 2:7.
\textsuperscript{119} Cf. Gen 3.
make [God]. Thus in the world men make gods and they worship their creations. It would be appropriate for the gods to worship the men. As is the truth with the works of man, they result from his power. Therefore they are called the acts of power. They are his works. It is from rest that his children come into being. Therefore his power resides in his works, but it is in the children that the rest is manifested. And you will find that this extends to the image. And this one is the man pertaining to the image. It is from his power that he does his works, but it is from rest that he begets his children. In this world the slaves serve the free. In the kingdom of heaven the free will minister to the slaves. The children of the bridal chamber will minister to the children of the [marriage. The] children of the bridal chamber have a [single] name, Rest. [Being] together they do not need to take form, [since they have] contemplation [...] they are many [...] among those who are in the [...] the glories of the [...] not [...] them [...] go down to the [water [...] he will redeem him/himself [...] namely those who have [...] in his name, for he said: ["Thus] we will fulfill

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120 Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
121 Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
73 (= Plate 121)

1 οσχονη ηνη δέκαον ανος ξεσενα
ηου νιοορη αυδ σελκτουοην [ŋ]σε
ριπλαναιπε εγτταξι νιοορη ιταινα
σταις εγοηρ εγτανουη σεναιχια
5 αυ δι ταει τε θε ον ειχωδ ανος ε
πλαττεαο ειχωδ ανος ξεουνηος
πε πλαττεαο ξειγαιακαητη σενα
ωηη φιλιπος παπωτολος πε
αυη χειευση πρανηε διηταει η
10 νοηπαρδειος κτενιξερειν αρη
ωε εροεο ετετεκην ηιονη πεν
ταρταεο ηιπταερος εβολ ριης
αηη ιηταετοου αυδ πενορος νεη
οωε απεηατκτοου νεηεοηος πε
15 υης διηταεις δε πε πεςοος αλλα πιεη(η)
υπαηη ριητηηε ιππαρδειοσ
αυδ τηεηηξεητ ιηηαπερεεηα αυδ
πε εβολ ιηνηε εβολ ριηηουη ατα
παηεηεο πεειηκινο ουληκηα
20 αο πε υηηε ηε ετηουην ηηνοου
ρραε ιηρηηε σεηοοογον[γ] ηιοου ον ταηηεει
α ουληηηηε ηε ετηεεηεηι ειλαδαυ
ριηηεηηναο ριη[ιε] ηηηοου ιηιαει
ει εβολ ριηπηα ε[ηε] αυδ ακει
25 υε ιηρηηηοαη εβολ ειηαη αυδ αεη
τηηουην αη[ηεη] ηηα[ενπν](ηη) αη[κααη]
ιηηνηουηο αηη[ηεηντε .] δη ηο[ηεραπα]
δειςος αηηρ[ηε . . . . . . παρηα]
δειςος αηηηη[ . . . . . . ηο]
30 οη νηηηηη[ . . . . . . . . .]  
ιηηηηγηη[ηη] [. . . . . . . . .]
νε νεηηηηη[ηη . . . . . . . ηε]
ηηουηηερ[ηε . . . . . . . ηε]
τηηουηηνοιη ηηει ηε[ . . . . ουεη]
35 ινηηει ηηηηνηουη[ηι[πηει . . . . . .]
73 (= Plate 121)

1 every righteousness.”122 Those who say that they shall
die first and (then) they shall arise
are wrong. If they do not first receive the
resurrection while they live, they will receive nothing when they die.

5 Thus also when they speak about
baptism they say that
baptism is a great thing, for if they receive it they will
live. Philip the apostle
said: “Joseph the carpenter planted

10 a garden because he needed
wood for his trade. It was he who
made the cross from the
trees that he planted, and his seed
hung upon that which he planted. His seed was

15 Jesus,123 and the plant was the cross.” But the Tree
of Life is in the middle of the garden,124
and it was from the olive tree that the chrism came,
and from it the
resurrection. This world is a
corpses-eater. All that are eaten
in it also die themselves. Truth
is a life-eater. Therefore no one
among those who nourish on [Truth] will die.
It was from that place that Jesus came, and he

20 brought food from there, and
those who wanted he gave them [to eat, so that]
they might not die.125 [God ... a]
garden, [man ...]
garden, there are [...]
exists with [...] of God in/ among [...] those that/ who are in [it ...]
I wish that [garden ...]
will be said to me: [“... eat]

35 this,” or “do not eat [that,” [...]

122 Matt 3:15.
123 Cf. Rom 1:3; Gal 3:16.
74 (= Plate 122)

1 οὐαυχ παει πνα [e] ἡγογυ δικ νει ἡνα ςογο[ο]ν ὑν αυμοινυ ὅτ τι μεθει ςαυραυ κνουτ αλλα πε 

5 νε πνιονοι ἡπνινοι πε ουμιον 

10 ουαυ ςοβ νιντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντρι

15 πνιονοι διυ πνιονυτει πνε 

20 ημιν ςελτριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντριντρι

25 απνοειν σκο [ς] ἐσρεινα βοι κτιν 

30 [.........] ζ ἐπικτρετε 

35 [.........] 

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74 (= Plate 122)

1 wish. This, the place where I will eat everything, it is there that the Tree of Knowledge is. That one killed Adam, but here the Tree of Knowledge has made man alive.

5 The Law was the tree. It could give knowledge of good and evil. It neither removed him from evil, nor did it place him in the good, but it created death for those who ate from it. For when he said, “eat this, do not eat that,” it became the beginning of death. The chrism is superior to baptism, for from the chrism we were called Christian,

10 not because of baptism, and it was because of the chrism that Christ was named (such). For the Father anointed the Son, and the Son anointed the apostles, and the apostles anointed us. He who has been anointed has everything. He has the resurrection, the light, the cross, the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him this in the bridal chamber. He received, and the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the Father. This is [the kingdom] of heaven.

25 The Lord said [it] well: “Some went to the kingdom of heaven laughing and they came out […] a Christian […] and immediately […] went down] to the water and he came […] everything concerning / because […] it is [a] game, [but … despise] this […] to the kingdom of [heaven …] if he despises […] and if he scorps it as a game […] out] laughing. Thus also

75 (= Plate 123)

1 ρικοεκ ἰηιπο[τ]ηηιον ἰηιπαρ
καὶ οὐγκοῦγα εὐχοε ιπιει αὐ κοσι κακε παπε παπερατίτωνα
πεντάρστενοι γαρ ἰηιπονος ἤτα
5 ἰηιον εὐο Ἰηττατκο αὐο ἰηιπονος
ἀρε εβολ αὐο ἦπενηετε αὐελπε
ἰηιποον γαρ αὐ ἰηιπτηιταττεκο
ἵπκοσιος αὐο ἰηιποοον αὐι ιηε
τηιτατκο ἰηπενταρστιένος
10 ἰος αὐοο γαρ αὐ ἰηιπτηιταττα
κο ιηιρβηνε αλλα ιηιηρε αὐο ἦ
ογαυ ιηαξι ηογηιτατκο ειητί
cακε ιηιηρε πετεηνον δε ἰηιον
ἑξι ποσω ἡαλλον ραατ αὐι ποτη
15 ἱοι ιηιπιλι οὐγητάρ ἰηι ιηιον ογ
ἄτα ροου εὐκη ἐρραί ετπνος η
πεσοι ετογηɣεναρτετε εηοιν αγ
ω ρνογρ εβολ ρηπηϊα ετογαλ αγ
ω παπτελεος τηρῃ ῥρωνε πε ποτη(η)
20 εναγαςω ἰηπει ηηαξι ναη ἰηττε
λεος ῥρωνε πηοου εηοην ουσανα
πε αῳε ετηρπηκανοι ἦπαονε ετοην
ετεπαει εεηε εηυηκ επητη εηνο
ογ οηαρκαη Αῃγη οηηα ηηαη-ηηη
25 ριαγν ραηεντατο πηηενγτηο αγ
ρανε ραηεντερανη νηηογητε
ωραηενηνηνη ηεη ηε ρη[πατ]
∷ελεετ ηηηη[κεωη]∷εηε ηξη[αῳα]
πε εβολ ρηηη[ ...... ] η[ ...... ]
30 ηε ηηιογηαι η[ .......... ]
eβολ ρηηηη[ .......... ]
αηοο αὐο αη[ .......... ]
eβολ ρηηηο[αη[ .......... ]
ηηρηιτααος ακ[ .......... ]
35 ω α耗ογητε αηεηαη[ ...... ]
πηγηος ετηγητη ηηη[ ...... ]

75.27 Till, Ménard: ρη[πατ] || 28 Till, Ménard: ῥηητ[κεωη]∷εη || 29 Till, Ménard:
ρηηη[καο ηοηεηγοη] || 30 Till, Ménard: ηεηιογηαι η[οοη η εηαηηκηε] || 31
Till, Ménard: ρηηηη[καηη ηοηεη εηεοηος]; Schenke: ρηηηη[καηη ........... ] || 32 Till,
Ménard: αη[ηον ηοηον αηεηηκηε]; || 33 Till: ρηηηο[αη ηηεπηηηκηε]; Ménard:
ρηηηο[αη ηηεπηηηκηε]; || 34 Ménard: ηξη; Schenke: ακ[εηηος οηος ηξη] || 35 Till:
αηεηαη[ ...... ηξη]; Ménard: αηεηαη[ ...... ηξη]; Schenke: αηεηαη[καης ηξη] ||
36 Till, Ménard: ηηη[πηη ηεηηραλ]; Schenke: ηηη[εηεκηκηε].
75 (= Plate 123)

with the bread and the cup and the oil,
even though there is one that is superior to these. The
world came into being from a transgression,
for he who made it wanted to
make himself imperishable and immortal.
He perished and he did not obtain what he hoped for,
for the world was not
imperishable, and the one who
created the world was not imperishable.

For things are not imperishable,
but (only) children. And no
thing will be able to receive imperishability without
becoming a child. But he who is unable
to receive, how much more shall he be unable to give? The
cup of prayer contains wine and
and it contains water,\(^{129}\) for it is laid down as the type of
the blood over which thanks is given.\(^{130}\) And
it fills with the Holy Spirit\(^{131}\) and
it is that of the completely perfect man.
Whenever we drink this we will receive the
perfect man. The living water is a body.\(^{132}\)
It is necessary for us to put on the living man.
Therefore, coming down to the
water he strips himself naked so that he may put
that one on. A horse begets a horse, a
human begets human, a god
begets god. Thus it is with [the]
bride[ groom] and brides [too]. They
[come into being] from the […]

\[^{130}\text{Cf. 1 Cor 10:16.}\]
\[^{131}\text{Cf. 1 John 5:8.}\]
\[^{132}\text{Cf. Heb 10:5.}\]
76 (= Plate 124)

1 άξων πάλαινειοι ἱράνε ἄξων ποιμὴν ἤπατε ἄξων πετεράν ἤπατε ἄξων ἤπατε

2 με πεισθεὶν οἱ πάλαινειοι οἱ ποιμὴν οἱ πετεράν οἱ πετεράν

3 ἐτούχον οἱ παντελείρι οἱ ποιμὴν

4 φοιν εἰργώθη ὁ οἴον οἱ πάλαινειοι κοινοὶ οἱ εἰργώθη ὁ οἴον οἱ εἰργώθη ὁ οἴον

5 οὗτοι γεράνεν παν ἐτούχον εἰργώθη

6 σωματικὸν κεους πε πεινε ἄξων

7 τῷ εἰκούτε δό ἐρούν ἰενεβράν οὐγνηί

8 κοου θε δό ἐρούν εὐδοκεῖ παρὰν

9 νιν εἰργώτων ἱράν άξων σε

10 χοοε ἐνδοκάρε παν γαρ εἰργώτων ἱράν εὐροινείν οἱ

11 ἴνωοι τιροῦ δοῦεν οὗν εὐτίκεινε

12 ύνοοι σαναρεπολαγεί ἄν ἰεντε

13 οὐχταγες νεταρςει ὅ ἐρούν σανα

14 ἰραπολαγεί ύνοοι οὐν νοον πρόθεν

15 ἴτελειος σαναρανταγεί ἄν ύνοι

16 ἀλλα σαναρανταγεί ὕρον ἄν εὐγκανα

17 γαρ ἐροῦν σαναρανταγείν ύνοιν ἰκερίτεν

18 ύνοια ἱαρχίνοι ναχ ἴτελειος εἰ

19 νιν νιν ἱαρχίνοι ναχ ἴτελειον νοοεῖν

20 ἵνωοι νιν ἱαρχίνοι ναχ ἴτελειον οὐο

21 σεπν ἵνωοι νιν ἱαρχίνοι ναχ ἴτελειον οὐο

22 [.................] πεινε πε ἴτελεον(ν)

23 [.................] ἐτριῳονε ἵ

24 [.................] ὁς εἴη πετεράν ε

25 [.................] πετεράς χαπτηράν

26 [.................] ἰενεβράν χιαρό癃

27 [.................] ναι εἰκούτε ἀλλα φιά

28 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

29 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

30 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

31 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

32 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

33 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

34 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

35 [.................] τε ζώνης χαρὰς αγχάκ χεβάλ

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and the true man and the Son
of Man and the seed of the Son of
Man. This true race is
renowned in the world. These are the places
where the children of the
bridal chamber\textsuperscript{133} dwell. In this world
the union is male and female, the place of power and
weakness. In the aeon the likeness of the union is another one,
but we refer to them with these names. But there are
others that are superior to every
name that is named and they are
superior to the strong. For where there is strength
there are those that are
stronger. Those are not this
and the other, but they are both this one
single (entity). It is this which will not be able to come down
upon the fleshly heart. Is it not necessary
for everyone who has everything
to know themselves completely? Some who do not know
themselves will have no benefit from what
they have, but those who have gotten to know themselves will
benefit from them. Not only
will they not be able to detain the perfect man,
but they will not be able to see him. For if they see
him they will detain him.
No one will be able to acquire for himself this grace in another way
[except by] putting on the perfect light
[and] himself becoming perfect
[light. He who has put it on] himself will go
\[\ldots\] this is the perfect
[\ldots] for us to become
[\ldots] before we came to
[\ldots] he who will receive everything
[\ldots] these places, he will be able to
[\ldots] that place, but he will
[\ldots the] middle as incomplete.
\textsuperscript{133} Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
Only Jesus knows the end of this one.
The holy man is completely holy, including
his body. For if he takes the
bread he will make it holy, or the cup
or all the other things that he takes and
purifies. And how will he not purify
the body too? As Jesus perfected
the water of baptism, thus he
poured out death. Therefore we go
down into the water, but we do not go
down into death, so that we may not be poured
out in the spirit of the world.
Whenever it blows the winter comes.
Whenever the Holy Spirit blows
the summer comes. He who has
knowledge of the truth is a free man,
and the free man does not sin.
For “he who sins is a slave to sin.”
Truth is the mother, but knowledge
is the mingling. Those to whom it is not given to sin
are called “free” by the world.
The knowledge of the truth
makes these to whom it is not given to sin arrogant,
that is, they are made free,
and it elevates them over everything, but love
edifies. And he who has been made free
through knowledge is a slave because of
love for those who have not yet been able to take up [the]
freedom of knowledge, [but] knowledge
makes them capable [to]
become free. Love [...] anything that it [is] its [...] is its, it does not [say that, ...]
or this is mine [...] are yours. Spiritual love
is wine and fragrance.

134 Cf. 1 Cor 11:23–25.
135 John 8:34.
136 Cf. 1 Cor 8:1. Cf. also 1 Cor 13:1–13.
78 (= Plate 126)

1 ΜΟΣ ΤΗΡΟΥ ΝΩΝΕΤΝΑΤΟΡΩΥ ΝΙΟΝ
2 ΚΕΡΑΠΟΛΑΧΗ ΠΑΟΥ ΝΩΝΕΤΝΑΤΡΑΠΟΥ
3 ΝΠΟΥΒΟΛ ΠΑΟΥ ΕΥΑΕΡΑΠΟΥ ΝΩΝΕΤ
4 ΤΟΥΣ ΝΕΤΤΑΡ ΠΟΝΟΠΕ ΕΥΑΡΑΛΟ ΕΤΟΥ
5 ΑΟΥΣ ΝΟΣΒΑΚ ΑΡΑΠΗΝ ΕΣΕΤΟΡΣ ΑΝ
6 ΝΟΝΟΡ ΕΥΑΕΡ ΕΡΑΠΟΥ ΝΠΟΥΒΟΛ ΑΚΑΥ
7 ΟΝ ΡΗΠΟΥΟΥΛΑΣ ΠΕΔΝΑΡΤΗΝΣ
8 ΥΓΕΠΑΛΑΝΣ ΑΝ ΑΠΕΤΟΟΟΟΕ ΕΙ ΝΙ
9 ΝΠΙ ΡΙΝΕΡ ΚΕΛΛΑΥ ΑΝ ΠΕ ΕΙ ΝΙΝΤ Α
10 ΠΟΟΘΙ ΑΥΑΙ ΑΡΕΒΑΙΓΕΓΕ ΝΙΠΑΝΗΓ
11 ΤΑΓΑΙΝ ΓΑΡ ΡΩΒΙ ΝΟΥΝΝΗΓΓΕ ΝΙΟ
12 ΒΕ ΠΕΤΕΤΡΓΗ ΝΕ ΝΙΟΝ ΝΕΤΝΑΧ
13 ΧΡΟΟΥ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΝΙΟΝ ΕΥΑΝΠΑ ΠΕΣ
14 ΓΕΙΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΝΙΝΕΓΚΑΙΕ ΕΥΑΝΠΕ ΟΥΛΟ
15 ΕΙΚ ΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΝΙΝΝΟΕΚ ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ
16 ΕΥΑΝΠΕ ΟΥΛΓΡΗΓΗ ΕΓΚΟΤΚ ΝΙΠΕΣ
17 ΓΑΙ ΚΑΓΑΟΥΓΤΟΡ ΕΠΕΖΓΗ ΔΕ ΓΙΝΝΟ
18 ΕΙΚ ΕΥΑΧΡΚΟΝΝΟΝΓΕ ΝΙΝΝΑΙ ΠΕΤ
19 ΚΑΝΑΣΤΑΙ ΑΧΑΣΑΣΤΑΙ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΝΙΝΟ
20 ΕΙΚ ΕΙΩΤΑΙ ΓΕ ΝΕΤΝΩΟΥ ΝΙΠΑΟΝΗ
21 ΡΕ ΝΙΝΟΥΤΕ ΝΙΝΗΡΕΝΝΟΚΟΝΧΟΣ
22 ΑΛΛΑ ΝΙΡΕΝΝΟΕΙΣ ΟΙΝΑ ΝΕΤΝΕΝΑ
23 ΧΡΟΟΥ ΝΟΥΝΠΟΜΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΝΙΠΟΚΟΣ
24 ΝΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΕΥΝΛΑΩΝΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΝΠΙ
25 ΧΟΒΙΣ ΑΡΕΠΡΙΚΟΝΕ ΤΟΥ ΝΙΠΡΟΝΕ
26 ΑΡΕΠΡΟΤΟ ΤΟΥ ΝΙΠΡΟΤΟ ΑΡΕΠΕΙ
27 [Ο ΤΩΡ ΝΙΠΕΝΟ ΝΡΕΝΟΣ ΝΕΩΤΩΡ]
28 [ΝΙΠΟΥΜΑΡΓΗΝΟΣ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΕΑΧ]
29 [ΡΕ ΠΙΝΑ ΤΑΗ ΝΙΠΠΙΝΑ ΑΥΑ ΠΛΟ]
30 [ΓΟΣ] ΑΡΑΚΡΟ [Ο]ΝΠΡ [I] ΕΙ ΝΙΠΛΟΓΟΣ
31 [ΑΥΑ ΠΟ]ΓΟΙΕΙΝ ΑΘΑ ΚΡΙΚΟΝΝΟΕΙ
32 [ΝΙΠΟΥΟΕΙΝ ΕΚ] ΑΡΑΚΡΟΝΕ ΡΙΟΝΕ
33 [ΠΡΟΝ] Ε ΡΕ [ΤΗΝ] ΜΕΡΙΤΚ ΕΚΩΛΑΩΝΕ
34 [ΝΙΠΠΑ] ΠΙΝΑ ΠΕΤΝΑΓΩΤΡΕ ΕΡΟΚ ΕΚ
35 [ΩΝΑ] ΟΝΕ ΙΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΕΤ

78.34 Ménard: ΝΙΠΝΙΝ | 35 Till, Ménard: [ΑΡΑΚΡΟ] ΟΝΕ.
78 (= Plate 126)

1 All those who will anoint themselves with it [benefit from] it. Those who stand near them also benefit, like those who are anointed who stand there. If those who are anointed with ointment leave their side and go, those who are not anointed, who are only standing near them, once again remain in their (own) stench. The Samaritan did not give anything to the wounded man except wine and oil.\footnote{137} It was nothing else except the ointment, and it healed the wounds. For “love covers a multitude of sins.”\footnote{138} He whom the woman loves, it is him that those she will bear resemble. If it is her husband, they resemble her husband. If it is an adulterer, they resemble the adulterer. Often, if a woman sleeps with her husband out of necessity, but her mind is on the adulterer whom she usually has communion with, the one she will bear she bears resembling the adulterer. But you who dwell with the Son of God, do not love the world, but love the Lord, so that those you will bear may not come to resemble the world, but that they may come to resemble the Lord. Man mixes with man, horse mixes with horse, donkey mixes with donkey. The species used to mix [with] their fellow members. Thus spirit mixes with spirit and Logos has communion with Logos [and light has] communion [with light. If you] become man, [it is the man who will] love you. If you become [spirit,] it is the Spirit that will join with you. \footnote{137} Cf. Luke 10:34. \footnote{138} 1 Pet 4:8.
79 (= Plate 127)

1 [Ménard: sχαίνει τοιούτον·] ηού
οιν ποιοίν πεταλοκενόντει
ηφαλυκές έκοικονομένει
γερα να μπορεί να ονομάζει
το πάνο πάνο υπέρ τού θρόνου
2 ενπο ρησιν ηφαλυκές έπτιο
ο πίνακη ηφαλυκές ου ορυγορά
ν εν τούτον ηφαλυκές ονομάζει
το πάνο πάνο τον και τον
3 οφετιο Πενταράθελενα ήπερ
νοτ ηπειρεοειν χρη αγίτωλαν
σώλων έλυμοντε σώλων
ουκετον ηφαλυκές ηφαλυκές
ποιον νομισματο ήλιονος οιωνο
dοιν ηφαλυκές ηφαλυκές
4 ποιον το ηφαλυκές κόσμον
ηφαλυκές ήλιονος ηφαλυκές
ποιον το ηφαλυκές κόσμον
5 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον υπερστηθεντενα
τον και τον και τον και τον
6 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον και τον και τον και τον
7 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον και τον και τον και τον
8 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον και τον και τον και τον
9 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον και τον και τον και τον
10 τον και τον και τον και τον
ποιον τον και τον και τον και τον

79 (= Plate 127)

1 will mix with you. If [you] become
light, it is the light that will have communion
with you. If you become one of those
above, those above will rest
5 upon you. If you become a horse
or donkey or calf or dog or
sheep or another among the animals that are
outside and those that are below,
neither man nor Spirit
10 nor Logos nor light nor those
above nor those inside will be able to love you. They
will not be able to rest within you
and you have no part in them. He
who is a slave against his will, he will be able to become
free. He who has become free by the
grace of his master and has sold
himself into slavery will no longer be able to
become free. The cultivation of the
world is by means of four elements. They gather
20 into the storehouse by means of water
and earth and wind and light.
And God's cultivation is also like this,
by means of four, by means of faith and
hope and love and
25 knowledge. Our earth is the faith. It is in this that we
take root. [And] the [water]
is the hope. [It is] through it [that we]
nourish. The wind is the love. It is through
it that we grow. And the light
30 [is] the knowledge. Through it we [ripen].
Grace is of [four kinds. It is]
earthly, it is [heavenly, . . .]
the heaven of the heaven [. . .]
this one is [blessed], who has not [. . .]

139 Cf. John 1:33.
80 (= Plate 128)

1 nouγγυχ παει πε ιε πακ αυρελα (ι) 
   τα ἡπα τηρ χω υπευηβαρει ξαλαγ 
   ετεπαι ουνακαριος πε παει ιτεει 
   ηνε χεογτελες ορανη πε παει γαρ
5 πλογος χιουη ηινη ερογ χος (c) ηοκ 
   αερεπαι ερατη ποις τηναρκατορ 
   οηου ιπεεινοου ποις ευαξαλαπα 
   σις ηυνοι ηνιν ζετεν νιν ωφε 
   αλ ελλυπει ξαλαγ ειτε ινοι ειτε ιουει
10 η αιτοτος η πιτος ειτα αληαιαπας 
   ηινεττιτον ηινοογ ριεντινονογου 
   ουγυρονε ετουγυνυρε τε εφαν 
   παυςι ιεπτοουν καλας περηε 
   ιεπτινονυγ ιενογ ιινογ ιινη
15 αληαιαπας ινειε (γ) ριγ αλ ινητερι 
   ιοηη ινειο δε ινογ αλλυπει εη 
   τητρυρουση ινογου ηλλα πετοα 
   πε καλας πιεοι αξαλλυπει ιιηο 
   ου ιηνουν αι ειτεερε ηλλα ηουκα
20 κια τε εηπυειε ινοογ πετεγιητα 
   ιιηη ιιηηςιες ηπουηνο ιιπεην 
   ιουγ ιοειε δε εβολ πιηπαι εε 
   ηυπει καλας ουχετζηνηνε ιεηηη 
   ιιηκα ηιν ειτε οηηε ειτε ρηηεοε ειτε
25 τβην ειτε ουγο ειτε ηπ ειτε σογο 
   [ειτε] ξαντ ειτε τηρ ειτε ηορτος ειτε 
   [ . . . ] ειτε αη ηαβονου ουςαβε 
   [δε πιε αη αηεηει ιηττροφιν ιηνου 
   [ηνοηα] ιηωηη[ε] ηει αηεκαρςον γαρ 
30 [ου . . . ] [ου . . . ] ιιηηαοοε δε αηηεκι 
   [ . . . ] γαρουοιν ρηερε αη ιηιηννου 
   [αηιεηεηειο[θε][τε]γαρουοι ρηταρ ρηκορ 
   [τος ινοη][οοοη] αηιεηεκεςες βαρουο 
   [αη ηπιρ α] αηιεβαλανος γαρουο

80.5 Ménard: ροιελκρ || 15 Ménard: ιενει ηι || 27 Ménard: [κεες] ειτε || 30 Till, Ménard: 
[ου ρηςερ ρηηου ιη[ηης]|Schenke: [ου εωκ][αλι] ηοηιιηηιηιιηη || 31 Till, Ménard: [κι γαρουογ 
80 (= Plate 128)

1 a soul. This one is Jesus Christ. He went
everywhere (and met everyone) and he did not burden anyone.
This kind of person is therefore a blessed one,
because he is a perfect man. For
5 the Word tells us concerning this how difficult
it is to sustain. How will we be able to
accomplish this great (thing)? How will he be able to give
rest to everyone? Above all it is not appropriate
to cause anyone grief, whether great or small,
or faithless or faithful, and then give rest
to those who are (already) at rest in the good.
There are some who profit from giving
rest to the one who is well off. He who does
the good cannot give
10 rest to these ones, for (he) does not take on that which
pleases him, but he cannot cause grief, for he
cannot make them become distressed, but he who
becomes well off sometimes causes them grief.
He is not like this, but it is their (own)
badness that causes them grief. He who has
the nature gives joy to the
good, but some
grieve terribly as a result of this. A master of a house acquired
everything, whether child or slave or
cattle or dog or pig or wheat
[or] barley or chaff or hay or
[...] or meat and acorn.
[But he is] wise and he knows the food of each
[one]. He placed bread before the children,
[...] but he placed
[... and (a simple) meal before] the slaves,
and [he threw barley] and chaff and hay before the cattle.
He threw bones before the dogs,
[and] he threw acorns
81 (= Plate 129)

1 Ἰάκωβ θείες ταλε τε ἐν Ἰσραήλ

4 τὴς Ἰννούτης ἑκάστης οὐσαβεὶ πε ἐν

6 μιᾶς ἐπὶ ἑττὴν ἵπποντικὸς Ἰωάν

8 φν ἰδιαίτερης σενάριατά ἐν Ἰ

11 νὸς ἀλλὰ Εὐαγγελισμὸν ἱερολόγον

13 σις Ἰησοῦν Ἰησοῦν ποιήσας Ἰωάν

14 ἵνα ἰεροὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ἤγγιζον ὅπως κος

15 ἡς ἴος Ἰησοῦν ἱππάρχῃ ἵππο

18 ἐιστ ἐνοῦ ἱππάρχῃς ἤρθος Ἰοῦ

21 σορ ὑπο τιμήτω περάσας Ἰοῦ

23 ὑπετάχθη Ἰννούτης εὐθαυσὸν οὐγ(ν)

26 τὰ καὶ ἰναὶ εὐθαυσῶν πεντάρχις ε

28 εὐθαυσῶν πεντάρχις εἰ ἐποτοῦ εὐθαυσῶν ἵππο

30 ἰπτάχθη ὑπετάχθη εὐθαυσῶν πεντάρχις ε

33 καὶ ἵνα ἵππον πεποίησας ἤγαγον τοὺς ἤγαγον τοὺς ἵππους ἠγαγ

35 σοῦ γε ἱππούς Ὑσοῦ ἔτερόντα

81 (Plate 129)

and slops before [the pigs]. Thus the
disciple of God, if he is wise he
understands what it is to be a disciple. The
bodily forms will not deceive
him, but he will look at the condition
of the soul of each one and
speak with him. There are many animals in the
world in human form.
If he knows them, he will throw
acorns to the pigs, but he will throw
barley and chaff and hay to the cattle.
He will throw bones to the dogs, to the slaves
he will give the first (course), and to the children he will give
the complete (banquet). There is the Son of Man,
and there is the son of the
Son of Man. The Lord is the Son of
Man and the son of the Son of
Man is he who creates through the
Son of Man. The Son of Man received
from God the ability to create.
He has the ability to beget. He who has received
the ability to create is a creature. He who has received
(the ability) to beget is a begotten one. He who creates cannot
beget. He who begets can create.
They say that he who creates begets,
but his “offspring” is a creature. [...] 
begotten [...] his children are not, but
they are [...] . He who creates works [openly],
and he himself is [revealed].
He who begets begets in [secret]
and he is hidden [...] 
the image. [Moreover,] he who [creates creates]
openly, but he who begets [begets]
children in secret. No [one will be able to]
know [when the husband]
82 (= Plate 130)

1. Ménard: [passe]; Schenke: [de xi] ∣ ∣ ∣ 30 Till: [ ... ] ... pe[eko]choc; Ménard: [xw hefo]o[en] [i]te[p]kochoc ∣ ∣ 31 Ménard: [ ... ... ey][pi ey]tik dreptou ∣ ∣ 32 Ménard: [euxevey][oyam][eb] ∣ 33 Ménard: [palegin]x.
82 (= Plate 130)

1 and the wife have communion with each other except they alone. For the marriage of the world is a mystery for those who have taken a wife. If the marriage of defilement is secret, how much more is the undefiled marriage a true mystery! It is not fleshly, but pure. It is not of desire, but of the will. It is not of the darkness or the night, but it is of the day and the light. If a marriage is stripped naked it has become fornication, and not only if the bride receives the seed of another man, but even if she comes out of her bedroom and is seen she has fornicated.

20 Let her only be revealed to her father and her mother and the friend of the bridegroom and the children of the bridegroom, these to whom it is given to enter the bridal chamber daily. But let the others desire even to hear her voice and enjoy her ointment, and let them nourish from the crumbs that fall from the table, like the dogs. Bridgrooms and brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to see the bridegroom with the bride unless [he becomes] this. When Abraham [...] for him to see that which he would see, [he] circumcised the flesh of the foreskin, [telling] us that it is necessary to destroy the flesh. [Most (creatures/things)] of [the] world stand and are alive as long as their [insides are hidden]. [When they are revealed], they die, according to the [example] of the visible man. [As long as] the innards of the man are hidden

141 Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.
145 Cf. Gen 17:23–18:2; John 8:56.
146 Cf. Col 2:11.
83 (= Plate 131)

1 ἦςπρῳνε εὐφαγεσθ ἀπεικναστ
cερὶβολ ἤργην θηλνού ἦςπρῳνε
tεῷε ὁν ἦπονε γας ετεῖνουνε
ην ϊαςίωυν ἦςερντ ἑρακτεν
5 νουνε σαλι εβολ αμρεπονην οὐο
ογε ταει τε ὁε ῥιξπο ὁν ετρὴπνο
ηγ ογ ὁνονω ρηετουνοι εβολ
αλλα ριηενη εφηοον γαρ τηνουν
ἡτκακα ῥπι εχοο ευφαγεσθ
10 δε αςβωλ εβολ εὐφαγεσθ
ων λε δε πορκ ἦ
τηνουν ἦππα τηρ ηυκοογε δε κα
τα ἱερος ἱερ ηοιον ἱαρεπογα
πογα ἤργην ἱαρεβαλβε ἱαρογο
15 ρεταζειν υαλβε επιτη επενειτ ηρ(η)
tεκτινουνε εραλε αις δε πορκ ἦ
τηνουν ἦππα τηρ ηυκοογε δε κα
τα ἱερος ἱερ ηοιον ἱαρεπογα
πογα ἤργην ἱαρεβαλβε ἱαρογο
20 νε ἵττκακα ετιπραι ἤργην ηιπορκς
υαγεσθουνε ρηερεθν εσαλωρκ
δε ευφαγεσθ ων ομε δε τη
νο ἵττκοογε ερος εχενουνε 2ρλ[λ]ϊ
ἵργην ογω στεγο εβολ ἵνεκαρ
25 νος εραί ηρηεθεν σο Ἰξοεις ερο(η)
tηνο ηρηελας κς ερικακαρ[τ]ιζε
ἡηον ετρηερε ηετηεογου[ογ αη]
ηετηογου ετεερε ηηοογ [αη ηε]
ηοδε ηειεπογους κς εσαο[εσαο]
30 ον μεν σρενεργει τηηετε[εουγη]
εσαμοο όηευ ηυε[εουγ ηηρογ]
τηηετερεογου [εσ]ηευ όηε[ογ ηε]
ηετουο εβολ ρηεηε[ετερεογου]
ογη ηεγουο αη ογη [εσαμοο η(η)]
35 ογη σεαωολη αη [ . . . . . . ]
the man is alive. When his innards are revealed
they come out of him and the man will die.¹⁴⁷
Thus also with the tree. As long as its root
is hidden, it blossoms and grows. If its
root is revealed the tree
dries up. Thus it is with every offspring in the
world, not only the revealed,
but also the hidden. For as long as the root
of evil is hidden it is strong, but if it is recognised
it has died, and if it is revealed
it has been destroyed. Therefore the Word says,
"Already the axe is laid at the
root of the trees."¹⁴⁸ It will not (simply) cut—that which
will be cut blossoms again—but
the axe burrows down beneath until
it brings out the root. Jesus plucked out
the root completely, but others
partly. As for us, let each
one among us dig down to the
root of the evil that is within him and pluck it out
from its root in his heart. And it will be uprooted
if we are aware of it, but if we
are ignorant of it it takes root
within us and it produces its
fruits in our heart. It rules us
and we are its slaves. It captures
us so that we may do what we do [not] want to.
Those things that we want to do we do [not].¹⁴⁹ [It is]
strong because we have not become aware of it. As long as [it]
[exists] it works. [Ignorance]
is the mother of [all evil].
Ignorance will lead to [death, because]
those things that exist as a result of [ignorance]
neither did exist, nor [do they exist],
nor will they come into being […]

¹⁴⁸ Matt 3:10.
84 (= Plate 132)

1. See Appendix B.

they will be perfected when the whole truth is revealed. For truth, like ignorance, when it is hidden it rests within itself, but if it is revealed and it is recognised it is glorified inasmuch as it prevails against ignorance and error. It makes free. The Word says, "If you know the truth, the truth will make you free."150

Ignorance is a slave, knowledge is freedom. If we know the truth we will find the fruits of truth within us. If we join with it it will receive our fullness. Now we have the visible things of the creation. We say that they are the honoured (and) strong, but the hidden things are the despised (and) weak.151 Thus it is with those (things) that are revealed of the truth: They are weak and despised, but the hidden (things) are the strong and honoured. But the mysteries of truth are revealed as types and images. But the bedroom is hidden. It is the Holy in the Holy. The veil covered at first how God administered the creation,152 but when the veil is rent153 and those of the inside are revealed this house will be left behind [as] a desert,154 or rather, it will be [destroyed],155 but the entire divinity156 will flee [from] these places, not into the Holies [of the] Holies, for it will not be able to mix with the unmixed [light] and the [fault]less fullness, [but] it will come to be under the wings of the cross157 [and under] its arms. This ark will [become their] salvation when the flood

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150 John 8:32.
151 Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.
85 (= Plate 133)

1 ηος ἰννοου ἐναρτε ἐφαί εξαιου ερωυ ερωυ
πάροινες ὀψίνε ὑντφύιν ἱτιήντου
νην ναι εναυοῖν οῦκ ερωυ ερος ε ἐ
πη νυου ἰπκατατέτασχαι ἰνμαρ

5 χιερεύς ετεβεναὶ ἦπενκατατέτας

10 ἀλλα ἤταληνοὺρ ἱττης επιτή αὐχ
πη νην νευος ναν ἱννετήναι νὴπ
τὴ χεκας εναναοκ ερον απνενυ

15 ὑταλανεμεανατερ αλανας νεταλενυ

20 ἀλ ἰντενυαλ ἀγολιν εβολ ἀγω λ
ποιοιτὸν ταρθ ινον ερον ενροσο(ν)

25 ταθ δε ενσαγωλιν εβολ τοτε πογο
ειν ἴππελειον ἱατατε εβολ εις/go (ν)

30 πεπλωστ ἐτυςίανυε τοις [σενα]
νοπκατεποπ[σεναστρ][η . . .]

35 ωψίνε ἰτογομη πκαςτ αψ[άι] . . . .
85 (= Plate 133)

1 of water bears down upon them. If
   some happen to be of the priestly tribe,
   these will be able to enter
   inside the veil with the
5 high priest. Therefore the veil
   was not rent above only, since
   it would have been opened to those above only, nor
   was it rent below only, since
   it would have been revealed to those below
10 only, but it was rent from above to below.\(^{158}\) Those
   above have opened those below for us
   so that we may enter the secret
   of the truth. This truly is that which is honoured,
   which is strong,\(^{159}\) but we will enter there
15 through despised types and weaknesses.
   They are humbled in the presence of the perfect glory.
   There is glory superior to glory,\(^{160}\) there is power superior
   to power. Therefore the perfect was opened
   for us with the secrets of the truth and
20 the Holies of the Holies were uncovered and
   the bedroom has invited us in.\(^{161}\) As long as
   it is hidden, evil is idle, but
   it has not been taken from the midst of the seed of the
   Holy Spirit. They are slaves of wickedness.
25 But whenever it is uncovered, then the
   perfect light will flow out upon
   everyone and all those who are in it will [receive]
   [chrism.] Then the slaves will become free [and]
   the captives will be redeemed. "[Every] plant [which]
30 my father who is in heaven has not planted [will be]
   uprooted."\(^{162}\) Those who have been separated will be joined […]
   will be filled. Everyone who will [enter]
   the bedroom shall ignite their [lamp],\(^{163}\)
   for [it] is like the marriages that are […]
35 happen at night, the fire […]

\(^{158}\) Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.
\(^{159}\) Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.
\(^{160}\) Cf. 2 Cor 3:18.
\(^{161}\) Cf. 1 Thess 2:12; 1 Pet 5:10.
\(^{162}\) Matt 15:13.
86 (= Plate 134)

1 ΗΠΟΥΨΗ ΟΨΧΗΕΨΗ ΗΨΝΥΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΚΕ ΗΨΠΙΓΑΨΗΟΣ ΗΠΟΨ ΟΨΧΑΨΚ ΝΨΒΟΛ ΡΙΨΝΕ ΧΟΟΥ ΗΝΨΟΥΕΙΝ ΗΨΡΕΨΦΟΟΥ ΕΤΨΗΗΑΥ Ν ΠΕΨΟΥΕΙΝ ΡΑΤΤΙ ΕΡΨΑΨΟΓΑ ΟΨΑΝΕ Ν
2 ΨΗΦΡΕ ΗΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨΨPsi
86 (= Plate 134)

1 at night, it is extinguished. But the mysteries
    of that marriage are fulfilled in the
day and the light. That day
or its light does not set. If one becomes
5 a child of the bridal chamber, he will receive the light.
    If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it
in the other place. He who will receive that light
    will not be seen nor can he be detained,
and no one will be able to trouble
10 such a person even while he dwells
    in the world, and, moreover, when he leaves
the world he has already received the truth in
    the images. The world has become the aeons,
for the aeon is for him the fullness,
15 and it is in this way that it appears
to him alone. It is not hidden in the darkness and the
    night, but it is hidden in a perfect day
and a holy light. The Gospel
    according to Philip.

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164 Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.
165 Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.
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